NITAFAN v.

CIR
Topic: Constitutional Interpretation
Facts:
Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in
Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries. In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their
emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their
salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating
that "(d)uring their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is
anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."
Issue:
Whether Judges salary may be subjected to income taxation.
Whether the income taxation constitutes a decrease of salary which is prohibited in the
Constitution.
Held:
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in
question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the
Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and
of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and
of the people in the adoption of the Constitution.11 it may also be safely assumed that the people
in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.
With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the imposition of
income tax upon the salary of judges is a diminution thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in
Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be declared discarded. The framers of
the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable
terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have
adopted
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and
deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of
the cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income taxation
equitably.
FRANCISCO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Topic: Constitutional Interpretation
Facts:
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices
of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other
high crimes." The House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the first impeachment on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. The Committee Report to this effect has not
yet been sent to the House in plenary.
On October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by ` respondent’s
house representatives. Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et.
al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that
"[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within
a period of one year."
The House argues: the one-year bar could not have been violated as the first impeachment
complaint has not been initiated. Sec. 3(1) of the same is clear in that it is the House, as a
collective body, which has “the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.” “Initiate”
could not possibly mean “to file” because filing can, as Sec. 3 of the same provides, only be
accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of
the House; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at
least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Since the House, as a collective body, has yet to act on
the first impeachment complaint, the first complaint could not have been “initiated”.
Issue:
Whether the term “initiation” means the filing of the complaint.
Held:
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of
the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, based on the records, is
thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one-
year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on
June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.

PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique
Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not
of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in
which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to
obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much
as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers
and the people mean what they say. Thus, these are the cases where the need for
construction is reduced to a minimum. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle
in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the
provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption,
and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the
reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and
the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make
the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue where, speaking through Madame
Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain
and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the
adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the
Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in
Chiongbian v. De Leon, this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a
provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering
that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not
willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms,
not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As worded in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, the court must harmonize them, if
practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word
operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.