PRESENTATION ON

PROTECTION OF WOMEN FROM

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT,2005
(A) PARTIES BY WHOM AND AGAINST
WHOM RELIEFS CAN BE SOUGHT
(B) TYPES OF RELIEFS
(C) EXECUTION OF ORDERS

BY
G.ARCHANA
PRINCIPAL CIVIL JUDGE (JUNIOR
DIVISION), ADONI
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

S.No. TOPIC PAGE No.

1. Introduction to Protection of Women from Domestic Violence 3

Act,2005
2. Parties By Whom And Against Whom Reliefs Can Be Sought 4

3. Types of reliefs 10

4. Execution of orders 15

5. Conclusion 17

2
 INTRODUCTION
The patriarchal setup has been deeply rooted in Indian society since time immemorial. It may
be believed that this system laid the foundation stone for the abuse of women. Domestic
violence affects women from every social background irrespective of their age, religion,
caste, or class. It is a violent crime that not only affects a person and her children but also has
wider implications for society. Although the root behind the crime is hard to decipher, certain
reasons behind the violence can be traced to the stereotyping of gender roles, and the
distribution of power. The definition of violence has evolved over the years to an extent it not
only includes physical forms of violence but also emotional, mental, financial, and other
forms of cruelty. Thus, the term domestic violence includes acts which harm or endangers the
health, safety, life, limb, or wellbeing (mental or physical) of the victim, or tends to do so,
and includes causing: physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal abuse, emotional abuse, and
economic abuse, perpetrated by any person who is or was in a domestic relationship with the
victim. Before the enactment of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
(“hereinafter to be referred as DV Act”), the victim could approach the court under Section
498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which provides for ‘husband or relative of husband of
a woman subjecting her to cruelty’ wherein only a certain set of offence dealing with cruelty
to married women was the only recourse. All other instances of domestic violence within the
household had to be dealt with under the offences that the respective acts of violence
constituted under the IPC without any regard to the gender of the victim.
To minimize the cumbersome position of law, be it procedural or substantive, the DV Act
was enacted to protect the women from acts of domestic violence. The legislative intent of
the Act was further emphasized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Indra
Sarma v. V.K.V Sarma1, wherein it was stated that the DV Act is enacted to provide a
remedy in civil law for the protection of women, from being victims of such relationship, and
to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the society. Other legislations like CrPC,
IPC, etc., where reliefs have been provided to women who are placed in vulnerable situations
were also discussed.
The objective of the Act is to provide for more effective protection of the rights of women
guaranteed under the Constitution who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within
the family and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The Hon’ble Madras
High Court in the case of Vandhana v. T. Srikanth2, in one of the early cases since the
1
(2013) 15 SCC 755
2
2007 SCC Online Mad 553

3
enactment of the DV Act, observed that the Act was formulated to implement
Recommendation No. 12 of United Nations Committee on Convention on Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 1989 and which was ratified by India
in June, 1993. Interpretation of the DV Act should conform to international conventions and
international instruments and norms. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Ishpal
Singh Kahai v. Ramanjeet Kahai3, reiterated that the object of the DV Act is to grant
statutory protection to victims of violence in the domestic sector who had no proprietary
rights. The Act provides for security and protection of a wife irrespective of her proprietary
rights in her residence. It aims at protecting the wife against violence and at the prevention of
recurrence of acts of violence.
The purpose of DV Act is to protect and curb widely prevalent offences of domestic violence
but women are still at the receiving end not because of inadequate laws but prima facie, due
to lack of its implementation in proper spirit, Maran Nama v. State of Tripura4.

PARTIES BY WHOM AND AGAINST WHOM RELIEFS CAN BE

SOUGHT
Before dwelling into the topic of parties by whom and against whom reliefs under DV Act
can be sought, there are certain important definitions enshrined under the Act which have to
be looked into and they are as follows.
IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS UNDER THE DV ACT
Aggrieved Person:-
According to the definition provided under the DV Act in Section 2(a), an “aggrieved
person” means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the
respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the
respondent. Therefore, any woman who is or has been in a domestic relationship is entitled to
make a complaint invoking provisions of the Act.
Domestic Relationship:-
According to Section 2(f) of DV Act, “domestic relationship” means a relationship between
two persons living in a shared household. Domestic relationship can be through marriage
such as wives, daughters-in-law, sisters-in-law, widows and any other members of the family;
or blood relationship such as mothers, sisters or daughters; and other domestic relationships
3
2011 SCC Online Bom 412
4
2010 SCC OnLine Gau 202.

4
including through adoption, live-in relationships, and women in bigamous relationship or
victims of legally invalid marriages. The law addresses the concerns of women of all ages
irrespective of their marital status.
The definition of “domestic relationship” under the DV Act is exhaustive: when a definition
clause is defined to “mean” such and such, the definition is prima facie restrictive and
exhaustive, Indra Sarma. V.K.V Sarma5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further stated that the
word domestic relationship means a relationship that has some inherent or essential
characteristics of marriage though not a marriage that is legally recognized. Expression
“relationship in the nature of marriage” cannot be construed in the abstract. It is to be taken in
the context in which it appears and to be applied bearing in mind the purpose and object of
DV Act as well as meaning of the expression “in the nature of marriage”.
“Relationship in the nature of marriage”, is akin to a common law marriage which inter alia
requires that the parties must have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves out to the world
as being akin to spouses for a significant period of time. The parties should also have a
“shared household” as defined in Section 2(s). Merely spending weekends or one night
together does not constitute “domestic relationship” under Section 2(f). Further held, not all
live-in relationships form a relationship “in the nature of marriage” because several
parameters have to be satisfied in order to constitute relationship in the nature of marriage.
Lastly, held, relationship with “keep” whom a man uses for sexual purposes and/or as a
servant, does not constitute relationship in the nature of marriage, D. Velusamy v. D.
Patchaiammal6.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court culled out some guidelines for testing under what circumstances,
a live-in relationship will fall within the expression "relationship in the nature of marriage"
under Section 2(f) of the DV Act. The guidelines, of course, are not exhaustive, but will
definitely give some insight to such relationships:
1. Duration of period of relationship: Section 2(f) of the DV Act has used the expression
"at any point of time", which means a reasonable period of time to maintain and continue a
relationship which may vary from case to case, depending upon the fact situation;
2. Shared household: The expression has been defined under Section 2(s) of the DV Act
and, hence, needs no further elaboration;
3. Pooling of resources and financial arrangements: Supporting each other, or any one of
them, financially, sharing bank accounts, acquiring immovable properties in joint names or in
5
(2013) 15 SCC 755
6
(2010) 10 SCC 469

5
the name of the woman, long-term investments in business, shares in separate and joint
names, so as to have a long-standing relationship, may be a guiding factor;
4. Domestic arrangements: Entrusting the responsibility, especially on the woman to run the
home, do the household activities like cleaning, h cooking, maintaining or upkeeping the
house, etc. is an indication of a relationship in the nature of marriage;
5. Sexual relationship: Marriage-like relationship refers to sexual relationship, not just for
pleasure, but for emotional and intimate relationship, for procreation of children, so as to give
emotional support, companionship and also material affection, caring, etc.
6. Children: Having children is a strong indication of a relationship in the nature of
marriage. The parties, therefore, intend to have a long-standing relationship. Sharing the
responsibility for bringing up and supporting them is also a strong indication;
7. Socialisation in public: Holding out to the public and socialising with friends, relations
and others, as if they are husband and wife is a strong circumstance to hold the relationship is
in the nature of marriage.
8. Intention and conduct of the parties: Common intention of the parties as to what their
relationship is to be and to involve, and as to their respective roles and responsibilities,
primarily determines the nature of that relationship. Intention may be expressed or implied
and what is relevant is their intention as to matters that are characteristic of a marriage.
Shared Household:-
According to Section 2(s) of DV Act 2005, a shared household is where the aggrieved person
or a woman lives in a domestic relationship, either singly, or along with the man against
whom the complaint is filed. It may also imply a household where a woman has lived in a
domestic relationship but has been thrown out. This may include all kinds of situations
whether the household is owned by the respondent or it is rented accommodation. It also
includes a house either owned jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent or both
may have jointly or singly, any rights, titles or interests. The DV Act recognizes a woman’s
right to reside in a shared household. This means a woman cannot be thrown out of such a
household except through the procedure established by the law. In case she is thrown out she
can be brought back again after obtaining the order from the court.
A woman to claim the protection of right in “shared household” has to establish (a) that the
relationship with the opposite party is “domestic relationship”, and (b) that the house in
respect of which she seeks to enforce the right is “shared household”. In Indian society, there
are many situations in which a woman may not enter into her matrimonial home immediately
after marriage. A woman might not live at the time of the institution of proceedings or might
6
have lived together with the husband even for a single day in “shared household” should not
be left remediless despite valid marriage. Narrow interpretation of “domestic relationship”
and “shared household” would leave many a woman in distress without remedy. Hence the
correct interpretation of aforesaid definition including the right to live in “shared household”
would be that words “live” or “have at any point of time lived” would include within its
purview “the right to live”, Vandhana v. T. Srikanth. This law does not alter the legality of
ownership or transfer the ownership and a woman cannot claim that she owns a house; it only
provides emergency relief to the victim in the sense that she cannot be thrown out of her
house. For claiming ownership, a woman has to follow a separate legal procedure and has to
file a separate application as per the provisions of laws whichever are applicable to her
situation.
Expression “at any stage has lived” refers to living of aggrieved person in a household at the
time of filing of application under S. 12 or passing of order under S. 19 or her living in recent
past prior to her exclusion from possession or on her remaining temporarily absent.
Expression does not contemplate that wherever aggrieved person lived with relatives of
husband, all such houses shall become shared household, Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha
Ahuja7.
Domestic Violence:-
“Domestic violence” is a broad term that entails not only physical beating but also other
forms of violence such as emotional violence, mental violence, sexual violence, financial
violence and other forms of cruelty that may occur within a household. The definition
provided in Section 3 of the DV Act includes the following as acts of domestic violence:
“Any act, omission or commission or conduct of the respondent shall
constitute domestic violence in case it— (a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety,
life, limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so
and includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic
abuse; or (b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to coerce
her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other
property or valuable security; or (c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any
person related to her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or (d) otherwise
injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.”

7
(2021) 1 SCC 414.

7
The Section also defines the meaning of terms physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and
emotional abuse, and economic abuse. It further enunciates that the overall facts and
circumstances of the case shall be taken into consideration in order to determine whether any
act, omission, commission or conduct of the respondent constitutes “domestic violence”
under the said section.
View that one or two beatings not sufficient in ordinary course for a woman to commit
suicide is not acceptable. Assault on woman cannot be accepted as social norm. What impact
an assault will have on a woman would depend upon circumstances of each case and court
cannot proceed with any fixed rule. Court should be sensitive to women's problems, Vajresh
Venkatray Anvekar v. State of Karnataka8. When a woman after 31 years of marriage,
having no children, compelled to live alone at advanced age of 63 years without any means of
sustenance situation falls within definition of “domestic violence” V.D. Bhanot v. Savita
Bhanot9.
Relationship between same sex partners (gay and lesbian), held, not covered under Section
2(f), Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma. It was further held that (i) relationship between
unmarried adult woman and unmarried adult male who lived or, at any point of time lived
together in a shared household, will fall under Section 2(f); (ii) unmarried woman
unknowingly entering into relationship with married adult male, such a relationship, may be a
relationship in the “nature of marriage”, and may, in a given situation, fall within Section
2(f).
“Economic abuse” includes prohibition or restriction to continued access to resources or
facilities which the aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of domestic
relationship including access to shared household, Saraswathy v. Babu10.

Who can seek help or can claim reliefs under the Domestic Violence Act?
According to the provisions of this Act, any aggrieved woman who is in a domestic
relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to the act of
domestic violence by the respondent can seek help. A woman can file a complaint against any
adult male perpetrator who commits an act of violence. She can also file a complaint against
any male or female relatives of the husband/ male partner (for example in a live-in
relationship) who has perpetrated violence.

8
(2013) 3 SCC 462
9
(2012) 3 SCC 183
10
(2014) 3 SCC 712

8
A petition under the provisions of the DV Act is maintainable by a woman who has stopped
living with the respondent, or by a woman who alleges to have been subjected to any act of
domestic violence prior to coming into force of the Act on 26-10-2006. If the legislative
intent was to keep a person not living with the respondent at the time of coming into force of
the Act out of the purview of the Act, there was no necessity for using the words “or has
been” in Section 2(a), Savita Bhanot v. Lt. Col. V.D. Bhanot11.
The amount or period of time lived together by the petitioner and respondent is not necessary
in terms that the petitioner and respondent should live or have lived together for a particular
period of time. Hence, application by lady, for maintenance, from a man with whom she
shared a close relationship is maintainable, M. Palani v. Meenakshi12.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court had observed in one of the cases that judicial separation does not
change the status of the wife as an “aggrieved person” under Section 2(a) read with Section
12 and does not end the “domestic relationship” under Section 2(f). It stated that judicial
separation is mere suspension of husband-wife relationship and not a complete severance of
relationship as happens in divorce, Krishna Bhattacharjee v. Sarathi Choudhury13.
Act or omission defining domestic violence is broad enough to include all “aggrieved
persons” including a not legally wedded wife and, those not entitled to maintenance under
Section 125 CrPC, Lalita Toppo v. State of Jharkhand14.

Persons against whom reliefs can be sought:-

The term respondent is defined under Section 2(q) of the DV Act and according to the
definition “respondent” means any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic
relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought
any relief under this Act. Provided that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in
the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the
male partner.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas
Harsora15, struck down ‘adult male’ from the definition of “respondent” stating that it is not
based on any intelligible differentia having rational nexus with object sought to be achieved.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court also explained in the said case that the categories of persons

11
2010 SCC OnLine Del 1278.
12
2008 SCC Online Mad 150
13
(2016) 2 SCC 705
14
(2019) 13 SCC 796
15
(2016) 10 SCC 165

9
against whom remedies under the DV Act are available include women and non-adults.
Expression “respondent” in Section 2(q) or persons who can be treated as perpetrators of
violence against women/against whom remedies under the DV Act are actionable cannot be
restricted to expression “adult male person” in Section 2(q). Thus, remedies under the DV
Act are available even against a female member and also against non-adults.
“Relative” of husband or the male partner include females. Legislature never intended to
exclude female relatives from ambit of complaint that could be made under 2005 Act.
Though expression “female” is not used in provision to Section 2(q), but no restrictive
meaning can be given to expression “relative” nor has said expression been defined to make
it specific to males only, Sandhya Manoj Wankhade v. Manoj Bhimrao Wankhade16.

TYPES OF RELIEFS
Chapter IV is the heart and soul of the Act which provides for various reliefs that can be
granted by Magistrate to an aggrieved woman. These reliefs as available to aggrieved woman
under Sections 12(2), 18 to 22, discussed, Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma. The reliefs that are
available for the aggrieved person under the DV Act are enshrined under Sections 18 to 23
and they are as follows:-
I. Protection orders (Section 18)
II. Residence order (Section 19)
III. Monetary Relief (Section 20)
IV. Custody orders (Section 21)
V. Compensation orders (Section 22)

I. PROTECTION ORDERS
The Magistrate after giving the aggrieved person and the respondent an opportunity
of being heard and if satisfied that domestic violence has taken place or is likely to
take place may pass a protection order and prohibit the respondent from
(a) committing any act of domestic violence;
(b) aiding or abetting in the commission of acts of domestic violence;

16
(2011) 3 SCC 650.

10
 (c) entering the place of employment of the aggrieved person or, if the person
aggrieved is a child, its school or any other place frequented by the aggrieved
person;
(d) attempting to communicate in any form, whatsoever, with the aggrieved person,
including personal, oral or written or electronic or telephonic contact;
(e) alienating any assets, operating bank lockers or bank accounts used or held or
enjoyed by both the parties, jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent or
singly by the respondent, including her stridhan or any other property held either
jointly by the parties or separately by them without the leave of the Magistrate;
(f) causing violence to the dependants, other relatives or any person who give the
aggrieved person assistance from domestic violence;
(g) committing any other act as specified in the protection order.
►Conduct of parties.—Conduct of parties even prior to coming into force of 2005
Act can be taken into consideration while passing the order for protection-cum-
residence and monetary relief, V.D. Bhanot v. Savita Bhanot17.
►Opportunity of hearing.—Two things are required before passing an order in
favour of aggrieved person, (i) opportunity of hearing to the parties; and (ii) on
being prima facie satisfied with regard to happening of the domestic violence or
likely to happen thereof. It cannot be accepted that only upon providing an
opportunity of hearing such orders are required to be passed, Madhusudan
Bhardwaj v. Mamta Bhardwaj18.
►Grant of relief.—Conduct of parties even prior to commencement of DVA, 2005,
reiterated, can be taken into consideration while passing an order under Sections 18,
19 and 20, Saraswathy v. Babu19.

II. RESIDENCE ORDER

The Magistrate may pass a residence order
a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any other manner disturbing
the possession of the aggrieved person from the shared household, whether or not
the respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared household;
(b) directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared household;
17
(2012) 3 SCC 183
18
2009 SCC OnLine MP 228
19
(2014) 3 SCC 712

11
 (c) restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from entering any portion of the
shared household in which the aggrieved person resides;
(d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing off the shared household
or encumbering the same;
(e) restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in the shared household
except with the leave of the Magistrate; or
(f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the
aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the
same, if the circumstances so require. The proviso appended to the section states that
no order shall be passed under clause (b) against any person who is a woman.
The High Court of Madras opined that the Act contemplates two types of reliefs viz.
(a) right to reside in shared household; and (b) right to seek residence orders under
Section 19 of the Act—Section 19(1) of the Act empowers Magistrate to pass
variety of residence order. Shared household would come into picture only when
relief is sought in terms of Sections 19(1)(a) to (e) of the Act. Aggrieved woman can
seek orders to enable her to continue to reside in shared household or protection
order to enable her to reside in shared household, then property, which is subject-
matter, should be shared household. Aggrieved woman can seek relief of alternate
accommodation in terms of Section 19(1)(f) of the Act and in such case concept of
shared household would not be attracted. Expression “shared household” occurring
in Section 19(1)(f) of the Act is just for purpose of enabling aggrieved woman to
seek alternative accommodation, which would be on par with shared household that
she enjoyed at some point of time, M. Muruganandam v. M. Megala20. Right of
residence is in addition to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC, Rajnesh v. Neha21.
►Alternative accommodation—Wife's claim for alternative accommodation in
terms of Section 19(1)(f) can only be made against her husband and not against her
in-laws or other relatives of the husband, S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra22.
►Alternate equivalent accommodation—“Similar” does not mean identical.
Direction of court to husband to pay monthly rent of alternate suitable
accommodation for wife which should be “similar” to accommodation of husband,
held, does not mean that it has to be identical in terms of area, facilities and luxuries.

20
2010 SCC Online Mad 6012.
21
(2021) 2 SCC 324
22
(2007) 3 SCC 169

12
 Word “similar” has to be construed as providing same degree of luxury and comfort
as is available in accommodation to which it is to be similar, Jaidev Rajnikant
Shroff v. Poonam Jaidev Shroff23.
► Distribution of the assets—The right of the wife under Section 19 does not
require to deal with the equality in distribution of the assets and properties of the
husband. It is a protective legislation for an enabling purpose to allow a wife to
reside exclusively and peaceably in such alternative premises which, of course,
should be of the same level. Besides, since it would be unencumbered residence,
exclusive for the wife, it would require to be about half the area of the shared
residence of the parties, Sabah Sami Khan v. Adnan Sami Khan24.
► Relief under the Act.—Act contemplates two types of reliefs viz. (a) right to
reside in shared household; and (b) right to seek residence orders under Section 19
of the Act—Section 19(1) of the Act empowers Magistrate to pass variety of
residence order. Shared household would come into picture only when relief is
sought in terms of Sections 19(1)(a) to (e) of the Act. Aggrieved woman can seek
orders to enable her to continue to reside in shared household or protection order to
enable her to reside in shared household, then property, which is subject-matter,
should be shared household. Aggrieved woman can seek relief of alternate
accommodation in terms of Section 19(1)(f) of the Act and in such case concept of
shared household would not be attracted. Expression “shared household” occurring
in Section 19(1)(f) of the Act is just for purpose of enabling aggrieved woman to
seek alternative accommodation, which would be on par with shared household that
she enjoyed at some point of time, M. Muruganandam v. M. Megala25.

III. MONETARY RELIEF

Under Section 20 of DV Act, an order for monetary relief can be passed by the court
in case a woman has incurred expenditure as a result of violence. This may include
expenses incurred by a woman on obtaining medical treatment, any loss of earnings,
damage to property, etc. The aggrieved person can also claim for maintenance from
her male partner. The Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay monetary relief to
meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any
child of the aggrieved person as a result of the domestic violence and such relief
23
(2022) 1 SCC 683
24
2010 SCC OnLine Bom 1629
25
2010 SCC OnLine Mad 6012

13
 may include, but is not limited to— (a) the loss of earnings; (b) the medical
expenses; (c) the loss caused due to the destruction, damage or removal of any
property from the control of the aggrieved person; and (d) the maintenance for the
aggrieved person as well as her children, if any, including an order under or in
addition to an order of maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force.
Further, it has also been provided in the section that the monetary relief provided
should be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with the standard of living to
which the aggrieved person is accustomed. In case there is a failure in part of the
respondent to make payment in terms of the monetary order, the Magistrate may
direct the employer or a debtor of the respondent, to directly pay to the aggrieved
person or to deposit with the court a portion of the wages or salaries or debt due to
or accrued to the credit of the respondent, which amount may be adjusted towards
the monetary relief payable by the respondent.

IV. CUSTODY ORDERS

The Magistrate may grant temporary custody of the children to the aggrieved
woman or any person making an application on her behalf. This is to prevent a
woman from being separated from her children, which itself is an abusive situation.
Section 21 also states that the Magistrate may, at any stage of hearing of the
application for protection order or for any other relief under this Act grant temporary
custody of any child or children to the aggrieved person or the person making an
application on her behalf and specify, if necessary, the arrangements for visit of such
child or children by the respondent. However, the Magistrate may refuse such visit
to such child or children, if it feels that any visit to the child or children by the
respondent may be harmful.

V. COMPENSATION ORDERS
The Magistrate may on an application being made by the aggrieved person, pass an
order directing the respondent to pay compensation and damages for the injuries,
including mental torture and emotional distress, caused by the acts of domestic
violence committed by that respondent.

14
 Magistrate’s power to grant interim and ex parte orders (Section 23):- Section 23
gives power to the Magistrate to pass such interim order as he deems just and proper
and also if the Magistrate is satisfied that an application prima facie discloses that
the respondent is committing, or has committed an act of domestic violence or that
there is a likelihood that the respondent may commit an act of domestic violence, he
may grant an ex parte order on the basis of the affidavit in such form, as may be
prescribed, of the aggrieved person under Section 18, Section 19, Section 20,
Section 21 or, as the case may be, Section 22 against the respondent.

EXECUTION OF ORDERS UNDER DV ACT

A. EXECUTION OF PROTECTION ORDER(SECTION 20):

Relevant provisions are as follows:-

1. Section 31 of Domestic Violence Act,2005

2. Section 19(7) of DV Act
3. Rule 15 of Domestic Violence Rules, 2006

1. Section 31 provides for the relief of orders under section 18 and section 23 of
Domestic Violence Act: Penalty for breach of protection order by respondent. —(1) A
breach of protection order, or of an interim protection order, by the respondent shall
be an offence under this Act and shall be punishable with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend
to twenty thousand rupees, or with both.
2. Section 19(7) categorically states that Magistrate can direct officer-in-charge of the
police station to assist the implementation of Protection Order.
“(7) The Magistrate may direct the officer in-charge of the police station in whose
jurisdiction the Magistrate has been approached to assist in the implementation of the
protection order.”
3. Rule 15. Breach of Protection Orders:
(l) An aggrieved person may report a breach of protection order or an interim protection
order to the Protection Officer.
(2) Every report referred to in sub-rule (1) shall be in writing by the informant and duly
signed by her.

15
 (3) The Protection Officer shall forward a copy of such complaint with a copy of the
protection order of which a breach is alleged to have taken place to the concerned
Magistrate for appropriate orders.
(4) The aggrieved person may. if she so desires, make a complaint of breach of protection
order or interim protection order directly to the Magistrate or the Police, if she so
chooses.
(5) If, at any time after a protection order has been breached, the aggrieved person seeks
his assistance, the protection officer shall immediately rescue her by seeking help
from the local police station and assist the aggrieved person to lodge a report to the
local police authorities in appropriate cases.
(6) When charges are framed under section 31 or in respect of offences under section
498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), or any other offence not summarily
triable, the Court may separate the proceedings for such offences to be tried in the manner
prescribed under Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and proceed to
summarily try the offence of the breach of Protection Order under section 31, in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter XXI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
(7) Any resistance to the enforcement of the orders of the Court under the Act by the
respondent or any other person purportedly acting on his behalf shall bendeemed to
be a breach of protection order or an interim protection order under the Act.
(8) A breach of a protection order or an interim Protection order or an interim protection
order shall immediately be reported to the local police station having jurisdiction and
shall be dealt with as a cognizable offence as provided under Sections 31 and 32.

B.EXECUTION OF MONETARY RELIEF(Section 20):

Relevant Provision: Section 20(6) of DV Act.

Section 20(4) of DV Act, contemplates that copy of the order under section 20(1) must be
forwarded to the concerned police station.
(4) The Magistrate shall send a copy of the order for monetary relief made under sub-section
(1) to the parties to the application and to the in charge of the police station within the local
limits of whose jurisdiction the respondent resides.
Section 20(6) categorically provides for the relief in case of breach of order of Monetary
relief which states the Magistrate may direct the employer or a debtor of the respondent

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to pay directly to the aggrieved person or to deposit such portion of wages or salaries or
debt due to the respondent.
(6) Upon the failure on the part of the respondent to make payment in terms of the order
under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may direct the employer or a debtor of the respondent,
to directly pay to the aggrieved person or to deposit with the court a portion of the wages or
salaries or debt due to or accrued to the credit of the respondent, which amount may be
adjusted towards the monetary relief payable by the respondent.

EXECUTION OF RESIDENCE ORDER (Section 19 of DV Act)

Relevant provision:- Section 19(3), 19(5) and 19(7) of DV Act
As per Section 19(3) in order to ensure the execution of residence order, the magistrate may
require the respondent to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for preventing the
commission of domestic violence.
By virtue of Section 19(5), the court may also pass an order directing the officer in charge of
the nearest police station to give protection to the aggrieved person or to assist her or the
person making an application on her behalf in the implementation of the order.
Further, as per Section 19(7), the Magistrate may direct the officer in-charge of the police
station in whose jurisdiction the Magistrate has been approached to assist in the
implementation of protection order.
Procedure to be followed in implementation of orders:
As per Section 28 of the Act, all proceedings under Sections 12,18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and
offences under Section 31 shall be governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).

CONCLUSION
Although the major objective of this law, being to protect the women against domestic
violence has been secured, certain portions of the law still remains to be developed. This law
provides civil remedies to the victims of domestic violence. Before enactment of this law, in
order to seek any civil remedies such as divorce, custody of children, injunctions in any form
or maintenance, a woman only had the option of taking recourse to the civil courts.
Therefore, the DV Act has certainly brought about the required and necessary change in the
system. Although the Act provides exhaustive remedies to counter the issue of domestic
violence certain terms and its interpretation needs to develop. The Act falls short in providing

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any relief to the male members in the community who are subjected to domestic violence,
being one of the areas where the law falls short.
However, it also needs to be considered that no crime can be abolished from the society
completely, it is only with stringent reforms and mechanism that it can be curbed.

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