Jagirdari system
The Mughal Jagirdari System: Meaning, Function, and Historiographical
Perspectives
Thejagirdari systemunder the Mughals stands as one of the most distinctive and
far-reaching administrative innovations in pre-modern South Asia. Evolving out of earlier
Islamic practices of land revenue assignments — particularly theiqtasystem — the Mughal
jagir emerged as a sophisticated institutional mechanism that combined fiscal extraction,
military financing, and imperial administrative control. Although scholars such as W.H.
Moreland, Irfan Habib, Iqtidar Alam Khan, Shireen Moosvi, Satish Chandra, and M. Athar Ali
have provided detailed studies of its features and functions, much of the historical
discourse remains cautious, relying on fragmentary Persian chronicles, imperial
documents, and limited primary archival materials. Despite these gaps, recent
historiography has increasingly emphasized the nuanced, dynamic, and evolving character
of the jagirdari system, particularly under Emperor Akbar (r. 1556–1605).
The wordjagiritself is a compound of two Persian terms —jai(place) andgir(holder) —
literally meaning “one who holds or occupies a place or land.” Essentially, a jagir was a tract
of land assigned by the Mughal emperor to his nobles, orumara, and military officers, or
mansabdars, in lieu of a cash salary. This system allowed the mansabdars to appropriate
themahsul(revenue) from whatever agricultural production occurred on the land. The
Mughal emperors, by distributing land revenues instead of cash payments, ensured that a
jagir was supposed to yield a revenue roughly equivalent to the salary entitlement —
known asmugarrara talab— of the mansabdar.
Importantly, a jagir was not hereditary; it could not automatically pass from father to son,
although the emperor retained the discretion to reward the son of a loyal or
high-performing jagirdar by inducting him into the imperial service and assigning him a
new jagir. Two notable exceptions existed:watan jagirs, which were hereditary holdings
often granted to prominent local families, and a fewal-tamghajagirs, especially under
Emperor Jahangir (r. 1605–1627), which were largely exempt from the normal rules of
reassignment. For most jagirs, however, periodic transfers were the norm — typically every
three to four years — a practice introduced by Akbar in 1568 specifically to curtail the
growing power of influential families like the Atkas in Punjab. These transfers were
designed to prevent mansabdars from entrenching themselves too deeply in local power
structures or forming alliances with thezamindars(local landholders andintermediaries).
Thejagirdarsthus formed a critical bureaucratic and military class whose economic and
social status was entirely dependent on imperial favor. On their assigned lands, jagirdars
were responsible not only for collecting state revenue but also for implementing the
agrarian plans of the Mughal state. This included improving irrigation facilities, maintaining
agricultural productivity, and, where possible, expanding cultivation into new areas.
Meeting these obligations required the jagirdars to maintain cooperative relationships with
local zamindars, who were themselves a heterogeneous group organized along caste, clan,
and tribal lines. Zamindars typically worked closely with the peasant cultivators and
exercised significant territorial rights over the land. They also maintained private armed
contingents calledulusorjamaiyat, which could resist external interference, including
revenue collection by jagirdars.
The relationship between jagirdars and zamindars was often tense, particularly when both
viewed the land as a source of wealth and political power. In areas where zamindars
resisted the collection of land revenue, these jagirs were labeledzortalab jagirs, and the
jagirdars would seek the assistance of the local military commander, thefaujdar, to
enforce collection. However, as long as zamindars paid the agreed-upon revenues, they
retained de facto control over their lands. Alongside the zamindars, thekhudkasht
cultivators formed the third critical group in this agrarian order. Khudkasht peasants were
considered the hereditary owners of their lands and could not be evicted as long as they
met their revenue obligations.
The Mughal emperors recognized the delicate balance between these groups and sought
to prevent the monopolization of power by any one of them. HistorianSatish Chandrahas
famously described the relationship between the jagirdar, zamindar, and khudkasht as a
triangular or tripolar relationship, arguing that it was the foundation of Mughal political
stability. According to Chandra, as long as the central government could convince
zamindars and cultivators that they were better off under the Mughal imperial umbrella —
and that the state was the ultimate arbiter of grievances — the empire maintained its
cohesion. When this balance broke down, as it increasingly did in the late seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, the empire faced severe challenges.
In his seminal workThe Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb, historianM. Athar Aliprovides a
detailed examination of the jagirdari system and its growing stresses during the reign of
Aurangzeb (r. 1658–1707). Themansabdars— the core officers of the empire — were
compensated either in cash (nagdi) or, more commonly, through jagirs andtuyuls(land
assignments). While the term tuyul may have originally referred specifically to royal princes’
land assignments, by Aurangzeb’s time, it was effectively interchangeable with jagir.
The fiscal architecture of the Mughal empire depended on accurately assessing and
matching revenue entitlements. Land was divided intokhalisa(reserved directly for crown
income) andpaibaqi(temporarily held by the state but usually assigned to officers). Most
mansabdars receivedjagir-i tankhwah— salary jagirs tied directly to their official rank
within the imperial hierarchy. Assignments were based onjamadamivaluations, which
were refined revenue figures expressed indams(with 40 dams equaling 1 rupee). These
valuations determined how much land was needed to meet a mansabdar’s sanctioned
salary.
However, the jagirdari system suffered from two major structural flaws, as Athar Ali details.
First, there was often a significant discrepancy between theassessed revenue
(j ama/jamadami) and theactual revenue collected(h
asilormahsul). For instance, while
Aurangzeb served as viceroy in the Deccan, he reported that although the jamadami
assessment was 1,449,000,000 dams, the actual yield was less than a quarter of that —
only around 400,000,000 dams after factoring in natural calamities and administrative
losses. To manage this gap, the administration employed methods such as therule of
months(e.g., an “eight-monthly jagir” would be expected to generate eight months’ worth
of pay relative to its assessed value) and sometimes appliedtakhfif-i dami(reduction in
jamadami) to adjust entitlements. If a jagirdar’s assigned jagir underperformed, he could
receive additional jagirs or supplemental cash payments to ensure he was compensated.
Another issue arose from theshrinking pool of assignable land. As more mansabdars
entered imperial service, especially during Aurangzeb’s reign, the demand for jagirs
exceeded the available supply. This led to intensified competition, frequent reassignments,
and administrative friction, all of which strained the system’s effectiveness. The inability to
consistently provide adequate jagir assignments destabilized the nobility, fueled factional
rivalries, and weakened the imperial center.
Yet, as recent historiography has emphasized, the jagirdari system was not merely a fiscal
and administrative arrangement but also a deeply political instrument. It allowed the
Mughal emperors to distribute rewards, manage loyalty, and balance competing factions
within the nobility. The practice of transferring jagirs prevented local entrenchment but
also sowed instability, creating a delicate tension that the emperors had to manage
continuously.
In sum, the Mughal jagirdari system was a complex institutional framework that linked the
empire’s fiscal, military, and political operations. While rooted in earlier Islamic
administrative practices, it reached new levels of sophistication under the Mughals,
particularly during Akbar’s reign. The jagirdari system’s ability to integrate the diverse
elements of the Mughal elite, maintain agrarian productivity, and channel resources toward
the imperial center was a key factor in the empire’s durability. At the same time, its
structural weaknesses — mismatches between assessment and yield, periodic
overextension, and the challenge of balancing central authority with local power holders —
sowed the seeds of future difficulties.
Historians continue to debate the precise causes of the Mughal Empire’s eventual decline,
but most agree that the jagirdari system played a central role in both its rise and its
eventual strains. Far from being a static institution, it was dynamic, constantly negotiated,
and adapted by both rulers and elites to meet the shifting demands of a vast, multiethnic,
and multi-religious empire.
The Early Phase of the Mughal Jagirdari System
The Mughaljagirdari systemis often understood as both a continuation and a significant
refinement of the earlierIslamic iqta system, which had been used by earlier Delhi
sultanates and other Islamic polities. Under the iqta, military officers or nobles were
granted the right to collect revenues from a designated area in return for service, but over
time, these assignments tended to become hereditary, allowing local elites to consolidate
control. The Mughal jagir, by contrast, was designed deliberately to avoid this drift toward
hereditary power. As Mughal administrative practices matured, particularly under Akbar (r.
1556–1605), the jagir evolved into anon-hereditary fiscal assignment, not a permanent
land grant or estate.
In this system, ajagirdar(literally, “holder of a jagir”—from Persianjai[place] andgir
[holder]) was entitled to collect themal-i wajibi(authorized revenue) and other taxes from
a specific territory, but only for a fixed period. Crucially, the jagirdar did not own the land;
his rights were strictly limited to the collection of state-designated revenues. This
distinction marked a key innovation in imperial governance: separating land ownership
from fiscal entitlement, thereby ensuring that land remained under the ultimate
sovereignty of the emperor.
The assignments varied in size and type. Some jagirdars controlled only part of a village,
while others were given large, multi-village units likeparganasor even entiresarkars.
These allocations were tied to the recipient’smansab(rank) andtalab(salary). The
responsibility for managing and collecting revenue fell on the jagirdar, who had to work
with local intermediaries, particularly thezamindars—a heterogeneous group of
hereditary landholders and chiefs who had longstanding ties to the land and local
peasantry.
Early Mughal Period: Babur and Humayun
In the foundational phase under Babur (r. 1526–1530), the pattern was somewhat ad hoc.
After his conquest of North India, Babur assigned roughly one-third of the conquered
territories to Afghan chieftains and loyal supporters under the namewajh(meaning
remuneration). These holders, calledwajhdars, were entitled to a fixed share of the area’s
total revenue, while the rest flowed into thekhalisa(imperial treasury). Alongside them,
existingzamindarswere generally left in place, and Babur governed other territories
through appointedhakims(governors). Humayun (r. 1530–1540, 1555–1556) seems to
have continued similar arrangements, although much of his reign was marked by instability
due to his conflicts with Sher Shah Suri.
Akbar’s Reorganization and Institutionalization
It was under Akbar that the jagirdari system became highly structured and institutionalized.
All imperial territory was divided intokhalisa(crown lands) andjagir(assigned lands). The
revenue from khalisa lands went directly to the state treasury, while jagir lands were
distributed among mansabdars, who were compensated for their service either incash
(naqd) or throughland assignments. Those receiving cash were callednaqdi, but the
majority received jagirs. Importantly, the estimated revenue from each jagir—calledjama
orjamadami(calculated indams, a small copper coin worth 1/40 of a silver rupee)—was
carefully matched to the mansabdar’s salary entitlement (mugarraratalab).
However, thejama(assessed revenue) was often much higher than the actual revenue, or
hasil, collected on the ground. This gap became a chronic problem, as later highlighted by
Athar Ali in his study of the Aurangzeb period. To balance these discrepancies, the
administration sometimes used an “eight-monthly” system, where the jagir’s yield was
calculated over only part of the year, or appliedtakhfif-i dami(reduction of estimated
value).
In Akbar’s reign, the jama of khalisa lands in major provinces like Delhi, Awadh, and
Allahabad accounted for less than 5% of total revenue. Under Jahangir (r. 1605–1627),
nearly 90% of the empire’s land was assigned as jagir, with only 10% reserved as khalisa.
Shah Jahan (r. 1628–1658) increased the share of khalisa to about one-seventh by his
twentieth regnal year. Aurangzeb (r. 1658–1707), during his first decade, raised the khalisa
share to about one-fifth, but pressures on imperial finances forced him to assign more land
as jagir in his later years. The continuous expansion of the mansabdari system, with more
officers seeking land assignments, placed mounting strain on the available revenue pool.
The Policy of Transfers
One of the most defining—and debated—features of the Mughal jagirdari system was the
policy of periodic transfers. Jagirdars were frequently moved from one jagir to another,
typically every three to four years, to prevent them from building entrenched local power
bases. This policy, first enforced systematically by Akbar in 1568 to check the rising
influence of the Atka family in Punjab, was a deliberate attempt to maintain central control.
European travelers likeFrançois Berniersharply criticized this practice. Bernier famously
argued that the absence of secure, inheritable land rights led jagirdars to exploit peasants
ruthlessly, as they had little long-term interest in the land’s development. According to
Bernier, this contributed to widespread agrarian distress and instability. His critique
became influential, shaping early colonial views of Indian land tenure systems.
However, modern historians such asIrfan Habib,Shireen Moosvi, andBhimsenhave
offered a more nuanced picture. Archival evidence suggests that while transfers were
officially regular, in practice high-ranking mansabdars often retained their jagirs for
extended periods, sometimes even over a decade. Furthermore, the strong presence of
hereditaryzamindarsand the vigilant oversight by bureaucratic officials meant that
jagirdars did not have unrestrained freedom to oppress the peasantry. The case ofTardi
Beg, whose jagir in Mewat coincided with his administrative post, exemplifies the careful
balancing of fiscal, military, and bureaucratic authority.
While the transfer system was central to Mughal administrative logic, there was flexibility,
especially when political circumstances required. For instance, Akbar sometimes allowed
familial preferences or political needs to shape jagir assignments. A notable example
involvesHusain Quli KhanandIsmail Quli Khan, whose jagirs were adjusted to align with
their postings in Lahore. These kinds of exceptions highlight the system’s adaptability and
the political calculations that often underpinned revenue assignments.
Administrative and Social Relationships
Beyond fiscal administration, the jagirdari system was embedded in atripolar social
relationshipinvolving the jagirdar, the zamindar, and thekhudkasht(self-cultivating
peasants). As historianSatish Chandrahas argued, this triangular relationship formed the
foundation of Mughal stability. The central government’s ability to maintain the loyalty and
cooperation of zamindars and peasants was crucial to sustaining imperial authority.
Zamindars, who commanded local military contingents (ulusorjamaiyat) and wielded
considerable influence, often resisted excessive revenue demands. In areas where
zamindars actively resisted jagirdars’ revenue collection efforts, the land was designated a
zortalab-jagir, and the jagirdar would require the support of thefaujdar(military officer)
to enforce imperial demands. At the village level,khudkashtpeasants—primary cultivators
with hereditary, non-evictable rights—formed another important layer of the system. As
long as they paid the state’s share, their rights were generally protected, anchoring Mughal
authority within the rural order.
Scope, Scale, and Economic Consequences
By the late sixteenth century, thejagirdari systemhad become the dominant framework
for revenue distribution across the Mughal Empire. As Shireen Moosvi has shown, toward
the end of Akbar’s reign,mansabdarsand their dependents absorbed over82%of the
imperial budget, the majority of it funneled through jagir assignments. Estimates by Irfan
Habib and Stephen Blake suggest that75% to 88%of the total territory was under jagir
assignment, underscoring how central the system was to sustaining the empire’s military
and administrative machinery.
Despite its enormous scale, the jagirdari system was embedded within a broader
socio-economic framework that limited its capacity for unchecked exploitation.
Lower-ranking jagirdars, lacking independent military power or deep political influence,
were generally unable to destabilize imperial order or inflict widespread hardship on the
peasantry. In fact, H.K. Naqvi’s study of144 rebellionsduring Akbar’s reign found virtually
no instance where rebellion arose purely because jagirdars had entrenched themselves
locally.
Types of Jagirs
The Mughal state employed several types of revenue assignments, reflecting different
purposes and conditions:
● Jagir Tankhwah: Salary jagirs, assigned in lieu of pay to mansabdars; these were
typically transferable every three to four years.
● Mashrut Jagir: Conditional jagirs, given under specific terms or obligations.
● In’am Jagir: Grant jagirs, awarded without any attached service obligation and
independent of the recipient’s rank.
● Watan Jagir: Hereditary jagirs, assigned to zamindars or chieftains within their
ancestral homelands; these were non-transferable and often treated as local
patrimonies.
Under Jahangir, some Muslim nobles were also grantedal-tamghajagirs, which resembled
watan jagirs in their hereditary nature. If a zamindar who already held a watan jagir was
appointed as a mansabdar, he typically received an additionaljagir tankhwahelsewhere if
his watan jagir’s revenue fell short of his ranked salary entitlement. For example,Maharaja
Jaswant Singh, with his watan jagir in Marwar, held a tankhwah jagir in Hissar to balance
his imperial salary.
Notably, the Mughal state sometimes converted watan jagirs intokhalisa(imperial crown
land) when political necessity demanded, as Aurangzeb did in Jodhpur in 1679.
Management of Jagirs
Jagirdars were authorized to collect onlymal wajib(authorized revenue) in accordance
with imperial regulations. They appointed their own administrative staff — including
karkuns(officials),amils(revenue collectors or amalguzars), andfotadars(treasurers) —
to manage local revenue collection. However, jagirdars operated under careful imperial
supervision.
Thediwanof the suba (province) was tasked with ensuring that jagirdars did not oppress
the peasantry or violate state policies. From Akbar’s twentieth regnal year, imperial officers
calledaminswere stationed in each province to monitor compliance with central revenue
directives. When jagirdars encountered resistance or difficulties, they could call upon the
faujdar(military commander) for support. By Aurangzeb’s time, larger or more powerful
jagirdars increasingly exercisedfaujdari(military-police) powers themselves, reflecting a
gradual merging of fiscal and administrative authority.
Fiscal Architecture and Strains
Athar Ali’s detailed examination inThe Mughal Nobility under Aurangzebhighlights how the
empire’s fiscal system rested on the careful matching of ranked entitlements to revenue
streams. Land was divided intokhalisa(crown reserves) andpaibaqi(lands temporarily
held by the state but typically assigned out). Most mansabdars were compensated through
jagir-i tankhwah(salary jagirs), allocated based on refined revenue calculations known as
jamadami— standardized estimates expressed indams(with 40 dams = 1 rupee).
Yet two critical structural problems undermined the system’s stability. First, there was often
a sharp gap between theassessed revenue(jama/jamadami) and theactual revenue
collected(hasilormahsul). Aurangzeb, while serving as viceroy in the Deccan, reported
that although the regional jamadami was assessed at1,449,000,000 dams, actual
collections after deducting for calamities yielded only about400,000,000 dams— less than
one-quarter of the estimated figure.
To navigate this discrepancy, the Mughal administration applied various fiscal devices, such
as assigning“eight-monthly” jagirs(based on partial-year revenue) or applyingtakhfif-i
dami(reductions in the assessed value) to ensure mansabdars received fair compensation,
whether through additional jagirs or cash payments.
Mounting Pressures and Consequences
Despite these fiscal adjustments, the jagirdari system faced intensifying pressures,
particularly during Aurangzeb’s reign:
1. Rapid Expansion of the Nobility: Aurangzeb’s incorporation of Deccan elites and
his continual recruitment of new mansabdars greatly swelled the nobility, increasing
the demand for jagir assignments.
2. Limited Land Pool: The pool of assignable land, especiallypaibaqilands, became
increasingly fixed or even contracted, as more areas were permanently assigned
out.
3. Overestimated Revenues: Chronic overestimation of regional revenue, particularly
in newly conquered or conflict-ridden territories, further strained the fiscal system.
These pressures generated tensions within the nobility, increased competition over jagir
allocations, and ultimately contributed to the gradual weakening of the Mughal
administrative order in the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Athar Ali’s seminal analysis powerfully links the internal mechanics of jagir management to
the broader imperial crisis of the Mughal Empire, particularly under Aurangzeb. According
to Ali, the jagirdari system — the core administrative and fiscal backbone of the empire —
was not merely a system of land assignment but a finely calibrated mechanism designed to
sustain themansabdarielite, reward service, and prevent the formation of independent
local power bases. However, as the empire expanded, especially into the Deccan, this
machinery began to buckle under multiple pressures.
When jagirdars could no longer be adequately compensated — especially in regions where
actual revenues fell drastically below official assessments — the entiremansabdari
systembegan to fracture. Aurangzeb’s own reports from the Deccan reflected this acute
shortfall: while officialjamadamiassessments projected vast sums, actual yields were
often less than a quarter of the expected revenue due to calamities, instability, and
administrative leakage. This fiscal mismatch undermined the state’s capacity to pay its
officers, fracturing the delicate balance on which the Mughal military-administrative elite
rested.
Compounding this were deeper political failures. As John Richards and others have noted,
the empire increasingly failed to integrate local elites —deshmukhs, zamindars,
tributary chiefs— into its imperial framework, leaving provincial societies fragmented and
weakening the state’s capacity to control its peripheries. Even when surplus collections
occurred, jagirdars were formally expected to remit the excess to the treasury, with
honesty sometimes rewarded through promotions (such as increases insawarrank). But
this system was heavily reliant on bureaucratic oversight and the personal integrity of
officials — qualities that eroded as the administrative fabric of the empire frayed under the
weight of its own overextension.
In Ali’s view, thejagirdari crisisunder Aurangzeb was not simply a problem of land
shortage or exhausted revenues. Rather, it was a deeply structural crisis tied to
overambitious imperial expansion, persistent overestimation of revenues, fragile
administrative patchwork solutions, and the growing loss of cohesion within the imperial
nobility. The Mughal fiscal system, which had been designed for a smaller, more tightly knit
empire, simply could not bear the strains imposed by its own ambitions.
Complications of the Transfer System
A key pillar of this system was the regular transfer of jagirs, essential to maintaining
imperial control but riddled with complications. Transfers assumed thatkharif(summer)
andrabi(winter) crops were of equivalent value across provinces — an assumption that
was rarely true outside Bengal and Orissa. As a result, jagirdars transferred mid-year often
suffered financial losses. Additionally, they were sometimes burdened with collecting
arrears (bagaya)left by their predecessors, compounding administrative difficulties.
Transfers were also shaped by the shifting needs of imperial service: mansabdars sent to
new provinces required jagirs there, while those leaving needed reassignment elsewhere.
Aurangzeb sought to rationalize this system by issuing orders that only officers serving in
the Deccan should hold jagirs there, an attempt to align fiscal assignments with service
locations. Administrative manuals from the period even advised matching jagir types to the
rank and capacity of assignees:
● Governors: one-fourth of their jagirs inzor-talab(rebellious) regions, the rest in
medium-stability areas.
● Senior officials (diwans, bakhshis): half in medium regions, half in stableraiyati
(revenue-paying) areas.
● Lower-ranking mansabdars: entirely in raiyati lands.
These guidelines reflected not only fiscal prudence but also a political strategy: preventing
jagirdars from embedding themselves too deeply in any one region and thus preserving
imperial cohesion.
Political Purpose: Preventing Local Power Bases
The regular rotation of jagirs was a deliberate political tool. By preventing nobles from
establishing permanent regional power bases, the system ensured that the Mughal elite
remained dependent on the emperor’s favor. No mansabdar could claim permanent
territorial control, which preserved the unity and political subordination of the nobility to
the imperial center.
The Exception: Watan-Jagirs
The major exception was thewatan-jagirsystem, applied primarily to Rajput and other
hereditary chiefs. These jagirs represented ancestral domains (watans) integrated into the
empire’s administrative structure. Chiefs were given mansabs that corresponded to the
assessed revenue of their territories, but their jagirs remained hereditary. While, in theory,
the emperor retained the right to intervene in succession, in practice, watan-jagirs were
typically left undisturbed even after rebellion or succession crises. Notable examples
includeJaswant Singh of Marwar(who retained his watan after being pardoned for
rebellion) andRaja Karan of Bikaner(similarly pardoned and restored). Occasionally,
al-tamghajagirs — permanent assignments to non-zamindar nobles — were issued, but
these were limited in scale and never rivaled the great Rajput hereditary estates.
Defined and Limited Powers of Jagirdars
Despite their revenue authority, jagirdars operated under tightly circumscribed powers.
They were permitted to collect only:
● Mal-i wajib(authorized land revenue).
● Huquq-i diwani(legal dues owed to the state).
Local officials, village headmen, and peasants were obligated to cooperate only within
these legal bounds. Building on the administrative foundations laid during Akbar’s reign (as
described by Abul Fazl), Aurangzeb issued firmans reinforcing:
● Strict adherence to imperial guidelines by allamils(revenue collectors).
● A hard cap: no more than half of the actual agricultural produce could be claimed as
revenue.
These measures reflected the emperor’s effort to balance the need for elite loyalty with the
protection of peasant livelihoods, attempting to sustain both political order and fiscal
stability.
In sum, Athar Ali’s analysis reveals that the jagirdari system’s collapse was not the product
of any single factor but a convergence of overextension, misaligned fiscal expectations,
insufficient administrative reform, and the gradual disintegration of elite cohesion — a
slow-motion unraveling that ultimately contributed to the weakening of the Mughal
imperial order.
Administration of Jagirs under the Mughal Empire
Within the Mughal system,jagirdars(revenue assignees) bore the primary responsibility
for managing their assigned lands, employing their own staff to oversee the collection of
taxes and revenues. Larger jagirdars, such as princes or senior mansabdars, often
organized their administrative structures to closely mirror those of thekhalisa(imperial)
system, reflecting the scale and complexity of their holdings.
Key local officials under the jagirdar included:
● Karori(revenue collector)
● Amin(revenue assessor)
● Fotadar(treasurer)
● Karkun(accountant)
Jagirdars and Zamindars
The termzamindarencompassed a broad spectrum of landholders, ranging from
small-scale cultivators to powerful rajas and regional chiefs. Under both Akbar and
Aurangzeb, official imperial revenue systems increasingly sought to bypass zamindars by
assessing revenues directly on the peasantry.
However, in practice, jagirdars often relied on zamindars asintermediaries, using them to
summarize land assessments and to collect lump-sum payments, frequently without fully
accounting for the actual yields or burdens placed on individual peasants. This
intermediary role added layers of administrative and fiscal pressure, particularly under
Aurangzeb, when the intensified demands of imperial warfare strained local systems,
leading at times to conflict and even rebellion.
Imperial Control Over Jagirdars
To maintain imperial authority and prevent local abuses, the Mughal state established a
parallel administrative frameworkalongside jagirdari governance.
Key imperial agents included:
● Ganungo(accountant) andchaudhariordeshmukh(local headmen), who were
tasked with overseeing and verifying jagirdar collections.
● Qazi(judge), who handled judicial matters independently, offering a legal check on
the jagirdar’s power.
● Waqa-i-navis(news reporters), who monitored local conditions and reported
instances of misconduct directly to the imperial court.
Additionally, peasants had the formal right to bypass local authorities and bring complaints
directly to the emperor, preserving a line of central oversight even in distant provinces.
Importantly, the imperial government also bore obligations toward jagirdars, particularly in
ensuring that they could manage their assignments securely and collect their due revenues
without undue interference.
Jagirdars and the Peasants
European observers likeFrançois Bernierfamously criticized the Mughal jagir transfer
system, arguing that it encouraged short-term exploitation: jagirdars, knowing their tenure
was temporary, sought to maximize extraction before their inevitable transfer. Indian
observers such asBhim Senalso noted instances of oppressive behavior by jagirdar
agents, though scholars today debate how widespread or unchecked this exploitation truly
was.
While official records show risingjama(land revenue assessments), historians caution that
these increases may not directly reflect worsening peasant conditions, as much of the rise
was nominal, keeping pace with broader price inflation. Nevertheless, even if total revenue
demands remained stable in real terms, the contraction of cultivated lands — whether due
to war, rebellion, or mismanagement — likely placed heavier burdens on the remaining
peasantry.
