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American Stories (Brands/Breen/Williams/Gross)
Chapter 7 Democracy and Distress: The Violence of Party Politics, 1788-1800

7.1 Multiple-Choice Questions

1) For many Americans, George Washington was
A) a symbol of the new government.
B) a routine, typical political leader.
C) not a popular leader.
D) a threat to proclaim himself king.
E) a good general, but not necessarily a good politician.
Answer: A
Page Ref: 185

2) The Judiciary Act of 1789

A) was primarily the work of Oliver Ellsworth.
B) set up a Supreme Court with one chief justice and eight associate justices.
C) defined the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
D) provided that the Chief Justice would be chosen by the Senate.
E) established the power of judicial review.
Answer: A
Page Ref: 186

3) Which of the following individuals was NOT a member of George Washington's first cabinet?
A) Thomas Jefferson
B) James Madison
C) Edmund Randolph
D) Alexander Hamilton
E) Henry Knox
Answer: B
Page Ref: 186

4) Which of the following was NOT a Hamiltonian idea?

A) Private greed could be the source of public good.
B) The new central government would survive if the wealthiest people supported it.
C) France was the United States' most important ally.
D) A national bank was necessary for the country's economic health.
E) Anarchy was a greater threat than monarchy.
Answer: C
Page Ref: 187, 193

5) The greatest challenge facing the first Washington administration was

A) foreign affairs.
B) waging war with Native Americans.
C) setting the government's finances in order.
D) territorial expansion.
E) regulating interstate trade.
Answer: C
Page Ref: 188

55
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ 07458. All rights reserved.
 6) Hamilton's Report on the Public Credit recommended
A) the renunciation of all old government debts.
B) that the federal government assume remaining state debts.
C) that the states fund most government activities.
D) that bankers be restricted in their dealings with the federal government.
E) that the federal government offer its creditors 80 percent of the face value of its obligations.
Answer: B
Page Ref: 188

7) James Madison opposed Hamilton's proposal for the public debt because
A) he feared Hamilton's growing political power.
B) the powers of state government would be reduced.
C) he believed only a chosen few would benefit.
D) it did not foster the government of the Revolution.
E) many soldiers had lost the old loan certificates that entitled them to payment.
Answer: C
Page Ref: 189

8) One criticism of Hamilton's assumption program was that

A) states like Massachusetts, which had sloppy financial systems, would be rewarded for nonpayment of
debt.
B) no provision was made for the original holders of the debt.
C) James Madison would profit from it personally.
D) it was disproportionately favorable to the South.
E) it could lead to the establishment of a monarchy.
Answer: A
Page Ref: 189

9) Opposition to Hamilton's proposed national bank

A) was based on "loose construction" of the Constitution.
B) reflected the fears of private bankers.
C) was justified because his plans so clearly favored a few "monied interests."
D) generally did not involve the general public.
E) involved issues relating to Congress's constitutional powers.
Answer: E
Page Ref: 190

10) The Bank of the United States was based on the doctrine of
A) strict construction.
B) states' rights.
C) implied powers.
D) judicial review.
E) checks and balances.
Answer: C
Page Ref: 190

56
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ 07458. All rights reserved.
11) Jeffersonians' fear of strong financial institutions was based on
A) the fact that most were simple farmers who did not understand banking policy.
B) their resentment of Federalists, who tended to have more money.
C) religious beliefs about the sin of greed.
D) anti-Semitism, because they thought banks were controlled by Jewish interests.
E) their belief that they were the root of corruption in the British government.
Answer: E
Page Ref: 190

12) By the end of Washington's first term of office,

A) political harmony had unified the cabinet.
B) political squabbling had divided the government.
C) political parties appeared in the campaigning.
D) the machinery of government had been brought to a standstill.
E) politicians understood the force of public opinion.
Answer: B
Page Ref: 190-191

13) Which of the following would Alexander Hamilton have proposed?

A) strong diplomatic ties with France
B) the purchase of western lands
C) giving the common man the vote
D) providing government subsidies to manufacturers
E) modeling the banking system on the German model
Answer: D
Page Ref: 191

14) The Report on Manufacturers suggested

A) low tariffs on imported goods.
B) congressional taxes on industrial goods.
C) protective tariffs.
D) strict laissez faire.
E) a fluctuating tariff schedule.
Answer: C
Page Ref: 191

15) Alexander Hamilton failed to achieve his economic policy objectives in his attempt to secure
A) funding of the national debt.
B) assumption of the state debts.
C) creation of a national bank.
D) passage of a protective tariff.
E) approval of a standardized currency schedule.
Answer: D
Page Ref: 191

16) During Washington's second term in office,

A) foreign affairs became a much more important focus.
B) relations with Great Britain and France improved dramatically.
C) Hamilton and Jefferson resolved their differences over domestic policy.
D) Hamilton ceased to be a force in American politics.
E) the European war unified American officials in support of France.
Answer: A
Page Ref: 191
57
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ 07458. All rights reserved.
17) Members of the Federalist party
A) advocated states' rights.
B) supported the French Revolution.
C) wanted Thomas Jefferson to be president.
D) supported a strong national government.
E) despised centralized economic planning.
Answer: D
Page Ref: 191

18) In the early 1790s, British actions toward the United States indicated
A) respect for the status of the new nation.
B) a desire to recruit the United States as a close ally.
C) disdain for American rights.
D) a willingness to join the French in taking advantage of the new country.
E) the need for American resources to feed and clothe British troops.
Answer: C
Page Ref: 192

19) When war broke out in Europe, President Washington

A) used the war to foster new economic ties.
B) upheld the Treaty of 1778 and supported France.
C) attempted to keep the United States neutral.
D) placed an embargo on all goods to Europe.
E) doubled the budget for the navy.
Answer: C
Page Ref: 193

20) Thomas Jefferson felt it was important that the new government
A) foster strong ties with Great Britain.
B) support business and industrial development.
C) decrease the role agriculture played in the American economy.
D) lean toward France in the event it clashed with Britain.
E) expand the franchise.
Answer: D
Page Ref: 193

21) Working behind the scenes to inform the British of John Jay's intentions in treaty negotiations was
A) Thomas Jefferson.
B) Edmund Genet.
C) Alexander Hamilton.
D) John Adams.
E) Ben Franklin.
Answer: C
Page Ref: 194

22) Jay's Treaty succeeded in

A) getting British troops to withdraw from the northwest forts.
B) opening New Orleans to U.S. commerce.
C) pacifying southerners who had lost slaves during the war.
D) humiliating the French.
E) calming Washington's anxieties.
Answer: A
Page Ref: 194
58
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ 07458. All rights reserved.
23) As a result of the Battle of Fallen Timbers,
A) Great Britain continued to dominate the western frontier.
B) the United States asserted its authority on the western frontier.
C) the Indians scored a decisive victory.
D) the inadequacy of the American army was made evident.
E) the British encouraged Native Americans in the Northwest Territory to give up their land without
further violence.
Answer: B
Page Ref: 195

24) Why did Spain agree to the terms of the Pinckney Treaty?
A) It mistook Jay's Treaty for an Anglo-American alliance.
B) It needed the additional sources of revenue.
C) It needed protection on its southwest borders.
D) The United States threatened direct military action.
E) It thought there was a secret agreement between the United States and France to take Spain's North
American possessions.
Answer: A
Page Ref: 195

25) Washington believed that the Whiskey Rebellion

A) was not something with which to be concerned.
B) presented a direct threat to the nation.
C) should have been dealt with by the state of Pennsylvania.
D) indicated the importance of repealing the excise tax.
E) was the result of a legitimate complaint on the part of distillers.
Answer: B
Page Ref: 197

26) Which of the following statements about the Whiskey Rebellion is FALSE?
A) It took place in western Pennsylvania.
B) It lent credence to fears of political violence against the government.
C) It involved an attempt to prohibit the consumption of whiskey and other alcoholic beverages.
D) The Washington administration's reaction to it was an embarrassing fiasco.
E) It increased Republican electoral strength along the frontier.
Answer: C
Page Ref: 197

27) Washington's Farewell Address

A) warned against creating a strong military.
B) attempted to bring harmony to the political system.
C) supported the political ideology of Jefferson and Madison.
D) advised against permanent alliances with nations that weren't interested in promoting American
security.
E) wholeheartedly endorsed the two-party system.
Answer: D
Page Ref: 198

59
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ 07458. All rights reserved.
28) The election of 1796 was complicated by
A) changes in the nation's voting laws.
B) interference from British diplomats.
C) behind-the-scenes manipulations by Alexander Hamilton.
D) Washington's refusal to stay out of politics.
E) confusion over the differences between Federalists and Republicans.
Answer: C
Page Ref: 198-200

29) John Adams's presidency was made much more difficult by

A) his lack of experience with government.
B) the interference of Alexander Hamilton.
C) Jefferson's refusal to cooperate with a Federalist president.
D) continued problems with the British on the seas.
E) his inability to communicate with Jefferson.
Answer: B
Page Ref: 200-202

30) During the Adams administration,

A) Great Britain continued to pose problems for the nation.
B) domestic problems occupied the president's full attention.
C) France reacted negatively to the terms of Jay's Treaty.
D) few Americans seemed concerned with foreign affairs.
E) France became a closer ally thanks to the terms of Jay's Treaty.
Answer: C
Page Ref: 200

31) One consequence of the XYZ affair was that

A) Adams declared war on France.
B) France suffered diplomatic humiliation.
C) Hamilton resisted the idea of a strong army.
D) Adams and Jefferson reached a political impasse.
E) High Federalists used the tensions it created as an excuse for military expansion.
Answer: E
Page Ref: 200-201

32) The intention of the Naturalization Law was to

A) help immigrants assimilate into society.
B) allow the government to deport undesirable aliens.
C) allow the Federalists to maintain political control.
D) create a heterogeneous society for America.
E) keep out eastern European immigrants.
Answer: C
Page Ref: 203

33) Why did the Sedition Act distress many Americans?

A) It threatened their political rights.
B) It kept the Federalists in power.
C) It suspended free elections.
D) It expanded the powers of Congress.
E) It allowed libel convictions without a jury trial.
Answer: A
Page Ref: 201
60
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ 07458. All rights reserved.
34) In 1798, the Federalists sponsored a military buildup with the intention of
A) taking the French West Indies.
B) suppressing internal political dissent.
C) conquering Canada.
D) pacifying the Indian tribes of the Ohio Valley.
E) pumping federal dollars into a sagging economy.
Answer: B
Page Ref: 201

35) In the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, Jefferson and Madison called for a restoration of
A) a strong central government.
B) states' rights.
C) the Articles of Confederation.
D) the Bill of Rights.
E) a standardized currency.
Answer: B
Page Ref: 204

36) According to the Kentucky Resolutions,

A) ultimate power always remained with the federal government.
B) states had the right to nullify federal law under certain circumstances.
C) the Sedition Act was worthy of enforcement by the states.
D) the state of Kentucky chose to remain neutral in the contest between Hamilton and Jefferson.
E) the "general welfare" of the nation should be the guiding principle in state decisions.
Answer: B
Page Ref: 204

37) As a result of the actions taken by President Adams in 1799,

A) he was overwhelmingly reelected in 1800.
B) the United States resolved its differences with France.
C) the Federalist Party remained the major party.
D) France compensated the United States for ships taken.
E) the French added even more restrictions on U.S. commerce.
Answer: B
Page Ref: 205

38) In the election of 1800, Thomas Jefferson almost lost to

A) Aaron Burr.
B) Thomas Knox.
C) Henry Adams.
D) George Washington
E) Alexander Hamilton.
Answer: A
Page Ref: 205-206

39) The Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution

A) changed the process of electing the president and vice president.
B) decreased presidential power.
C) heightened the potential for further political conflict.
D) stopped the African slave trade.
E) dealt with the judicial power of the United States.
Answer: A
Page Ref: 206
61
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ 07458. All rights reserved.
 40) Each of the following is true of the election of 1800 EXCEPT
A) Alexander Hamilton intrigued to keep his own party's candidate from winning.
B) the Federalist Party was hopelessly split.
C) the electoral college chose Thomas Jefferson to be the third president.
D) John Adams refused to attend Jefferson's inauguration.
E) it led to changes in the presidential electoral process.
Answer: C
Page Ref: 206-207

7.2 True/False Questions

1) Alexander Hamilton favored low tariffs, a national bank, and funding of the national debt.
Answer: FALSE
Page Ref: 188-191

2) James Madison used the doctrine of implied powers to deny the consitutionality of Hamilton's Bank of the
U.S. proposal.
Answer: FALSE
Page Ref: 190

3) Thomas Jefferson tended to emphasize the importance of industrial development when forecasting the
future of the United States.
Answer: FALSE
Page Ref: 190-191

4) Hamilton and Jefferson disagreed over whether Great Britain or France should be America's closest
European ally.
Answer: TRUE
Page Ref: 191

5) Alexander Hamilton was the main leader of the Republicans.

Answer: FALSE
Page Ref: 191

6) Jay's Treaty accomplished little of what John Jay had hoped to achieve when he began his negotiations with
the British.
Answer: TRUE
Page Ref: 194

7) In 1798, the Federalists called for a military buildup, secretly intending to use the army to silence their
political opponents.
Answer: TRUE
Page Ref: 201

8) The Alien Acts were designed to curb out-of-control immigration from Germany and Sweden.
Answer: FALSE
Page Ref: 202-204

9) The Sedition Act posed no real threat to civil liberties in the United States.
Answer: FALSE
Page Ref: 203-204

62
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ 07458. All rights reserved.
 10) In the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, Madison and Jefferson sowed the seeds of nullification and
secession.
Answer: TRUE
Page Ref: 204

7.3 Essay Questions

1) How did the conflicting views of Hamilton and Jefferson give rise to our first political parties?
Page Ref: 187-191

2) What was the role of foreign policy issues in the bitter political polarization of the late 1790s?
Page Ref: 191-195

3) What threat did the Alien and Sedition Acts pose to individual liberties? What threat did the Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions pose to the integrity of the Union? How do these issues relate to the balance between
liberty and order?
Page Ref: 202-205

63
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ 07458. All rights reserved.
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
you of all the tricks they have played upon us, as they would fill
volumes. The letter had been obviously opened by being slit
across above the seal, and gummed up again. It had been
cleverly done, and I might not have discovered it but for the
fact that the gum used was not quite set. It therefore opened
along the line of the slit, and I at once found the gum where no
gum should have been. I will send you a short note by the
direct mail so that you shall not be surprised at the delay in the
delivery of this. Although we have been hard at work since last
mail, I do not know that anything of much importance has
occurred except that we have been admitted to the defence of
Mahmud Sami, with whom we have had several long
conferences. Toulba is ill, suffering from nervous excitement, I
think, and asthma. I do not know whether he will die, but I
have done everything in my power to get him proper medical
assistance, a change of room, a companion, and, if possible, a
raised bed.
"The last evidence in the question of the burning of Alexandria
has not been communicated to us except through the medium
of the Egyptian Gazette, which may or may not be correct. It is
not formidable in itself, but it is quite sufficient to give colour to
a finding against the prisoner on that charge. It becomes,
therefore, of the most vital importance to consider whether
there is no way out other than through the portals of the court
martial. There is no doubt that we could discredit the evidence,
and even smash it up in cross-examination. And besides, on the
other charges of Rebellion and Massacre of June 11th I feel sure
we could make it hot for the prosecution, but there is an opinion
in a very high quarter that there is a strong determination to
execute if the Court should find guilty. Assume, therefore, that
the Court Martial find the prisoner (for I am only speaking of the
chief now) guilty, it will be for the English Government to
reverse the sentence. I am of opinion that it would be
dangerous to trust them to carefully examine the evidence and
the manner in which it has been obtained. I think it possible
that that matter would be hastily disposed of in the Foreign
Office, and that they might leave the prisoner to the Court,
declaring that everything had been done to secure a fair trial,
and that they could not interfere with a verdict deliberately
arrived at after the fullest opportunity given to the defence. And
besides, it is more than probable that they would allow some
sentence to pass—any sentence suffered here would be most
dangerous to the prisoner. After careful consideration I dare not
advise the prisoner to trust to the trial if he have an alternative.
If terms of banishment are offered, with proper safeguards and
provision for maintenance, I shall be strongly in favour of
accepting them. To sum up: If found guilty by the Court, some
punishment, perhaps death, certainly a serious one, will be
inflicted: If acquitted, either voluntary banishment without
means, or remaining in the country at the mercy of the
Government here. If he leaves the country under a compromise
all charges except that of rebellion would have to be withdrawn,
and provision for his life in a suitable place would have to be
accorded. I have reason to believe that the course of a
compromise finds favour with all but Riaz, and is also favourably
regarded by Dufferin.
"Give us your opinion, and believe me ever very sincerely yours,
"Mark Napier.
"P. S.—As far as the case goes nothing could be better. In law, in
fact, and in the infamous manner it has been conducted. But
there are the dangers and considerations I have alluded to.
Broadley has in my opinion conducted all the different
discussions with the Court and Dufferin with the greatest
energy, skill, and judgment. The law of the case is perfect for
us, but it is a case which will be decided in the Cabinet and not
in the Court. It is impossible to rebut hearsay, and as I have had
no opportunity to consider the whole evidence, I will not offer
an opinion on that now."
Broadley and Napier to Blunt. Telegram. November 28th, 7.42 p.
m.:
"Long interview with Dufferin. I entreat you give us discretion to
obtain best terms possible. We know delay fatal. Rely on our
judgment. Foreign Office's support unreliable. Dufferin disposed
to exceed his instructions on our behalf. Dufferin rules Egyptian
Government. Defense case burning Alexandria suspicious.
Hence anxiety. Embrace present moment. Dufferin's good
offices absolutely necessary. Telegraph instantly full discretion.
Interview Dufferin ten to-morrow.
"Broadley, Napier."

Napier to Blunt. Same date:

"I give you my honour I most strongly concur in our telegram
herewith. Strongest cause for full immediate discretion. Every
personal interest contrary to our request. Napier, private."

Blunt to Broadley, November 28th midnight:

"Cannot approve terms less than honourable exile—not
internment—Aden, Malta, Cyprus. Within these limits use
discretion."

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 29th:

"Arabi gives us written authority to act with discretion in concert
with Dufferin, who proposes Arabi pleads guilty on formal
charge of rebellion—others abandoned. Sentence read
commuting punishment to exile—exile simple on parole—good
place which you can settle with the Foreign Office—perhaps
Azores. Suitable allowance granted and compensation for loss of
property entailed by sentence. You probably fail to realize
difficulty of rebutting case of burning Alexandria and obtaining
evidence for defence. Foreign Office certainly indisposed to
interfere in any Egyptian sentence short of death—for example,
long detention in an Egyptian prison. Am convinced ultimate
result inevitably worse, dreading great responsibility, having full
knowledge of the position of affairs. I trust you will leave us
discretion, to avoid possible disaster."

Blunt to Broadley. Telegram. November 29th, 3 p. m.:

"Have consulted De la Warr. We approve full discretion on basis
of telegram just received."

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. November 30th:

"All progressing well. Try to negotiate in concert with De la Warr
the place of exile—Fiji suggested. Gratified at your confidence."

Blunt to Broadley. Telegram. November 30th, 2.30 p. m.:

"Reject Fiji or Azores. Insist on Moslem country for religious life.
They cannot refuse. Will consult Chenery. De la Warr away."

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 1st:

"Dufferin's conduct admirable. Suggests De la Warr's arranging
place of exile with Foreign Office. Prisoners entirely satisfied."

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 3rd:

"Arabi's trial over. For correct account see 'Standard.' Egyptian
Government fulfilled all engagements to the letter."
 Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 4th:
"Arabi delighted at result and sends thanks—inclined Cape.
Dufferin brick [sic]."

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 4th, 4.50 p. m.:

"Surprised your not wiring. Success complete. Anglo-Egyptian
colony furious."

Blunt to Broadley. Telegram. December 4th:

"Congratulate all. De la Warr says place of exile in English
territory left to Dufferin. I don't fancy Cape. How about Gibraltar
or Guernsey. Consult Arabi."

Broadley to Blunt. Telegram. December 4th:

"Many thanks kind telegram."

It will be perceived by these telegrams that it was not without

reluctance that I agreed to the compromise proposed by Dufferin.
We had at the moment the full tide of English opinion with us, and I
knew that the Foreign Office could not do otherwise than agree to
almost any terms we chose to impose, and I was most unwilling that
the charge of rebellion should be admitted by us. At the same time it
was not possible for me in the face of Broadley's, and especially
Napier's, telegrams to withhold my assent. The responsibility was
too great. I had also the question of costs to consider. It is true that
a public subscription had been opened which had brought us
valuable names. But the actual sums subscribed did not yet amount
to £200, while Broadley's bill was running already to £3,000. A
continuation for another month of the trial would have meant for me
a larger expenditure than I was prepared to face in a political quarrel
which was not quite my own. I therefore took counsel with De la
Warr, and especially with Robert Bourke, of whom I have already
spoken, and who warned me how frail a thing public opinion was to
rely on, and advised me strongly to consent. I remember walking up
and down with him in Montagu Square, where he lived, in indecision
for half an hour before I was finally convinced and yielded. I
consequently sent the telegram of approval, and eventually, after
much argument, we succeeded in obtaining as Arabi's place of exile
the Island of Ceylon, the traditional place of exile of our father Adam
when driven out of Paradise. No more honourable one could possibly
have been fixed upon.
The exact terms of the arrangement come to with Dufferin were
unfortunately not committed by him to writing, an oversight on
Broadley's part, who ought to have insisted on this and thus saved
us much after trouble and misunderstanding. The negligence
allowed the Egyptian Government to inflict degradation of rank on
the prisoners, which was certainly not in the spirit of Lord Dufferin's
arrangement, though, perhaps, legally following the pro formâ
sentence of death for rebellion. Room, too, was left for dispute as to
what was the amount of the allowance intended as compensation for
the confiscations. Broadley seems to have exaggerated to his clients
the promises on this head. Personally I consider that they were not
illiberally dealt with, as the property of most of them was
insignificant, and they were allowed to retain property belonging to
their wives. The only considerable sufferer pecuniarily was Mahmud
Pasha Sami, who had a large estate which he forfeited. As to Arabi,
his sole worldly possessions, besides what furniture was in his house
at Cairo, a hired one, and some horses in his stable, consisted of the
eight acres of good land he had inherited from his father in his
native village, to which he had at various time added parcels of
uncultivated land on the desert edge, amounting to some six
hundred acres, paid for out of his pay in prosperous days. These at
the time of the confiscation cannot have been worth much over
£2,000 or £3,000, for barren land was then selling for only a few
reals the acre, and he had not had time to reclaim or improve them.
[33]
A point, too, which was long disputed, but which is no longer of
importance, was whether the paroles of the prisoners were given to
the Egyptian or the English Governments. But with these matters I
need not trouble myself more than to say that the English
Government, having gained its end of getting the rebellion admitted
by us, and so a title given for their intervention in Egypt, gave little
more help to the defence of certain unfortunate minor prisoners who
on various pretexts found themselves excluded from the amnesty,
and were subjected to all the injustices of the Khedive's uncontrolled
authority. These, however, belong to a period beyond that of which I
now propose to write, namely, that of the permanent Occupation,
and cannot be detailed in my present memoir, which now, I think,
has made clear at least my own part in the events of the revolution
to the last point where that part was personal.
Looking back at my action in Egypt during that period, with its early
successes and its final failure to obtain for the National Government
fair treatment at English hands, I cannot wholly regret the course I
took. I made, of course, many mistakes, and I feel that I am in
considerable measure responsible for the determination the
Nationalists came to to risk their country's fortune on the die of
battle. But I still think their fate would have been a worse one if they
had not fought, tamely surrendering to European pressure. They at
least thus got a hearing from the world at large, and if any attention
since has been paid to fellah grievances it has been won wholly by
Arabi's persistence, which I encouraged, in accepting the logic of
their political principles even to the point of war. It obliged England
to listen to their complaints and, if it could not prevent her from
depriving them of their political liberty, it has forced her since to
remedy most of their secular material wrongs.
What the future may bring to Egypt I know not. She has grown rich
under English tutelage, and though I do not consider riches
synonymous with the well being of a nation, they have been in
Egypt of at least this value, that they have enabled the native Nile
population so far to hold its own against foreign intrusion as owner
of the soil. While this is, the Nation will remain alive, and the day
may yet come for the fellah race when self-government will be
restored to them, and the armed struggle of 1882 will appear to
them in its true light as the beginning of their national life, and one,
as such, glorious in their annals. To that day of final emancipation I
still pin my hopes, though it is not likely I shall live to see it.[34]
If my life is prolonged for a few years, it is my intention to continue
the writing of my memoirs, and this will include much that is of
importance to Egypt, though nothing of such high historical value as
the recital already made. The present volume may well stand by
itself, and so with regret I leave it. I should have wished to include
in it an account of Lord Dufferin's mission of reconstruction, and the
weak efforts made by Gladstone to undo the wrong he had inflicted
on the cause of liberty, and on his own reputation as a man of good.
But this would lead me too far, and I prefer to end my actual
narrative at the point where we have now arrived, the close of the
eventful year, 1882. On one of the last days of it I received a second
characteristic letter from Gordon in which, speaking of the war and
the suppression of liberty in Egypt, he quotes the following
appropriate verse:

"When thou seest the violent oppression of the poor, or the

subversion of justice, marvel not at it, for the Higher than the
Highest regardeth it."

FOOTNOTES:
[33] A claim made recently in his name for a large indemnity in
regard to these lands, and embodied in a petition addressed to
our King Edward, is an entire illusion on Arabi's part, and marks
the fact, otherwise very apparent to those who know him, that he
has fallen into a condition of senile decay for which there is no
remedy.
The worst oversight was that the promised general amnesty was
not exactly defined. Hence the later prosecutions on so-called
"criminal" charges.
[34] This was written in 1904.
APPENDICES
 APPENDIX I
Arabi's Account of his Life and of the Events of
1881-1882, as told to me, Wilfrid Scawen Blunt,
in Arabic yesterday, March 16th, 1903, at Sheykh
Obeyd
I was born in the year 1840 at Horiyeh, near Zagazig, in the
Sherkieh. My father was Sheykh of the village, and owned eight and
a half feddans of land, which I inherited from him and gradually
increased by savings out of my pay, which at one time was as much
as £250 a month, till it amounted to 570 feddans, and that was the
amount confiscated at the time of my trial. I bought the land
cheaply in those days for a few pounds a feddan which is worth a
great deal now, especially as it was in a poor state (wahash) when I
bought it and now is in good cultivation. But none of it was given me
by Saïd Pasha or any one, and the acreage I inherited was only eight
and a half. I invested all the money I could save in land, and had no
other invested money or movable property except a little furniture
and some horses and such like, which may have been worth £1,000.
As a boy I studied for two years at the Azhar, but was taken for a
soldier when I was only fourteen, as I was a tall well grown lad and
Saïd Pasha wanted to have as many as possible of the sons of the
village Sheykhs, and train them to be officers. I was made to go
through an examination, and what I had learned at the Azhar served
me well, and I was made a boulok-amin, clerk, instead of serving in
the ranks, at sixty piastres a month. I did not, however, like this, as I
thought I should never rise to any high position, and I wished to be
a personage like the Mudir of our province, so I petitioned Ibrahim
Bey, who was my superior, to be put back into the ranks. Ibrahim
Bey showed me that I should lose by this as my pay would then be
only fifty piastres, but I insisted and so served. I was put soon after
to another examination, out of which I came first, and they made
me chowish, and then to a third and they made me lieutenant when
I was only seventeen. Suliman Pasha el Franzawi was so pleased
with me that he insisted with Saïd Pasha on giving me promotion,
and I became captain at eighteen, major at nineteen, and
Lieutenant-Colonel, Caimakam, at twenty. Then Saïd Pasha took me
with him as A. D. C. when he went to Medina, about a year before
he died. That was in a. h. 1279 (1862?).
Saïd Pasha's death was a great misfortune to me and to all, as he
was favourable to the children of the country. Ismaïl was quite
otherwise. In his time everything was put back into the hands of the
Turks and Circassians, and the Egyptians in the army got no
protection and no promotion. I went on serving as Caimakam for
twelve years without much incident till war came with Abyssinia. I
was not sent to the war with Russia, but when the war with
Abyssinia broke out all available troops were wanted, and the
garrisons were withdrawn from the stations on the Haj Road, and I
was sent to do this. I was sent quite alone without a single soldier or
a single piastre and had to get there as best I could on a camel. I
went in this way to Nakhl and Akaba and Wej collecting the
garrisons and putting in Arabs to take charge of the forts there as
ghaffirs. Then we crossed over the sea to Kosseir and so by Keneh
to Cairo. I was not paid a penny for this service or even my
expenses. The country was in a fearful state of oppression, and it
was then I began to interest myself in politics to save my
countrymen from ruin. I was sent on to Massowa from Cairo and
took part in the campaign of which Ratib Pasha was commander-in-
chief, with Loringe Pasha, the American, as Chief of the Staff. I was
not present at the battle of Kora, being in charge of the transport
service between Massowa and the army. It was a disastrous battle,
seven ortas being completely destroyed. Loringe Pasha was the
officer mostly in fault. The Khedive's son, Hassan, was there, but
only as a boy, to learn soldiering. He was not in command nor is it
true that he was taken prisoner by the Abyssinians.
After this I thought much about politics. I remember to have seen
Sheykh Jemal-ed-Din, but not to speak to, but my former connection
with the Azhar made me acquainted with several of his disciples. The
most distinguished of them were Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, and
Sheykh Hassan el Towil. The first book that ever gave me ideas
about political matters was an Arabic translation of the "Life of
Bonaparte" by Colonel Louis. The book had been brought by Saïd
Pasha with him to Medina, and its account of the conquest of Egypt
by 30,000 Frenchmen so angered him that he threw the book on the
ground, saying "See how your countrymen let themselves be
beaten." And I took it up and read all that night, without sleeping,
till the morning. Then I told Saïd Pasha that I had read it and that I
saw that the French had been victorious because they were better
drilled and organized, and that we could do as well in Egypt if we
tried.
You ask me about the affair of the riot against Nubar Pasha in the
time of Ismaïl and whether I had a hand in it. I had none, for the
reason that I was away at Rashid (Rosetta) with my regiment. But
the day before the thing happened I was telegraphed for by the War
Office with my fellow Caimakam, Mohammed Bey Nadi, to deal with
the case of a number of soldiers that had been disbanded by the
new Ministers without their arrears of pay or even bread to eat, and
who were at Abbassiyeh. But I knew nothing of what was being
arranged against Nubar. That was done by order of the Khedive,
Ismaïl Pasha, through a servant of his, Shahin Pasha, and his
brother-in-law, Latif Eff. Selim, director of the military college. These
got up a demonstration of the students of the college, who went in a
body to the Ministry of Finance. They were joined on the way by
some of the disbanded soldiers and officers, not many, but some. At
the Ministry they found Nubar getting into his carriage, and they
assaulted him, pulled his moustache, and boxed his ears. Then
Ismaïl Pasha was sent for to quell the riot and he came with Abd-el-
Kader Pasha and Ali Bey Fehmy, the colonel of his guard, whom he
ordered to fire on the students, but Ali Fehmy ordered his men to
fire over their heads and nobody was hurt. Ali Fehmy was not with
us at that time. He was devoted to Ismaïl, having married a lady of
the palace, but he did not like to shed the blood of these young
men.
Ismaïl Pasha, to conceal his part in it and that of those who got up
the affair, accused Nadi Bey and me and Ali Bey Roubi of being their
leaders and we were brought before a mejliss on which were Stone
Pasha and Hassan Pasha Afflatoun with Osman Rifki, afterwards
Under-Secretary of War, and others. I showed, however, that it was
impossible we could be concerned in it as we had only that very
night arrived from Rosetta. Nevertheless we were blamed and
separated from our regiments, Nadi being sent to Mansura, Roubi to
the Fayûm, and I to Alexandria where I was given a nominal duty of
acting as agent for the Sheykhs of Upper Egypt, whose arrears of
taxes in the shape of beans and other produce were to be collected
and sent to Alexandria in security for money advanced to Ismaïl by
certain Jews of that place. But before we separated we had a
meeting at which I proposed that we should join together and
depose Ismaïl Pasha. It would have been the best solution of the
case, as the Consuls would have been glad to get rid of Ismaïl in any
way, and it would have saved after complications as well as the
fifteen millions Ismaïl took away with him when he was deposed. But
there was nobody as yet to take the lead, and my proposal, though
approved, was not executed. The deposition of Ismaïl lifted a heavy
load from our shoulders and all the world rejoiced, but it would have
been better if we had done it ourselves as we could then have got
rid of the whole family of Mohammed Ali, who were none of them,
except Saïd, fit to rule, and we could have proclaimed a republic.
Sheykh Jemal-ed-Din proposed to Mohammed Abdu to kill Ismaïl at
the Kasr-el-Nil Bridge and Mohammed Abdu approved. Ismaïl
collected the money of the Mudiriehs six months before his
deposition. Latif afterwards avowed his part in the affair. Latif was
put in prison but released on application of the freemasons to Nubar.
Tewfik Pasha, when he succeeded Ismaïl, by his first act made public
promise of a Constitution. You ask me whether he was sincere in
this. He never was sincere, but he was a man incredibly weak, who
never could say "no," and he was under the influence of his Minister,
Sherif Pasha, who was a sincere lover of free forms of government.
Tewfik, in his father's reign, had amassed money, which was what he
cared for most, by receiving presents from persons who had
petitions to make, and who thought he could forward their ends. He
had no wish for a Constitution, but he could not say "no" when
Sherif pressed him. So he promised. Two months later he fell under
the stronger influence of the Consuls, who forbade him to decree it.
On this Sherif called the Ministers together, and they all gave him
their words of honour that they would resign with him if he resigned.
And so it happened. But some of them, notwithstanding their
promise, joined Riaz Pasha when he became Prime Minister in
Sherif's place. In order to persuade them Riaz engaged that each
Minister should be supreme in his own department, and that they
would not allow Tewfik to interfere in any way with the
administration. Mahmud Sami joined him as Minister of the Awkaf,
Ali Mubarak as Minister of Public Works, and Osman Pasha Rifki, a
Turk of the old school, who hated the fellahin, was made Minister of
War. The new government was a tyrannical one. Hassan Moussa el
Akkad, for signing a petition against the breaking of the Moukabala
arrangement, was exiled to the White Nile, and Ahmed Fehmi for
another petition, and many other people were got rid of who
incurred the displeasure of the Ministers. Of all the Ministers the
worst was Osman Rifki.
We colonels were now once more with our regiments, and as native
Egyptians subject to much oppression. On any pretext a fellah officer
would be arrested, and his place filled by a Circassian. It was the
plan to weed the whole army of its native officers. I was especially in
ill favour because I had refused to allow my men to be taken from
their military duty and put to dig the Tewfikieh Canal, which it was
the practice to make them do without extra pay. Plans were made to
involve me in some street quarrel with the view to my assassination,
but through the love of my soldiers I always escaped. All officers
who were not Circassians were in danger, and all were alarmed. It
was thus that Ali Fehmy, who was a fellah born, though through his
wife connected with the Court, came to join us, for he feared he,
too, would be superseded. He was Colonel of the 1st Regiment of
Guards, and stationed at Abdin; I was at Abbassiyeh with the 3rd
Regiment, and Abd-el-Aal Helmi was at Toura. Ali Roubi commanded
the cavalry.
Matters came to a crisis in January, 1881. I had gone to spend the
evening with Nejm ed Din Pasha, and there were at his house some
pashas talking over the changes Osman Rifki had in hand, and I
learned from them that it had been decided that I and Abd-el-Aal
should be deprived of our commands, and our places given to
officers of the Circassian class. At the same moment a message
arrived for me from my house to say that Ali Fehmy had come there
with Abd-el-Aal and was awaiting me. So I went home and I found
them there, and from them I learned the same evil news. We
therefore took council what was to be done. Abd-el-Aal proposed
that we should go in force to Osman Rifki's house and arrest or kill
him, but I said, "No, let us petition first the Prime Minister, and then,
if he refuses, the Khedive." And they charged me to draw the
petition up in form. And I did so, stating the case, and demanding
the dismissal of Osman Rifki, and the raising of the army to 18,000
men, and the decreeing of the promised Constitution. [N. B.—I think
Arabi makes a mistake here, confusing these last two demands with
those made on the 9th of September. But he insisted on it the three
proposals were first made in February, and made in writing then.]
This we all three signed, though knowing that our lives were at
stake.
The following morning we went with our petition to the Minister of
the Interior and asked to see Riaz. We were shown into an outer
room and waited while the Minister read it in an inner room.
Presently he came out. "Your petition," he said, "is muhlik" (a
hanging matter). "What is it you want? to change the Ministry? And
what would you put in its place? Whom do you propose to carry on
the government?" And I answered him, "Ye saat le Basha, is Egypt
then a woman who has borne but eight sons and then been barren?"
By this I meant himself and the seven ministers under him. He was
angry at this, but in the end said he would see into our affair, and so
we left him. Immediately a council was assembled with the Khedive
and all his Court, and Stone and Blitz also. And the Khedive
proposed that we should be arrested and tried, but others said, "If
these are put on trial, Osman Pasha also must be tried." Therefore
Osman was left to deal with it alone. And the rest you know.
You ask did the Khedive at that time know of our intention to
petition. He did not know that nor that Ali Fehmy came to us. But
afterwards he knew. You ask did I know the Baron de Ring. I did not
know him, nor any one of the Consuls, but I heard that the French
Consul had the most influence, and I wrote to him telling him what
our position was, and begging him to let the other Consuls know
that there was no fear for their subjects. You ask if I knew Mahmud
Sami. I did not know him yet. But he was friends with my friend Ali
Roubi, and I had heard a good account of him as a lover of freedom.
He was of a Circassian family, but one that had been 600 years in
Egypt.
As to the second demonstration of September 9th, we knew then
that the Khedive was with us. He wished to rid himself of Riaz, who
disregarded his authority. I saw him but twice to speak to that
summer, and never on politics. His communication was through Ali
Fehmy, who brought us word to the following effect: "You three are
soldiers. With me you make four." You ask me whether he was
sincere. He never was sincere. But he wished an excuse to dismiss
Riaz. We therefore demanded next time the dismissal of Riaz, as well
as the rest, knowing he would be pleased. On the morning of the
9th September we sent word to the Khedive that we should come to
the asr to Abdin to make demand of the fulfilment of his promises.
He came, and with him Cookson, and it was with Cookson that I
debated the various proposals made. He asked if we should be
content with Haidar Pasha, but I said "we want no relation of the
Khedive." There were no written demands the second time, only a
renewal of the three demands of the 1st February, the Chamber of
Notables, the raising of the army to 18,000 men, according to the
firmans, and the dismissal of Riaz. They agreed to all. The Khedive
was delighted. I know nothing of Colvin having been there, or of any
advice he gave to the Khedive. The only ones I saw were Cookson
and Goldsmid. It was Cookson who talked to me. If the Khedive had
tried to shoot me, the guns would have been fired on him, and there
would have been bad work. But he was entirely pleased with the
whole of the proceedings.
You ask about Abu Sultan (Sultan Pasha). He was disappointed,
because when the Ministry was formed under Sherif Pasha he was
not included in it. It was thought, however, that the post of
President of the Chamber of Deputies was more honourable and
more important. Only he did not take this view, and was put out at
being omitted from the Ministry. That was the beginning of his
turning against us.
To your question about the ill-treatment of the Circassians arrested
for a plot while I was Minister of War, I answer plainly, as I have
answered before, I never went to the prison to see them tortured or
ill-treated, I simply never went near them at all.
About the riots of Alexandria there is no question but that it was due
to the Khedive and Omar Pasha Loutfi, and also to Mr. Cookson. The
riots were certainly planned several days beforehand, and with the
object of discrediting me, seeing that I had just given a guarantee of
order being preserved. The Khedive sent the cyphered telegram you
know of to Omar Loutfi, and Omar Loutfi arranged it with Seyd
Kandil, the chief of the Alexandria mustafezzin. Seyd Kandil kept the
thing from us who were at Cairo. Mr. Cookson's part in it was that a
number of cases of firearms were landed, and sent to his consulate,
obviously with the intention of arming somebody. The moment I
heard of what had happened, I sent Yakub Sami to Alexandria with
orders to make a full inquiry, and the facts were abundantly proved.
Much of what has been said however was incorrect. It is not true
that the bodies of Christians were found dressed as Moslems. The
riot began with a Maltese donkey boy, but that was only the excuse.
Omar Loutfi, as you say, was a strong partisan of Ismaïl's. You ask
why a man so dangerous was left in a post where he could work so
much mischief. I can only say that he was not under the orders of
the Minister of War, but of the Interior. It was a misfortune he was
left there. Neither Nadim nor Hassan Moussa el Akkad went to
Alexandria on any business of that kind. Hassan Moussa went there
on a money errand.
What you ask me is true about Ismaïl Pasha. He made us an offer of
money. The circumstances of it were these. We had ordered a
number of pieces of light artillery from Germany, but they would not
deliver them without payment, and we had none. Ismaïl Pasha
offered to let us have £30,000 to pay this, on condition that we
would allow it to be said that we were acting in his interests. The
offer was made through M. Mengs [Max Lavisson], Ismaïl's Russian
agent, and Hassan Moussa had some hand in it. But it was never
produced, and if Ismaïl really sent it to Alexandria, it remained there
in their hands. We never touched it.
I do not remember to have heard of any offer such as you speak of
having been made by the Rothschilds [this was an offer made as I
heard at the time by the Paris Rothschilds of a pension to Arabi of
£4,000 (100,000 francs) yearly, if he would leave Egypt], but I
received soon after the leyha [the note sent in by the Consuls
demanding the dismissal of the Mahmud Sami Ministry], a visit from
the French Consul, during which he asked me what my pay then
was, and offered me the double—that is to say, £500 a month from
the French Government if I would consent to leave Egypt and go to
Paris and be treated there as Abd-el-Kader was treated. I refused,
however, to have anything to do with it, telling him that it was my
business, if necessary, to fight and die for my country, not to
abandon it. I never heard of the Rothschilds in connection with this
offer.
I will now give you an account of how Tel-el-Kebir was lost. Some
days before, when the English were advancing, we made a plan to
attack them at Kassassin. Mahmud Sami was to advance on their
right flank from Salahieh, while we were to advance in front, and a
third body was to go round by the desert, south of the Wady, and
take them in the rear. The attack was tried and put partly in
execution, but failed because the plan had been betrayed by Ali Bey
Yusuf Khunfis, who sent the original sketch made by me to Lord
Wolseley. He and others in the army had been corrupted by Abou
Sultan acting for the Khedive. When Mahmud advanced, he found
artillery posted to intercept him and retreated, leaving us
unsupported, and the battle was lost. Sir Charles Wilson, while I was
in prison at Cairo, brought me my plan, and asked me whether it
was in my own hand, and I said "yes," and he told me how they had
come by it. "It is a good plan," he said, "and you might have beaten
us with it."
This was our first misfortune. At Tel-el-Kebir we were taken by
surprise and for the same reason of treachery. The cavalry
commanders were all seduced by Abou Sultan's promises. They
occupied a position in advance of the lines, and it was their duty to
give us warning of any advance by the English. But they moved
aside and gave no warning. There was also one traitor in command
within the lines, Ali Bey Yusuf Khunfis. He lit lamps to direct the
enemy, and then withdrew his men, leaving a wide space open for
them to pass through. You see the marks upon this carpet. They just
represent the lines. That is where Ali Yusuf was posted. Mohammed
Obeyd was there, and I was at this figure on the carpet a mile and a
half to the rear. We were expecting no attack as no sound of firing
had been heard. I was still asleep when we heard the firing close to
the lines. Ali Roubi, who was in command in front, sent news to me
to change my position as the enemy was taking us in flank. I said
my prayer and galloped to where we had a reserve of volunteers,
and called to them to follow me to support the front line. But they
were only peasants, not soldiers, and the shells were falling among
them and they ran away. I then rode forward alone with only my
servant Mohammed with me, who, seeing that there was no one
with me and that I was going to certain death, caught hold of my
horse by the bridle and implored me to go back. Then seeing that
the day was lost already, and that all were flying, I turned.
Mohammed continued with me and we crossed the Wady at Tel-el-
Kebir, and keeping along the line of the Ismaïlia Canal reached
Belbeis. There I had formed a second camp, and I found Ali Roubi
arrived before me, and we thought to make a stand. But on the
arrival of Drury Lowe's cavalry none would stay, and so we
abandoned all and took train for Cairo. Ali Roubi made mistakes by
extending the lines too far northwards, but he was loyal. The traitors
were Abdul Ghaffar, I think, and certainly his second in command of
the cavalry, Abd-el-Rahman Bey Hassan, and Ali Yusuf Khunfis. You
say Saoud el Tihawi, too. It may be so. Those Arabs were not to be
trusted. His grandfather had joined Bonaparte when he invaded us a
hundred years ago.
Now I return home after twenty years of sorrowful exile, and my
own people I laboured to deliver have come to believe, because the
French papers have told them so, that I sold them to the English!

The Grand Mufti's remarks on the above

[N. B.—On March 18th, 1903, I read the foregoing account to
Sheykh Mohammed Abdu at his house at Aïn Shems. He approved
most of it as correct, but made the following remarks:
1. As to the riot against Nubar.—Arabi's account of this is correct,
except that the order given to Ali Ferny to fire on the students was
not intended to be obeyed and was part of the comedy. Ali Fehmy
fired over their heads by order. Latif Bey was arrested and
imprisoned after the riot by Nubar, but was released on an
application made to Nubar by the freemasons, Latif being a member
of that body. Latif in after days freely acknowledged his share in the
affair. As to what Arabi says of his having proposed at that time to
depose Ismaïl, there was certainly secret talk of such action. Sheykh
Jemal-ed-Din was in favour of it, and proposed to me, Mohammed
Abdu, that Ismaïl should be assassinated some day as he passed in
his carriage daily over the Kasr el Nil bridge, and I strongly
approved, but it was only talk between ourselves, and we lacked a
person capable of taking lead in the affair. If we had known Arabi at
that time, we might have arranged it with him, and it would have
been the best thing that could have happened, as it would have
prevented the intervention of Europe. It would not, however, have
been possible to establish a republic in the then state of political
ignorance of the people. As to Ismaïl's having taken away fifteen
millions with him to Naples, nobody knows the amount. All that is
known is that it was very large. For the last few months of his reign
Ismaïl had been hoarding money, which he intercepted as it was
sent in to the Finance Office from the Mudiriehs.
2. As to Tewfik in his father's time.—What Arabi says of Tewfik
having taken presents for presenting petitions to Ismaïl may be true,
but the thing was not talked of, nor is it in accordance with Tewfik's
conduct when in power. I do not believe it.
3. As to Riaz' tyranny.—Riaz was tyrannical, but not to the point of
shedding blood. This he was always averse to. I do not remember
any talk about the people being made away with secretly by him.
There was no danger of such at any rate before the affair of the
Kasr-el-Nil. During the summer, however, of that year, 1881, there
was talk of attempts against Arabi and the other colonels.
4. As to the affair of the Kasr-el-Nil, February 1st, 1881.—Arabi's
account is confused and incorrect. The first petition made by Arabi
and the officers was simply one of injustice being done them. It was
made by Osman Rifki, and it drew down upon them the anger of the
Minister of War, who determined to get rid of them, and first brought
Arabi under the notice of the Consuls. Baron de Ring, who had a
quarrel with Riaz, interested himself in their case, but only indirectly.
The petition talked of by Arabi as having been drawn up in January
by him and taken to Riaz, certainly contained no reference to a
Constitution or to the increase of the army to 18,000 men. These
demands were not made until the September demonstration. The
petition of the Kasr-el-Nil time was simply a strong complaint to Riaz
of Osman Rifki's misdoings, and demanding his dismissal from the
Ministry of War. Riaz, at the council after the demonstration, was in
favour of its being made the subject of an inquiry, which would have
necessitated the trial by court-martial not only of the petitioners, but
also of Osman Rifki. Riaz was not in favour of violence. But it was
pointed out to him, privately, that if he opposed the more violent
plan it would be said he was seeking to curry favor with the soldiers
as against the Khedive, and he, therefore, left the matter to Osman
Rifki, to be dealt with as he pleased.
5. As to the demonstration of Abdin, September 9th, 1881.—The
seven months between the affair of Kasr-el-Nil and the
demonstration of September were months of great political activity,
which pervaded all classes. Arabi's action gained him much
popularity, and put him into communication with the civilian
members of the National party, such as Sultan Pasha, Suliman
Abaza, Hassain Shereï, and myself, and it was we who put forward
the idea of renewing the demand for a Constitution. The point of
view from which he at that time regarded it was as giving him and
his military friends a security against reprisals by the Khedive of his
Ministers. He told me this repeatedly during the summer. We
consequently organized petitions for a Constitution, and carried on a
campaign for it in the press. Arabi saw a great deal of Sultan Pasha
during the summer, and Sultan, who was very rich, made much of
him, sending him presents, such as farm produce, horses, and the
rest, in order to encourage him, and to get this support for the
constitutional movement. It was in concert with Sultan that the
demonstration of Abdin was arranged, and it is quite true that Sultan
expected to be named to a Ministry after the fall of Riaz. But Sherif
Pasha, who became Prime Minister, did not think of him and
overlooked him. Afterwards Sultan was pacified and pleased when
he was offered the presidency of the new Chamber of Notables. It
was not till after the leyha, ultimatum, that he had any quarrel with
Arabi. Then it is true that Arabi drew his sword in Sultan's presence
and that of other members of the Chamber when they hesitated and
were afraid to oppose the leyha. Up to this they had acted together.
Arabi's account of the Khedive's message, "You three are soldiers.
With me you are four," is excellent, and exactly shows the situation
as between him and the officers. Colvin certainly was with the
Khedive at Abdin, but as he knew no Arabic he probably was not
noticed by Arabi. It was Cookson who did the talking. Baron de Ring
had been recalled by his government on the request of Riaz, who
complained of his encouragement of the officers.
6. As to the riots of Alexandria.—Arabi is correct in his account as
regards Omar Loutfi and the Khedive, who had been arranging the
riot for some weeks. But it is not true as regards Seyd Kandil, who
was only weak and failed to prevent it. He is also wrong about
Cookson. The firearms introduced into the Consulate were for the
defence of the Maltese and other English subjects. Seyd Kandil was
exiled for twenty years, but was allowed quietly to come back, and is
now at his country place in Egypt, and I have often talked over the
affair with him. If you like we will go together and pay him a visit
next autumn. Arabi is right in saying that neither Hassan Moussa nor
Nadim were concerned in the riot. Nadim went down to Alexandria
to deliver a lecture and Hassan on money business.]

[The Mufti also added the following remarks on March 20th, 1903.
There was an attempt to introduce freemasonry into Egypt in the
later years of Ismaïl Pasha. The lodges were all connected with
lodges in Europe. Sheykh Jemal-ed-Din joined one, but he soon
found out that there was nothing of any value in it and withdrew.
Ismaïl encouraged it for his purposes when he began to be in
difficulties, but freemasonry never was a power in Egypt.
Mohammed Obeyd was certainly killed at Tel-el-Kebir. There were
rumours for a long time of his having been seen in Syria, and we
used to send from Beyrout when we were living there in exile to try
and find him for his wife's sake, who was at Beyrout, but they
always turned out to be false reports.
Mahmud Sami was one of the original Constitutionalists, dating from
the time of Ismaïl. He was a friend of Sherif and belonged to the
same school of ideas. It is most probable that he gave warning to
Arabi of his intended arrest, as he was one of the Council of
Ministers and must have known. After the affair of Kasr-el-Nil he was
altogether with Arabi and the Colonels. That was why Riaz got rid of
him from the Ministry and appointed Daoud Pasha in his place.
Riaz, at the beginning, underrated the importance of Arabi's action.
Afterwards he was afraid of it. He began by despising it as he did all
fellah influence in politics.
Sherif Pasha resigned in February, 1882, not on account of any
quarrel with Arabi, but because he was afraid of European
intervention. He was opposed to an insistence on the power of
voting the budget claimed by the Chamber of Notables, and he
retired so as not to be compromised.
Ragheb Pasha is (as mentioned by Ninet) of Greek descent, though
a Moslem. He had been Minister under Ismaïl, but was a
Constitutionalist. After the leyha he was named Prime Minister, with
Arabi for Minister of War. He acted honestly with Arabi, and
remained with the National Party during the war.
Butler gives May 20th, 1880, as the date of the first military petition.
That is probably correct.
Ibrahim el Aghany was one of the best and ablest of Jemal ed Din's
disciples at the Azhar. He is still living and employed in the
Mékhemeh (?).
When the Council was summoned to consider Arabi's petition asking
for Osman Rifky's dismissal, the Khedive was with Osman Rifky for
having Arabi arrested and sent up the Nile, but Riaz at first was for
an inquiry. During an adjournment, however, of the Council, Taha
Pasha persuaded Riaz that if he was for lenient measures it would be
thought he was intriguing with the soldiers against the Khedive—to
make himself Khedive—and Riaz thereupon made no further
opposition. This I learned afterwards from Mahmud Sami who, as
one of the Ministers, was present at the Council.
Ibrahim Eff. el Wakil with Hassan Shereï and Ahmed Mahmud were
the leaders of the liberal party in the Chamber of Notables.]

Further Account given by Sheykh Mohammed Abdu,

December 22nd, 1903
[When Sheykh Jemal-ed-Din was exiled a few days after the Sherif's
dismissal in 1879, I was told to leave Cairo where I was professor in
the normal school, and to go to my village. My successor at the
school was Sheykh Hassan the blind. I was soon tired of being in my
village and went to Alexandria where I was watched by the police,
so I went secretly to Tantah and wandered about for a long while.
Then I came back to Cairo hoping to see Mahmud Sami, who was
my friend, and at that time Minister of the Awkaf, but he was away,
so I went to Ali Pasha Mubarak's, Minister of Public Works, who was
also a friend, but he received me badly, and everybody advised me
not to stay, as it would be thought I came in connection with a
secret society which had been recently formed by Shahin Pasha and
Omar Lutfi and other Ismaïlists against Riaz, so I went to my village
again. But again I grew tired of it, as the villagers were always
quarrelling and resolved to return once more and lecture at the
Azhar. Riaz Pasha was at that time in difficulty to find any one who
could write good Arabic in the Official Paper, and he consulted
Mahmud Sami, who told him that if there were but three more like
me Egypt could be saved. And my successor, Sheykh Hassan, gave
him the same opinion of me.
So I was appointed at the end of Ramadan (October, 1880), third
Editor of the Journal. But my two senior Editors were jealous and
would give me no work to do. So the Journal was no better written.
At this Riaz was displeased, and made inquiry, and as the result I
was made Editor, and a little later Director of the Press. This was
before the end of 1880. The first time I saw you was when I called
on you with Rogers Bey at the Hôtel du Nil, and it was I who
recommended to you Mohammed Khalil, and afterwards he brought
you to see me at my house. I criticized the Government strongly in
the Official Journal, and as Director of the Press allowed all liberty.
But I was not in favour of a revolution, and thought that it would be
enough if we had a Constitution in five years' time. I disapproved of
the overthrow of Riaz in September, 1881, and, about ten days
before the military demonstration at Abdin, I met Arabi at the house
of Toulba Ismat, and Latif Bey Selim had come with him, and there
were many there. And I urged him to moderation, and said, "I
foresee that a foreign occupation will come and that a malediction
will rest for ever on him who provokes it." On this Arabi said that he
hoped it would not be he. And he told me at the same time that
Sultan Pasha had promised to bring petitions from every Notable in
Egypt in favour of the Constitution. This was true, for all the Omdehs
were angry with Riaz for having put down their habit of employing
forced labour. Suliman Abaza would not join in the revolution as he
thought it premature, and Shereï Pasha was also against it. But
when once the Constitution was granted we all joined to protect it.
But Arabi could not control the army, where there were many
ambitions.
I did not know of the intended demonstration at Abdin, as I was
known to be friendly to Riaz, but it was arranged with Sultan Pasha
and Sherif Pasha. The Khedive was in a constant change of mind
about Arabi at that time, and joined Riaz and Daoud Pasha in their
attempt to crush Arabi, but the day before the event they told the
Khedive, who, to overthrow Riaz, approved.]

Conversation with Arabi at Sheykh Obeyd, January

2nd, 1904
You ask me at what date the Khedive Tewfik put himself first into
communication with us soldiers. It was in this way. Shortly before
the affair of the Kasr-el-Nil he encouraged Ali Fehmy to go to us,
with whom we were already friends, his intention being to use him
as a spy on us, he being Colonel of the Guard. But Ali Fehmy joined
us in our petition to Riaz Pasha, and was involved with us in our
arrest. After the affair of the Kasr-el-Nil, and seeing the position we
had gained in the minds of the people, the Khedive thought to make
use of us against Riaz, and he sent Ali Fehmy to us with the
message, "You three are soldiers. With me you make four." That was
about a month after the affair, and we knew he was favourable to us
also through Mahmud Sami, who was then Minister of War. And
Mahmud Sami told us, "If ever you see me leave the Ministry, know
that the Khedive's mind is changed to you, and that there is danger."
In the course, therefore, of the summer (1881) when trouble began
to begin for us through the spies of Riaz Pasha, who was Minister of
the Interior, and who had us watched by the police, we had
confidence in Mahmud Sami.
And I was specially involved in displeasure through my refusal to
allow my soldiers to be taken from their military work to dig the
Tewfikieh Canal, they being impressed for the labour by Ali Pasha
Moubarak as Minister of Public Works. For this and for other reasons
the Khedive turned from us, and resolved, with Riaz Pasha, to
separate and disunite the army; and the regiments were to be sent
to distant places so that we should not communicate one with the
other. And Mahmud Sami was called upon, as Minister of War, to
work their plan against us, the Khedive at that time being at
Alexandria with the rest of the Ministers. And when Mahmud Sami
refused, Riaz Pasha wrote to him, "The Khedive has accepted your
resignation." And both he and the Khedive notified Mahmud Sami
that he was to go at once to his village in the neighbourhood of
Tantah, and remain there, and not to go to Cairo, and on no account
to have communication with us. He nevertheless came to Cairo to
his house there, and we called on him, but he refused to see us.
Then we knew that evil was intended against us. And the Khedive
appointed Daoud Pasha Yeghen in his place, and the vexation on us
increased, and we knew that attempts were to be made against us.
At the beginning of September the Khedive returned to Cairo with
Riaz and the Ministers, and it was resolved to deal with us. Then I
took counsel with Abd-el-Aal and Abd-el-Ghaffar, the commander of
the cavalry at Gesireh, and Fuda Bey Hassan, Caimakam in
command at the Kaláa. The miralaï in command at the Kaláa had
been dismissed by Mahmud Sami shortly before leaving office, and
had not been replaced. This miralaï was of us but khaïn (a traitor),
and we agreed that we would make a demonstration and demand
the dismissal of the whole Ministry, and that a Ministry favourable to
the Wattan should replace them, and that a Mejliss el Nawwab
should be assembled, and that the army should be raised to 18,000
men. But we did not tell Ali Fehmy of our design, for we did not
wholly at that time trust him. And the next morning I wrote stating
our demands, and sent it to the Khedive at Ismaïlia Palace, saying
that we should march to Abdin Palace at the asr, there to receive his
answer. And the reason of our going to Abdin and not to Ismaïlia,
where he lived, was that Abdin was his public residence, and we did
not wish to alarm the ladies of his household. But if he had not
come to Abdin we should have marched on to Ismaïlia.
When, therefore, the Khedive received our message he sent for Riaz
Pasha and Khairy Pasha and Stone Pasha, and they went first to
Abdin Barracks, where both the Khedive and Riaz Pasha spoke to the
soldiers, and they gave orders to Ali Fehmy that he should, with his
regiment, occupy the Palace of Abdin. And Ali Fehmy assented, and
he posted his men in the upper rooms out of sight, so that they
should be ready to fire on us from the windows. But I do not know
whether they were given ball cartridge or not. Then the Khedive with
the Generals went on to the Kaláa, and they spoke to the soldiers
there in the same sense, calling on Fuda Bey to support the Khedive
against us, the Khedive scolding him and saying, "I shall put you in
prison"; but the soldiers surrounded the carriage, and the Khedive
was afraid and drove away, and he went on by the advice of Riaz to
Abassiyeh to speak to me, but I had already marched with my
regiment through the Hassaneyn quarter to Abdin. They asked about
the artillery and were told that it also had gone to Abdin, and when
the Khedive arrived there he found us occupying the square, the
artillery and cavalry being before the west entrance, and I with my
troops before the main entrance, and already when I arrived before
the palace I had sent in to Ali Fehmy, who I had heard was there,
and had spoken to him, and he had withdrawn his men from the
palace, and they stood with us.
And the Khedive entered by the back door on the east side, and
presently he came out to us with his generals and aides-de-camp,
but I did not see Colvin with him, though he may have been there,
and he called on me to dismount, and I dismounted, and he called
on me to put up my sword, and I put up my sword, but the officers
approached with me to prevent treachery, about fifty in number, and
some of them placed themselves between him and the palace, but
Riaz Pasha was not with the Khedive in the square, and remained in
the palace. And when I had delivered my message and made my
three demands to the Khedive, he said, "I am Khedive of the country
and shall do as I like" ("and Khedeywi 'l beled wa 'amal zey ma inni
awze"). I replied, "We are not slaves, and we shall never more be
inherited from this day forth" ("Nahnu ma abid wa la nurithu ba'd el
yom"). He said nothing more, but turned and went back into the
palace. And presently they sent out Cookson to me with his
interpreter, and he asked me why, being a soldier, I made demand of
a parliament, and I said that it was to put an end to arbitrary rule,
and pointed to the crowd of citizens supporting us behind the
soldiers. He threatened me, saying, "We shall bring a British army,"
and much discussion took place between us, and he returned six or
seven times to the palace, and came out again six or seven times to
me, until finally he informed me that the Khedive had agreed to all,
and the Khedive wished for Haidar Pasha to replace Riaz. But I
would not consent, and when it was put to me to say I named Sherif
Pasha, because he had declared himself in favour of a Mejliss el
Nawwab, and I had known him a little in former times, in the time of
Saïd Pasha, when he served with the army. And in the evening the
Khedive sent for me and I went to him at Ismaïlia Palace, and I
thanked him for having agreed to our request, but he said only,
"That is enough. Go now and occupy Abdin, and let it be without
music in the streets" (lest that should be taken as a token of
rejoicing).
And when Ali Pasha Nizami came to Cairo with Ahmed Pasha Ratib
from the Sultan, the Khedive was alarmed lest an inquiry should be
made, and Mahmud Sami being again Minister of War ordered us to
leave Cairo, and I went to Ras-el-Wady and Abd-el-Aal to Damiata,
but Ali Fehmy remained at Cairo. And I saw nothing of Ali Nizami.
But being at Zagazig on a visit to friends, Ahmed Eff. Shemsi and
Suliman Pasha Abaza, as I was returning by train to Ras el Wady, it
happened that Ahmed Pasha Ratib was on his way to Suez, for he
was going on to Mecca on pilgrimage. And I found myself in the
same carriage with him, and we exchanged compliments as
strangers, and I asked him his name, and he asked me my name,
and he told me of his pilgrimage and other things, but he did not
speak of his mission to the Khedive, nor did I ask. But I told him that
I was loyal to the Sultan as the head of our religion, and I also
related to him all that had occurred, and he said, "You did well." And
at Ras el Wady I left him, and afterwards he sent me a Koran from
Jeddah, and later, on his return to Stamboul, he wrote to me, saying
that he had spoken favourably of me to the Sultan, and afterwards I
received a letter dictated by the Sultan to Sheykh Mohammed
Dhaffar telling me what I know.
As to Yakub Sami, he was of family originally Greek from Stamboul.
He went by my order to Alexandria to inquire into the affair of the
riot, but they would not allow a true inquiry to be made into it. It
was Yakub Sami who, with Ragheb Pasha, proposed that we should
cut off the Khedive's head. You say we should have done better to
do so, but I wished to gain the end of our revolution without the
shedding of a drop of blood.
 APPENDIX II
Programme of the National Party of Egypt,
forwarded by Mr. Blunt to Mr. Gladstone, Dec.
20th, 1881, with Mr. Gladstone's Answers
1. The National party of Egypt accept the existing relations of Egypt
with the Porte as the basis of their movement. That is to say: They
acknowledge the Sultan Abd el Hamid Khan as their Suzerain and
Lord, and as actual Caliph or Head of the Mussulman religion; nor do
they propose, while his empire stands, to alter this relationship.
They admit the right of the Porte to the tribute fixed by law, and to
military assistance in case of foreign war. At the same time, they are
firmly determined to defend their national rights and privileges, and
to oppose, by every means in their power, the attempts of those
who would reduce Egypt again to the condition of a Turkish Pashalik.
They trust in the protecting Powers of Europe, and especially in
England, to continue their guarantee of Egypt's administrative
independence.
2. The National party express their loyal allegiance to the person of
the reigning Khedive. They will continue to support Mohammed
Towfik's authority as long as he shall rule in accordance with justice
and the law, and in fulfilment of his promises made to the people of
Egypt in September 1881. They declare, however, their intention to
permit no renewal of that despotic reign of injustice which Egypt has
so often witnessed, and to insist upon the exact execution of his
promise of Parliamentary government and of giving the country
freedom. They invite His Highness, Mohammed Towfik, to act
honestly by them in these matters, promising him their cordial help;
but they warn him against listening to those who would persuade
him to continue his despotic power, to betray their national rights, or
to elude his promises.
3. The National party fully recognize the services rendered to Egypt
by the Governments of England and France, and they are aware that
all freedom and justice they have obtained in the past has been due
to them. For this they tender them their thanks. They recognize the
European Control as a necessity of their financial position, and the
present continuance of it as the best guarantee of their prosperity.
They declare their entire acceptance of the foreign debt as a matter
of national honour—this, although they know that it was incurred,
not for Egypt's benefit, but in the private interests of a dishonest and
irresponsible ruler—and they are ready to assist the Controllers in
discharging the full national obligations. They look, nevertheless,
upon the existing order of things as in its nature temporary, and
avow it as their hope gradually to redeem the country out of the
hands of its creditors. Their object is, some day to see Egypt entirely
in Egyptian hands. Also they are not blind to the imperfections of the
Control, which they are ready to point out. They know that many
abuses are committed by those employed by it, whether Europeans
or others. They see some of these incapable, others dishonest,
others too highly paid. They know that many offices, now held by
strangers, would be better discharged by Egyptians, and at a fifth of
the cost; and they believe there is still much waste and much
injustice. They cannot understand that Europeans living in the land
should remain for ever exempt from the general taxation, or from
obedience to the general law. The National party does not, however,
propose to remedy these evils by any violent action; only it would
protest against their unchecked continuance. They would have the
Governments of France and England consider that, having taken the
control of their finances out of the hands of the Egyptians, they are
responsible for their prosperity, and are bound to see that efficient
and honest persons only are employed by them.
4. The National party disclaim all connection with those who, in the
interest of Powers jealous of Egypt's independence, seek to trouble
the peace of the country—and there are many such—or with those
who find their private advantage in disturbance. At the same time
they are aware that a merely passive attitude will not secure them
liberty in a land which is still ruled by a class to whom liberty is
hateful. The silence of the people made Ismaïl Pasha's rule possible
in Egypt, and silence now would leave their hope of political liberty
unfulfilled. The Egyptians have learned in the last few years what
freedom means, and they are resolved to complete their national
education. This they look to find in the Parliament just assembling,
in a fair measure of freedom for the press, and in the general growth
of knowledge among all classes of the people. They know, however,
that none of these means of education can be secured except by the
firm attitude of the national leaders. The Egyptian Parliament may
be cajoled or frightened into silence, as at Constantinople; the press
may be used as an instrument against them, and the sources of
instruction cut off. It is for this reason and for no other that the
National party has confided its interests at the present time to the
army, believing them to be the only power in the country able and
willing to protect its growing liberties. It is not, however, in the plans
of the party that this state of things shall continue; and as soon as
the people shall have established their rights securely the army will
abandon its present political attitude. In this the military leaders fully
concur. They trust that on the assembling of the Parliament their
further interference in affairs of State may be unnecessary. But for
the present they will continue to perform their duty as the armed
guardians of the unarmed people. Such being their position, they
hold it imperative that their force should be maintained efficient, and
their complement made up to the full number of 18,000 men. They
trust that the European Control will keep this necessity in view when
considering the army estimates.
5. The National party of Egypt is a political, not a religious party. It
includes within its ranks men of various races and various creeds. It
is principally Mohammedan, because nine-tenths of the Egyptians
are Mohammedans; but it has the support of the Moors, of the
Coptic Christians, of the Jews, and others who cultivate the soil and