UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW

Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers, and Election Law

Atty. Kris Gargantiel

APEL CASE DIGESTS- DAY 2

NOTE:
1. DO NOT JUST COPY-PASTE FROM NET!
2. MAKE SURE IT IS RECIT READY AND RELATED TO THE TOPIC TO BE
COVERED/DISCUSSED.
3. DO NOT FORGET TO NUMBER THE CASE ASSIGNED TO YOU. (Please refer to the
case # column for day 2 for your reference)
4. REMEMBER, YOU ARE MAKING A DIGEST. DO NOT UPLOAD THE FULL TEXT.

DIGEST FORMAT:
Nature of the case
Facts
Issue/s
Decision/Doctrine

Quasi-Judicial or Adjudicatory Powers

1. ANG TIBAY vs. CIR and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC.
G.R. No. 46496. 27 February 1940

FACTS:

The National Labor Union, Inc. prayed for the vacation of judgment rendered by the
Supreme Court, remanding the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and
avers that the claim of Toribio Teodoro of Ang Tibay that there was shortage of leather
soles making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National
Labor Union is entirely false, and that Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for
discriminating against the National Labor Union and unjustly favoring the National Workers’
Brotherhood of Ang Tibay to which Teodoro belong, and that the exhibits in the case are so
inaccessible to the National Labor Union that even with the exercise of due diligence, they could
not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations.
Ang Tibay filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of CIR and motion for new
trial of the Union.

ISSUE: Whether the Motion for New Trial should be granted.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The Court of Industrial Relations is a special
court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No.
103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the
nation.

It not only exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question,
matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting, employers and employees or
laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the relations between them,
subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (Section 1).

The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of

procedure. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of
this character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the
evidence must be substantial.

The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its
judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The
Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.

2. Miguel vs. Vda. De Reyes, G.R. No. L-4851, 31 July 1953

Facts: Eloy Miguel filed a homestead application for a parcel of public land with the Bureau of
Lands in Isabela. Thereafter, His son, Demetrio Miguel, declared for taxation purposes another
parcel of land in Isabela and had since then been in actual, open, peaceful, and continuous
possession of the same under a claim of ownership. Having informed that Anacleta M. Vda. De
Reyes had included both the abovementioned parcels of land in a sales application she filed
with the Bureau of Lands, Plaintiffs Eloy and Demetrio Miguel filed their protest with the said
bureau. Pending hearing, Reyes had successfully acquired the said parcels of land and an OCT
had been issued in her favor. Plaintiffs filed an action to the CFI, praying for judgement to void
the sales patent and cancel the said OCT. CFI dismissed the complaint, and thereupon brought
the case to the Supreme Court on appeal.

Issue: Whether or not plaintiffs can maintain this action to the Supreme Court.

Held: The Supreme Court held in the negative.

If plaintiffs were aggrieved by the action or decision of the Director of Lands, their
remedy was to appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. It does not even appear
that they have pursued their protest to its conclusion in the Bureau of Lands itself. Having
failed to exhaust their remedy in the administrative branch of the Government, plaintiffs
cannot not now seek relief in the courts of justice.

3. Brillantes vs. Castro, G.R. No. L-9223, 30 June 1956

DOCTRINE: Section 7 of the same Act also pertinently provides that "Any person aggrieved by
an order of the Secretary of Labor issued under this Act may obtain a review of such order in
the Supreme Court by filing in such court within fifteen (15) days after the entry and publication
of such order a written petition praying that the order of the Secretary of Labor be modified or
set aside in whole or in part . . ."

FACTS:

The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant before the Wage Administration Service for
the recovery of alleged unpaid salary and overtime pay. They entered into an arbitration
agreement.

The claim for overtime and underpayment is hereby dismissed but the respondent is adjudged
to pay to the claimant the amount of P50.88 corresponding to his salary for services rendered.
The RTC dismissed. The aforesaid decision rendered by the Hearing Officer of the WAS was
pursuant to the authority granted to the Secretary of Labor to "delegate any or all of his powers
in the administration or enforcement of the Minimum Wage Law to the Chief of the WAS, who
may act personally or through duly authorized representative" R.A. No. 602, The Minimum
Wage Law, section 12(e).

ISSUES: Whether the right to go to the Supreme Court for review of said order granted by
Section 7 of the Minimum Wage Law is not exclusive and that under said Section 7 the review
by this Tribunal is limited to questions of law and that the findings of fact contained in the
appealed decision must be accepted

RULING: This is not entirely correct. The findings of fact made by the Secretary of Labor or his
delegate are accepted and are conclusive only if supported by substantial evidence. So that
plaintiff could well have appealed from the decision of the WAS to this Tribunal, even on
question of fact, if he was prepared and in a position to show that the findings of fact of the WAS
were not supported by substantial evidence.

If plaintiff-appellant and his counsel were dissatisfied with the findings of the hearing officer of
the WAS; if they believed that the findings were a distortion of the facts as contained in the
evidence, they should have appealed from said decision to this Tribunal. And if they were
really convinced that said hearing officer of the WAS deliberately distorted the facts to favor the
employer, they should have prepared charges of partiality and malfeasance and lodged the
same with the proper authorities for investigation.

We fully agree with the trial court in its order dismissing the complaint on the ground that the
action is barred by prior judgment.

The authorities above cited on res ad judicata refer to decisions rendered by the courts. They
are applicable to decisions of a quasi-judicial body like the WAS. The rule which forbids the
reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the
judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive, or administrative officers and boards acting
within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers.

There are, however, cases in which the doctrine of res judicata has been held applicable to
judicial acts of public, executive, or administrative officers and boards. In this connection, it has
been declared that whenever a final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on
the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or
a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata.

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is affirmed.

4. CARMELO v RAMOS G.R. No. L-17778 November 30, 1962

FACTS: The Mayor of Manila created a committee to investigate the anomalies involving the
license inspectors and other personnel of the License Inspection Division of the Office of the
City Treasurer and of the License and Permits Division of the said office and named Jesus
Carmelo, as chairman. The committee issued subpoenas to Armando Ramos requiring him to
appear before it in connection with an administrative case but Ramos refused to appear.
Claiming that Ramos’ refusal tended to impede or obstruct the administrative proceedings,
petitioner filed with the CFI a petition to declare Ramos in contempt. The trial court dismissed
the petition. It held that there is no law empowering committees created by municipal mayors to
issue subpoenas and demand witnesses testify under oath and that to compel Ramos to testify
would be to violate his right against self-incrimination.

ISSUE: W/N the said committee is empowered to subpoena witnesses and ask for their
punishment in case of refusal

RULING: No. Petitioner's committee has no power to cite witnesses to appear before it and to
ask for their punishment in case of refusal. The rule is that Rule 64(Contempt)of the Rules of
Court applies only to inferior and superior courts and does not comprehend contempt committed
against administrative officials or bodies like the one in this case, unless said contempt is clearly
considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of Section
580 of the Revised Administrative Code. There is nothing said in the executive order of the
Mayor creating the committee about such a grant of power. All that the order gives to this body
is the power to investigate anomalies involving certain city employees. SC did not agree with the
petitioner that a delegation of such power to investigation implies also a delegation of the power
to take testimony or evidence of witnesses whose appearance may be require by the
compulsory process of subpoena. Here, whatever power may be claimed by petitioner's
committee may only be traced to the power of the Mayor to investigate as implied from his
power to suspend or remove certain city employees. There is no statutory grant of power to
investigate to petitioner's committee. In the second place, even granting that the Mayor has the
implied power to require the appearance of witnesses before him, the rule, as noted earlier, is
that the Mayor cannot delegate this power to a body like the committee of the petitioner.
(Francia v. Pecson, etal.,supra.)

Doctrine: The rule is that Rule 64 (Contempt) of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and
superior courts and does not comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or
bodies like the one in this case, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly
defined as contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Even granting that the Mayor has the implied power to require the
appearance of witnesses before him, the rule, as noted earlier, is that the Mayor cannot
delegate this power to a body like the committee of the petitioner.

5. Agusmin Promotional Enterprises vs. CA, G.R. No. L-48478, 30 September 1982

DOCTRINE: In deciding administrative questions, technical rules of procedure are not strictly enforced
and due process of law in the strict judicial sense is not indispensable

FACTS: Respondents Guiang and Liceralde and six others, all of whom were holders of ordinary timber
licenses consolidated their timber concession to form Agusmin Promotional Enterprises, Inc. (AGUSMIN)
which was allowed.

Because of some differences, respondents Guiang and Liceralde requested the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources to allow withdrawal of their respective forest areas from AGUSMIN and to
consolidate the same with the timber license of Pedro B. de Jesus and Sulpicio Lagnada.

The Secretary of Agriculture referred it to the Director of Forestry who denied the same, ratiocinating that
that the request is beyond his jurisdiction because through the consolidation, all of them effectively
renounced their individual identities to one identity. The issuance of a new timber license in their favor
will be in violation of forestry rules and regulations.

On appeal (DANR Case No. 3093-A), the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reversed the
decision of the Director of Forestry and authorized Guiang and Liceralde to withdraw their forest areas
from the timber license of AGUSMIN.

Guiang and Liceralde sought the immediate implementation of the aforesaid decision by filing a motion for
immediate execution which was granted over the opposition of AGUSMIN. Guiang, Liceralde and Pedro
B. de Jesus, a holder of Ordinary Timber License No. 42-'67, formed a corporation known as the P.B. DE
JESUS & CO., INC., hereinafter referred to as DE JESUS & CO., for short.

AGUSMIN interposed an appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
in DANR Case No. 3093 and DANR Case No. 3093-A, by filing a notice of appeal on June 3, 1967, but
paid the appeal fee only on June 5, 1967 and July 12, 1967.

Guiang and Liceralde, however, filed, instead, an Urgent Motion to Dismiss Appeal on July 24, 1967,
contending that the appellant therein failed to comply with all the requirements of Executive Order No. 19,
series of 1966, to perfect an appeal to the Office of the President by not paying the appeal fee of P20.00
which is charged for every appeal or petition for review with the Office of the President, so that the Office
of the President did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, and, hence, the decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources became final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from
receipt of a copy of the said decision.

Stripped of the non-essentials, the appellate court issued a decision, affirming in full the judgment of the
letter-decisions of the Office of the President in DANR which ruled in favor of herein respondents

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not holding the decisions of the Executive Secretary in
DANR Case Nos. 3093-A and 3562 were validly issued.

RULING: The Supreme Court held in the negative. While there may be some merit in the arguments of
the petitioner since the rule is that "in deciding administrative questions, technical rules of procedure are
not strictly enforced and due process of law in the strict judicial sense is not indispensable," little, if any,
useful purpose could be gained in further discussing these issues of technical rules of procedure and due
process of law raised by AGUSMIN because Letter of Instruction No. 172, which ordered the cancellation
of the timber license issued to AGUSMIN, in effect, reversed and set aside the said decisions of the
Executive Secretary which favored AGUSMIN before the same became final and enforceable In the
words of the Court of Appeals, the said decision "did not acquire any finality."

[Easier version of the facts + ruling: AGUSMIN interposed that his failure to pay the appeal fee on the
same date that he filed the notice of appeal should be liberally construed in his favor because in deciding
administrative questions, technical rules of procedure are not strictly enforced and due process of law in
the strict judicial sense is not indispensable. This is true but then SC ruled that AGUSMIN no longer had
standing because of the issuance of Letter of Instruction No. 172 by the Office of the President.]

6. Anzaldo vs. Clave, G.R. No. L-54597, 15 December 1982

DOCTRINE:
Due Process; Administrative Law; There is a denial of due process where a Presidential Assistant renders
a decision concurring with the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission which he heads. — It is
evident that Doctor Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant Clave
concurred with the recommendation of Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission.

FACTS:
Dr. Anzaldo has been working in the National Institute of Science and Technology for 28 years. She was
holding the position Scientist Research Associate IV when she was appointed as Science Research
Supervisor II. Her appointment was approved by the CSC in 1978. The position was previously held by
Dr. Kintanar who recommended Dr. Venzon to his position. Dr. Venzon contested the position. Dr. Afable,
the one who appointed Anzaldo, averred that Anzaldo’s appointment was approved by the NIST
evaluation Committee which gave 88 points to Anzaldo and 66 points to Venzon.

The issue was elevated to the Office of the President by Venzon. Clave was then the Presidential
Executive Assistant. Pursuant to PD 807 or the Civil Service Decree, Clave referred the issue to the CSC.
Clave was also holding the chairmanship of the CSC. Clave issued Res 1178 appointing Venzon to the
contested position.
After the denial of her motion for the reconsideration of that resolution, on January 5, 18, Anzaldo
appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines. Since Clave was holding the office of PEA he
just affirmed his decision as the CSC chairman.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Anzaldo was denied of his right to due process

DECISION:
YES. Where a Presidential Assistant renders a decision concurring with the recommendation of the Civil
Service Commission which he heads.

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Anzaldo. When PEA Clave said in his decision that he was “inclined
to concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission”, what he meant was that the was
concurring with Chairman Clave’s recommendation: he was concurring with himself. It is evident that
Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the
recommendation of (himself) Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission. Due process of law means
fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Anzaldo that PEA Clave should decide whether his own
recommendation as Chairman of the CSC, as to who between Anzaldo and Venzo should be appointed
Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the Philippines.

Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Doctor Anzaldo that Presidential
Executive Assistant Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission, as to who between Doctor Anzaldo and Doctor Venzon should be appointed
Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the Philippines.

7. PCGG vs. Peña, G.R. No. L-77663, 12 April 1988

DOCTRINE: Regional trial courts do not have such jurisdiction over the Commission (PCGG). To
eliminate all doubts, the Court upholds the primacy of administrative jurisdiction as vested in the
Commission and holds that jurisdiction over all sequestration cases of ill-gotten wealth, assets and
properties under the past discredited regime fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, subject to review exclusively by this Court.

FACTS:
On March 25, 1986, the Presidential Commission on Good Government issued an order freezing the
assets, effects, documents and records of two export garment manufacturing firms denominated as
American Inter-fashion Corporation and De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation. The Commission
appointed Ms. Noemi L. Saludo as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the said corporations with full authority to
manage and operate the same.

On June 27, 1986, the Commission designated the OIC, Saludo, and Mr.Yeung Chun Ho private
respondent herein, as authorized signatories to effect deposits and withdrawals of the funds of the two
corporations.

On September 4, 1986, the Commission designated Mr. Yim Kam Shing as co-signatory, in the absence
of Mr. Yeung Chun Ho and Mr. Marcelo de Guzman, in the absence of Ms. Saludo.
In a memorandum dated February 3, 1987, and addressed to depository banks of the said two
corporations, Ms. Saludo revoked the authorizations previously issued upon finding that Mr. Yim Kam
Shing was a Hong Kong Chinese national staying in the country on a mere tourist visa, and designated
James Dy as her co-signatory and Enrico Reyes Santos as the other authorized signatory with Teresita
Yu as the latter's co-signatory. The said memorandum was approved by then Commissioner Mary
Concepcion Bautista of the Commission.

On February 11, 1987, the OIC withdrew the amount of P400,000.00, more or less, from the Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company against the accounts of the said corporations for payment of the salaries of the
staff, employees and laborers of the same for the period from February 1 to 15 of 1987.

On February 13, 1987, respondents Yeung Chun Kam Yeung Chun Ho and Archie Chan who are all in
Hongkong, instituted through Yim Kam Shing an action for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction against the said bank, the Commission, then Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista and the
OIC, Saludo, at the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila.

On February 16, 1987, respondent judge issued ex-parte the questioned temporary restraining order
enjoining the bank, its attorneys, agents or persons acting in their behalf "from releasing any funds of
American Inter-fashion Corporation without the signature of plaintiff Yim Kam Shing and to desist from
committing any other acts complained of ..." and the Commission "from enforcing the questioned
memorandum dated February 3, 1987"

On February 20, 1987, the Commission filed a motion to dismiss with opposition to plaintiffs' (private
respondents herein) prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the Commission or over the subject of the case and that assuming arguendo its
jurisdiction, it acted with grave abuse of discretion since private respondents as 33% minority
shareholders are not entitled to any restraining order or preliminary injunction.

On March 24, 1987, the Court issued a temporary restraining order, "ordering respondent judge to cease
and desist from enforcing his orders dated February 16 and March 5, 1987 and from proceeding with the
case subject to the condition that the amounts that the petitioner may withdraw from the accounts of (the
sequestered corporations) with the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Inc., shall be limited to the
'necessary operating expenses of the two companies and for the payment of the salaries, and among
others.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the PCGG.

RULING:
No, the Regional Trial Court does not have jurisdiction over the PCGG.

The Court sustains petitioner's stand and holds that regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals for that
matter have no jurisdiction over the Presidential Commission on Good Government in the exercise of its
powers under the applicable Executive Orders and Article XVIII, section 26 of the Constitution and
therefore may not interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of the Commission.

Under Section 2 of the President's Executive Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of the
Commission regarding “the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated
by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their Close Relatives,
Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees” whether civil or criminal, are lodged
within the “exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan” and all incidents arising from,
incidental to, or related to, such cases necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan's exclusive and
original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court.

Executive Order No. 1 issued on February 28, 1986 created the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, charging it with the task of assisting the President in regard to the "recovery of all ill-gotten
wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his
administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using
their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship."

These ample powers and authority vested in the Commission by the President in the exercise of
legislative power granted her in the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution were confirmed in said
Constitution and in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the Freedom Constitution (Proc. No. 3) mandated that
'The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to: .. (d) recover ill-
gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest
of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts."

PCGG exercises quasi-judicial functions. In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, the Commission is a
co-equal body with regional trial courts and “co-equal bodies have no power to control the other.”
However, although under B.P. 129, the CA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgment…of
regional trial courts and quasi-judicial bodies, E.O. No. 14 specifically provides in Section 2 that "The
Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the
Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof." Necessarily, those who wish
to question or challenge the Commission's acts or orders in such cases must seek recourse in the same
court, the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan's
decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court.

8. Paredes vs. CSC, G.R. No. 88177, 4 December 1990

FACTS:

In 1985, Paredes was given a promotional appointment as H.S. Project Supervisor.

Atty. Amor, H.S. Project Officer IV, contested the promotional appointment of Paredes as H.S.
Project Supervisor, and claims that she is the qualified next-in-rank pursuant to P.D. 807 and
the Qualification Standards of the HSRC.

HSRC Commissioner Mendiola, rendered a decision dismissing Atty. Amor's protest. Pursuant
to Resolution 85-132 dated April 11, 1985 of the Civil Service Commission, petitioner Paredes
can be extended a promotional appointment as H.S. Project Supervisor because although she
is only a holder of a two year Elementary Teachers Certificate her educational deficiency can be
substituted with her 31 years of service in the government the greater part of which has been in
the supervisory level.

Atty. Amor appealed to the Office of the President. The Office of the President requested CSC
to comment on the appeal. Commissioner Mendiola in his Second Indorsement reiterated his
decision. He also opined that the appeal may be considered moot and academic because
petitioner was promoted to the position of HS Program Coordinator.

Atty. Amor again protested the promotion of Paredes arguing that the latter is not qualified for
the said position. The MSPB (Merit Systems Protection Board) rendered its decision that
Paredes is found not at all qualified for the contested position of HS Project Supervisor as well
as of the higher position of HS Program Coordinator which she presently occupies. She should
be reverted to her former position, that Atty. Amor be appointed to the position of HS Program
Coordinator in the HLURB (Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board).

Petitioner Paredes alleged that the HSRC has no approved Qualification Standards; that her
promotional appointments are legal.

MSPB denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. CSC ruled that although the HLURB
Qualification Standards has not been approved, it can be used as a basis for recruitment and
promotion in order not to jeopardize the operations of the Office. CSC issued Resolution
denying for lack of merit petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Moreover, Paredes filed a sworn complaint against private respondent Amor for falsification of
official documents, dishonesty, violation of Civil Service Law and reasonable office Rules and
Regulations, habitual tardiness, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for
being notoriously undesirable.

MSPB rendered its decisions absolving private respondent Amor of all charges except for
habitual tardiness. Paredes interposed an appeal to the Civil Service Commission. Civil Service
Commission dismissed the appeal on the ground that petitioner Paredes is not the party
adversely affected by the decision. Citing Section 39(a) of Presidential Decree No. 807, it ruled
that the parties who can appeal in an administrative case are the government and the
respondent.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the public respondent (Civil Service Commission) committed a grave abuse of
discretion when it sustained the revocation of petitioner Paredes' appointment as HS
Project Coordinator and in declaring the said position vacant.

2. Whether Paredes can interpose an appeal to CSC even she is not the party affected by
the decision.

DECISION:

1. The Court held in the negative. In the case at bar, it may be conceded that in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, the Civil Service Commission committed
an error in applying the Qualification Standards which it admitted it has not
approved. Exigency of the service does not justify the use of a Qualification
Standard it has not approved. However, the error is not so grave as would
warrant the nullification of its resolution declaring the position of H.S. Project
Coordinator vacant.

The absence of a Qualification Standard does not justify the appointment of

petitioner Paredes or anybody for that matter to the contested position.
 Although, without a duly approved Qualification Standard it would be extremely
difficult if not impossible for the appointing authority to determine the qualification
and fitness of the applicant for a particular position. Public interest therefore
requires that a Qualification Standard must exist to guide the appointing authority
not only in extending an appointment but also in settling contested appointments.

In declaring the Position of HS Project Coordinator vacant, the public respondent

has therefore not abused its discretion as the Qualification Standards of the HSRC
which should be the basis and guide for appointment it has not been approved by
the Civil Service Commission yet.

2. Here the MSPB after hearing and the submission of memoranda exonerated private
respondent Amor of all charges except for habitual tardiness. The penalty was only a
reprimand so that even private respondent Amor, the party adversely affected by the
decision, cannot even interpose an appeal to the Civil Service Commission.

As correctly ruled by private respondent Amor, petitioner Paredes is not the party
adversely affected by the decision so that she has no legal personality to interpose
an appeal to the Civil Service Commission. In an administrative case, the
complainant is a mere witness. Even if she is the Head of the Administrative
Services Department of the HSRC as a complainant she is merely a witness
for the government in an administrative case. No private interest is involved
in an administrative case as the offense is committed against the government.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

10. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS (NAFTU), Petitioner, vs. MAINIT
LUMBER DEVELOPMENT COMPANY WORKERS UNION-UNITED LUMBER AND
GENERAL WORKERS OF THE PHILIPPINES. (MALDECOWU-ULGWP), Respondents.
GR No. 79526 December 21,1990

Facts:

Private respondent Mainit Lumber Development Company Workers Union-

United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines, MALDECOWU-ULGWP
(ULGWP, for short), a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Ministry
of Labor and Employment, filed with Regional Office No. 10, Ministry of Labor and
Employment at Cagayan de Oro City, a petition for certification election to determine
the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative among the rank and file
workers/employees of Mainit Lumber Development Company Inc. (MALDECO), a
duly organized, registered and existing corporation engaged in the business of
logging and saw-mill operations employing approximately 136 rank and file
employees/workers. The case was scheduled for hearing two (2) times.
 The Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification election. On April 26,
1985, NAFTU appealed the decision of the Med-Arbiter on the ground that
MALDECO was composed of two (2) bargaining units, the Sawmill Division and
theLogging Division, but both the petition and decision treated these separate and
distinct units only as one.

The Bureau of Labor Relations affirmed the decision. Thus, a certification

election was held on separate dates at the employer's sawmill division and logging
area respectively. In said election MALDECOWU- ULGWP garnered a total vote of
146 while NAFTU garnered a total of 2 votes.

On July 26, 1986, NAFTU filed an election protest alleging massive vote buying
accompanied with grave and serious threat force and intimidation on the lives of 25
applicants as stated in a Joint Affidavit attached thereto.

Issue:

Whether or not it was right for the Med-Arbiter to change the employer from two
separate bargaining units to only one.

Ruling:

In the case at bar, petitioner alleges that the employer MALDECO was
composed of two bargaining units, the Sawmill Division in Butuan City and the
Logging Division, in Zapanta Valley, Kitcharao, Agusan Norte, about 80 kilometers
distant from each other and in fact, had then two separate CBA's, one for the
Sawmill Division and another for the Logging Division, both the petition and decision
referred only to one bargaining unit; that from 1979 to 1985, the Ministry of Labor
and Employment recognized the existence of two (2) separate bargaining units at
MALDECO, one for its Logging Division and another for its Sawmill Division.
While the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be reckoned
with in determining the appropriate bargaining unit, the same is not decisive or
conclusive. Other factors must be considered. The test of grouping is community or
mutuality of interests. This is so because "the basic test of an asserted bargaining
unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will
best ensure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights."
(Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Company, Inc., et al., 103 Phil.
1103 [1958]). Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the employees of the
Sawmill Division and the Logging Division. Their functions mesh with one another.
One group needs the other in the same way that the company needs them both.
There may be differences as to the nature of their individual assignments but the
distinctions are not enough to warrant the formation of a separate bargaining unit.

Secondly, the issue had been raised earlier by the petitioner. The respondent Bureau of
Labor Relations had already ruled on the same in its decision dated April 28, 1986
affirming the Med-Arbiter's Order dated April 11, 1985 which granted the petition for
Certification Election. NAFTU did not elevate the April 28, 1986 decision to this Court.
On the contrary, it participated in the questioned election and later it did not raise the
issue in its election protest (Rollo, p. 210). Hence, the principle of res judicata applies. It
was settled as early as 1956 that "the rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once
judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-
judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their
jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers . . ." (B.F.
Goodrich Philippines, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission and Leandro M.
Castro, 159 SCRA 355 [1988]).

11. Zagada vs. CSC, G.R. No. 99302, 27 November 1992

FACTS:

The CSC received a complaint against Zagada and one Nestor Valdez for falsification of entry in
the district plantilla of personnel for 1981 in Legazpi City. Complainant’s key witness, was the
clerk who prepared the plantilla under then OIC Eleanor Osea. Before the plantilla could be
submitted to the Office of the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports, Zagada took over as
new district supervisor.

Zagada and Valdez approached “witness” and asked him to make adjustments in said plantilla
so that Valdez would be listed as Elementary Grade Teacher (EGT)-5 instead of EGT-3 even
though there was no proof that Valdez was qualified for the position. Zagada was adjudged
guilty of misconduct and was made to pay a fine equal to 1 month and 1 day of his salary.
Valdez was considered terminated as of the date of his retirement.

Upon elevation to the Merit Systems Protection Board, the decision was affirmed but the Board
imposed a penalty of 6 months fine without pay.

CSC modified the Board’s decision and imposed a penalty of 1 year suspension without pay.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petition to the SC was valid. [YES]

2. WON the affidavit of the clerk Guinoo was sufficient to constitute substantial evidence to
sustain the finding of grave misconduct against Zagada. [NO]

RULING:
1. YES. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the writ of certiorari is available where any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In order for this Court to sustain the findings of an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial
functions, such a body must abide by the elementary rules of due process. When there is denial
of due process, there is grave abuse of discretion and the writ of certiorari is in order.

2. NO. The affidavit of Guinoo was self-serving as he admitted responsibility for altering the
plantilla himself. Assuming Guinoo was regular in the performance of his duties, under no
circumstance will he allow any changes in the plantilla after it had been signed and certified
correct (allegedly by Osea).

The CSC erred in finding Zadaga guilty of grave misconduct on the sole basis of Guinoo’s
affidavit, the same not being substantial evidence. This constitutes a denial of administrative
due process amounting to grave abuse of discretion.

12. Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez,

G.R. No. 109113, 25 January 1995

FACTS:

In order to provide about 1.3 million liters of water daily to about 3.8 million people in the
metropolitan area, Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) launched the
Angat Water Supply Optimization.

Private respondent Philippine Large Diameter Pressure Pipes Manufacturer’s Association

(PLDPPMA) filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman on the public bidding
conducted by MWSS for projects APM-01 and APM-02 of its Angat Water Supply Optimization
Project (AWSOP), which aims to provide 1.3 million liters of water daily to about 3.8 million
residents in the metropolitan area. The letter of complaint accused the MWSS of an apparent
plan even before the bidding to favour suppliers of fiberglass pipes and urged the Ombudsman
to conduct an investigation to hold in abeyance the award of contracts.

The Fact finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman issued an injunction
directed to the Board of Trustees of the MWSS

(1) to set aside the recommendation of its Pre-qualification, Bids, and Awards Committee for
Construction Services and Technical Equipment (PBAC-CSTE) that contract no. APM-01 be
given to a contractor offering fiberglass pipes and

(2) to instead award the contract to a complying and responsive bidder.

Petitioner MWSS assailed the order of the Ombudsman for lack of jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman over PLDPPMA’s complaint and for issuing the challenged order contrary to PD
1818 prohibiting the issuance of restraining orders/injunctions in cases involving government
infrastructure projects.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the complaint at bar

RULING:

No, the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the complaint at bar.

Although the Ombudsman is granted investigatory power and public assistance duties, in
issuing the challenged orders, it has not only directly assumed jurisdiction over, but likewise pre-
empted the exercise of discretion by, the MWSS. It is the agency that should be in the best
position to evaluate the feasibility of the projections of the bidders and to decide which bid is
compatible with its development plans. The issue here involved, on basically technical matters,
deserve to be disentangled from undue interference from courts and so from the Ombudsman
as well.

As a GOCC, MWSS is charged with the construction, maintenance, and operation of waterwork
system to ensure uninterrupted and adequate supply and distribution of potable water.
Therefore, it is the agency that should be in the best position to evaluate the feasibility of the
projections of the bidders and to decide which bid is compatible with its development plans.
The exercise of this discretion to reject a bid and to award contracts, which is a purely technical
matter, is vested in the MWSS entrusted with such function that even courts or the Ombudsman
cannot unduly interfere from.

13. LASTIMOSA VS VASQUEZ

FACTS:

On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, filed a
criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of
authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo.
Initially, the deputy ombudsman found no prima facie evidence.

After review, Omb. Vasquez reversed and directed that the mayor be charged with a criminal
case in the RTC. The case was referred to provincial prosecutor Lastimosa. She conducted her
own preliminary investigation and found that only acts of lasciviousness had been committed.
She filed a case for acts of lasciviousness with the MCTC. As no case for attempted rape had
been filed by the Prosecutor’s Office, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica ordered on July 27, 1994
Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner Lastimosa to show cause why they should not be
punished for contempt for “refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives” of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

Petitioner contends that the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case against
the mayor because the crime involved (rape) was not committed in relation to a public office.
For this reason, it is argued that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to place her and
Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for refusing to follow his orders and
to cite them for indirect contempt for such refusal.

Petitioner also contends that her suspension is invalid because the order was issued without
giving her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar the opportunity to refute the charges against them
and because, at any rate, the evidence against them is not strong as required.

ISSUES:

Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to
assist in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo

Whether the suspension of petitioner is invalid

RULING:

AFFIRMATIVE. The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute on
its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient." This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime
committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are
related to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty. It is enough that
the act or omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when
committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate and prosecute.
NEGATIVE. Prior notice and hearing is not required, such suspension not being a penalty but
only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.

14. PBCom vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 112024, 28 January 1999

FACTS:
Petitioner, Philippine Bank of Communications, on August 7, 1987, requested the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (CIR) for a tax credit of P5,016,954.00 representing the overpayment of taxes in the first
and second quartets of 1985. On July 25, 1988, it filed a claim for refund of creditable taxes withheld by
their lessees from property rentals in 1985 for P282,795.50 and in 1986 for P234,077.69. Pending
investigation by the CIR, petitioner instituted a petition for review on Nov. 18, 1988 before the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA). In 1993, the CTA rendered a decision denying the request for a tax refund or credit in
the amount of P5,299,749.95 on the ground that it was filed beyond the two-year reglementary period.
The petitioner's claim for refund in 1986 was likewise denied on the assumption that it was automatically
credited by PBCom against its tax payment in the succeeding year. These pronouncements by the CTA
were affirmed in toto by the CA. Hence, this petition. Petitioner argues that its claim for refund tax credits
are not yet barred by prescription relying on the applicability of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 7-85
stating that overpaid income taxes are not covered by the two-year prescriptive period under the Tax
Code and that taxpayers may claim refund or tax credits within (ten) 10 years under Art. 1414 of the Civil
Code.

ISSUE:
WON the issuance of RMC 7-85, which changed the prescription period of two years to ten years on
claims of excess quarterly income tax payments, was valid.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that when the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued RMC 7-85,
changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten years on claims of excess quarterly income tax
payments, such circular created a clear inconsistency with the provision of Sec. 230 of the 1977 NIRC. In
so doing, the BIR did not simply interpret the law; rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the statute
passed by Congress. It bears repeating that Revenue memorandum-circulars are considered
administrative rulings (in the sense of more specific and less general interpretations of tax laws) which are
issued from time to time by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is widely accepted that the
interpretation placed upon a statute by the executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is entitled to
great respect by the courts. Nevertheless, such interpretation is not conclusive and will be ignored if
judicially found to be erroneous. Thus, courts will not countenance administrative issuances that override,
instead of remaining consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement.

16. Baylon vs. Fact-Finding Intelligence Bureau

DRA. HONORATA G. BAYLON, petitioner, vs. FACT-FINDING INTELLIGENCE BUREAU

represented by DIRECTOR AGAPITO ROSALES and the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
respondents.

G.R. No. 150870. December 11, 2002.

Nature of the case: By the present petition for review on certiorari, petitioner prays this Court to
give due course to her appeal and to ultimately set aside the Office of the Ombudsman's order
for her suspension from public office.

Facts: Dr. Honorata G. Baylon (petitioner), Head of the Division of Hematology and Transfusion
Medicine at the National Kidney and Transplant Institute (NKTI), was designated as Program
Manager of the government's National Voluntary Blood Donation Program (Blood Donation
Program) with NKTI as the lead agency in the implementation thereof.

After a sponsored study made by the USAID on the safety of the country's blood banking
system which found out that the Philippines' blood transfusion service failed to adequately meet
the demand for safe blood and that the blood sourced from commercial blood banks had a
contamination rate of four percent, Flavier (then Secretary of the DOH) ordered the closure of
provincial retail outlets of commercial blood banks as a result of which an acute shortage of
transfused blood ensued because of the blood banks' refusal to sell blood in retaliation to the
said closure order.

Flavier accordingly directed the full operation of the Blood Donation Program, which apparently
served as the then only viable system from which blood could be sourced.

In March 1995, the Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed in post audit the sale transactions
entered into by the NKTI with FVA on the ground that the blood bags were purchased without
public bidding, contrary to the applicable laws or rules, thereby allegedly resulting to overpricing.
The COA found that FVA sold "Terumo" blood bags to the Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC) and to blood banks Our Lady of Fatima and Mother Seaton at prices lower than those
at which it sold to the NKTI, leading to a consequent total loss to the government.

A criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and an
administrative complaint for gross misconduct was lodged against the petitioner. The Office of
the Ombudsman found probable cause to hold petitioner criminally liable and also
recommended petitioner and the rest of her co-respondents guilty of Grave Misconduct.

Issue/s:

(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals is in grave error in dismissing the petition for review of
the petitioner on a mere technicality. (YES)

(2) Whether or not the Resolution of the Court of Appeals be set aside and the Memorandum
Reviews of the Ombudsman be nullified. (YES)

Decision/Doctrine:

(1) The correctness of the Court of Appeals' dismissal of petitioner's petition for review
notwithstanding, this Court cannot write finis to the case at bar by the strict application of
the rules of procedure governing appeals. For judicial cases do not come and go through
the portals of a court of law by the mere mandate of technicalities. After going over all the
pleadings, evidence, and all other documents bearing on this case, this Court has resolved to
spare the present petition from dismissal to which it should have been consigned as a matter of
procedure.
We find attendant in the case at bar transcendental considerations which outweigh rules
of procedure thereby providing justification for the suspension of their application.
Petitioner's evidence and arguments in support of her claim of innocence of the charge of grave
misconduct have indeed cast doubt on the veracity of the Ombudsman's factual conclusions in
the subject administrative case against her. We cannot thus simply brush aside petitioner's
protestations of lack of administrative culpability for the sake of sticking to technicalities when
the merits of her cause are crying out for proper judicial determination.

The tardiness of the appeal of petitioner before the Court of Appeals undoubtedly stemmed from
her counsel's faux pas in the remedy pursued to assail the Ombudsman's questioned
Memorandum Reviews. In the normal course of things, petitioner would have been covered by
the general rule that a client is bound by the negligence or mistakes of his counsel. Yet, the
patent merits of petitioner's cause for the nullification of her suspension from public office nag
the Court towards the realization that to deny her the instant petition now based merely on the
fiction that the counsel's negligence binds the client is to unjustly seal petitioner's fate without
the benefit of a review of the correctness and justness of her imposed administrative liability.
Hers, thus, is a case of an extremely different kind; the exception to the rule on the
effects of the counsel's mistake or negligence, for the application of the rule would result
in serious injustice to petitioner. Especially in this case where she had nothing to do with
her counsel's mistake and negligence, thus clearly falling within the ambit of the reasons
provided for by Ginete v. CA for the relaxation of the rules.

(2) While factual findings of administrative and quasi-judicial agencies are generally
accorded not only respect but at times finality this holds true only when they are
supported by substantial evidence.

The Ombudsman's finding in its questioned Memorandum Reviews that petitioner is guilty of
grave misconduct was anchored principally on the fact that FVA sold the same "Terumo" blood
bags to PNRC and the Mother Seaton and Our Lady of Fatima blood banks at lower prices.
Such fact, however, cannot be regarded substantial evidence proving that petitioner is guilty of
grave misconduct.

In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant
disregard of established rule must be manifest. Petitioner's actuations in the procurement of
the blood bags were clearly antithetical to what constitutes grave misconduct.

What appears from the questioned Memorandum Reviews of the Ombudsman is that they
merely relied on the singular circumstance that certain medical institutions were allowed to
purchase the blood bags at lower prices, without taking into account petitioner's countervailing
evidence. While substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, suffices to
hold one administratively liable, the substantial evidence rule does not authorize any finding to
be made just as long as there is any evidence to support it; it does not excuse administrative
agencies from taking into account countervailing evidence which fairly detracts from the
evidence supporting a finding. The evidence in support of the Ombudsman's findings does not
amount to substantial evidence.

Disposition: WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is hereby GRANTED. The assailed May 2, 2001
and November 21, 2001 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, as well as the June 16, 2000 and
July 28, 2000-approved Memorandum Reviews of the Ombudsman, are hereby SET ASIDE.
The respondent is hereby ABSOLVED from any administrative liability in connection with the
purchases in question.

SO ORDERED.

17. LAXINA, SR. vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

G.R. No. 153155. 30 September 2005

FACTS:

In 1998, Ursal filed with the NBI a complaint for attempted rape against petitioner Laxina, Sr.,
the Barangay Chairman of Brgy. Batasan Hills, Quezon City. Laxina was subsequently charged
with sexual harassment before the RTC. In 2000, Ursal brought before the DILG a complaint-
affidavit charging Laxina with grave misconduct for the alleged attempted rape. The DILG
referred the complaint to the Quezon City Coucil (City Council). Thereafter, Ursal filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman a similar complaint affidavit.

The Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the Office of the Ombudsman found Laxina
guilty of grave misconduct and meted the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of material benefits,
per its Memorandum Order. Laxina sought review of the said Memorandum Order before the
Court of Appeals, arguing that: the Office of the Ombudsman did not have jurisdiction over the
administrative complaint; Ursal’s filing of the same administrative cases before the Ombudsman
and the City Council warranted the dismissal of both cases; and Laxina was denied due process
in the proceedings before the Ombudsman.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the cases should be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping;

2. Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the jurisdiction over the case; and
3. Whether the right of Laxina to due process was violated.

HELD:

1. No. The rule on forum-shopping applies only to judicial cases or proceedings, and
not to administrative cases.

2. Yes. The mandate of the Ombudsman to investigate complaints against erring public
officials, derived from both the Constitution and the law gives it jurisdiction over the
complaint against petitioner. To fulfill this mandate, R.A. No. 6770, or the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, was enacted, giving the Ombudsman or his Deputies
jurisdiction over complaints on all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-
feasance against officers or employees of the government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality therefor, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and the disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials,
 except those who may be removed only by impeachment or over members of
Congress and the Judiciary.

On the other hand, under R.A. No. 7160 or the Local Government Code, the
sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan has disciplinary authority over any
elective barangay official. Without a doubt, the Office of the Ombudsman has
concurrent jurisdiction with the Quezon City Council over administrative cases against
elective officials such as Laxina.

3. No. Laxina was accorded the opportunity to be heard. He was required to answer the
formal charge and given a chance to present evidence in his behalf. He was not
denied due process. More importantly, the decision of the Ombudsman is well
supported by substantial evidence. A finding of guilt in an administrative case would
have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that
respondent has committed the acts stated in the complaint or formal charge.
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This is different from the
degree of proof required in criminal proceedings, which calls for a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

18. Globe Telecom vs. NTC, G.R. No. 143964, 26 July 2004

FACTS:

Private respondent Smart Communications, Inc. (Smart) filed with the NTC a Complaint to effect
the interconnection of their SMS or texting services with petitioner Globe Telecom, Inc. (Globe).
Smart alleged that Globe, with evident bad faith and malice, refused to grant Smart’s request for
the interconnection of SMS. Globe pointed out procedural defects in Smart’s complaints and
moved to dismiss the case.

NTC issued the Order where it ruled that both Smart and Globe were “equally blameworthy” and
issued an Order for their lack of cooperation in the submission of the documentation required for
interconnection and for having unduly maneuvered the situation into the present impasse and
penalized both on the ground of providing SMS under Value Added Services (VAS) without prior
approval from the NTC. NTC ordered Smart and Globe to secure the requisite authority to
provide SMS within 30 days, subject to payment of fine in the amount of P200.00 from the date
of violation and for every day during which such violation continues. Globe filed with the CA a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to nullify and set aside the Order.

Issue:
 Whether or not NTC acted with due process in levying the fine against Globe.

Held:

No. (The order of the NTC is hereby SET ASIDE)

The assailed NTCs determination and corresponding penalty were rendered in the
exercise of quasi-judicial functions. Therefore, all the requirements of due process attendant to
the exercise of quasi-judicial power apply to the present case. The 7 Cardinal Primary Rights in
justiciable cases before an administrative tribunal in the case of Ang Tibal vs CIR are as follows:

The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider
the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of
having something to support its decision. Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must
be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected.

NTC violated several of these cardinal rights due Globe in the promulgation of the
assailed Order.

First. The NTC Order is not supported by substantial evidence. Neither does it sufficiently
explain the reasons for the decision rendered.

Second. Globe and Smart were denied opportunity to present evidence on the issues
relating to the nature of VAS and the prior approval.

Third. The imposition of fine is void for violation of due process. NTC cited Sec. 21 of
Public Service Act as a basis for its imposition of fine on Globe. Section 21 requires notice
and hearing because fine is a sanction, regulatory and even punitive in character. Indeed, the
requirement is the essence of due process.

19. Almanzor vs. Felix, G.R. No. 144935, 15 January 2005

Facts: Petitioner-spouses are officials of the Technological University of the Philippines

(TUP). Both their signatures are needed as a prerequisite to the collection by TUP
employees of their proportionate vacation pay.

Respondent Felix, a professor in TUP, filed for a violation of Anti-graft and corrupt
Practices Law against the petitioners alleging that they maliciously refused to sign his
clearance which was needed to collect his PVP. The Ombudsman found the petitioners
guilty of slight misconduct. The CA affirmed the decision of the Ombudsman. Hence,
this review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether the decision of the Ombudsman in administrative cases is immediately
executory pending appeal?

Ruling: The Court held in the affirmative.

Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court shall not disturb the
findings of the Ombudsman as agreed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court
cannot weigh once more the evidence submitted not only before the Ombudsman but
also before the Court of Appeals. Under Sec. 27 of Republic Act 6770, findings of fact
by the Ombudsman are conclusive as long as it is supported by substantial evidence.
No error has been committed by the appellate court in sustaining the penalty of
suspension imposed on petitioners.

20. SAMALIO v CA G.R. No. 140079 March 31, 2005

FACTS: Weng Sai Qin, a Chinese with Uruguayan passport was taken to Augusto R. Samalio,
Intelligence Officer of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID), because it was
suspected that her passport was fake. Ms. Weng paid $500 in exchange of her passport but
was returned to her without an immigration arrival stamp. Upon Ms. Weng’s complaint, City
Prosecutor’s Office of Pasay City recommended that Samalio be prosecuted for Robbery and
Violation of Section 46 of the Immigration Law before the Sandiganbayan. BID Commissioner
issued an order commencing an administrative case against Samalio and imposing a preventive
suspension for 90 days. In his Answer, Samalio denied the charges against him and elected a
formal investigation if the same was not found to be satisfactory. His answer contained the
affidavits of his witnesses. Since his answer was found to be unsatisfactory, the case was set
for formal hearing before the Board of Discipline of BID. After formal hearing before the Board of
Discipline of BID, Acting Commissioner Ramon J. Liwag, issued the decision finding Samalio
guilty of the charges and was ordered dismissed from service. Upon indorsement to Justice
Secretary, said decision was confirmed. Such decision was also affirmed by CSC and CA.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Samalio was deprived of due process.

HELD: No. The CSC decision and resolution which upheld the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice confirming the decision of the Commissioner of the BID are supported by substantial
evidence. The case was decided on the basis of the pleadings and papers submitted by the
parties, and relied on the records of the proceedings taken. The Rules of Court, which are
meant to secure to every litigant the due process of law, may be applied to proceedings before
an administrative body with quasi-judicial powers in the absence of different and valid statutory
or administrative provisions prescribing the ground rules for the investigation, hearing and
adjudication of cases before it. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-
type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either
through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The
requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand. In this case, Samalio was heard through the
various pleadings which he filed with the Board of Discipline of the BID when he filed the answer
and two motions to dismiss, as well as other motions and papers. He was able to participate in
all stages of the administrative proceeding. He was able to elevate his case to the Secretary of
Justice and subsequently, to the CSC by way of appeal. Hence, Samalio’s denial of due
process cannot be invoked since he was given the opportunity to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration.

Doctrine: Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings
similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments
or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. A formal or trial-
type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied
where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process
in its strict judicial sense.

21. Land Bank vs. Natividad, G.R. No. 127198, 16 May 2005

DOCTRINE: Procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. DAR has the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation.

This is a Petition for Review assailing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court which ordered the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) to pay
private respondents the amount of P30.00 per square meter as just compensation for the State's
acquisition of private respondents' properties under the land reform program.

FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the determination of just
compensation for their agricultural lands. The trial court ordered respondents, particularly, respondents
Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the Philippines, to pay these lands owned by
petitioners and which are the subject of acquisition by the State under its land reform program.

DAR and Land Bank filed separate motions for reconsideration which were denied by the trial court as the
same did not contain a notice of hearing. Land Bank consequently failed to file a timely appeal and the
assailed Decision became final and executory.

Land Bank then filed a Petition for Relief from Order Dated 30 July 1996, citing excusable negligence –
failure of its counsel to include a notice of hearing due to pressure of work – as its ground for relief. This
was denied by the trial court because Land Bank lost a remedy in law due to its own negligence.

Land Bank alleges that 1) private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DAR's
valuation of their properties; and 2) Private respondents thus failed to exhaust administrative remedies
when they filed a petition for the determination of just compensation directly with the trial court; and 3) that
private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DAR's valuation instead of filing a
petition to fix just compensation with the trial court

Private respondents filed a Comment averring that Land Bank's failure to include a notice of hearing in its
motion for reconsideration due merely to counsel's heavy workload, which resulted in the motion being
declared pro forma, does not constitute excusable negligence.

ISSUES:
1. Whether counsel's failure to include a notice of hearing constitutes excusable negligence entitling
Land Bank to a relief from judgment.
 2. Whether private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DAR's valuation
instead of filing a petition to fix just compensation with the trial court

RULING:
1. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Firstly, the Supreme Court noted that relief from judgment
can only be resorted to on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Measured
against this standard, the reason proffered by Land Bank's counsel, i.e., that his heavy workload
prevented him from ensuring that the motion for reconsideration included a notice of hearing, was by no
means excusable.

Secondly, the Supreme Court emphasized that procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication
of cases. Courts and litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. The liberal interpretation and
application of rules apply only in proper cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and
circumstances, and that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to
ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.

2. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Supreme Court first noted that private respondents did
write a letter to the DAR Secretary objecting to the land valuation summary but such was left
unanswered. Secondly, the Supreme Court ruled that the trial did not err in taking cognizance of the case
as the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice.

Following the ruling in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court declared that
there is nothing contradictory between the DAR's primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation.
The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings.

In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to
determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform
program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just
compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial
function.

The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents for
their property, taking into account its nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market value,
assessor's value and the volume and value of its produce. The Supreme Court is convinced that the trial
court correctly determined the amount of just compensation due private respondents in accordance with,
and guided by, RA 6657 and existing jurisprudence.

22. SANTOS v. WILSON GO, G.R. No. 156081, 19 October 2005

FACTS:
The petitioners are corporate directors and officers of Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI). FEPI allegedly
entered into a Project Agreement with Manila Southcoast Development Corporation (MSDC), whereby
FEPI undertook to develop several parcels of land in Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly owned by MSDC.
Under the terms of the Agreement, FEPI was to convert an approximate area of 1,269 hectares into a
first-class residential, commercial, resort, leisure, and recreational complex. The said Project Agreement
clothed FEPI with authority to market and sell the subdivision lots to the public.

Respondent Wilson Go offered to buy Lot 17, Block 38 from FEPI. The Contract to Sell signed by the
parties was the standard, printed form prepared by FEPI. Go fully complied with the terms of the Contract.
FEPI, however, failed to develop the property. Neither did it release the TCT to Go. The latter demanded
fulfillment of the terms and conditions of their agreement. FEPI balked.
In several letters to its clients, including respondent Go, FEPI explained that the project was temporarily
halted due to some claimants who opposed FEPI's application for exclusion of the subject properties from
the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Further, FEPI's hands were tied by a
cease and desist order issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).

Go then filed a complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). He likewise filed
a separate Complaint-Affidavit for estafa under Articles 316 and 318 of the Revised Penal Code before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City against petitioners as officers of FEPI.

Petitioners challenged the jurisdiction of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City to conduct the preliminary
investigation on the ground that the complainant was not from Pasig City, the contract was not executed
nor were the payments made in Pasig City. Besides, none of the elements of estafa under Articles 316
and 318 were present. According to petitioner, there being neither deceit nor misrepresentation, there
could be neither damage nor prejudice to respondent, and no probable cause exists to indict the
petitioners.

In his reply, Go stressed that the City Prosecutor of Pasig City had jurisdiction over the case. He argued
that the Contract to Sell specifically provided that payment be made at FEPI's office at Pasig City and the
demand letters bore the Pasig City address. He averred that FEPI could not disclaim ownership of the
project since the contract described FEPI as owner without mentioning MSDC.

After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor resolved to dismiss the complaint for estafa. Go
appealed the City Prosecutor's Resolution to the Department of Justice (DOJ), which, in turn reversed the
City Prosecutor's findings. Accordingly, an Information for estafa was filed against petitioners and
Federico Campos and Polo Pantaleon before the MTC of Pasig City. However, the arraignment was
deferred since Campos and Pantaleon filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause, which
was granted by the trial court. Meanwhile petitioners herein filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for
review.

The appellate court disposed of the case and opined that a petition for review pursuant to Rule 43 cannot
be availed of as a mode of appeal from the ruling of the Secretary of Justice because the Rule applies
only to agencies or officers exercising quasi-judicial functions. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but
the motion was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation by the prosecutor is a quasi-judicial function.

RULING:
NO. In Bautista v. Court of Appeals, we held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding, thus: “the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule- making functions. Preliminary investigation is
merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably
charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the
case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes
that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that
pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.”

Though some cases describe the public prosecutor's power to conduct a preliminary investigation as
quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an
officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at
this point. A quasi-judicial body is as an organ of government other than a court and other than a
legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making.A quasi-
judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and
their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a public
prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file an information against
a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing the former's order
or resolutions.

23. Bautista vs. CA, G.R. No. 143375, 6 July 2006

FACTS:

In April 1998 petitioner Ruth D. Bautista issued to private respondent Susan Aloña Metrobank Check No.
005014037 dated 8 May 1998 for P1,500,000.00 drawn on Metrobank Cavite City Branch. According to
the private respondent (Susan Aloña), the petitioner assured her that the check would be sufficiently
funded on the maturity date.

On 16 March 1999 private respondent filed a complaint-affidavit with the City Prosecutor of Cavite City. In
addition to the details of the issuance and the dishonor of the check, she also alleged that she made
repeated demands on the petitioner to make arrangements for the payment of the check within five (5)
working days after receipt of notice of dishonor from the bank, but that petitioner failed to do so.

Petitioner then submitted her own counter-affidavit asserting in her defense that presentment of the check
within ninety (90) days from due date thereof was an essential element of the offense of violation of BP
22. Since the check was presented for payment 166 days after its due date, it was no longer punishable
under BP 22 and therefore the complaint should be dismissed for lack of merit. She also claimed that she
already assigned the private respondent her condominium unit at Antel Seaview Condominium, Roxas
Boulevard, as full payment for the bounced checks thus extinguishing her criminal liability.

On 22 April 1999, the investigating prosecutor issued a resolution recommending the filing of an
Information against petitioner for violation of BP 22, which was approved by the City Prosecutor.

On 13 May 1999, the petitioner filed with the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor for Region IV a
petition for review of the resolution. The ORSP denied the petition. Bautista filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the ORSP also denied.

On 1 October 1999, the petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals questioning the resolution of the ORSP.
She submits that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation performs a quasi-judicial function. In
these cases, the Supreme Court held that the power to conduct preliminary investigation is quasi-judicial
in nature. But this statement holds true only in the sense that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is
an office in the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court. Here is where the
similarity ends.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Office of the Prosecutor is a quasi-judicial body as to warrant appeals of its decisions
approving the filing of a criminal complaint to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

RULING:

No, the Office of the Prosecutor is not a quasi-judicial body.

A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is very different from other quasi-judicial
proceedings. A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and
other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-
making."

In Luzon Development Bank v. Luzon Development Bank Employees, it was held that a voluntary
arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency, hence
his decisions and awards are appealable to the Court of Appeals. This is so because the awards of
voluntary arbitrators become final and executory upon the lapse of the period to appeal; and since their
awards determine the rights of parties, their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court.
Therefore, the proper remedy from an award of a voluntary arbitrator is a petition for review to the Court
of Appeals, following Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, which provided for a uniform procedure for
appellate review of all adjudications of quasi-judicial entities, which is now embodied in Rule 43 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is
merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably
charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the
case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.While the fiscal makes
that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that
pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.

Hence, the Office of the Prosecutor is not a quasi-judicial body; necessarily, its decisions approving the
filing of a criminal complaint are not appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. Since the ORSP
has the power to resolve appeals with finality only where the penalty prescribed for the offense does not
exceed prision correccional, regardless of the imposable fine, the only remedy of petitioner, in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion, is to present her defense in the trial of the case.

Besides, it is well-settled that the courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the fiscal to determine the
specificity and adequacy of the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it to
be insufficient in form or substance or if he finds no ground to continue with the inquiry; or, he may
otherwise proceed with the investigation if the complaint is, in his view, in due and proper form.

24. Destileria Limtuaco vs. Advertising Board of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164242, 28
November 2008

FACTS:

AdBoard is an umbrella non-stock, non-profit corporation created in 1974 composed of several

national organizations in the advertising industry, including Advertising Suppliers Association of
the Philippines (ASAP), Association of Accredited Advertising Agencies Philippines
(4As),Cinema Advertising Association of the Philippines (CAAP), Independent Blocktimers
Association of the Philippines (IBA), Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), Outer
Advertising Association of the Philippines (OAAP), the Marketing & Opinion Research Society of
the Philippines (MORES), Philippine Association of National Advertisers (PANA) and the Print
Media Organization (PRIMO).

Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. (Destileria) was formerly a member of PANA.

In January 2004, Destileria and Convoy Marketing Corporation (Convoy), through its advertising
agency, SLG Advertising (SLG), a member of the 4As, applied with the AdBoard for a clearance
of the airing of a radio advertisement entitled, "Ginagabi (Nakatikim ka na ba ng Kinse Anyos)."

AdBoard issued a clearance for said advertisement. Not long after the ad started airing,
AdBoard was swept with complaints from the public. This prompted AdBoard to ask SLG for a
replacement but there was no response. With the continued complaints from the public,
AdBoard, this time, asked SLG to withdraw its advertisement, to no avail. Thus, AdBoard
decided to recall the clearance previously issued, effective immediately. The said decision to
recall was conveyed to SLG and AdBoard's members-organizations.

Petitioners protested the AdBoard's decision, after which, they filed a Complaint which was later
on amended, for Dissolution of Corporation, Damages and Application for Preliminary Injunction
with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order with the RTC. The Amended Complaint sought
the revocation/cancellation of AdBoard's registration and its dissolution on the grounds, inter
alia, that it was usurping the functions of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the
Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) by misrepresenting that it has
the power to screen, review and approve all radio and television advertisements. Petitioners
seek the nullity of AdBoard's "Code of Ethics for Advertising" and "ACRC Manual of Procedures
for Screening and Filing of Complaints and Appeals."

In May 2004, AdBoard a circular reminding its members-organizations of Article VIII of the
ACRC Manual of Procedures, which prohibits the airing of materials not duly screened by it.

ISSUE:

Whether the acts of AdBoard sought to be prohibited in this case are not the acts of a tribunal,
board, officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions

DECISION:

Yes. First of all, the petition filed in this case is one for prohibition, i.e., to command AdBoard
to desist from requiring petitioners to secure a clearance and imposing sanctions on any agency
that will air, broadcast or publish petitioners' ads without such clearance. Under Section 2, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, for petitioners to be entitled to such recourse, it must establish the
following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person
exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or
person has acted without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion;
and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.

A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function by which he has the power to determine
what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine
these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function is a term
which applies to the action and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies,
which are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature. Ministerial function is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard
for the exercise of his/its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done.

The acts sought to be prohibited in this case are not the acts of a tribunal, board, officer, or
person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. What is at contest here is the
power and authority of a private organization, composed of several members-organizations,
which power and authority were vested to it by its own members. Obviously, prohibition will
not lie in this case. The definition and purpose of a writ of prohibition excludes the use of the
writ against any person or group of persons acting in a purely private capacity, and the
writ will not be issued against private individuals or corporations so acting.
 26. EQUITABLE PCI BANKING CORPORATION, versus RCBC CAPITAL
CORPORATION, December 18, 2008, G.R. No. 182248

Facts:

On May 24, 2000, Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. (EPCIB) and the individual shareholders of
Bankard, Inc., as sellers, and RCBC Capital Corporation (RCBC), as buyer, executed a
Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) for the purchase of EPCIB’s interests in Bankard,
representing 226,460,000 shares, for the price of PhP 1,786,769,400. To expedite the
purchase, RCBC agreed to dispense with the conduct of a due diligence audit on the
financial status of Bankard.

Under the SPA, RCBC undertakes, on the date of contract execution, to deposit, as
down payment, 20% of the purchase price, or PhP 357,353,880, in an escrow account.
The escrowed amount, the SPA stated, should be released to petitioners on an agreed-
upon release date and the balance of the purchase price shall be delivered to the share
buyers upon the fulfillment of certain conditions agreed upon, in the form of a manager's
check.

On June 2, 2000, RCBC deposited the stipulated down payment amount in an escrow
account after which it was given full management and operational control of Bankard.
June 2, 2000 is also considered by the parties as the Closing Date referred to in the
SPA.

Sometime in September 2000, RCBC had Bankards accounts audited, the audit’s
conclusion was that the warranty, as contained in Section 5(h) of the SPA (simply Sec.
5[h] hereinafter), was correct.

On December 28, 2000, RCBC paid the balance of the contract price. The
corresponding deeds of sale for the shares in question were executed in January 2001.

Thereafter, in a letter of May 5, 2003, RCBC informed EPCIB of its having overpaid the
purchase price of the subject shares, claiming that there was an overstatement of
valuation of accounts amounting to PhP 478 million, resulting in the overpayment of
over PhP 616 million. Thus, RCBC claimed that EPCIB violated their warranty, as
sellers, embodied in Sec. 5(g) of the SPA (Sec. 5[g] hereinafter).

Following unsuccessful attempts at settlement, RCBC, in accordance with Sec. 10 of

the SPA, filed a Request for Arbitration dated May 12, 2004 with the ICC-ICA. Per
RCBC, its overpayment amounted to PhP 556 million. It thus prayed for the rescission
of the SPA, restitution of the purchase price, payment of actual damages in the amount
of PhP 573,132,110, legal interest on the purchase price until actual restitution, moral
damages, and litigation and attorneys fees. As alternative to rescission and restitution,
RCBC prayed for damages in the amount of at least PhP 809,796,092 plus legal
interest.

To the Request for Arbitration, EPCIB filed an Answer dated July 28, 2004, denying
RCBCs inculpatory averments and setting up RCBC is not entitled to its alternative
prayer of damages, being guilty of laches and failing to set out the details of the breach
as required under Sec. 7.

Arbitration in the ICC-ICA proceeded after the formation of the arbitration tribunal
consisting of retired Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, nominated by petitioners; Neil
Kaplan, RCBCs nominee; and Sir Ian Barker, appointed by the ICC-ICA.

After drawn out proceedings with each party alleging deviation and non-compliance by
the other with arbitration rules, Justice Kapunan rendered a Partial Award dated
September 27, 2007.

On the matter of prescription, the tribunal held that RCBCs claim is not time-barred. As
such, the tribunal concluded, RCBCs claim was filed within the three (3)-year period
under Sec. 5(g) and that the six (6)-month period under Sec. 5(h) did not apply.

The tribunal also exonerated RCBC from laches, the latter having sought relief within
the three (3)-year period prescribed in the SPA. On the matter of estoppel suggested in
petitioners answer, the tribunal rejected the same.

On October 26, 2007, RCBC filed with the RTC a Motion to Confirm Partial Award. On
the same day, EPCIB countered with a Motion to Vacate the Partial Award. On
November 9, 2007, petitioners again filed a Motion to Suspend and Inhibit Barker and
Kaplan.

On January 8, 2008, the RTC issued the first assailed order confirming the Partial
Award and denying the averted separate motions to vacate and to suspend and inhibit.
From this order, petitioners sought reconsideration, but their motion was denied by the
RTC in the equally assailed second order of March 17, 2008.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court acted contrary to law and judicial authority in refusing to
vacate the arbitral award, notwithstanding it was rendered in plain disregard of the
parties contract and applicable Philippine law, under which the claim in arbitration was
indubitably time-barred.

Held:

No. The Court will not overturn an arbitral award unless it was made in manifest
disregard of the Law.

As a rule, the award of an arbitrator cannot be set aside for mere errors of judgment
either as to the law or as to the facts. Courts are without power to amend or overrule
merely because of disagreement with matters of law or facts determined by the
arbitrators. They will not review the findings of law and fact contained in an award, and
will not undertake to substitute their judgment for that of the arbitrators, since any other
rule would make an award the commencement, not the end, of litigation. Errors of law
and fact, or an erroneous decision of matters submitted to the judgment of the
arbitrators, are insufficient to invalidate an award fairly and honestly made. Judicial
review of an arbitration is, thus, more limited than judicial review of a trial.

Nonetheless, the arbitrator's award is not absolute and without exceptions. The
arbitrators cannot resolve issues beyond the scope of the submission agreement. The
parties to such an agreement are bound by the arbitrators award only to the extent and
in the manner prescribed by the contract and only if the award is rendered in conformity
thereto. Thus, Sections 24 and 25 of the Arbitration Law provide grounds for vacating,
rescinding or modifying an arbitration award. Where the conditions described in Articles
2038, 2039 and 2040 of the Civil Code applicable to compromises and arbitration are
attendant, the arbitration award may also be annulled.

27. Solid Homes vs. Laserna, G.R. No. 166051, 8 April 2008

FACTS:

Respondents Evelina Laserna and Gloria Cajipe entered into a contract to sell with Solid Homes, Inc. for
the sale of a parcel of land located at Loyola Grand Villas.

When respondents had allegedly paid 90% of the purchase price, they demanded the execution and
delivery of the Deed of Sale and the Transfer Certificate of Title of the property upon final balance
payment. But Solid Homes, Inc. did not comply with such demands.

Respondents filed against Solid Homes, Inc. a Complaint for Delivery of Title and Execution of Deed of
Sale with Damages before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
HLURB Arbiter denied respondents' prayer for the issuance of the Deed of Sale and the delivery of the
TCT. The said decision was modified by the HLURB Board of Commissioner by directing respondents to
execute the necessary deed of sale and deliver the TCT over the subject property immediately upon full
payment.

Solid Homes, Inc. appealed the decision before the Office of the President (OP), which affirmed in toto
the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners.

Solid Homes, Inc. now alleged that the OP Decision, as affirmed by the Court of Appeal, which merely
adopted by reference the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, without a recitation of the
facts and law on which it was based, runs afoul of the mandate of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Solid Homes, Inc. was denied due process. [NO]

RULING:

NO. Solid Homes, Inc. was not denied due process. Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
does not apply to decisions rendered in administrative proceedings.

The rights of parties in administrative proceedings are not violated as long as the constitutional
requirement of due process has been satisfied. Among these rights are "the decision must be rendered
on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected"; and that the decision be rendered "in such a manner that the parties to the proceedings can
know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered".

There is no requirement that the decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based. As long as the administrative decision is grounded on evidence, and expressed in a
manner that sufficiently informs the parties of the factual and legal bases of the decision, the due process
requirement is satisfied.

At bar, the Office of the President apparently considered the Decision of HLURB as correct and sufficient.
The brevity of the assailed Decision was not the product of willing concealment of its factual and legal
bases. Such bases were already contained in the HLURB decision, and the parties adversely affected
need only refer to the HLURB Decision in order to be able to interpose an informed appeal or action for
certiorari under Rule 65.

Although the decisions of the Office of the President need not comply with the constitutional requirement
imposed on courts under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Rules of Court may still find
suppletory application whenever practicable and convenient.

There is no mandate that requires the application of the Rules of Court in administrative proceedings.

28. Soriano vs. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, 29 April 2009

FACTS:

On August 10, 2004, the petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan (ELISEO F. SORIANO),
aired on UNTV 37 the following remarks:

“Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling; Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di
ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang
itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan.
Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.”

To which the MTRCB found the petitioner liable for his utterances, thereby imposing a penalty of three (3)
months suspension from his program.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Eliseo’s freedom of speech, as guaranteed under Sec. 4, Art. III of the Constitution
has been violated, and that his suspension was valid.

Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that his rights were not violated.

It was explained that the statement of Eliseo can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to an
average child.

The Court also ruled that Eliseo cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of free speech,
especially when said statements were made in a medium easily accessible to children. With respect
to the young minds, said utterances are to be treated as unprotected speech.

Eliseo’s freedom of speech was weighed against the duty of the government to protect the
development and welfare of the youth. The State has the obligation and responsibility to provide
protection to the youth against improper activities that may prejudice their general well-being. The
statements were uttered in a TV program that is for general viewership, and in a timeslot that would
likely reach the eyes and ears of the children. The statements were then deemed to be unprotected
speech as it could corrupt the young minds of the children. This constitutes a compelling state
interest in regulating the petitioner’s utterances as provided for by PD 1986.

The Supreme Court also held that the three-month suspension is not a prior restraint on speech
which is illegal and presumed to be unconstitutional breaches of the freedom of speech.

The suspension is in the form of a permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment for
the offensive and obscene remarks he uttered in his television program. Moreover, the petitioner is
deemed to have yielded his right to the full enjoyment of his freedom of speech to regulation under
PD 1986 as it has impliedly accepted the power of the MTRCB to regulate the broadcast industry
when it acquired a permit or license to show a motion picture or broadcasting a TV program
pursuant to the same decree.

The imposition of a penalty of THREE (3) months suspension on the television program was
imposed.

29. LOPEZ VS OMBUDSMAN

FACTS:
Petitioner Lopez was the Administrative Officer V of DECS Region 12. Among his duty as such
officer is to determine necessary expenses in the attainment of the objectives of DECS Region
12. In Dec 1993, Lopez together with other officials and employees of DECS Region 12 were
implicated by the COA-Special Audit Team in the alleged deficiencies in the purchase of several
laboratory equipment ordered by different schools division. In post-haste the COA Regional
Directors indorsed a Complaint against petitioner and concerned employees to the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao for preliminary investigation.

The Office of Ombudsman-Mindanao docketed the complaint as Case No. 3-93-27791, entitled
"Commission on Audit vs. Makil Pundaodaya, et al.," for Falsification of Documents by Public
Officers. Petitioner was directed by Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) Tolentino to submit a
Counter-Affidavit. But he was not informed about his right to counsel. Petitioner submitted his
Counter-Affidavit without the assistance of a counsel. The other respondents of Case No. 3-93-
27791 submitted theirs through Atty. Camello as counsel.

More than 4 years after he submitted his Counter- Affidavit, the petitioner was
surprised that, without preliminary investigation and clarificatory question asked, on July 17,
1998, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao terminated the preliminary
investigation recommending that he, together with the other respondents in Case No.
OMB3-93-9791, be prosecuted for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Petitioner sent a letter to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao dated June 8, 1999 seeking
the reconsideration of the Resolution in Case No. OMB 33-93-2791 wherein he stressed that he
was deprived of due process and that there was inordinate delay in the resolution of the
preliminary investigation.

In their part, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao explained that the delays were due to
some granted Motion of Extension to File Counter-Affidavit by Atty. Camello, the unfurnishing of
defendants' Counter-Affidavit to COA, the granting of COA's extension to file their Reply-
Affidavit due to urgent matters in the Commission and the number of transactions involved
against the defendants as there were 30 Informations to be reviewed. It was also found that the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao erroneously assumed or deliberately made to appear that
he was represented by said attorney. As a consequence thereof, the Office of Ombudsman-
Mindanao did not notify him of the progress of the preliminary investigation. In fact, it did not
issue any order directing COA, Region XIl to
furnish him with a copy of the latter's Reply-Affidavit, which explained why petitioner
could not be expected to submit a Rejoinder to rebut the issues raised in said Reply-
Affidavit.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner’s right to speedy disposition is violated

RULING:
Article III of the Constitution provides that:

Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

The constitutional right to a "speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative
cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings." Hence, under the
Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked
with the administration of justice.

the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only
when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or even without cause or
justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried.

In this case, the preliminary investigation was resolved close to four (4) years from the time all
the counter and reply affidavits were submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman.The cases are
not sufficiently complex to justify the length of time for their resolution. Neither can the long
delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation be justified on the basis of the
number of informations filed before the Sandiganbayan nor of the transactions involved. Indeed
it appears that the COA special audit team had already come up and provided the Office of the
Ombudsman with the facts and figures on the alleged overpricing, lack of public bidding and
irregular inspection reports, so much so that a delay of almost four years in terminating the
preliminary investigation is not justified. In such event, petitioner is entitled to the dismissal of
the cases filed against him.

30. ESTRADA vs. OMBUDSMAN, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, 21 January 2015\

FACTS:
Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada two (2) criminal
complaints for plunder, among others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two
complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014.

On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of
the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the “Request”). Sen. Estrada’s
request was made “[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant which he may not have been furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to
‘have access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman).”

The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request and reiterated that there is no provision under this
Office's Rules of Procedure which entitles respondent to be furnished all the filings by the other parties,
e.g. the respondents. Ruby Tuason, Dennis Cunanan, Gondelina G. Amata and Mario L. Relampagos
themselves are all respondents in these cases. Under the Rules of Court as well as the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, the respondents are only required to furnish their counter-
affidavits and controverting evidence to the complainant, and not to the other respondents.

Later on, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution which found probable cause to indict Sen. Estrada
and his co-respondents with one count of plunder and 11 counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No.
3019. Sen. Estrada filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the Joint Resolution dated 28 March 2014)
dated 7 April 2014. Sen. Estrada prayed for the issuance of a new resolution dismissing the charges
against him. Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the Ombudsman's Order denying his Request,
Sen. Estrada filed the present Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and sought to annul and set aside the
joint resolution.

ISSUE:
WON the Office of the Ombudsman, in issuing the challenged order, acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and violated Sen.
Estrada's constitutional right to due process of law.

RULING:
No. The Ombudsman's denial Order of Sen. Estrada's Request did not constitute grave abuse of
discretion. Indeed, the denial did not violate Sen. Estrada's constitutional right to due process. Moreover,
there is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents.

Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counteraffidavits of his co-respondents violates
his constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which states
thatit is a compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman
furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither Section 3 (b), Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4 (c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada's claim.

What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish
the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the
order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. This is clear from Section 4 (b), Rule II of
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman when it states, "[a]fter such affidavits [of the
complainant and his witnesses] have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order,
attaching
thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within
ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counteraffidavits . . . ." At this point, there is still no counter-affidavit
submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what Section 4 (b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and
his witnesses, not the affidavits of the corespondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-
respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of the complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can
thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which denied Sen.
Estrada's Request.

Although Section 4 (c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman provides that a
respondent "shall have access to the evidence on record," this provision should be construed in relation
to Section 4 (a) and (b) of the same Rule, as well as to the Rules of Criminal Procedure. First, Section 4
(a) states that "the investigating officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute
affidavits to substantiate the complaint." The "supporting witnesses" are the witnesses of the complainant,
and do not refer to the co-respondents.

We should remember to consider the differences in adjudicating cases, particularly an administrative case
and a criminal case:

Any lawyer worth his salt knows that quanta of proof and adjective rules vary depending on
whether the cases to which they are meant to apply are criminal, civil or administrative in
character. In criminal actions, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for conviction; in civil
 actions and proceedings, preponderance of evidence, as support for a judgment; and in
administrative cases, substantial evidence, as basis for adjudication. In criminal and civil actions,
application of the Rules of Court is called for, with more or less strictness. In administrative
proceedings, however, the technical rules of pleading and procedure, and of evidence, are not
strictly adhered to; they generally apply only suppletorily; indeed, in agrarian disputes application
of the Rules of Court is actually prohibited.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 212140-41.

32. PHILCOMSAT vs. Sandiganbayan

PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION and PHILCOMSAT

HOLDINGS CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN 5th DIVISION and
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, respondents.

G.R. No. 203023. June 17, 2015.

Nature of the case: Petitioners are assailing the Sandiganbayan's Resolution promulgated on
3 May 2012 dismissing their complaint in Civil Case No. SB-12-CVL-0001, and the Resolution
promulgated on 14 August 2012 denying their motion for reconsideration.

Facts: PHC, formerly known as Liberty Mines, Inc. (LMI), is a domestic corporation listed in the
Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE). On 13 September 1995, Oliverio G. Laperal (Laperal), then
Chairman of the Board and President of LMI, and Honorio Poblador III, then President of
PHILCOMSAT, signed a Memorandum of Agreement for the latter to gain controlling interest in
LMI through an increase in its authorized capital stock. On 24 June 1996, Laperal and
PHILCOMSAT executed a Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement reiterating the increase in
capital stock of LMI.

Sometime in 1997, LMI changed its name to PHC. It declassified its shares and amended its
primary purpose to become a holding company. PHC then filed its application with the PSE for
listing the shares representing the increase in its capital stock. Included in this application were
the PHC shares owned by PHILCOMSAT.

Pending the PSE's final approval of PHC's application for listing of the shares, the PCGG on 1
March 2005, made a written request to suspend the listing of the increase in PHC's capital stock
citing as reason the need to settle the conflicting claims of the two sets of board of directors of
the Philippine Overseas Telecommunication Corporation (POTC) and PHILCOMSAT.

In November 2007, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed new government

nominees to the POTC and PHILCOMSAT boards. POTC owns 100% of PHILCOMSAT.

On 19 November 2007, in a special stockholders' meeting attended by POTC's private

stockholders and Presidential Management Staff Undersecretary Enrique D. Perez, as
representative and proxy of the Republic of the Philippines, and observed by Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) representatives. On the same day, PHILCOMSAT held a special
stockholders' meeting attended by Erlinda I. Bildner as proxy for POTC.
On 7 May 2008, the PCGG issued En Banc Resolution recognizing the validity of the POTC's
and PHILCOMSAT's respective stockholders' meetings and elections, both held on 19
November 2007.

In a letter 14 dated 25 July 2011, Katrina C. Ponce-Enrile (Ponce-Enrile), then President of

POTC, wrote to then PCGG Chairman Andres D. Bautista (Chairman Bautista) demanding that
the PCGG rescind its objection to the listing of the increase in PHC's capital stock. When PCGG
failed to reply, PHILCOMSAT sent a final demand letter reiterating its demand for PCGG to
withdraw its objection to the listing of the increase in PHC's capital stock.

On 11 January 2012, Ponce-Enrile received a letter from Chairman Bautista, informing her that,
the agency was discussing the matter with the Department of Finance and that the two would
give a joint recommendation thereafter. However, the PCGG never communicated said
recommendation to PHILCOMSAT.

On 1 February 2012, PHILCOMSAT filed a complaint before the Sandiganbayan against PCGG
to compel the latter to withdraw its opposition to the listing of the increase in PHC's capital
stock. The PCGG filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which was granted. On 14 August
2012, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Issue/s: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case a quo for lack of
jurisdiction on [the] ground that the action allegedly involves an intra- corporate controversy.
(NO)

Decision/Doctrine:

The Complaint involves an Intra-corporate Controversy

To determine if a case involves an intra-corporate controversy, the courts have applied two
tests: the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test.

Under the relationship test, the existence of any of the following relationships makes the
conflict intra-corporate: (1) between the corporation, partnership or association and the public;
(2) between the corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as its franchise,
permit or license to operate is concerned; (3) between the corporation, partnership or
association and its stockholders, partners, members or officers; and (4) among the
stockholders, partners or associates themselves.

On the other hand, the nature of the controversy test dictates that "the controversy must not
only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must as well pertain to the
enforcement of the parties' correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and
the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation."

A combined application of the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test has
become the norm in determining whether a case is an intra-corporate controversy, to be "heard
and decided by the [b]ranches of the RTC specifically designated by the Court to try and decide
such cases."

Under the relationship test, an intra-corporate controversy arises when the conflict is "between
the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members or officers."
Petitioners insist that the PCGG is not a stockholder, partner, member or officer of the
corporation. This is misleading and inaccurate.

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the Court settled that, due to the Compromise Agreement validly
entered into by the Republic through the PCGG, the Republic of the Philippines now owns 4,727
shares of POTC.

As it stands today, the Republic of the Philippines owns 34.9% of POTC, which wholly owns
PHILCOMSAT, which in turn owns 81% of PHC. The Republic, then, has an interest in the
proper operations of the PHC, however indirect this interest may seem to be.

Chairman Sabio, while himself not a stockholder of the subject corporations, was acting as head
of the PCGG, which is the agency tasked to adopt safeguards so that incidents of graft and
corruption, as well as cases of abuse of "powers, authority, influence, connections or
relationship" in these corporations are eliminated.

The Republic acts through its lawfully designated representatives or nominees. Thus,
PCGG nominees and directors sit in the boards of directors of sequestered corporations
not for themselves but on behalf of the Republic. It is their duty to protect and advance
the interests of the Republic of the Philippines.

The nature of the controversy test examines the controversy in relation to the "enforcement of
the parties' correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal and
intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation."

The act of Chairman Sabio in asking the SEC to suspend the listing of PHC's shares was done
in pursuit of protecting the interest of the Republic of the Philippines, a legitimate stockholder in
PHC's controlling parent company, POTC. The character of the shares held by the
PCGG/Republic, on whose behalf the PCGG Chairman is presumed to be acting, is irrelevant to
Chairman Sabio's actions. Any shareholder, harboring any apprehensions or concerns, could
have done the same or posed the same objection. It was an act that had no relation to any
proceeding or question of ill-gotten wealth or sequestration. The PCGG was merely protecting
the rights and interest of the Republic of the Philippines. From the foregoing, it is clear
that the dispute in the present case is an intra-corporate controversy.

Moreover, with regard to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that the
jurisdiction lies with the regular courts and not with the Sandiganbayan.

As the Court has already conclusively ruled, the RTC is co-equal to the PCGG only in relation to
cases falling under the latter's function under the applicable Executive Orders, specifically
Section 2 of E.O. 14, and Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Note that in this case, the acts complained of do not pertain to the PCGG's function under the
aforementioned provisions of law and the Constitution, nor can it be considered an "[incident]
arising from, incidental to, or related to" such cases. Rather, the PCGG, acting as
representative of the Republic, was exercising a duty of a stockholder to ensure the
proper and lawful exercise of corporate acts. Based on the foregoing, the Sandiganbayan
correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

33. Iglesias v. Office of the Ombudsman

 G.R. No. 180745, August 30, 2017

DOCTRINE:

Administrative due process demands that the party being charged is given an opportunity to be
heard. An important component of due process is the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature of the charges against him or her.

FACTS:

Petitioner Iglesias was employed as Acting District Collector by the Bureau of Customs on
October 1, 2002. On January 28, 2004, the Department of Finance, filed a Complaint-Affidavit
against Iglesias before the Office of the Ombudsman. They claimed that Iglesias failed to file her
Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALNs) prior to the year 2000. Iglesias filed
her Counter-Affidavit with Counter Complaint in the administrative case. Thereafter, she filed a
Motion for Extension of Time to File Counter-Affidavit in the criminal case. However, she was
still unable to file her counter-affidavit.

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued a Joint Resolution resolving the
administrative and criminal cases in favor of Iglesias. However, the respondent disapproved the
Joint Resolution for failure to justify the substantial increase in her net worth. Petitioner argued
that she was denied of administrative process for the Resolution issued by the Ombudsman
based on new allegations that were not included in the original complaint which she was not
informed of.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner was denied of due process of law (NO)

RULING:

Administrative due process demands that the party being charged is given an opportunity to be
heard. An important component of due process is the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature of the charges against him or her. A proper appraisal of the accusations would give the
accused an opportunity to adequately prepare for his or her defense. Otherwise, substantial
justice would be undermined

Due process is complied with "if the party who is properly notified of allegations against him or
her is given an opportunity to defend himself or herself against those allegations, and such
defense was considered by the tribunal in arriving at its own independent conclusions."

A reading of the Office of the Ombudsman Resolution reveals that she was dismissed from
service not solely on the irregularities found in her 1989 to 1999 SALNs but also because of
anomalies found in her 2000 to 2002 SALNs, which she was informed of and was given the
opportunity to refute.

Even if the findings in relation to petitioner's 1989 to 1999 SALNs were disregarded, petitioner
would still be liable for the discrepancies in her 2000 to 2002 SALNs. These discrepancies were
stated in the Complaint Affidavit and were given clarification by petitioner in her Counter-
Affidavit and Position Paper. Moreover, she was able to move for reconsideration of the Office
of the Ombudsman February 7, 2005 Resolution. These circumstances preclude petitioner from
claiming that she was denied her right to due process.

Petitioner Alberta de Joya Iglesias is GUILTY of DISHONESTY and GRAVE MISCONDUCT

based on the anomalies found in her 2000 to 2002 SALN.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

1. Carale (Chairman of NLRC) and Ceniza (Presiding Commissioner, 4 th
division of NLRC) vs Abarintos (RTC Judge)
GR No. 120704, March 3, 1997

Facts: Private Respondent Pontejos was appointed as Labor and Employment

Development Officer in the NLRC in 1989. In 1992, he was reclassified as Labor
Arbitration Associate. In 1994, Pontejos was again reassigned to the NLRC by Carale
through an Administrative Order.

Pontejos filed a complaint before the RTC against petitioners for Illegal Transfer
Tantamount to Removal. The RTC dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.

Petitioners maintain that being a permanent civil service employee, Pontejos is subject
to civil service laws and regulations. His complaint should have been raised before the
Merit Systems and Protection Board (MSPB), whose functions have been transferred
directly to the CSC itself.

Issue: Whether respondent judge has jurisdiction to review the validity of transfer order
issued by the NLRC?

Ruling: The Court held in the affirmative.

The non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is not jurisdictional. It only renders the

action premature, i.e., the claimed cause of action is not ripe for judicial determination
and for that reason a party has no cause of action to ventilate in court.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies ensures an orderly procedure which favors a

preliminary sifting process, particularly with respect to matters peculiarly within the
competence of the administrative agency, avoidance of interference with functions of
the administrative agency by withholding judicial action until the administrative process
had run its course, and prevention of attempts to swamp the courts by a resort to them
in the first instance.

In this case, Pontejos did not attempt to seek administrative relief by asking for
reconsideration of detail order, or directly to the CSC, through the MSPB which is
empowered to:

“Hear and decide cases brought before it by offices and employees who feel aggrieved
by the determination of appointing authorities involving... transfer, detail, reassignment
and other personnel actions, as well as complaints against any officers in the
government arising from personnel actions of these officers or from violations of the
merit system....”

2. Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner, vs. Carlito Lacap, Respondent.

G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, a party must first avail of all the means afforded him by
administrative processes before he/she can seek the intervention of the court.
However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of
primary jurisdiction are subject to exceptions, namely:
(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
(b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction;
(c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice
the complainant;
(d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and
oppressive;
(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by
the courts of justice;
(f) where judicial intervention is urgent;
(g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage;
(h) where the controverted acts violate due process;
(i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered
moot;
(j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
(k) when strong public interest is involved; and,
(l) in quo warranto proceedings.
NATURE:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing
the Decision dated April 28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 56345 which
affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, San Fernando,
Pampanga (RTC) in Civil Case No. 10538, granting the complaint for Specific Performance and
Damages filed by Carlito Lacap (respondent) against the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner).

FACTS:
District Engineer of Pampanga issued and published an “Invitaton to Bid”. Respondent, doing
business under the name and style Carwin Construction and Construction Supply (Carwin
Construction) submitted the lowest bid and was awarded the contract for the concreting of Sitio
5 Bahay Pare.
Upon receiving a Notice to Proceed from District Engineer Ponio, respondent undertook the
works, made advances for the purchase of the materials and payment for labor costs. Office of
the District Engineer of San Fernando, Pampanga conducted a final inspection of the project
and found it 100% completed in accordance with the approved plans and specifications.
Respondent sought to collect payment for the completed project. However, DPWH withheld
payment from respondent, because COA disapproved the final release of funds on the
ground that the contractor’s license of respondent had expired at the time of the
execution of the contract.
The District Engineer sought the opinion of the DPWH Legal Department. The latter, in its reply,
opined that RA 4566 (Contractor’s License Law) does not provide that a contract entered into
after the license has expired is void and there is no law which expressly prohibits or declares
void such contract, the contract is enforceable and payment may be paid, without prejudice to
any appropriate administrative liability action that may be imposed on the contractor and the
government officials or employees concerned.
Despite this, no payment was made to the respondent.
Hence, the respondent filed a complaint before the RTC. OSG filed a Motion to Dismiss and
alleged, among others, that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action since
respondent did not appeal to the COA the decision of the District Auditor to disapprove the
claim.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent and based its ruling on the pronouncement against
enriching oneself at the expense of another
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It held that since the case involves the application of
the principle of estoppel against the government, which is a purely legal question, then the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable as to warrant
the dismissal of the case.
RULING:
NO, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable.
As a general rule, a party must first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative
processes before he/she can seek the intervention of the court.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which
is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by
the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of
primary jurisdiction are subject to exceptions, namely:
(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
(b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction;
(c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice
the complainant;
(d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and
oppressive;
(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by
the courts of justice;
(f) where judicial intervention is urgent;
(g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage;
(h) where the controverted acts violate due process;
(i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered
moot;
(j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
(k) when strong public interest is involved; and,
(l) in quo warranto proceedings.
The present case falls under exceptions (c) and (e). Hence, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is inapplicable.
There is already an unreasonable delay in this case. Despite the opinion of the DPWH Legal
Department to pay the respondent even though the latter has an expired license, the
respondent remained unpaid despite repeated demands. This unreasonable delay and
official inaction to the great prejudice of the respondent.
Moreover, the question of whether a contractor with an expired license at the time of the
execution of its contract is entitled to be paid for completed projects, clearly is a pure question of
law. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, and not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. The final decision
on questions of law rests not with the administrative authorities, but with the courts of justice.
In short, exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply, because nothing of an
administrative nature is to be or can be done. The issue does not require technical knowledge
and experience but one that would involve the interpretation and application of law.
3. PHIC vs. Chinese General Hospital
G.R. No. 163123, 15 April 2005
DOCTRINE:
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, an administrative decision must
first be appealed to the administrative superiors at the highest level before it may be elevated to
a court of justice for review.

This doctrine, however, is a relative one and its flexibility is conditioned on the peculiar
circumstances of a case. There are a number of instances when the doctrine has been held to
be inapplicable. (see ruling for the exceptions)

FACTS:
Chinese General Hospital (CGH) was accredited by Medicare as a health care provider. It filed
Medicare claims with the SSS for medical services rendered from 1989-1992 in the amount of
Php8,102,782.10. On Feb. 14, 1995, RA 7875, an act instituting a national health insurance
program and establishing PhilHealth was enacted. All pending applications for Medicare claims
including those of CGH were transferred to PhilHealth. But Philhealth only paid CGH
Php1,365,556.32 for 1989-1992 instead of the amount claimed. CGH filed claims for medical
services with PhilHealth for 1998-1999 in the amount of Php7,554,342.93. This claim was
denied on Jan. 14, 2000 because it was filed beyond the 60-day period allowed under the
implementing rules and regulations. CGH’s claim was denied with finality on June 6, 2000. CGH
filed a petition with the CA.

CA granted the petition and ordered Philhealth to pay the amounts claimed by CGH. The SC
affirmed this decision. Philhealth filed Motion for Reconsideration, but was denied. CGH filed a
motion for execution of the final judgment.

CGH then moved for partial reconsideration saying that the decision did not impose any
condition for the entitlement to payment from Philhealth. CA granted the partial reconsideration.

PhilHealth moved for reconsideration of this CA resolution, but was denied. They contend that
the respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to judicial intervention.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to
judicial intervention. [NO]

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, an administrative decision must first be appealed to the administrative superiors at
the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review.

This doctrine, however, is a relative one and its flexibility is conditioned on the peculiar
circumstances of a case. There are a number of instances when the doctrine has been held to
be inapplicable. Among the established exceptions are:
1) when the question raised is purely legal;
2) when the administrative body is in estoppel;
3) when the act complained of is patently illegal;
4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention;
5) when the claim involved is small;
6) when irreparable damage will be suffered;
7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
8) when strong public interest is involved;
9) when the subject of the controversy is private land;
10) in quo warranto proceedings.

The SC held that the instant case falls as one of the exceptions, concerning as it does
public interest. Although they were not made parties to the instant case, the rights of millions
of Filipinos who are members of PHILHEALTH and who obviously rely on it for their health care,
are considered, nonetheless, parties to the present case. This Court is mandated herein to take
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of the interests of the state, the health care
giver and the members. With these in mind, We hold that the greater interest of the greater
number of people, mostly members of PHILHEALTH, is paramount.

Furthermore, when the representatives of herein petitioner met with Dr. Enrique Zalamea,
PHILHEALTH’s President and Chief Executive Officer, he informed them that, in lieu of protest
to be filed directly with him, the representatives could make representations with the Office of
the President, which petitioner did to no avail, considering that the formal protest filed was
referred back by the Office of the President to Dr. Zalamea. Being then the head of
PHILHEALTH, and expected to have an intimate knowledge of the law and the rules creating
the National Health Insurance Program, under which PHILHEALTH was created, he instructed
herein petitioner to pursue a remedy not sanctioned by the rules and not in accord with the rule
of exhaustion of administrative remedies. In so doing, PHILHEALTH is deemed estopped from
assailing the instant petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when PHILHEALTH
itself, through its president, does not subscribe to it.

The Supreme Court held that they cannot turn a deaf ear to the respondent’s plea for fairness
which essentially demands that its claims for services already rendered be honored as the
National Health Insurance Program law intended.
 4. Maglalang vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
G.R. No. 190566, December 11, 2013
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure seeking reversal of the Resolution issued by the Court
of Appeals.
FACTS:
The petitioner was working as a teller at the Casino Filipino at Angeles City which
was operated by the respondent, a government owned and controlled
corporation which was created under Presidential Decree No. 1869.
In December 2008, during an altercation with a client involving the erroneous
counting of money, they were invited by the casino’s Internal Security Office to
air their concerns. Afterwards, the petitioner was instructed to file an incident
report on the matter.
However, in January 2009, the petitioner was issued a memorandum charging
him with discourtesy which he was later found guilty of and was imposed by a 30-
day suspension by the respondent’s Board of Directors. The petitioner then filed
a motion for reconsideration seeking for the reversal of the decision and a motion
for production to be furnished with documents relative to the case. Both motions
were denied.
In August 2009, the petitioner filed for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Civil
Procedure before the Court of Appeals. The petitioner contended that the acts of
the respondent attributed to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction for adjudging him guilty of the charge, in failing to observe
the proper procedure in the rendition of its decision and in imposing the harsh
penalty of a 30-day suspension. He further explained that he did not appeal to
the Civil Service Commission because the penalty imposed on him was only a
30-day suspension which is not within the CSC’s appellate jurisdiction.
The CA outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari for being premature as
petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking recourse from
the CA.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in outright dismissing the
petition for certiorari filed before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
DECISION/DOCTRINE:
No, the Court of Appeals was not correct in outright dismissal of the petition for
certiorari filed before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
The Court cited the case of Public Hearing Committee of Laguna Lake
Development Authority vs. SM Prime Holdings, Inc. where they stated that under
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to
seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or
herself of all means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if
resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving
the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first
before the court's judicial power can be sought.
The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of
action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on
practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails
lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies.
Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will
shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been
completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned
every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.
However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as
it admits the following exceptions: 1) when there is a violation of due process; (2)
when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative
action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when
there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when
there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary
whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed
approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies
would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9)
when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the
rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there
are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and
unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no
administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political
agency applies and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies has been rendered moot.
The case falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides
no administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee like
petitioner is covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and penalized
with a suspension for not more than 30 days.
The judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a special
civil action for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR, not an appeal. An appeal and a
special civil action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely distinct and
separate from each other. One cannot file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules where appeal is available, even if the ground availed of is grave
abuse of discretion. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only
when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal
a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, as the same should not be a
substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari
are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
Doctrine of Prior Resort (Doctrine of Primary
Administrative Jurisdiction)
1. Crusaders Broadcasting vs. NTC, G.R. No. 139583, 31 May 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner Crusaders Broadcasting System, Inc. was the grantee of a Temporary Permit to
operate DWCD-FM at a frequency of 97.9 Mhz. Its chairman sent a letter to the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) requesting a permit to allow them to stop their
broadcasting for around a month in order to renovate its broadcast booth and the entire
facilities of the station. The Temporary Permit to operate of the Crusaders was renewed
covering the period from January 1, 1995 to December 31, 1996.

On December 12, 1996, Crusaders applied for another renewal of its Temporary Permit.
The NTC conducted an ocular inspection and it found out that the station is inoperative,
thus, the NTC denied the application for the renewal of its Temporary Permit. Crusaders
presented a motion for reconsideration explaining that Crusaders was not able to resume its
operation because of a case filed by Conamor Broadcasting Corporation against Crusaders
and the subsequent issuance of an injunction order by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
163, Pasig City enjoining Crusaders from operating its radio station. By reason thereof, on
July 14, 1997, the NTC issued a show-cause order directing Crusaders to explain why its
application for renewal of Temporary Permit for the station should not be denied; why its
station should not be closed; and why the assigned frequency of the station should not be
recalled. Crusaders failed to submit a responsive pleading, consequently, the NTC issued
an order, declaring Crusaders in default and thereafter, handed down its decision recalling
the assigned frequency.

Later, the NTC granted the motion for new trial filed by Crusaders. But despite the evidence
presented, NTC still denied Crusaders' request for renewal of its Temporary Permit to
operate DWCD-FM. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the NTC.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the NTC properly denied the application for renewal of Crusaders'
temporary permit to operate DWCD-FM, and validly ordered the withdrawal of the latter's
assigned frequency.

RULING:
YES. It should be noted that by virtue of Executive Order (E.O) No. 546, creating the
Ministry of Public Works and Ministry of Transportation and Communications, the regulation
of radio communications is a function assigned to, and being performed by, the NTC.

Petitioner does not deny and in fact, uses it as the reason for the stoppage of its broadcast
that it was the filing of the aforementioned civil case against it (petitioner) which grounded
DWCD-FM's broadcasting. It is not disputed, either, that what prompted Conamor to bring a
complaint against petitioner was the latter's rescission of a "Programming and Marketing
Agreement".

In order to settle the civil case, Crusaders and Conamor later entered into a "Compromise
Agreement" which superseded the programming and marketing agreement. Conamor has
been given the right to operate and manage a radio station despite the clear mandate of the
Radio Law that only holders of a legislative franchise can do so. Even on this ground alone,
Crusaders can be prevented by the NTC from broadcasting. That the said ground was not
reflected in the show-cause order does not mean that the same cannot be raised thereafter
by the NTC, as it has done in the present case, when it gleaned a basis therefor during the
administrative proceedings, from the evidence presented by the petitioner itself the
substance of the agreement between petitioner and Conamor. The said findings were not
rebutted by petitioner which kept on harping only on the alleged unfairness of NTC in the
application of its procedures as well as on the existence of the said civil case against it and
on the refusal of NTC to approve its application for the acquisition of a new transmitter.

On the matter of factual findings by the NTC as to the inoperativeness of subject radio
station, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the said findings are supported by
substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

The Court upholds the primary jurisdiction exercised by the NTC and quotes with approval
the following opinion of the Court of Appeals, to wit: “Moreover, the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction prevents this Court from “arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy which falls under the jurisdiction of a tribunal possessed of a special
competence. (Paat v. Court of Appeals). As held in Villaflor v. Court of Appeals), which
reiterates the rulings in Ismael, Jr. and Co. v. Deputy Executive Secretary and Concerned
Officials of MWSS v. Vasquez: ‘Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.’ ”

2. Energy Regulatory Board vs. CA, G.R. No. 113079, 20 April 2001

DOCTRINE: When an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy,

it merely interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for
it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. Thus, an action by an administrative
agency may be set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, abuse of power,
lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the
law.
FACTS: Petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) is engaged in the business of
importing crude oil, refining the same and selling various petroleum products through a network
of service stations throughout the country.

Private respondent Petroleum Distributors and Service Corporation (PDSC) owns and operates
a Caltex service station at the corner of the MIA and Domestic Roads in Pasay City.

In 1983, Shell filed with the quondam Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU) an application for
authority to relocate its Shell Service Station at Tambo, Parañaque, Metro Manila, to Imelda
Marcos Avenue of the same municipality. PDSC filed an opposition to the application.

BEU dismissed the application on jurisdictional grounds and for lack of "full title" of the lessor
over the proposed site. However, on May 7, 1984, the BEU reinstated the same application and
thereafter conducted a hearing thereon. BEU rendered a decision denying Shell's application.

EO 172 was issued creating the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) and transferring to it the
regulatory and adjudicatory functions of the BEU. The decision denied the appeal of Shell and
affirmed the BEU decision. Shell moved for reconsideration and prayed for a new hearing or the
remand of the case for further proceedings. In a supplement to said motion, Shell submitted a
new feasibility study to justify its application. The ERB rendered a Decision allowing Shell to
establish the service station

PDSC filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision, but was denied so the PDSC
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in fact finding to those of the ERB whose findings
were based on substantial evidence.

HELD: The Court held in the affirmative. The interpretation of an administrative government
agency like the ERB, which is tasked to implement a statute, is accorded great respect and
ordinarily controls the construction of the courts.8 A long line of cases establish the basic rule
that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special
technical knowledge and training of such agencies.

'The rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the multifarious needs of a
modern or modernizing society and the establishment of diverse administrative agencies for
addressing and satisfying those needs; it also relates to the accumulation of experience and
growth of specialized capabilities by the administrative agency charged with implementing a
particular statute.

Executive officials are presumed to have familiarized themselves with all the considerations
pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law, and to have formed an independent,
conscientious and competent expert opinion thereon. The courts give much weight to the
government agency or officials charged with the implementation of the law, their competence,
expertness, experience and informed judgment, and the fact that they frequently are drafters of
the law they interpret."

As a general rule, contemporaneous construction is resorted to for certainty and predictability in

the laws, especially those involving specific terms having technical meanings. However, courts
will not hesitate to set aside such executive interpretation when it is clearly erroneous, or when
there is no ambiguity in the rule,14 or when the language or words used are clear and plain or
readily understandable to any ordinary reader.

Stated differently, when an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of

policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best
advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.16 Thus, an action by an
administrative agency may be set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law,
abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter
and spirit of the law.17

However, there is no cogent reason to depart from the general rule because the findings of the
ERB conform to, rather than conflict with, the governing statutes and controlling case law on the
matter.

In reviewing administrative decisions, the findings of fact made therein must be respected as
long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant;
that it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of
the witnesses or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on
the sufficiency of evidence; that the administrative decision in matters within the executive
jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.
Petitioner ERB is in a better position to resolve petitioner Shell's application, being
primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. The power to
determine whether the building of a gasoline retail outlet in a trading area would benefit
public interest and the oil industry lies with the ERB not the appellate courts.

In the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at the highest level,
followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence and substantial
evidence, in that order. A litany of cases has consistently held that substantial evidence is all
that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact.It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.

Suffice it to state in this regard that the factual landscape, measured within the context of such
an evidentiary matrix, is strewn with well-nigh overwhelming proof of the necessity to build such
a gasoline retail outlet in the vicinity subject of the application.

In denying Shell's application, the Court of Appeals next pointed to the alleged 'staleness' of
Shell's feasibility study because it was submitted in evidence about two (2) years after it was
prepared in early 1988.

3. PALOMA vs. MORA, G.R. No. 160703, Sept 23. 2005

DOCTRINE:

- Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not
to compel the performance of a discretionary duty.
- The new law can not be applied to make respondents accountable for actions which
were valid under the law prevailing at the time the questioned act was committed.
- The rule in statutory construction is that all statutes are to be construed as having only a
prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a
retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language
used
 - Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts in the case at bar is the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction; i.e. , courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact.

Facts: Petitioner was appointed as General manager of Palompon, Leyte Water District was
later terminated due to a Board Resolution of said water district (Respondent, et. al). Because of
the termination, petitioner filed for a petition for mandamus praying for his restoration to his GM
position.

Petitioner argued that it was a violation of the civil service rules and he was not afforded
due process. The RTC dismissed petitioner’s case and this was brought to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) which exonerated respondents. Lastly, petitioner brought the case to the CA
which also affirmed the ruling of the RTC, hence this case.

Issue: W/N the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s decision.

Ruling: In the case at bar, P.D. No. 198, 25 otherwise known as THE PROVINCIAL WATER
UTILITIES ACT OF 1973, which was promulgated on 25 May 1973, categorically provides that
the general manager shall serve at the pleasure of the board of directors.

In fine, the appointment of petitioner and his consequent termination are clearly within
the wide arena of discretion which the legislature has bestowed the appointing power, which in
this case is the Board of Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water District. Here, considering
that the petitioner is at loggerheads with the Board, the former's services obviously
ceased to be "pleasurable" to the latter. The Board of Directors of a Water District may
abridge the term of the General Manager thereof the moment the latter's services cease
to be convivial to the former.

… laws change depending on the evolving needs of society. In a related development,

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo inked into law Republic Act No. 9286, which amended
Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 providing that thereafter, the General Manager of Water Districts
shall not be removed from office, except for cause and after due process.

Unfortunately for petitioner, Rep. Act No. 9286 is silent as to the retroactivity of the law
to pending cases and must, therefore, be taken to be of prospective application. The general
rule is that in an amendatory act, every case of doubt must be resolved against its retroactive
effect.

To apply Rep. Act No. 9286 retroactively to pending cases, such as the case at bar, will
rob the respondents as members of the Board of the Palompon, Leyte Water District of the right
vested to them by P.D. No. 198 to terminate petitioner at their pleasure or Discretion.
Prescinding from the foregoing premises, at the time petitioner was terminated by the Board of
Directors, the prevailing law was Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 prior to its amendment by Rep. Act
No. 9286.

Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction:

We recall in Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton that water districts are government
instrumentalities and that their employees belong to the civil service. Thus, " [t]he hiring and
firing of employees of government-owned or controlled corporations are governed by the Civil
Service Law and Civil Service Rules and Regulations."

In a surfeit of cases, this Court has held that quasi-judicial bodies like the CSC are
better-equipped in handling cases involving the employment status of employees as those in the
Civil Service since it is within the field of their expertise. This is consistent with the powers
and functions of the CSC, being the central personnel agency of the Government, to
carry into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws,
including, in this case, P.D. No. 198.
4. SHERWILL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. SITIO STO. NIÑO RESIDENTS
ASSOCIATION INC. [G.R. No. 158455. June 28, 2005.]
DOCTRINE:
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts,
and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which,
under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such
issues to the administrative body for its view. In addition, the courts cannot and will not resolve a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal,
especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact.
FACTS:
Petitioner Sherwill Development Corporation is the registered owner of two parcels of land in
Muntinlupa, Rizal. Both lots form part of the Muntinlupa Estate, while the titles thereon were
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal in September 1913.
In 2002, the petitioner filed a complaint for quieting of title against respondents Sitio Sto. Niño
Residents Association, Inc. (SSNRAI), etc. alleging, among others, that the latter have
unlawfully entered and occupied said lots. The petitioner alleged that LMB Case No. 7-98 is the
first step of respondents to disturb and/or cast clouds on the subject TCTs. Said LMB case
contains the fact that LMB is set to recommend to the Philippine Government, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), the "nullification" and/or the reversion of the subject TCTs to the
Philippine Government, despite the fact that the latter sold and/or disposed of subject lots
pursuant to Act No. 1120 and other pertinent laws.
ISSUE: W/N LMB has jurisdiction over the LMB Case No. 7-98
RULING:
The Court held in the affirmative.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts,
and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which,
under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such
issues to the administrative body for its view. In addition, the courts cannot and will not resolve a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal,
especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact.
Further, it was discussed that the Director of Lands, who is the officer charged with carrying out
the provisions of the Public Land Act, has control over the survey, classification, lease, sale or
any other form of concession or disposition and management of the public lands, and his finding
and decision as to questions of fact, when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (now Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources), is conclusive.
Therefore in such cases, such as in the present case, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy, since the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence is with the LMB.

GMA Network, Inc. vs. ABS-CBN, et al., G.R. No. 160703, September 23, 2005
DOCTRINE: While it is true that the regular courts are possessed of general jurisdiction over
actions for damages, it would nonetheless be proper for the courts to yield its jurisdiction in
favor of an administrative body when the determination of underlying factual issues requires the
special competence or knowledge of the latter.
NTC's regulatory power over the broadcasting and cable television industry extends to matters
which are peculiarly within its competence. These include the:
1. Determination of rates,
2. Issuance of certificates of authority,
3. Establishment of areas of operation,
4. Examination and assessment of the legal, technical and financial qualifications of
applicant operators,
5. Granting of permits for the use of frequencies,
6. Regulation of ownership and operation,
7. Adjudication of issues arising from its functions, and
8. Other similar matters.
FACTS:
Petitioner GMA Network, Inc. (GMA') filed on May 6, 2003 before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a complaint for damages against respondents ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation (ABS-CBN'), Central CATV, Inc. (SkyCable'), Philippine Home Cable Holdings, Inc.
(Home Cable') and Pilipino Cable Corporation (Sun Cable').
In its complaint, GMA alleged that respondents engaged in unfair competition when the cable
companies arbitrarily re-channeled petitioner's cable television broadcast on February 1, 2003,
in order to arrest and destroy its upswing performance in the television industry.
GMA argued that respondents were able to perpetrate such unfair business practice through a
common ownership and interlocking businesses. SkyCable and Sun Cable are wholly-owned
subsidiaries of Sky Vision Corporation (Sky Vision') which is allegedly controlled by
Lopez, Inc. On the other hand, Home Cable is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Unilink
Communications Corporation (Unilink'), which is owned by Mediaquest Holdings, Inc., a
company controlled by the Pension Trust Fund of the PLDT Employees (PLDT Group').
Pursuant to a Master Consolidation Agreement, the ownership, rights and interests in Sky
Vision and Unilink were purportedly placed under a holding company known as 'Beyond Cable',
66.5 % of which is owned by the Benpres Group, composed of Lopez Inc., Benpres Holdings
and ABS-CBN, while 33.5% thereof is owned by the PLDT Group. As a result of this business
combination, respondents have cornered at least 71% of the total cable television market
in Mega Manila. They are thus able to dictate the signal transmission, channel position, and the
airing of shows, programs, and broadcast of non-cable companies like ABS-CBN and GMA,
which the law requires them to carry.
GMA alleged that the re-channeling of its cable television broadcast resulted in damage to its
business operations.
ISSUES:
1. WON the complaint be adjudicated under the jurisdiction of the trial court or the NTC.
2. WON GMA entitled to an award of damages, it would have to initially ascertain whether
there was arbitrary re-channeling which distorted and downgraded GMA's signal?
HELD:
1. National Telecommunications Commission has jurisdiction over the case.
The regulation of ownership of television and cable television companies is likewise
within the exclusive concern of the NTC, pursuant to its broader regulatory power of ensuring
and promoting a 'larger and more effective use of communications, radio and television
broadcasting facilities' in order that the public interest may well be served. The NTC is
mandated to maintain effective competition among private entities engaged in the
operation of public service communications. It is also the agency tasked to grant certificates
of authority to cable television operators, provided that the same 'does not infringe on the
television and broadcast markets.

2. Ruling on Damages
Finally, the complaint failed to state a cause of action against ABS-CBN and the other
respondents, considering that the ultimate facts upon which the complaint for damages depends
fall within the technical competence of an administrative body. Otherwise stated, pending
determination by the NTC of the factual questions involved in the case, petitioner's complaint,
which is founded upon such factual issues, would be premature.

Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action

1. Sta. Rosa Mining vs. Leido, G.R. No. L-49109, 1 December 1987

FACTS:

Petitioner Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc. (petitioner, for short) is a mining corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. It alleges that it is the holder of fifty
(50) valid mining claims situated in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, acquired under the
provisions of the Act of the U.S. Congress dated 1 July 1902 (Philippine Bill of 1902, for short).
On 14 October 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1214 was issued, requiring holders of subsisting
and valid patentable mining claims located under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 to
file a mining lease application within one (1) year from the approval of the Decree. Petitioner
accordingly filed a mining lease application, but "under protest," on 13 October 1978, with a
reservation annotated on the back of its application that it is not waiving its rights over its mining
claims until the validity of Presidential Decree No. 1214 shall have been passed upon by this
Court.

Petitioner avers that its fifty (50) mining claims had already been declared as its own private and
exclusive property in final judgments rendered by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte
(CFI, for short) in land registration proceedings initiated by third persons, such as, a September
1951 land title application by a certain Gervacio Liwanag, where the Director of Mines opposed
the grant of said application because herein petitioner, according to him (Director of Mines), had
already located and perfected its mining claims over the area applied for.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner has no standing to file the instant petition as it failed to fully exhaust
administrative remedies.

RULING: :

The court cite the pendency of petitioner's appeal, with the Office of the President, of the ruling
of the respondent Secretary of Natural Resources issued on 2 April 1977 in DNR Case No.
4140, which upheld the decision of the Director of Mines finding that forty four (44) out of
petitioner's fifty (50) mining claims were void for lack of valid "tie points" as required under the
Philippine Bill of 1902, and that all the mining claims had already been abandoned and
cancelled, for petitioner's non-compliance with the legal requirements of the same Phil. Bill of
1902 and Executive Order No. 141.

We agree with respondents' contention that it is premature for the Court to now make a finding
on the matter of whether petitioner had abandoned its mining claims. Until petitioner's appeal
shall have been decided by the Office of the President, where it is pending, petitioner's
attempt to seek judicial recognition of the continuing validity of its mining claims, cannot
be entertained by the Court. As stated by the Court, through Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla in
Ham v. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. applying the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies: "By its own act of appealing from the decision of the Director of Lands and the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines, and
without waiting for the latter's decision, the defendant cannot complain if the courts do
not take action be fore the President has decided its appeal."
The decisions of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte in applications for land
registration filed by third persons covering the area over which petitioner had located and
registered its mining claims, as cited by petitioner, are inapplicable. Said decisions merely
denied the applications of such third persons for land registration over areas already covered by
petitioner's mining claims, for failure to show titles that were registrable under the Torrens
system; that was all. While the CFI made a statement in one case declaring that the petitioner's
mining claims are its vested property and even patentable at that time, there is nothing in said
CFI decision that squarely passed upon the question of whether petitioner had valid, patentable
(but still unpatented) mining claims which it had continued to maintain, in compliance with the
requirements of applicable laws. This question, which involves a finding of facts, is
precisely the issue before the Office of the President in the petitioner's appeal from the
decision of the Secretary of Natural Resources in DNR Case No. 4140 holding that
petitioner's mining claims are considered abandoned cancelled for failure of petitioner to
comply with the requirements of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Executive Order No. 141.
In short, the decisions of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, relied upon by
petitioner, do not foreclose a proceeding, such as DNR Case No. 4140, to determine whether
petitioner's unpatented mining claims have remained valid and subsisting.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The temporary

restraining order issued by the Court on 19 October 1978 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Costs
against the petitioner.

OTHER ISSUES IN THE CASE

ISSUES:
(1) Whether Santa Rosa already had a vested right over its mining claims even before
Presidential Decree No. 1214, following the rulings in McDaniel v. Apacible and Gold Creek
Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez
(2) whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1214 is constitutional

RULING:
(1) NO. The Court is not impressed that this is so.

The cases cited by petitioner, true enough, recognize the right of a locator of a mining claim as
a property right. This right, however, is not absolute. It is merely a possessory right, more so, in
this case, where petitioner's claims are still unpatented. They can be lost through abandonment
or forfeiture or they may be revoked for valid legal grounds. The statement in McDaniel v.
Apacible that "There is no pretense in the present case that the petitioner has not complied with
all the requirements of the law in making the location of the mineral claims in question, or that
the claims in question were ever abandoned or forfeited by him," 9 confirms that a valid mining
claim may still be lost through abandonment or forfeiture.

The petitioner can not successfully plead the ruling in Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez,
supra. In that case, what was in issue was Gold Creek's right to a patent over its mining claim,
after compliance with all legal requirements for a patent. In the present case, no application for
patent is in issue, although as a holder of patentable mining claims petitioner could have applied
for one during all these years but inexplicably did not do so. In Gold Creek, no finding of
abandonment was ever made against the mining claimant as to deprive it of the initial privilege
given by virtue of its location; on the other hand, such a finding has been made in petitioner's
case (although the finding among others is on appeal with the President).

(2) PD 1214 is Constitutional.

Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was not bound to exhaust administrative remedies on
the question of whether or not its mining claims are still subsisting (not abandoned or cancelled
before challenging the constitutionality of said Decree, we hold that Presidential Decree No.
1214 is not unconstitutional. 10 It is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the State, as owner,
over lands of the public domain, of which petitioner's mining claims still form a part, and over the
patrimony of the nation, of which mineral deposits are a valuable asset. It may be underscored, in this
connection, that the Decree does not cover all mining claims located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only
those claims over which their locators had failed to obtain a patent. And even then, such locators may still
avail of the renewable twenty-five year (25) lease prescribed by Pres. Decree No. 463, the Mineral
Development Resources Decree of 1974.

Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the affected land or the mining claim. It
merely segregates the located land or area from the public domain by barring other would-be
locators from locating the same and appropriating for themselves the minerals found therein. To
rule otherwise would imply that location is all that is needed to acquire and maintain rights over
a located mining claim. This, we cannot approve or sanction because it is contrary to the
intention of the lawmaker that the locator should faithfully and consistently comply with the
requirements for annual work and improvements in the located mining claim.

Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8, Art. XIV of the 1973 Constitution which
states:

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for
a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the measure
and the limit of the grant.

The same constitutional mandate is found in Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution, which
declares:

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna. and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State. ...
 2. SSS Employees Assication vs. Bathan-Velasco, G.R. No. 108765, 27 August
1999

DOCTRINE: The rule is well-entrenched that a party must exhaust all administrative
remedies before resorting to the courts. The premature resort to the court is fatal to one's
cause of action. This rule would give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the
matter by itself correctly, and prevent the unnecessary and premature clogging of the court’s
docket.

FACTS:

ACCESS filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition for certification election to
determine the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of
SSS. The Bureau of Labor Relations ordered the certification election among the rank and file
employees of the SSS in its main office.

On October 11, 1991, ACCESS garnered 1,378 votes while SSSEA obtained 1,116
votes in the certification election. SSSEA filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations an election
protest and/or motion to annul the certification election. The protest and motion was denied.
Bathan-Velasco, Officer in Charge, Bureau of Labor Relations, also denied the Election Protest
and/or Motion to Nullify Certification Elections in the Regional Offices After October 11, 1991.
She also declared ACCESS as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank
and file employees of SSS. Bathan-Velasco denied SSSEA’s motion for reconsideration.

SSSEA filed special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court. SSSEA argues
that no certification election was held in the regional offices of respondent SSS. They also argue
that the certification election should not have proceeded because of the pendency of a formal
charge of a company-initiated union with the Bureau of Labor Relations.

ISSUE: Whether or not SSSEA failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before resorting to
the courts.

HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative.

SSSEA failed to take an appeal from the order of Bathan-Velasco to the Secretary of
Labor, pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor Code. When a party fails to exhaust all
administrative remedies, a premature resort to the courts would result in the dismissal of the
petition.

Moreover, the issues raised by SSSEA in its special civil action for certiorari involve a
review of the factual findings of the Bureau of Labor Relations. Factual issues are not proper
subjects of an original petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, as its power to review is
limited to questions of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion of judicial or quasi-judicial
tribunals or officials. Judicial review does not extend to an evaluation of the sufficiency of the
evidence upon which the proper labor officer or office based his or its determination.