I.

HISTORICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. Development of Administrative Law as a distinct field of public law
Factors responsible for the emergence of administrative agencies

Recognition as a distinct category of law

Due to the rapid expansion of administrative agencies and their increased functions that
a substantial body of jurisprudence has developed in the field and general recognition
has been given to “administrative law” as a distinct category of law.

Multiplication of government functions

As modern life became more complex, the subjects of government regulations
correspondingly increased, which, in turn caused a multiplication of government
functions necessitating an enormous expansion of public administration. And so the
legislature had to create more and more administrative bodies, boards, or tribunals
specialized in the particular fields assigned to them and to which, in turn caused a
multiplication of government functions, necessitating an enormous expansion of public
administration.

And so the legislature had to create more and more administrative bodies, boards or
tribunals specialized in the particular fields assigned to them.

The doctrine of separation of powers and the constitutional position of

administrative agencies

The doctrine of separation of powers is a fundamental principle in constitutional law

that divides government authority into three distinct branches: legislative, executive,
and judicial. The purpose of this division is to prevent the concentration of power in
one branch, ensure a system of checks and balances, and uphold the rule of law.

Legislative: Responsible for creating laws.

Executive: Charged with implementing and enforcing laws.
Judiciary: Tasked with interpreting laws and resolving disputes.

Despite the clear division of roles, administrative agencies challenge traditional notions
of this doctrine. These agencies, which exist primarily in the executive branch, often
exercise quasi-legislative, quasi-executive, and quasi-judicial powers, making their
constitutional position unique.

Constitutional Position of Administrative Agencies

Administrative agencies play a crucial role in modern governance due to the complexity
and volume of government functions. They operate as specialized bodies that address
specific regulatory or policy areas, such as public health, the environment, or trade.

Quasi-Legislative Powers: Administrative agencies are often granted the authority to

create rules and regulations that have the force of law. This delegation of legislative
power is generally permissible if:
1) The enabling statute provides clear policy guidelines.
2) The rules are consistent with the enabling law and the Constitution.

Quasi-Executive Powers: Agencies enforce the laws and regulations they promulgate.
This includes conducting inspections, issuing licenses, and imposing penalties for non-
compliance.

Quasi-Judicial Powers: Many agencies are empowered to resolve disputes or

adjudicate cases within their specialized domain, often through administrative
hearings. These decisions can usually be appealed to the judiciary.
Checks and Balances on Agencies:
1) To address concerns about the concentration of power in administrative agencies
2) The legislative branch provides oversight through enabling statutes and
appropriations.
3) The judiciary reviews administrative actions for compliance with the law (e.g.,
through judicial review or the principle of due process).
4) The executive branch supervises agencies under its control.

Judicial Perspective on Administrative Agencies

Courts generally uphold the constitutionality of administrative agencies provided:
1) The delegation of powers respects the non-delegation doctrine, meaning Congress
or the legislature gives sufficient guidance and standards.
2) The agencies adhere to principles of due process, ensuring fairness and impartiality
in administrative proceedings.

B. Definition of Terms:

Administrative Law
The entire system of laws under which the machinery of the State works and by which
the State performs all government acts.

The law which provides the structure of government and prescribes it procedure.

The law which controls or is intended to control the administrative operations of the
government or “the law of governmental administration.”

The part of public law which fixes the organization and determines the competence of
the administrative authorities, and indicates to the individual, remedies for the
violation of his rights.”

The branch of modern law under which the executive department of government acting
in a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial capacity, interferes with the conduct of the
individual for the purpose of promoting the well-being of the community, as under
laws regulating public corporations, business addicted with a public interest,
professions, trades and callings, rates and prices, laws for the protection of the public
health and safety and the promotion of the public convenience and advantage.”

Administrative Agencies
Administrative agency is the term used generally to describe an agency exercising some
significant combination of executive, legislative, and judicial powers. It is a government
body charged with administering and implementing particular legislation.

It covers boards, commissions, divisions, bureaus and departments, and the somewhat
less familiar designations of “office” and “authority.” Some commentators assert that
the “administrative” is a fourth power of the government, since viewed from the
standpoint of any particular act of the agency, it is either executive or in the narrowest
sense, administrative, or legislative, or judicial, or to distinguish it from agencies which
are purely or essentially legislative or judicial, it is quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial
C. Cases:
Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. v. The Public Service Commission
G.R. No.47065, 26 June 1940

FACTS: The petitioner, Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. challenged the constitutionality of
Commonwealth Act No. 454, which amended Commonwealth Act No. 146 to allow the Public Service
Commission to impose certain conditions on certificates of public convenience. The petitioner argued
that the Act constituted an invalid delegation of legislative power and should not apply to existing
certificates.

The petitioner, Angat Bus Line Co., had been operating TPU buses in Pangasinan, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija,
and Zambales for over 20 years under certificates of public convenience (CPCs) issued by the Public
Utility Commission.

On August 26, 1939, the petitioner sought authorization from the Public Service Commission (PSC) to
operate ten additional Brockway trucks, citing compliance with existing CPC terms and the Eight-Hour
Labor Law.

The PSC approved the petition but imposed new conditions:

• The CPCs would only remain valid for 25 years.
• The Commonwealth of the Philippines could acquire the petitioner’s business at cost minus
reasonable depreciation.

Dissatisfied with these conditions, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
The petitioner then elevated the case to the Supreme Court, challenging the constitutionality of
Commonwealth Act No. 454 and the applicability of these conditions to its existing CPCs.

ISSUE/S:
1. Constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 454: Whether the delegation of legislative powers to
the PSC under the Act violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
2. Applicability of the Act to Existing CPCs: Whether the conditions imposed by the PSC under
Commonwealth Act No. 454 could retroactively apply to CPCs issued before the Act’s enactment.
3. Due Process: Whether the PSC’s imposition of the 25-year limitation violated the petitioner’s right
to due process.

RATIONALE: The Supreme Court ruled as follows:

1. Constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 454: The Act was a valid exercise of the legislature's
power. The delegation of powers to the PSC was not unconstitutional as it was limited by the
standard of "public interest.” The PSC’s authority to impose conditions like time limits on CPCs was
consistent with the Constitution’s mandate to regulate public utilities in the public interest.

2. Applicability of the Act to Existing CPCs: The Court upheld that public utility regulations apply to
both new and existing CPCs since the business of a common carrier is subject to public regulation.
However, the imposition of the 25-year limitation without proper notice and hearing was deemed
irregular and violative of due process.

3. Due Process: The PSC failed to provide the petitioner an opportunity to present evidence and be
heard regarding the imposed conditions, violating the principles of fair play and procedural due
process.

The Supreme Court reversed the PSC’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings,
directing the PSC to provide the petitioner a proper hearing before imposing conditions.
DOCTRINE: Under Section 16(a) of Commonwealth Act No. 146 which is a complement of Section 15,
the Commission is empowered to issue certificates of public convenience whenever it finds that the
operation of the public service proposed and the authorization to do business will promote the public
interests in a proper and suitable manner. Inasmuch as the period cannot be disregarded by the
Commission in determining the question whether the issuance of the certificate will promote the public
interests in a proper and suitable manner.

Statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the state of its police
power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but
likewise to those already established and in operation.

The business of a common carrier holds such a peculiar relation to the public interest that there is
superinduced upon it the right of public regulation. When private property is "affected with a public
interest it ceased to be juris private only.” When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which
the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be
controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created.

Public utility regulations are a legitimate exercise of police power and apply to existing businesses,
provided due process is observed.

The imposition of conditions on CPCs must align with public interest and adhere to procedural
fairness.
 Calalang v. Williams, et al., G.R. No. 47800, 2 December 1940

FACTS: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to
the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of one year
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street from 7:30 am
to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 5:30 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street
from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of
Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of the
measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of the
Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate
and control the use of and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations
made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public
Works approved the recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief
of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence,
all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above
mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

ISSUE/S:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and
abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding
the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?

RATIONALE: 1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the
National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired
by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at
the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare
may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority
because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because
then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of
liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.

2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in
its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through
the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of
salus populi est suprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and
diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups
as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount
objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the
greatest good to the greatest number.”
 Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company, Inc., et al.,
G.R. No. 37878, 25 November 1932

FACTS: Act No. 1446 was passed. Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any franchise or right of
way is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the
lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or corporation shall use
such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or
corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as
a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final."

Pursuant to said Act, Meralco filed a petition requesting the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as
a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be
permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric Company and the compensation to be paid to
the Manila Electric Company by such transportation companies.

Copies of the petition were directed to be sent to transportation companies affected by the petition.
Opposition was entered to the petition by a number of public utility operators.

ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the Supreme Court can sit as arbitrators and fix the terms and
compensation as is asked of them in this case.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that it exercises judicial power exclusively, as defined by the
Organic Act, and should not perform any duties outside of its judicial functions. The Court
emphasized that arbitration is a method chosen by the parties involved, and while arbitration
agreements are generally favored, they cannot oust the courts of jurisdiction. The Court found that
Section 11 of Act No. 1446 improperly delegated non-judicial functions to the members of the
Supreme Court, which was contrary to public policy and the principles of democratic governance.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court declared Section 11 of Act No. 1446 invalid, as it would be improper and
illegal for the members of the Supreme Court to act as a board of arbitrators with final decision-
making authority. The Court declined to proceed with Meralco's petition, reaffirming the importance of
maintaining the separation of powers and limiting its functions to those expressly conferred by the
Constitution.

The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our
government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court.
Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by
any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to
the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it. The Supreme Court and its members should not
and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not
pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions.

Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic
government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of
the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to
act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company.
 Noblejas v. Teehankee, et al, G.R. No. L-28790, 29 April 1968

FACTS: Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner of Land
Registration, a position created by Republic Act No. 1151. By the terms of Section 2 of said Act, the said
Commissioner is declared “entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a
Judge of the Court of First Instance.”

On March 7, 1968, the respondent, Claudio Teehankee sent a letter which requires him to explain why
no disciplinary action must be taken against him for “approving or recommending approval of
subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of
the areas covered by the original titles.”

Noblejas then answered that he could be only suspended and investigated in the same way as a Judge
of first instance and therefore, all these actions must be submitted to the Supreme Court, conformably
to Section 67 of the Judiciary act (R.A. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

He received a communication from the Executive Secretary which states that he is suspended and has a
pending investigation for his gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest.

The petitioner applied to the court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter to the Secretary of
Justice claiming the lacking of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion on the letter.

ISSUE: Whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme
Court, in view of the conferment upon him by the Statutes heretofore mentioned Rep. Act 1151 and
Appropriation Laws of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.

RATIONALE: It is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land Registration is
a District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary at all.

In the second place, petitioner’s theory that the grant of “privileges of a Judge of First Instance”
includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or
removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being possessed by a
variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same
privileges.

Incidentally, petitioner’s stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor General, another
appointee of the President, could not be removed by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer
upon the Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these
Justices are only removable by the Legislature, through the process of impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec.
24, par. 2).

Such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature when it granted these
executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges of First Instance. It is thereby shown that where the
legislative design is to make the suspension or removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First
Instance applicable to other officers, provision to that effect is made in plain and unequivocal language.
But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if the Legislature had
really intended to include in the general grant of “privileges” or “rank and privileges of Judges of the
Court of First Instance” the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or
removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be
unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by
charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and
simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.

WHEREFORE, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied for are denied, and the petition is
ordered dismissed. No costs.
 In Re: Rodolfo U. Manzano, A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC, 5 October 1988

FACTS: Judge Manzano was appointed by Ilocos Sur Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the member of
Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to Executive Order No. 856. Before
accepting the appointment, Judge Manzano wrote a letter to the SC requesting that he be authorized to
accept the appointment and to assume and discharge the powers and duties attached to the said
position. He petitioned that his membership in the Committee will not in any way amount to an
abandonment to his position as Executive Judge and as a member of judiciary.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition shall be granted.

RATIONALE: No. An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/
City Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees,
particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving
local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are—

3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final or judge who may be found
to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for
appropriate action;

3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the
proper administration of criminal justice.

It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions.

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and
affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better
carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the
organic law of its existence.

Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is provided that the
Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be under the supervision of the Secretary of Justice and
quarterly accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Justice.

Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall
not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section 12,
Art. VIII, Constitution)

The Supreme Court examined the functions of the Provincial/City Committees on Justice, which were
primarily administrative, involving the regulation and control over individuals' conduct and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to implement legislative policies. These functions are under the
supervision of the Secretary of Justice, which could potentially conflict with the constitutional
mandate that members of the judiciary should not be designated to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions.

The Court, in its decision, denied Judge Manzano's request. The majority opinion highlighted the
importance of maintaining the separation of powers and ensuring that judges remain confined to their
adjudicative roles to preserve judicial independence. It was noted that while judges should not adopt
an attitude of indifference towards the Committees on Justice, their involvement should be limited to
assistance incidental to their judicial duties, rather than formal membership.

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Gutierrez argued that the constitutional prohibition should not be
interpreted too rigidly. He maintained that the Committee on Justice was a study group with
recommendatory functions, and that judges' participation in such groups could enhance the
administration of justice without compromising judicial independence. He emphasized the need for
judges to engage in public activities that do not interfere with their judicial responsibilities but instead
contribute to their effectiveness.

Justice Melencio-Herrera also dissented, expressing concerns about the restrictive interpretation of the
constitutional provision. She argued that the supervision by the Secretary of Justice over the
Committee's work should not be a cause for concern, as it would not extend to judicial functions. Both
dissenting justices believed that Judge Manzano's membership in the Committee would not violate
constitutional provisions and that such involvement was consistent with the primary functions of his
judicial position.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court's decision reflects a cautious approach to maintaining the separation
of powers and ensuring that judges remain focused on their judicial duties, while the dissenting
opinions highlight the potential benefits of judicial involvement in administrative and recommendatory
functions related to justice administration.
 Puyat, et al. v. De Guzman, Jr, et al, G.R. No. L-51122, 25 March 1982

FACTS: On 14 May 1979, an election for the 11 Directors of the International Pipe Industries (IPI), a
private corporation, was held – six of the elected directors were herein petitioners that may be called
the Puyat Group, while the other five were herein respondents, the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat
Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.

On 25 May 1979, the Acero Group instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings questioning the
election.

Conferences were held on 25-31 May 1979 and the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds
the appearance of Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as
counsel for the Acero group. Section 11, Article VIII, 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no
Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before xxx any administrative body" and SEC was an
administrative body. The prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his
appearance.

When SEC Case was called on 31 May 1979, it turned out that Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased
on 15 May 1979 ten shares of IPI stock for Php200.00, but the deed of sale was notarized only on 30
May 1979. He then filed on 31 May 1979 an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the
owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation, which motion was granted by
the SEC Commissioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, in intervening in the SEC Case, is in effect appearing
as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional
provision.

RATIONALE: The Court en banc ruled that ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention,
Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. His appearance could theoretically
be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) IPI shares.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez.
He had acquired a mere Php200.00 worth of stock in IPI. He acquired them "after the fact", that is, on
30 May 1979, after the contested election of Directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed, and
one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to
intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for the Acero group, but which was
objected to by petitioners Puyat group. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided,
instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.

Under those facts and circumstances, there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before an
administrative body, which is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention"
was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.

A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an
Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal
participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the
Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which
is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.

Thus, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case falls within the ambit of the
prohibition contained in the 1973 Constitution. Respondent Commissioner's Order granting
Assemblyman Fernandez leave to intervene in the SEC Case was reversed and set aside.
 Gancayco v. City Government of Quezon City, et al,
G.R. No. 177807, 11 October 2011

FACTS: In 1950s, retired Justice Emilio Gancayco bought a parcel of land located in EDSA. Then on
March 1956, Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904 requiring the construction of arcades for
commercial buildings to be constructed. At the outset, it bears emphasis that at the time Ordinance No.
2904 was passed by the city council, there was yet no building code passed by the national legislature.
Thus, the regulation of the construction of buildings was left to the discretion of local government
units. Under this particular ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is to be created by
constructing the wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line.
Thus, the building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property line,
thereby creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of
the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes.

The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, sometime in 1965, Justice
Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the
application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property.
On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancayco’s request and issued
Resolution No. 7161, S-66, “subject to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner
shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when public
interest so demands.”

Decades after, in March 2003, MMDA conducted operations to clear obstructions along EDSA, in
consequence, they sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building
violated the National Building Code.

Gancayco did not comply with the notice and filed a petition for TRO with the RTC Quezon City to
prohibit the MMDA from demolishing his property. The RTC rendered its Decision on 30 September
2003 in favor of Justice Gancayco. It held that the questioned ordinance was unconstitutional, ruling
that it allowed the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. The RTC said
that because 67.5 square meters out of Justice Gancayco’s 375 square meters of property were being
taken without compensation for the public’s benefit, the ordinance was confiscatory and oppressive. It
likewise held that the ordinance violated owners’ right to equal protection of laws.

MMDA appealed with the CA. CA held that the MMDA went beyond its powers when it demolished
the subject property. It further found that Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to sidewalks, streets,
avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila, thus excluding Justice
Gancayco’s private property. Lastly, the CA stated that the MMDA is not clothed with the authority to
declare, prevent or abate nuisances.

ISSUE/S: (1) WHETHER OR NOT JUSTICE GANCAYCO WAS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE
VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE NO. 2904.
(2) WHETHER OR NOT ORDINANCE NO. 2904 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
(3) WHETHER OR NOT THE WING WALL OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO’S BUILDING IS A PUBLIC
NUISANCE.

RATIONALE:
(1) We find that petitioner was not guilty of estoppel. When it made the undertaking to comply with all
issuances of the BIR, which at that time it considered as valid, petitioner did not commit any false
misrepresentation or misleading act.
(2) Justice Gancayco may not question the ordinance on the ground of equal protection when he also
benefited from the exemption. It bears emphasis that Justice Gancayco himself requested for an
exemption from the application of the ordinance in 1965 and was eventually granted one. Moreover, he
was still enjoying the exemption at the time of the demolition as there was yet no valid notice from the
city engineer. Thus, while the ordinance may be attacked with regard to its different treatment of
properties that appears to be similarly situated, Justice Gancayco is not the proper person to do so.
(3) The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from constructing an
arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The wing walls do
not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons and property. The fact that an
ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a nuisance. Clearly,
when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or the city
engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons
and property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the
structure.

Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation.
It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not
a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a
nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be determined and
resolved in the ordinary courts of law.

MMDA illegally demolished Gancayco's property.

 Chiongbian, et al v. Orbos, et al, G.R. No. 96754, 22 June 1995

FACTS: Pursuant to Art. X, section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6734, the
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, calling for a plebiscite to be held in the
provinces of – Basilan, Cotobato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao,
Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del
Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto
Princesa and Zamboanga.

In the ensuing plebiscite held on November 16, 1989, four provinces voted in favor of creating an
autonomous region – provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. These provinces
became the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in accordance with the constitutional provision.
On the other hand, with respect to provinces and cities not voting in favor of the Autonomous Region,
Art. XIX, section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in
such plebiscites shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and
cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the
existing administrative regions. Provided, however, that the President may, by administrative
determination, merge the existing regions.

Pursuant to such provision, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 429,
“providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao.”
(1) Misamis Occidental, at present part of Region X, will become part of Region IX.
(2) Oroquieta City, Tangub City and Ozamiz City, at present parts of Region X will become parts of Region IX.
(3) South Cotobato, at present a part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.
(4) General Santos City, at present part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.
(5) Lanao del Norte, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.
(6) Iligan City and Marawi City, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.

Petitioners, members of Congress representing various legislative districts in South Cotobato,

Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Lanao del Norte and Zamboanga City wrote to then President Aquino
protesting E.O. No. 429 contending that – There is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain
provinces and cities within the existing regions and restructure them to new administrative regions.
While the authority necessarily includes the authority to merge, the authority to merge does not include
the authority to reorganize; that the transfer of regional centers under Executive Order 429 is actually a
restructuring (reorganization) of administrative regions.

As their protest went unheeded, while Inauguration Ceremonies of the New Administrative Region IX
was scheduled, petitioners brought this suit for certiorari and prohibition.

On the other hand, in the petition of Immanuel Jaldo, a resident of Zamboanga City suing in the
capacity of a taxpayer and citizen, he contends that Art. XIX, section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is
unconstitutional because (1) it unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him
to merge by administrative determination the existing regions or at any rate provides no standard for
the exercise of the power delegated and (2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.
The Solicitor General defends the reorganization of regions in Mindanao by E.O. No. 429 as merely the
exercise of a power traditionally lodged in the President and as a mere incident of his power of general
supervision over local governments and control of executive departments, bureaus and offices under
Art. X, section 16 and Art. VII, section 17 of the Constitution.

He argues that the power is not limited to the merger of those regions in which the provinces and cities
which took part in the plebiscite are located but that it extends to all regions in Mindanao as
necessitated by the establishment of the autonomous region; That the power is not limited to the
merger of those regions in which the provinces and cities which took part in the plebiscite are located
but that it extends to all regions in Mindanao as necessitated by the establishment of the autonomous
region.

In these suits Petitioners challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (R.A. No. 6734), authorizing the President of the Philippines to merge by
administrative determination the regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous Region,
and the Executive Order issued by the President pursuant to such authority, “Providing for the
Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanao.”

ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether the power to merge administrative regions is legislative in character, as petitioners
contend, or whether it is executive in character, as respondents claim it is, and, in any event, whether
Art. XIX, section 13 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the President’s discretion;
(2) Whether the power granted authorizes the reorganization even of regions the provinces and cities
in which either did not take part in the plebiscite on the creation of the Autonomous Region or did not
vote in favor of it.
RATIONALE: (1) In conferring on the President the power to merge [by administrative determination]
the existing regions following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization
of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division
of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local governments but
also the direction of executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices.

As this Court observed in Abbas, while the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly
provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to
facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, section 4
of the Constitution].

The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays but are “mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes.” The
power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries which has
been described in Pelaez v. Auditor General or as “administrative in nature.”

There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the
power to merge administrative regions. The question is whether Congress has provided a sufficient
standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of the power granted and whether in
any event the grant of power to him is included in the subject expressed in the title of the law.

First, the question of standard. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered
or implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on
the same subject as that of the challenged legislation.

With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the
same policy underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the
Executive Department, to wit: “to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to
enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic
development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public business.”

Indeed, as the original eleven administrative regions were established in accordance with this policy, it
is logical to suppose that in authorizing the President to “merge [by administrative determination] the
existing regions” in view of the withdrawal from some of those regions of the provinces now
constituting the Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was to reconstitute the original basis for
the organization of administrative regions.

[HISTORY: It will be useful to recall first the nature of administrative regions and the basis and purpose
for their creation. On September 9, 1968, R.A. No. 5435 was passed “authorizing the President of the
Philippines, with the help of a Commission on Reorganization, to reorganize the different executive
departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the government, including banking or
financial institutions and corporations owned or controlled by it.” The purpose was to promote
“simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government.”

Accordingly, the Reorganization Commission prepared an Integrated Reorganization Plan which

divided the country into eleven administrative regions. By P.D. No. 1, the Plan was approved and made
part of the law of the land on September 24, 1972. P.D. No. 1 was twice amended in 1975, first by P.D.
No. 742 which “restructured the regional organization of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi” and
later by P.D. No. 773 which further “restructured the regional organization of Mindanao and divided
Region IX into two sub-regions.” In 1978, P.D. No. 1555 transferred the regional center of Region IX
from Jolo to Zamboanga City.]

(2) Finally, it is contended that the power granted to the President is limited to the reorganization of
administrative regions in which some of the provinces and cities which voted in favor of regional
autonomy are found, because Art. XIX, section 13 provides that those which did not vote for autonomy
“shall remain in the existing administrative regions.”
The contention has no merit. Such provision is subject to the qualification that the President may by
administrative determination merge the existing regions. This means that while non-assenting
provinces and cities are to remain in the regions as designated upon the creation of the Autonomous
Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other regions as the
exigency of administration may require.

The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or redrawing of the lines
separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local
government units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services. There will be
no “transfer” of local governments from one region to another except as they may thus be regrouped so
that a province like Lanao del Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region
IX.
The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or to the division or
merger of local governments, which all have political consequences on the right of people residing in
those political units to vote and to be voted for. It cannot be overemphasized that administrative
regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not for political
representation.

WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are DISMISSED for lack of merit

Funa v. Duque III, G.R. No. 191672, 25 November 2014

FACTS: PGMA appointed Duque as Chairman of the CSC, which the CA affirmed. Subsequently, the
President issued EO 864, which provides the inclusion of the Chairman of the CSC in the Board of
Trustees of GSIS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH), Employee’s Compensation
Commission (ECC), and the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF). Petitioner, Dennis A.B. Funa,
in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen, and lawyer, filed a petition challenging the
constitutionality of EO 864, as well as the Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, and the
designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors of GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC, and HDMF
for being a clear violation of Sec 1 and 2 of Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: Does the designation of Duque as member

of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio
RULING: JUDGMENT Court PARTIALLY
capacity, impair the independence of the CSC and
GRANTS the petition
violate the constitutional prohibition against the
holding of dual or multiple offices for the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions

RATIONALE: UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF DUQUE’S DESIGNATION AS MEMBER OF THE

GOVERNING BOARDS OF THE GSIS, PHIC, ECC, & HDMF Sec 1, Art IX-A of the 1987 Constitution
expressly describes all Constitutional Commissions as independent. Although functions are executive
in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines. Each Constitutional
Commission conducts its own proceedings and rules in the exercise of its own discretion.

Decisions, rulings, and orders are subject to review on certiorari by the court as provided by Sec 7, ART
IX-A of the 1987 Constitution

To safeguard this independence, the Constitution provides certain inhibitions and disqualifications
upon the Chairmen members as provided by Sec 2, Art IX-A of the 1987 Constitution

Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a cabinet position, Duque is covered by Sec
7(2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, he can hold any other office or employment in the
government during his tenure as the Chairperson of CSC. Sec 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292
is clear that the CSC Chairman membership in a governing body is dependent on the condition that the
functions of the government entity where he will seat of Board member must affect the career
development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government employees. The court
finds no irregularity in the said provision because matters affecting the career development,
employment status, rights, and privileges, and welfare of government employees are among the
primary functions of the CSC. Constitutionality of Sec 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292
upheld. Apart from carrying out powers and functions for which they are created, GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC, and HDMF are also tasked to perform other corporate powers and functions that are not
personnel-related. When CSC chairman sits as member of the governing Boards of GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC, and HDMF, he may exercise powers and functions which are not derived
anymore from his position as CSC chairman. He also becomes entitled to receive per diem a form of
additional compensation that is not allowed by an ex officio position, which proscription is
provided by Sec 2, Art IX-A of the 1987 Constitution Therefore, should be held unconstitutional.
Duque’s appointment also violates the independence of CSC. GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC, and HDMF
and the members of their respective governing Boards are under the control of the President. CSC
chairman cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the control of the President.

EFFECT OF DECLARATION OF UNCONSITUTIONALITY OF DUQUE’S DESIGNATION AS

MEMBER OF THE GOVERNING BOARD OF THE GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC, AND HDMF – THE DE
FACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE Duque did not validly hold office as the Director of GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC, and HDMF due to the application of the prohibition of Sec 2, Art IX-A of the 1987
Constitution. He is not considered as a de jure officer while he served his term as Director of those
GOCCs. De jure officer o deemed, in all respects, legally appointed and qualified and whose term of
office has not expired Duque was a de facto officer during his tenure as Director of these GOCCs De
facto officer o Appointment is valid on its face o In possession of an office The acts of the de facto
officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third
persons who are interested therein are concerned.
 International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace
Southeast Asia (Philippines), G.R. No. 209271, 26 July 2016

FACTS: This case originated from the field trials for Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) eggplant, also known as
Bt talong, which were conducted under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) by the petitioners,
including the University of the Philippines Los Banos Foundation, Inc. (UPLBFI) and International
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. (ISAAA), along with others. Bt talong,
engineered with a soil bacterium gene to produce a protein toxic to certain pests, underwent contained
experiments from 2007 to 2009 before moving to field testing after receiving Biosafety Permits in 2010.

Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines) and other respondents filed a petition for a Writ of Kalikasan
with the Supreme Court on April 26, 2012, claiming the Bt talong field trials violated their constitutional
right to health and a balanced ecology. They argued the trials lacked an Environmental Compliance
Certificate, proper public consultations, and that Bt talong, being genetically modified, was presumed
harmful.

The Supreme Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) for further proceedings. The CA
ultimately ruled in favor of the respondents, directing the permanent cessation of the Bt talong field
trials mainly on the basis of applying the precautionary principle due to insufficient safety guarantees.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, leading the Supreme Court to render a Decision on December 8,
2015, which affirmed with modifications the CA ruling, permanently enjoining the field testing of Bt
talong and declaring DAO 08-2002 null and void for failure to comply with the National Biosafety
Framework.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not there is a violation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of
administrative remedies;
(2) Whether or not the Precautionary Principle applies;
(3) Whether DAO 08-2002 was invalid for failure to comply with the National Biosafety Framework

RATIONALE:
(1) Yes, the liberalized rule on standing is now enshrined in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits
in the Rules “collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that
humans are stewards of nature,” and aims to further encourage the protection of the environment.
(2) Yes, the precautionary principle originated in Germany in the 1960s, expressing the normative idea
that governments are obliged to “foresee and forestall” harm to the environment.

When there is a lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity and
environmental effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving the case before it.

The Court ordered government agencies to strengthen regulations and ensure compliance with all legal
requirements before allowing future field testing of genetically modified crops.

DOCTRINE: **Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC):** Required for projects that may
potentially have significant impacts on the environment, according to Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1151.

EO 514: Establishing the National Biosafety Framework, Prescribing Guidelines for its Implementation,
Strengthening the National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines and For Other Purposes

Writ of Kalikasab is a legal remedy under Philippine law that provides protection of one’s
Constitutional right to a healthy environment, as outlined in Section 16, Article II of the Philippine
Constitution, which says that the “state shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
II. CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
A. Administrative Agencies and the Executive Power of the President

B. Congressional Oversight Power

Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 157013, 10 July 2003

(concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Puno)

FACTS: The petitioner, Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
challenging the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003). He alleged that the provisions allowing immigrants or permanent residents abroad
to register and vote, the delegation of powers to a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC),
and certain powers granted to COMELEC violated the Constitution.

ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 violated the residency requirement under Section 1, Article V of
the Constitution.
(2) Whether COMELEC's proclamation of winning candidates under Section 18.5 infringed upon
Congress's exclusive mandate to canvass and proclaim winners for President and Vice President
(Section 4, Article VII).
(3) Whether the JCOC's review powers (Sections 19 and 25) over COMELEC's implementing rules
undermined its independence.

RATIONALE:
(1) Section 5(d) on Residency Requirement
The Court upheld the validity of Section 5(d). It reasoned that the Constitution, under Section 2,
Article V, empowered Congress to establish a system of absentee voting, effectively creating an
exception to the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V. The provision's requirement for an
affidavit of intent to return to the Philippines does not violate the Constitution as it aligns with
Congress's authority.
(2) Section 18.5 on Proclamation of Winners
The provision was declared unconstitutional insofar as it allowed COMELEC to proclaim winning
candidates for President and Vice President, as it usurped Congress’s authority under Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution. The Court maintained that the canvassing of votes and proclamation
of winners for these positions remain exclusive to Congress.
(3) Sections 19 and 25 on JCOC’s Oversight Powers
The Court invalidated the provisions granting the JCOC power to review, revise, and approve the
COMELEC’s Implementing Rules and Regulations. It held that such provisions undermined
COMELEC's independence as guaranteed under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution.

DOCTRINE: Legislative measures creating systems for absentee voting must comply with the
Constitution, particularly on suffrage qualifications, while recognizing Congress's power to legislate
such exceptions.

COMELEC’s independence is constitutionally enshrined and must not be subordinated to legislative

oversight, as this could compromise its autonomy.

Concurring Opinion:
Justice Reynato S. Puno agreed with the majority that the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee's
(JCOC) powers to review, revise, amend, and approve the COMELEC’s implementing rules were
unconstitutional. He emphasized that granting the JCOC such authority violated the independence of
the COMELEC as provided under Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.

Dissenting Opinion:
Justice Puno dissented on the issue of the residency requirement under Section 5(d) of Republic Act No.
9189. He expressed reservations regarding the constitutionality of allowing immigrants and permanent
residents abroad to vote by merely executing an affidavit of intent to return to the Philippines. Justice
Puno reasoned that this provision effectively sidestepped the residency requirement stipulated in
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

His dissent underscored the potential risks of enabling individuals who no longer have a substantial
connection to the Philippines to participate in its electoral processes. He highlighted that suffrage is a
right tied to a genuine residency, which reflects an intent to participate meaningfully in the country's
governance.
 Abakada Guro Party List et al. v Purisima et al.,
GR No. 166715 , August 14, 2008

FACTS: RA 9335 or Attrition Act of 2005 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC. The law intends to encourage their officials and employees to exceed
their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of Rewards
and Incentives Fund and Revenue Performance Evaluation Board.

The Boards in the BIR and BOC to be composed by their respective Commissioners, DOF, DBM, and
NEDA, were tasked to prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of
the fund, to set criteria and procedures for removing service officials and employees whose revenue
collection fall short of the target; and further, to issue rules and regulations. Also, the law tasked the
DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the CSC to promulgate and issue the IRR of RA 9335, subject to the
approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created solely for the purpose of approving
the formulated IRR. Later, the JCOO having approved a formulated IRR by the agencies, JCOO became
functus officio and ceased to exist.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA
9335 and sought to prevent herein respondents from implementing and enforcing said law.
Petitioners assail, among others, the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that
it violates the doctrine of separation of powers, as it permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law, when legislative function should have been deemed
accomplished and completed upon the enactment of the law. Respondents, through the OSG, counter
this by asserting that the creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances
rather than violates separation of powers, as it ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the congressional oversight committee violates the doctrine of
separation of powers under the Constitution.

RULING: YES. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 having approved the IRR
formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC on May 22, 2006, it became functus officio
and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of
implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.

This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to confront the issue of the
constitutionality of the Joint Congressional.

Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an
encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation
of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of
government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation
of power in the executive branch.

However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment “beyond the legislative sphere,” the
Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its
committees or its members with either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative
power, it must follow the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures” specified
under the Constitution, including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any
post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In
particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted
in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of
its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present
the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a
committee formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or disapprove such regulations before
they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the
form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad
powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution‘s diagram of power as it
entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law
which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Congress, in the
guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its
stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the
Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of
whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto
itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.

From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires
Congress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect
shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any
directive or ruling made by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of
the law.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby partially granted. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining
provisions of RA 9335 is upheld.

Carlota, Salvador T., “Legislative and Judicial Control of Administrative Decision

Making”, 68 Phil. L.J. 161 (1993)

The article by Salvador T. Carlota examines the increasing role of administrative agencies in governance
and the mechanisms for controlling their powers.

Rise of Administrative Agencies – As governance becomes more complex, administrative agencies are
given broad rule-making and adjudicative powers, affecting both private rights and public interest.
Legislative Control – Congress has theoretical power to create, modify, or abolish agencies, but in
practice, it primarily expands them. Budgetary oversight and legislative investigations offer limited
control due to practical constraints.

Non-Delegation Doctrine – While the doctrine requires Congress to set clear standards when
delegating power, courts often uphold vague standards like "public interest." This weakens legislative
control.

Judicial Review – Courts review administrative actions for errors in law, jurisdiction, and grave abuse
of discretion but generally defer to agency expertise, applying the substantial evidence rule to factual
findings.

Administrative Procedure – The Administrative Code of 1987 sets minimum procedural safeguards to
ensure fairness in agency decision-making while allowing flexibility.

Conclusion – Legislative oversight is limited, and judicial review is constrained by deference to

administrative expertise. The focus should shift to improving administrative safeguards to prevent
arbitrary decision-making.
 Carino, et al. v. Commission on Human Rights, et al,
G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991

FACTS: The case stemmed from actions taken on September 17, 1990, by some 800 public school
teachers in Manila, who conducted “mass concerted actions” to highlight their demands due to
unaddressed grievances. These teachers, including the eight private respondents in the Supreme Court
case, were served orders by the Secretary of Education to return to work within 24 hours or face
dismissal. Subsequently, administrative charges were filed against them, leading to preventive
suspensions and, for some, dismissals or suspensions after administrative proceedings.Law firm
websites

In parallel, the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and the Alliance of Concerned
Teachers (ACT) filed petitions for certiorari with the Supreme Court and the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, challenging these administrative actions, asserting violations of their rights to due process and
peaceable assembly.

Simultaneously, the respondent teachers lodged complaints with the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) alleging undue replacement and lack of formal notice, leading the CHR to initiate a case and
schedule a dialogue. The CHR, despite the Solicitor General’s motion to dismiss on behalf of Secretary
Cariño, arguing lack of jurisdiction and absence of a cause of action, proceeded with the case. The CHR
intended to adjudicate on whether the teachers’ rights were violated and if their actions were justifiable,
essentially covering ground that had been or was being addressed by the Secretary of Education and
the courts.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the CHR has the authority to review, reverse, or modify decisions made by the courts or
quasi-judicial bodies in cases involving human rights violations.
2. Whether the CHR has adjudicatory powers over cases involving alleged human rights violations
related to civil or political rights.

RULING: The Supreme Court unequivocally ruled that the CHR does not possess adjudicatory powers
similar to a court of justice or a quasi-judicial agency. Its authority is limited to investigating all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights but does not extend to trying and deciding
on cases. The court emphasized that investigation does not equate to adjudication, and the CHR’s
attempt to resolve the matters involving the striking teachers usurps the jurisdiction and functions of
the Education Secretary and the Civil Service Commission.

DOCTRINE: This case established that the Commission on Human Rights is empowered solely to
investigate allegations of human rights violations involving civil and political rights but does not have
the jurisdiction to adjudicate or make final determinations on these matters. The role of the CHR is
investigative, not adjudicatory, emphasizing a clear delineation of powers between investigative bodies
and judicial or quasi-judicial entities.

The creation of the Commission on Human Rights was a response to the need for a dedicated body to
investigate allegations of human rights abuses, particularly in the aftermath of the Marcos regime. This
case is significant as it clarified the scope and limitations of the CHR’s authority, ensuring that the
delineation between investigative and adjudicatory functions is maintained, respecting the separation
of powers and the specialized roles of different government bodies and agencies in the Philippine legal
system.
 Simon, Jr., et al. v. Commission on Human Rights et al, G.R. No. 100150, 5 January1994

FACTS: This case involves a petition filed by Brigido R. Simon Jr., Carlos Quip, Carlito Abelardo, and
Generoso Ocampo, who are officials of Quezon City, against the Commission on Human Rights (CHR).
The petitioners sought to prohibit the CHR from hearing and investigating the case filed by the officers
and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated, led by Roque Fermo, which was
docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. The conflict originated from a demolition notice issued by
petitioner Carlos Quimpo, ordering the private respondents to vacate the premises along North EDSA
to make way for a People’s Park. Private respondents filed a complaint with the CHR alleging human
rights violations and requesting intervention to prevent the demolition. The CHR ordered the
petitioners to cease the demolition, subsequently cited petitioners for contempt when the demolition
proceeded, and approved financial aid for the affected vendors.

ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether the CHR has jurisdiction to investigate the alleged violations of the “business rights” of the
private respondents.
(2) Whether the CHR has the authority to impose fines, such as the Php 500 fine levied against the
petitioners.
(3) Whether the CHR has the power to disburse funds, such as the Php 200,000 financial aid granted to
the vendors affected by the demolition.

RULING:
(1) The Supreme Court held that the CHR does not have jurisdiction over the alleged violations in this
case. The term “human rights” in the Constitution was intended by the framers to refer specifically
to civil and political rights, focusing on severe cases of human rights violations. Economic rights
(such as the right to conduct business) do not fall within the CHR’s investigatorial jurisdiction.
(2) The CHR has the power to adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court. However, its contempt power
only applies to its investigatory functions, not to impose judicial-like orders such as “cease and
desist” order.
(3) The Court did not rule on the CHR’s power to disburse funds and noted that this matter lies with
the appropriate administrative agencies.

DOCTRINE: The CHR’s authority is limited to investigating all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights, not economic rights, and it does not have adjudicatory powers akin
ton courts of law.

The creation of the CHR was influenced by the experiences of human rights violations during martial
law declared by then-President Ferdinand Marco. Its establishment was intended to prevent a repeat of
such abuses and to provide an independent body for the protection and promotion of human rights.
The constitutional powers of the CHR were crafted to focus on civil and political rights in the wake of
past abuses and not to serve as a court of quasi-judicial entity.
 Concerned Officials of Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS)
v. Vasquez, et al, G.R. No. 109113, 25 January 1995

FACTS: Private respondent Philippine Large Diameter Pressure Pipes Manufacturer’s Association
(PLDPPMA) filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman on the public bidding conducted by
MWSS for projects APM-01 and APM-02 of its Angat Water Supply Optimization Project (AWSOP),
which aims to provide 1.3 million liters of water daily to about 3.8 million residents in the metropolitan
area. The letter of complaint accused the MWSS of an apparent plan even before the bidding to favour
suppliers of fiberglass pipes and urged the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation to hold in
abeyance the award of contracts.
The Fact finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman issued an injunction directed
to the Board of Trustees of the MWSS (1) to set aside the recommendation of its Pre-qualification, Bids,
and Awards Committee for Construction Services and Technical Equipment (PBAC-CSTE) that contract
no. APM-01 be given to a contractor offering fiberglass pipes and (2) to instead award the contract to a
complying and responsive bidder.

Petitioner MWSS assailed the order of the Ombudsman for lack of jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over
PLDPPMA’s complaint and for issuing the challenged order contrary to PD 1818 prohibiting the
issuance of restraining orders/injunctions in cases involving government infrastructure projects.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over PLDPPMA’s complaint and has the
power to issue orders directing the Board of Trustees of the MWSS to set aside the recommendation of
PBAC-CSTE and to instead award the contract to a complying and responsive bidder.

RULING: No. While recognizing the investigatory and public assistance duties of the Ombudsman,
the assailed orders were an undue interference in the adjudicatory responsibility of the MWSS Board of
Trustees rather than a mere directive requiring the proper observance of and compliance with the law.
The Fact finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman reveals a predisposition
against the use of fiberglass pipes, a technical, rather than a legal matter.

As a GOCC, MWSS is charged with the construction, maintenance, and operation of waterwork system
to insure uninterrupted and adequate supply and distribution of potable water. Therefore, it is the
agency that should be in the best position to evaluate the feasibility of the projections of the bidders and
to decide which bid is compatible with its development plans. The exercise of this discretion to reject
a bid and to award contracts, which is a purely technical matter, is vested in the MWSS entrusted with
such function that even courts or the Ombudsman cannot unduly interfere from.

DOCTRINE: This case reiterated the principle that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while broad in
investigating acts or omissions of public officials that appear to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient, does not extend to overriding the technical and policy discretion of government bodies or
agencies in executing their tasks.

– A government agency’s technical determinations and policy decisions, especially those involving
specialized knowledge and expertise, are afforded respect and a degree of finality by the judiciary,
including the Ombudsman.
– The principle of separation of powers underlines the preference for non-interference in the activities
of government bodies tasked with specific functions, except in cases of clear illegality,
unreasonableness, or grave abuse of discretion.
 Lastimosa v. Vasquez, et al, G.R. No. 116801, 6 April 1995

FACTS: On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, filed a
criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of
authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. Initially,
the deputy ombudsman found no prima facie evidence.

After review, Omb. Vasquez reversed and directed that the mayor be charged with a criminal case in
the RTC. The case was referred to provincial prosecutor Lastimosa. She conducted her own preliminary
investigation and found that only acts of lasciviousness had been committed. She filed a case for acts of
lasciviousness with the MCTC. As no case for attempted rape had been filed by the Prosecutor’s Office,
Deputy Ombudsman Mojica ordered on July 27, 1994 Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner
Lastimosa to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt for “refusing and failing to
obey the lawful directives” of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Petitioner contends, the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case against the mayor
because the crime involved (rape) was not committed in relation to a public office. For this reason, it is
argued that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to place her and Provincial Prosecutor
Kintanar under preventive suspension for refusing to follow his orders and to cite them for indirect
contempt for such refusal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor
to assist in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo.

RULING: Yes. The office of the Ombudsman has the power to “investigate and prosecute on its own or
on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.

“This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a
public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected
with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty.

It does not matter that the office of the Provincial Prosecutor had already conducted the preliminary
investigation and all that remained to be one was for the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file the
corresponding case in court. Even if the preliminary investigation had been given over to the Provincial
Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature of the offense to be charged would still be subject
to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman.

DOCTRINE: This case illustrates the expanded powers of the Ombudsman as mandated by the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 (RA 6770) to ensure accountability among public officials. It underscores the
principle that public officials are subject to the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman in cases of misconduct,
irrespective of whether the acts are related to their official functions. This decision reaffirms the
Ombudsman’s integral role in maintaining integrity within the public service.
 Bureau of Internal Revenue v. Office of the Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 115103, 11 April 2002

FACTS: Graft Investigation Officer II Christopher S. Soquilon of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman) received information regarding allegedly anomalous grant of tax refunds to Distillera
Limtuaco & Co., Inc. (Limtuaco) and La Tondeña Distilleries, Inc. (La Tondeña), and immediately
recommended to then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez that the "case" be docketed and subsequently
assigned to him for investigation. The Ombudsman then issued a subpoena duces tecum to the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) ordering them to appear before the Ombudsman and to bring the complete
original case dockets of the refunds granted to Limtuaco and La Tondeña. The BIR moved to vacate the
subpoena duces tecum, but the Ombudsman denied such motion. The BIR moved to reconsider,
alleging that the matter subject of the investigation was beyond the scope of the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman and that it had the exclusive authority whether to grant a tax credit and that the
jurisdiction to review the same was lodged with the Court of Tax Appeals and not with the
Ombudsman. Moreover, BIR insists that the investigative power of the Ombudsman is not unbridled.
Particularly on the issue of tax refunds, the BIR maintains that the Ombudsman could validly exercise
its power to investigate only when there is an appropriate case and subject to the limitations provided
by law. The BIR opines that the fact-finding investigation by the Ombudsman is not the proper case as
it is only a step preliminary to the filing of recovery actions on the tax refunds granted to Limtuaco and
La Tondeña.

ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not a pending action is necessary before the Ombudsman can validly exercise its
investigative power.
(2) Whether or not the determination of granting tax refunds by the BIR could no longer be disturbed
by the Ombudsman through its investigative power.

RULING: As to the first issue, the Court held that the pendency of an action is not a prerequisite before
the Ombudsman can start its own investigation. Under the 1987 Constitution, Ombudsman and his
Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials or employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof. Clearly, there is no requirement of a pending action before the Ombudsman
could wield its investigative power. The Ombudsman could resort to its investigative prerogative on its
own or upon a complaint filed in any form or manner. Even when the complaint is verbal or written,
unsigned or unverified, the Ombudsman could, on its own, initiate the investigation. The Court further
explained that the Office of the Ombudsman is different from other investigatory and prosecutory
agencies of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through
official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them.

As to the second issue, the Court held that the contention of the BIR is baseless. The power to
investigate and to prosecute which was granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified.
The Ombudsman Act makes it perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all
kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance that have been committed by any officer or
employee during his tenure of office. Concededly, the determination of whether to grant a tax refund
falls within the exclusive expertise of the BIR. Nonetheless, when there is a suspicion of even just a
tinge of impropriety in the grant of the same, the Ombudsman could rightfully ascertain whether the
determination was done in accordance with law and identify the persons who may be held responsible
thereto. In that sense, the Ombudsman could not be accused of unlawfully intruding into and
intervening with the BIR's exercise of discretion.
 Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc, et al, G.R. Nos. 145957-68, 25 January 2002

FACTS: Respondents were employed at the Office of the Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC),
Davao del Sur, Provincial Office, Digos, Davao del Sur with salaries below grade 27, as follows: 1. Mr.
Ruben Enoc, Provincial Officer 2. Ms. Susana B. Abawag, Special Disbursing Officer 3. Mr. Dominador
D. Dala, Supply Officer 4. Mr. Teodoro Yos, Inspector 5. Ms. Leticia Lagunsay, Employee 6. Ms. Emma
Ligason-Bernales, Public Health Nurse I 7. Ms. Elvira I. Lim, Development Management Officer (DMO)
II 8. Dr. Carlos L. Denia, Medical Officer IV 9. Mr. Diomedes E. Mirafuentes, DMO II 10. Ms. Evangeline
Gallito, Employee 11. Ms. Josefina Labo-Tungal, Officer-In-Charge, OSCC Bansalan Sub-Office Two
criminal cases were filed against all of them: (1) 11 counts of malversation, and (2) one count of
violation of RA 3019, section 3 (e). The malversation charges were based on alleged purchases of
medicine and food assistance for cultural community members. The violation of RA 3019 is in
connection with the purchases of supplies for the OSCC without bidding or canvass. Since none of the
respondents had the required rank to be tried for the crimes in the Sandiganbayan, the informations
were filed instead by the Ombudsman in RTC Digos, Davao del Sur. Respondents move to quash the
informations on the basis that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute graft cases falling within
the jurisdiction of regular courts, as held in the case of Uy vs Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the jurisdiction to investigate, file information and
prosecute cases before the regular courts Held The court holds that the Ombudsman has authority to
investigate and prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) against respondents in the RTC, Branch
19 of Digos, Davao Del Sur even as this authority is not exclusive and is shared by him with the regular
prosecutors.

RULING: The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman is not confined to those tried by the Sandiganbayan.
Section 15 (1) of the RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act), which gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11 (4) of the same act, which grants the Special
Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, do not exclude from the Ombudsman's jurisdiction the cases
involving public officers and employees cognizable by other courts.

Section 15 (1): the Ombudsman's exercise of his primary jurisdiction to "take over, at any stage, from
any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases" cognizable the
Sandiganbayan is NOT INCOMPATIBLE with the Ombusman's duty to investigate and prosecute other
offenses committed by public officers and employees Section 11: The Office of the Special Prosecutor is
merely a component of the Office of the

Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the
Ombudsman. As its mere component, lawmakers certainly did not intend to confine the investigatory
and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. Besides, the law likewise allows the
Ombudsman to direct the Special prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11(4c) of RA 6770. The power to investigate and to prosecute
granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any
public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient..
 Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, et al,
G.R. No. 124295, 23 October 2001

FACTS: Judge Renato A. Fuentes presided over an expropriation case in Davao City involving the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). When the government failed to pay
compensation for expropriated properties, the court issued a writ of execution. This led to an auction
sale of DPWH scrap materials, which allegedly included still-serviceable equipment. Complaints from a
congressman and a DPWH official prompted an administrative case against Sheriff Norberto Paralisan,
resulting in his dismissal. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao then initiated a criminal and
administrative investigation against Judge Fuentes for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (R.A. No. 3019).
Fuentes challenged the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction, arguing that only the Supreme Court has the
authority to administratively investigate judges.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate a judge for acts
related to his judicial functions, without a prior administrative case filed before the Supreme Court.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Judge Fuentes and held that the Ombudsman cannot
investigate a judge’s official acts without referring the matter to the Supreme Court. Under Article VIII,
Section 6 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has exclusive administrative supervision over all
courts and their personnel. Allowing the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute judges would
violate the separation of powers and judicial independence.

Thus, the Supreme Court ordered the Ombudsman to dismiss the case and refer the complaint to the
Court for proper administrative action.

DOCTRINE: The Supreme Court has exclusive administrative supervision over the judiciary, including
disciplinary authority over judges.

The Ombudsman cannot investigate judges for acts done in their judicial capacity without first referring
the matter to the Supreme Court.

Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, et al, G.R. No. 161629, 29 July 2005

FACTS: The case involves Atty. Ronaldo P. Ledesma, who served as the Chairman of the First Division
of the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) of the Bureau of Immigration (BID). He was found guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the service due to his failure to properly evaluate applications for the extension
of Temporary Resident Visas (TRVs) for certain foreign nationals. The applications in question were
deemed questionable, and Ledesma was responsible for transmitting these applications to the Board of
Commissioners (BOC) of the BID.

The BSI's role includes not only the transmission of applications but also the interviewing of applicants
and the evaluation of their documents before making recommendations to the BOC. Ledesma was
principally accountable for certifying the regularity and propriety of the applications, which he knew
were defective.

Following a decision by the Court of Appeals on July 29, 2005, which affirmed an earlier ruling from
August 28, 2003, Ledesma was suspended from service for six months and one day without pay. In his
motion for reconsideration, he argued that while the BSI evaluates applications, the final decision rests
with the BOC, which acts as a collegial body. He contended that the BOC's approval of the applications,
despite their alleged defects, implied that the BOC had sanctioned his actions.

ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether Atty. Ledesma's actions constituted conduct prejudicial to the service.
(2) The extent of accountability of the BSI and the BOC in the evaluation and approval of TRV
applications.
(3) The implications of the BOC's approval of applications on Ledesma's liability for the alleged
deficiencies in the applications.

RULING: The court acknowledged that while the BSI is responsible for screening and evaluating
applications, the BOC ultimately makes the independent decision regarding the approval of TRV
extensions. The court noted that the BOC's approval of the applications transmitted by Ledesma
suggested that it found no impropriety or had waived the deficiencies in the applications.

However, the court also emphasized the importance of integrity and discipline in public service. It
cautioned Ledesma to exercise greater care in the performance of his duties, as even minor irregularities
could lead to suspicion and undermine the credibility of his office.

Ultimately, the court modified the penalty imposed on Ledesma, changing his suspension to an
admonition to be more circumspect in his duties, thereby recognizing the need for accountability while
also considering the BOC's role in the approval process
DOCTRINE: The BSI has a critical role in the evaluation of applications for TRV extensions, and its
head is accountable for ensuring the integrity of the applications transmitted to the BOC.

The BOC's approval of applications does not absolve the BSI of its responsibility to conduct thorough
evaluations.

Public officials must maintain the highest standards of integrity and discipline, as even minor lapses
can lead to significant consequences.

Estarija v. Ranada, et al, G. R. No. 159314, 26 June 2006

FACTS: After due proceedings, the Ombudsman found Estarija (petitioner) guilty of dishonesty and
grave misconduct and dismissed him from service.

Estarija seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration. He claimed that his dismissal was
unconstitutional since the Ombudsman did not have direct and immediate power to remove
government officials, whether elective or appointive, who are not removable by impeachment. He
maintained that under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman’s administrative authority is merely
recommendatory.

Estarija likewise argued that Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as “The Ombudsman Act of
1989” is unconstitutional because it gives the Office of the Ombudsman additional powers that are not
provided for in the Constitution. The Ombudsman denied petitioner’s MR.

Estarija then went to the Court of Appeals via Petition for Review. The CA affirmed the judgment of the
Ombudsman. It held that the constitutionality issue was belatedly raised by petitioner in the motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Ombudsman.

Petitioner then went to the SC via Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether or not the power of the Ombudsman to directly remove, suspend, demote, fine or
censure erring officials violates the Constitution.

RULING: No. In passing Rep. Act No. 6770, Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with the
power to prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees to make him a more active
and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office. Moreover, the legislature
has vested the Ombudsman with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions. x x x x In
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, we held that Rep. Act No. 6770 is consistent with the intent of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution. They gave Congress the discretion to give the Ombudsman powers that are
not merely persuasive in character. Thus, in addition to the power of the Ombudsman to prosecute and
conduct investigations, the lawmakers intended to provide the Ombudsman with the power to punish
for contempt and preventively suspend any officer under his authority pending an investigation when
the case so warrants. He was likewise given disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies except members of
Congress and the Judiciary. It must be stressed that the Constitution gave Congress the discretion to
give the Ombudsman other powers and functions. Thus, the Constitution does not restrict the powers
of the Ombudsman in Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, but allows the Legislature to enact
a law that would spell out the powers of the Ombudsman. Through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6770,
specifically Section 15, par. 3, the lawmakers gave the Ombudsman such powers to sanction erring
officials and employees, except members of Congress, and the Judiciary. To conclude, we hold that
Sections 15, 21, 22 and 25 of Republic Act No. 6770 are constitutionally sound. The powers of the
Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render this constitutional
body not merely functional but also effective. Thus, we hold that under Republic Act No. 6770 and the
1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government
service an erring public official other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.
 Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing, et al, G.R. No. 165416, 22 January 2008

FACTS: Florita A. Masing, a former principal of Davao City Integrated Special School, and Jocelyn A.
Tayactac, an office clerk, were charged with administrative offenses before the Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao. The charges involved collecting unauthorized fees, failing to remit
authorized fees, and misappropriating public funds.

The Ombudsman found Masing guilty of gross misconduct, neglect of duty, and violations of Republic
Act No. 6713, ordering her dismissal. Tayactac was found guilty of simple neglect of duty and was
suspended for six months. The respondents challenged the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction, arguing that the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) had exclusive disciplinary authority under
Republic Act No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers). The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
the respondents, reversing the Ombudsman’s decision and ordering their reinstatement. The
Ombudsman sought review before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to directly discipline public school
teachers and employees or merely recommend disciplinary action to the DECS.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Office of the Ombudsman, reversing the decision of
the Court of Appeals and reinstating the Ombudsman’s rulings.

The 1987 Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) grant the Ombudsman
broad powers to investigate and discipline public officials, including public school teachers.
The Ombudsman’s power is not merely recommendatory; it has the authority to impose disciplinary
actions and ensure compliance with its decisions.

Republic Act No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers) does not preclude the Ombudsman
from exercising its jurisdiction over administrative cases involving public school teachers. The DECS
procedure under Section 9 of the Magna Carta only applies to investigations conducted by the DECS
itself.

The Court clarified that the Ombudsman’s authority to discipline extends to all government officials
and employees, except those removable by impeachment, members of Congress, and the Judiciary.

DOCTRINE: The Ombudsman has concurrent investigative and disciplinary authority over public
school teachers and employees, as granted by the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770. Its decisions are
not merely recommendatory but have binding effect.
 Samson v. Restrivera, G.R. No. 178454, 28 March 2011

FACTS: Petitioner Filipina Samson was a department head at the Population Commission, located at
the Provincial Capitol in Trece Martirez City, Cavite. In March 2001, she agreed to assist her friend, Julia
A. Restrivera, in registering Restrivera's land in Carmona, Cavite, under the Torrens System. Petitioner
estimated the expenses for this process to be around P150,000 and accepted an initial payment of
P50,000 from Restrivera to cover these costs. However, it was later discovered that the land in question
was government property, which rendered the registration impossible.

When petitioner failed to return the P50,000 after not completing the task, Restrivera filed a criminal
complaint against her for estafa and also lodged an administrative complaint for grave misconduct
against her before the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of violating
Section 4(b) of Republic Act No. 6713, known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees, and initially suspended her for six months without pay. This penalty was later
reduced to three months upon reconsideration.

The Ombudsman concluded that petitioner's acceptance of the payment created a perception that she
was acting as a fixer, which was contrary to the ethical standards expected of public officials. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the Ombudsman's decision, leading to the present petition for review.

Petitioner’s Arguments:
• The Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction over the complaint since the act was a private matter and not
related to her official duties.
• The dismissal of the estafa case indicated that she could not be found administratively liable for
misconduct.
• She argued for mitigating circumstances, citing her long years of public service and that this was her
first charge.

Respondent’s Arguments:
• The Ombudsman had jurisdiction over the complaint, as it involved acts that were illegal or
improper, regardless of whether they were related to official duties.
• Petitioner failed to uphold the standards of conduct required of public officials by accepting payment
for work she did not complete.
• The issues raised by petitioner were already resolved correctly by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE/S: Does the Ombudsman have jurisdiction over a case involving a private dealing by a
government employee, or where the act complained of is not related to the performance of official
duty?

RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals
regarding the administrative liability of the petitioner. It ruled that the Ombudsman indeed had
jurisdiction over the complaint, as the law does not require that the act or omission be connected to the
performance of official duties. The Court emphasized that administrative cases can proceed
independently of criminal proceedings, and the dismissal of the estafa case did not preclude
administrative liability.

The Court also clarified that while the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals found petitioner guilty of
violating Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713, it noted that this section merely sets a standard of conduct and
does not constitute a ground for disciplinary action on its own. The Court referenced a previous ruling
(Domingo v. Office of the Ombudsman) that established that failure to abide by the norms of conduct
under Section 4(b) is not a ground for administrative action.

However, the Court found that petitioner was guilty of conduct unbecoming a public officer due to her
failure to return the P50,000 after not fulfilling her promise. The Court noted that her actions could
erode public trust in government employees, especially given her high position. The penalty was
modified to a fine of P15,000 instead of suspension, considering her long service and the fact that this
was her first charge.

DOCTRINE: The Ombudsman has jurisdiction over acts of public officials that may not be directly
related to their official duties if such acts are illegal, unjust, or improper.

Administrative liability can exist independently of criminal liability, and the dismissal of a criminal case
does not automatically absolve a public official from administrative accountability.

The standards of conduct set forth in R.A. No. 6713 serve as ideals for public officials but do not
constitute grounds for disciplinary action unless specified in the implementing rules.
 Gonzales III v. Office of the President, et al, G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014

FACTS: Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzales III was dismissed by the Office of the President (OP)
for gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct in handling the administrative case of Senior Inspector
Rolando Mendoza. Mendoza was dismissed from service due to a robbery-extortion case and later took
a tourist bus hostage in 2010, leading to multiple deaths. The Incident Investigation and Review
Committee (IIRC) found Gonzales accountable for delays in resolving Mendoza’s appeal, allegedly
contributing to Mendoza's desperate actions.

Gonzales questioned the OP’s jurisdiction, arguing that under Section 21 of R.A. No. 6770 (The
Ombudsman Act of 1989), only the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over the Deputy
Ombudsman.

ISSUE/S: Whether to not the Office of the President (OP) had no authority to discipline him, as such
jurisdiction lies solely with the Ombudsman under Section 21 of RA No. 6770.

RULING:
Unconstitutionality of Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770: The Supreme Court ruled that granting the
President the power to discipline and remove a Deputy Ombudsman violates the constitutional
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman under Article XI, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution.

The Ombudsman and its deputies must be insulated from political influence, ensuring their
impartiality in investigating and prosecuting public officials.

Invalidity of Gonzales’ Dismissal: The OP had no jurisdiction to remove Gonzales.

There was no gross neglect of duty since Gonzales acted on Mendoza’s appeal within a reasonable
period. The Office of the Ombudsman retains the authority to determine any administrative liability
under civil service rules.

DOCTRINE: The Office of the Ombudsman is independent, and its Deputies cannot be disciplined or
removed by the President.

The President’s power over non-impeachable officials must respect the independence of constitutional
offices.
III. Powers and Functions of Administrative Agencies: Quasi-Legislative or Rule-Making
Function of Administrative Agencies

A. Non-delegation Doctrine

Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners,

G.R. No. L-11216, 6 March 1916

FACTS: In 1965, Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a foreign corporation organized under the
laws of Spain and engaged in business in the Philippines as a common carrier of passengers and
merchandise by water, received a show-cause order from the Board of Public Utility Commissioners.
The order asked Compania General why it should not be required to present detailed annual reports on
its operations and finances.

The Board was invoking Sec. 16(e) of Act No. 2307, which states that the Board shall have the power to
require every public utility to submit an annual report of finances and operations, "in such form and
containing such matters as the Board may from time to time by order prescribe."

In its return to the show-cause order, Compania General refused to provide annual reports of its
finances and operations, saying that the power being invoked by the Board constituted an invalid
delegation of authority by Congress.

The Board eventually decided to require Compania General to submit a report of its finances and
operations. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the power being invoked by the Board was an invalid delegation of power by
Congress.

RULING: Yes. Sec. 16(e) of Act No. 2307 leaves a lot of discretion to the Board in the manner by which
it shall administer such power. The law is effectively an expression of the will of the Board and not an
expression of the will of Congress or the will of the State with respect to the public utilities to which it
refers.

Indeed, the subject provision does not lay down the general rules of action under which the
commission shall proceed, nor does it itself prescribe in detail what those reports shall contain.

The Legislature seems simply to have authorized the Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require
what information the Board wants. It would seem that the Legislature, by the provision in question,
delegated to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners all of its powers over a given subject-matter in a
manner almost absolute, and without laying down a rule or even making a suggestion by which that
power is to be directed, guided or applied.

Practically everything is left to the judgment and discretion of the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners, which is unrestrained as to when it shall act, why it shall act, how it shall act, to what
extent it shall act, or what it shall act upon.

As such, the Board's order against Compania General is set aside. Case is remanded to the Board for
dismissal.
 United States v. Ang Tang Ho, G.R. No. 17122, 27 February 1922

FACTS: The Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868 “An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding
of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the
distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General xxx to issue the necessary rules
and regulations therefor xxx”.

Pursuant thereto, the Governoe-General issued Executive Order No. 53 fixing the price at which rice
should be sold. Defendant Ang Tang Ho who sold rice at a price greater than that fixed by Executive
Order No. 53 was found guilty of violation thereof. He contested the validity of said law averring that it
constituted invalid delegation of legislative power

ISSUE/S: Did Act No. 2868 validly delegate legislative power to the Governor-General?

RULING: No. A law must be complete in all its terms and provision. When it leaves the legislative
branch of the government, nothing must be left to the judgment of the delegate of the legislature. The
Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the
Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued “for any cause,” and
leaves the question as to what is “any cause” to the discretion of the Gov-Gen.

The Act also says it may be issued “…whenever… conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in
the price of palay, rice or corn.” The Legislature does not specify or define what is “an extraordinary
rise.”

The Act also says that the Governor-General, “with the consent of the Council of State,” is authorized to
issue and promulgate “temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this
Act.” It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such
temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect.

That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order,
but has left it to the sole judgment and discretion of the Governor-Gener to say what is or what is not “a
cause,” and what is or what is not “an extraordinary rise in the price, and as to what is a “temporary
rule” or an “emergency measure” for the carrying out the purposes of the Act.

DOCTRINE: The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate
a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its
own action to depend. (US v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1)
 People of the People Islands, et al. v. Vera, G.R. No. L-45685, 16 November 1937

FACTS: Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano
Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled “The People of the Philippine Islands
vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.”, Court of First Instance of Manila, on January 8, 1934, rendered a
judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty.

The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct
Philippine Legislature. The CFI of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred the application for
probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same. June 18, 1937.
Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the
petition for hearing.

Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the herein respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition, alleging, among other things,
that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution,
is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands (in that
Philippine Legislature is made to apply only to the provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states that it
is to be made applicable to chartered cities like the City of Manila) and because section of the said Act
endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective
or otherwise in their respective provinces.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Act no. 4221 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

RULING: Section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative
authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.

The power to make laws — the legislative power — is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones
Law (sec. 12) and in a unicamiral National Assembly by the Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1, Constitution of
the Philippines). The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties and
responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. The rule, however, which
forbids the delegation of legislative power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions.

The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided
for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals.
Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction
of the Probation Office.

In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to
inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.

For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative bodies
endowed with power to determine when the Act should take effect in their respective provinces. They
are the agents or delegates of the legislature in this respect. The rules governing delegation of legislative
power to administrative and executive officers are applicable or are at least indicative of the rule which
should be here adopted. An examination of a variety of cases on delegation of power to administrative
bodies will show that the ratio decidendi is at variance but, it can be broadly asserted that the rationale
revolves around the presence or absence of a standard or rule of action — or the sufficiency thereof —
in the statute, to aid the delegate in exercising the granted discretion. In some cases, it is held that the
standard is sufficient; in others that is insufficient; and in still others that it is entirely lacking. As a rule,
an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary
powers delegated to it.
In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards in the exercise of their discretionary
power to determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in their respective provinces? What
standards are fixed by the Act? We do not find any and none has been pointed to us by the respondents.
The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial
boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, if we may
use the language of Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission”
which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the
legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the
provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other
words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the
Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not
wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed
amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other
interpretation. This, to our minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.

Pelaez v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-23825, 24 December 1965

FACTS: In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this
was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary of any municipality and may change the
seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require the
then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor
general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs
were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of
RA 2370 which provides that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names
changed” except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the President, under this new law, cannot even
create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are
units of municipalities?”

The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being
created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created
without creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated
such power to create municipalities to the President.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue
of Sec. 68 of the RAC.

RULING: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete
in itself – it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate;
and (b) fix a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable – to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such
standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or
formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard,
there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within
or beyond the scope of his authority.

Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may require” – which
would mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require – is present,
still, such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what
the phrase “as the public welfare may require” qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence,
the proper interpretation is “the President may change the seat of government within any subdivision
to such place therein as the public welfare may require.” Only the seat of government may be changed
by the President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of a municipality.

The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently
legislative in character not administrative (not executive).
 Edu v. Ericta, supra

FACTS: Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner, petitioned the SC to rule
squarely on the constitutionality of the Reflector Law in this proceeding for certiorari and prohibition
against respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G. Ericta of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch, to annul and set aside his order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
directed against Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner for the enforcement of the aforesaid statute, in
a pending suit in his court for certiorari and prohibition, filed by the other respondent Teddy C. Galo
assailing; the validity of such enactment as well as such administrative order.

Such administrative order, which took effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect
reproducing what was set forth in the Act. Thus: “No motor vehicles of whatever style, kind, make,
class or denomination shall be registered if not equipped with reflectors. Such reflectors shall either be
factory built-in-reflector commercial glass reflectors, reflection tape or luminous paint. The luminosity
shall have an intensity to be maintained visible and clean at all times such that if struck by a beam of
light shall be visible 100 meters away at night.” 35 Then came a section on dimensions, placement and
color.

As to dimensions the following is provided for: “Glass reflectors — Not less than 3 inches in diameter
or not less than 3 inches square; Reflectorized Tape — At least 3 inches wide and 12 inches long. The
painted or taped area may be bigger at the discretion of the vehicle owner.” Provision is then made as to
how such reflectors are to be “placed, installed, pasted or painted.”

There is the further requirement that in addition to such reflectors there shall be installed, pasted or
painted four reflectors on each side of the motor vehicle parallel to those installed, pasted or painted in
front and those in the rear end of the body thereof. The color required of each reflectors, whether built-
in, commercial glass, reflectorized tape or reflectorized paint placed in the front part of any motor
vehicle shall be amber or yellow and those placed on the sides and in the rear shall all be red.

Penalties resulting from a violation thereof could be imposed. Thus: “Non-compliance with the
requirements contained in this Order shall be sufficient cause to refuse registration of the motor vehicle
affected and if already registered, its registration maybe suspended in pursuance of the provisions of
Section 16 of RA 4136; Provided, however, that in the case of the violation of Section 1 (a) and (b) and
paragraph (8) Section 3 hereof, a fine of not less than ten nor more than fifty pesos shall be imposed.
The respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration of the order of injunction.

ISSUE/S:
1.) WON Reflector Law is unconstitutional.
2.) WON A.O No. 2 is invalid and contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power.

RULING: NO. both are valid and constitutional. It is thus obvious that the challenged statute is a
legislation enacted under the police power to promote public safety. What is delegated is authority
which is non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of
Congress being assumed.

1. Police Power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. “the
most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable of powers,” (Justice Holmes) aptly pointed out “to all
the great public needs.”

Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it
could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: “Needs that were
narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation.

2. Delegation of Legislative Power. It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of

separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of
the government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its
exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter
and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves
the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative
power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The
legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and
what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which
the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of
power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which
constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to
exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call be made. The Constitution
is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and
practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that
the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the
charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which
legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated
may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.

The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met.
The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy
and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is
public safety.

Agustin v. Edu, et al., G.R. No. L-49112, 2 February 1979

FACTS: On December 2, 1974, President Ferdinand Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 229,
which required all motor vehicles to secure early warning devices (EWD) consisting of a pair of
triangular, collapsible, reflectorized plates in red and yellow to be purchased from the Land
Transportation Commission. The purposes of this LOI were to prevent accidents caused by vehicular
obstructions and to adhere to the road safety standards outlined in the 1968 Vienna Convention on
Road Signs and Signals, which the Philippines had ratified as per PD No. 207.

LOI No. 229 was later amended by LOI No. 479 issued on November 15, 1976. Unlike before where
owners of motor vehicles were required to purchase the reflectorized plates from the Land
Transportation Commission, LOI No. 479 now made it possible for said owners to buy early warning
devices anywhere so long as they adhere to the standards prescribed by the Land Transportation
Commissioner.

President Marcos issued a six-month suspension of said LOI, after which he issued another LOI lifting
its suspension. On August 29, 1978, Land Transportation Commissioner Romeo Edu issued
Memorandum Circular No. 32, which contained LTC Administrative Order No. 1 or the rules and
regulations in the implementation of LOI No. 229 as amended.

Leovilo Agustin, a private citizen and owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, filed a petition before the SC,
assailing the constitutionality of both LOI No. 229 as amended and LTC Administrative Order No. 1.
Among others, Agustin claimed that LOI No. 229 was violative of the provisions and delegation of
police power, an oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, and unconstitutional order that was
contrary to the precepts of the New Society. Pending its final resolution, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order preventing agencies concerned from implementing both LOI No. 229 as amended and
LTC Administrative Order No. 1.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not LOI No. 229 as amended violated the constitutional provision on undue
delegation of power.

RULING: No, the Court ruled that LOI No. 229 as amended falls within the State's police power, and
President Marcos' issuance of the same was clearly an exercise of such power. The intent of the law can
be clearly seen in the WHEREASes of the assailed LOI (to prevent accidents, safeguard the safety of the
public, and adhere to the State's commitment to public international law). The Court later went on a
lengthy discourse in defining what police power is:

"Nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty." (Chief Justice
Taney, US Supreme Court Chief Justice, 1847)

"The State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to achieve the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State." (Calalang v.
Williams)

"The power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order or safety, and
general welfare of the people." (Primicias v. Fugoso)

"Inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and
welfare of society." (Justice Malcolm)

"The totality of legislative power." (Morfe v. Mutuc)

"A dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in
organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights
did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably
the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to communal peace, safety, good order, and
welfare."
 Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. L-
58184, 30 October 1981

FACTS: On 14 September 1981, the Free Telephone Workers Union (FTWU), employees of the
Philippine Long Distance Company (PLDT) filed a notice of strike with the Minister of Labor (Blas
Ople). FTWU alleged that PLDT violated certain labor law provisions and certain provisions of their
collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Minister of Labor, in accordance with Article 264 of the
Labor Code (as amended by BP 130) took over the matter and on 25 September 1981 Blas Ople certified
the labor dispute to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration and
enjoined any strike at the PLDT.

FTWU now questions the constitutionality of Article 264 on the ground that the law was an undue
delegation of legislative power by Congress to the Minister of Labor. It was submitted that there was an
undue delegation of the power and discretion to assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for
compulsory arbitration to the NLRC, and in effect make or unmake the law on free collective
bargaining; that the law is contrary to the assurance of the State to the workers’ right to self-
organization and collective bargaining.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not such provision is an undue delegation of power.

RULING: No. In the first place, this issue is not yet ripe for adjudication as the Minister of Labor was
yet to take on the entirety of the case. There is still no ground to rule that there is an unconstitutional
application of the law.

There is no undue delegation of legislative power. The law in question provides:

In labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest,
such as may occur in but not limited to public utilities, companies engaged in the generation or
distribution of energy, banks, hospitals, and those within export processing zones, the Minister of Labor
and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the
Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of
automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout. If one has already taken place at
the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to
work and the employers shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same
terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Minister may seek the assistance of
law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he
may issue to enforce the same.

The rule is: what cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter
and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves
the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative
power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The
legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and
what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which
the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of
power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which
constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be made.

The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of
flexibility and practicability. To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which
implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters principle and lays down
fundamental policy.

There is no undue delegation in this case. The law in issue is complete and it set a sufficient standard.
The law cannot be any clearer, the coverage being limited to “strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the
national interest.” The petitioners are employees of a company engaged in the delivery of public
communication which is of vital public interest.
 Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz, et. al, G.R. No. 84818,
18 December 1989

FACTS: By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to establish,
construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station or
stations and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite communications." Under this
franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to "construct and operate such ground facilities as
needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground
terminal or terminals.”

Pursuant to the said franchise, petitioner, since 1967, has established its earth stations and antennas to
provide direct satellite communication. Since 1968, the petitioner has been leasing its satellite circuits to
different telephone, cable, and radio companies.

Executive Order No. 196 placed the petitioner under the jurisdiction, control, and regulation of
respondent NTC, including all its facilities and services and the fixing of rates.

Petitioner filed with respondent NTC an application for authority to continue operating and
maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously operating and maintaining since 1967, to
continue providing the international satellite communications services it has likewise been providing
since 1967, and to charge the current rates applied for in rendering such services. Pending the hearing,
it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue to operate and maintain the above-
mentioned facilities, provide the services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for.

PHILCOMSAT was granted one-year provisional authority to continue operating its existing facilities,
to render the services it was then offering, and to charge the rates it was then charging.

The NTC order had extended the provisional authority of the petitioner for another six (6) months, but
it directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen percent (15%)
on the present authorized rates.

PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and commissioner Alcuaz assailING the said directive and holds that the
enabling act (EO 546) of the NTC, empowering it to fix rates for public service communications, does
not provide the necessary standards which were constitutionally required, hence, there is an undue
delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC.

PHILCOMSAT asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, providing for the creation of NTC
and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of EO 196, placing PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of
NTC, can it be inferred that NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and
adjudicatory powers.

PHILCOMSAT subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction
of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to NTC, the exercise of
which allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the questioned order violates procedural due process for having been issued
motu proprio without prior notice and hearing and the rate reduction it imposes is unjust, unreasonable
and confiscatory.
RULING: YES. The application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies
is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative: that where the function of the administrative agency is
legislative, notice and hearing are not required, but where an order applies to a named person, as in the
instant case, the function involved is adjudicatory.

The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a
quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to the petitioner and
to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although patently superficial, that there is merit
in a reduction of some of the rates charged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial
statements-without affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or
aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was
offered nor were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to impose
as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner could be
in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business requirements. The rates it
charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies
attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to
lend greater credence to petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its rates would
adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public considering the maintenance
requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner
was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which
respondent NTC based its questioned order.

While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of the
petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory
procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming
that such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner.
Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature does not perforce entail the applicability of a
different rule of statutory procedure that would otherwise be applied to any other order on the same
matter unless otherwise provided by the applicable law. In the case at bar, the applicable statutory
provision is Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act which provides:

Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing the Commission shall have power,
upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the
limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, ... which shall be imposed, observed and followed
thereafter by any public service;

There is no reason to assume that the aforesaid provision does not apply to respondent NTC, there
being no limiting, excepting, or saving provisions to the contrary in Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196.

It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without
first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial
whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own
motion as in the present case. That such a hearing is required is evident in respondents' order of
September 16, 1987 in NTC Case No. 87-94 which granted PHILCOMSAT a provisional authority "to
continue operating its existing facilities, to render the services it presently offers, and to charge the rates
as reduced by them "under the condition that "(s)ubject to hearing and the final consideration of the
merit of this application, the Commission may modify, revise or amend the rates ..." 12

While it may be true that for purposes of rate-fixing respondents may have other sources of information
or data, still, since a hearing is essential, respondent NTC should act solely on the basis of the evidence
before it and not on knowledge or information otherwise acquired by it but which is not offered in
evidence or, even if so adduced, petitioner was given no opportunity to controvert.

Again, the order requires the new reduced rates to be made effective on a specified date. It becomes a
final legislative act as to the period during which it has to remain in force pending the final
determination of the case. 13 An order of respondent NTC prescribing reduced rates, even for a
temporary period, could be unjust, unreasonable or even confiscatory, especially if the rates are
unreasonably low since the utility permanently loses its just revenue during the prescribed period. In
fact, such order is in effect final insofar as the revenue during the period covered by the order is
concerned. Upon a showing, therefore, that the order requiring a reduced rate is confiscatory, and will
unduly deprive petitioner of a reasonable return upon its property, a declaration of its nullity becomes
inductible, which brings us to the issue on substantive due process.
 Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325 (1997) (non-delegation
issue only)

FACTS: Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed a petition before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) seeking
to amend the 1987 Constitution through a people’s initiative, specifically to remove term limits for
elected officials. COMELEC, in response, issued Resolution No. 2300 to facilitate the petition process.
However, several groups, including Senators and civic organizations, challenged the validity of such
actions, arguing that there was no valid enabling law for a people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution.

ISSUE/S: Whether the delegation of legislative power to COMELEC through R.A. No. 6735 was valid.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the delegation of power to COMELEC under R.A. No. 6735
was invalid. The law failed to meet the two essential requirements for valid delegation:

Completeness Test – A law must be complete in itself, setting forth the policy to be implemented.
Sufficient Standard Test – A law must provide a clear standard to guide the delegated authority.

The Court held that R.A. No. 6735 was incomplete, inadequate, and insufficient to serve as an enabling
law for constitutional amendments via a people’s initiative. Because of this, COMELEC had no
authority to promulgate rules for the process, making its actions void.

The Supreme Court ruled that COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
in entertaining the Delfin Petition. R.A. No. 6735 did not sufficiently empower COMELEC to regulate a
people’s initiative for constitutional amendments, rendering COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 void.

DOCTRINE: Potestas delegata non delegari potest (What has been delegated cannot be further
delegated).

Delegation of legislative power is valid only if the law is complete and provides sufficient standards to
guide the delegate.

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)

FACTS: Congress made a delegation of power to the President of the United States under Section:9(c)
of the National Industrial Recovery Act which exceeded constitutional limits.

Section:9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933 authorized the President of the
United States “to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the
products thereof produced to withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be
produced or withdrawn from storage by any state law or valid regulation or order prescribed
thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State. Any violation
of an order of the President issued under the provisions of this subsection shall be punishable by a fine,
not to exceed $1,000, or imprisonment not to exceed six months, or both.” The President issued the
foregoing prohibition by Executive Order, and then authorized the Secretary of Interior to exercise all of
the powers vested in the President under Section:9(c). The Secretary of Interior then issued regulations
to carry out the President’s orders, which required all petroleum producers to file monthly statements,
under oath, with the Division of Investigations of the Department of the Interior. Further, the President
approved a “Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry,” and designated the Secretary of
Interior with all of the powers vested in him under the Act and the Code. Section:9(c) was challenged
on the ground that it was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power by Congress.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the delegation of power to the President under Section:9(c) of the National
Industrial Recovery Act an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.

RULING: Yes. The attempted delegation was plainly void because the power sought to be delegated
was legislative power, but nowhere in the statute did Congress declare or indicate any policy or
standard to guide or limit the President when acting under the delegation. Dissent. Justice Cardozo felt
that the “declaration of policy” in Section:1 of the Act, stating that there was a national emergency, was
a sufficient definition of a standard to make the statute valid. Concurrence. None.
Discussion.

The Executive Orders and regulations issued by the Secretary of Interior were void because the
delegation of power to the President under Section:9(c) was without constitutional authority.

DOCTRINE: There are limits of delegation which there is no constitutional authority to transcend.
Although the Constitution has never been regarded as denying to Congress the necessary resources of
flexibility and practicality, Congress is forbidden to delegate the essential legislative functions which it
is vested by Article I, Section:1 and Article I, Section:8 of the United States Constitution.
 Abakada Guro Party List, etc., et al. v. Exec. Sec. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 168207,
1 September 2005 (non-delegation issue only)

FACTS: RA 9337, an act amending certain sections of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, is
questioned by petitioners for being unconstitutional. Procedural issues raised by petitioners are the
legality of the bicameral proceedings, exclusive origination of revenue measures and the power of the
Senate concomitant thereto.

Also, Substantive issue was raised with regard to the undue delegation of legislative power to the
President to increase the rate of value-added tax to 12%.

Petitioners also argue that the increase to 12%, as well as the 70% limitation on the creditable input tax,
the 60- month amortization on the purchase or importation of capital goods exceeding P1,000,000.00,
and the 5% final withholding tax by government agencies, is arbitrary, oppressive, and confiscatory,
and that it violates the constitutional principle on progressive taxation, among others.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
respectively, of the NIRC giving the President the stand-by authority to raise the VAT rate from 10% to
12% when a certain condition is met, constitutes undue delegation of the legislative power to tax.

RULING: NO. The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a
delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate
under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1,
2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the
12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive.

No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact
that the word shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the word shall connotes a mandatory
order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of
discretion.Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and
courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.

Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence
of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty which cannot be evaded by the President.
Inasmuch as the law specifically uses the word shall, the exercise of discretion by the President does not
come into play. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are
present. The time of taking into effect of the 12% VAT rate is based on the happening of a certain
specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or body
other than the legislature itself.

Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Ermita, 583 SCRA 428 (2009)

FACTS: Following the 2006 Nursing Board Examination leakage scandal, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 566 (EO 566), which directed the Commission on Higher Education
(CHED) to regulate the establishment and operation of review centers in the country. The Review
Center Association of the Philippines and various independent review centers challenged the validity
of EO 566 and its implementing rules, arguing that it unconstitutionally expanded CHED’s jurisdiction
beyond what was provided in Republic Act No. 7722 (Higher Education Act of 1994).

ISSUE/S: Whether EO 566 constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power by expanding

CHED’s authority beyond the scope of its enabling law.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that EO 566 was unconstitutional, as it unlawfully expanded
CHED’s jurisdiction without a legislative basis. The Court emphasized that:

Legislative Power Cannot Be Delegated Without a Clear Standard – Only Congress has the authority to
expand the jurisdiction of CHED. The Executive Department cannot create new regulatory powers
through an executive order.

No Statutory Basis for CHED’s Regulation of Review Centers – CHED’s jurisdiction under RA 7722 is
limited to higher education institutions and degree-granting programs. Review centers, which do not
confer degrees, do not fall within CHED’s mandate.

Doctrine of Potestas Delegata Non Delegari Potest – The power delegated to CHED by Congress
cannot be further delegated by the President to cover review centers, as this would usurp legislative
authority.

Quasi-Legislative Authority Must Have a Valid Delegation – Since EO 566 had no legislative basis, its
implementing rules and regulations were also invalid.

The Supreme Court declared EO 566 and CHED Memorandum Order No. 30, s. 2007, VOID, ruling that
they were issued without legislative authority and violated the principle of separation of powers
DOCTRINE: Delegation of legislative power requires sufficient standards to prevent an agency from
exercising unchecked discretion.

The President cannot unilaterally expand an agency’s jurisdiction without congressional authorization.

A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)

FACTS: A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation (Petitioners) were convicted in the District Court of the
United States for the Eastern District of New York for violating the Live Poultry Code, promulgated
under Section:3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act.

Section:3 of the Act authorized the President to approve “codes of unfair competition” for trades and
industries, and a violation of any code provision in any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce was made a misdemeanor punishable by a fine. The Live Poultry Code was approved by the
President on April 13, 1934. Petitioners were convicted in the District Court for violating the Live
Poultry Code, and contended that the Code had been adopted pursuant to an unconstitutional
delegation by Congress of legislative power.

ISSUE/S: Did Congress, in authorizing the “codes of unfair competition” establish the standards of
legal obligation, thereby performing its essential legislative function?

RULING: No. The code-making authority conferred was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power. Under Title 1, Section:1 of the Act there was a broad “Declaration of Policy,” and the President’s
approval of a code was simply conditioned on his finding that it would “tend to effectuate the policy of
this title.” The Act imposed no limitations on the scope of the new laws, and there was a very wide field
of legislative possibilities. Dissent. None. Concurrence. The delegated power of legislation was
unconfined and vagrant.

Section:3 of the Act was without precedent in that it supplied no standards for any trade, industry or
activity. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorized the President to make the codes to
prescribe them. Congress made an unconstitutional delegation because it vested in the President a
clearly legislative function without imposing necessary standards and restrictions.

DOCTRINE: Congress is not permitted to abdicate or transfer to others the essential legislative
functions with which it is vested by Article I of the Constitution of the United States.

Federal Energy Administration v. Al Gonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 49 L. Ed.
2d 49 94 96 SCT 2295 (1976)

FACTS: The case involves a challenge to the President’s authority under Section 232 of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, which allows the President to impose restrictions on imports for national
security reasons. Acting under this authority, President Nixon imposed license fees on imported oil,
which were later adjusted by President Ford. Algonquin SNG, Inc. and other importers challenged the
fees, arguing that the delegation of power to the President was unconstitutional.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 constitutes an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to the President.

RULING: The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the delegation, ruling that Section 232 provides an
"intelligible principle" to guide the President's actions. The Court reasoned that Congress had set clear
standards by limiting presidential action to cases where imports threatened national security and by
requiring consultation and investigation before imposing restrictions.

The Supreme Court ruled that the delegation of power under Section 232 was valid, as it contained
sufficient standards and procedural safeguards to prevent an unconstitutional transfer of legislative
authority to the President.

DOCTRINE: Intelligible Principle Test – A delegation of power is constitutional as long as Congress

provides clear guidance or an intelligible principle to the delegatee (President in this case).

National Security as a Justifiable Basis – Restrictions on trade are permissible if they align with
Congress’s intent to safeguard national security.
 White v. Roughton, 530 F2d 750 (CA 71976)

FACTS: White, a welfare applicant, challenged the decision-making authority of the local welfare
administrator (Roughton) under Illinois' public assistance system. The system granted broad discretion
to local welfare officials in determining eligibility for assistance. White argued that this delegation of
power lacked clear standards, leading to arbitrary and inconsistent decisions.

ISSUE/S: Whether the delegation of discretionary power to local welfare officials, without clear
standards, is unconstitutional.

RULING: The Seventh Circuit ruled that broad and standardless discretion in determining welfare
eligibility violates due process. The court emphasized that laws delegating power to administrative
officials must include clear guidelines to prevent arbitrary decisions. The ruling stressed the need for
uniform and fair application of welfare policies.

The court found that the delegation of power to local welfare officials was too broad and lacked
sufficient safeguards, making it unconstitutional. The decision reinforced the principle that
discretionary authority must be guided by clear legislative standards to ensure fairness and due
process.

DOCTRINE: Limits on Delegation of Power – Governmental bodies cannot delegate unchecked

discretion to officials without providing clear guidelines.

Due Process and Administrative Discretion – When government benefits (such as welfare) are at stake,
procedural safeguards must be in place to prevent arbitrary decision-making.

B. Permissible Delegation
Ascertainment of Facts

Panama Refining Co. Ryan, supra

FACTS: Congress made a delegation of power to the President of the United States under Section:9(c)
of the National Industrial Recovery Act which exceeded constitutional limits.

Section:9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933 authorized the President of the
United States “to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the
products thereof produced to withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be
produced or withdrawn from storage by any state law or valid regulation or order prescribed
thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State. Any violation
of an order of the President issued under the provisions of this subsection shall be punishable by a fine,
not to exceed $1,000, or imprisonment not to exceed six months, or both.” The President issued the
foregoing prohibition by Executive Order, and then authorized the Secretary of Interior to exercise all of
the powers vested in the President under Section:9(c). The Secretary of Interior then issued regulations
to carry out the President’s orders, which required all petroleum producers to file monthly statements,
under oath, with the Division of Investigations of the Department of the Interior. Further, the President
approved a “Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry,” and designated the Secretary of
Interior with all of the powers vested in him under the Act and the Code. Section:9(c) was challenged
on the ground that it was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power by Congress.

ISSUE/S: Was the delegation of power to the President under Section:9(c) of the National Industrial
Recovery Act an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power?

RULING: Yes. The attempted delegation was plainly void because the power sought to be delegated
was legislative power, but nowhere in the statute did Congress declare or indicate any policy or
standard to guide or limit the President when acting under the delegation. Dissent. Justice Cardozo felt
that the “declaration of policy” in Section:1 of the Act, stating that there was a national emergency, was
a sufficient definition of a standard to make the statute valid. Concurrence. None.

The Executive Orders and regulations issued by the Secretary of Interior were void because the
delegation of power to the President under Section:9(c) was without constitutional authority.

DOCTRINE: There are limits of delegation which there is no constitutional authority to transcend.
Although the Constitution has never been regarded as denying to Congress the necessary resources of
flexibility and practicality, Congress is forbidden to delegate the essential legislative functions which it
is vested by Article I, Section:1 and Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution.
 Lovina v. Moreno, G.R. No. L-178221, Nov. 29, 1963; 9 SCRA 557 (1963)

FACTS: Numerous residents of Macabebe, Pampanga complained that appellees had blocked the
"Sapang Bulati", a navigable river in the same municipality and asked that the obstructions be ordered
removed, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056. After notice and hearing to the parties, the
said Secretary of Public Works and Communications found the constructions to be a public nuisance in
navigable waters, and ordered the land owners, spouses Lovina, to remove five (5) closures of Sapang
Bulati. After receipt of the decision, the appellees filed a petition in CFI of Manila to restrain the
Secretary from enforcing his decision. The trial court, after due hearing, granted a permanent
injunction. It held that Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional and that Sapang Bulati is not a
navigable river but a private stream. The appellees’ contention is that Republic Act No. 2056 is
unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary of Public Works and Communications with sweeping,
unrestrained, final and unappealable authority to pass upon the issues of whether a river or stream is
public and navigable, whether a dam encroaches upon such waters and is constitutive as a public
nuisance, and whether the law applies to the state of facts, thereby Constituting an alleged unlawful
delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not there is an unlawful delegation of judicial power.

RULING: The contentions of the appellees are not tenable. R.A. 2056 merely empowers the Secretary to
remove unauthorized obstructions or encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private
person was anyway entitled to make, because the bed of navigable streams is public property, and
ownership thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession. It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's
power under the Act necessarily involves the determination of some questions of fact, such as the
existence of the stream and its previous navigable character; but these functions, whether judicial or
quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the exercise of the power granted by law to clear navigable
streams of unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, and authorities are clear that they are, validly
conferable upon executive officials provided the party affected is given opportunity to be heard, as is
expressly required by Republic Act No. 2056, section 2. The mere fact that an officer is required by law
to inquire the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his
official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private, rights do not constitute an
exercise of judicial powers. Accordingly, a statute may give to non-judicial officers the power to declare
the existence of facts which call into operation its provisions, and similarly may grant to commissioners
and other subordinate officer, power to ascertain and determine appropriate facts as a basis for
procedure in the enforcement of particular laws. It is noteworthy that Republic Act 2605 authorizes
removal of the unauthorized dikes either as "public nuisances or as prohibited constructions" on public
navigable streams, and those of appellees clearly are in the latter class. In fine, it is held that Republic
Act No. 2056 does not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public
Works; that the findings of fact of the Secretary of Public Works under Republic Act No. 2056 should be
respected in the absence of illegality, error of law, fraud, or imposition, so long as the said, findings are
supported by substantial evidence submitted to him. The decision appealed from is reversed, and the
writs of injunction issued therein are annulled and set aside.
Filling in of Details

Alegre v. Collector of Customs, 53 Phil. 394 (1920)

FACTS: Juan B. Alegre, an abaca producer and exporter, applied for a permit to export 100 bales of
abaca to England. The Insular Collector of Customs denied the request, stating that the shipment
required certification from the Fiber Standardization Board (FSB). Alegre challenged the
constitutionality of the law requiring such certification, arguing that it was an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the law granting the Fiber Standardization Board authority to establish fiber
grading standards and require certification for exports was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power.

RULING: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the law, ruling that the delegation was
valid because:

Legislative Power Cannot Be Delegated, But Administrative Power Can – The legislature set clear
policies and standards for fiber grading, while the FSB was merely tasked with implementing and
enforcing these rules.

FSB’s Role Was Executive, Not Legislative – The Board’s function was to apply and enforce existing
legal standards, not to create new laws.

Delegation Was Necessary – The technical nature of fiber grading required expertise and specialized
administration, which the legislature could not directly perform.

The Supreme Court ruled that the creation of the Fiber Standardization Board and its authority to
certify fiber exports was a valid exercise of administrative power, not an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power.

DOCTRINE: Legislative power cannot be delegated, but administrative functions may be delegated to
executive agencies to carry out the law’s purpose.

The legislature must establish the law’s policy and standards, leaving only its implementation to
administrative bodies