UNIT-3

OFFENCES AGAINST WOMAN AND CHIILDREN

❖ Sexual offences against women and children.

❖ Matrimonial offences - Dowry Death (section 80, BNS); Cruelty by husband or relative of
husband (sections 85 & 86, BNS) and other offences relating to marriage (sections 81-84,
BNS).
❖ Notion of ‘Obscenity’ under BNS (Sections 294-296).

❖ Offences of criminal force and assault against woman (sections 74-79, BNS) – Sexual
Harassment, Voyeurism, Stalking.
❖ Protection of children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO), 2012 – Salient features;
Procedure for reporting and recording of statements; Mandatory Presumptions.

Sec.63- Rape-
Section 63 of the BNS defines rape. It is an unlawful sexual intercourse between a man and a
woman without the woman's consent or against her will under any of the seven circumstances
enumerated in section 63 of the BNS.
However, the original section 375 and the provisions providing punishment therefor have
witnessed major amendments, rather overhauling, during 1983 and 2013. Both the
Amendment Acts were triggered by peculiar instance of custodial rape and of brutal gang
rape on young woman in a moving bus in the capital of the country, respectively
The amendments carried out in the year 1983 overhauled the law relating to rape. These
amendments were a result of countrywide criticism by all sections of society including
parliamentarians, women and social organisations against the judicial pronouncement of the
Supreme Court in Tukaram v State of Maharashtra, which it popularly referred to as the
Mathura rape case.
In this case. Mathura, an 18 year-old Harijan orphan girl, was, along with her brother and
another, brought to the police station for recording statement. After statements were recorded,
the accused police constables asked Mathura to wait in the police station and told her brother
and another to move out. Immediately thereafter, one of the accused raped her in the police
station and another, who could not rape her as he was in a highly intoxicated condition,
sexually molested her.
The trial court acquitted both the accused on the ground of the tacit consent of the victim. The
Bombay High Court, on appeal, reversed the trial court's order of acquittal. It held one of the
accused guilty of rape, and the other for molesting her, and awarded rigorous imprisonment
for five years and for one year, respectively. The High Court had observed that there was a
difference between "consent" and "passive submission", and held that mere passive or
helpless surrender of the body and its resignation to other's lust, induced by threats or fear,
cannot be equated with the "desire or will", nor can furnish an answer by the mere fact that
the sexual act was not in opposition to such desire or volition. The Supreme Court, on appeal
by the accused, however, reversed the conviction. It held that Mathura could not have been
overawed in the police station, especially since her relatives were waiting outside. It observed
that Mathura was subjected to no fear of death or hurt, which may have led her to submit to
the act. Further, no injuries were found on Mathura after the incident and the absence of
injuries indicated that the alleged intercourse was a peaceful affair. The Supreme Court
disbelieved Mathura's version that she put up a stiff resistance and shouted loudly for help.
The court described it as a "tissue of lies" and a concoction on her part. It acquitted both the
accused.
To nullify the effect of the Supreme Court judgment in the Mathura case and other cases of
that period, extensive amendments were introduced to the IPC and to the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872. Sections 376A to 376D were added to the IPC and section 114A was inserted in
the Evidence Act, 1872.
On the late evening of 16 December 2012, a young girl was gang raped in New Delhi in a
moving public transport bus in the presence of her friend and thereafter she and her friend
were thrown out of the bus. The victim died subsequently. The incidence of brutal gang rape
led to a nation-wide protest against the culprits. The Government of India, after giving an
anxious consideration to the need to review the existing rape laws and enhance punishment
for brutal sexual assaults, appointed a Committee (headed by the Late JS Verma J). The
Committee was asked to look into possible amendments to criminal law for ensuring quicker
trial of, and harsher punishments to, persons accused of committing sexual assault of extreme
nature on women. The Committee was mandated to submit its report within thirty days from
the date of Notification.
Committee in its Report not only proposed revision and substitution of sections 375, 376, and
sections 376A to 376D of the IPC,10 but also recommended insertion of a few new ones
therein, for making the law relating to sexual assault on women and girls more effective and
deterrent. Most of these recommendations were given legislative effect through the Criminal
Law (Amendment) Act, 201313 and were inserted at appropriate places in the IPC.
The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018,14 recalling the growing incidences of brutal and
violent sexual assaults on minor girls that shook the Nation's conscience, inter alia,
criminalised rape on women below twelve years and sixteen years of age as distinct offences
of grave nature and stipulated more deterrent and stringent punishments therefor.
Section 375 defines "rape", while section 376 provides for punishment for the offence of
"rape". Section 376A to 376E deal with certain forms of sexual assault on woman and
stipulate punishment therefor. Latest amendments carried out in section 376 and section
376E, and insertions of sections 376AB, 376DA, and 376DB in the Penal Code have made
the law relating to sexual offences more stringent and deterrent. Section 377, which has been
partly declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2018, deals with unnatural offences.
Essential Ingredients
Section 63 defines the offence of rape. The revised section 63 has widened the definition of
the offence of rape. It, unlike its earlier version, not confined "rape” merely to penile-vaginal
penetration (in the circumstances specified thereunder), but is also extended to
(i) penile-urethra, penile-oral, or penile-anal penetration;
(ii) object-vaginal, object-urethra, or object-anal insertion;
(iii) insertion of a part of body, other than the penis, in the vagina, the urethra or anus
of a woman;
(iv) manipulation of any part of body of a woman for causing vaginal, urethral or anal
penetration and
(v) application by a man of his mouth to the vagina, urethra or anus of a woman or
making her to do so with him or any other person.
Nevertheless, the offence of "rape", even in its revised version, retains, in essence, the idea of
coercive non-consensual (as well as consensual in certain situations) "sexual intercourse", 16
in an extended form, between a man and a woman in a set of specified circumstances. Its
essence lies in the "penetration",1" howsoever slight, of the penis, or "insertion" of any object
or part of body (other than the penis), or manipulation of any part of the body of a woman for
penetration into the vagina, urethra, or anus of a woman.

The essential ingredients of the offence of rape are:

(i) there must be sexual intercourse, as understood in terms of the provisions of
section 63(a) to (d), with a woman by a man;
(ii) such a sexual intercourse must be under any of the seven circumstances:
(a) against her will;
(b) without her consent;
(c) with consent obtained under fear of death or of hurt;
(d) consent given under misconception of fact that the man is her husband;
(e) consent given by reason of unsoundness of mind, intoxication or under influence of
any stupefying or unwholesome substance;
(f) with a woman under eighteen years of age, with or without her consent; or
(g) with a woman who is unable to communicate her consent.

A careful look at these "circumstances" reveals that the first two clauses, namely, first and
secondly, which deal respectively with sexual intercourse with a woman "against her will"
and "without her consent", contemplate a conscious woman capable of exercising her will or
giving (or withholding) her consent for the sexual act. The next two clauses, namely, thirdly
and fourthly, which deal respectively with sexual intercourse with the consent of the woman
obtained by putting her (or a person in whom she is interested in) in fear of death or hurt, or
making her to believe that she is his wife, contemplate consent of a woman who is conscious
but either afraid or under a misconception. The last two but one clauses, i.e. fifthly and
sixthly, deal with the consensual sexual intercourse with a woman who is, due to either
insanity or immaturity, mentally incapable of exercising her will or giving consent for the
sexual intercourse. The last clause, i.e.seventhly, makes sexual intercourse with a woman who
is unable to communicate her consent for sexual act, a rape.

Explanation 1: For the purposes of this section, “vagina” shall also include labia majora.
Explanation 2: Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by
words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates
willingness to participate in the specific sexual act;
Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by
the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity.
Exception 1: A medical procedure or intervention shall not constitute rape.
Exception 2: Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not
being under eighteen years of age, is not rape.

Marital Rape-An Exception to "Rape"

The Exception 2 to section 63 states that non-consensual sexual intercourse by a man with his
own wife, if she is over fifteen years, does not amount to rape. It, thus, keeps outside the
ambit of "rape" a coercive and non-consensual sexual intercourse by a "husband" with his
"wife" (above fifteen years of age) and thereby allows a "husband" exercise, with impunity,
his marital right of (non-consensual or undesired) sexual intercourse with his "wife".
It is believed that the husband's immunity for marital rape is premised on the assumption that
a woman, on marriage, gives forever her consent to the husband for sexual intercourse. Her
husband has the right to have sexual intercourse with her, whether she is willing or not, and
she is under obligation to surrender or by ruling out the possibility of false, fabricated and
motivated complaints of rape by "wife" against her "husband and the pragmatic procedural
difficulties that might arise in such a legal proceeding."
However, in Independent Thought v UOI," the Supreme Court was urged to re-look into some
of the presumptive assumptions on which the marital rape exception is based between the
ages of 15 and 18 as it violates constitutional rights of girls who are married . In the
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), and section 3(1) of the
Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (PCMA), read with the legislative intent and
contours of apt provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
(JJA), the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DVA), and section 2(d)
of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 (PHRA), constitutional propriety of Exception
2, so far it relates to sexual intercourse between a man and his wife above 15 but below 18
years of age, was doubted. The marital rape exception, in this context, offends Article 14, and
goes contrary to the philosophy & ethos of Article 15(3), and spirit of Article 21 of the
Constitution.
Section 63 makes it clear that sexual intercourse, consensual or non-consensual, with a girl
below the age of eighteen is rape. Her consent for sexual intercourse is totally irrelevant. Her
consent does not absolve him from liability. It is inconsequential.
But Exception 2 to section 63 allows a man, with impunity, to have sexual intercourse,
consensual or non-consensual, with a girl above 15 years of age, if she happens to be his
wife.
It, nevertheless, punishes the husband for having sexual intercourse with his wife, with or
without her consent, if she happens to be below 15 years. In other words, husband of a girl
child between 15 and 18 years of age has blanket liberty and freedom, with no criminal
liability attached therewith, to have forced or non-consensual sexual intercourse with her.
But a mere survey of "child-friendly" statues in vogue, namely, the PCMA, the POCSO Act,
the JJA, and the DVA, and makes the husband's liberty murky. The PCMA not only treats
marriage of a girl below 18 years as voidable marriage at the instance of the girl child, but
also provides punishment (of rigorous imprisonment for a term up to two years or with a fine
of up to Rs one lac) for the person marrying her as well as the persons who perform, conduct,
direct or abet the marriage."
And the husband is said to have committed an offence of aggravated "penetrative sexual
assault" under the POCSO Act when he has sexual intercourse with her (and is punishable by
rigorous imprisonment of a term nor less than ten years and extendable to imprisonment for
life with fine). She, under the JJA, is still a "child" who is "in need of care and protection".
She needs to be cared for, protected and appropriately rehabilitated. It cannot be said, with
any degree of rationality, that a girl child below 18 years loses her status as a "child in need of
care and protection" soon after she gets married. She deserves, rather entitles, protection
under the DVA from such sexual abuse and the consequential mental as well as physical pain.
The sexual intercourse with a girl-child against her will or without her consent guaranteed
under the Indian Constitution and protected by the PHRA. These "child-friendly statutes"
legislations, the apex court observed, are essential for the well-being of the girl-child,
whether married or not, and are protected by Article 15(3) of the Constitution.
These "child-friendly" legislations also link child marriages and sexual intercourse with a girl
child and draw attention to the adverse consequences of both. But Exception 2 to section 63,
BNS, which, in essence, provides that sexual intercourse with a girl-child between 15 and 18
years of age is not rape, if it is between the girl-child and her husband, is only a "jarring note"
in the scheme of the pro-child legislations.
Apparently, there is conflict or incongruity between Exception 2 to section 63, IPC, and that
of section 5(n), read with section 6, POCSO Act. Sexual intercourse between a married girl-
child (above 15 but below 18 years of age) and her husband is not rape under the BNS, and
thereby it is not punishable thereunder, but it is an "aggravated penetrative sexual assault"
under the POCSO Act, and thereby is made punishable. Further, by virtue of section 42A,
POCSO Act, the provisions of the POCSO Act override the provisions of any other law,
including the BNS, to the extent of any inconsistency.

Sec-64: Punishment for Rape:

1. Whoever, except in the cases provided for in sub-section (2), commits rape, shall be
punished with rigorous imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not
be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also
be liable to fine.
2. Whoever,
1. being a police officer, commits rape,
1. within the limits of the police station to which such police officer is
appointed; or
2. in the premises of any station house; or
3. on a woman in such police officer’s custody or in the custody of a
police officer subordinate to such police officer; or
2. being a public servant, commits rape on a woman in such public servant’s
custody or in the custody of a public servant subordinate to such public
servant; or
3. being a member of the armed forces deployed in an area by the Central
Government or a State Government commits rape in such area; or
4. being on the management or on the staff of a jail, remand home or other place
of custody established by or under any law for the time being in force or of a
women’s or children’s institution, commits rape on any inmate of such jail,
remand home, place or institution; or
5. being on the management or on the staff of a hospital, commits rape on a
woman in that hospital; or
6. being a relative, guardian or teacher of, or a person in a position of trust or
authority towards the woman, commits rape on such woman; or
7. commits rape during communal or sectarian violence; or
8. commits rape on a woman knowing her to be pregnant; or
9. commits rape, on a woman incapable of giving consent; or
10. being in a position of control or dominance over a woman, commits rape on
such woman; or
 11. commits rape on a woman suffering from mental illness or physical disability;
or
12. while committing rape causes grievous bodily harm or maims or disfigures or
endangers the life of a woman; or
13. commits rape repeatedly on the same woman, shall be punished with rigorous
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which may
extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the
remainder of that person’s natural life, and shall also be liable to fine.
 64(1) – Rigorous imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less
than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
 64(2) – Rigorous imprisonment for not less than 10 years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life which shall mean the remainder of that person’s natural life and fine.

Sec.65- Punishment for Rape in certain cases-

1. Whoever, commits rape on a woman under sixteen years of age shall be punished with
rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which
may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the
remainder of that person’s natural life, and shall also be liable to fine;

Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and
rehabilitation of the victim;
Provided further that any fine imposed under this sub-section shall be paid to the
victim.
2. Whoever, commits rape on a woman under twelve years of age shall be punished with
rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which
may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the
remainder of that person’s natural life, and with fine or with death;

Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and
rehabilitation of the victim;
Provided further that any fine imposed under this section shall be paid to the victim.

Sec-66- Punishment for causing death or resulting in persistent vegetative state of

victim-Whoever, commits an offence punishable under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of
section 64 and in the course of such commission inflicts an injury which causes the death of
the woman or causes the woman to be in a persistent vegetative state, shall be punished with
rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may
extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that
person’s natural life, or with death.
Sec-70- Gang Rape-
Where a woman is raped by one or more persons constituting a group or acting in
furtherance of a common intention, each of those persons shall be deemed to have committed
the offence of rape and shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall
not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to life which shall mean imprisonment
for the remainder of that person’s natural life, and with fine;

Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and
rehabilitation of the victim;
Provided further that any fine imposed under this sub-section shall be paid to the victim.
(2) Where a woman under eighteen years of age is raped by one or more persons constituting
a group or acting in furtherance of a common intention, each of those persons shall be
deemed to have committed the offence of rape and shall be punished with imprisonment for
life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life, and with
fine, or with death;

Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and
rehabilitation of the victim;
Provided further that any fine imposed under this sub-section shall be paid to the victim.

Priya Patel v/s State of MP:

(W1)-wife
(W2) Sister-in-law
(A)→ Husband
→ W₂ was in a room, A came into this room and started having sexual intercourse with W₂,
W₂ expressed strong denial and unwillingness, against this. when w, entered this room, she
slapped w₂ and told her to comply with the desires of A.
→ The SC held that W1, cannot be convicted under sec.70, because a woman cannot form an
intent to Rape.

Sexual offence against women

(where accused is having some relationship with victim/ prosecutrix).
Sec.67, 68,69 BNS.

Sec.67-upon his wife under judicial separation:

when a person has sexual intercourse with his own wife, who is living separately, whether
under a decree of separation or otherwise, without her consent, punished with imprisonment
2-7yrs + fine.
Explanation: In this section, “sexual intercourse” shall mean any of the acts mentioned in
clauses (a) to (d) of section 63.

Sec.68 – person in authority

Whoever, being:
1. in a position of authority or in a fiduciary relationship; or
2. a public servant; or
3. superintendent or manager of a jail, remand home or other place of custody
established by or under any law for the time being in force, or a women’s or children’s
institution; or
4. on the management of a hospital or being on the staff of a hospital, abuses such
position or fiduciary relationship to induce or seduce any woman either in his custody
or under his charge or present in the premises to have sexual intercourse with him,
such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be punished with
rigorous imprisonment 5-10yrs + fine.

Sec.69- by employing deceitful means-

Whoever, by deceitful means or by making promise to marry a woman without any

intention of fulfilling the same, and has sexual intercourse with her, such sexual
intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of
0-10 yrs+ fine.
Explanation: “deceitful means” shall include the false promise of employment or
promotion, inducement or marring after suppressing identity.

Case laws for dowry related offences:

Satvir Singh vs. State of Punjab (2001) .
In the tragic case of Tejinder Pal Kaur, a young mother who attempted suicide due to ongoing
dowry-related harassment, the Supreme Court examined the application of relevant
provisions under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023. Initially, the Sessions Court
convicted the appellants under Section 62 read with Section 111 (abetment of suicide) and
Section 85 (cruelty by husband or relatives). The High Court substituted Section 111 with
Section 107 (dowry death) and enhanced the sentence. However, the Supreme Court ruled
that Section 111 could not apply, as Tejinder Pal Kaur survived the suicide attempt. Further,
Section 107 was deemed inapplicable because the demand for dowry was not shown to be
proximate to the act. The Court concluded that the abusive conduct was appropriately
punishable under Section 85 BNS, which criminalizes cruelty to a woman over dowry
demands. Considering that the primary accused had already served a significant part of the
sentence, the Court reduced the imprisonment to the period already undergone but increased
the fine to ₹1 lakh for each appellant. Failure to pay the fine would result in an additional
nine months of imprisonment. This judgment reinforces accountability while applying the
appropriate legal provisions under BNS.

Establishing Strict Presumption in Dowry Death Cases: Ram Badan Sharma v. State Of
Bihar
The case of Ram Badan Sharma v. State Of Bihar (2006 INSC 528) deliberates on the
grave issue of dowry-related harassment leading to the untimely death of a woman. The
Supreme Court of India reviewed the conviction of Ram Badan Sharma and his son, Surya
Kant Sharma, who were found guilty of causing the death of Sanju Kumari through
poisoning. This judgment underscores the judiciary's stance on dowry demands and sets a
precedent for handling similar cases in the future.
Summary of the Judgment
On November 20, 1993, a complaint was filed alleging that Sanju Kumari was poisoned by
her husband, Surya Kant Sharma, and her father-in-law, Ram Badan Sharma, due to unmet
dowry demands. The prosecution presented compelling evidence of persistent dowry
demands and subsequent harassment leading to Sanju's death within seven years of marriage.
The trial court, and subsequently the High Court, found the accused guilty under Sections
304-B (dowry death) and 201 (concealing evidence) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The
Supreme Court upheld these convictions, reinforcing the stringent application of laws against
dowry-related offenses.
Precedents Cited
The judgment references several landmark cases that have shaped the interpretation of dowry
death laws in India:
 Soni Devrajbhai Babubhai v. State of Gujarat (1991): Emphasized the legislative
intent behind Section 304-B IPC to eradicate the social evil of dowry.
 Hem Chand v. State of Haryana (1994): Clarified the presumption under Section
113-B of the Evidence Act, linking dowry harassment directly to dowry death.
 Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab (2001): Defined the temporal proximity required
("soon before her death") to establish a causal link between dowry demands and
death.
 Hira Lal v. State (Govt. of NCT), Delhi (2003): Highlighted the challenges in
 prosecuting dowry death cases due to family involvement and lack of corroborative
evidence.
Legal Reasoning
The court meticulously applied Section 304-B IPC, which deals with dowry deaths, along
with Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, which allows for a presumption of dowry death
based on certain criteria:
 Persistent Demand for Dowry: Evidence demonstrated that the accused repeatedly
demanded a color TV, Yamaha motorcycle, and Rs 20,000, which were unmet.
 Harassment and Cruelty: Witness testimonies established that Sanju Kumari was
subjected to ongoing harassment and physical abuse due to dowry-related issues.
 Death within Seven Years of Marriage: Sanju Kumari's death occurred within
seven years of her marriage, satisfying the temporal condition of Section 304-B.
 Unnatural Circumstances: The manner of death, specifically poisoning through
prasad and the hurried cremation without informing the parents, indicated unnatural
death.
The presumption under Section 113-B was thus effectively invoked, placing the burden on
the accused to rebut the presumption, which they failed to do convincingly.
Impact
This judgment reinforces the judiciary's firm stance against dowry-related crimes, ensuring
that the presumption in dowry death cases is upheld robustly. It serves as a deterrent against
dowry demands and highlights the necessity for timely and precise legal interventions in
dowry death cases. Moreover, it underscores the importance of circumstantial evidence in
establishing guilt, especially in cases where direct evidence may be lacking.
Complex Concepts Simplified
Section 304-B IPC (Dowry Death): This section criminalizes the death of a woman under
unnatural circumstances within seven years of marriage, provided there is evidence that she
was subjected to dowry demands or harassment by her husband or his relatives.
Section 113-B of the Evidence Act: Introduced to create a legal presumption that a woman's
death was a dowry death if it occurred under certain conditions related to dowry demands.
This shifts the burden of proof to the accused to disprove the presumption.
Presumption: In legal terms, a presumption allows the court to accept a fact as true until it is
rebutted by evidence to the contrary. Under Section 113-B, if the conditions are met, dowry
death is presumed, and the accused must provide evidence to refute this presumption.
Unnatural Death: Any death that occurs under circumstances that do not follow the usual,
expected pattern. In this case, Sanju Kumari’s death was deemed unnatural due to the
poisoning and the subsequent hurried cremation.
Conclusion
The Ram Badan Sharma v. State Of Bihar judgment is a pivotal decision in the realm of
dowry death jurisprudence in India. By affirming the applicability of Section 304-B IPC and
Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, the Supreme Court has reinforced the legal mechanisms
designed to protect women from dowry-related abuse and coercion. This case exemplifies the
judiciary's commitment to upholding the law against entrenched social evils and serves as a
benchmark for future cases, ensuring that justice is consistently delivered in matters of dowry
death.

Shanti v/s state of Haryana

Section 304B does not explain the term "cruelty". However, section 498A, IPC, explains as to
what amounts to "cruelty". In Shanti v State of Haryana, 18% the Supreme Court held that
sections 304B and 498A are not mutually exclusive. And the meaning of cruelty" given in
explanation to section 498A, having regard to the common background to sections 304B and
498A, can be applied to section 304B. Section 498A explains cruelty to mean: (a) any wilful
conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to
cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health, whether mental or physical, of the
woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing
her, or any person related to her, to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.
The explanation of cruelty as given in section 498A can be relied on for the purposes of
section 304B as well. 187Section 304B does not explain the term "cruelty". However, section
498A, IPC, explains as to what amounts to "cruelty". In Shanti v State of Haryana, 18% the
Supreme Court held that sections 304B and 498A are not mutually exclusive. And the
meaning of cruelty" given in explanation to section 498A, having regard to the common
background to sections 304B and 498A, can be applied to section 304B. Section 498A
explains cruelty to mean: (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive
the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health,
whether mental or physical, of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such
harassment is with a view to coercing her, or any person related to her, to meet any unlawful
demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand. The explanation of cruelty as given in section 498A can
be relied on for the purposes of section 304B as well.