Political Philosophy: Essential Selections

Aristotle(384-322)
Born in Stagira, north of Athens, in the region of Macedon, Aristotle came to the Academy when
he was 17, and stayed for 20 years. Over that time his relationship with Plato evolved from
student to colleague, and while they agreed on many subjects, they also disagreed on many
others. After Plato's death, the Academy was continued by more orthodox Platonists, and
Aristotle returned to Macedon, where he was appointed by King Philip to be tutor to Philip's son
Alexander (who would later be known as Alexander the Great). In 335 he returned to Athens and
started his own school, the Lyceum.
Aristotle wrote on an even wider variety of topics than did Plato, investigating what we would
consider natural science as well as philosophy. His works range from logic to physics to animals
to clouds to ethics. His dialogues are no longer extant, but we have many treatises, used in the
Lyceum, and lecture notes. We excerpt here selections from the treatise on Politics.

From Politics*
1. Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to
some good; for everyone always dets in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all
communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest. of all, and
which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest
good.
Some people think that the gualifications of a statesman, king, householder, and master are the
same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects. For example, the
ruler over a few is called a master; over more, the manager of a household; over a still larger
number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference between a great household and a
small state. The distinction which is made between the king and the statesman is as follows:
When the government is personal, the ruler is a king; when, according to the rules of the political
sciencé, the citizens rule and are ruled in turn; then he is called a statesman.
But all this is a mistake, as will be evident to any one who considers the matter according to the
method which has hitherto guided us. As in other departments of science, so in politics, the
compound should always be resolved into the simple elements or least parts of the whole. We
must therefore look at the elements of which the state is com-posed, in order that we may see in
what the different kinds of rule differ from one an-other, and whether ány scientific result can be
attained about each one of them.

2. He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state of anything else,
will obtain the clearest view of them. In the first place there must be a union of those who cannot
exist without each other; namely, of male and female, that the race may continue (and this is a
union which is formed, not of choice, but because, in common with other animals and with
plants, mankind have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of themselves), and of
natural ruler and subject, that both may be preserved. For that which can foresee by the exercise
of mind is by nature lord and master, and that which can with its body give effect to such
foresight is a subject, and by nature a slave; hence master and slave have the same interest. Now
natüre has distinguished between the female and the slave. For she is not niggardly, like the
smith who fashions the Delphian knife for many uses; she makes each thing for a single use, and
every instrument is best made when intended for one and not for many uses But among
barbarians no distinction is made between women and slaves, /because there is no natural ruler
among them: they ate a community of slaves, male and female: That is why the poets say,—
“It is meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians;”
as if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were by nature one.
Out of these two relationships the first thing to atise is the family, and Hesiod is right when he
says,—
First house and wife and an ox for the plough,”
for the ox is the poor man's slave. The family is the association established by nature for the
supply of men's everyday wants, and the members of it are called by Charondas, "com-panions
of the cupboard," and by Epimenides the Cretan, "companions of the manger" But when several
families are united, and the association aims at something more than the supply of daily needs,
the first society to be formed is the village. And the most natural form of the village appears to
be that of a colony from the family, composed of the children and grandchildren, who are said to
be "suckled with the same milk." And this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally
governed by kings; because the Hellenes were under royal rule before they came together, as the
barbarians still are. Every family is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the colonies of the family
the kingly form of government prevailed because they were of the same blood. As Homer says:
“Each one gives law to his children and to his wives.”

For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times. That is why men say tha the Gods
have a king, because they themselves either are or were in ancient times unde the rule of a king.
For they imagine not only the forms of the Gods but their ways of lit to be like their own.
When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough be nearly or quite
self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the ba needs of life, and continuing
in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, the earlier forms of society are natural, so
is the state, for it is the end of them, and nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when
fully developed, we call its na-ture, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family.
Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the
best.
Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political
animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or
above humanity; he is like the
“Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one”
whom Homer denounces-the natural outcast is forthwith a lover offar; he may be compared to an
isolated piece at draughts.
Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident.
Nature, as we often say, makes hothing in yain, and man is the only animal who has the gift of
speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found
in other animals (for their nature attains to the percep-s tion of pleasure and pain and the
intimation of them to one another, and no further),% the power of speech is intended to set forth
the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a
characteristic of man that he alone has o any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the
like, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.
the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will
be no foot or hand, except homonymously, as we might speak of a stone hand; for when
destroyed the hand will be to better than that. But things are defined by their function and
power; and we ought not to say that they are the same when they no longer have their proper
quality, but only that they are homonymous. The proof that the state is a creation of nature and
prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he
is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need
because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state. A
social instinct is implanted in all men by na-ture, and yet he who first founded the state was the
greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated
from law and justice, he is the worst of all; since arned injustice is the more dangerous, and he is
equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and excellence, which he may use
for the worst ends.
That is why, if he has not'excellence, he is the most unholy and the most savage of ani-mals, and
the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in states; for the administration
of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society....

6. Having determined these questions, we have next to consider whether there is only one form
of government or many, and if many, what they are, and how many, and what are the differences
between them.
A constitution is the arrangement of magistracies in a state, especially of the highest of all. The
government is everywhere sovereign in the state, and the constitution is in fact the government.
For example, in democracies the people are supreme, but in oligarchies, the few; and, therefore,
we say that these two constitutions also are different: and so in other cases.
First, let us consider what is the purpose of a state, and how many forms of rule there are by
which human society is regulated. We have already said, in the first part of this treatise, when
discussing houschold management and the rule of a master, that man is by nature a political
animal. And therefore, men, even when they do not require one another's help, desire to live
together; not but that they are also brought together by their common interests in so far as they
each attain to any measure of well-being. This is certainly the chief end, both of individuals and
of states. And mankind meet together and maintain the political community also for the sake of
mere life (in which there is possibly some noble element so long as the evils of existence do not
greatly overbalance the good). And we all see that men cling to. life even at the cost of endurifig
great misfor-tune, seeming to find in life a natural sweetness and happiness.
There is no difficulty in distinguishing the various kinds of rule; they have been often defined
already in our popular discussions. The rule of a masier, although the slave by nature and the
master by nature have in reality the same interests, is nevertheless exercised primarily with a
view to the interest of the master, but accidentally considers the slave, since, if the slave perish,
the rule of the master perishes with him. On the other hand, the government of a wife and
children and of a household, which we have called household management, is exercised in the
first instance for the good of the governed or for the common good of both parties, but
essentially for the good of the governed, as we see to be the case in medicine; gymnastic, and
the arts in general, which are only accidentally concerned with the good of the artists
themselves. For there is no reason why the trainer may not sometimes practise gymnastics, and
the helmsman is always one of the crew. The trainer or the helmsman considers the good of
those committed to his care. But, when he is one of the persons taken care of, he accidentally
participates in the advantage, for the helmsman is also a sailor, and the trainer becomes one of
those in training. And so in politics: when the state is framed upon the principle of equality and
likeness, the citizens think that they ought to hold office by turns. Formerly, as is natural,
everyone would take his turn of service; and then again, somebody else would look after his
interest, just as he, while in office, had looked after theirs. But nowadays, for the sake of the
advantage which is to be gained from the public rèvenues and from office, men want to be
always in office. One might imagine that the rulers, being sickly, were only kept in health while
they continued in office; in that case we may be sure that they would be hunting after places.
The conclusion is evident: that governments which have a regard to the common interest are
constituted in accordance with strict principles of justice, and are therefore true forms; but those
which regard only the interest of the rulers are all defective and perverted forms, for they are
despotic, whereas a state is a community of freemen.

7. Having determined these points, we have next to consider how many forms of government
there are, and what they are; and in the first place what are the true forms, for when they are
determined the perversions of them will at once be apparent. The words constitution and
government have the same meaning, and the government, which is the supreme authority in
states, must be in the hands of one, or of a few, or of the many. The true forms of government,
therefore, are those in which the one, or the few, or the many, govern with a view to the common
interest; but governments which rule with a view to the -private interest, whether of the one, or
of the few, or of the many, are per versions. For the members of a state, if they are truly citizens,
ought to participate in its advantages. Of forms of government in which one rules, we call that
which regards the common interest, kingship; that in which more than one, but not many, rule,
aristocracy: and it is so called, either because the rulers are the best men, or because they have
at heart the best interests of the state and of the citizens. But when the many administer the
state for the common interest, the government is called by the generic name—a con-stitution.
And there is a reason for this use of language. One man or a few may excel in excellence; but as
the number increases it becomes more difficult for them to atain perfection in every kind of
excellence, though they may in military excellence, for this is found in the masses. Hence in a
constitutional government the fighting-men have the supreme power, and those who possess
arms are the citizens.
Of the above-mentioned forms, the perversions are as follows:— of Kingship, tyranny, of
aristocracy, oligarchy; of constitutional government, democracy. For tyranny is a kind of
monarchy which has in view the interest of the monarch only; oligarchy has in view the interest of
the wealthy, democracy, of the needy. none of them the common good of all.

8. But there are difficulties about these forms of government, and it will therefore be necessary
to state a little more at length the nature of each of them. For he who would make a philosophical
study of the various sciences, and is not only concerned with prac-tice, ought not to overlook or
omit anything, but to set forth the truth in every particu-lar, Tyranny, as I was saying, is monarchy
exercising the rule of a master over the political society; oligarchy is when men of property have
the government in their hands; democ-racy, the opposite, when the indigent, and not the men of
property, are the rulers. And here arises the first of our difficulties, and it relates to the
distinction just drawn. For democracy is said to be the government of the many. But what if the
many are men of property and have the power in their hands? In like manner oligarchy is said to
be the government of the few; but what if the poor are fewer than the rich, and have the power in
their hands because they are stronger? In these cases the distinction which we have drawn
between these different forms of government would no longer hold good.
Suppose, once more, that we add wealth to the few and poverty to the many, and name the
governments accordingly—-an oligarchy is said to be that in which the few and the wealthy, and
a democracy that in which the many and the poor are the rulers-there will still be a difficulty. For,
if the only forms of government are the ones already men-tioned, how shall we describe those
other governments also just mentioned by us, in which the rich are the more numerous and the
poor are the fewer, and both govern in their respective states?
The argument seems to show that, whether in oligarchies or in democracies, the number of the
governing body, whether the greater number, as in a democracy, or the smaller number, as in an
oligarchy, is an accident due to the fact that the rich everywhere are few, and the poor numerous.
But if so, there is a misapprehension of the causes of the difference between them. For the real
difference between democracy and oligarchy is poverty and wealth. Wherever men rule by
reasón of their wealth, whether they be few or many, that is an oligarchy, and where the poor rule
that is a democracy. But in fact, the rich are few and the poor many; for few are well-to-do,
whereas freedom is enjoyed by all, and wealth and freedom are the grounds on which the two
parties claim power in the state.

9. Let us begin by considering the common definitions of oligarchy and democracy, and what is
oligarchical and democratic justice. For all men cling to justice of some kind, but their
conceptions are imperfect and they do not express the whole idea. For exam-ple, justice is
thought by them to be, and is, equality-not, however, for all, but only for equals. And inequality is
thought to be, and is, justice; neither is this for all, but only for unequals. When the persons are
omitted, then men judge erroneously. The reason is that they are passing judgement on
themselves, and most people are bad judges in their own case. And whereas justice implies a
relation to persons as well as to things, and a just distribution, as I have already said in the
Ethics, implies the same ratio between the persons and between the things, they agree about the
equality of the things, but dispute about the equality of the persons, chiefly for the reason which
Flave just given—because they are bad judges in their own affairs; and secondly, because both
the parties to the argument are speaking of a limited and partial justice, but imagine themselves
to be speaking of absolute justice. For the one party, if they are unequal in one respect, for
example wealth, consider themselves to be unequal in all; and the other party, if they are equal in
one respect, for example free birth, consider themselves to be equal in all. But they leave out the
capital point. For if men met and associatediout of regard to wealth only, their share in the state
would be proportioned to their property, and the oligarchical doctrine would then seem to carry
the day. It'would hot be just that he who paid one mina should have the same share of a hundred
minae, whether of the principal or of the profits, as he who paid the remaining ninety-nine. But a
state exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only: if life only were the
object, slaves and brute animals might form a state, but they cannot, for they have no share in
happiness or in a life based on choice. Nor does a state exist for the sake of alliance and security
from injustice, nor yet sake of exchange and mutual intercourse, for then the Tyrrhenians and the
Carthaginians, and all who have commercial treaties with one another, would be the citizens of
one state. True, they have agreements about imports, and engagements that they will do no
wrong to one another, and written articles of alliance. But there are no magistracies common to
the contracting parties; different states have each their own magis-tracies. Nor does one state
take care that the citizens of the other are such as they ought to be, nor see that those who
come under the terms of the treaty do no wrong or wickedness at all, but only that they do no
injustice to one another. Whereas, those who care for good government take into consideration
political excellence and defect. Whence it may be further inferred that excellence must be the
care of a state which is truly so called, and not merely enjoys the name: for without this end the
community becomes a mère alliance which differs only in place from alliances of which the
members live apart; and law is only a convention, "a surety to one another of justice," as the
sophist Lycophron says, and has no real, power to make the citizens good and just.
This is obvious; for suppose distinct places, such as Corinth and Megara, to be brought together
so that their walls touched, still they would not be one city, not even if the citizens had the right
to intermarry, which is one of the rights peculiarly characteristic of states: Again, if men dwelt at
a distance from one another, but not so far off as to have no intercourse, and there were laws
among them that they should not wrong each other in their exchanges, neither would this be a
state. Let us suppose that one man is a carpenter, another a farmer, another a shoemaker, and so
on, and that their number is ten thousand: nevertheless, if they have nothing in common but
exchange, alliance, and the like, that would not constitute a state. Why is this? Surely not
because they are at a distance from one another; for even supposing that such a community
were to meet in one place, but that each man had a house of his own, which was in a manner his
state, and that they made alliance with one another, but only against evil-doers; still an accurate
thinker would not deem this to be a state, if their intercourse with one another was of the same
character after as before their union. It is clear then that a state is not a mere society, having a
common place, established for the prevention of mutual crime and for the sake of exchange.
These are conditions without which a state cannot exist; but all of them together do not
constitute a state, which is a community of families and aggregations of families in well-being,
for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life. Such a community can only be established among
those who live in the same place and intermarry.
Hence there arise in cities family connexions, brotherhoods, common sacrifices, amusements
which draw men together. But these ate created by friendship, for to choose to live together is
friendship. The end of the state is the good life, and these are the means towards it. And the
state is the union of families and villages in a perfect and self-sufficing life, by which we mean a
happy and honorable life.
Our conclusion, then, is that political society exists for the sake of noble actions, and not of living
together. Hence they who contribute most to such a society have a greater share in it than those
who have the same or a greater freedom or noblity of birth but are inferior to them in political
excellence; or than those who exceed them in wealth but are surpassed by them in excellence,
From what has been said it will be clearly seen that all the partisans of different forms of
government speak of a part of justice only.

10. There is also a doubt as to what is to be the supreme power in the state:-Is it the multitude?
Or the wealthy? Or the good? Or the one best man? Or a tyrant? Any of these altérnatives seems
to involve disagreeable consequences. If the poor, for example, because they are more in
number, divide among themselves the property of the rich-is not this unjust? No, by heaven (will
be the reply), for the supreme authority justly willed it. But if this is not extreme injustice, what
is? Again, when in the first division all has been taken, and the majority divide anew the property
of the minority, is it not evident, if this goes on, that they will ruin the state? Yet surely,
excellence is not the ruin of those who possess it, nor is justice destructive of a state; and
therefore this law of confiscation clearly cannot be just. If it were, all the acts of a tyrant must of
necessity be just; for he only coerces other men by superior power, just as the multitude coerce
the rich. But is it just then that the few and the wealthy should be the rulers? And what if they, in
like man-ner, rob and plunder the people-is this just? If so, the other case will likewise be just.
But there can be no doubt that all these things are wrong and unjust.
Then ought the good to rule and have supreme power? But in that case everybody else, being
excluded from power, will be dishonored. For the offices of a state are posts of honor; and if one
set of men always hold them, the rest must be deprived of them.
Then will it be well that the one best man should rule? That is still more oligarchical, for the
number of those who are dishonored is thereby increased. Someone may say that it is bad in any
case for a man, subject as he is to all the accidents of human passion, to have the supreme
power, rather than the lax. But what if the law itself be democratic of oligarchical, how will that
help us out of our difficulties? Not at all; the same conse quences will follow.

11. Most of these questions may be reserved for another occasion. The principle that the
multitude ought to be in power rather than the few best might leem to be solved and to contain
some difficulty and perhaps even truth. For the many offom each individ-wa is not a good man,
when they meet together may be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but
collectively, just as a feast to which hamly contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a
single purse. For each individual among the many has a share of excellence and practical
wisdom, and when they meet together, just as they become in a manner one man, who has many
feet, and hands, and senses, so too with regard to their character and thought. Hence the many
are better judges than a single man of music and poetry; for some understand one part, and
some another, and among them they understand the whole. There is a similat combination of
qualities in good men, who differ from any individual of the many, as the beautiful are said to
differ from those who are not beautiful, and works of art from realities, because in them the
scattered elements are combined, although, if taken separately, the eye of one person or some
other feature in another person would be fairer than in the picture. Whether this principle can
apply to every democracy, and to all bodies of men, is not clear. Or rather, by heaven, in some
cases it is impossible to apply, for the argument would equally hold about brutes; and wherein, it
will be asked, do some men differ from brutes? But there may be bodies of men about whom our
statement is nevertheless true. And if so, the difficulty which has been already raised, and also
another which is akin to it-viz, what power should be as. signed to the mass of freemen and
citizens, who are not rich and have no personal merit-are both solved. There is still a danger in
allowing them to share the great offices of state, for their folly will lead them into error, and their
dishonesty into crime. But there is a danger also in not letting them share, for a state in which
many poor men are excluded from office will necessarily be full of enemies. The only way of
escape is to assign to them some deliberative and judicial functions. For this reason Solon and
certain other
"legislators give them, the power of electing to offices, and of calling the magistrates to ac-
count, but they do not allow them to hold office singly. When they meet together their
perceptions are quite good enough, and combined with the better class they are useful to the
state (just as impure food when mixed with what is pure sometimes makes the entire mass more
wholesome than a small quantity of the pure would be), but each indi-vidual, left to himself,
forms an imperfect judgement. On the other hand, the popular form of government involves
certain difficulties. In the first place, it might be objected that he who can judge of the healing of
a sick man would be one who could himself heal his disease, and make him whole-that is, in
other words, the physician; and so in all professions and arts. As, then, the physician ought to be
called to account by physicians, so ought men in general to be called to account by their peers.
But physicians are of three kinds:-there is the ordinary practitioner, and there is the master
physician, and thirdly the man educated in the art: in all arts there is such a class; and we
attribute the power of judging to them quite as much as to professors of the art. Secondly, does
not the same principle apply to elections? For a right election can only be made by those who
have knowledge; those who know geometry, for example, will choose a geometrician rightly, and
those who know how to steer, a pilot; and, even if there be some occupations and arts in which
private persons share in the ability to choose, they certainly cannot choose better than those
who know. So that, according to this argument, neither the election of magistrates, nor the
calling of them to account, should be entrusted to the many. Yet possibly these objections are to
a great extent met by our old answer, that if the people are not utterly degraded, although
individually they may be worse judges than those who have special knowledge, as a body they
are as good or better. Moreover, there are some arts whose products are not judged of solely, or
best, by the artists themselves, namely those
• arts whose products are recognized even by those who do not possess the art; for exam-ple,
the knowledge of the house is not limited to the builder only; the user, or, in other words, the
master, of the house will actually be a better judge than the builder, just as the pilot will judge
better of a rudder than the carpenter, and the guest will judge better of a feast than the cook.
This difficulty seems now to be sufficiently answered, but there is another akin to it.
That inferior persons should have authority in greater matters than the good would appear to be
a strange thing, yet the election and calling to account of the magistrates is the greatest of all.
And these, as I was saying, are functions which in some states are as signed to the people, for
the assembly is supreme in all such matters. Yet persons of any age, and having but a small
property qualification, sit in the assembly and deliberate and judge, although for the great
officets of state, such as treasurers and generals, a high qualification is required. This difficulty,
may be solved in the same manner as the preceding, and the present practice of democracies
may be really defensible. For the power does not reside in the juryman, or counsellor, or member
of the assembly, but in the court, and the council, and the assembly, of which the aforesaid
individuals -counsellor, assembly-man, juryman-are only parts or members. And for this reason
the many may claim to have a higher authority than the few; for the people, and the council, and
the courts consist of many persons, and their property collectively is greater than the property of
one or of a few individuals holding great offices. But enough of this.
The discussion of the first question shows nothing so clearly as that laws, when good, should be
supreme; and that the magistrate or magistrates should regulate those matters only on which the
laws are unable to speak with precision owing to the difficulty of any general principle embracing
all particulars. But what are good laws has not yet been clearly explained; the old difficulty
remains. The goodness or badness, justice or injustice, of laws varies of necessity with the
constitutions of states. This, however, is clear, that the laws must be adapted to the
constitutions. But, if so, true forms of government will of necessity have just laws, and perverted
forms of government will have unjust laws.

12. In all sciences and arts the end is a good, and the greatest good and in the highest degree a
good in the most authoritative of all—-this is the political science of which the good is justice, in
other words, the common interest. All men think justice to be a sort of equality; and to a certain
extent they agree with what we have said in our philosophical works about ethics. For they say
that what is just is just for someone and that it should be equal for equals. But there still remains
a question: equality or inequality of what? Here is a difficulty which calls for political speculation.
For very likely some persons will say that offices of state ought to be unequally distributed
according to superior excellence, in whatever respect, of the citizen, although there is no other
difference between him and the rest of the community; for those who differ in any one respect
have different rights and claims. But, surely, if this is true, the complexion or height of a man, or
any other advantage, will be a reason for his obtaining a greater share of political rights. The
error here lies upon the surface, and may be illustrated from the other arts and sciences. When a
number of flute-players are equal in their art, there is no reason why those of them who are
better born should have better flutes given to them; for they will not play any better on the flute,
and the superior instrument should be reserved for him who is the superior artist. If what I am
saying is still obscure, it will be made clearer as we proceed. For if there were a superior flute-
playen who was far inferior in birth and beauty, although either of these may be a greater good
than the art of flute-playing and may excel flute-playing in a greater ratio than he excels the
others in his art, stilhhe ought to have the best flutes given to him, unless the advantages of
wealth and birth contribute to excellence in flute-playing, which they do not. Moreover, upon this
principle any good may be compared with any other. For if a given height may be measured
against wealth and against free-dom, height in general may be so measured. Thus if A excels in
height more than B in excellence, even if excellence in general extels height still more, all goods
will be com-parable; for if a certain amount is better than some other, it is clear that some other
will be equal. But since no such comparison can be made, it is evident that there is good reason
why in politics men do not ground their claim to office on every sort of inequality.
For if some be slow, and others swift, thatis no reason why the one should have little and the
others much; it is in gymnastic contests that such excellence is rewarded. Whereas the rival
claims of candidates for office can only be based on the possession of elements which enter into
the composition of a state. And therefore the well-born, or free-born, or rich, may with good
reason claim office, for holders of offices must be freemen and tax-payers: a state can be no
more composed entirely of poor men than entirely of slaves. But if wealth and freedom are
necessary elements, justice and valor are equally so; for without the former qualities ai state
cannot exist at all, without the latter not well.

13. If the existence of the state is alone to be considered, then it would seem that all, or some at
least, of these claims are just; but, if we take into account a good life, then, as I have already
said, education and excellence have superior claims. As, however, those who are equal in one
thing ought not to have an equal share in all, nor those who are unequal in one thing to have an
unequal share in all, it is certain that all forms of government which rest on either of these
principles are perversions. All men have a claim in a certain sense, as I have already admitted,
but not all have an absolute claim. The rich claim because they have a greater share in the land,
and land is the common element of the state; also they are generally more trustworthy in
contracts. The free claim under the same title as the well-born; for they are nearly akin. For the
well-born are citizens in a truer sense than the low-born, and good birth is always valued in a
man's own home. Another reason is, that those who are sprung from better ancestors are likely
to be beuter men, for good birth is excellence of race. Excellence, too, may be truly said to have
a claim, for justice has been acknowledged by us to be a social excellence, and it implies all
others. Again, the many may urge their claim against the few; for, when taken collec-tively, and
compared with the few, they are stronger and richer and better. But, what if the good, the rich,
the well-born, and the other classes who make up a state, are all living together in the same city,
will there, or will there not, be any doubt who shall rule?— No doubt at all in determining who
ought to rule in each of the above-mentioned forms of government. For states are characterized
by differences in their governing bodies-one of them has a government of the rich, another of
the good, and so on. But a difficulty arises when all these elements coexist. How are we to
decide? Suppose the good to be very few in number: may we consider their numbers in relation
to their duties, and ask whether they are enough to administer the state, or so many as will make
up a state? Objections may be urged against all the aspirants to political power. For those who
found their claims on wealth or family might be thought to have no basis of justice; on this prin-
ciple, if any one person were richer than all the rest, it is clear that he ought to be ruler of them.
In like manner he who is very distinguished by his birth ought to have the superiority over all
those who claim on the ground that they are free-born. In an aristocracy a like difficulty occurs
about excellence; for if one citizen is better than the other members of the government, however
good they may be, he too, upon the same princi-pleiof justice, should rule over them. And if the
people are to be supreme because they are stronger than the few, then if one man, or more than
one, but not a majority, is stronger than the many, they ought to rule, and not the many.
All these considerations appear to show that none of the, principles un which men claim to rule
and to hold all other men in subjection to them are right. To those who claim to be masters of the
government on the ground of their excellence or their wealth, the many might fairly answer that
they themselves are often better and richer than the few—1 do not say individually, but
collectively. And another problem which is sometimes put forward may be metin a similar
manner. Some persons doubt whether the legislator who desires to make the justest laws ought
to legislate with a view to the good of the better or of the many, when the case which we have
mentioned occurs. Now what is right must be construed as equally right, and what is equally
right is to be considered with reference to the adyantage of the state, and the common good of
the citizens. And a citizen is one who shares, in governing and being governed. He differs under
different forms of government, but in the best state he is one who is able and chooses to be
governed and to govern with a view to the life of excellence.
If, however, there be some one person, or more than one, although not enough to make up the
full complement of a state, whose excellence is so pre-eminent that the excellence or the
political capacity of all the rest admit of no comparison with his or theirs, he or they can be no
longer regarded as part of a state; for justice will not be done to the superior, if he is reckoned
only as the equal of those who are so far inferior to him in excellence and in political capacity.
Such a man may truly be deemed a God among men. Hence we see that legislation is necessarily
concerned only with those who are equal in birth and in capacity; and that for men of pre-
eminent excellence there is no law—they are themselves a law. Anyone would be ridiculous who
attempted to make laws for them: they would probably retort what, in the fable of Antisthenes,
the lions said to the hares, when in the council of the beasts the latter began haranguing and
claiming equality for all. And for this reason democratic states have instituted ostracism, equality
is above all things their aim, and therefore they ostracized and banished from the city for a time
those who seemed to predominate too much through their wealth, or the number of their friends,
or through any other political influence. Mythology tells us that the Argonauts left Heracles
behind for a similar reason; the ship Argo would not take him because she feared that he would
have been too much for the rest of the crew. That is why those who denounce tyranny and blame
the counsel which Periander gave to Thrasybulus cannot be held altogether just in their censure.
The story is that Periander, when the herald was sent to ask counsel of him, said nothing, but
only cut off the tallest ears of corn till he had brought the field to a level. The herald did not know
the meaning of the action, but came and-reported what he had seen to Thrasybulus, who
understood that he was to cut off the principal men in the state; and this is a policy not only
expedient for tyrants or in practice confined to them, but equally necessáry in oligarchies and
democracies. Ostracism is a measure of the same kind, which acts by disabling and banishing
the most prominent citizens. Great powers do the same to whole cities and nations, as the
Athenians did to the Samians, Chians, and Lesbians; no soonet had they obtained a firm grasp of
the em-pire, than they humbled their allies contrary to treaty; and the Persian king has
repeatedly crushed the Medes, Babylonians, and other nations, when their spirit has been stirred
by the recollectión of their former greatness.
The problem is a universal one, and equally concerns all foums of government, uuc as well as
false; for, although perverted forms with a view to their own interests may adopt this policy,
those which seck the common interest do so likewise. The same thing may be observed in the
arts and sciences; for the painter will not allow the figure to have a foot which, however beautiful,
is not in, proportion, nor will the ship-builder allow the stern or any other part of the vessel to be
unduly large, any more than the chorus-master will allow anyone who sings louder or better than
all the rest to sing in the choir. Monarchs, 10o, may practise compulsion and still live in harmony
with their cities, if their own government is for the interest of the state. Hence where there is an
acknowledged superiority the argument in favour of ostracism is based upon a kind of political
justice. It would certainly be better that the legislator should from the first so order his state as
to have no need of such a remedy. But if the need arises, the next best thing is that he should
en-deavour to correct the evil by this or some similar measure. The principle, however, has not
been fairly applied in states; for, instead of looking to the good of their own consti-tution, they
have used ostracism for factious purposes. It is true that under perverted forms of government,
and from their special point of view, such a measure is just and expedient, but it is also clear that
it is not absolutely just.