UNIT-II

OFFENCES AGAINST HUMAN BODY-II

❖ Hurt (section 114, BNS): Simple (section 115) and Grievous (sections 116 & 117, BNS)

❖ Acid Attack (section 124, BNS).

❖ Wrongful Restraint (section 126, BNS) & Wrongful Confinement (section 127, BNS).

❖ Criminal Force and Assault (sections 128 – 131, BNS).

❖ Kidnapping (section 137, BNS) and Abduction (section 138, BNS).

Hurt (section 114, BNS): Simple (section 115) and Grievous (sections 116 & 117, BNS)
114-Hurt-
Simple Hurt
The term "simple hurt" is used nowhere in the IPC. However, to differentiate ordinary hurt,
from that of grievous hurt, the expression "simple hurt" has come into popular usage.
[s 114] Hurt. Whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person is said to cause
hurt.
Section 114 defines hurt as "whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person is
said to cause hurt". This section does not define any offence. It merely states what is the
meaning of "hurt". The expression "bodily pain" means that the pain must be physical as
opposed to any mental pain. So, mentally or emotionally hurting somebody will not be "hurt"
within the meaning of this section. However, in order to come within this section, it is not
necessary that any visible injury should be caused on the victim. All that the section
contemplates is the causing of bodily pain. The degree or severity of the pain is not a material
factor to decide whether this section will apply or not. A blow or a fisticuff will come within
the meaning of "causing bodily pain" and hence, will be covered under this section.
"Causing disease" means communicating a disease to another person. However, the
communication of the disease must be done by contact.
"Infirmity" denotes an unsound or unhealthy state of the body. This infirmity may be a result
of a disease or as a result of consumption of some poisonous, deleterious drug or alcohol.
"Infirmity" has been interpreted by courts to mean inability of an organ to perform its normal
function. The inability may be temporary or permanent in nature.
As per the section, the hurt must be caused to "any person". This means "any person" other
than the person causing the hurt. Self-inflicted hurt does not come within the purview of this
section. Section 115 elaborates on what amounts to voluntarily causing hurt.
115. Voluntarily causing hurt:
1. Whoever does any act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any person, or with the
knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt to any person, and does thereby cause hurt
to any person, is said “voluntarily to cause hurt”.
Intention or Knowledge
Intention to cause hurt, or knowledge that an act is likely to cause hurt, is the most decisive
factor to decide whether a person can be held guilty of voluntarily causing hurt. The extent of
injury that is actually caused is not relevant, but what is the intention with which the hurt was
caused is relevant. There may be cases where the act may even result in death. But, if the
intention of the accused as gathered from the surrounding background facts, was only to
cause hurt, then the accused will be punishable only under this section and not for murder.
The following offences have been held to be one of causing only simple hurt, even though
death occurred:
(i) Assault with hands and foot; deceased died. Cause of death was not known. It was held
that it was an offence under section 323.
(ii) Stick blows on buttocks and thighs with the object of chastisement. There was no
intention or apprehension of death.
(iii) Several unarmed people beating a crop thief at night, resulting in his death. Conviction
under section 323 was held proper.
(iv) A single blow with open hand was given on the neck. This act was not followed by any
other violence. However, there was a fracture of the vertebrae and the victim died. It was held
to be an offence only under section 323.
(v) A victim was given a single kick in the abdomen. He died due to fatty heart and enlarged
liver. It was held to be an offence of only causing simple hurt.
All the above-mentioned instances have been decided on the settled principle that a person
must be punished for the hurt he intended to cause or had knowledge that it is likely to be
caused as a result of the act done by the person. No one should be punished for unfortunate
and completely unforeseen result of the acts done.
2. Whoever, except in the case provided for by sub- section (1) of section 120 voluntarily
causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both.

116.Grevious hurt:
The following kinds of hurt only are designated as “grievous”, namely:
1. Emasculation.
2. Permanent privation of the sight of either eye.
 3. Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear.
4. Privation of any member or joint.
5. Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint.
6. Permanent disfiguration of the head or face.
7. Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth.
8. Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of
fifteen days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.

Section 116 states specifically the nature of injuries that can be categorised as "grievous
hurt". No other hurt outside the categories of injuries enumerated in section 116 can be
termed as grievous hurt. Therefore, unless a hurt caused comes within the injuries specified in
section 116, this section will not apply. All these clauses need to be interpreted strictly.
Clauses 1 to 7 of section 116 state the specific nature of injuries, such as emasculation, loss of
sight, loss of hearing, loss of limb or joint, loss of use of any limb or joint, disfiguration of
the head or face, fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth. The eighth clause is a general
clause which covers all injuries which endanger life or which caused bodily pain or disrupted
a person's routine activity for twenty days or more. Clause 8, like any other clause, needs to
be construed strictly. Mere hospitalisation for more than fifteen days does not ipso facto turn
the "hurt" into "grievous hurt". Therefore, if the victim has not co-operated or not consented
for operation, the "hurt" caused would not be "grievous hurt" and the accused therefore
cannot be held guilty for causing "grievous hurt".

Sec.117- Voluntarily causing grievous hurt-

(1) Whoever, voluntarily causes hurt, if the hurt which he intends to cause or knows himself
to be likely to cause is grievous hurt, and if the hurt which he causes is grievous hurt, is said
“voluntarily to cause grievous hurt”.
(2) Whoever, except in the case provided for by sub-section (3), voluntarily causes grievous
hurt, shall be punished 0-7 yrs + fine.

Explanation: A person is not said voluntarily to cause grievous hurt except when he both
causes grievous hurt and intends or knows himself to be likely to cause grievous hurt. But he
is said voluntarily to cause grievous hurt, if intending or knowing himself to be likely to
cause grievous hurt of one kind, he actually causes grievous hurt of another kind.

Illustration: A, intending of knowing himself to be likely permanently to disfigure Z’s face,

gives Z a blow which does not permanently disfigure Z’s face, but which causes Z to suffer
severe bodily pain for the space of fifteen days. A has voluntarily caused grievous hurt.
(3) Whoever commits an offence under sub-section (1) and in the course of such commission
causes any hurt to a person which causes that person to be in permanent disability or in
persistent vegetative state, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment, 10 yrs to
imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s
natural life.
(4) When grievous hurt of a person is caused by a group of five or more persons on the
ground of his, race, caste, sex, place of birth, language, personal belief or any other ground,
each member of such group shall be guilty of the offence of causing grievous hurt, and shall
be punished with imprisonment 0-7 yrs + fine.

In Modi Ram v State of Madhya Pradesh, the accused was about 21-22 years of age, married
to one Jani Bai. About a year and a half after marriage, Jani Bai was seduced by one
Chunnilal and thereafter they started living together in the same area. One morning, when
Chunnilal was going to answer the call of nature, about five or six persons caught hold of him
and gave him a beating. Apart from causing him other injuries, they also cut off his nose and
his male organ. The accused was convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a
term of one year. The high court, however, enhanced the sentence rigorous imprisonment to
eight years. On appeal, the Supreme Court, taking into consideration the young age of the
accused, the humility and hurt he would have faced in having his wife live with another man
soon after marriage in the same vicinity, observed that there was grave provocation and
hence, by relying upon section 335, referred to in section 325, reduced the sentence from
imprisonment from eight years to three years.

Pandurang vs. State of Hyderabad (AIR 1955 SC 216).

In 1955, the case of Pandurang vs State of Hyderabad unfolded, eight years after Hyderabad's
integration into the Indian Union. Pandurang stood accused, alongside others, of the brutal
murder of Ramchander in 1951.
The primary legal issue revolved around Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which
deals with "common intention" and criminal liability. The crux of the matter was whether
Pandurang could be held equally responsible for the murder, given the uncertainties
surrounding his specific intent and individual actions during the incident. Eyewitness
testimonies varied, leaving Pandurang's role ambiguous.
Initially convicted under Section 302 (murder) and sentenced to death by lower courts,
including the Hyderabad High Court, Pandurang's case underwent appellate review by the
Supreme Court. The apex court acknowledged the severity of the crime but highlighted the
lack of conclusive evidence establishing Pandurang's specific intent or his individual action
causing the fatal injury.
Consequently, the court invoked Section 34 and ruled that Pandurang couldn't be held
vicariously liable for the murder of Ramchander. Instead, he was convicted under Section 326
(grievous hurt) and sentenced to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment. This case underscores the
challenges of determining culpability in cases where evidentiary ambiguities exist and the
importance of adhering to due process in criminal justice proceedings.

Hori Lal vs. State of UP (AIR 1970 SC 1969).

Although fracture has not been defined in sec 320 IPC, but as per Supreme Court judgment in
the case of Hori lal and Anr vs. State of U.P. (1969), incised wound to the bone is to be
consider as fracture, hence, grievous hurt. Before giving opinion, it has to be proved that, the
tooth was not originally loose and injury caused fracture or dislocation of tooth. An injury can
be said to endanger life if it is in itself that it put the life of the injured in danger.There is thin
line between degree of body injury ‘dangerous to life’ and ‘likely to cause death’.So, The line
separating Grievous Hurt and Culpable Homicide is very thin.

Acid Attack (section 124, BNS).

124- Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by use of acid, etc-
Section 124, plausibly realising that the existing provisions of the BNS dealing with grievous
hurt and punishments therefor inadequate to check effectively the frequent acid attacks, are
inserted in the BNS by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 to arrest the growing
phenomenon of causing serious injury by use of acid or any substance which has acidic or
corrosive character or burning nature that is capable of causing bodily injury leading to scars
or disfigurement or permanent or temporary disability.
Causing physical and mental suffering by use of acid is invariably motivated by deep-rooted
jealousy or feeling of revenge. Acid attack survivors are physically, psychologically and
socially traumatized and crippled.
A careful reading of the provisions discloses that the sections provide eight types of injuries:
(i) permanent damage, (ii) partial damage, (iii) deformity, (iv) burns, (v) maiming, (vi)
disfigurement, (vii) disability, or (viii) grievous hurt.
The first of the injuries are classified based on the normal aftereffect of acid attack whereas
the eighth one is on the gravity of the effect. Under section 124, grievous hurt is only one
among the eight injuries.
(2) Whoever throws or attempts to throw acid on any person or attempts to administer acid to
any person, or attempts to use any other means, with the intention of causing permanent or
partial damage or deformity or burns or maiming or disfigurement or disability or grievous
hurt to that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of 5 to 7 yrs + fine.
Further, the amount of fine to be imposed on perpetrator of the offence under section 124 has
to be "just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses of the treatment of the victim and it
must be paid to the victim.
However, the amount of compensation paid in the form of fine is not enough to ensure their
treatment and rehabilitation. The Supreme Court, noticing that the Victim Compensation
Scheme prepared in pursuance of section 357A of the CrPC by some States and Union
Territories is un-uniform and inadequate and realising that victims of acid attack need to
undergo a series of plastic surgeries and other corrective treatments, has directed all the States
and Union Territories to pay a compensation of at least three lac rupees to every victim of
acid attack as the aftercare and rehabilitation cost. Of this amount, a sum of one lac rupees is
to be paid to the victim within fifteen days of occurrence of the incident or being brought to
the notice of the State or Union Territory, as the case may be, to facilitate immediate medical
attention and expenses, and the balance of two lac rupees be paid as expeditiously as may be
possible and positively within two months thereafter.
The Supreme Court, in a case wherein a Dalit girl from Bihar was a victim of acid attack and
who did not receive any compensation from the State Government, made it dear that the
Laxmi dictum does not put a bar either on the Government's discretion to award
compensation limited to Rs three Lacs or the degree of injuries which a victim of acid attack
has to suffer to seek compensation. Government has a discretion to provide for more
compensation to a victim of acid attack. The compensation payable by the State under section
357A, CrPC, is in addition to the payment of fine to the victim under section 326A, IPC.
Taking a serious note of the unjustified reduction of sentence (to the imprisonment already
undergone) of a perpetrator of an acid attack in vengeance of her refusal to marry him by the
high court, the Supreme Court not only expressed its "shock" and wondered the "unknown
notion of mercy" that guided the high court to reduce the sentence, but also felt that "sense of
justice" is "ostracized" and "unceremoniously sent to vanprasatha". The apex court restored
the sentence (rigorous imprisonment for a term of one year) awarded by the trial court and
ordered the respondent-convict to pay a compensation of Rs 50,000 and the State to pay a
compensation of Rs three Lacs. In case, the accused fails to pay the ordered compensation
within six months, he is required to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for six months.
With a view to ensuring effective combat of incidents of acid attacks, the apex court has also
directed the Home Secretary, Ministry of Home Affair and the Secretary, Ministry of
Chemical Fertilizers, Government of India, to convene a meeting of the Chief
Secretaries/concerned Secretaries of the State Governments and the Administrators of the
Union Territories, inter alia, to discuss:
(i) enhancement of appropriate provision for effective regulation of the sale of acid in
the States/Union Territories;
(ii) measures for the proper treatment, aftercare and rehabilitation of the victims of
acid attack and needs of acid attack victims, and
(iii) compensation payable to acid victims by the State or cation of some separate fund
for payment of compensation to the acid attack victims. It also issued a set of
following Directions to the Chief Secretaries of the States and Administrators of
the Union Territories and directed them to comply forthwith.
The Direction are:
(1) Over the counter, sale of acid is completely prohibited unless the seller maintains a
log/register recording the sale of acid which will contain the details of the person(s) to whom
acid(s) is/are sold and the quantity sold. The log/register shall contain the address of the
person to whom it is sold.
(2) All sellers shall sell acid only after the buyer has shown:
(a) a photo ID issued by the Government which also has the address of the person;
(b) specifies the reason/purpose for procuring acid.
(3) All stocks of acid must be declared by the seller with the concerned Sub-Divisional
Magistrate (SDM) within 15 days.
(4) No acid shall be sold to any person who is below 18 years of age.
(5) In case of undeclared stock of acid, it will be open to the concerned SDM to confiscate
the stock and suitably impose fine on such seller up to Rs 50,000.
It also directed the educational institutions, research laboratories, hospitals, Government
Departments and the Departments of Public Sector Undertakings, who are required to keep
and store acid, to follow a set of guidelines, namely,
(1) a register of usage of acid shall be maintained and the same shall be filed with the
concerned Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM).
(2) A person shall be made accountable for possession and safe keeping of acid in their
premises.
(3) Acid shall be stored under the supervision of this person and shall be compulsory
checking of the students and personnel leaving the laboratories or place of storage where acid
is used. And
(4) Concerned SDM shall be vested with the responsibility of taking appropriate action for
the breach, default or violation of these directions.

Wrongful Restraint (section 126, BNS) & Wrongful Confinement (section 127, BNS).
126- Wrongful restraint-
Ingredients
Section 126 defines "wrongful restraint". The essential ingredients of "wrongful restraint"
are:
(i) voluntary obstruction of a person and
(ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in
which he has a right to proceed.
Physical obstruction by mere verbal prohibition constitutes wrongful restraint. In wrongful
restraint, physical presence of accused is not always necessary. Where, therefore, the
complainant and his wife and daughter occupied a house and during their temporary absence,
the accused put a lock on the outer door and thereby obstructed them from getting into the
house, it was held that the accused was guilty of wrongful restraint. However, a house-owner,
who partially restrained his tenant by closing one of the door leaves of the main entrance
gate, was not held guilty of wrongful restraint as the complainant had sufficient passage to
move in and out.
The "wrong" defined is a wrong against a "person" and if a man is prevented from taking his
animal or cart along with him in one direction, that will not be an offence within the section.
Thus, where the complainant driving a bullock cart was obstructed from taking his cart
through the passage, but there was no obstruction to the complainant passing through the
passage alone without the cart, it was held that there could be no conviction for wrongful
restraint, for though the complainant was hindered from driving his cart through the passage,
he himself was unobstructed. But it would amount to wrongful restraint if a person was going
to his field with his bulls through a pathway and the accused came there and obstructed him
and his bulls and beat and drove away the bulls and the complainant, by fearing that if he
proceeded further he would also be beaten, came away.
Obstruction to vehicle alone does not constitute "wrongful restraint" as defined in section 126
as obstruction of a person only comes within its purview. Only obstruction to plying or
parking of a vehicle in a particular place does not amount to wrongful restraint as there is no
obstruction to human body. An obstruction caused to a vehicle carrying passengers amounts
to wrongful restraint of the passengers. The fact that the passengers are free to get down and
proceed to the desired direction does not take the obstruction to the passengers outside the
ambit of wrongful restraint.
The offence is determined by the effect caused and not by the nature of the act by which
wrongful restraint is brought about.
In Raja Ram v State of Haryana, a woman and a 13-year old boy were summoned to the
police station for interrogation. The proviso to section 160, CrPC, provides that no woman or
a male under 15 years of age should be summoned to the police station for interrogation.
Instead, they must be interrogated at the place where they reside. The accused, a police
officer, was found guilty of infringing section 160, CrPC. It was held that in view of this,
detaining of a woman and a 13-year old boy in the police station would amount to wrongful
restraint. The accused was found guilty under section 341, IPC, but not under section 342,
IPC.
In Vijay Kumari Magee v Smt SM Rao, the complainant was in occupation of a room in the
campus of Victoria School. A letter was addressed to her on 1 October stating that since the
managing committee has decided not to allow outsiders to reside in the campus, she was to
vacate the room. The complainant asked for some extension of time to vacate the room, as the
notice given was very short. Since she failed to vacate by end October, her room was locked
and she was prevented from entering her room and thus wrongfully restrained. The Supreme
Court held that no offence under section 126(2) was established, as the complainant had "no
right to proceed" in the direction, viz, enter the hostel room. As per section 126, which spells
out as to what is wrongful restraint, only if a person has a right to proceed in a particular
direction, can an obstruction of the same amount to "wrongful restraint". Since, the
complainant had no right to enter the room on the cancellation of her allotment, no offence
under section 126(2) was made out.
(2) A person guilty of wrongful restraint is punishable by simple imprisonment for a term up
to one month, or a fine of up to five thousand rupees, or both.

Sec-127.Wrong Confinement-
Ingredients
Section 127 defines "wrongful confinement". It is a form of "wrongful restraint". The
essential ingredients of the offence of "wrongful confinement" are:
(i) wrongful restraint of a person, and
(ii) the restraint must be to prevent that person from proceeding

In Shyam Lal Sharma v State of Madhya Pradesh, it was learnt that certain officials were
demanding bribes at a traffic barrier from the drivers of the vehicles. A trap was laid. A circle
inspector raided the office and recovered the notes which were given. The accused objected
to the search as it was done without a warrant and also demanded that a search memo be
given. The circle inspector agreed to give the search memo and he was allowed to go. But,
after he went out of the office and was on the road, he was forcibly seized, lifted, taken into
the office and thrown on a chair. He was confined there and threatened with a lathi, till he had
complied with the demand that he gives in writing that he had conducted a search of the
barrier. It was contended that since the search was conducted in violation of the procedure
prescribed under section 165, CrPC, the accused had a right to obstruct the search. The
Supreme Court, however, found fault with the behaviour of the accused, subsequently where
after the circle inspector was allowed to leave, he was wrongfully restrained. It was held that
section 127(2), was not confined to offences against public servants, but is a general section
and makes a person who wrongfully restrains another, guilty of the offence under that section.
A wrongful confinement is a wrongful restraint in such a manner, as to prevent that person
from proceeding beyond a certain circumscribed limits. The accused were convicted under
sections 127.
(2) Whoever wrongfully confines any person shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term 0 to 1 yr or fine 0 to 5000, or with both.
(3) Whoever wrongfully confines any person for three days, or more, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term 0 to 3 yr or fine 0 to 10000, or with both.
(4) Whoever wrongfully confines any person for ten days or more, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term 0 to 5 yr and fine not less then10000.
(5) Whoever keeps any person in wrongful confinement, knowing that a writ for the
liberation of that person has been duly issued, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years in addition to any term of imprisonment
to which he may be liable under any other section of this Chapter and shall also be liable to
fine.
(6) Whoever wrongfully confines any person in such manner as to indicate an intention that
the confinement of such person may not be known to any person interested in the person so
confined, or to any public servant, or that the place of such confinement may not be known to
or discovered by any such person or public servant as hereinbefore mentioned, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years
in addition to any other punishment to which he may be liable for such wrongful confinement
and shall also be liable to fine.
(7) Whoever wrongfully confines any person for the purpose of extorting from the person
confined, or from any person interested in the person confined, any property or valuable
security or of constraining the person confined or any person interested in such person to do
anything illegal or to give any information which may facilitate the commission of an
offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.
(8) Whoever wrongfully confines any person for the purpose of extorting from the person
confined or any person interested in the person confined any confession or any information
which may lead to the detection of an offence or misconduct, or for the purpose of
constraining the person confined or any person interested in the person confined to restore or
to cause the restoration of any property or valuable security or to satisfy any claim or
demand, or to give information which may lead to the restoration of any property or valuable
security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.

In Deep Chand v State of Rajasthan, the victim was the son of a wealthy businessman. One
day, two masked men entered his room and one of them had a revolver. The two persons
threatened to shoot him if he made any noise. They took him outside, where two camels were
waiting. The face of the victim was covered with a cloth. They took him on the camel for
some distance, and thereafter, he was taken to the house of the accused where he was
confined for 17 days. He was forced to write three letters to demand a ransom of Rs 50,000
from the victim's father. After the ransom amount was paid, they released the victim.
Thereafter, the accused were identified and charged under sections 347, 365, 382 and 452,
IPC, and were convicted under these sections.
In CBI v. V. Ponraj (2022), while the main allegations revolved around corruption and
criminal conspiracy concerning misuse of public funds, the case also involved charges under
Section 127 of BNS, which deals with wrongful restraint. The Central Bureau of
Investigation alleged that the accused, including V. Ponraj, had conspired to prevent
government officials from properly inspecting or intervening in the fraudulent
implementation of a borewell scheme, thereby wrongfully restraining the lawful discharge
of public duties.
The trial court discharged the accused from all charges, including wrongful restraint, on the
grounds that the evidence was insufficient. However, the Supreme Court criticized this
approach, holding that at the discharge stage, courts must not conduct a detailed analysis of
evidence. Instead, they must only determine whether a prima facie case exists. The Court
found that the materials provided by the CBI—including witness statements and documents
—were adequate to support the charge of wrongful restraint alongside other offenses.
The Supreme Court reinstated the charges, reaffirming that wrongful restraint, even in
administrative or official contexts, is prosecutable if public officials are obstructed from
performing their lawful duties.

In Raghunath Singh v. State of M.P., the Supreme Court examined charges against the
appellant, Raghunath Singh, originally convicted under Sections 366/368 and 376 IPC. While
the rape conviction was overturned due to lack of evidence of non-consensual intercourse, the
issue centered on whether Raghunath Singh wrongfully confined the prosecutrix, Mst.
Parvati, and whether he had knowledge that she had been abducted or kidnapped. The Court
emphasized that conviction under Section 368 IPC requires proven knowledge of the victim's
prior kidnapping or abduction. Since the High Court had disbelieved Parvati's testimony that
she informed Singh of her being misled, the Court held that Singh's knowledge was not
established.
However, the evidence showed that Singh forcibly confined Parvati in a room, watched her
movements, and restricted her from escaping. This fulfilled the definition of "wrongful
confinement" under Section 126 bns, as he restrained her movement beyond specific limits.
The Court concluded that although the knowledge requirement for Section 368 wasn't
satisfied, Singh could still be convicted under Section 126 BNS for wrongful confinement
lasting less than three days. Thus, he was sentenced to one year’s rigorous imprisonment
under Section 126.

Criminal Force and Assault (sections 128 – 131, BNS).

128. Force-
To constitute force the following ingredients are necessary:
i) The causing of motion or Change of motion or Cessation of motion of any person; or the
causing of motion or Change of motion or Cessation of motion of any
substance
ii) By a person using his own bodily power or by disposing any substance in such a
manner that the motion or change or cessation of motion takes place without any
further act on his part, or on the part of any other person or by inducing any animal to
move, to change its motion, or to cease to move.
In Chandrika Sao v State of Bihar, an assistant superintendent of commercial taxes paid a
surprise visit to the shop of the accused to inspect the books of account. He found two sets of
account books in the shop. He took them and started looking into them. Suddenly, the
accused snatched away both the books from him. The accused was charged under section
132,BNS. It was contented on behalf of the accused that the mere snatching of books does not
amount to "using force" as contemplated by section 129. The Supreme Court rejected this
argument observing that it would be clear from a bare perusal of the section that one person
can be said to have used force against another if he causes motion, change of motion or
cessation of motion to that other. By snatching away the books which the official was
holding, the accused necessarily caused a jerk to the hand or hands. Further, the natural effect
of snatching the books from the hand or hands of the official would be to affect the sense of
feeling of the hands of the official. The court, therefore, held that the action of the accused
amounts to use of force as contemplated by section 129, BNS.

129- Criminal force-

Criminal force is equivalent to "battery" in English law, which means the intentional
infliction of force by one person upon another against the latter's consent.
The essential ingredients of the section are:
(i) there must be use of force as defined by section 128;
(ii) such force should be used intentionally;
(iii) the force must be used against a person and
(iv) it should have been used without the consent of the person against whom it is
used.
The use of force should be in:
(a) pursuit of committing an offence; or
(b) intending to cause or knowing that it is likely to cause injury, fear or annoyance to the
person to whom the force is used.
As seen in the definition of "force", criminal force is also concerned with the use of force on
a human being alone and not against immovable property or other inanimate objects. Further,
the section contemplates the physical presence of the person on whom the force is used.
When the lock of a house was broken in the absence of the occupant of the house, then it is
clear that the accused had taken possession of the house without any force or show of force.
But, if a person struck a pot which another person was carrying and which was in contact
with his body, it constitutes the offence of criminal force, if it is done to cause him fear,
annoyance, etc. Thus, the physical presence of a person makes the crucial difference between
an act amounting to "criminal force" or not.
The use of force which causes motion, change of motion or cessation of motion to another
person, done without the consent of such person, in order to commit an offence, or cause
injury, fear or annoyance to the said person, thus, will amount to criminal force. No bodily
injury or hurt need be caused.

130. Assault-
The essential ingredients of assault are:
(i) the accused should make a gesture or preparation to use criminal force;
(ii) such gesture or preparation should be made in the presence of the person in
respect of whom it is made;
(iii) there should be intention or knowledge on the part of the accused that such gesture
or preparation would cause apprehension in the mind of the victim that criminal
force would be used against him and
(iv) such gesture or preparation has actually caused apprehension in the mind of the
victim, of use of criminal force against him.

Gesture or Preparation
According to this section, the mere gesture or preparation with the intention or knowledge
that it is likely to cause apprehension in the mind of the victim, amounts to an offence of
assault. The explanation to the section provides that mere words do not amount to assault,
unless the words are used in aid of the gesture or preparation which amounts to assault.

Cause Apprehension of Assault

Another essential requirement of assault is that the person threatened should be present and
near enough to apprehend danger. In order to constitute the offence of assault, it is essential
that the person apprehends that there will be use of criminal force against him.
There must have been present ability in the assailant to give effect to his purpose. If a person
standing in the compartment of a running train, makes threatening gestures at a person
standing on the station platform, the gestures will not amount to assault, for the person has no
present ability to effectuate his purpose. Mere threat of an assault is not an assault. For
example, A has been constantly taking fruits from B's tree. B tells A that the next time he sees
him taking away the fruits, he will beat him. This will not amount to an assault. This is
merely threat of an assault from B to A, that in the future, if A persists with a certain
behaviour, he will be beaten. At that point in time, there was no apprehension in A that B
would use criminal force against him immediately. It is something in the nature of a
conditional assault or a threat to commit assault.
The question whether a particular act amounts to an assault or not, depends on whether the
act has caused reasonable apprehension in the mind of the person that criminal force was
imminent. As stated earlier, the words or the action should not be threat of assault at some
future point in time. The apprehension of use of criminal force against the person should be
in the present and immediate.

In Mahadeo Pandey vs. Emperor , the four accused persons had thrown bricks into his house
from enmity, that several bricks had been thrown in, and that he had gone out of his house
and had seen the accused standing with bricks in their hands outside his house, and that the
accused had raised their hands to throw bricks. The complainant shouted, and three witnesses
came up and saw the accused, and the accused ran away. The learned Sessions Judge fails to
notice that in the present case the accused threw bricks into the house of another person who
did not consent to that operation. In the present case the throwing of bricks into the house of
the complainant was an act which would endanger the personal safety of the complainant
when he was inside and of any other person who might be inside. I do not see anything in the
section which indicates that the facts found would not constitute an offence under this
section. The learned Sessions Judge was certainly wrong when he states that if anybody had
been hit in the house it would furnish grounds only for a civil action. I may point out that the
facts found would also amount to the offence of assault under Section 352, I.P.C. as the
throwing of the brickbats by the accused would be a gesture which would cause the
complainant to apprehend that criminal force was about to be used against him, that is, if the
bricks hit him criminal force would be used against him. I consider that there is no reason
whatever to set this conviction aside on legal grounds and I have already found that the facts
were sufficiently proved. The sentence is not excessive. For these reasons I refuse this
reference.

131. Punishment for assault or criminal force otherwise than on grave provocation:
Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person otherwise than on grave and sudden
provocation given by that person, shall be punished with Imprisonment for 3 months, or fine
of 1,000 rupees, or both.

Explanation: Grave and sudden provocation will not mitigate the punishment for an offence
under this section, if the provocation is sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an
excuse for the offence, or if the provocation is given by anything done in obedience to the
law, or by a public servant, in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant, or if
the provocation is given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private
defence. Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to mitigate the offence, is a
question of fact.

Kidnapping (section 137, BNS) and Abduction (section 138, BNS).

Sec 137. Kidnapping-
The BNS recognizes two kinds of kidnapping:
1.kidnapping from India and
2.kidnapping from lawful guardianship.
Kidnapping in any form curtails the liberty of an individual. Essentially, it imfringes the right
to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and human rights. It causes
terror in the mind of the people and has deleterious effect on civilized society.¹

Kidnapping from India

The words used in the section are "beyond the limits of India". This means that the offence
under this section is complete, the moment a person is taken outside the geographical
territory of India. It is not necessary that the persons should reach their destination in some
other foreign territory. By the same token, if, a person is apprehended before he crosses the
Indian border, then the offence will not be complete. At best, it may amount to an attempt to
commit the offence of kidnapping from India under section 137 BNS. Till then, he has a locus
paenitentia.
The taking away of a person outside the territory of India is made a separate offence, because
it has the effect of removing a person from the jurisdiction of the Indian law enforcing
agencies.
Kidnapping from Lawful Guardianship
Whoever takes or entices any child or any person of unsound mind, out of the keeping of the
lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind, without the consent of such
guardian, is said to kidnap such minor or person from lawful guardianship.
Explanation. The words 'lawful guardian' in this section include any person lawfully
entrusted with the care or custody of such minor or other person.
Exception. This section does not extend to the act of any person who in good faith believes
himself to be the father of an illegitimate child, or who in good faith believes himself to be
entitled to the lawful custody of such child, unless such act is committed for an immoral or
unlawful purpose.
The essential ingredients of the section are:
(i) taking or enticing away a child or a person of unsound mind,
(ii) the taking or enticing away must be out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of
such child or person of unsound mind and
(iii) such taking or enticing away must be without the consent of such guardian.

Taking and Enticing

All that is required to bring an act within the purview of this section, is to "take or entice" a
child or a person of unsound mind from the keeping of the lawful guardian. "Taking" implies
no active or constructive force. The word means "to go, to escort". The consent of the minor
child is of no relevance. Consent given by a child or a person of unsound mind is not consent.
But there must be some active part played by the accused for "taking" the child. Simply
permitting or allowing a child to accompany one will not amount to an offence.

In S Varadarajan v State of Madras, girl who was on the verge of attaining majority,
voluntarily left her father's house, arranged to meet the accused at a certain place and went to
the sub-registrar's office, where the accused and the girl registered an agreement to marry.
There was no evidence whatsoever that the accused had "taken" her out of the lawful
guardianship of her parents, as there was no active part played by the accused to persuade her
to leave the house. It was held that no offence under this section was made out.

In State of Haryana v Raja Ram, the prosecutrix was a young girl of 14 years. She became
friendly with a person called Jai Narain, aged 32, who was a frequent visitor. When Jai
Narain was forbidden by the prosecutrix's father from coming home, he sent messages
through one Raja Ram. She was constantly persuaded to leave the house and come with Jai
Narain, who would keep her in a lot of material comfort. One night, the prosecutrix arranged
to meet Jai Narain in his house and went to meet him where she was seduced by Jai Narain.
Jai Narain was convicted under section 376 for rape of minor and Raja Ram under section
366. The question before the Supreme Court was whether Raja Ram could be said to have
"taken" the minor girl, since she willingly accompanied him. The Supreme Court held that it
was not necessary that the taking or enticing must be shown to have been by means of force
or fraud. Persuasion by the accused person, which creates willingness on the part of the minor
to be taken out of the keeping of the lawful guardian, would be sufficient to attract the
section. Persuading or soliciting a minor to abandon legal guardianship at any stage by a
person is sufficient to hold him responsible under section 361, IPC. However, taking away" is
distinct from "allowing" a minor to "accompany". The former, unlike the latter, implies
certain active role on the part of the accused in making the minor to leave or keep out of the
legal guardian.

Section 361 makes the taking or enticing of any minor person or person of unsound mind
"out of the keeping of the lawful guardian", an offence. The meaning of the words "keeping
of the lawful guardian" came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in State of
Haryana v Raja Ram,. The court observed that the word "keeping", in the context, connotes
the idea of charge, protection, maintenance and control. It is not necessary that the minor
should be under physical possession of the guardian. It suffices for the purpose of the section
if it is under a continuous control of the guardian. Hence, a minor, who goes on a visit either
with or without consent of the guardian, or goes on street, still is in "keeping" of the guardian,
it goes "out of the keeping" when it is driven away from parental roof or control. The court
compared it with the language used in English statutes, where the expression used was "take
out of the possession" and not "out of the keeping". The difference in the language between
the English statutes and this section only goes to show that section 361 was designed to
protect the sacred right of the guardians with respect of their minor wards.

The term used in the IPC is "lawful guardian" and not "legal guardian". The expression
"lawful guardian" is a much more wider and general term than the expression "legal
guardian". "Legal guardian" would be parents or guardians appointed by courts. "Lawful
guardian" would include within its meaning not only legal guardians, but also such persons
like a teacher, relatives etc, who are lawfully entrusted with the care and custody of a minor."

138. Abduction.-
The essential ingredients of this section are:
(i) forcible compulsion or inducement by deceitful means, and
(ii) the objects of such compulsion or inducement must be the going of a person from
any place.
It must be noted that abduction per se as defined under section 138 is not an offence, and
hence is not punishable. There should be an assault which is an offence against the human
body and that assault should be with the intention of abducting. Only if the abduction falls in
the categories provided under sections 140, 87 etc will it amount to an offence.
Thus, abduction is an offence only if it is done with intent to:
(a) murder;
(b) secretly and wrongfully confining a person;
(c) induce woman to compel her for marriage
(d) subject person to grievous hurt, slavery, etc,
(e) steal from a person under ten years.

By Force
The term "force", as embodied in section 138, means the use of actual force and not merely
show of force or threat of force. Where an accused threatened the prosecutrix with a pistol to
make her go with him, it would amount to abduction under this section.
Deceitful Means
Under this section, inducing a person by deceitful means to go from any place is also an
offence. Deceitful means is used as an alternative to "use of force".
To Go from Any Place
An essential element of abduction is compelling or inducing a person to go from any place. It
need not be only from the custody of lawful guardian as in the case of kidnapping.
For unlike kidnapping, abduction is a continuing offence. The offence of kidnapping is
complete, the moment a person is removed from India or from the keeping of lawful custody
of guardian. But, in the case of abduction, a person is being abducted not only when he is first
taken away from any place, but also when he is subsequently removed from one place to
another.
A kidnapped girl managed to escape from the kidnappers when she met the accused, who
misrepresented to her that he was a police constable and would take her to the police station.
But instead, he took her to his house, kept her there, demanded and took a ransom of Rs 600
from her mother, before he handed her back. It was held that his act amounted to abduction."
Where a woman is passed from hand to hand in several places, each of the persons will be
guilty of offence of abduction.

Minor's Consent to Marry her Kidnapper-Is it valid?

The Supreme Court in its decision in Thakoral D Vadgama v State of Gujarat where a rich
industrialist had induced a minor girl of 16 to leave her home and come to his garage to have
illicit intercourse with him. In this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction under
section 87, IPC, passed by the trial court and the Gujarat High Court. The accused came into
contact with the family of the girl's father, held out hopes of appointing him as the manager
of a new factory, which he was going to start at Mount Abu and Ahmedabad and stayed in big
hotels spending lavishly. He also presented Mohini, the concerned girl, with a Parker pen.
Within a few days, thereafter, he purchased by way of gifts for Mohini, skirt, silver waist
band, etc. He was actually found on Mohini's bed by her mother at Mount Abu and his
connection with Mohini was suspected, and in spite of the mother's grave protest, he was in
correspondence with her without the knowledge of her parents.

Sec. 140- Abducting to Murder or ransom-

(1) Kidnapping or abducting in order to murder. Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person in
order that such person may be murdered or may be so disposed of as to be put in danger of
being murdered, shall be punished with imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a
term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
(a) A kidnaps Z from India, intending or knowing it to be likely that Z may be sacrificed to an
idol. A has committed the offence defined in this section.
(b) A forcibly carries or entices B away from his home in order that B may be murdered. A
has committed the offence defined in this section.
This section will apply if a person has been abducted with intention that he be murdered. The
actual murder of the person is not required. It is sufficient that there was abduction with
intent to murder.
The prosecution is required to prove that:
(i) the accused kidnapped the person;
(ii) the person was kidnapped in order,
(a) that he may be murdered, or
(b) that he might be disposed of in such manner as to be put in danger of being
murdered.
Section 140 becomes inapplicable where the man was done to death before he was
kidnapped. It may amount to an offence contrary to section 238, but not to section
140,BNS. If the person abducted is done to death. it is for the accused to explain, to the
satisfaction of the court, the way he dealt with the victim. In the absence of such an
explanation, the court may presume that the abductor caused his death. He can be held
responsible for the death even if it is not known to him who caused it.
(2) Kidnapping for Ransom
Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person or keeps a person in detention after such kidnapping
or abduction, and threatens to cause death or hurt to such person, or by his conduct gives rise
to a reasonable apprehension that such person may be put to death or hurt, or causes hurt or
death to such person in order to compel the Government or any foreign State or international
inter-governmental organization or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act or to
pay a ransom, shall be punishable with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be
liable to fine.
(3) Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person with intent to cause that person to be secretly and
wrongfully confined, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
(4) Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person in order that such person may be subjected, or
may be so disposed of as to be put in danger of being subjected to grievous hurt, or slavery,
or to the unnatural lust of any person, or knowing it to be likely that such person will be so
subjected or disposed of, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.