Consolidated Bank & Trust Corp. vs. CA (G.R. No. 138569, Sept.
11,
2003)
Facts:
L.C. Diaz opened a savings account with Solidbank
L.C. Diaz’s cashier, Mercedes Macaraya, filled up a cash and check deposit slips and
instructed their messenger Ismael Calapre to deposit the same with Solidbank. A passbook
was likewise provided with the latter.
Calapre presented the two deposit slips and the passbook to Solidbank’s Teller No. 6, who
acknowledged the same by providing the duplicate copies of the two deposit slips.
However, since the transaction took time and Calapre had to make another deposit to
Allied Bank, he left the passbook with Teller No. 6.
Upon returning to retrieve the passbook, Calapre was informed by Teller No. 6 that
“somebody got the passbook;" Calapre then reported this incident back to Macaraya.
Macaraya, together with Calapre, immediately went to Solidbank to deposit a P200,000
check, but when they inquired about the passbook, Teller No. 6 told Macaraya that
someone shorter than Calapre but she could not remember to whom she gave the
passbook. Teller No. 6 also provided Macaraya a deposit slip for an unauthorized P90,000
check deposit, which was later dishonored.
The following day, August 15, 1991, L.C. Diaz called up Solidbank to stop any transaction
using the same passbook until L.C. Diaz could open a new account. Unfortunately, an
amount of P300,000 has already been unauthorizedly withdraw on August 14, 1991.
The withdrawal slip for the P300,000 bore the signatures of LC Diaz’s authorized
signatories, who denied signing it. Noel Tamayo received the withdrawal.
L.C. Diaz’s messenger, Emerano Ilagan, was charged with Estafa through Falsification of
Commercial Document, which case was dismissed by the RTC.
L.C. Diaz then filed a suit to recover the P300,000 from Solidbank, initially absolved by a
Regional Trial Court in a decision later overturned by the Court of Appeals, ruling Solidbank
was negligent.
The rulings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals conflict on the application of the law.
The trial court pinned the liability on L.C. Diaz based on the provisions of the rules on
savings account, a recognition of the contractual relationship between Solidbank and L.C.
Diaz, the latter being a depositor of the former. Accordingly, “possession of the
passbook shall raise the presumption of ownership and any payment or payments
made by the bank upon the production of the said book and entry therein of the
withdrawal shall have the same effect as if made to the depositor personally."
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals applied the law on quasi-delict to determine who
between the two parties was ultimately negligent. The law on quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana is generally applicable when there is no pre-existing contractual relationship
between the parties. Accordingly, the teller of Solidbank who received the withdrawal
slip for P300,000 allowed the withdrawal without making the necessary inquiry. The
appellate court stated that the teller, who was not presented by Solidbank during
trial, should have called up the depositor because the money to be withdrawn was
a significant amount. Had the teller called up L.C. Diaz, Solidbank would have known
that the withdrawal was unauthorized. The teller did not even verify the identity of
the impostor who made the withdrawal.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the rule on breach of contract due to negligence, or culpa contractual is
applicable in the instant case.
Ruling:
Yes, the contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the
Civil Code on simple loan.
Article 1980 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "x x x savings x x x deposits of money
in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple
loan." There is a debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its depositor. The bank
is the debtor and the depositor is the creditor. The depositor lends the bank money and
the bank agrees to pay the depositor on demand. The savings deposit agreement between
the bank and the depositor is the contract that determines the rights and obligations of the
parties.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8791 ("RA 8791") declares that the State recognizes the
"fiduciary nature of banking that requires high standards of integrity and performance." ’
This fiduciary relationship means that the bank's obligation to observe "high standards of
integrity and performance" is deemed written into every deposit agreement between a
bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to assume a degree
of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family.
Solidbank's tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the
passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative. The tellers know, or should
know, that the rules on savings account provide that any person in possession of the
passbook is presumptively its owner. If the tellers give the passbook to the wrong person,
they would be clothing that person presumptive ownership of the passbook, facilitating
unauthorized withdrawals by that person. For failing to return the passbook to Calapre, the
authorized representative of L.C. Diaz, Solidbank and Teller No. 6 presumptively failed to
observe such high degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook, and in insuring its
return to the party authorized to receive the same.
In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a presumption
that the defendant was at fault or negligent. The burden is on the defendant to prove that
he was not at fault or negligent. In contrast, in culpa aquiliana the plaintiff has the burden
of proving that the defendant was negligent.
In the present case, L.C. Diaz has established that Solidbank breached its contractual
obligation to return the passbook only to the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz.
PNB vs. Sps. Tajonera (G.R. No. 195889, Sept.24, 2014)
Facts:
Respondent Eduarosa Realty Development, Inc. (ERDI) thru its Vice President Ma.
Rosario Tajonera (Rosario), who also performed the duties of President and Marketing
Director dealing with banks, obtained loans from petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB)
and entered into several credit agreements to finance the completion of the construction
of their 20-storey Eduarosa Tower Condominium.
Pursuant to the Credit Agreement, ERDI initially loaned for an amount of 60 million pesos
secured by three (3) parcels of the land with an aggregate area of 1,352 square meters
and proceeds of contract receivables arising from the sale of condominium units to be
constructed on the mortgaged Paranaque properties.
Relative thereto, there was an amendment to the subject Credit Agreement for three (3)
times, to wit:
First Amendment, ERDI obtained an additional loan amounting to 40 million pesos. As
additional security, Rosario and his spouse executed a Supplement Real Estate Mortgage
on their 958-square meter lot in Greenhills in favor of PNB.
Second Amendment, ERDI and PNB executed an extension on the repayment dates of
the loan and additional loan.
Third Amendment, PNB granted an additional loan amounting to 55 million pesos to ERDI,
subject to several conditions stated in the said agreement.
ERDI’s outstanding loan obligation with PNB amounted to ₱211,935,067.40.
Consequently, ERDI failed to settle its obligation. Hence, PNB foreclosed spouses
properties in Greenhills and obtained the same as the highest bidder.
ERDI filed a complaint against PNB for annulment of sale, cancellation of title, cancellation
of mortgage, and damages before the RTC, alleging, among others, that their mortgage
obligation had been novated and no new loans were released to them, in violation of the
provisions of the Supplement to REM.
PNB did not release the remaining balance of the approved loan amounting to
₱39,503,088.84 under the Third Amendment, there was no sufficient valuable
consideration in the execution of the Supplement to REM that secured the said credit
agreement.
PNB contended that its refusal to release the balance of the last loan was due to
respondents’ failure to settle their amortization.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Supplement to REM was supported by sufficient and valuable
consideration because the loan proceeds secured by it under the Third Amendment had
been substantially released to the respondents.
Ruling:
No, there was no sufficient valuable consideration in the execution of the Supplement to
REM on the Third Amendment as the balance of the last approved additional loan in the
amount of ₱39,503,088.54 remained unreleased, the cancellation of the Supplement to
REM constituted over the respondents’ Greenhills property was in order.
The agreement between PNB and the respondents was one of a loan. Under the law, a
loan requires the delivery of money or any other consumable object by one party to another
who acquires ownership thereof, on the condition that the same amount or quality shall be
paid.
Loan is a reciprocal obligation, as it arises from the same cause where one party is the
creditor, and the other the debtor. The obligation of one party in a reciprocal obligation is
dependent upon the obligation of the other, and the performance should ideally be
simultaneous. This means that in a loan, the creditor should release the full loan amount
and the debtor repays it when it becomes due and demandable.
PNB, not having released the balance of the last loan proceeds in accordance with the
Third Amendment had no right to demand from the respondents’ compliance with their own
obligation under the loan. Indeed, if a party in a reciprocal contract like a loan does not
perform its obligation, the other party cannot be obliged to perform what is expected of
them while the other's obligation remains unfulfilled.
Consequently, the Supplement to REM covering the Greenhills property became
unenforceable, as the said property could not be entirely foreclosed to satisfy the
respondents’ total debts to PNB. Moreover, the Supplement to REM was no longer
necessary because PNB’s interest was amply protected as the loans had been sufficiently
secured by the Paranaque properties. As aptly found by the RTC, the Paranaque
properties together with the 20-storey condominium building to be erected thereon would
have been sufficient security in the execution of the REM even without the Greenhills
property as additional collateral. Thus, under the circumstances, PNB’s actuation in
foreclosing the Greenhills property was legally unfounded.
Soriano vs. People of the Phils., et.al. (G.R. No. 162336, Feb.1, 2010)
Facts:
Spouses Enrico and Amalia Carlos appeared to have an outstanding loan of ₱8 million
with the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM), but had never applied for nor
received such loan; that it was petitioner HILARIO P. SORIANO, who was then president
of RBSM, who had ordered, facilitated, and received the proceeds of the loan; and that the
₱8 million loan had never been authorized by RBSM's Board of Directors and no report
thereof had ever been submitted to the Department of Rural Banks, Supervision and
Examination Sector of the BSP.
Consequently, two separate informations were correspondingly filed against Soriano
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). One for Estafa through falsification of commercial
documents, under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and the
other was for violation of Section 83 of RA 337, as amended by PD 1795 otherwise known
as “The General Banking Act,” which prohibits the so-called DOSRI loans.
The petitioner moved to quash the informations on the ground that the commission of
estafa under par. 1(b), Article 315 of the RPC is inherently incompatible with the violation
of DOSRI law, hence a person cannot be charged for both offenses.
He argued that a violation of DOSRI law requires the offender to obtain a loan from his
bank, without complying with procedural, reportorial, or ceiling requirements. On the other
hand, estafa under par. 1(b), Article 315 of the RPC requires the offender to misappropriate
or convert something that he holds in trust, or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligation involving the duty to return the same.
Issue/s:
Whether or not petitioner could not possibly be held liable for estafa in concurrence with
the charge for DOSRI violation.
Ruling:
NO, the informations filed against petitioner do not negate each other.
The bank money (amounting to ₱8 million) which came to the possession of petitioner was
money held in trust or administration by him for the bank, in his fiduciary capacity as the
President of said bank. It is not accurate to say that petitioner became the owner of the ₱8
million because it was the proceeds of a loan. That would have been correct if the bank
knowingly extended the loan to petitioner himself. But that is not the case here.
According to the information for estafa, the loan was supposed to be for another person, a
certain "Enrico Carlos"; petitioner, through falsification, made it appear that said "Enrico
Carlos" applied for the loan when in fact he ("Enrico Carlos") did not. Through such
fraudulent device, petitioner obtained the loan proceeds and converted the same. Under
these circumstances, it cannot be said that petitioner became the legal owner of the ₱8
million. Thus, petitioner remained the bank’s fiduciary with respect to that money, which
makes it capable of misappropriation or conversion in his hands.
A bank officer violates the DOSRI law when he acquires bank funds for his personal
benefit, even if such acquisition was facilitated by a fraudulent loan application. Directors,
officers, stockholders, and their related interests cannot be allowed to interpose the
fraudulent nature of the loan as a defense to escape culpability for their circumvention of
Section 83 of Republic Act (RA) No. 337.
Section 83. No director or officer of any banking institution shall, either directly or indirectly,
for himself or as the representative or agent of others, borrow any of the deposits of funds
of such bank, nor shall he become a guarantor, indorser, or surety for loans from such
bank to others, or in any manner be an obligor for moneys borrowed from the bank or
loaned by it, except with the written approval of the majority of the directors of the bank,
excluding the director concerned. Any such approval shall be entered upon the records of
the corporation and a copy of such entry shall be transmitted forthwith to the
Superintendent of Banks. The office of any director or officer of a bank who violates the
provisions of this section shall immediately become vacant and the director or officer shall
be punished by imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than ten years and by a
fine of not less than one thousand nor more than ten thousand pesos. x x x
The prohibition in Section 83 is broad enough to cover various modes of borrowing. It
covers loans by a bank director or officer (like herein petitioner) which are made either: (1)
directly, (2) indirectly, (3) for himself, (4) or as the representative or agent of others. It
applies even if the director or officer is a mere guarantor, indorser or surety for someone
else's loan or is in any manner an obligor for money borrowed from the bank or loaned by
it. The covered transactions are prohibited unless the approval, reportorial and ceiling
requirements under Section 83 are complied with.
A direct borrowing is obviously one that is made in the name of the DOSRI himself or
where the DOSRI is a named party, while an indirect borrowing includes one that is made
by a third party, but the DOSRI has a stake in the transaction. The latter type – indirect
borrowing – applies here.
If the law finds it necessary to protect the bank and the banking system in such situations,
it will surely be illogical for it to exclude a case like this where the DOSRI acted for his own
benefit, using the name of an unsuspecting person. A contrary interpretation will effectively
allow a DOSRI to use dummies to circumvent the requirements of the law.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Eduardo M. Cojuangco Jr., et al.
Topic: Sequestration and ownership of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) shares allegedly
acquired with ill-gotten wealth from coconut levy funds.
Doctrine:
To validly issue sequestration orders and claim properties as ill-gotten wealth, the PCGG
must strictly comply with constitutional and procedural requirements, and the government
must prove clear linkage to public funds and misuse of official position.
Facts:
The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed a case to recover San
Miguel Corporation (SMC) shares allegedly acquired by Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. and his
associates using coconut levy funds. In pursuit of this, the PCGG issued multiple
sequestration orders; however, several of these were later contested due to procedural
deficiencies, such as being authorized by only one commissioner instead of the required
two. Owing to the complexity of the transactions and properties involved, the case was
divided into eight parts, with Civil Case No. 0033-F specifically addressing the SMC
shares. The Republic sought partial summary judgment to reclaim shares held by 14
corporations collectively known as the CIIF block, but it struggled to establish sufficient
evidence for those shares directly linked to Cojuangco. The Sandiganbayan granted
judgment in favor of the Republic for the CIIF shares but dismissed the portion of the case
involving Cojuangco, citing a lack of conclusive proof. The Republic subsequently elevated
the case to the Supreme Court through an appeal.
Issues:
Were the sequestration orders valid under PCGG rules?
Were the SMC shares acquired using public (coconut levy) funds, making them ill-gotten
wealth?
Did the lack of direct evidence justify the case’s dismissal?
Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the sequestration orders issued by the PCGG were invalid
due to non-compliance with legal requirements, specifically the absence of approval from
at least two commissioners and the lack of sufficient prima facie evidence. Regarding the
ownership of the SMC shares, the Court dismissed the Republic’s claim involving Eduardo
Cojuangco Jr., finding no clear or competent evidence that public funds—particularly
coconut levy funds—were used in the acquisition of the shares, nor was there proof that
Cojuangco had misused his official position. The Court emphasized that the failure to
directly and credibly link the source of funds to the coconut levy was enough to warrant
the dismissal of the complaint. Finally, it held that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in its decisions throughout the proceedings.
