Jef Strategy
Jef Strategy
small vote share swings causing large impact on outcomes and the 2004 year 10-calendar days (%)
May04 -17 180
example. Potential market volatility ahead of the elections should be used May09 19 13
. May19 6 36
Independents
9%
potential setbacks at the state elections does not necessarily imply a setback at the national
Congress
elections. Some important allies of the party have left since 2019, but the party has been able allies
21% BJP
to forge a few new relationships as well which should be helpful. 53%
Opposition that is I.N.D.I.A. 26 opposition parties have formed a grand alliance – INDIA
2024 elections :
Total 543
BJP allies
(Indian National Democratic Inclusive Alliance) to create a strong contender for upcoming . 4%
be. 10 6
-10
The X factors. Given the demographics, every national election sees about 125m first time -20
-20
-30
voters. Their voting tendencies are untested at the national elections so far. 2024 elections -40
-31
-50 -42
will see 255m registered voters (25% of total) who were not eligible voters in the pre-Modi era. 2ppt 4ppt 6ppt
Also, certain emotive issues viz. cross border conflicts, Ram Temple issues etc. can have an .
Impact of share loss Impact of share gain
The market outlook. Out of the last 4 national elections, the previous two elections results
were more on the expected lines but yet the Indian market outperformed MSCI AxJ during
the election results period (10 days incl results impact) by 5-9ppts. In the previous 6 months
leading up to the election week India outperformed before 2014 elections but was inline for
2019 elections. We note that in Dec-18 (i.e. 4-5 months before the 2019 national elections),
the BJP had lost 3 key state elections in the state of MP, Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh, yet won
the final national election in style.
We believe that political continuity is the most likely outcome, though the margin of victory
could be narrower. We therefore OWT on capex recovery plays including banks, industrial and
property. Our top picks are Axis Bank, ICICI Bank, SBI, L&T, Ultratech and property and select
industrial mid-caps including Thermax, KEI, Siemens & Kajaria. We also tactically OWT staples
running up to the elections in the expectations of favourable rural policies. We believe that the Mahesh Nandurkar * | Equity Analyst
housing cycle will play out irrespective of the election outcome but the broader capex cycle 91 224224 6120 | mnandurkar@jefferies.com
might slow down in the event that ruling party changes and freebie politics emerges. We note Abhinav Sinha * | Equity Analyst
that even in the 2004 type of scenario of an election upset, the economy & the stock market 91 22 4224 6121 | abhinav.sinha@jefferies.com
were both back on track recouping the initial losses in 6 months' time. Nishant Poddar, CFA * | Equity Associate
+91 22 42246165 | npoddar@jefferies.com
Please see analyst certifications, important disclosure information, and information regarding the status of non-US analysts on pages 54 - 59 of this report.
* Jefferies India Private Limited
Equity Strategy
Equity Research
August 30, 2023
Table of Contents
Executive Summary 3
Opposition unity to have a limited impact 3
Market movement post Dec'18 losses - a quick reversal was seen 4
What if 2004 were to repeat? 4
Negatives for the BJP - Weak rural recovery post pandemic & rising inflation 5
Freebie politics on the rise 5
Young population seems to support Modi 5
Expect strong business cycle to continue 6
Section 1: Political Continuity Likely 7
Modi remains popular but 2024 mandate might not be as strong 7
Mr Modi riding high on the strong economic trend and outlook 9
Some political set backs recently 12
Ten states account for 80% of seats for the BJP 15
Swing analysis – More to lose for the BJP 18
Did You Know? 21
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
Executive Summary
Our base case estimate is for the BJP to win between 251-300 seats, reaching close to a majority on
its own or with help from its NDA partners. This, though, should be a decline vs. the 303 seats won
in the 2019 elections. Prime Minister Modi remains the most popular leader in India. While some anti-
incumbency is likely post a decade-long rule for the BJP, particularly with rising inflation and weak rural,
we believe Mr. Modi's popularity should help the BJP to tide over these challenges. Rising opposition
focus on defeating the BJP, as visible in the I.N.D.I.A. alliance formation, should only make a small
impact on the party's prospects.
Opposition unity to have a limited impact The INDIA alliance adds allies to the erstwhile
26 opposition parties have come together to form the INDIA alliance for taking on the BJP for the 2024 Congress led UPA alliance primarily in 5 states
national elections. The INDIA alliance is a souped up version of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA)
which has been anchored by the Congress since 2004 elections, with varying partners. The UPA won
91 seats (out of 543) in 2019, and the newer allies of the UPA won another 64 seats back then, two
of which - Shiv Sena and JD(U) were the allies of BJP then. But these seats are anyway outside the
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
303 which BJP won itself in 2019. The impact of this alliance formation will be visible on BJP's 303
to the extent that the unified opposition fields only one candidate as against 2/3 earlier and hoping to
transfer votes from 2/3 different parties to one single candidate. The impact of this new alliance would
be limited to only 6 states viz. West Bengal, Maharashtra, Delhi, Punjab and Bihar.
Calculating the adverse impact in Maharashtra and Bihar is difficult due to the pre-poll seat sharing
agreement between the BJP & Shi Sena/JDU. In the other 3, theoretical impact comes to -11 seats. The
real impact will be lower as the votes are seldom fully transferable and some political leader viz. CPI(M)
leader - Mr Yechury have already made some adverse comments. In Maharashtra, due the party split
in Shiv Sena, the adverse impact on the BJP will be likely much lower. Bihar, can be a swing state.
Exhibit 4 - New major Congress allies under INDIA alliance Theoretical impact of direct vote transfer is 11
seats for the BJP; though changing alliances in
Party State Impact on BJP
Bihar and some other states can take the hit to
❑ Assuming full transfer of votes among allies, 15-25 seats
constituency wise analysis shows loss of 10 seats for
Trinamool
West Bengal the BJP
Congress
❑ However, CPIM leaders indicate alliance with
Trinamool may not be workable in West Bengal
❑ Shiv Sena’s 18 seat tally was boosted by support from
Shiv Sena the BJP in 2019 polls
Maharashtra
(UBT) ❑ However, 13 of Sena’s 18 MPs have rebelled to ally
with BJP
❑ JDU’s 16 seat tally was boosted by support from the
BJP in 2019 polls
JDU Bihar
❑ However, some smaller JDU allies like RLJD allying
again with BJP
❑ Assuming full transfer of votes among allies,
constituency wise analysis shows loss of 1 seat for the
BJP in Punjab and Nil in Delhi
AAP Delhi, Punjab
❑ However, AAP may fight upcoming state elections
against Congress, local Delhi Congress leadership
comments against tie-up
.
Source: ECI, Jefferies
Several large state parties such as BJD (Odisha), YSRCP (Andhra), BRS (Telangana), TDP (Andhra & Several large state parties are out of both NDA
Telangana), BSP (UP & others) etc. staying away from the INDIA alliance. Overall, we expect the INDIA and INDIA alliance
alliance to make a difference of ~20 seats (15-25) to the BJP's likely 2024 tally.
Market movement post Dec'18 losses - a quick reversal was seen BJP lost state elections in Dec'18 and a tough
Ahead of the 2024 national elections, five state elections will be held in late '23 and will be seen as fight is envisaged again in Dec'23
an indicator of BJP performance in 2024, with all of these states (MP, RJ, Chattisgarh, Telangana and
Manipur) having a substantial BJP presence. In 2018, the BJP lost power in the three states of MP,
Rajasthan and Chattisgarh to the Congress and the results came as a negative surprise.
The MSCI India underperformed the regional benchmark by 4ppt during the election results period.
However, the subsequent period until the national elections, saw the Indian markets perform inline with
the regional markets. Partly, as the elections neared, it became clearer that the voting patterns in the
national and state polls may differ. Indeed, BJP did a near clean sweep of these three states in the
national polls.
Exhibit 5 - Performance of India vs. region around and after the Dec18 state elections Market reversed the Dec'18 post poll losses by
115 the time 2019 elections were out
110
105
100
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
95
90
85
80
Dec-18 Jan-19 Feb-19 Mar-19 Apr-19 May-19
Exhibit 6 - MSCI India vs MSCI AxJ 1 year post 2004 elections After Underperforming initially, post the 2004
Both indices rebased to 100 on 1st May 2004
elections, Indian markets ended the year inline
130 with the regional markets
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
Post the adverse election outcome, Indian indices dropped by 10 ppts but relative to MSCI AxJ, the Continued strong economic performance post
markets underperformed by only 3ppts in the election result week. Popular sentiment that the new 2004 elections helped recoup the losses
government, particularly with communist party support, would find it difficult to continue with broad
market reforms and infrastructure development initiated by the BJP weighed down on market initially.
Six months later, however, India's underperformance had been reversed.
Negatives for the BJP - Weak rural recovery post pandemic & rising
inflation
The relatively weak rural economy could become a campaign point for the opposition. The rural wage
growth over the last several years have trended close to or below inflation. Meanwhile, the government
has also given low hikes to the Minimum Support Prices (MSPs) for key crops which are procured by
the government such as wheat and rice. Another possible campaign issue seen recently is the relatively
high inflation, particularly post COVID. While the Modi-1 government had done well to bring inflation
down from 10% to 4%, the same has risen and is currently at 7.4% - which is seen hurting the urban
poor disproportionately.
towards rising direct transfers / ‘freebies’ as the key election promise made such as free electricity,
unemployment dole, higher monthly rations and subsidized loans / grants etc. The weak rural economy
and the high inflation may see some counter policies, which will come in the form of direct transfers
and / or subsidies.
Exhibit 7 - Major welfare policies ahead of national elections Large welfare scheme launch may happen in
Election Party Policy Jan'24 budget
2009 Cong National farm-loan waiver scheme
Rural employment guarantee expansion
2014 Cong National food security Act
Land acquisition law changes
2019 BJP Farmer basic income scheme
Higher MSP increase
80
70
60
50
40 33.5
27.1 25.6
30 24.0 23.7
18.7
20 13.1 12.7 11.7 9.0 8.4 8.4 7.2 7.0
10
0
Singh…
Kejriwal
Kumar
Akhilesh
Amit Shah
Gandhi
Sambit
Shivraj
Tharoor
Narendra
Rajnath
Piyush
Adityanath
Gadkari
Smriti Irani
banerjee
Nitish
Goyal
Arvind
Rahul
Mamta
Patra
Singh
Yadav
Sashi
Nitin
Modi
Yogi
.
Source: X Corp, Jefferies
There will be ~125m (12.5%) young first time votes for this election. More than 50% of the voting
population is under the age of 40, suggesting the youth vote is important for the political parties. On
this parameter, Mr. Modi is relatively well positioned. His social media following indicates a lead of 3-4x
among competitors such as Rahul Gandhi and Arvind Kejriwal. The digital India program of the BJP,
promotion of sports tournaments and a strong border policy are seen to be resonating with the youth
this should be a strong point favour of the BJP.
Expect strong business cycle to continue Capex cycle turn is durable and we OWT
The Indian economic cycle is usually driven by capex cycle which has turned positive in the last 2 years, domestic cyclicals
after close to a decade long slowdown. Indeed, GFCF (Gross Fixed Capital Formation or Investments)
as % of GDP has risen over FY22 and FY23, and set to rise further. Assuming our base case of
political continuity, the investment cycle should continue to unfold over the next several years. We
OWT domestic cyclicals - banks, industrial and property in the anticipation of this. We believe that a
strong housing cycle will play out irrespective of the election outcome given the strong demand-supply
situation and typical cycles being 6-8 years long. Broader capex cycle should also unfold, but slowly,
if the political dispensation were to change.
GFCF as a % of GDP
faster economic growth
35.8
34.7 34.3
35.0 33.6 34.0 33.4
32.8 33.2
31.3
30.7
29.9 30.1
29.5 28.9 29.2
30.0 28.3 28.3 28.7 28.2 28.2 28.5
27.5 27.3
26.0
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
.
Source: CMIE, Jefferies
Exhibit 10 - Market Impact on various 2024 election scenarios
- This is the base case for the markets. 70% probability. Property & Capex Cylce plays:
Modi-led BJP - Continued strength in capex cycle driving strong economic growth including Cement, Infra & Cap
Majority Govt and investor sentiments. goods, Large Banks, SMID caps
-20% probability; BJP falls short of the majority by 20-30 seats but Property, Select capex plays
Modi-Led forms the government with the help of its partners inclduing L&T, cement,
Coalition - The populist pressure may rise but Modi's priorities unlikely to Discretionary consumption,
change
- 10% probability. 'INDIA' opposition alliance forms a weak and Staples, IT, Pharma. Domestic
populist government. cyclicals can be bought after the
Weak Coalition - A steep 10%+ market correction possible. Investor sentiments to be initial fall
impacted.
.
Source: Jefferies
India has enjoyed the political stability provided by a single party (BJP) majority since 2014 with Prime Minister Mr. Narendra Modi in the lead. The last
time a party and PM were elected for a third successive term was in 1962. Current popularity trends of Mr. Modi place him as the favorite for the PM
candidate. The Indian economy seems to be finally embracing a full blown capex cycle, after a decade and completion of several marquee projects would
be a key deliverable ahead of the 2024 national polls. There have been some political setbacks too, as the anti-incumbency impact is felt at the local level.
Overall, our base case is for Modi / BJP to return to power, though with a somewhat reduced mandate.
Modi remains popular but 2024 mandate might not be as strong Crossing majority mark of 272 for the third time
2014 victory of the BJP marked a turning point for India politically as it saw a single party majority in a will not be as easy as the first two times
national election after a gap of 30 years. In 2019, BJP returned to power with an even larger mandate
with 303 of the 543 seats won. The ensuing political stability has been used by the BJP to usher in
several reforms, many of which have been politically difficult decisions and may not have been possible
under a coalition government. The majority mark of 272 though may not be easy for the BJP to cross
this time as the party faces a somewhat more united opposition than previously and recent state
election reversals indicate anti-incumbency building up in sections of the society.
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
Exhibit 11 - No. of seats won by the single largest party BJP is the only party to win full majority in 2
450 414 National elections in the last 35 years
No. of seats won by the ruling party
400
350
303
300 272 seats required to form govt. 282
244
250 206
197 182 182
200 161
145
150
100
50
0
1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 2014 2019
80
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
Sep14
Apr15
Aug17
Aug19
Aug21
Aug23
Aug16
Aug18
Aug20
Aug22
Feb16
Jan17
Jan18
Jan19
Jan20
Jan21
Jan22
Jan23
.
Source: India Today, Jefferies
For the BJP, the biggest positive continues to be that PM Modi enjoys strong popularity among Indian ... consistently above 60%
voters. Indeed, the opposition is perceived to lack a strong, consensus PM candidate to project. The
Mood-of-the-nation survey by the India Today group shows PM’s approval ratings at close to 70%.
Indeed, during the 2nd term, the PM has enjoyed average approval ratings of 69%, 10ppt above the
2014-19 term. Mr. Modi’s image as a hard worker from humble background, decisive leader and clean
track record, has burnished his appeal time.
A couple of early opinion polls (India TV-CNX, India Today-CVoter) suggests a somewhat stronger As per early opinion polls, NDA alliance - led by
outcome for the BJP; with the BJP’s coalition National Democratic Alliance (NDA) projected to win an BJP - expected to win 2024 elections...
average 312 seats. BJP itself is projected to win a majority 287-290 seats. The recently formed alliance
of opposition parties (INDIA) is projected to win ~185 seats, with 66-74 seats for the Congress; falling
significantly behind the 272 seat majority mark.
Exhibit 13 - Summary of opinion polls so far for 2024 elections ...with full majority again in 2024 elections
Non-aligned &
Independents
9%
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
Congress
allies
21% BJP
53%
Same prime minister for 3 terms has happened in the past India's first PM Mr. Nehru won for three
A third successive term for Mr. Modi as PM would not be unprecedented; though quite rare. India’s first successive terms
Prime Minister, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, was the PM for four successive terms, spanning nearly 20-years;
with him being re-elected thrice consecutively. Ms. Indira Gandhi had also been elected to the PM’s post
thrice (1967, 71 and 80); although the third term wasn’t successive. Both were Congress party leaders.
Exhibit 14 - Party in power since Independence Jawaharlal Nehru (4) and Indira Gandhi (3) has
served as PM for more than 2 terms
1947 1952 1957 1962 1966 1971 1977 1980 1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 2004 2009 2014 2019
Party in power
Mr Modi riding high on the strong economic trend and outlook A cyclical upturn, as evident in the rising capex
India is currently at the start of what can potentially be a multi-year economic upcycle; with the housing upcycle, got underway since late'21
upturn well underway since late ’20 and the private corporate capex seeing an uptick. When Mr. Modi
became the PM in May’14, India’s broader economic cycle, as defined by the capex cycle, had just
started a prolonged slump. There was a large housing and private corporate sector capex boom, which
ended in 2013, resulting in significant inventory overbuild with property developers and low capacity
utilization with the manufacturing sector. Also, several reforms like the bankruptcy Act, GST rollout,
RERA implementation etc. had disrupted the near term growth in his first term.
Factors enabling the investment cycle are the strength of the corporate and banking sector balance Qualitative improvements such as digitisation,
sheet. Corporate sector has undergone a massive deleveraging cycle over FY15-FY23 and the current formalisation of economy, alongside low debt
D/E is at an all-time low of 0.6x. Clearly, the corporate sector has a capacity to borrow and invest. On levels for corporate and strong balance sheet
the other hand, the banking sector has gone through a massive NPL cycle when NPL’s peaked at 11% for banks are all visible now
in the year 2018. Since then NPL’s have come down to 4% and trending further down. Banks have also
beefed up the equity capital and now the tier I capital adequacy of the sector is at an all time high hinting
that the banks have the capacity to lend. The rising property cycle is acting as the bridge to improve
the risk appetite in the economy driving banks to lend and corporate to borrow.
The Indian economy has also seen a qualitative improvement as government policies drive higher
formalization. Government's promotion of the India public digital goods infrastructure (Aadhaar, UPI,
ONDC etc.), alongside policy changes such as rolling out the GST reform have helped quickened the
pace of formalization in the economy. The government has also rolled out schemes such as the
Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme to push manufacturing (e.g. in smartphones wherein India
is now assembling iPhones) - is helping to drive job creation and also improving the job conditions as
more of the economy becomes organized and rules driven.
.
Source: Jefferies
Exhibit 17 - PM Modi inaugurating the 1st Vande Bharat train PM Modi himself associates with
transformative projects such as upgradation of
Indian railways
.
Source: PIB, Jefferies
The fiscal tilt of the Modi-2 government has very much been on infrastructure development, with some Significant step up in infra investments by
visible progress. Mr. Modi, for example, has associated himself with the launch of the new European government done in 2019-24 term
styled 'Vande Bharat' passenger railway trains. There are several large projects in advanced stages of
completion touching multiple parts of the country, which are likely to see openings during 2023-2024,
in the run-up to the national elections. These include Delhi-Mumbai expressway, Mumbai Trans Harbor
Link, Mumbai coastal road, Navi Mumbai International Airport, Metro trains across several large cities
etc.
Exhibit 18 - Key infrastructure projects of Modi 2019-2024 tenure Key infrastructure projects under Modi
Key infrastructure projects of Modi 2019-2024 tenure government will be an important poll plank for
Introduction of 100 Vande Bharat passenger trains
the BJP
New metro lines in 20+ cities
Construction of new 1000Km+ Delhi-Mumbai expressway
New International Airports in Mumbai and Delhi (NOIDA)
Trans Harbor Sea Link (22Km) in Mumbai
Chenab River Railway bridge (world's highest)
Char Dham (pilgrimage) highway in Himalyan terrain
Mumbai-Nagpur 700Km Expressway
New parliament building and complex in Delhi
Source: Jefferies
Arguably, the second tenure of the Mr. Modi has seen somewhat lesser number of large new social Social schemes announcements were more
schemes announced. However, there are a few large ones which have again followed the saturation dominant in first term of Mr. Modi, but
strategy and are quite meaningful among the lower economic strata. These include, household water- execution has gathered pace on housing, water
connection (‘nal se jal’) scheme, expansion of health insurance programs (Ayushman Bharat & Jan and health insurance schemes during the
Aushadhi), the conclusion of Housing for all schemes, the successful delivery of COVID vaccines, extra second term
food rations during COVID years etc.
Exhibit 19 - Modi government's popular policies Saturation styled social schemes on basic but
Modi 1 (2014-19) Popular Policies Modi 2 (2019-24) Popular Policies tangible benefits has been Modi's policy goal
Financial Inclusion (PMJDY) Extra ration schemes during COVID
Ujjwala (free gas cylinder) scheme Free COVID vaccines (2bn doses)
Clean India (toilets in each home) Clean water (piped water in each home)
Housing for All Housing for All - Execution continued
Power for all India / Rural electrification Health insurance programs (Ayushman Bharat)
Small enterprenuer Loan scheme (Mudra)
PM Modi with Joe Biden in Washington Mr. Modi has made several high profile foreign
visits with positive outcome for India
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
.
Source: PIB, Jefferies
Exhibit 20 - Nifty during Modi-2 and key events
21000
17000
Second
COVID wave RBI ends
BJP regains
rate hike
15000 powers in
Vaccination BJP wins UP Maharashtra
broad-basing elections
COVID lockdowns
13000 Major capex
start expanding
push in budget FIIs sell US$20bn but
strong domestic flows
support market
11000
10 new PLI
Modi re- schemes added
Corporate
elected
tax cuts
9000
Mobile PLI
scheme
announced
7000
Govt / RBI
announce
COVID relief
5000
Jan-19 Jul-19 Jan-20 Jul-20 Jan-21 Jul-21 Jan-22 Jul-22 Jan-23 Jul-23
Nifty
.
Source: Bloomberg, Jefferies
Some political set backs recently BJP has lost a few state elections post 2019
Even as Mr. Modi’s popularity has stayed high, the BJP has seen a few political reversals at the state national elections
government level. The state elections are largely fought considering the local leadership and issues
most pertinent to that state. We also note that the outcomes for state and national elections from the
same constituency are often different. Nonetheless, a perception of BJP losing power at state levels
can develop into a larger national narrative for ‘change’. States where BJP / NDA has seen a political set-
back post May’19 include in North (Himachal Pradesh, Punjab), East (Jharkhand) and South (Karnataka,
Tamil Nadu).
Exhibit 21 - BJP / NDA seat and vote share in state elections reversals since May19 BJP lost its seat share in some recent key state
* Change in alliance partners
elections, however was able to maintain vote
State Seat share (%) Vote share (%)
share in some of them
Pre-May19 Post-May19 Pre-May19 Post-May19
Jharkhand 45.7 30.1 31.3 33.4
Tamil Nadu (NDA) 58.1 33.3 40.9 40.1
Himachal Pradesh 64.7 36.8 48.8 43.0
Punjab (NDA)* 15.4 1.7 30.6 7.7
Karnataka 46.4 29.5 35.6 36.0
.
Source: ECI, Jefferies
An analysis of the political reversals for the BJP though does not suggest any significant decline in the Retaining vote shares amidst seat loss
party’s popularity. The states where the BJP was in direct contention against the opposition and lost indicates core voter base is still intact for the
power (Jharkhand and Karnataka); the party actually saw its vote share increase in the latter two states, BJP
indicating that the core voter base of party has not faded. Even in UP, the 2022 seat count was smaller
than the 2017 one by 12ppt, even as party vote share went up by nearly 4ppt to 45%. The reason for
the seat declines in such cases are then localized to state elections / local leadership & alliances etc.
The outcome for a national level can be much different.
.
Source: ECI, Jefferies
Turnover in political allies for the BJP Loss of a few long term allies limits the broader
Part of the political setback for the BJP has been a churn in its alliance partners. Three states where NDA alliance reach in 2024
BJP has seen a loss of its long term allies are Punjab (Shiromani Akali Dal or SAD), Maharashtra (Shiv
Sena) and Bihar (Janata Dal United). In the latter two states, the BJP had seen loss of the alliance
partner despite fighting the 2019 national elections as well as the ensuing state elections. In both these
states, the leader of the local partner formed a government in an alliance with the opposition, with the
party leader in the Chief Minister post.
Seats
Party Leader State Comment
(2019)
Telugu Desam Andhra Pradesh, NDA member over 1998-2004 and 2014-2018.
3
Party (TDP) Telangana Not part of INDIA alliance
.
Source: Election commission on India, Jefferies
Ten states account for 80% of seats for the BJP 10 states, predominantly in Northern
The BJP’s origination in the 80s and 90s has predominantly been from the ‘Hindi heartland’ states and Western India remain key to BJP's
of North and Central India. Significant attempts have been made over the last decade to attempts performance
to broaden its presence among the regions with relatively weaker presence viz. the South Indian and
Eastern Indian states. The party did see a modestly improved outcome in 2019 with the Top-10 states
accounting for 80.5% of its seats tally (244 out of 303) vs. an 85.0% proportion (240 out of 282) in
the 2014 elections. Nonetheless, concentration remains high and we evaluate party’s prospects in key
states below.
The key seat driver for the BJP remains the 'Hindi heartland' - essentially North West India, where the The core states could see ~10% or 20 seat
BJP party and Mr. Modi traditionally derive the highest cultural affinity. Uttar Pradesh (UP) remains key loss in 2024, partly due to anti-incumbency and
to political fortunes across India, but most so for the BJP. A joint opposition strategy last time did not partly on the joint INDIA alliance strategy of the
yield much results and with the same not being repeated (BSP staying out) in 2024, BJP should likely opposition
see 63-70 of the 80 seats here. Mr. Yogi, BJP's UP Chief Minister, is also quite popular.
Yogi’s image in the state has often drawn comparisons to Mr. Modi’s rise in Gujarat in the 90s/00s.
Crackdown on crime by the UP states administration has been a visible policy with actions such
as destruction of unauthorized property and capture / death of wanted criminals gaining national
coverage. Mr. Yogi has also worked to enhance the investment climate of the state with, for example,
organizing ‘Invest UP’ summit akin to earlier ‘Vibrant Gujarat’ summit done by Mr. Modi.
Jharkhand 14 12 11 10-12 JMM and Congress alliance may have some impact
Assam 14 7 9 8-10 Popular local government of BJP
North East Ex-of Assam 11 1 5 3-5 Recent violence an issue
Chhattisgarh 11 10 9 6-8 Local Congress govt seen to do well
Haryana 10 7 10 6-8 Some moderation expected
Delhi 7 7 7 6-7 United opposition unlikely a challenge to Modi
J&K (pre-split basis) 6 3 3 3 Jammu and Ladakh strongholds
Uttarakhand 5 5 5 5 BJP won recent local elections
Himachal Pradesh 4 4 4 4 Reversal in local elections, pension an issue
Other UTs & Goa 8 6 3 3-5
Segment total 170 66 96 75-94
States with weak BJP presence
Tamil Nadu 39 1 0 0-1 Usually state sees reversal; limited presence
Andhra Pradesh 25 2 0 0-2 Alliance with TDP, JSP can help
Kerala 20 0 0 0-1 Limited presence
Punjab 13 2 2 1-2 Congress leader migration, but AAP-Congress tieup
Segment total 97 5 2 1-6
. Grand total 543 282 303 251-300
Source: Jefferies
Exhibit 26 - PM Modi and UP CM Yogi in Investor summit in UP
.
Source: https://invest.up.gov.in/wp-content/gallery/investor-summit/pgimg-14.jpg, Jefferies
Among other major states for the BJP, we see limited losses in Bihar and Maharashtra despite the
political realignments, including loss of allies for the BJP. Gujarat will likely see a repeat of the sweep.
The joint I.N.D.I.A. opposition and anti-incumbency (where BJP does not have very popular local
leaders) could lead to some erosion of seats in the other heartland states. Overall, we still see limited
damage (~20 seats) in the 'core' region (vs. 226 in 2019); helping to keep BJP in sight of a strong No.
1 / near majority position.
State /
Comment BJP Seats
Region
80
❑ Seats dipped by 9 to 62 (out of 80) between 2014 and 2019 70
71
62
63-70
30
26 26 25-26
25
❑ Gujarat has been the home ground of Mr. Modi and a clean 20
sweep of 26 seats has happened here in both 2014 and 2019. 15
Gujarat ❑ With the state repeatedly sending the BJP back to power since 10
5
1999 (including in 2022), we believe BJP is unlikely to see any
0
seat loss here in 2024 elections. 2014 2019 2024E
Gujarat
120
❑ The other Hindi heartland states (105 seats) may see small 100
97 98
79-90
Other Hindi losses for the BJP on anti-incumbency and somewhat weaker 80
Heartland (RJ, local leadership. 60
MP, JH, CG, ❑ Ex-Delhi and Jharkhand, the BJP is largely in a direct contest 40
HY, DL, UA, with the Congress, wherein a joint opposition is unlikely to 20
The gains for the BJP in 2019 had come from an improvement in its 'non-core' states in East and South Large gains made in East India in 2019 by the
India, with the seats in the Eastern region (West Bengal, Odisha, North East) rising from 11 to 40 by BJP; though South India remained a difficult
2019. Further gains are unlikely, though a joint alliance and recent North Eastern state violence can geography
reduce this tally by a few seats.
Presence in South India, outside Karnataka, is limited though some visible progress has happened in
Telangana. We think of the 109 seats in the South, BJP may find it tough to exceed the 29 peak seen
in 2019.
Overall, we project a range of 251-300 seats for the BJP, with the mid-point implying a small majority,
in line with 2014.
State /
Comment BJP Seats
Region
50
❑ Success in the Eastern states saw BJP’s tally rise from 11 to 40 40
40
between 2014 to 2019. 29-37
East India 30
❑ West Bengal likely to see Trinamool Congress fight in alliance
(West Bengal, 20
with the Congress and Communist parties. 11
North East,
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
10
❑ In the North-East, significant infrastructure development
Odisha) 0
happened though recent violence in Manipur a negative 2014 2019 2024E
❑ BJP’s East India tally to decline somewhat. East India (WB, NE, OD)
35
South India ❑ Party’s significant presence is in Karnataka with 25/28 seats 30
29
18-29
(Karnataka, won. Recent large losses in local elections to Congress show 25 21
20
Telangana, some anti-incumbency. 15
Andhra ❑ BJP has seen some gains in the Telangana in 2019 (4/17) but 10
12 11
10
8 7-10
❑ In Punjab former Congress leader Amarinder Singh is in BJP. 8
(Punjab, Goa, ❑ J&K impact of state split to be seen. BJP has traditionally done 4
2
J&K, Uts) well in 3/6, see no change to that.
0
❑ Overall, 7-10 seat range of 2014-19 to be largely retained. 2014 2019 2024E
Swing analysis – More to lose for the BJP A high base in 2019 make the BJP susceptible
The BJP’s victory on 303 seats last time was a fairly strong outcome with the party winning 37% of to small vote share losses having big impact
the overall India vote. We did a swing analysis to gauge the impact of a reverse voter swing (anti- on seats
incumbency essentially) on the party’s 2024 prospects. If BJP's vote share dropped by 1ppt with the
second best candidate getting all the vote in the particular constituency, then the total seats will drop
by 20. We checked for every ppt drop in voting share in the same scenario. The analysis suggests that
a 4ppt swing away in vote share from the BJP will translate to a loss in its single party majority with
only 270 total seats. Major seats drop is seen in U.P. with approximately 13% seats drop with just 2ppt
vote loss. Party has a strong hold in 7 states/UT - Arunachal Pradesh, Daman and Diu, Gujrat, Himachal
Pradesh, Delhi, Tripura and Uttarakhand where even upto 8ppt share drop has little impact.
Exhibit 29 - Sensitivity - Incremental seats for the BJP vs incremental vote share gain BJP will gain only 6 additional seats with 2ppt
X-axis: Vote Share gain, Y-axis: Estimated no.of additional seats win
additional voteshare
25
22
20
20 18
15 13
12
10
10
6
5
0
2ppt 3ppt 4ppt 5ppt 6ppt 7ppt 8ppt
BJP Gain
.
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
Source: Jefferies
Exhibit 30 - Sensitivity - Incremental seat loss vs incremental vote share loss BJP can lose majority if they lose about 4ppt
X-axis: Vote share lost, Y-axis: Estimated no.of seat loss
of vote share
70
61
60
53
50
42
40 37
31
30 24
20
20
10
0
2ppt 3ppt 4ppt 5ppt 6ppt 7ppt 8ppt
BJP Loss
.
Source: Jefferies
Exhibit 31 - General Election 2019 Exhibit 32 - State government ruling party - Aug'23
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
. .
Source: ECI, Jefferies Source: ECI, Jefferies
• Mallikarjun Kharge, a veteran Congress leader Popularly known as • Of the 543 MPs elected, 78 were women. This is the highest number of
women elected. 27 of the sitting 41 female MPs retained their seats.
"solillada Saradara", (a leader without defeat) lost his 1st ever election
in 2019, after winning all elections since 1972, he was defeated by
•
BJP's Umesh Jadhav in Gulbarga constituency.
Malkajgiri (Telangana) was the largest Lok Sabha constituency
by number of electors with 3,150,303 (as against 1,679,558 per
constituency on an average) and highest number of valid votes polled
• Bihar saw about 0.8m voters opting for the None of The Above (NOTA)
(1,563,646).
option - the highest in the country.
• US$502 million, is the value of cash, drugs, alcohol and goods • Dhubri, in Assam, had the highest voter turnout in 2019, at 90.66% and
the seat was won by AIUDF.
confiscated from politicians attempting to bribe voters with gifts.
• Designated expenses for each candidate were capped at Rs7.0m per • Anantnag, in J&K had the lowest voter turnout in 2019, at 9%. The seat
was won by J&K National Conference.
constituency in bigger states and Rs5.4m in smaller ones.
• In a first, candidates with criminal antecedents had to publish • 881 candidates with declared assets worth INR 50m or more
contested.
information in this regard in newspapers and through TV channels on
three occasions during the campaign period.
• For the first time ever, 12 EVMs were used at every single polling
•
booth, in the Nizamabad district of Telangana, because a total of 185
Ramesh Kumar Sharma, an Independent candidate from the Patliputra
candidates were competing.
Lok Sabha seat in Bihar was the richest candidate in the 2019
elections with declared assets over INR 1.1 bn.
After being out of power for nearly ten years, the political opposition to the BJP is trying to present a united front. Several state level dynamics imply
that a pan-India unity remains highly unlikely, though the recent parliament session shows rising collaboration among the opposition. Nonetheless, the
opposition has notched up a few poll victories in 2023 and a litmus test would arrive in late ’23 when 5 states are up for elections. Opposition will look to
capitalize on anti-incumbency factors, try a new mix of caste & religion combinations and likely promise large direct income transfers to shore up their
votes. Our analysis suggests that the current 26 party I.N.D.I.A. opposition alliance can cause a loss of 15-25 seats to the BJP in the base case, though
there is still time to put up an even stronger front.
Exhibit 33 - India's key regional parties and influential states Of the 20 parties shown in the map, 11 are a
part of INDIA alliance. The balance 9 parties
add up to 60 seats
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
.
Source: ECI, Jefferies, *numbers in bracket represent seats won in the 2019 general elections
Exhibit 34 - Current Lok Shaba Compsition Exhibit 35 - Current Rajya Sabha Composition
SP Shiv Sena BSP AAP, TDP, SAD Left parties SP, SS, Others
Left AAP
1% 4% 2% Others 3% 8%
parties 4%
4%
1% BRS BRS
JDU JDU
3% 2% Trinamool 3%
BJP 2% BJP
Other Cong 4% 38%
56%
allies (DMK, Trinamool
RJD, NCP) 6%
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
5%
Congress Other Cong
9% allies (DMK,
YSRCP
4% BJD RJD, NCP)
Other BJP allies 8% Other BJP
2%
(ADMK, RPI etc) allies (ADMK,
3% RPI etc)
. Congress
YSRCP BJD Nominated
Source: ECI, Jefferies 13% 5%
4% 4% 2%
.
Source: ECI, Jefferies
Exhibit 36 - Strong wins by Congressin party in state elections Congress' key victories over BJP post 2019
States Election Date Election Outcome elections have come in Karnataka and
Chhastisgarh Nov'18 Congress wins over BJP by a huge margin Himachal Pradesh on its own
Madhya Pradesh Nov'18 Close fight between Congress and BJP, Congress forms government but later broken
Rajasthan Nov'18 Congress wins over BJP with close to majority seats
From a leadership perspective, the Congress party has also seen some changes, though not far- Leadership is officially no longer with the
reaching ones since 2019. The party had fought the May19 elections with Mr. Rahul Gandhi as the Gandhi family in the Congress party
presumptive PM candidate and the main campaigner. Post the electoral losses; Rahul resigned from
the Congress party president post. Mrs. Sonia Gandhi stepped in as in ‘interim’ chief post that. Mrs.
Priyanka Gandhi has also taken a more active role in party activities over the last few years which
included being officially in charge of UP elections of 2022 and taking an active part in the 2022 Himachal
Pradesh state polls.
The lack of full time leadership in the party led to some senior leaders protesting for changes in the
party in 2020 which finally led to leadership elections in the party. Mr. Mallikarjun Kharge (earlier leader
of opposition) was appointed as the Congress party chief in Oct ’22. Mr. Kharge has continued to work
quite closely with the Gandhi family. An expansion of the Congress Working Committee was also carried
out in Aug 23, with several inductees part of the ‘rebel’ group including Mr. Shashi Tharoor and Mr.
Sachin Pilot. Mr. Rahul Gandhi, meanwhile, remains the key campaigner / leader for the Congress party
with a well publicized ‘Bharat Jodo Yatra’ (cross nation walk) being done by him in 2022 and planned
again in 2023.
Exhibit 37 - Key Congress leaders Rahul Gandhi remains the most visible
Constituency Congress leader
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
Leader Comment
(2019)
❑ Rahul Gandhi resigned from the party
president post in 2019.
Waynad, Kerala
❑ He is the most visible campaign leader for
the party and likely PM candidate
Seats
Party Leader State Comment
(2019)
Shiv Sena NDA member from 1998 but broke the alliance
(Uddhav Maharashtra 18 in 2019 to form Maharashtra govt. with NCP &
faction) Congress. Party split 2022.
United (JDU)
RLD & Congress. Part of INDIA alliance
Left Parties Left parties are anti-BJP for long though a seat
Kerala, West
(CPIM, CPI, 5 sharing alliance with Congress / Trinamool in
Bengal
AIFB) Kerala / WB will be a first
• Infrastructure • Infrastructure
• Double the length of national highways. Improve fuel quality • Augment and rapid construction of national highways.
by mandating 10 percent ethanol in petrol. Scale renewable Modernise Indian railway infrastructure.
energy capacity to 175 GW.
• Electrify and convert to broad gauge all railway tracks.
• Economics
• Promote green energy. Manufacturing promotion.
• Economics
• Revise the national GST law from three tax tiers to a single
• Raise India's ranking further in "ease of doing business". moderate rate of tax. Reduce taxes on exported products to
Double exports, introduce single-window compliance zero. Exempt from the GST essential goods and services that
procedures for all businesses. are currently not exempt. Enact a new Direct Taxes Code.
Seats
Party Leader State Comment
(2019)
Exhibit 42 - State election Poll promises Populist poll promises by state governments
State Party Policy implemented recently
Maharashtra BJP Rs6,000/farmer direct transfer scheme
MP BJP Rs1,000/mth income transfer to women
Rajasthan Cong Doubling free units of electricity to 100
Allocation to NPS cut to near zero
Chhattisgarh Cong Rs2,500/mth to educated unemployed
Rs6,000/annum to landless labourers
Karnataka Cong 200 units/mth free electricity
Rs2,000/mth to female head of family
Rs3,000/mth for unemployed grads for 2-years,
Rs1,500/mth for unemployed diploma holders for 2-
years
Transfer of Rs0.1m-1.0 to each backward household
Telangana BRS
as one time grant
Rs10,000/acre/annum subsidy to farmers
Punjab AAP 300/units/mth free electricity
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
Exhibit 43 - A freebie scheme in Rajasthan Freebie politics can be a big campaign tool e.g.
Rajasthan state govt. (Congress run) ahead of
elections offering free smartphone, alongside
3-year free data connections, to 13.5m women
in a scheme worth ~US$0.8bn
.
Source: Government of Rajasthan, Jefferies
Exhibit 44 - BJP Policies which saw strong opposition protests A few BJP policies have seen relatively large
BJP policies which have seen opposition protests scale protests post 2019
. .
Source: ECI, Jefferies Source: ECI, Jefferies
Upcoming state elections can drive momentum 5 state elections around Nov-Dec'23
A ‘semi-final’ for the 2024 elections will be played out in the Nov-Dec’23 when elections to five states
are held. These 5 states together account for 15% of the lower house seats and are thus significant. In 3
of the states viz. Chhattisgarh, MP and Rajasthan – the BJP is in a direct contest against the Congress.
The Telangana state will likely see a three cornered fight between ruling BRS and the oppositions
Congress and BJP. The Mizoram state, though small politically, will also be seen as a signal to BJP’s
North Eastern dominance given the recent spate of violence in neighboring Manipur.
Exhibit 47 - State Election calendar before 2019 National elections BJP is either in power or the number 2 party in
% Rajya Sabha all of the 5 upcoming state elections
State Likely election date % LS In-power / Election outcome
(Upper house)
Chhatisgarh Nov-Dec'23 2.0 2.0 Congress
Madhya Pradesh Nov-Dec'23 5.3 4.5 BJP
Mizoram Nov-Dec'23 0.2 0.4 BJP coalition govt
Rajasthan Nov-Dec'23 4.6 4.1 Congress
Telangana Nov-Dec'23 3.1 2.9 TRS
Exhibit 48 - Rajasthan - State Election vs National Election (Vote Share) Exhibit 49 - Rajasthan - State Election vs National Election (Seats Won)
70% 120%
59% Rajasthan Rajasthan
60% 96%
100%
50%
39% 40% 80%
40% 35%
60% 50%
30% 37%
15% 40%
20%
10% 2% 2% 4% 1% 3% 20% 9%
0% 2% 4% 3% 0% 0%
0% 0%
BJP INC RLP BSP Others BJP INC RLP BSP Others
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
State Election - 2018 National Election - 2019 State Election - 2018 National Election - 2019
. .
Source: ECI, Jefferies Source: ECI, Jefferies
*BJP: Bhartiya Janata Party, INC: Indian National Congress *BJP: Bhartiya Janta Party, INC: Indian National Congress
Exhibit 50 - Chhatisgarh - State Election vs National Election (Vote Share) Exhibit 51 - Chhatisgarh - State Election vs National Election (Seats Won)
60% 100%
51% Chhatisgarh 82% Chhatisgarh
50% 44% 42% 76%
80%
40% 34%
60%
30%
40%
20%
11% 17% 18%
8% 20%
10% 4% 2% 5% 6%
0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0%
0% 0%
BJP INC BSP JCC(J) Others BJP INC BSP JCC(J) Others
State Election - 2018 National Election - 2019 State Election - 2018 National Election - 2019
. .
Source: ECI, Jefferies Source: ECI, Jefferies
*BJP: Bhartiya Janta Party, INC: Indian National Congress *BJP: Bhartiya Janata Party, INC: Indian National Congress
Exhibit 52 - Haryana - State Election vs National Election (Vote Share) Exhibit 53 - Haryana - State Election vs National Election (Seats Won)
70% 120%
58% Haryana 100% Haryana
60% 100%
50%
80%
37%
40%
28% 29% 60% 44%
30%
34%
15% 16% 40%
20%
10% 4% 4% 5% 5% 20% 11% 10%
0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
0% 0%
BJP INC BSP JJP Others BJP INC BSP JJP Others
State Election - 2019 National Election - 2019 State Election - 2019 National Election - 2019
. .
Source: ECI, Jefferies Source: ECI, Jefferies
*BJP: Bhartiya Janata Party, INC: Indian National Congress *BJP: Bhartiya Janata Party, INC: Indian National Congress
Exhibit 54 - Karnataka - State Election vs National Election (Vote Share) Exhibit 55 - Karnataka - State Election vs National Election (Seats Won)
70% 120%
59% Madhya Pradesh Madhya Pradesh
60% 97%
100%
50% 42% 42% 80%
35%
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
40%
60% 47% 50%
30%
40%
20% 12%
10% 5% 2% 4% 20%
3% 1% 0% 2% 0%
0% 0%
BJP INC BSP Others BJP INC BSP Others
State Election - 2018 National Election - 2019 State Election - 2018 National Election - 2019
. .
Source: ECI, Jefferies Source: ECI, Jefferies
*BJP: Bhartiya Janata Party, INC: Indian National Congress *BJP: Bhartiya Janata Party, INC: Indian National Congress
Exhibit 58 - Orissa - State Election vs National Election (Vote Share) Exhibit 59 - Orissa - State Election vs National Election (Seats Won)
State Election - 2018 National Election - 2019 State Election - 2018 National Election - 2019
. .
Source: ECI, Jefferies Source: ECI, Jefferies
*BJP: Bhartiya Janata Party, INC: Indian National Congress *BJP: Bhartiya Janata Party, INC: Indian National Congress
Exhibit 60 - Telangana - State Election vs National Election (Vote Share) Exhibit 61 - Telangana - State Election vs National Election (Seats Won)
State Election - 2018 National Election - 2019 State Election - 2018 National Election - 2019
. .
Source: ECI, Jefferies Source: ECI, Jefferies
*BJP: Bhartiya Janata Party, INC: Indian National Congress *BJP: Bhartiya Janata Party, INC: Indian National Congress
Exhibit 62 - Maharashtra - State Election vs National Election (Vote Share) Exhibit 63 - Maharashtra - State Election vs National Election (Seats Won)
State Election - 2019 National Election - 2019 State Election - 2019 National Election - 2019
. .
Source: ECI, Jefferies Source: ECI, Jefferies
* BJP: Bhartiya Janata Party, INC,: Indian National Congress * BJP: Bhartiya Janata Party, INC: Indian National Congress
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
The previous two sections discuss several political strategy factors that can determine the election outlook. Over and above, there are several more
nuanced factors that can tilt the election one way or the other as due to the Indian system of ‘first past the post’, outcomes for many seats is determined
by a narrow margin. Hence, many other factors like voter turnout, caste equation, social media presence etc matter. We also highlight the perils of reading
too much into the state election results as many a time, those are fought on local issues as against the national elections.
Given the demographics, every national election sees about 60-75m first time voters. Their voting tendencies are untested at the national elections so far.
2024 elections will see 65m registered voters (7% of total) who were not eligible voter in the pre-Modi era. Also certain emotive issues viz. cross border
conflicts, Ram Temple issues etc can have an impact on the election outcome.
Social Media usage is the highest in India with almost 585mn registered users of Whatsapp & 315m
users of Facebook.
This sudden surge of social media use in India is likely to have significant impact on next year’s election.
As any news/messages can travel swiftly over social media, it can be used for both positively or
negatively to influence the voters. On positive side, Social media can be a medium to provide right
information, empower the voters. On the negative side, it can also be used to spread fake news with
respect to any political party/Leader which could have an impact on how people vote.
Political leaders also try to engage with people using platforms like X (formerly Twitter). Prime Minister,
Narendra Modi with 90m followers has the highest followers on X among political leaders in India much
above second highest political leader (Amit Shah) with 34m followers also from BJP. Rahul Gandhi
from the opposition Indian National Congress party has about 24m followers on X . As a result, social
media marketing has become a critical component of political campaign, and political parties are hiring
the best talent to build their social media marketing campaigns which is likely play an important role
in how people vote in next election.
Exhibit 64 - X Corp(Twitter) followers of political leaders Large following of the PM Modi on social
100 (m) media; 7 out of the 10 most followed political
90 90.0
leaders are from BJP - shows the inclination of
80
India's youth
70
60
50
40 33.5
27.1 25.6
30 24.0 23.7
18.7
20 13.1 12.7 11.7 9.0 8.4 8.4 7.2 7.0
10
0
Singh…
Kejriwal
Kumar
Akhilesh
Amit Shah
Gandhi
Sambit
Shivraj
Tharoor
Narendra
Rajnath
Piyush
Adityanath
Gadkari
Smriti Irani
banerjee
Nitish
Goyal
Arvind
Rahul
Mamta
Patra
Singh
Yadav
Sashi
Nitin
Modi
Yogi
.
Source: X Corp, Jefferies
Exhibit 65 - Regional party trying to gauge talent with "Reel" contest Smaller parties getting on with the influencer
game
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
.
Source: Jefferies
How will the new voter vote? Nearly a quarter of voters in 2024 would not
Out of 912mn eligible voters in 2019, 615m voters actually cast their ballot. The election commission have been adults during the last Congress
recorded a total of 951mn registered voters in early 2023, which is likely to increase further as more government
people reach the voting age (18) and generally registration intensifies closer to national elections. We
estimate that for the 2024 elections, 991m voters would be eligible which would include ~128mn new
voters who did not vote in 2019 elections. Similarly, 126 m new eligible voters voted in 2019 who did
not vote in 2014. So overall, 254m or 26% of the eligible voters in 2024 have not been exposed to the
previous (Congress) Government era which creates a substantial scope for anti-incumbency.
Exhibit 66 - New voter addition >10% voter base increment happening over last
140 (mn) (%) 30 two elections
120 25
100
20
80
15
60
10
40
20 5
0 0
The 20-39 old group, comprising of young working Indian is 48% of the electorate, putting this together
more than 50% of the voting population is under the age of 40, suggesting issues around job security
and economic prosperity will resonate more which the current incumbent government is banking on.
Exhibit 67 - Electorate demographics in 2024 (Est) Demographics are fairly young for the voter
Age Bracket Est no. of registered share is total base with nearly three fifths below the age of
42
voters in 2024 (mn) registered voters (%)
18-22 128 13%
23-27 119 12%
28-42 319 32%
43-62 288 29%
63+ 137 14%
Total 991 100%
.
Source: Jefferies estimates
National elections vs state election voting National parties do have an edge vs. state ones
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
Local affairs tend to dominate India’s state elections, while general elections are contested over national during the national polls
issues. Voters perceive that local parties are less likely to have a major say at a national level. As a result
some fence sitters vote for national party in general election but for a local party for state elections. This
hypothesis is corroborated by our voting pattern analysis of different types of elections in key states
over the last 10 years. In states where regional factors are generally stronger, the voting percentage of
national parties like BJP and Congress is higher in national elections, compared to state elections.
The data for seven large states, which account for 50% of all Lok Sabha seats, indicates that BJP
vote share increased by over 5.7% on average in these states over last 3 general elections than in
corresponding state elections. Similarly, congress’ rose by 1.4%. On the other hand, regional parties like
DMK, AIADMK, JD(S), TMC, SP received lower vote share in national elections.
Exhibit 68 - Average vote share change in National vs State Elections BJP and Congress both gained vote share vs.
National Parties : BJP, Congress. Dominant Regional Parties: AIADMK, JDS, SP, TMC, DMK
regional parties during the national polls during
8.0% past two elections
5.7%
4.0% 1.4%
0.0%
-4.0%
-3.4%
-8.0% -6.6% -6.2%
-7.7%
-8.9%
-12.0%
AIADMK
TMC
SP
BJP
JD(S)
DMK
Congress
.
Source: ECI, Jefferies
Secondly, even within the national parties, voters vote differently in state vs national elections. Very National election outcome in the three states
recent example is the Dec 18 state elections in Rajasthan, MP and Chhattisgarh. In these states, where BJP lost in Dec'18 vs. May'19 was quite
Congress won the state elections but during the national elections 5-6 months later, the same voters different
voted in favour of the BJP
Exhibit 69 - Seat Share change in National Election 2019 vs State Election 2018 Exhibit 70 - Vote Share change in National Election 2019 vs State Election
2018
80% BJP Congress
65%
59% 25%
60% 49% BJP Congress
19%
20% 17%
40% 16%
20% 15%
0% 10%
-20% 5%
-40% 0%
winning a majority vote. This also implies that concentrated vote share in a few constituencies is more
important to win seats than small vote shares in many constituencies.
BJP had 37% share of the vote across India in 2019 and won 55% of the seats, while congress, with
20% of the vote, won only 10% i.e. for every 1% vote share, BJP took 1.5% of the seats and congress
0.5% - a result of its stellar performance in a few states, despite Congress’ wider geographic spread.
Similarly, YSR and DMK with vote share of 2.5% and 2.3% won 4.1% and 4.4% of the seats respectively
due to the concentrated vote shares in their respected states of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. While
BSP with 4th largest vote share of 3.6% managed only 1.8% of the seats due to spread-out votes.
In the 2004 and 2009 general election, BJP and Congress had a much closer seat share to vote share
ratio, but the gap was significant in 2014 and 2019 as BJP focused concentrating its votes in states
where they have strong hold which worked in their favor.
Exhibit 71 - Seat-share to vote-share ratio for parties in 2019 (with >1% vote) Successfull state parties like YSRCP and
Seat-share to vote-share ratio for parties in 2019 (with >1% vote) Trinamool enjoy high vote concentration levels
Party Seat Won Total Seats in National Vote Seat Share to
Parliament (%) Share(%) Vote Share
Exhibit 72 - Seat-share to Vote share for BJP and Congress over last 4 elections BJP seat to vote ration was 3x that of Congress
1.8 (seats to votes) 1.7 in last two polls
1.6 1.5
BJP Congress
1.4 1.3
0.8
0.6 0.5
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.0
. 2004 2009 2014 2019
Source: Jefferies
Higher voter turnout leads to more decisive mandates as it is seen as an indication of a "wave" for critical to party fortunes
or against a party. In 2004, BJP was expected to win or retain power, and was so confident it called
an early election, showcasing its work in “India Shining”. It lost, one of the reason being that its core
supporter didn’t turn up to vote. There was a 2% decline in voter turnout in that election compared to
the previous one in 1999.
Turnout in 2014 was 66.4%, +8% from previous election in 2009 which showed massive anti-
incumbency wave against the UPA-2 government, which was due to various corruption scandals
unfolding, high inflation and India being tagged as “Fragile 5” as Indian economy saw a major downturn.
Other instances of large increase in voter turnout includes 1984-85, when the prime minister Indira
Gandhi was assassinated and a strong pro-congress sympathy wave resulted in it winning more than
400 seats in the general elections highest ever by any single party.
In 2019, the turnout was 67.4% the highest ever also favored a BJP government as the party returned
with even higher number of seats than the 2014 regime change victory.
Exhibit 73 - Voter Turnout trend in past election Since 1998 (BJP victory), turnouts >60% have
80 (%) been generally positive for the party
66 67
70 64 62 62
61 60 60
57 56 58 58 58
60 55 55
46 48
50
40
30
20
10
0
Voter turnout
.
Source: ECI, Jefferies
The turnout of women voters in India was historically lower than overall voter turnout. The differential Tough to say if women vote differently than
between total and female voter was 9ppts in early years of independence. This number has been men...
reducing and in 2019 it was down to 0. While it is not clear if women favor any particular political party,
the rising women voter turnout has incentivized the government to launch women oriented policies.
Exhibit 74 - Men vs Women voter turnout ...though gradually the women voter turnout
Emotional issues
Indian voters have a very high emotional quotient which can have a significant impact on how they
vote. Empirical evidence has shown this time and again. Indira Gandhi, prime minister and daughter
of India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was assassinated in 1984. The country was moved
emotionally and voted in her son, the inexperienced Rajiv, with super majority of 411 seats out of 542,
the highest ever by a single party. The 1970s saw Congress lose some national appeal after the more
authoritarian Indira has declared a state of emergency, protecting herself from a guilty verdict delivered
against her in a relation misusing state machinery in the 1971 election. The lost support seemed to be
recovered quickly as all Congress supporter came together in support of her son.
BJP’ Atal Bihari Vajpayee ran a fractured mandate for 13 months in 1998-99, before a re-election in
Mid-1999. His handling of the Kargil War (in May and June, when Pakistani troops, posing as militants,
occupied several border hilltops) and the swift military operation forced the enemy to withdraw. Atop a
wave a patriotic fervor that swept the nation, the BJP-led NDA-1 won a comfortable and stable majority.
More recently, before the 2019 general election, the Narendra Modi led government was facing some
anti-incumbency pressure as some bold economic reforms such as Demonetization, GST, Bankruptcy
code, inflation targeting led to near term economic cost hampering sentiments of the middle class
population, a strong vote bank of BJP.
However, Narendra Modi led government’s swift response to Pulwama attack in Feb 2019, where 'Emotional' issues which have significantly
militants rammed explosive led vehicle into Indian Military convoy, by conducting airstrike in Balakot influenced the voters in the past include death
region of Pakistan destroying Militant training camps led to another patriotic wave helping BJP with a of leaders and wars
thumping majority of 303 seats in general election held in May 2019.
For 2024 election, BJP could benefit to an extent on emotional sentiment attached to Ram temple
inauguration in Ayodhaya city which is in the state of Uttar Pradesh (80 seats out of 543 seats in
the state). The land on which the Ram temple is being constructed has been long disputed between
the 2 major communities in India. The controversial case was taken up by supreme court in 2011
and the judgement was passed in 2019 in favor of constructing the Ram temple on the disputed site.
The Construction activity of this Ram temple started in Aug 2020 and the phase 1 is expected to be
inaugurated in Jan’24, few months before the general election which should swing some sentimental
votes in the favor of incumbent BJP.
Exhibit 76 - Ram Mandir demonstration in Repulic Day parade in Delhi Construction of a Ram Temple at Ayodhya has
been a key issue for the BJP and same can see
a fruition prior to the 2024 elections
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
.
Source: PIB, Jefferies
A section of government employees says that by bringing in the NPS, the government is putting the
social security of workers at stake. NPS is not as attractive as OPS for them. Another issue with the new
scheme is the uncertain amount of the pension. Under NPS, the pay-out is market-linked and return-
based, unlike OPS, where it is predetermined. Under OPS, the employees need not contribute anything
to their pensions, so they have more cash as a monthly salary.
Though fiscally not prudent, opposition parties are promising to get OPS back at national level. Some
state governments like Chhattisgarh, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan restored OPS for state
government employees and recent loss of BJP in the state of Himachal Pradesh was attributed to OPS.
Currently, there are about 2.8m Central Government and 5.6m State government employees under
NPS scheme, which including their family would imply 29.4m voters (3% of total voters) which could
potentially be influenced by opposition parties promise to bring back OPS.
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
Out of the last 4 national elections, the previous two elections results were more on the expected lines but yet the Indian market outperformed MSCI AxJ
during the election results period (10 days including results impact) by 5-9ppts. In the previous 6 months leading up to the election week India OPFed
before 2014 elections but was in line for 2019 elections. We note that in Dec-18 (i.e. 4-5 months before the 2019 national elections), the BJP had lost 3
key state elections in the state of MP, Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh, yet won the final national election in style.
We believe that political continuity as the most likely outcome, though, it might come with a lower margin of victory. We therefore advocate OWT on
domestic cyclicals / capex recovery plays including banks, industrial and property. Our top picks are Axis Banks, ICICI bank, SBI, L&T, Ultratech, Godrej
Properties, and Macrotech, and select industrial mid-caps including Thermax, Siemens, KEI & Kajaria. We also like the structural story in the hospital
sectors and our top picks include Max and Medanta. We believe that the housing cycle will play out irrespective of the election outcome due to strong
industry momentum but capex cycle might slow down in the event that ruling party changes in the Government. We note that even in 2004 type of scenario
of an election upset, the economy and stock market were both back on track recouping the initial post-election losses in 6 months time.
markets slowly begin to price in the expected election results over a period of 6 months prior to the
actual election date. Leading up to the elections, investors usually receive signals like the opinion polls
and state election results. Many investors and analysts also tend to speak to politicians, journalists
and gather qualitative information including pre-poll alliances, or politicians switching parties, etc.
Several valuable inputs after each round of voting (national elections usually take place across different
geographies at different point in time across 6-7 phases spread over a period of a month). After the
surprise election results of 2004 and 2009, investors have started paying more attention to these
political developments.
Six Months before Elections Election Result (10days) Six months after elections
Early election call led to a 5ppt 3ppt underperformance as NDA Reform friendly pairing of
2004: UPA outperformance as the market was loses power; UPDA needs Manmohan Singh/P chidambram
defeats NDA expecting NDA to retain power. communist support. drives 6ppt outperformance
The UPA expected to retain power 24ppt outperformance as UPA India underperformed MSCI AxJ
2009: UPA as per the opnion poll; India comes to power with a larger slightly by 3ppts, with no change
underperformed MSCI AxJ by 13ppt mandate and stable govt. in policies via-a-vis UPA 1.
retains power
Strong NDA performance in Dec-13 5ppt outperformance as BJP wins a Initial reform actions like fiscal
2014: NDA polls/subsequent opinion polls majority on its own; the most stable consolidation/inflation-targeting
raises hopes of a strong central govt in 30 years drive a 8ppt outperformance
defeats UPA coalition and leads to a 14 ppt
outperformance.
The NDA expected to retain power 9ppt outperformance as BJP wins India underperformed MSCI AxJ by
as anti-incumbency wave subsided with a much bigger mandate. 9ppt as no major change in policy
2019: NDA
after Pulwama. India perfomed vis-a-vis NDA 1
retains power inline with MSCI AxJ
.
Source: Jefferies,*Performance based on MSCI India ($) and MSCI AxJ($) index
Voting for national elections are held over several phases (for the 2019 election first round of voting
was held on 11 April and the final round of voting took place on the 19 May spread over seven rounds of
voting). Exit polls are published after all the rounds of polling is over. The formal counting of votes and
election usually announced a few days later. For example the voting for 2019 elections was over on the
19 May and the exit polls (more reliable than opinion polls) were published on the same day evening
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
and the final election results were announced on the 23 May. While the exit polls are published at the
end of all the rounds, whispers or results can possibly spread much earlier.
Exhibit 78 - Nifty price movement during 2019 Election Even in 2019, despite market anticipating a
12200 Modi victory, the gains were sharp when it
11th Apr: Polling starts 23rd May: result released
became clear a single party majority was being
12000 repeated
19th May: Polling
Ends; exit poll
released
11800
11600
11400
11200
11000
4/1/2019 4/16/2019 5/1/2019 5/16/2019 5/31/2019 6/15/2019 6/30/2019
.
Source: Bloomberg, Jefferies
After the election results, the policies of the elected government decide what happens, as it should. Post
elections, the next event for the market is the budget presented by the new government, usually, in July.
Exhibit 79 - Sectoral performance 6m before 2019 elections Mid-caps underperformed large caps in run-up
15.0 to 2019 elections, partly as a risk-off trade
12.0
10.3
10.0
6.2
5.0 3.4
0.1 0.0
0.0
-1.2 -1.7
-5.0 -2.2
-3.4 -4.0 -4.6
-10.0 -8.3
6m before election
.
Source: Bloomberg, Jefferies
Exhibit 80 - Sectoral performance during 2019 election results Industrials and financials, along with small
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
6m After Election
.
Source: Bloomberg, Jefferies
Exhibit 82 - Nifty 1-year forward consensus PE Some derating happened for the Nifty in 2H18
Nifty 1yr fwd consensus PE Average PE +1 sd -1 sd as slowing economic growth raised concerns
(X) on rising anti-incumbency
23
21
19
17
15
13
11
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
9
7
Aug-13
Aug-14
Aug-15
Aug-16
Aug-17
Aug-18
Aug-19
Aug-20
Aug-21
Aug-22
Aug-23
.
Source: Bloomberg, Jefferies
Exhibit 83 - Bond-Equity yield gap Yield gap is much above average
3.0 (ppt)
2.0
1.0
0.0
-1.0
-2.0
-3.0
Aug-13
Aug-14
Aug-15
Aug-16
Aug-17
Aug-18
Aug-19
Aug-20
Aug-21
Aug-22
Aug-23
Exhibit 84 - Nifty 1yr forward PE Premium/Discount over MSCI EM Indian market valuations close to long term
average vs EMs
100 (%) Current PE
90 premium 51%
80
70
60
50
40
30
20 Average PE premium: 48%
10
0
Aug-13
Aug-14
Aug-15
Aug-16
Aug-17
Aug-18
Aug-19
Aug-20
Aug-21
Aug-22
Aug-23
Nifty PE Premium/(Discount) over EMs Average
.
Source: Bloomberg, Jefferies
Exhibit 85 - Nifty 1yr forward PE Premium/Discount over MSCI AxJ India trading tad above average premium vs.
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
Aug-14
Aug-15
Aug-16
Aug-17
Aug-18
Aug-19
Aug-20
Aug-21
Aug-22
Aug-23
- This is the base case for the markets. 70% probability. Property & Capex Cylce plays:
Modi-led BJP - Continued strength in capex cycle driving strong economic including Cement, Infra & Cap
Majority Govt growth and investor sentiments. goods, Large Banks, SMID caps
-20% probability; BJP falls short of the majority by 20-30 seats but Property, Select capex plays
Modi-Led forms the government with the help of its partners inclduing L&T, cement,
- The populist pressure may rise but Modi's priorities unlikely to Discretionary consumption,
Coalition change
- 10% probability. 'INDIA' opposition alliance forms a weak and Staples, IT, Pharma. Domestic
populist government. cyclicals can be bought after
Weak Coalition - A steep 10%+ market correction possible. Investor sentiments to the initial fall
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
be impacted.
.
Source: Jefferies
The opinion polls indicated that the incumbent BJP would claim victory with a repeat mandate. But
Congress party joined hands with left-wing partners to put together a comfortable majority of more
than 335 seats out of a total of 543 Loksabha seats. This completely caught the markets off-guard.
The markets underperformed by 3ppts in the election result week reflecting popular sentiment that
the new government, particularly with communist party support, would find it difficult to continue with
broad market reforms and infrastructure development initiated by the BJP.
Six months later, however, India's underperformance had been reversed. The newly formed government
was headed by Dr Manmohan Singh, viewed as the driver of India's 1991 reforms. Mr P Chidambaram
was the Finance Minister, who had earlier given a 'dream budget' (lower taxation, major capital markets
reform etc) in 1997. While the disinvestment program of NDA was shelved, the UPA government
continued the infrastructure development agenda, particularly with a high focus on the Public Private
Participation (PPP) model.
Exhibit 87 - MSCI India vs MSCI AxJ during 2004 election year After an initial large dip in 2004, the Indian
Both indices rebased to 100 on 1st Jan 2004
markets caught up as the UPA govt continued
120.0 with the Infrastructure push and the capex /
115.0 housing cycle boomed
110.0
105.0
100.0
95.0
90.0
85.0
80.0
75.0
70.0
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
This time the markets were in for a positive surprise as BJP on its own won 303 seats the best result
by any party since 1984. The indices gave a "big thumbs up", registering a record 8% gain over next 3
days. However, this outperformance was only lasted for that week. The government policies in NDA-2
were more-or-less the same as before, ie, there was no perceived change in longer-run reform pace.
Over the next 6-12 months, India was inline vs MSCI AxJ.
Exhibit 89 - MSCI India vs MSCI AxJ during 2019 election year Indian markets UPFed in 2019 despite BJP
Both indices rebased to100 on 1st Jan 2019
victory
120
115
110
105
100
95
90
115
105
95
85
75
65
55
30.7
29.9 30.1
29.5 28.9 29.2
30.0 28.3 28.3 28.7 28.2 28.2 28.5
27.5 27.3
26.0
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
.
Source: CMIE, Jefferies
Karnataka State budget move towards populism Congress govt. cut the proposed capex and
The 2023 Karnataka state elections were fought by the Congress on the basis of several poll promises increased the non-capex expenditure, taxes
with significant fiscal implications. Adhering to poll promises made by the party, the Jul'23 budget for and deficit to implement its freebie program
the state post the elections showed a clear increase in allocation to revenue expenditure, +11.3% from worth ~2.0% of state GDP
pre-election budget. About Rs520bn (2.0% of state GDP) was allocated to the 5 guarantees that the
Congress party promised before election which are (i) free bus travel for women under Shakti scheme,
(ii) free electricity up to 200 units for domestic consumers under Gruha Jyoti scheme, (iii) Rs 2,000
monthly financial assistance to woman head of family under Gruha Lakshmi scheme, (iv) 5kg additional
foodgrains to eligible persons under Annabhagya scheme, and (v) monthly unemployment allowance
of Rs 3,000 for degree holders and Rs 1,500 for diploma holders under Yuvanidhi scheme. For delivery
personnel in e-commerce companies, life and health insurance of Rs.200k has been announced the
premium of which will be paid by the state government.
The capital expenditure for FY24 was reduced by 7% from pre-election budget announced by the BJP.
The total expenditure has increased by 7% from pre-election announcement to Rs.3.05Trn. On the
revenue side alcohol duties were raised by 10ppt-20ppt; nonetheless, absolute deficit was projected to
be 10% higher than proposed under the BJP budget.
Exhibit 92 - Karnataka State Budget highlights Congress FY24 budget was much more
FY24e populist than BJP's FY24 budget. Rather
FY24BE (Pre FY24BE (Post FY24e (Cong) vs
Karnataka State Budget FY23 (Post) vs
Election) Election) FY24e (BJP) interestingly, Congress' GDP projection was
FY23
RS. bn RS. bn RS. bn (% change) (% change)
also higher by 10%!
Revenue 2,124 2,259 2,384 12.3 5.5
Total Expenditure 2,737 2,867 3,053 11.6 6.5
Capital Expenditure 528 583 544 3.0 (6.8)
Revenue Expenditure 2,184 2,255 2,509 14.9 11.3
Fiscal Deficit 611 606 666 9.0 10.0
GSDP 21,812 23,339 25,673 17.7 10.0
Fiscal deficit as % of GSDP 2.8% 2.6% 2.6%
.
Source: Finance department of Karnataka, Jefferies
two-wheeler growth has been weak. The latter (or rural demand) has now shown some signs of
improvement, but the recovery still remains patchy.
We believe that the Government might look to undertake some measures to prop up the bottom of the
pyramid. In each of the previous national elections – the respective Government has taken some pro-
poor / social measures as listed in the table below. We believe that the ongoing rural recovery may get
an upthrust if the Government were to take some explicit measures which is likely. Consumer staples,
Telecom and two-wheeler would be a good way to play this tactical near-term possibility.
Exhibit 93 - Certain populist options for the BJP govt. ahead of 2024 elections
.
Source: Jefferies
Exhibit 94 - Major welfare policies ahead of national elections 2019 pre-election budget had seen the farmer
Election Party Policy basic income scheme being rolled out by the
2009 Cong National farm-loan waiver scheme BJP
Rural employment guarantee expansion
2014 Cong National food security Act
Land acquisition law changes
2019 BJP Farmer basic income scheme
Higher MSP increase
UPS and downs - The past 25 years under NDA and UPA rule*
12.0 (%)
10.0 8.9 8.5 9.1
7.9 7.9 7.9 8.1 7.7 8.3
7.9 7.4 8.0 6.8 6.5 7.2
8.0 6.2 6.4 6.0
6.0 4.8 5.2 5.5
3.8 3.8 3.9
4.0 3.1
2.0
0.0
-2.0
-4.0
-6.0
-8.0 -5.8
FY99
FY00
FY01
FY02
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY19
FY20
FY21
FY22
FY23
FY24E
NDA UPA1 UPA2 NDA1 NDA2
.
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
Source: Jefferies, * NDA is National Democratic Alliance, a BJP led Coalition. UPA is United Progressive Alliance, a Congress led coalition.
Exhibit 96 - Consumer Price Index (CPI)*
16.0(%)
14.0 13.1
12.4
12.0 10.5 10.1
10.0 9.1 9.4
8.4
8.0 6.7 6.2 6.7
5.8 6.2
5.5 5.4
6.0 4.9 4.5 4.8
4.3 4.0 3.9 3.8 4.4
4.0 3.4 3.8 3.6 3.4
2.0
0.0
FY99
FY00
FY01
FY02
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY19
FY20
FY21
FY22
FY23
FY24E
4.5 (%)
4.0 3.8
3.5
3.0 2.6
2.4 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.3
2.5 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
1.9
2.0 1.8
1.6 1.5
1.3 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.3
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
FY99
FY00
FY01
FY02
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY19
FY20
FY21
FY22
FY23
FY24E
NDA UPA1 UPA2 NDA1 NDA2
.
Source: Jefferies
Exhibit 99 - Current Account deficit as a % of GDP
6.0 (%)
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
4.8
5.0 4.3
4.0
2.9 2.9
3.0 2.4
1.7 1.9 2.1 2.0 1.8
2.0 1.3 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.2
1.0 1.1 1.0 0.9
1.0 0.6 0.4 0.6
0.0
-1.0
-0.8 -0.9
-2.0 -1.3
-3.0 -2.4
FY99
FY00
FY01
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY20
FY21
FY22
FY23
FY02
FY19
FY24E
Company Valuation/Risks
For Important Disclosure information on companies recommended in this report, please visit our website at https://javatar.bluematrix.com/
sellside/Disclosures.action or call 212.284.2300.
Analyst Certification:
I, Mahesh Nandurkar, certify that all of the views expressed in this research report accurately reflect my personal views about the subject security(ies)
and subject company(ies). I also certify that no part of my compensation was, is, or will be, directly or indirectly, related to the specific recommendations
or views expressed in this research report.
I, Abhinav Sinha, certify that all of the views expressed in this research report accurately reflect my personal views about the subject security(ies) and
subject company(ies). I also certify that no part of my compensation was, is, or will be, directly or indirectly, related to the specific recommendations or
views expressed in this research report.
I, Nishant Poddar, CFA, certify that all of the views expressed in this research report accurately reflect my personal views about the subject security(ies)
and subject company(ies). I also certify that no part of my compensation was, is, or will be, directly or indirectly, related to the specific recommendations
or views expressed in this research report.
Registration of non-US analysts: Mahesh Nandurkar is employed by Jefferies India Private Limited, a non-US affiliate of Jefferies LLC and is not registered/
qualified as a research analyst with FINRA. This analyst(s) may not be an associated person of Jefferies LLC, a FINRA member firm, and therefore may
not be subject to the FINRA Rule 2241 and restrictions on communications with a subject company, public appearances and trading securities held by
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
a research analyst.
Registration of non-US analysts: Abhinav Sinha is employed by Jefferies India Private Limited, a non-US affiliate of Jefferies LLC and is not registered/
qualified as a research analyst with FINRA. This analyst(s) may not be an associated person of Jefferies LLC, a FINRA member firm, and therefore may
not be subject to the FINRA Rule 2241 and restrictions on communications with a subject company, public appearances and trading securities held by
a research analyst.
Registration of non-US analysts: Nishant Poddar, CFA is employed by Jefferies India Private Limited, a non-US affiliate of Jefferies LLC and is not
registered/qualified as a research analyst with FINRA. This analyst(s) may not be an associated person of Jefferies LLC, a FINRA member firm, and
therefore may not be subject to the FINRA Rule 2241 and restrictions on communications with a subject company, public appearances and trading
securities held by a research analyst.
As is the case with all Jefferies employees, the analyst(s) responsible for the coverage of the financial instruments discussed in this report receives
compensation based in part on the overall performance of the firm, including investment banking income. We seek to update our research as appropriate,
but various regulations may prevent us from doing so. Aside from certain industry reports published on a periodic basis, the large majority of reports are
published at irregular intervals as appropriate in the analyst's judgement.
Jefferies Group LLC, its affiliates or subsidiaries is acting as a manager or co-manager in the underwriting or placement of securities for ICICI Bank or
one of its affiliates.
Within the past 12 months, Jefferies Group LLC, its affiliates or subsidiaries has received compensation from investment banking services from Macrotech
Developers.
Within the past twelve months, Macrotech Developers has been a client of Jefferies LLC and investment banking services are being or have been provided.
Jefferies Group LLC, its affiliates or subsidiaries expect to receive or intend to seek compensation for investment banking services from Max Healthcare
Institute Ltd within the next three months.
Jefferies Group LLC, its affiliates or subsidiaries is acting as a manager or co-manager in the underwriting or placement of securities for Max Healthcare
Institute Ltd or one of its affiliates.
Jefferies International Ltd, its affiliates or subsidiaries has, or had, within the past 12 months an agreement to provide investment services to Max
Healthcare Institute Ltd.
Within the past 12 months, Jefferies Group LLC, its affiliates or subsidiaries has received compensation from investment banking services from Global
Health Limited.
Within the past twelve months, Global Health Limited has been a client of Jefferies LLC and investment banking services are being or have been provided.
Jefferies Group LLC, its affiliates or subsidiaries has acted as a manager or co-manager in the underwriting or placement of securities for Global Health
Limited or one of its affiliates within the past twelve months.
Jefferies International Ltd, its affiliates or subsidiaries has, or had, within the past 12 months an agreement to provide investment services to Global
Health Limited.
For Important Disclosure information on companies recommended in this report, please visit our website at https://javatar.bluematrix.com/
sellside/Disclosures.action or call 212.284.2300.
Valuation Methodology
Jefferies' methodology for assigning ratings may include the following: market capitalization, maturity, growth/value, volatility and expected total return
over the next 12 months. The price targets are based on several methodologies, which may include, but are not restricted to, analyses of market risk,
growth rate, revenue stream, discounted cash flow (DCF), EBITDA, EPS, cash flow (CF), free cash flow (FCF), EV/EBITDA, P/E, PE/growth, P/CF, P/FCF,
premium (discount)/average group EV/EBITDA, premium (discount)/average group P/E, sum of the parts, net asset value, dividend returns, and return on
equity (ROE) over the next 12 months.
Jefferies Franchise Picks
Jefferies Franchise Picks include stock selections from among the best stock ideas from our equity analysts over a 12 month period. Stock selection is
based on fundamental analysis and may take into account other factors such as analyst conviction, differentiated analysis, a favorable risk/reward ratio
and investment themes that Jefferies analysts are recommending. Jefferies Franchise Picks will include only Buy rated stocks and the number can vary
depending on analyst recommendations for inclusion. Stocks will be added as new opportunities arise and removed when the reason for inclusion changes,
the stock has met its desired return, if it is no longer rated Buy and/or if it triggers a stop loss. Stocks having 120 day volatility in the bottom quartile of
S&P stocks will continue to have a 15% stop loss, and the remainder will have a 20% stop. Franchise Picks are not intended to represent a recommended
portfolio of stocks and is not sector based, but we may note where we believe a Pick falls within an investment style such as growth or value.
Singapore: Jefferies Singapore Limited, which is licensed by the Monetary Authority of Singapore; located at 80 Raffles Place #15-20, UOB Plaza 2,
Singapore 048624, telephone: +65 6551 3950.
Japan: Jefferies (Japan) Limited, Tokyo Branch, which is a securities company registered by the Financial Services Agency of Japan and is a member
of the Japan Securities Dealers Association; located at Tokyo Midtown Hibiya 30F Hibiya Mitsui Tower, 1-1-2 Yurakucho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0006;
telephone +813 5251 6100; facsimile +813 5251 6101.
India: Jefferies India Private Limited (CIN - U74140MH2007PTC200509), licensed by the Securities and Exchange Board of India for: Stock Broker (NSE
& BSE) INZ000243033, Research Analyst INH000000701 and Merchant Banker INM000011443, located at Level 16, Express Towers, Nariman Point,
Mumbai 400 021, India; Tel +91 22 4356 6000. Compliance Officer name: Sanjay Pai, Tel No: +91 22 42246150, Email: spai@jefferies.com, Grievance
officer name: Sanjay Pai, Tel no. +91 22 42246150, Email: compliance_india@jefferies.com. Registration granted by SEBI and certification from NISM in
no way guarantee performance of the intermediary or provide any assurance of returns to investors.
Australia: Jefferies (Australia) Pty Limited (ACN 623 059 898), which holds an Australian financial services license (AFSL 504712) and is located at Level
22, 60 Martin Place, Sydney NSW 2000; telephone +61 2 9364 2800.
Dubai: Jefferies International Limited, Dubai branch, which is licensed by the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA Reference Number F007325);
registered office Unit L31-06, L31-07, Level 31, ICD Brookfield Pace, DIFC, PO Box 121208, Dubai, UAE.
This report was prepared by personnel who are associated with Jefferies (Jefferies International Limited, Jefferies GmbH, Jefferies Hong Kong Limited,
Jefferies Singapore Limited, Jefferies (Japan) Limited, Tokyo Branch, Jefferies India Private Limited), and Jefferies (Australia) Pty Ltd; or by personnel who
are associated with both Jefferies LLC and Jefferies Research Services LLC ("JRS"). Jefferies LLC is a US registered broker-dealer and is affiliated with
JRS, which is a US registered investment adviser. JRS does not create tailored or personalized research and all research provided by JRS is impersonal.
If you are paying separately for this research, it is being provided to you by JRS. Otherwise, it is being provided by Jefferies LLC. Jefferies LLC, JRS, and
their affiliates are collectively referred to below as "Jefferies". Jefferies may seek to do business with companies covered in this research report. As a
result, investors should be aware that Jefferies may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider
this report as only one of many factors in making their investment decisions. Specific conflict of interest and other disclosures that are required by FINRA
and other rules are set forth in this disclosure section.
***
If you are receiving this report from a non-US Jefferies entity, please note the following: Unless prohibited by the provisions of Regulation S of the U.S.
Securities Act of 1933, as amended, this material is distributed in the United States by Jefferies LLC, which accepts responsibility for its contents in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 15a-6 under the US Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. Transactions by or on behalf of any US person
may only be effected through Jefferies LLC. In the United Kingdom and European Economic Area this report is issued and/or approved for distribution by
Jefferies International Limited ("JIL”) and/or Jefferies GmbH and is intended for use only by persons who have, or have been assessed as having, suitable
professional experience and expertise, or by persons to whom it can be otherwise lawfully distributed. Jefferies LLC, JIL, Jefferies GmbH and their affiliates,
may make a market or provide liquidity in the financial instruments referred to in this report; and where they do make a market, such activity is disclosed
specifically in this report under “company specific disclosures”.
For Canadian investors, this material is intended for use only by professional or institutional investors. None of the investments or investment services
mentioned or described herein is available to other persons or to anyone in Canada who is not a "permitted client" as defined by National Instrument
31-103 Registration Requirements, Exemptions and Ongoing Registrant Obligations. This research report is a general discussion of the merits and risks of
a security or securities only, and is not in any way meant to be tailored to the needs and circumstances of any recipient. The information contained herein
is not, and under no circumstances is to be construed as, an offer to sell securities described herein, or solicitation of an offer to buy securities described
herein, in Canada or any province or territory thereof. Any offer or sale of the securities described herein in Canada will be made only under an exemption
from the requirements to file a prospectus with the relevant Canadian securities regulators, if applicable, and only by a dealer properly registered under
applicable securities laws or, alternatively, pursuant to an exemption from the dealer registration requirement in the relevant province or territory of Canada
in which such offer or sale is made. The information contained herein is under no circumstances to be construed as investment advice in any province or
territory of Canada and is not tailored to the needs of the recipient. To the extent that the information contained herein references securities of an issuer
incorporated, formed or created under the laws of Canada or a province or territory of Canada, any trades in such securities must be conducted through
a dealer registered in Canada. No securities commission or similar regulatory authority in Canada has reviewed or in any way passed judgment upon this
research report, the information contained herein or the merits of the securities described herein, and any representation to the contrary is an offence.
In Singapore, Jefferies Singapore Limited (“JSL”) is regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. For investors in the Republic of Singapore, where this
material is prepared and issued by a Jefferies affiliate outside of Singapore, it is distributed by JSL pursuant to Regulation 32C of the Financial Advisers
Regulations. The material contained in this document is intended solely for accredited, expert or institutional investors, as defined under the Securities
and Futures Act 2001 (Singapore). If there are any matters arising from, or in connection with this material, please contact JSL, located at 80 Raffles Place
#15-20, UOB Plaza 2, Singapore 048624, telephone: +65 6551 3950. In Dubai, this material is issued and distributed by Jefferies International Limited,
Dubai branch, and is intended solely for Professional Clients and should not be distributed to, or relied upon by, Retail Clients (as defined by DFSA). A
distribution of ratings in percentage terms in each sector covered is available upon request from your sales representative. In Japan, this material is issued
and distributed by Jefferies (Japan) Limited to institutional investors only. In Hong Kong, this report is issued and approved by Jefferies Hong Kong Limited
and is intended for use only by professional investors as defined in the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Ordinance and its subsidiary legislation. In the
Republic of China (Taiwan), this report should not be distributed. The research in relation to this report is conducted outside the People’s Republic of China
(“PRC”). This report does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy any securities in the PRC. PRC investors shall have the relevant
qualifications to invest in such securities and shall be responsible for obtaining all relevant approvals, licenses, verifications and/or registrations from the
relevant governmental authorities themselves. In India, this report is made available by Jefferies India Private Limited. In Australia, this report is issued
and/or approved for distribution by, or on behalf of, Jefferies (Australia) Securities Pty Ltd (ACN 610 977 074), which holds an Australian financial services
license (AFSL 487263). It is directed solely at wholesale clients within the meaning of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) of Australia (the “Corporations Act”),
in connection with their consideration of any investment or investment service that is the subject of this report. This report may contain general financial
product advice. Where this report refers to a particular financial product, you should obtain a copy of the relevant product disclosure statement or offer
document before making any decision in relation to the product. Recipients of this document in any other jurisdictions should inform themselves about
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.
and observe any applicable legal requirements in relation to the receipt of this document.
This report is not an offer or solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security or derivative instrument, or to make any investment. Any opinion or estimate
constitutes the preparer's best judgment as of the date of preparation, and is subject to change without notice. Jefferies assumes no obligation to maintain
or update this report based on subsequent information and events. Jefferies, and their respective officers, directors, and employees, may have long or
short positions in, or may buy or sell any of the securities, derivative instruments or other investments mentioned or described herein, either as agent or
as principal for their own account. This material is provided solely for informational purposes and is not tailored to any recipient, and is not based on,
and does not take into account, the particular investment objectives, portfolio holdings, strategy, financial situation, or needs of any recipient. As such,
any advice or recommendation in this report may not be suitable for a particular recipient. Jefferies assumes recipients of this report are capable of
evaluating the information contained herein and of exercising independent judgment. A recipient of this report should not make any investment decision
without first considering whether any advice or recommendation in this report is suitable for the recipient based on the recipient’s particular circumstances
and, if appropriate or otherwise needed, seeking professional advice, including tax advice. Jefferies does not perform any suitability or other analysis to
check whether an investment decision made by the recipient based on this report is consistent with a recipient’s investment objectives, portfolio holdings,
strategy, financial situation, or needs.
By providing this report, neither JRS nor any other Jefferies entity accepts any authority, discretion, or control over the management of the recipient’s
assets. Any action taken by the recipient of this report, based on the information in the report, is at the recipient’s sole judgment and risk. The recipient
must perform his or her own independent review of any prospective investment. If the recipient uses the services of Jefferies LLC (or other affiliated
broker-dealers), in connection with a purchase or sale of a security that is a subject of these materials, such broker-dealer may act as principal for its own
accounts or as agent for another person. Only JRS is registered with the SEC as an investment adviser; and therefore neither Jefferies LLC nor any other
Jefferies affiliate has any fiduciary duty in connection with distribution of these reports.
The price and value of the investments referred to herein and the income from them may fluctuate. Past performance is not a guide to future performance,
future returns are not guaranteed, and a loss of original capital may occur. Fluctuations in exchange rates could have adverse effects on the value or price
of, or income derived from, certain investments.
This report may contain forward looking statements that may be affected by inaccurate assumptions or by known or unknown risks, uncertainties, and
other important factors. As a result, the actual results, events, performance or achievements of the financial product may be materially different from
those expressed or implied in such statements.
This report has been prepared independently of any issuer of securities mentioned herein and not as agent of any issuer of securities. No Equity Research
personnel have authority whatsoever to make any representations or warranty on behalf of the issuer(s). Any comments or statements made herein are
those of the Jefferies entity producing this report and may differ from the views of other Jefferies entities.
This report may contain information obtained from third parties, including ratings from credit ratings agencies such as Standard & Poor’s. Reproduction and
distribution of third party content in any form is prohibited except with the prior written permission of the related third party. Jefferies does not guarantee
the accuracy, completeness, timeliness or availability of any information, including ratings, and is not responsible for any errors or omissions (negligent
or otherwise), regardless of the cause, or for the results obtained from the use of such content. Third-party content providers give no express or implied
warranties, including, but not limited to, any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose or use. Neither Jefferies nor any third-party
content provider shall be liable for any direct, indirect, incidental, exemplary, compensatory, punitive, special or consequential damages, costs, expenses,
legal fees, or losses (including lost income or profits and opportunity costs) in connection with any use of their content, including ratings. Credit ratings
are statements of opinions and are not statements of fact or recommendations to purchase, hold or sell securities. They do not address the suitability of
securities or the suitability of securities for investment purposes, and should not be relied on as investment advice.
Jefferies research reports are disseminated and available electronically, and, in some cases, also in printed form. Electronic research is simultaneously
made available to all clients. This report or any portion hereof may not be copied, reprinted, sold, or redistributed or disclosed by the recipient or any
third party, by content scraping or extraction, automated processing, or any other form or means, without the prior written consent of Jefferies. Any
unauthorized use is prohibited. Neither Jefferies nor any of its respective directors, officers or employees, is responsible for guaranteeing the financial
success of any investment, or accepts any liability whatsoever for any direct, indirect or consequential damages or losses arising from any use of this
report or its contents. Nothing herein shall be construed to waive any liability Jefferies has under applicable U.S. federal or state securities laws.
For Important Disclosure information relating to JRS, please see https://adviserinfo.sec.gov/IAPD/Content/Common/crd_iapd_Brochure.aspx?
BRCHR_VRSN_ID=483878 and https://adviserinfo.sec.gov/Firm/292142 or visit our website at https://javatar.bluematrix.com/sellside/
Disclosures.action, or www.jefferies.com, or call 1.888.JEFFERIES.
© 2023 Jefferies
This report is intended for Jefferies clients only. Unauthorized distribution is prohibited.