Journal of Genocide Research (2004), 6(2),

June, 229–247

The intervention and prevention of

genocide: Sisyphean or doable?
SAMUEL TOTTEN

Introduction
As is readily apparent from the mass of killing fields that stained the globe
throughout and late into the twentieth century, there is a dire need for an
efficacious system of intervention and prevention. Although far from accom-
plishing the latter goal, progress has been made and there is hope on the horizon.
Such hope though will only become reality if there is the will to act early and
effectively when genocide early warning signals are first detected.

Confronting genocide
Over the course of the past century, many perpetrators of genocide have gone
unfettered in their efforts to exterminate certain groups of people, while attempts
to prevent or halt genocide have been, for the most part, unsuccessful. The terrible
fact is, in more cases than not, when the world community did act, it was after a
particular genocide had already begun; and as a result of that the murdered and
the maimed already numbered in the tens of thousands, if not more.
Indeed, far too little has been done to intervene in ethnic strife and other types
of conflict prior to the outbreak of genocide. Granted, it is not a simple task to
ascertain whether, for example, a civil war is going to creep towards or explode
into a genocidal situation. Furthermore, in light of the plethora of violent conflict
in the world, it is no small task to keep a hand on the pulse of such conflicts in
order to ascertain the likelihood or possibility that any one of them is going to
“go genocidal.” Furthermore, not all extrajudicial killings or massacres of
innocent victims culminate in genocide.
Many (scholars and activists, alike) have argued that in the information age it
should be fairly easy to detect a potentially explosive/genocidal situation in the
making. Such individuals have pointed out that with 24-hour news coverage by
such outlets as CNN, along with the daily coverage of world news by major
newspapers and the Internet, there is ample coverage of the world’s events—all
of which provide windows of opportunity into ascertaining genocidal situations
early on. Furthermore, they argue, the hundreds of non-governmental organiza-

ISSN 1462-3528 print; ISSN 1469-9494 online/04/020229-19  2004 Research Network in Genocide Studies
DOI: 10.1080/1462352042000225967
SAMUEL TOTTEN

tions—those whose focus is human rights, the plight of refugees, famine relief,
and others—that operate across the globe constitute an unofficial and quasi early
warning system. Finally, as some have pointed out, there also exists sophisti-
cated government surveillance (e.g. space-based satellites) systems that provide
around the clock information. Many have argued that with such an abundance of
information sources, organizations, and mechanisms, there should be little
problem in detecting potential genocidal situations. If only that were the case.
First, it must be noted that none of the aforementioned news sources have the
mandate, let alone the means, to monitor, month-in and month-out, the day-to-
day statements, decisions, actions and reactions of human rights violators in
order to ascertain the evolution of—let alone the intentions behind—such
actions. Indeed, time and again, the media—due, in part, to the way information
is gathered—have misinterpreted and misjudged the nature of mass slaughter. In
fact, conflicting reports of the same situation by different media sources,
humanitarian groups and/or government officials have often confused the issue.
The 1994 Rwanda genocide presents a classic example of the aforementioned
situation. In The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda,
Kuperman (2001) reports that

Starting on April 11, [1994,] just four days into the violence, news reports indicated that
fighting in Rwanda had “diminished in intensity.” Three days later it was reported that “a
strange calm reigns in downtown” Kigali … The commander of Belgian peacekeeping in
Rwanda confirmed: “The fighting has died down somewhat, one could say that it has all
but stopped.” As late as April 17, UNAMIR commander [Romeo] Dallaire told the BBC
that except for an isolated pocket in the north, “the rest of the line is essentially quite
quiet.” Only on April 18 did a Belgian radio station question this consensus, explaining that
the decline in reports of violence was because “most foreigners have left, including
journalists.” The exodus of reporters was so extreme that it virtually halted Western press
coverage … For example, France’s Le Monde went silent for four days and Britain’s
Guardian for seven. Ironically, this was just as the killing peaked and spread to Rwanda’s
final two prefectures. Three days into the killing, on April 10, the New York Times quoted
an estimate of 8,000 dead in Kigali by the French humanitarian group Médecins Sans
Frontières and “tens of thousands” by the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC). Three days later, the RPF [Rwandan Patriotic Front] offered its own estimate that
“more than 20, 000” were dead in Kigali. However, during the second week, media
estimates did not rise at all and so failed to approach levels that commonly would be
considered “genocidal” for a country of 8 million people that included 650,000
Tutsi. … Death tolls of 20,000 are not uncommon in civil wars and generally are not
considered genocidal. In order to make a determination of genocide in a specific case, one
has to examine the details of the violence including whether the victims were noncombat-
ants, were killed deliberately (rather than in crossfire), were members of a single group
defined by ascriptive characteristics, and were being targeted exclusively because of their
identity rather than for suspected actions such as supporting government rebels. In the
absence of such details, only a high death estimate would suggest the possibility of
genocide. Accordingly, given the early confusion about the nature of the violence in
Rwanda, a death toll of 20,000 during the first week did not seem to indicate the occurrence
of genocide. (pp 26–27)

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Variations of the above situation have been “played out” time and again
throughout the last century when massacres have been perpetrated. Ascertaining
what and what is not “genocidal” is, obviously, not an exact science. At least not
yet. Yet, there are certain actions that can and should be implemented in order
to better judge whether there is a possibility that a situation is evolving towards
genocide or not. These shall be discussed shortly.
Second, when a major crisis hits a region, television news teams flock to the
area to cover the events, but as soon as the events are no longer “newsworthy”
or a crisis hits another part of the world, such teams are often en route elsewhere.
As a result, television news networks are not likely to be able to gauge whether
a situation is moving towards genocide. Newspaper reportage of major conflicts
is not as “flighty” as television coverage, but even major newspapers’ intensive
coverage of an area has proved inadequate in detecting early signals that
genocide is on the horizon.
Third, while surveillance operations conducted by independent nations are
capable of detecting mass movements of people, piles of bodies, or huge gaps
in the earth that may constitute mass burial grounds, what they detect is often
taking place during the course of a genocide or in the aftermath—again, not
prior to it, when the most people could be saved from extermination. Further-
more, if a neutral nation is not inclined to intervene, it is easy for a government
bureaucrat or higher echelon official to ignore and/or not act upon that which is
detected in reconnaissance photos.
Fourth, although the field personnel of many non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) are often privy, if not outright witnesses, to major human rights
infractions, it is not their job or within the realm of their expertise to track
human right violations or other types of conflict for the purpose of ascertaining
whether a potential genocide is on the horizon. NGO personnel dealing with
famines, the massive movements of refugees, and other major crises, already
have their hands full, often working in far-flung areas under chaotic and
dangerous conditions. Thus, while such individuals and groups can, when
possible, provide critical information regarding major human rights infractions,
their efforts are often bound to be, at best, sporadic and fragmentary.
At one and the same time, it must be noted that in certain cases where the
press and various NGOs only managed to provide fragmented information about
incidents of cataclysmic violence that eventuated in genocide, the information
would have proved invaluable had the reports been conscientiously followed up
and fully investigated by the UN and/or independent governments. The reality,
though, is that many individuals in the UN and officials of independent
governments have cavalierly disregarded or outright dismissed such reports.
Here again, Rwanda provides a classic example. In her hard-hitting book A
People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide, Linda Melvern
(2000), an investigative journalist, reports the following:

In the years immediately before the 1994 genocide … human rights groups [were] gather-
ing information and becoming increasingly active in Rwanda. They reported extensively on

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the Bagogwe massacres in January 1991 and the February 1992 massacre at Bugesera,
describing the involvement of military and local government officials. In some communi-
ties, Tutsi had been repeatedly attacked and the military had distributed arms to civilians
who supported [President] Habyarimana … So bad did the situation in Rwanda become
that, in January 1993, a group of international human rights experts from ten countries
collected testimony from hundreds of people, interviewed witnesses and the families of
victims, and reviewed numerous official documents. In March 1993, a report was published
revealing that in the previous two years those who held power in Rwanda had organized
the killing of a total of 2,000 of its people, all Tutsi … The word genocide was not used
in the report, being considered too highly charged by some of the group’s authors, but a
press release distributed with the report carried the headline: “Genocide and War Crimes
in Rwanda.” … There was little international concern when the human rights report came
out. Only the Belgian government recalled its ambassador from Kigali for consultations,
and the Rwandese ambassador in Brussels was told that Belgium would reconsider its
economic and military aid unless steps were taken to rectify the situation. The French
ambassador dismissed the massacres as rumors. (pp 55–56; italics added)

Similarly, Kuperman (2001) notes that prior to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda:
… death lists containing hundreds of names came to light in the succeeding two years. In
spring 1992, the Belgian embassy in Kigali reported an anonymous allegation of a “secret
headquarters charged with exterminating the Tutsi of Rwanda to resolve definitively … the
ethnic problem in Rwanda and to crush the domestic Hutu opposition.” In March 1993 an
international human rights panel reported that most victims of sporadic massacres in
Rwanda were killed because they were Tutsi. During the first week of December 1993
several ominous indications arose: a Belgian cable reported the Presidential Guard conduct-
ing paramilitary training of youths; a Rwandan journal reported weapons being distributed
to militias; and UNAMIR received an anonymous but credible letter, purportedly from
leading moderate Rwandan army officers, warning of a “Machiavellian plan” to conduct
massacres throughout the country starting in areas of high Tutsi concentration and also
targeting leading opposition politicians. On December 17, the Rwandan press exposed
details of a planned “final solution,” including militia coordination, transportation arrange-
ments, French military aid, and “identification committees” to compile death lists. These
dangers signs were usually conveyed to Brussels within days via cable. (p 102)

A complicating factor in some, if not many, pre-genocidal situations is that

pieces of information and/or warnings may come from unknown parties, and
thus it is difficult to ascertain their validity. One such case occurred during the
period of the Holocaust. As Pauline Jelinek (2001) writes in her article “File:
allies tipped off to genocide in early ’42,” it is now believed that “The West may
have been informed about Nazi Germany’s plans for the Holocaust months
earlier than previously thought. ‘It has been decided to eradicate all the Jews,’
says a newly declassified document believed to have been obtained by British
and American intelligence by March 1942. Previously, historians have judged
that the West didn’t learn until August 1942 that the Holocaust was happening”
(p 4). As to why the British and US governments did nothing in response to such
news, Holocaust historian Richard Breitman answered with a question of his
own: “Why would any British or American official pay particular attention to the

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views of an unknown Chilean diplomat in Prague?” (quoted in Jelinek, 2001,

p 4).
It is also true that when warning after warning of a pending genocide is
reported over a period of months (and even years), those on the receiving end
often begin to dismiss them. Once again, the 1994 Rwandan genocide offers an
instructive example. A US government official, Colonel Tony Marley, the US
State Department’s political-military advisor in the region, asserted that “’We
had heard them cry wolf so many times’ that the new warnings fell on deaf ears”
(quoted in Kuperman, 2001, p 105).
Finally, intelligence-gathering is not as strong as it could or should be when
racial, religious, national, political and ethnic strife that has the potential to
become genocidal is taking place. As a result, early warning signals are either
missed entirely or not pieced together in order to demonstrate that there is a
pattern indicating the likelihood of genocide. There is also the problem in which
one intelligence body neglects, for whatever reason, to share its intelligence with
other parties (including the United Nations).
Ultimately, what is needed is an efficient, effective and highly regarded
system whose express purpose is the prediction of potential genocides—and then
the will by the international community (or at least members of it) to act
immediately and effectively.

Detecting an actual case of genocide early on

Barbara Harff (1993), a political scientist at the US Naval Academy, has argued
that
The UN is in principle structurally capable of dealing with human rights abuses. One
problem lies in the lack of data that allows for accurate predictions that would give
adequate time to deal with impending crises. The establishment of an early warning system
similar to forecasting is indispensable to both prevention and readiness to respond in a
manner that would prevent escalation. Databanks must include background information on
pre-conflict situations. Early warning models need to be tested against real world conflict
scenarios. Although early warning of escalation may not lead necessarily to effective
responses, it makes planning relief and peacekeeping efforts feasible. (p 4)

Such a system must be capable of both detecting and tracking those situations
that have the potential to turn genocidal. To be recognized as a legitimate source
of information, such a system will have to have the imprimatur of the inter-
national community (e.g. United Nations). That said, while it needs to be
supported by the international community, the system, ideally, should be
operated by an independent agency that is not constrained by the whims of the
United Nations—and particularly the UN Security Council. The system must not
only be equipped with the latest and best monitoring, computing, and communi-
cation technology, but be operated by non-political, objective personnel with an
expertise in the operation of early warning systems and early forecasting of
conflict escalation. Ideally, members of the team should, collectively, have an

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expertise in the areas of international law human rights, and genocide. It is a

given, or at least should be, that such a system must be based on the latest and
best knowledge regarding the preconditions of genocide, risk assessment factors
and data risk banks (Gurr, 1998), early warning indicators, and “accelerators”
(e.g. “accelerating events resemble the last stage of a crises before open conflict
occurs”) (Harff, 1998, p 71). Ultimately, such a system needs to be capable of
providing fairly definitive statements regarding situations that have the likeli-
hood of degenerating into genocide.
The significance and value of early warning cannot and should not be
underestimated. As Davies and Gurr (1998) state:

The goal of early warning … is proactive engagement in the earlier stages of potential
conflicts or crises, to prevent or at least alleviate their more destructive expressions. The
chances for successful, cost effective, preventive conflict peace-building and pre-emptive
peacemaking initiatives … are usually more cost-effective strategies than late attempts at
crisis avoidance, containment (peacekeeping) and/or humanitarian assistance (as in Bosnia
or Congo/Zaire). The former requires longer-term risk assessments, but even reliable
short-term early warnings allow for more effective late-stage crisis management, facilitat-
ing advance planning and deployment of supplies and personnel. (p 2; italics added)

Among some of the many situations an early warning system would need to
monitor are: massive human rights violations; extreme nationalism, resulting in
the scape-goating, discrimination and ostracism of certain groups; “the exclusion
of the victim from the universe of obligation” (Fein, 1990, p 5); “pervasive
racialistic ideologies and propaganda [endemic] in the nation-state’s society”
(Porter, 1982, pp 17–18); extreme political strife; internal strife/civil war; state
failure; ethnopolitical conflict (Davies and Gurr, 1998, p 3); food crises (Davies
and Gurr, 1998, p 3); mass exodus of refugees; mass internal displacement of
citizens; “the possibility of retaliation for genocidal acts by kin of the victims of
an earlier genocide” (Porter, 1982, pp 17–18); and a total breaking off of
communication/interaction with other nations, and/or the total closing of borders
by a nation (e.g. such as the Khmer Rouge’s actions in Cambodia in 1975). The
“exclusion of the victim from the universe of obligation” might include, for
example, any of the following: governmental actions that dehumanize and/or
isolate groups of people from the body politic; threats or actions taken to commit
“ethnic cleansing” (as in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s); and television, radio
or newspaper commentary in a country that systematically disparages, maligns
or attempts to ostracize a particular group (e.g. the Nazis’ scurrilous comments
on the radio and newspapers about Jews and others) and/or calls for the removal,
harm or destruction of a particular group of individuals (e.g. broadcasts calling
for the destruction of the Tutsis on the Rwandan government-controlled radio
prior to and during the 1994 Rwandan genocide; and the television commentary
in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s in which both Slobodan Milosevic
and Franjo Tudjman took over the media and used them as propaganda tools to
incite their followers against their declared “enemies”).

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Tentativeness to intervene
As noted earlier, over the past century or so most nations have been extremely
tentative to undertake or even support humanitarian efforts to attempt to prevent
genocide. Among the key factors impacting such tentativeness are: the primacy
of sovereignty, the concept of internal affairs, and realpolitik. Integrally tied to
the latter three factors is the lack of political will.

The issue of sovereignty (and “internal affairs”): a sticking point that is

undergoing a metamorphosis of sorts
Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, state sovereignty has not only been a
“defining principle of interstate relations and a foundation of world order”
(Weiss and Hubert, 2001, p 5), but a notion that most world leaders have—at
least in regard to their own states—perceived as being almost sacrosanct. It is
also true that the concept “lies at the heart of both customary international law
and the United Nations Charter and remains both an essential component of the
maintenance of international peace and security and a defense of weak states
against the strong” (Weiss and Hubert, 2001, p 5). That is the positive side. The
negative side is that over the centuries—through today—many leaders have
interpreted sovereignty to mean that they are allowed to treat their citizens in any
way they wish, and no one—certainly not another nation nor any intergovern-
mental bodies—have the right to interfere with their nation’s “domestic” or
“internal” affairs. As a result, such leaders have tortured, maimed, starved,
enslaved, murdered, and committed genocide at will with the “understanding”
that no one would interfere with their actions. Furthermore, since the establish-
ment of the United Nations in 1948, whenever a nation or group dared to
criticize or threaten to intervene in a situation involving massive human rights
violations (or “internal affairs”), the targeted state, more often than not, cited
Article 2(7) in the United Nations Charter that provides that “nothing contained
in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters
that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require
the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.”
Be that as it may, a whole host of factors have resulted in a weakening of the
“sanctity” of sovereignty—or at least it appears that way today. Among such
factors are the following: the new international human rights regime (e.g. the UN
Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide, as well as others), the end of the Cold War, and the
information age. As Weiss and Hubert (2001) note: “Not only have technology
and communications made borders permeable but the political dimensions of
internal disorder and suffering have also often resulted in greater international
disorder. Consequently, perspectives on the range and role of state sovereignty
have, particularly over the past decade [or so—1990–present], evolved quickly
and substantially” (p 5). Part and parcel of the reasons for this evolution is the
way the international community—or at least significant segments of it—cur-

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rently perceive and interpret the issue of “domestic” or “internal” affairs. More
specifically, the latter note that Article 1(2) of the UN Charter asserts that “All
Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from
membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in
accordance with the present Charter.” They further note that such obligations
require member states to “promote and encourage respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion” (italics added). As Weiss and Hubert (2001) further note: “The Charter
elevates the solution of economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems as
well as human rights, to the international sphere. By definition, these matters
cannot be said to be exclusively domestic, and solutions cannot be located
exclusively within the sovereignty of states. Sovereignty therefore carries with it
primary responsibility for states to protect persons and property and to discharge
the functions of government adequately within their territories” (p 8). What this
means, then, is that those nations that mistreat their citizens—be it through
starvation, torture, massacres, genocide or in other ways that contravene the UN
Declaration of Human Rights—have, for the time being, in a sense, abdicated
their “right” to sovereignty.
On a related note, another major and new challenge to the principle of
sovereignty is:

the broadening interpretation of [that which constitutes a] threat to international peace and
security, [which is] the Charter-enshrined license to override the principle of interven-
tion … Collective efforts by the UN to deal with the internal problems of peace and
security, and gross violations of human rights, including genocide, have therefore run
against the grain of the claim to sovereignty status as set out in the Charter … [This
broadening of the interpretation] actually began during the Cold War with the [UN]
Security Council’s coercive decision in the form of economic sanctions and arms and oil
embargoes against apartheid in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa … An affront to
civilization was packaged as a threat to international peace and security in order to permit
action. (Weiss and Hubert, 2001, p 9; italics added)

Thus, the precedent was set for conducting interventions in the face of
potential and/or actual cases of genocide.
Certainly three other events that point to the shifting perception of sovereignty
are the relatively recent establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR), the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), and the International Criminal Court (ICC). All three bodies, which
were established by the United Nations, have the mandate to arrest and try
individuals suspected of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.
(For an in-depth and outstanding discussion of these and related matters, see
The Responsibility to Protect by the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty, and its supplementary volume that is subtitled “Research,
Bibliography, Background”).

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Garnering the political will to act in order to effectively halt a genocide

Without the willingness of an international body, a group of nations, or, at the
very least, a single nation, to act to prevent a genocide or intervene early on, not
even the most sophisticated and most efficiently operated genocide early warning
system will be of much, if any, use. As Donald Krumm (1998), Humanitarian
Affairs Consultant with the US Committee for Refugees, asserts, what is of
crucial importance is “… urgently engaged early action by governments and
international organizations based on having received warning. Many would
argue that, had warning been matched with decisive action, the disintegration of
the former Yugoslavia and the genocide in Rwanda could have been
averted … [W]hat is missing is the vision and sense of mission to redesign the
international response system to move quickly to prevent or limit the damage
resulting from conflict” (p 248). At the heart of such indecision is the critical
component of political will (or, rather, the lack of political will) by intergovern-
mental bodies such as the United Nations and/or individual nations—including,
of course, the United States, the sole superpower today—to abide by the United
Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide to conscien-
tiously and consistently work to prevent genocide from becoming a reality.
Speaking of the lack of political will and the disastrous results of such,
genocide scholar Helen Fein (1992) has argued that
… a monitoring scheme and an “early warning” system alike depend both on political will
to pay the costs of sanctions, deterrence or intervention, and reliable reports on life integrity
violations and patterns of discrimination; state terror and genocide have been repeated in
part because of the inviolability of perpetrators in the international system, and the lack of
censure or sanctions from other states, regional and international organizations, from
trading partners, patrons and allies. Thus, we must consider not only how to target or move
dangerous states to change but also how to move the movers to act. (pp 50–51; italics
added)
Discussing various factors that complicate the issue of “political will,” Bruce
Jentleson (1998), a professor of public policy and political science at Duke
University, argues that:
Even if early warning is achievable, there remains the problem of mustering the political
will necessary to act. Although the essence of the strategic logic of preventive diplomacy
is to act early, before the problem becomes a crisis, it is often the same lack of a sense of
crisis that makes it more difficult to build the political support necessary for taking early
action. In a traditional realist calculus, such situations have had difficulty passing muster
both because the immediate tends to take priority over the potential, and because many
contemporary ethnic conflicts involve areas which, as the U.S. ambassador to Somalia
candidly put it, are “not a critical piece of real estate for anybody in the post-Cold War
world.” (italics added)
… It is only partially parochial to say that this problem is particularly bad in post-Cold War
American politics. But it is true in two senses. First, although the United States cannot and
should not be expected to act unilaterally or always shoulder the major share of responsi-
bility, U.S. leadership continues to be crucial to concentrated multilateral action. In Bosnia,

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although there was plenty of responsibility to go around, the corollary to the impact that
the United States had, once it finally became serious about playing a lead role, is the
debilitating effect of its earlier halting policies. In Rwanda, despite the historically-based
lead roles of Belgium and France, Adelman and Suhrke (1996) argue that “by acts of
omission, the United States ensured that neither an effective national response nor a
collective UN effort to mitigate the genocide materialized.” (p 73)
… There is also a problem of political will for international institutions. Although the
United Nations has institutional weaknesses that are its own fault and responsibility, it does
also get unfairly blamed for inaction and indecisiveness when the lack of will really resides
with its members. The UN authorities in charge of UNPROFOR [the UN Protection Force]
deserve much of the criticism they received for how they managed the Croatia–Bosnia
peacekeeping mission, but the exceedingly limited mandate UNPROFOR was given from
the start was the doing largely of the key permanent members of the Security Council: the
United States, Britain, France, and Russia. Similarly, in Rwanda, one of UNAMIR’s [the
UN’s Assistance Mission to Rwanda] problems all along was the refusal by the major
powers to provide sufficient financing or mandate. And when the early warning was
sounded about another crisis brewing in Burundi in late 1994 and early 1995, including a
charge by former [US] President Jimmy Carter that the willingness to send troops to Bosnia
but to keep doing very little in Burundi was racist, the most the Security Council mustered
was a resolution for more contingency plans. Nor is this only true of the Security Council.
(pp 306–308)
In the Executive Summary of the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU)
“International Panel of Eminent Personalities (IDEP): report on the 1994
genocide in Rwanda and surrounding events,” which was formed to investigate
the Rwandan genocide and to contribute to the prevention of further conflicts in
the region, it is reported that
The Panel endorsed the finding of the earlier Carlsson Inquiry report that “the U.N.’s
Rwandan failure was systemic and due to a lack of political will.” (p 140; italics added)
The Panel found that “[j]ust about every mistake that could be made was made.” … The
Panel found that the U.N. did not perceive the U.N. Assistance Mission to Rwanda
(UNAMIR) as a particularly difficult mission, and so did not provide UNAMIR with an
adequate force or mandate. The Panel also argued that the U.N. had compromised its
integrity by maintaining “insistent and utterly wrong-headed neutrality regarding the
genocidaires.” (p 140)
The Panel suggested that the U.N. Security Council and Secretariat had paid too much
attention to cease-fire negotiations rather than ending the massacres. … The Panel found
clear evidence that “a small number of major actors,” including Belgium, France, and the
United States, could have directly “prevented, halted, or reduced the slaughter.” (p 140)
… The Panel called for a substantial re-examination of the 1948 Genocide Convention with
attention to, interalia: 1. the definition of genocide; 2. a mechanism to prevent genocide;
and 3. the legal obligation of states when genocide is declared. The Panel also proposed the
institution of a special Rapporteur for the Genocide Convention, within the office of the
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, to provide the U.N. Secretary General and
Security Council with pertinent information concerning situations that are at risk for
genocide. (p 140)

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The question that remains is the following: how is pressure to be applied to

the United Nations and independent nations to act expediently when a potential
genocide is on the horizon? To make any headway at all in addressing the
intervention and prevention of genocide, it is imperative that scholars, policy-
makers, and activists focus their attention on this most complex and contentious
of issues. Among some of the many issues worthy of serious examination are:
(1) way(s) to alter the tentativeness of the political will of the United Nations
and/or independent nations to act, including the application of pressure by the
constituents of such bodies—in the case of the latter, it would be petitions,
letters, and rallies directed at the nation’s leaders by their citizens; (2) ways in
which the general public can be quickly and thoroughly informed of a pending
genocide, and efficiently polled regarding its opinion about whether to intervene
or not; and (3) methods for applying the most effective pressure on the United
Nations and the governments of independent nations to act, sooner rather than
later, to prevent genocide from becoming a reality.
Finally, the few situations where the international community mustered the
political will to act in order to prevent a potential genocide should be analyzed
to assess what can be learned and applied to future pre-genocidal situations.
Among two of the most notable situations are those of the Bahá’í community in
Iran in the 1980s, and East Timor at the close of the twentieth century. (Both are
discussed later herein.)

A strong mandate, a well-trained and well-resourced force, and a speedy

response
Assuming that early warning indicators are acted upon in an expedient fashion
and there is the political will to act (and that is a huge assumption), there is still
the critical need for the intervening bodies to implement an effective effort to
halt the genocide. Anything less than a strong mandate with a well-trained,
well-equipped and adequately sized contingent of personnel working in a timely
manner is bound to be insufficient—if not an abysmal failure.
Time and again, though, in the recent past (e.g. the 1990s), weak mandates
with under-resourced, and/or sorely under-manned, and slowly implemented
operations were sent to Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo—and in every case, the
results were disastrous. As Jentleson (2000) points out, “… While the first
decade of the post-Cold War era did have some preventive successes, it was
more marked (or marred) by missed opportunities. Even in such ‘success’ cases
as Kosovo [1999] and East Timor [1999], whatever may have been achieved was
achieved only after mass killings, only after scores of villages were ravaged,
only after hundreds of thousands were left as refugees. Yes, these conflicts were
stopped from getting worse—but they were already humanitarian tragedies”
(p 5).
As for the 1994 Rwanda genocide, it is now a commonly known fact that
Canadian Major General Romeo Dallaire, the former commander of UNAMIR
force, “… argued forcefully and consistently that the United Nations could have

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halted the genocide had it been willing to commit more troops with authority to
take decisive, preventive action”. Testifying at a trial conducted by the UN
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in February 1998, Dallaire
reported how he had repeatedly requested that the United Nations provide him
with additional troops and enlarge his mandate—and how these requests were
made before Rwandan President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down—but the
requests fell on deaf ears. When he was asked during his testimony if he and his
troops could have possibly halted the genocide, Dallaire stated: “Yes, absolutely.
We had a time frame of two weeks [the first two weeks of the crisis] easily
where we could have made the task of killing much more difficult for these
people”. Continuing, Dallaire stated that
one obvious tactic would have involved preventing Hutus from establishing their network
of roadblocks and barricades that kept Tutsis from fleeing and aided in rounding them up
for massacres. Instead, according to the general, his force was too small, ill-equipped, and
inadequately trained and without legal mandate to intervene. Dallaire said that an effective
force could and should have been assembled and deployed in April 1994, but the United
Nations lacked the political will to do so. (p 176; italics added)

Unlike Rwanda, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not result in an absolute

failure. While the horror in Bosnia-Herzegovina was great and many innocent
people were killed, the international community expended a great deal of effort,
time, and resources in an attempt to temper the conflict and prevent the ongoing
“ethnic cleansing” and bloodshed. And, in fact, great numbers of lives were saved.
However, it is also true that the mission in Bosnia was badly flawed. Roy Gutman
(1996) argues as much in an article entitled “Bosnia: negotiation and retreat”:
The mission in Bosnia was a humiliating exercise in “how not to proceed,” according to
one U.N. ground commander. Even as massive war crimes were being committed, the
superpowers of the U.N. Security Council looked the other way, refusing to take a
consistent position, distorting historical precedent when convenient. Peacekeeping is not
feasible in a raging war, nor is diplomacy, unless it is backed my military force. While U.N.
personnel saved many lives, they also may have prolonged the conflict. (p 187)

Elsewhere in his article, Gutman (1996) discusses the debacle of Srebrenica,

one of the so-called UN “safe areas.” In 1993,
… after Srebrenica came under renewed attack …, the U.N. Security Council, under
pressure by non-aligned states, responded in mid-April by proclaiming the town a “U.N.
safe area.” Three weeks later, the Security Council extended the concept to five other
mostly Muslim cities: Tuzla, Gorazde, Zepa in the east, Bihac in the northwest, and
Sarajevo. In June 1993, it authorized “necessary measures, including the use of force” to
deter bombardment or armed incursion and to ensure the movement of humanitarian aid.
This was classic “mission creep,” with a vague statement of goals and no agreement on
means. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said 34,000 troops would be needed to
police the safe areas, but in the event, U.N. members promised 7,000 and only 3,400 were
finally deployed, according to Human Rights Watch, quoting U.N. observers in the field.
When foreign ministers met in Washington in late May, with diplomacy failed and the U.S.

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government backing off from its “lift and strike option,” they endorsed the plan to protect
“safe areas” as the alternative. But two years later, when Bosnia Serbs conquered
Srebrenica, the “safe area” policy collapsed. All the flaws of the U.N. Mission combined
into a single disaster: the refusal to confront the Bosnian Serbs blocking food deliveries;
the absence of military intelligence; the emphasis on diplomatic process and partition over
the protection of the population; and the failure to implement the Geneva Conventions, or
even to report on violations. (p 201)
The so-called safe area at Srebrenica was overrun on July 11, 1995, as the
outnumbered and Dutch troops watched the Serb forces divide the people within
the safe area into two groups, forcing the oldest people, women and children
onto trucks and buses and removing the thousands of men and boys to secret
locations. Ultimately, approximately 7,000 Muslims were slaughtered, resulting
in the single, largest massacre in Europe since the Holocaust.
In many cases, even when an intervention was agreed upon, extreme efforts
were made by various nations to avoid sending in ground troops. Such a limited
intervention can and has had tragic consequences. For example, in March 1999, a
decision was made by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to use air
power—versus ground troops—aimed at Serb troops accused of violence, re-
pression and “ethnic cleansing” against the ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo.
The controversial NATO air attack lasted for 78 days. As Alex Alvarez (2001)
notes in Governments, Citizens, and Genocide: A Comparative and Interdisci-
plinary Approach, ironically and tragically, “the attacks incited the Serb leader-
ship to speed up the policies of ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians, resulting
in wide-spread massacres and the uprooting and dislocation of the majority of the
population” (pp 139–140). Had troops been on the ground, they may have been
able to prevent the Serbs from carrying out their destructive aims.
Various scholars, non-governmental personnel, and policymakers have raised
the issue of establishing a rapid action force for the express purpose of staving
off and/or intervening during a course of genocide. Such a force, many claim,
should be voluntary in order to avoid, as much as possible, the evasive and
inadequate commitment of troops by individual nations as a result of realpolitik
and a lack of political will. Some have strongly argued that it should be a
volunteer force under the auspices of the United Nations but not the Security
Council, thus removing it from the whims of the UN Security Council. Still
others have suggested that it be established under a special unit within the
UN—a unit whose specialty is the prevention of genocide and which has both
a genocide early warning system at hand and the mandate to act when a genocide
is on the horizon. All have noted that such a force must be well-equipped and
well-trained. As one can imagine, this is a controversial issue, but one that
deserves ample consideration by all concerned parties.

The critical need for a synergy amongst scholars in different fields

Over the past 25 years or so, genocide scholars (as opposed to, for example,
those in such fields as humanitarian intervention, peace studies, conflict resol-

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ution, and international law) have basically focused on nine major concerns
vis-à-vis the intervention and prevention of genocide: (1) defining what genocide
is and is not; (2) examining and delineating the processes of genocide; (3)
analyzing specific genocidal events, including their causes, the individuals and
groups involved (e.g. perpetrators, collaborators, victims, bystanders, rescuers),
the ways in which the genocides are perpetrated, the horrific results, and the
aftermath; (4) analyzing data from genocidal incidents in order to ascertain early
warning signals; (5) developing risk data bases; (6) undertaking incipient work
on the development of genocide early warning systems; (7) delineating and
analyzing the adverse impact of the denial of past genocides; (8) arguing in favor
of trying and punishing perpetrators of genocide, and analyzing the adverse
impact of impunity; and (9) developing and implementing educational efforts at
different levels of (secondary, college and university) schooling and/or within
governmental agencies (including legislative, judicial and executive bodies, as
well as the military).
Among some of the earliest ideas put forth in regard to the intervention and
prevention of genocide are the following: the establishment of a Genocide
Bureau (or genocide early warning system) that would monitor “hot spots”
around the globe that have the potential to explode into genocidal acts (Knight,
1982); a Committee on Genocide that would periodically report on situations
that have the potential to degenerate into genocide and/or actual genocidal
actions (Knight, 1982; Whitaker, 1985; and in 1988, Charny recommended that
such a Committee be “empowered to indict a State against which charges of
genocide were raised” p 25); the convening of mass media professionals to
examine and develop more effective ways of disseminating information about
genocidal acts (Charny, 1982); a specially organized and systematic effort to
collect first-person accounts of targeted groups, relief workers and journalists in
areas where a potential genocide was brewing (Totten, 1991); and the develop-
ment of a World Genocidal Tribunal that would have the authority to try
individuals as well as governments that have committed genocide (Kutner and
Katin, 1984).
Although some of the ideas were spawned as early as 1982, none of them
have been implemented. It is, of course, one thing to conjure up such ideas/con-
cepts, and something altogether different to implement them. The lack of
implementation does no one any good, especially potential victims of genocide.
As important as the aforementioned developments are, they only begin to touch
the proverbial tip of the iceberg in regard to what needs to be done in order to
develop the most effective methods possible to intervene and/or prevent geno-
cides from being perpetrated.
The fact is, an eclectic group of organizations and individuals outside the field
of genocide studies are working on various issues related to the intervention and
prevention of genocide. Unsurprisingly, certain individuals, as will be noted
below, are working on some of the same issues as genocide scholars. Tellingly,
some of research efforts and mechanisms developed outside of genocide studies
are not only more sophisticated in certain ways but further along in addressing

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certain factors that result in genocide and/or that mitigate against early and
effective actions to address potentially genocidal situations. Among some of the
many issues individuals and groups outside of genocide studies are considering
and analyzing, developing, and/or implementing are: international law (accords,
covenants, conventions, treaties); information-gathering and analysis; intelli-
gence sharing; early warning signals; data risk bases; early warning systems;
“confidence building measures” preventive diplomacy, Track I diplomacy, and/
or Track II diplomacy; conflict resolution; conflict prevention; conflict manage-
ment; peacekeeping; diplomatic peacekeeping; peacemaking; peace enforcement;
sanctions (and in certain cases, “smart sanctions” or combinations of sanctions,
as well as the use of “carrots” or inducements); partitioning; temporary protec-
tion measures for refugees fleeing internal and other types of conflict; humani-
tarian intervention; policing efforts (such as regional police forces, constabulary
forces, private security forces); military intervention; and institution building. If
there is to be any hope whatsoever of developing an effective means to intervene
and prevent genocide, genocide scholars and others must undertake a joint effort
to a create a synergism between and amongst the aforementioned efforts. Not to
do so will, almost inevitably, result in an ongoing fragmented and hit and miss
approach to this life and death issue.

The critical need to address the systemic issues that contribute to conflict
and, in certain cases, to genocide
If there is to be any hope of preventing genocide (versus intervening after a
genocide has already begun), then it is crucial for intergovernmental organiza-
tions, non-governmental organizations, individual governments, policymakers,
and scholars to address the underlying root causes of human rights infractions
that often serve as catalysts to mass violence—and, in certain cases, genocide.
In other words, sincere efforts and real progress must be made in undertaking
key structural changes that address those factors underlying violent conflict. Not
to do so is bound to result in situations where the international community is
“condemned” to reacting to grave crises already under way in which hundreds,
thousands and tens of thousands or more may have already been killed.
Among some of the many issues that need to be addressed—and the earlier
the better—are: racism; rabid or racial anti-Semitism; other types of extreme
prejudice and/or discrimination that “marks” a particular group of people as
“other” international and/or national economic policies that exacerbate social
tensions and fuel conflict (including harmful economic inequalities); and scarcity
of resources (land, food, water, energy, etc.) and/or over-population, which, in
turn, exacerbates the former.
Each and every one of these problems is complex, and will require in-depth
study in order to address them in an effective manner. To neglect them entirely,
to address them in a piecemeal fashion, or to attempt to “patch” them with a
band-aid approach is tantamount to inviting genocide to rear its ugly face yet
again.

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Progress and hope on the horizon

Despite all of the bad news, there is good news in that several real advances have
been made in the battle against the perpetration of genocide. Six of the most
notable shall be mentioned herein. First, numerous institutes and think tanks
have been established in various parts of the world whose goals are, in part,
conducting research germane to the issues of intervention and prevention of
genocide. Such organizations are based in such diverse locales as London; New
York City; College Park, Maryland; and Washington, DC.
Second, as Kuper (1985) noted—and as previously mentioned above—one of
the most successful cases of genocide prevention may have involved the effort
to protect the Bahá’í community in Iran in the 1980s. More specifically, “in this
case, there was an immediate protective response by the United Nations. The
explanation for this radical departure from normal U.N. practice is to be found
partly in the somewhat pariah status of Iran …, [b]ut a more important factor
was the role of the Bahá’í International Community in conducting a skillful
campaign, in the nature of an international alert, sharply focused on the United
Nations” (Kuper, 1985, p 163). This case, along with the 1999 intervention in
East Timor, needs to be carefully analyzed in order to ascertain what can be
learned from them and applied to future situations that have the potential to
degenerate into genocide.
Third, in 1993 and 1994 two ad-hoc international courts were established by
the United Nations Security Council to try those indicted for genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and violations of the Geneva Conventions, as they
pertained, respectively, to the violence in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
Both the International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda (ICTR) have been relatively successful (if
lumbering) in bringing successful prosecutions. In September 1998, for example,
the ICTR found Jean-Paul Akayesu, a former town mayor, guilty of the crime
of genocide. This was a historical occasion in that it was the first time an
international court had issued such a verdict for the specific crime of genocide.
Fourth, in June of 1998, a treaty (the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court) established the first International Criminal Court (ICC), “a
permanent body on call to deal with rouge leaders in a systematic way so that
a mastermind of death like the late Pol Pot would not pose a jurisdictional
problem if caught” (Crossette, 1998, p 3). The Statute gives the Court, which
was established by the United Nations under the aegis of the Security Council,
jurisdiction for the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
The Court became operative on July 1, 2002, after a minimum of 60 UN
countries had ratified it. Notable among those refusing to ratify was the United
States—though the establishment of the ICC proceeded without the United
States—which promptly sought, and achieved, an agreement within the UN that
would place US citizens serving in foreign postings outside the Court’s jurisdic-
tion.
Fifth, as previously mentioned, there was the notable international intervention

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in East Timor in 1999. In 1975 Indonesia invaded and annexed East Timor after
Portugal, which had ruled the territory for close to four centuries, suddenly
withdrew. An estimated 200,000 people were murdered during Indonesia’s brutal
24-year rule. In 1999, the territory voted overwhelmingly for independence in a
UN-sponsored referendum. Immediately following the election, the Indonesian
military and pro-Indonesian militia gangs went on a rampage that resulted in an
estimated 1,500 people killed and mass destruction of the territory (e.g. about
70% of East Timor’s buildings were destroyed, telephone exchanges were
wrecked, electrical lines ripped out, and farms burned to the ground). An
estimated 800,000 people were forced into military-controlled camps in Indone-
sian-controlled West Timor. The terror and killings drew international attention,
and pressure was placed on the UN to act by various foreign ministries as well
as human rights organizations such as Amnesty International (the latter of which
issued an urgent alert in September 1999). The killing and destruction only came
to an end once international peacekeepers (who were authorized by the UN
Security Council to use “all necessary measures” against violent militias)
intervened to halt the violence and place East Timor under UN rule on
September 20, 1999, some three weeks after the election. Ultimately, and
notably, Indonesia voluntarily relinquished its claim to the territory. This came
as a relief to the countries taking part in the intervention for though the declared
mission was to rescue civilians, “the unspoken premise was potentially explo-
sive: the international community was effectively coming to the aid of a
separatist movement in a sovereign nation” (King, 1999, p A9). It almost goes
without saying that had the international community not intervened when it did,
many more innocent victims would have been slaughtered—possibly in the tens
of thousands or more.
Sixth, slowly but surely the notion of sovereignty is changing in favor of
intervention in the face of massive human rights violations—and particularly
genocide. In and of itself, this “movement” has the power to radically alter the
tentativeness of individual nations, as well as the United Nations, to intervene in
the domestic affairs of individual states and to possibly, at least in certain ways,
temper the realpolitik and lack of political will that has so often been evident as
individual nations have done all they could to avoid both recognizing genocide
for what it is and from preventing it from engulfing tens and hundreds of
thousands in its maw.

Conclusion
As Rudolph Rummel (2002), a political scientist and a scholar of genocide and
democide studies, has trenchantly noted, “Instead of ‘Never Again,’ the fact of
the matter is that genocide reappeared in the last half of the twentieth century
again, and again, and again” (p 173). He knows of what he speaks. Among some
of the many cases of genocide perpetrated in the post-World War II years are as
follows: the Indonesian massacres of suspected communists (1965–1966); the
Bangladesh genocide (1971); the Burundi genocide (1972); the so-called auto-

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genocide in Cambodia (1975–1979); the Iraqi gassing of the Kurds (late 1980s);
and the aforementioned genocides in Rwanda genocide (1994) and the former
Yugoslavia (1990s).
Almost every time a genocide is perpetrated, politicians, Holocaust and
genocide scholars, human rights activists and various members of the public
decry the horrific situation, and assert that it must not happen again. But it
always does, somewhere else, time and again.
Up to this point in time it seems as if the international community has either
not cared enough to put in the will, time, effort and resources to devise effective
ways to prevent genocide or it has perceived the task as next to impossible.
Though it will be extremely complex, difficult, time-consuming, and costly, it is
not impossible. If humanity truly cares about its fellow human beings, then the
means must be devised, and sooner rather than later, to prevent genocide. It is
a given that the longer it takes to accomplish this task an ever greater number
of victims will fall prey to genocide—again, and again and again.

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