Part 1 - 6th jan

 The nomenclature of Skepticism

 Investigative: investigating and inquiring activity.
 Suspensive: the feeling after the skeptical investigation.
 Aporetic: it puzzles whether to assent or deny, for it investigates everything.
 Pyrrhonian: Pyrrho is the first systematic exponent of skepticism.
 What is skepticism
 An ability to set out oppositions among things.
 Equipollence.
 Suspension of judgment.
 Tranquility.

Part 2 - 9th jan

he skeptic or Pyrrhonian
Those who possess skeptical ability.
The principles of skepticism
The causal principles of skepticism is to become tranquil.
The constitutive principles is equipollence.
Do skeptics hold beliefs?
Skeptics do not reject beliefs forced upon them by appearances.
What kind of belief do skeptics reject?
Skeptics reject all kind of beliefs of unclear objects of investigation.
Skeptics/Pyrrhonists do not assent to anything unclear.
Do skeptics belong to a school?
Skeptics do not belong to a school if it is based on an unclear belief.
Skeptics coherently follow to appearances, traditional customs, law and persuasions, their own
feelings without holding any dogmatic opinion.

Part 3 - 13th jan

 Do skeptics study natural science?

 Skeptics don’t make assertions and firm conviction on scientific beliefs.
 Skeptics study natural science for tranquility through equipollence.

 Do skeptics reject what is apparent?

 Skeptics do not reject what is apparent.
 Skeptics reject what is said about what is apparent.
 Skeptics accept that “sugar is sweet”, but they investigate “sugar is sweet by
nature”.
  The standard of skepticism
 Standards adopted to provide convictions.
 Standards of action in everyday life.
 The standard of skeptical persuasion is what is apparent.

 The fourfold everyday observances are:

 Guidance by nature, necessitation by feelings, handing down of laws and customs,
and teaching of kinds of expertise.

Part 4 - 20th jan

 What is the aim of skepticism?

 Tranquility in matters of opinion and moderation of feeling in matters forced upon us.
 Skeptics are disturbed by things which are forced upon them.
 Perpetual trouble by holding things as good or bad by nature.
 Dogmatists suffer from additional opinion, but skeptics do not.

 The general modes of suspension of judgment

 Tranquility follows suspension of judgment.
 Suspension of judgment comes about through the opposition of things.
 Skeptics oppose what appears to what appears, what is thought of to what is thought
of, present things to present things.
 The Ten Modes
 The modes through which skeptics conclude to suspension of judgment.
 1. The mode depending on the variations among animals.
 2. The mode depending on the differences among humans.

 3. The mode depending upon differing constitutions of the sense-organs.

 4. The mode depending on circumstances.

Part 5 – 27th jan

 5. The mode depending on positions and intervals and places.

 6. The mode depending on admixtures.
 7. The mode depending on quantities and preparations of existing things.
 8. The mode deriving from relativity.
 9. The mode depending on frequent or rare encounters.
 10. The mode depending on persuasions, customs, laws, and belief in myths and
dogmatic suppositions.

Indian Logic: Reasoning and Argument

Logical terms in inference

 X is a philosophical view because it is a Pyrrhonian view. For example, Pyrrho’s

view.
 Subject: X
 Object to be proved: a philosophical view.
 Thesis: X is a philosophical view.
 Reason/evidence: a Pyrrhonian view.
 Example, Pyrrho’s view.
 Similar class: whatever is philosophical view.
 Dissimilar class: whatever is non-philosophical view.

Triple Characteristics
Three-membered inference logical reasoning

 Subject: X is a philosophical view.

 Forward pervasion: whatever is Pyrrhonian view is a philosophical view.
 Counter pervasion: whatever is non-philosophical view is non-Pyrrhonian view.
 Subject must be common for both the proponent and the opponent.
 Forward pervasion shows the presence of reason in all similar cases.
 Counter pervasion shows the absence of reason in all dissimilar cases.

Reasoning
How to Think Critically

 Reasoning is a logical thinking process.

 By knowing reasoning, thinking becomes clear and systematic.
 Reasoning removes all sorts of unjustifiable thoughts.
 There are two types of reasoning in Indian logic: assertive and deconstructive.
 Assertive reasoning is of three kinds.
 Causal reasoning, identity reasoning, and non-observation reasoning.
 All three types of assertive reasoning are triple-characterized reasoning in structure.
 The first two are affirmative reasoning and the last one is negative reasoning

Argument
How to Communicate Critically

 Argument is a set of propositions in which the conclusion is derived from the

premises.
 Argument must be either sound or unsound.
 There is a difference between logical validity and logical soundness in Indian logic.
 Sound argument must necessarily be triple-characterized in structure.
 There are two types of argument: assertive and deconstructive.
 Assertive argument is either affirmative or negative in structure.

 There are three types of assertive argument.

  Causal argument, identity argument, and non-observation argument.
 The first two types of argument are affirmative and the last one is negative in
formulation.
 All three types of argument are triple-characterized arguments.

Part 6– 30th jan

Causal Reasoning

 Causal reasoning infers cause through its effect.

 Example: there is fire because there is natural smoke, e.g., in a hearth.
 Fire and natural smoke are cause and effect.
 Causal relation is necessary relation.
 Wherever there is natural smoke there is fire, like in a hearth.
 Wherever there is not fire there is not natural smoke, like in a lake. Example include in reasoning
 Here relation is conceptual relation of the concepts ‘fire’ and ‘natural smoke’.

Causal Argument

 Causal argument proves the existence of a cause through its effect.

 Example, wherever there is natural smoke there is fire. There is natural smoke on
that hill. Therefore, there is fire on the hill.
 Wherever there is X, there is Y. There is X. Therefore, there is Y.
 The first premise is a major premise, the second premise is the minor premise, and
the last proposition indicated by ‘therefore’ is the conclusion.
 The existence of fire on the hill is inferred from the necessary relation between fire
and natural smoke found over there on the hill.

Identity Reasoning

 Identity reasoning is based on necessary relation of the identity or nature of things.

 Example, this object is a table because it is a wooden table.
 There is necessary relation between the concepts ‘table’ and ‘wooden table’.
 Whatever is wooden table is a table.
 Whatever is not a table is not a wooden table.
 Relation between general and particular, a word and its meaning.

Identity Argument

 Identity argument proves the necessary conceptual relation between two things
which share the same identity.
 Example, whatever is a product is caused and conditioned. This classroom is a
product. Therefore, this classroom is caused and conditioned.
 Whatever is X is Y. Z is X. Therefore, Z is Y.
 In this argument, the necessary conceptual relation between ‘product’ and ‘cause
and condition’ is seen in ‘classroom’.
  The caused and conditioned nature of classroom is inferred from the necessary
relation between ‘product’ and ‘cause and condition’.

Part 7 – 3rd feb

Non-observation Reasoning

 Non-observation reasoning is negative formulation of the first two types of reasoning.

 Example, there is no fire because there is no natural smoke, e.g., in a lake.
 Wherever there is no natural smoke there is no fire.
 Wherever there is fire there is natural smoke.
 This is not a PG classroom because it is not a classroom, e.g., a waiting room.
 Whatever is not a classroom is not a PG classroom.
 Whatever is a PG classroom is a classroom.

Non-observation Argument

 Non-observation argument proves the non-existence of an object through conceptual

necessary relation.
 Example, wherever there is no natural smoke, there is no fire. There is no natural
smoke on the hill. Therefore, there is no fire on the hill.
 Whatever is not a classroom is not a PG classroom. This is not a classroom.
Therefore, this is not a PG classroom.
 Whatever is not cognized by a true cognition does not exist. A bird is not cognized by
a true cognition in this room. Therefore, there is no bird in this room.

Prasaṅga/Consequentialist Reasoning

 Prasanga argument shows contradiction in opponent’s argument.

 Investigation of cause
 If song makes people feel happy by nature, then it must make all people feel happy
all the time because it is the true nature of song.
 Investigation of effect
 If tension is actually caused by low marks, then all Xs who score low marks must be
in tension because tension is the result of low marks by its nature.
 Investigation of nature
 If X is good by nature, then it must be good for all because that which is good by
nature cannot be non-good.

Part 8 – 6th feb

Prasaṅga/Consequentialist Argument

 Investigation of cause
  If one member in a family becomes kind-hearted, then all other family members will
become compassionate, and that eventually convert the entire community into
compassionate community.
 If one IIT student gets placement in a big company, then all other IIT students will get
good placement and all companies will be run by IITians.
 If some people do not produce smoke in Delhi, then all other people will follow them
making Delhi a pollution free city.
 If many people become honest, then all other people will become honest too, and the
entire world will become a cheating free world.
 If a farmer does organic farming, then all other farmers will follow him, and all people
in the world will enjoy organic food.

Part 11 – 17th feb

Fallacies of ambiguity

 Ambiguity
 Ambiguity occurs when it is unclear which meaning of a term is intended in a given
context.
 Semantic ambiguity
 Sometimes we do not know which interpretation to give to a phrase or a sentence
because its grammar or syntax admits more than one interpretation.
 Expressions that are misleading or potentially misleading are ambiguous.
 Example, the word “cardinal”.
 “The cardinals are in town.”
 A priest, a bird-watcher, and baseball fan would react the remark differently.

 The priest would prepare for a religious function. The bird-watcher would get out
binoculars. The baseball fan would head for the stadium.
 In this context, the remark might be criticized as ambiguous.
 “X is at the bank.” “X has deposited 500 rupees in the bank.”
 Syntactic ambiguity
 “The conquest of the Persians.”
 Persians' conquering someone or someone’s conquering Persians.
 “Mary had a little lamb.”
 Mary had a little lamb; it followed her to school. Mary had a lamb and then some
broccoli.

 Ambiguity leads to the fallacy of equivocation.

 Fallacy of Equivocation
 Equivocation occurs when the same expression is used in different senses in an
argument.
 Six is an odd number of legs for a horse. Odd numbers cannot be divided by two.
Therefore, six cannot be divided by two.
 If something is desired, then it is desirable. If it is desirable, then it is good.
Therefore, if something is desired, then it is good.
 If something is desired, then it is capable of being desired. If something is capable of
being desired, then it is good. Therefore, if something is desired, then it is good.

 Definitions
 Definitions avoid fallacies of clarity.
 Lexical/Dictionary definitions
 The most common kind of definition.
 The goal of lexical definition is to provide factual information about the standard
meaning of a word.
 Lexical definitions are sometimes circular definitions. “Car” as “automobile” and
“automobile” as “car”.
 Lexical definitions are sometimes incorrect definitions. “Fan” as “a device waved in
the hand or operated mechanically to create a current of air.”

 Disambiguating Definitions
 Disambiguating definitions specify a sense in which a word or phrase is used by a
particular speaker on a particular occasion.
 Disambiguating definitions can be used to removed semantic ambiguity.
 “When I said the banks were collapsing, I meant river banks, not financial
institutions.”
 Disambiguating definitions are also used to remove syntactic ambiguity.
 “When I said that all of my friends are not students, I meant that not all of them are
students, not I meant that none of them are students.”
 Whether the ambiguity is semantic or syntactic, the goal of disambiguating definition
is to capture what the speaker intended rather than what a word means.

 Stipulative Definitions
 Stimulative definitions are used to assign a meaning to a new term or to assign a
new or special meaning to a familiar term.
 “By such expression I mean so”. “Googol” to stand for number 1 followed by 100
zeros.
 Technical terms in different disciplines have stipulative definitions.
 Stipulative definition might go wrong if a stipulative term is used for different
meanings.
 Precising Definition
 Precising definitions are used to draw a sharp boundary around the things to which a
term refers.

 Precising definitions are combinations of dictionary definition and stipulative

definition.
  Example, the precising definition of “city”.
 Systematic or Theoritical Definition
 Systematic definitions are used to give a systematic order or structure to a subject
matter.
 Are definitions always needed? Is definition absolute or conventional?
 When do we require definitions?

After Minor

Part 12– 3rd march

Fallacies of relevance

 Fallacies of relevance arise when a premise, true or not, is not adequately related to
the conclusion.
 The most common forms of the fallacies of relevance are ad hominem and appeals
to authority.
 Relevance
 If premises are true, but have no bearing of the truth of the conclusion.
 Why irrelevant remarks can have any influence at all.
 We generally assume that person’s remarks are relevant, so conversation takes
place.
 Irrelevance is sometimes innocent.

 In some cases, for politeness or to conceal stupidity.

 The combination of generosity and fear of looking stupid leads to accept irrelevant
statements as reasons.
 Irrelevance is also used to divert attention from the real issue.
 Ad hominem arguments
 Ad hominem is an argument directed against a person who is making a claim rather
than the person’s claim or argument for it.
 Ad hominem is irrelevant, for the character or social position or status of a person
should have nothing to do with the truth of what that person says or with the
soundness or strength of that person’s arguments.
 A speaker’s ethnicity, race, caste, sex, or sexual orientation almost never give us any
good reason to challenge the truth of what the person says or the soundness of his
or her argument.

 Why ad hominem is used in argument.

 Ad hominem is often introduced just to distract from the real point at issue.
 Can’t a speaker’s character or position be a reason to doubt for the truth of what he
or she says?
 Ad hominem deniers
 Ad hominem deniers deny the truth of what is said or the strength or soundness of an
argument through personal attacks.
 Example, you are illiterate, so your justification is wrong.
 Denial, I am just saying that illiterate people can’t justify things.
 Example, X is too young, so he can’t be qualified for this job.

 Ad hominem silencers
 This type of ad hominem questions a person’s right to make a claim or present an
argument.
 The right to speak is revoked without necessarily denying the truth of what is said.
 Example, your argument can’t be counted, for you are not a member of this
committee.
 Ad hominem dismissers
 Ad hominem dismissers dismiss the speaker as untrustworthy and unreliable.
 This fallacy does not deny the truth of the claim or the speaker’s right to say it.
Instead, it questions the person’s integrity.

 Example, X says that he saw you misguiding him, but X is a selfish person, so you
shouldn’t value him.
 Appeals to authority
 Example, this is right because X says so.
 Is there anything wrong with citing authorities or experts to support what we say?
 Some people stand in a better position to know things than others, there is nothing
improper about citing them as authorities.
 At the same time, appeals to authority can be abused.
 Whether the person cited is, in fact, an authority at all.
 Whether the person cited is an authority in the particular area under discussion.
 Are movie stars wrong authorities in advertisements?

 Movie stars are experts in attracting people’s attention and not because they are
experts concerning the products they are endorsing.
 Is it easy to know who is expert in an area if you yourself are not an expert in that
area?
 Are all area related questions settled by the experts in that area?
 Can experts be wrong? Who is right authority and who is wrong authority?
 Can reliance on experts and authorities be avoided in this complicated and
specialized world?
 We need to be critical to appeals to authority.
 Appeal to popular opinion
 A judgment based on what most people think on a particular issue.

 Example, lying is immoral because most people think so.

 Is appeal to popular opinion always false?
 Example, the sky looks blue, for most people think that it does look blue.
 Appeal to tradition
 Morality is not based on facts about humans, for it has to be valid for all rational
creatures, whether human or not.
 Kant centers his analysis on the concept of the “good will”.
 Good will is a will that is motivated by the idea of duty or moral law.
 Good will serves ground for morality according to Kant.
 Good will is end in itself and it is good without limitation.
 Good will is good even in ordinary life.
 If the will is not good, virtues like courage, understanding, wealth, health, self-control
could be extremely evil and harmful.

 A self-controlled criminal might well be more evil than one who loses control easily.
 Good will is not good because of what it accomplishes, but purely in itself.
 Good will is an intrinsic value not an extrinsic value.
 Moral law is duty of rational beings and it is categorical imperative, opposite of
hypothetical imperative.
 Categorical imperative: Moral maxims and laws which are unconditional and
unchangeable.
 Hypothetical imperative: Moral rules which can be changed and modified.
 “Do not tell lie” is a categorical imperative.
 “If you don’t want to get into trouble, don’t tell lie” is a hypothetical imperative.

 Categorical imperatives or moral maxims:

 1) “Act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of
nature.”
 Any human action which can be universal is moral action.
 If the action is not universal, then it cannot be moral according to Kant.
 The universality of action can be checked like this, What if everyone did that?
 2) “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any
other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”
 According to Kant, human being cannot be means at all.
 Any human cannot be used as a means.

 Any form of human exploitation and discrimination cannot be morally justified.

 Human being is end in himself/herself.
 What about animals? According to Kant, animals don’t have moral standing because
they don’t have good will, but he is against the cruelty towards animals.
 Even God is not beyond morality, He must follow moral duty.
 3) “A systematic union of rational beings through common objective laws, that is, a
kingdom, which can be called a kingdom of ends.”
 Every rational being is a member of the kingdom of ends who gives universal laws in
it but is also himself subject to these laws.
 This is a kind of moral community of rational beings who follow moral duty.

 A community where categorical imperatives are followed.

 These three moral maxims are categorical imperatives which are formula of the
universal law, formula of humanity, and formula of the kingdom of ends.
  Duty: duty is to be practical unconditional necessity of action and it must therefore
hold for all rational beings and only because of this be also a law for all human wills.
 Ground of practical law lies in that which is end in itself.
 Good is motivated by the sense of duty guided by reason.
 Actions have moral value if they are acted from a sense of duty guided by reason.
 Now how to put Kant’s ethics into practice?

 That action is moral which is universal and treats humans as end not means.
 Only those actions are moral which are done out of a sense of duty guided by
reason.
 Lying is immoral because it is not universal and doesn’t treat human/s as end.
 Lying is immoral because the action of lying treats the other person as a means.
 Telling truth is moral because it is universal.
 Truth will remain as truth even if everyone tells truth.
 What are the criticisms of Kant’s ethics?
 Kant’s critics argue that feelings and emotions have moral roles, but Kant excludes
them from the moral domain.

Part 20 – 21th April

Utilitarian Reasoning

 The chief exponents of this theory are Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.
 Jeremy Bentham (1748—1832) was an English philosopher.
 John Stuart Mill (1806—1873) was also an English philosopher.
 Bentham has propounded Utilitarianism in his An Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation.
 Utilitarianism is known as the greatest happiness principle.
 Utilitarianism is a kind of consequentialism according to which consequence is the
most fundamental moral value than the moral agent and moral action.

 According to Bentham, pain and pleasure are natural to humans.

 Pain, unhappiness, suffering, misery are synonyms.
 Similarly, pleasure, happiness, well-being are synonyms.
 Pain and pleasure serve the foundation of “what we ought to do”.
 Humans are subject to pain and pleasure, so morality is directly related to them.
 Happiness or pleasure is the only thing that is good.
 Pain or displeasure is the only thing that is bad.
 Bentham advocates the principle of utility.

 By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce pleasure or
to prevent the happening of pain.
 Utility is understood first in terms of happiness and then as the balance of pleasure
over pain.
 Utilitarianism is to maximize pleasure at the individual level or at the group level and
to minimize pain at all levels.
 Bentham’s Utilitarianism is called Act Utilitarianism.
 That action is right which maximizes the balance of pleasure over pain.
 That action is wrong which does not maximize the balance of pleasure over pain.

 The greatest amount of pleasure or happiness of the greatest number of people.

 If many people are involved, then the greatest happiness for the greatest number is
followed.
 If only one person is involved, then this theory approves of whatever maximizes the
balance of pleasure over pain for that individual.
 How to measure pleasure and pain?
 According to Bentham, individual pleasures and pain can be measured:
 (1) intensity (how strong), (2) duration (how long), (3) certainty or uncertainty (how
likely to occur), (4) proximity (how soon), (5) fecundity (more pleasure), (6) purity
(pain).

 Bentham’s utilitarianism is an attack on religious morality which is against earthly

pleasure according to him.
 According to Bentham, asceticism is utilitarian view because its aim is heaven
through painful practices.
 Bentham doesn’t talk about the quality of happiness, but J.S. Mill does.
 Morality needs everyone to be treated as an equal.
 How is equal treatment possible if morality is greatest happiness principle?
 How to align individual action with the general greatest happiness principle?
 Rule Utilitarianism is built upon Act Utilitarianism.

 Certain rules are made in order to achieve the balance of pleasure over pain, and
following those rules is moral practice.
 What are the objections to utilitarianism?
 The narrowness objection: the utilitarian theory of good is too narrow because
happiness is only one type of good.
 The agency objection: that what matters is not just subjective feelings of pleasure
and pain we have, but also how we act.
 The evil pleasures objection: that not all pleasures are good.
 The quality objection: in addition to the quantity of pleasure, quality matters too.

 The irrelevance objection: happiness is not a good at all. It is a possible objection.

 In utilitarianism, each and every life is not valued, but only majority’s concerns are
addressed at the cost of minority.
 Utilitarianism is consequentialist, can consequences be predicted?
 Do we have any control on consequence once its cause is already committed?
 On the other hand, should we ignore the consequence while doing action?
 Does utilitarianism advocate to take pleasure in the misfortune of others?
  If everyone pursues his/her own happiness, there would be chaos because wills are
likely to conflict.

 Utilitarianism is strongly against social discrimination.

 Happiness of one section of society and individual liberty advance the collective
happiness.
 Animals are equally worthy of moral consideration because they feel pain and
pleasure.
 Utilitarian reasoning:
 An action is right if it produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number.
 Saving a life is right because it produces the greatest happiness for the greatest
number.
 Whatever produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number is morally right.
Saving a life produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Therefore,
saving a life is morally right.

Part 21–25th April

Immanuel Kant: An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?

 The essay was written in 1784.

 “Enlightenment is mankind’s exit from its self-incurred immaturity.”
 “Immaturity is the inability to make use of one’s own understanding without the
guidance of another.”
 “Self-incurred is this inability if its cause lies not in the lack of understanding but
rather in the lack of the resolution and the courage to use it without the guidance of
another.”
 “Have the courage to use your own understanding! is thus the motto of
enlightenment.”

o “Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why such a great part
of mankind, long after nature has set them free from the guidance of
others, still gladly remain immature for life and why it is so easy for others
to set themselves up as guardians.”
o “It is so easy to be immature.”
o “If I have a book that has understanding for me, a pastor who has a
conscience for me, a doctor who judges my diet for me, and so forth,
surely I do not need to trouble myself.”
o “I have no need to think, if only I can pay; others will take over the tedious
business for me.”
o “After they [guardians] have first made their domestic animals stupid and
carefully prevented these placid creatures from daring to take even one
step out of the leading strings of the cart to which they are tethered, they
show them the danger that threatens them if they attempt to proceed on
their own.”
o “Now this danger is not so great, for by falling a few times they would
indeed finally learn to walk; but an example of this sort makes them timid
and usually frightens them away from all further attempts.”
o “It is thus difficult for any individual man to work himself out of an
immaturity that has become almost natural to him.”
o “He has become fond of it and, for the present, is truly incapable of
making use of his own reason, because he has never been permitted to
make the attempt.”
o “Hence there are only a few who have managed to free themselves from
immaturity through the exercise of their own minds, and yet proceed
confidently.”
o “For there will always be found some who think for themselves, even
among the established guardians of the masses, and who, after they
themselves have thrown off the yoke of immaturity, will spread among the
herd the spirit of rational assessment of individual worth and the vocation
of each man to think for himself.”
o “Therefore a public can achieve enlightenment only gradually.”
o “A revolution may perhaps bring about the fall of an autocratic despotism
and of an avaricious or overbearing oppression, but it can never bring
about the true reform of a way of thinking.”
o “For this enlightenment, however, nothing more is required
than freedom and indeed the most harmless form of all the things that
may be called freedom: namely, the freedom to make a public use of
one’s reason in all matters.”
o “But I hear from all sides the cry: don’t argue! The officer says: “Don’t
argue, but rather march!” The tax collector says: “Don’t argue, but rather
pay!” The clergyman says: “Don’t argue, but rather believe!”
o “Only one ruler in the world says: “Argue, as much as you want and
about whatever you want, but obey! Here freedom is restricted
everywhere.”
o “The public use of reason must at all times be free, and it alone can bring
about enlightenment among men; the private use of reason, however,
may often be very narrowly restricted without the progress of
enlightenment being particularly hindered.”
o “I understand, however, under the public use of his own reason, that use
which anyone makes of it as a scholar before the entire public of
the reading world.”
o “The private use I designate as that use which one makes of his reason
in a certain civil post or office which is entrusted to him.”
o “Here one is certainly not allowed to argue; rather, one must obey.”
o “So it would be very destructive, if an officer on duty should argue aloud
about the suitability or the utility of a command given to him by his
superior; he must obey.”
o “But he cannot fairly be forbidden as a scholar to make remarks on
failings in the military service and to lay them before the public for
judgment.”
 o “The citizen cannot refuse to pay the taxes imposed on him; even an
impudent complaint against such levies, when they should be paid by
him, is punished as an outrage.”
o “If it is asked “Do we now live in an enlightened age?” the answer is “No,
but we do live in an age of enlightenment.”
o “As matters now stand, much is still lacking for men to be completely
able—or even to be placed in a situation where they would be able—to
use their own reason confidently and properly in religious matters without
the guidance of another.”
o “Yet we have clear indications that the field is now being opened for them
to work freely toward this, and the obstacles to general enlightenment or
to the exit out of their self-incurred immaturity become ever fewer.”
o “I have placed the main point of enlightenment—mankind’s exit from its
self-imposed immaturity—primarily on religious matters since our rulers
have no interest in playing the role of guardian to their subjects with
regard to the arts and sciences and because this type of immaturity is the
most harmful as well as the most dishonorable.”
o “Argue, as much as you want and about whatever you want, only obey!”
o A Reflection on Enlightenment or Modernism
o Rationality
o Universality
o Homogeneity
o Given truth

Part 22–29th April

Descartes’ Methodological Skepticism

Of those things that may be called into doubt
“It is some years now since I realized how many false opinions I had accepted as true from
childhood onwards, and that, whatever I had since built on such shaky foundations, could only be
highly doubtful.”
“Hence I saw that at some stage in my life the whole structure would have to be utterly
demolished, and that I should have to begin again from the bottom up if I wished to construct
something lasting and unshakeable in the sciences.”
“But this seemed to be a massive task, and so I postponed it until I had reached the age when
one is as fit as one will ever be to master the various disciplines.”
“Hence I have delayed so long that now I should be at fault if I used up in deliberating the time
that is left for acting. The moment has come, and so today I have discharged my mind from all its
cares, and have carved out a space of untroubled leisure.”
“I have withdrawn into seclusion and shall at last be able to devote myself seriously and without
encumbrance to the task of destroying all my former opinions.”
“To this end, however, it will not be necessary to prove them all false—a thing I should perhaps
never be able to achieve.”
“But since reason already persuades me that I should no less scrupulously withhold my assent
from what is not fully certain and indubitable than from what is blatantly false, then, in order to
reject them all, it will be sufficient to find some reason for doubting each one.”
“Nor shall I therefore have to go through them each individually, which would be an endless task:
but since, once the foundations are undermined, the building will collapse of its own accord, I
shall straight away attack the very principles that form the basis of all my former beliefs.”
“Certainly, up to now whatever I have accepted as fully true I have learned either from or by
means of the senses: but I have discovered that they sometimes deceive us, and prudence
dictates that we should never fully trust those who have deceived us even once.”
“But perhaps, although they sometimes deceive us about things that are little, or rather a long
way away, there are plenty of other things of which there is clearly no doubt, although it was from
the senses that we learned them: for instance, that I am now here, sitting by the fire, wrapped in
a warm winter gown, handling this paper, and suchlike.”
“Indeed, that these hands themselves, and this whole body are mine—what reason could there
be for doubting this?”
“Unless perhaps I were to compare myself to one of those madmen, whose little brains have
been so befuddled by a pestilential vapour arising from the black bile, that they swear blind that
they are kings, though they are beggars, or that they are clad in purple, when they are naked, or
that their head is made of clay, or that their whole body is a jug, or made entirely of glass.”
“But they are lunatics, and I should seem no less of a madman myself if I should follow their
example in any way.”
“This is all very well, to be sure. But am I not a human being, and therefore in the habit of
sleeping at night, when in my dreams I have all the same experiences as these madmen do
when they are awake — or sometimes even stranger ones?”
“How often my sleep at night has convinced me of all these familiar things—that I was here,
wrapped in my gown, sitting by the fire—when in fact I was lying naked under the bedclothes.”
“All the same, I am now perceiving this paper with eyes that are certainly awake; the head I am
nodding is not drowsy; I stretch out my hand and feel it knowingly and deliberately; a sleeper
would not have these experiences so distinctly.”
“But have I then forgotten those other occasions on which I have been deceived by similar
thoughts in my dreams? When I think this over more carefully I see so clearly that waking can
never be distinguished from sleep by any conclusive indications that I am stupefied; and this very
stupor comes close to persuading me that I am asleep after all.”
“Let us then suppose that we are dreaming, and that these particular things (that we have our
eyes open, are moving our head, stretching out our hands) are not true; and that perhaps we do
not even have hands or the rest of a body like what we see.”
“It must nonetheless be admitted that the things we see in sleep are, so to speak, painted
images, which could not be formed except on the basis of a resemblance with real things; and
that for this reason these general things at least (such as eyes, head, hands, and the rest of the
body) are not imaginary things, but real and existing.”
“For the fact is that when painters desire to represent sirens and little satyrs with utterly
unfamiliar shapes, they cannot devise altogether new natures for them, but simply combine parts
from different animals; or if perhaps they do think up something so new that nothing at all like it
has ever been seen, which is thus altogether fictitious and false, it is certain that at least the
colours which they combine to form images must be real.”
“By the same token, even though these general things—eyes, head, hands, and so forth—might
be imaginary, it must necessarily be admitted that at least some other still more simple and
universal realities must exist, from which (as the painter’s image is produced from real colours)
all these images of things—be they true or false—that occur in our thoughts are produced.”
“In this category it seems we should include bodily nature in general, and its extension; likewise
the shape of extended things and their quantity (magnitude and number); likewise the place in
which they exist, the time during which they exist, and suchlike.”
“From all this, perhaps, we may safely conclude that physics, astronomy, medicine, and all the
other disciplines which involve the study of composite things are indeed doubtful; but that
arithmetic, geometry, and other disciplines of the same kind, which deal only with the very
simplest and most general things, and care little whether they exist in nature or not, contain
something certain and indubitable.”
“For whether I am waking or sleeping, two plus three equals five, and a square has no more than
four sides; nor does it seem possible that such obvious truths could be affected by any suspicion
that they are false.”
“However, there is a certain opinion long fixed in my mind, that there is a God who is all-powerful,
and by whom I was created such as I am now.”
“Now how do I know that he has not brought it about that there is no earth at all, no heavens, no
extended things, no shape, no magnitude, no place—and yet that all these things appear to me
to exist just as they do now?”
“Or even — just as I judge now and again that other people are mistaken about things they
believe they know with the greatest certitude—that I too should be similarly deceived whenever I
add two and three, or count the sides of a square, or make a judgement about something even
simpler, if anything simpler can be imagined?”
“But perhaps God has not willed that I should be so cheated, for he is said to be supremely
good.—But if it were incompatible with his goodness to have created me such that I am
perpetually deceived, it would seem equally inconsistent with that quality to permit me to be
sometimes deceived.”
“Nonetheless, I cannot doubt that he does permit it.”
“Perhaps, indeed, there might be some people who would prefer to deny the existence of any
God so powerful, rather than believing that all other things are uncertain.”
“But let us not quarrel with them, and let us grant that all this we have said of God is only a
fiction; and let them suppose that it is by fate or chance or a continuous sequence of things that I
have come to be what I am.”
“Since, though, to be deceived and to err appear to be some kind of imperfection, the less
powerful the source they invoke to explain my being, the more probable it will be that I am so
imperfect that I am perpetually deceived.”
“To all these arguments, indeed, I have no answer, but at length I am forced to admit that there is
nothing of all those things I once thought true, of which it is not legitimate to doubt—and not out
of any thoughtlessness or irresponsibility, but for sound and well- weighed reasons; and
therefore that, from these things as well, no less than from what is blatantly false, I must now
carefully withhold my assent if I wish to discover any thing that is certain.”
“But it is not enough to have realized all this, I must take care to remember it: for my accustomed
opinions continually creep back into my mind, and take possession of my belief, which has, so to
speak, been enslaved to them by long experience and familiarity, for the most part against my
will.”
“Nor shall I ever break the habit of assenting to them and relying on them, as long as I go on
supposing them to be such as they are in truth, that is to say, doubtful indeed in some respect,
as has been shown just now, and yet nonetheless highly probable, so that it is much more
rational to believe than to deny them.”
“But I have already denied that I have any senses or any body. Now I am at a loss, because
what follows from this? Am I so bound up with my body and senses that I cannot exist without
them?”
“But I convinced myself that there was nothing at all in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no
bodies. Did I therefore not also convince myself that I did not exist either?”
“No: certainly I did exist, if I convinced myself of something.—But there is some deceiver or
other, supremely powerful and cunning, who is deliberately deceiving me all the time.— Beyond
doubt then, I also exist, if he is deceiving me; and he can deceive me all he likes, but he will
never bring it about that I should be nothing as long as I think I am something.”
“So that, having weighed all these considerations succinctly and more than succinctly, I can
finally decide that this proposition, ‘I am, I exist’, whenever it is uttered by me, or conceived in the
mind, is necessarily true.”