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P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan, (SC) : Law Finder Doc Id # 2724805

2025 INSC 598 : 2025(2) RCR(Civil) 758
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Before:- J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.
Civil Appeal No. 5622 of 2025 [Arising From SLP (C) No. 2549 of 2021]. D/d. 29.04.2025.
P. Kumarakurubaran - Appellant
Versus
P. Narayanan & Ors. - Respondents
For Petitioners : Mr. K. K. Mani, Advocate and Ms. T.archana, Advocate.
For Respondents : Mr. S. Nandakumar, Sr. Advocate, M/S. KSN & Co., Advocate, Mr. Siddharth Naidu,
Advocate, Mr. V Balachandran, Advocate, Ms. Deepika Nandakumar, Advocate, Mr. Viresh Kumar
Bhawra, Advocate, Ms. Aisha Bansal, Advocate and Mr. Naresh Kumar, Advocate.
IMPORTANT
Rejection of plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC on limitation grounds is impermissible when
the issue involves a mixed question of law and fact, especially regarding the date of
knowledge of the impugned transaction.
A. Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Order 7, Rule 11 - Rejection of plaint - Suit barred by limitation -
Held, whether the suit is barred by limitation, especially in cases involving the date of
knowledge of the impugned transaction, is a mixed question of law and fact, requiring
adjudication upon evidence - Rejection of plaint solely on limitation without a full-fledged trial
is impermissible.
[Paras 11 to 14]
B. Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Order 7, Rule 11 - Scope of power - Held, the power to reject a
plaint is drastic and must be exercised sparingly - The plaint averments must be taken at face
value and assumed to be true at the threshold stage - Rejection of plaint is warranted only
when the suit is manifestly barred by law.
[Paras 12.1 to 14]
C. Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Order 7, Rule 11(d) - Limitation - Date of knowledge - Held, when
the date of knowledge of the impugned transaction is specifically pleaded, the limitation issue
cannot be summarily decided under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC - Such matters necessitate a trial for
proper adjudication.
[Paras 12.1 to 13]
D. Power of Attorney Limited authority - Held, a power of attorney holder cannot act beyond
the scope of authority granted under the document - Allegations of misuse of authority and

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fraud require detailed evidence and cannot be summarily dismissed at the threshold.
[Paras 14 to 15]
E/MM/30/4/2025

Cases Referred :-
Chhotanben v. Kiritbhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar, (2018) 6 SCC 422 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 524
Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational
Trust, (2012) 8 SCC 706: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 612
Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali, (2020) 7 SCC 366
Daliben Valjibhai v. Prajapati Kodarbhai Kachrabhai, 2024 SCC Online SC 4105
ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC 70
Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Vessel M.V. Fortune Express, (2006) 3 SCC 100
N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board, 2024 INSC 817
P.V. Guru Raj Reddy v. P. Neeradha Reddy, (2015) 8 SCC 331: (2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 100
Raghwendra Sharan Singh v. Ram Prasanna Singh(Dead) by LRs, (2020) 16 SCC 601
Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv Kumar Gupta, (2007) 10 SCC 59
Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property, (1998) 7 SCC 184
Roop Lal Sathi v. Nachhattar Singh Gill, (1982) 3 SCC 487
Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557
Salim D. Agboatwala v. Shamalji Oddhavji Thakkar, (2021) 17 SCC 100
Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, (2020) 17 SCC 260
Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle,
2024 SCC Online SC 3844
Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137
T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467
Read impugned order dated 03.09.2020.
JUDGMENT
R. Mahadevan, J. - Leave granted.
2. This Civil Appeal arises out of the final judgment and order dated 03.09.2020 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Madras ("the High Court") in CRP(NPD) No. 131 of 2018, whereby the High
Court allowed the Civil Revision Petition filed by Respondent No.1 and rejected the plaint filed by
the appellant under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("CPC") on the ground
that the suit was barred by limitation.

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3. Originally, the appellant / plaintiff instituted a suit bearing O.S. No. 310 of 2014 before the
Principal District Court, Chengalpet, against the respondents / defendants and the Government
authorities for the following reliefs:
(i) Declaring that the appellant is the legal owner of the suit schedule property,
(ii) Issuing a permanent injunction against Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 restraining them from
causing any interruption on the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule
property by the appellant,
(iii) Declaring the sale deed bearing No. 303/1993 dated 10.10.1988 registered in Pudukottai Sub
Registration Office, Tuticorin District, in favour of Defendant No. 1 with respect to the suit
schedule property as null and void,
(iv) Declaring the Settlement Deed bearing No. 1493/2012 dated 16.04.2012 registered in
Alandur Sub Registration Office executed by Defendant No.1 in favour of Defendant No. 2 with
respect to the suit schedule property as null and void,
(v) Declaring the General Power of Attorney Deed bearing No. 3725/2012 dated 31.12.2012
registered in Alandur Sub Registration Office executed by Defendant No. 2 in favour of
Defendant No. 3 with respect to the suit schedule property as null and void,
(vi) Issuing a permanent injunction that Defendant No. 5 should not register any document
created by Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 with respect to the suit schedule property except the
appellant,
(vii) Issuing a permanent injunction directing Defendant No. 5 not to issue building plan
permit to Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 except the appellant for the construction of new building in
the suit schedule property, and
(viii) Cost of the suit to be paid by the Defendants to the appellant.
4. It was alleged in the plaint that the appellant was assigned a vacant site by the Special
Tahsildar, Saidapet, Tamil Nadu, on 05.05.1974. He constructed a roof house and was in possession
and enjoyment of the said property by paying tax and other charges. While so, he executed a Power
of Attorney in favour of his father, K. Pothikannu Pillai, which was registered on 06.01.1978 as
Document No. 04-11-101-102-3/1978 in the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Thallakulam, Madurai, for the
purposes of putting up construction, entering into agreement, and performing other relevant
activities. Contrary to the same, the father of the appellant executed a sale deed on 10.10.1988, in
favour of the second respondent / Defendant No.1 / granddaughter vide Document No. 303/1993 on
the file of the Sub-Registrar, Pudukottai, which according to the appellant, was illegal, as the Power
of Attorney did not authorize his father to alienate the property. After coming to know about the
same, the appellant approached the Additional Commissioner of Police, Chennai and gave a
complaint on 09.12.2011 under Land Grabbing Cell against the family of Defendant No. 1.
Subsequently, the appellant applied for the individual patta to the Special Tahsildar, Alandur, on
24.02.2012 and also made a representation to Defendant No. 4 not to register any document with
respect to the suit schedule property. In the meanwhile, the father of the appellant had died.
Following the same, the second respondent / Defendant No.1 executed a settlement deed in favour of
the third respondent / Defendant No.2 vide Document No. 1198/2012 on 16.04.2012. Subsequently, the
third respondent / Defendant No.2 executed a General Power of attorney deed in favour of the first

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respondent / Defendant No.3 on 31.12.2012. Thereafter, the defendants made application for
building permission on 05.07.2013, to which, the appellant filed his objection. In the said
circumstances, the appellant came forward with the suit for the reliefs stated supra.
5. During the pendency of the aforesaid suit, the respondents / defendants filed an interlocutory
application bearing I.A. No. 151 of 2015 in O.S. No. 310 of 2014 under Order VII Rule 11 CPC seeking
rejection of the plaint, on the ground that the suit was undervalued and was barred by limitation.
6. After hearing both sides, the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kancheepuram District at
Chengalpet, by order dated 04.10.2017, dismissed the aforesaid application, observing that the
grounds raised by the defendants can only be addressed after conducting a detailed trial based on
the material facts, records, and other related issues, and therefore, the plaint cannot be rejected at
the threshold. Challenging the same, the appellant / plaintiff preferred a Civil Revision Petition
bearing No. 131 of 2018 before the High Court.
7. By order dated 03.09.2020, the High Court allowed the aforesaid Civil Revision Petition after
having held that the suit was barred by limitation. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant / plaintiff
is before us with the present appeal.
8. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court erred in allowing the
application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and in rejecting the plaint on the ground of
limitation, particularly while exercising its revisional jurisdiction. Adding further, it is submitted
that the question of limitation - especially in matters involving the knowledge or notice of the
impugned transaction-is a mixed question of law and fact, which cannot be conclusively determined
without a full-fledged trial. The Additional District Judge, upon a careful consideration of the
pleadings, rightly held that the suit raised triable issues requiring evidence, and therefore, correctly
declined to reject the plaint at the preliminary stage. It is also submitted that the plaint contains
specific averments challenging the alienation of the suit property by the appellant's father, who
had no authority to do so; and that, the appellant, being a third party to the document, has duly
and correctly valued the suit in accordance with the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and
Suit Valuation Act, 1955; and hence, the rejection of the plaint either on the ground of limitation or
valuation, without affording the appellant an opportunity to adduce evidence, is contrary to the
settled principles of law.
8.1. It is also submitted that a suit seeking a declaration along with a consequential relief of
injunction cannot be construed as a suit for declaration simpliciter. Such a suit is one for
declaration with further relief as contemplated under section 34 of the Specific Relief Act.
Therefore, it cannot be dismissed solely on the basis that one of the prayers may not be
maintainable or barred. The dismissal of the entire suit on the strength of a single prayer without
examining the merit and maintainability of the consequential relief is legally untenable. In this
regard, reliance was placed on the decision of this court in N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi
and Village Industries Board, 2024 INSC 817 in which, it was held that the suit for a declaration
of a right cannot be held to be barred so long as right to property subsist.
8.2. The learned counsel submitted that the power of attorney relied upon is specific in nature and
is confined solely to matters relating to construction and obtaining necessary approvals. It did not
confer any authority upon the appellant's father to execute a sale deed or enter into a sale
agreement. In the absence of such authority, the execution of the sale deed and the settlement deed
by the respondents is wholly without jurisdiction and stands vitiated by fraud.

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8.3. The learned counsel further pointed out that the appellant has sought the relief of declaration
of title and permanent injunction by expressly disputing the right, title, and possession claimed by
the respondents. The plaint contains specific allegations regarding fraudulent alienation,
subsequent encumbrance, and the absence of authority on the part of the appellant's father to
effect the transfer of the suit property. These are serious and contested issues that necessitate a
detailed adjudication based on oral and documentary evidence. At the threshold stage, it is
impermissible for the Court to assess the truth or falsity of these averments or to summarily reject
the suit on the ground of limitation. Furthermore, the Additional District Judge, in declining the
application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC committed no jurisdictional error, as the plaint disclosed
triable issues requiring full-fledged trial. However, the High Court while exercising revisional
jurisdiction, has erroneously interfered with the order of the trial Court and proceeded to reject the
suit at the preliminary stage.
8.4. Stating so, the learned counsel prayed to allow this appeal by setting aside the order passed by
the High Court.
9. Per contra, the learned counsel for Respondent No.1, at the outset, submitted that the present
appeal is liable to be dismissed as per the judgment of the High Court, which rightly held that the
suit filed by the appellant was hopelessly barred by limitation. Continuing further, it is submitted
that in the plaint, the appellant failed to establish the date of knowledge of the alleged transaction,
which was a significant and material fact necessary to corroborate the cause of action for filing the
suit. On the other hand, the certified copy of the sale deed dated 10.10.1978 executed by the power
of attorney holder, namely, the father of the appellant, was alleged to have been received by the
appellant on 28.07.2011. If the said date is construed as the date of knowledge, the suit ought to
have been instituted within a period of three years therefrom i.e., on or before 27.07.2014, in
accordance with Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963. However, the plaint came to be filed only on
03.12.2014. Consequently, the High Court upheld the maintainability of the interlocutory application
filed by the respondents under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for rejection of the plaint.
9.1. It is also submitted that the appellant and the respondents are closely related, as the power of
attorney holder was the father of the appellant, and the respondents are the appellant's sister,
nephew, and niece. Therefore, the appellant's contention that he remained unaware of the alleged
transaction for a period of 26 years is untenable in law.
9.2. Further, the learned counsel referred to the power of attorney and submitted that the terms
'signing and filing of all applications and agreement and Indemnity Bonds' clearly indicate that the
appellant's father, acting as the power of attorney holder, was duly authorized to execute lawful
agreements. Accordingly, he executed the sale deed dated 10.10.1988 in favour of the second
respondent / Defendant No.1 under the authority of the said document.
9.3. The learned counsel also submitted that a bare perusal of the averments in the plaint reveals
that the suit is barred by limitation. In this regard, reliance was placed on the decisions of this
Court in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali, (2020) 7 SCC 366 and Raghwendra Sharan
Singh v. Ram Prasanna Singh(Dead) by LRs, (2020) 16 SCC 601 wherein, it was held that when the
foundational facts, as pleaded, squarely attract the bar of limitation, no trial is warranted and the
suit is liable to be dismissed at the threshold. That apart, the learned counsel referred to the
decision of this Court in Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Others v. Shrimant Chhatrapati
Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Another, 2024 SCC Online SC 3844 wherein, it
was clearly held that the spirit and intention of Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC is only for the courts to
nip at its bud when any litigation ex-facie appears to be a clear abuse of process.

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9.4. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the respondents / defendants being the absolute owners
of the property, have been in peaceful possession and enjoyment thereof. However, the appellant,
having suppressed material facts, deliberately instituted the suit after an inordinate delay of 26
years. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the High Court rejecting the plaint does not
warrant any interference by this Court.
10. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and upon careful perusal of the pleadings, the
material on record, and the impugned judgment, we find it necessary to examine whether the
rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC was justified in the facts and circumstances
of the present case. It is to be pointed out at this juncture that though the respondents / defendants
sought to reject the plaint on two grounds - valuation of the suit and limitation - the High Court
rejected the plaint solely on the ground that it was time-barred. Accordingly, we shall confine our
consideration in this appeal to the issue of limitation.
11. It is well-settled that Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, governs suits seeking cancellation of
an instrument and prescribes a period of limitation of three years from the date when the plaintiff
first had knowledge of the facts entitling him to such relief. The emphasis under Article 59 is not on
the date of the transaction per se, but on the accrual of the cause of action, which, in cases
involving allegations of fraud or unauthorized execution of documents, hinges upon the date on
which the plaintiff acquired knowledge of such facts.
12. In the present case, the appellant has specifically averred in the plaint that upon becoming
aware of registration of documents allegedly carried out among the defendants in relation to the
suit property, he immediately approached the Additional Commissioner of Police, Chennai and
lodged a land grabbing complaint on 09.12.2011 against the family of Defendant No.1. Subsequently,
he applied for patta in his favour on 24.02.2012, and raised objections on 05.03.2012 to Defendant
No. 4 stating that the suit property belonged to the plaintiff and that no registration concerning the
same should be carried out. He has also submitted an objection petition to Defendant No. 5
requesting that no planning permit be granted to anybody except the appellant in respect of the
suit property. Thereafter, the appellant instituted the suit on 03.12.2014 seeking a declaration and
consequential reliefs. On the other hand, the respondents / defendants stated in their application
filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC that the appellant had knowledge of the execution of the sale
deed by his father in favour of Defendant No.1 at the earliest point of time and hence, the suit
instituted by the appellant was barred by limitation. While the trial Court rejected the said
application holding that the issue of limitation involved a mixed question of law and fact, the High
Court in revision, took a contrary view and allowed the application filed under Order VII Rule 11
CPC and rejected the plaint solely on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation.
12.1. However, we are of the considered view that the issue as to whether the appellant had prior
notice or reason to be aware of the transaction at an earlier point of time, or whether the plea
regarding the date of knowledge is credible, are matters that necessarily require appreciation of
evidence. At this preliminary stage, the averments made in the plaint must be taken at their face
value and assumed to be true. Once the date of knowledge is specifically pleaded and forms the
basis of the cause of action, the issue of limitation cannot be decided summarily. It becomes a mixed
question of law and fact, which cannot be adjudicated at the threshold stage under Order VII Rule
11 CPC. Therefore, rejection of the plaint on the ground of limitation without permitting the parties
to lead evidence, is legally unsustainable.
12.2. In this regard, we may usefully refer to the following decisions of this Court, which have
consistently held that when the question of limitation involves disputed facts or hinges on the date

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of knowledge, such issues cannot be decided at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC:
(i) Daliben Valjibhai & Others v. Prajapati Kodarbhai Kachrabhai & Another, 2024 SCC
Online SC 4105
"10. The First Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the defendants made an application for
correcting the revenue records only in the year 2017 and on the said application the Deputy
Collector issued notice to the plaintiffs in March 2017 and that was the time when the plaintiffs
came to know about the execution of the sale deed. It is under these circumstances that the suit
was instituted in the year 2017. While the High Court came to the correct conclusion that under
Article 59 of the Limitation Act, a suit can be instituted within 3 years of the knowledge, it
proceeded to return a finding that in cases where the document is registered, the knowledge must
be presumed from the date of registration.
11.
12. Further, in Chhotanben v. Kirtibhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar where again a suit for
cancellation of sale deed was opposed through an application under Order 7, Rule 11, on ground
of limitation, this Court specifically held that limitation in all such cases will arise from date of
knowledge. The relevant portion is as follows:
"15. What is relevant for answering the matter in issue in the context of the application under
Order 7, Rule 11 (d) CPC, is to examine the averments in the plaint. The plaint is required to be
read as a whole. The defence available to the defendants or the plea taken by them in the written
statement or any application filed by them, cannot be the basis to decide the application under
Order 7, Rule 11 (d). Only the averments in the plaint are germane. It is common ground that the
registered sale deed is dated 18-10-1996. The limitation to challenge the registered sale deed
ordinarily would start running from the date on which the sale deed was registered. However, the
specific case of the appellant-plaintiffs is that until 2013 they had no knowledge whatsoever
regarding execution of such sale deed by their brothers, original Defendants 1 and 2, in favour of
Jaikrishnabhai Prabhudas Thakkar or Defendants 3 to 6. They acquired that knowledge on 26-12-
2012 and immediately took steps to obtain a certified copy of the registered sale deed and on
receipt thereof they realised the fraud played on them by their brothers concerning the ancestral
property and two days prior to the filing of the suit, had approached their brothers (original
Defendants 1 and 2) calling upon them to stop interfering with their possession and to partition
the property and provide exclusive possession of half (½) portion of the land so designated
towards their share. However, when they realised that the original Defendants 1 and 2 would not
pay any heed to their request, they had no other option but to approach the court of law and
filed the subject suit within two days therefrom. According to the appellants, the suit has been
filed within time after acquiring the knowledge about the execution of the registered sale deed. In
this context, the trial court opined that it was a triable issue and declined to accept the
application filed by Respondent 1-Defendant 5 for rejection of the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11
(d). That view commends to us.
...
19. In the present case, we find that the appellant-plaintiffs have asserted that the suit was filed
immediately after getting knowledge about the fraudulent sale deed executed by original
Defendants 1 and 2 by keeping them in the dark about such execution and within two days from
the refusal by the original Defendants 1 and 2 to refrain from obstructing the peaceful enjoyment

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of use and possession of the ancestral property of the appellants. We affirm the view taken by the
trial court that the issue regarding the suit being barred by limitation in the facts of the present
case, is a triable issue and for which reason the plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold in
exercise of the power under Order 7, Rule 11 (d) CPC."
(emphasis supplied)
13. In view of the above, there was no justification for the High Court in allowing the application
under Order 7, Rule 11, on issues that were not evident from the plaint averments itself. The High
Court was also not justified in holding that the limitation period commences from the date of
registration itself. In this view of the matter the judgment of the High Court is unsustainable."
(ii) Salim D. Agboatwala & Others v. Shamalji Oddhavji Thakkar & Others, (2021) 17 SCC
100
"11. As observed by this Court in P.V. Guru Raj Reddy v. P. Neeradha Reddy [(2015) 8 SCC 331:
(2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 100], the rejection of plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 is a drastic power
conferred on the court to terminate a civil action at the threshold. Therefore, the conditions
precedent to the exercise of the power are stringent and it is especially so when rejection of plaint
is sought on the ground of limitation. When a plaintiff claims that he gained knowledge of the
essential facts giving rise to the cause of action only at a particular point of time, the same has to
be accepted at the stage of considering the application under Order 7, Rule 11 .
12. Again as pointed out by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Chhotanben v. Kiritbhai
Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar [(2018) 6 SCC 422 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 524], the plea regarding the
date on which the plaintiffs gained knowledge of the essential facts, is crucial for deciding the
question whether the suit is barred by limitation or not. It becomes a triable issue and hence the
suit cannot be thrown out at the threshold.
13...
14. But a defendant in a suit cannot pick up a few sentences here and there from the plaint and
contend that the plaintiffs had constructive notice of the proceedings and that therefore limitation
started running from the date of constructive notice. In fact, the plea of constructive notice is
raised by the respondents, after asserting positively that the plaintiffs had real knowledge as well
as actual notice of the proceedings. In any case, the plea of constructive notice appears to be a
subsequent invention."
(iii) Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India & Another, (2020) 17 SCC 260
"6. The central question is: whether the plaint as filed by the appellant could have been rejected
by invoking Order 7, Rule 11 (d) CPC?
7. Indeed, Order 7, Rule 11 CPC gives ample power to the court to reject the plaint, if from the
averments in the plaint, it is evident that the suit is barred by any law including the law of
limitation. This position is no more res integra. We may usefully refer to the decision of this Court
in Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv Kumar Gupta [(2007) 10 SCC 59]. In paras 13 to 20, the Court
observed as follows: (SCC pp. 65-66)
"13. As per Order 7, Rule 11, the plaint is liable to be rejected in the following cases:
'(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;

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(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to
correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently
stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to supply the requisite stamp paper
within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so;
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;
(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9;'
14. In Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, [(2003)
1 SCC 557] it was held with reference to Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code that:
'9. ... the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are
the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power ... at any stage of the suit -
before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the
conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of
Rule 11 Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in
the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage....' (SCC p. 560, para 9).
15. In ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal [ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate
Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC 70] it was held that the basic question to be decided while dealing with
an application filed under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code is whether a real cause of action has been
set out in the plaint or something purely illusory has been stated with a view to get out of Order
7, Rule 11 of the Code.
16. "The trial court must remember that if on a meaningful-not formal-reading of the plaint it is
manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should
exercise its power under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned
therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, [it has to be
nipped] in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC."
(See T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC 467], SCC p. 468.)
17. It is trite law that not any particular plea has to be considered, and the whole plaint has to
be read. As was observed by this Court in Roop Lal Sathi v. Nachhattar Singh Gill [(1982) 3
SCC 487], only a part of the plaint cannot be rejected and if no cause of action is disclosed, the
plaint as a whole must be rejected.
18. In Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property [(1998) 7 SCC 184] it was observed that
the averments in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out whether clause (d) of Rule 11
Order 7 was applicable.
19. In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr. [(2004) 3 SCC 137] this Court held thus: (SCC
pp. 146-47, para 15)
'15. There cannot be any compartmentalisation, dissection, segregation and inversions of the
language of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is adopted it would run counter to
the cardinal canon of interpretation according to which a pleading has to be read as a whole to
ascertain its true import. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it

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out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to
be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction or
words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. The intention of the party concerned is to be
gathered primarily from the tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole. At the same time
it should be borne in mind that no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on
hair-splitting technicalities.'
20. For our purpose, clause (d) is relevant. It makes it clear that if the plaint does not contain
necessary averments relating to limitation, the same is liable to be rejected. For the said purpose,
it is the duty of the person who files such an application to satisfy the court that the plaint does
not disclose how the same is in time. In order to answer the said question, it is incumbent on the
part of the court to verify the entire plaint. Order 7, Rule 12 mandates where a plaint is rejected,
the court has to record the order to that effect with the reasons for such order."
8. On the same lines, this Court in Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational
Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust [(2012) 8 SCC 706: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ)
612], observed as follows: (SCC pp. 713-15, paras 10-12) "10. ... It is clear from the above that
where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, the relief claimed is undervalued and not
corrected within the time allowed by the court, insufficiently stamped and not rectified within the
time fixed by the court, barred by any law, failed to enclose the required copies and the plaintiff
fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9, the court has no other option except to reject the
same. A reading of the above provision also makes it clear that power under Order 7, Rule 11 of
the Code can be exercised at any stage of the suit either before registering the plaint or after the
issuance of summons to the defendants or at any time before the conclusion of the trial.
11. This position was explained by this Court in Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [(2003) 1
SCC 557], in which, while considering Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code, it was held as under: (SCC p.
560, para 9)
'9. A perusal of Order 7, Rule 11 CPC makes it clear that the relevant facts which need to be
looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court
can exercise the power under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit - before registering the
plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial.
For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 CPC, the
averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement
would be wholly irrelevant at that stage, therefore, a direction to file the written statement
without deciding the application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC cannot but be procedural
irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.'
It is clear that in order to consider Order 7, Rule 11, the court has to look into the averments in
the plaint and the same can be exercised by the trial court at any stage of the suit. It is also clear
that the averments in the written statement are immaterial and it is the duty of the court to
scrutinise the averments/pleas in the plaint. In other words, what needs to be looked into in
deciding such an application are the averments in the plaint. At that stage, the pleas taken by the
defendant in the written statement are wholly irrelevant and the matter is to be decided only on
the plaint averments. These principles have been reiterated in Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v.
Ganesh Property [(1998) 7 SCC 184] and Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Vessel M.V. Fortune Express
[(2006) 3 SCC 100] .
12. It is also useful to refer the judgment in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC

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467], wherein while considering the very same provision i.e. Order 7, Rule 11 and the duty of the
trial court in considering such application, this Court has reminded the trial Judges with the
following observation: (SCC p. 470, para 5)
'5. ... The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful - not formal - reading of the
plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue,
he should exercise his power under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground
mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action,
nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC. An
activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial courts would insist imperatively on
examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest
stage. The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such men, (Chapter XI) and must be
triggered against them.' It is clear that if the allegations are vexatious and meritless and not
disclosing a clear right or material(s) to sue, it is the duty of the trial Judge to exercise his power
under Order 7, Rule 11 . If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action as observed
by Krishna Iyer, J. in the above referred decision [T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4
SCC 467], it should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the parties under Order
10 of the Code."
14. All these events have been reiterated in Para 28 of the plaint, dealing with the cause of action
for filing of the suit. Indeed, the said para opens with the expression "the cause of action to file
the suit accrued in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants when the illegal recoveries
were noticed and letter dated 21-7-2000 was sent to the defendants to clarify as to how the
interest was being calculated". This averment cannot be read in isolation.
....
22. It is well-established position that the cause of action for filing a suit would consist of bundle
of facts. Further, the factum of the suit being barred by limitation, ordinarily, would be a mixed
question of fact and law. Even for that reason, invoking Order 7, Rule 11 CPC is ruled out. In the
present case, the assertion in the plaint is that the appellant verily believed that its claim was
being processed by the regional office and the regional office would be taking appropriate
decision at the earliest. That belief was shaken after receipt of letter from the Senior Manager of
the Bank, dated 8-5-2002 followed by another letter dated 19-9-2002 to the effect that the action
taken by the Bank was in accordance with the rules and the appellant need not correspond with
the Bank in that regard any further. This firm response from the respondent Bank could trigger
the right of the appellant to sue the respondent Bank. Moreover, the fact that the appellant had
eventually sent a legal notice on 28-11-2003 and again on 7-1-2005 and then filed the suit on 23-2-
2005, is also invoked as giving rise to cause of action. Whether this plea taken by the appellant is
genuine and legitimate, would be a mixed question of fact and law, depending on the response of
the respondents."
13. In this backdrop, the approach of the High Court in reversing the well reasoned order of the
trial Court warrants interference. The trial Court had rightly held that the issue of limitation
necessitated adjudication upon evidence, particularly in view of the appellant's assertion that the
Power of Attorney executed by him did not confer any authority upon his father to alienate the suit
property and that the impugned transaction came to his knowledge only at a much later point in
time. In such circumstances, the determination of limitation involved disputed questions of fact that
could not be summarily decided without the benefit of trial. The High Court, however, proceeded to
reject the plaint solely on a prima facie assumption that the suit was barred by limitation, without

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undertaking any examination as to whether the plea regarding the date of knowledge was
demonstrably false or inherently improbable in light of the record. In the opinion of this Court, such
an approach amounts to an error of law and constitutes a misapplication of the well-established
principles governing the exercise of power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. For the same reasons, the
decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents are inapplicable, being factually
distinguishable.
14. It is also to be noted that the appellant has categorically averred in the plaint that he executed
the registered power of attorney in favour of his father solely for the limited purpose of
constructing a house and carrying out related activities. There is no express clause authorizing his
father to sell the suit property to any person without the appellant's consent and knowledge. Yet,
the appellant's father executed a sale deed in favour of his granddaughter, going beyond the scope
of the power of attorney, which raises serious doubt about misuse of authority and potential fraud.
Such assertions cannot be rejected in the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Accordingly, we
are of the view that the plaint discloses a cause of action which cannot be shut out at the
threshold. Thus, the trial Court acted within its jurisdiction in refusing to reject the plaint and in
holding that the matter ought to proceed to trial. The High Court, while exercising its revisional
jurisdiction under section 115 CPC, ought not to have interfered in the absence of any jurisdictional
error or perversity in the trial court's order. Rejecting the plaint where substantial factual disputes
exist concerning limitation and the scope of authority under the Power of Attorney, is legally
unsustainable.
15. In light of the foregoing, the judgment and order dated 03.09.2020 passed by the High Court in
CRP (NPD) No. 131 of 2018 is set aside and the order dated 04.10.2017 passed by the Additional
District Judge, Chengalpattu in I.A. No. 151 of 2015 in O.S. No. 310 of 2014 is affirmed. As a sequel,
the suit is restored for trial on its merits. It is, however, made clear that the trial Court shall
proceed without being influenced by any of the observations made by the High Court.
16. This appeal stands allowed in the above terms. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently,
connected Miscellaneous Application(s), if any, shall stand closed.
.
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