Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil.

139, 156
(1936)

Jose A. Angara filed a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission, one of the
respondents, for taking further cognizance of a protest filed by another respondent, Pedro Ynsua,
against Angara's election as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of
the Province of Tayabas. The petitioner argued that the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely regarding the merits of contested elections and
excludes the power to regulate the proceedings of such contests. The Solicitor-General appeared
and filed an answer on behalf of the respondent Electoral Commission, arguing that the Electoral
Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative
Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.
Pedro Ynsua, a petitioner, filed a defense on March 2, 1936, arguing that the Electoral
Commission had no existing law defining the period for protests against the election of members
of the National Assembly. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Electoral Commission,
stating that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy. The controversy involves a grave constitutional conflict between the
National Assembly and the Electoral Commission, as the Electoral Commission is not a separate
department of the government and conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law
between department powers and agencies are determined by the judiciary in justifiable and
appropriate cases. The 1935 draft of the Constitution of the United Kingdom aimed to transfer
the power of determining the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the legislature to
an independent, impartial, and non-partisan tribunal. The debate revolved around the
interpretation of paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft, which states that the elections, returns, and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting their election shall
be judged by an Electoral Commission. The debate also touched on the case of municipal
presidents and councilors, where there is no need for confirmation. However, if the assembly
wishes to annul the power of the commission, it may do so by certain maneuvers upon its first
meeting when returns are submitted to the assembly. The purpose of this clause is to give the
Electoral Commission all the powers exercised by the assembly referring to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of the members. In the 1935 session, the first clause of the draft
regarding the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly was
eliminated by the Sponsorship Committee in response to an amendment introduced by Delegates
Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar, and others. The amendment sought to restore
the power to decide contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly to the National Assembly itself. The Constitutional Convention members
deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission to remedy certain evils of the Constitution.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislatur

1
 Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisma, G.R. No.
166715, August 14, 2008

The petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing
Republic Act (RA) 93352, which was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law
encourages officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). The petitioners argue that the system of
rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of
these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
and efficiency. They also claim that limiting the scope of the system to officials and employees
only violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. The Court finds that petitioners
have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA 9335, except as
discussed below. Public office is a public trust, and its holder must be accountable to the people,
serving them with responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, patriotism, and justice. RA 9335
establishes safeguards to ensure that rewards are not claimed if they are the fruit of "bounty
hunting or mercenary activity" or the product of irregular performance of official duties. The
court recognizes standards such as "public interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience
and welfare," and "simplicity, economy and welfare." The policy of optimizing revenue-
generation capability and collection is infused with public interest. Legislative veto is a crucial
tool in preventing the executive branch and independent agencies from accumulating too much
power. The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld lower court decisions invalidating legislative veto
provisions in various cases, including the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and the Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act of 1980. The Macalintal Court ruled that the provision in RA
9189 creating a Joint Congressional Committee infringed on the constitutional independence of
the Commission on Elections. However, congressional oversight is not unconstitutional, as it is
essential for checks and balances in a democratic system. The Constitution of the Philippines
states that legislative power is vested in Congress, consisting of a Senate and a House of
Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both chambers, and
both single-chamber legislative veto and congressional committee legislative veto are invalid.
Section 12 of RA 9335, which empowers Congress or its members to play a role in the
implementation or enforcement of a law, is declared unconstitutional and invalid. The court will
invalidate similar provisions of other laws when appropriate cases are brought before them. The
remaining provisions of RA 9335 remain in force and effect.

2
  Dalamal v. Deportation Board, G.R. No. L-16812,
October 31, 1963

Kishu Dalamal, a British subject, was charged with violating the Central Bank Rules and
Regulations by aliens. The Deportation Board issued a warrant of arrest against him, but he was
released after filing a bond in the amount of P10,000.00. Dalamal filed a petition for habeas
corpus seeking the annulment of the warrant and the cancellation of his provisional liberty bond.
The grounds for the illegality of the warrant of arrest are that Section 1-(b) of Executive Order
No. 398 is repugnant to Section 1-(3), Article III, of the Constitution, which only allows judges
to issue warrants, either of arrest or search, and only upon probable cause. The delegation of
such power to the Deportation Board is unlawful, as a power delegated by Congress cannot be
delegated. During the American regime, the Governor General exercised the power to deport
aliens under Section 69 of Act 2711, known as the Administrative Code of 1917. This section
prescribes the procedure for deportation proceedings, including prior investigation, informed
consent, and the right to be heard by oneself or counsel, produce witnesses, and cross-examine
opposing witnesses. However, Executive Order No. 398 authorizes the Deportation Board to
order the arrest of the alien, transcending the authority given to the President by Section 69.
There is a divergence of opinion on whether the relevant provision of the Constitution only refers
to criminal proceedings where a judge is the sole arbiter, or if it involves both criminal and
administrative proceedings. In re McCulloch Dick, the Supreme Court ruled that the deportation
of aliens by the Governor-General, as an act of state, can be considered "under the combined
powers" of the Governor-General and the Philippine Legislature. The Supreme Court of the
United States has held that Congress has the power to delegate full power to the Philippine
Government to deport aliens as an act of state. The President has the inherent power to order the
deportation of an alien and as an incident thereof, while also having the power to order the arrest
of an alien. However, this power cannot be delegated under the principle of delegata potesta non
potest delegare or the theory that it is non-delegable because it involves the exercise of judgment
or discretion. The court concluded that Executive Order No. 398, which authorizes the
Deportation Board to issue warrants of arrest against aliens, is null and void, as it cannot be
delegated or authorized by Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. The warrant of arrest
issued by the respondent is set aside, and the bond put up by the petitioner is cancelled.

3
  Bureau Of Customs Employees Association
(BOCEA) v. Teves, G.R. No. 181704, December 6,
2011

The Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) filed a petition to declare Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9335, also known as the Attrition Act of 2005, unconstitutional and its
implementation permanently enjoined. The Act was enacted to optimize revenue-generation
capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs
(BOC). It aims to encourage officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing
a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund)
and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). The majority of BOC employees did not
sign the Performance Contracts, and all District Collectors, except a certain Atty. Carlos So of
the Collection District III of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), signed them.
BOCEA argued that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are constitutional
infringed on the fundamental rights of its members, including due process, equal protection of
the law, security of tenure, and legislative power delegation. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines has ruled that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are constitutional, except for Section 12.
The court found no merit in the petition and perforce dismissed the case. The court ruled that
R.A. No. 9335, aimed at optimizing the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and Bureau of Customs (BOC), is complete and contains
sufficient standards to negate BOCEA's supposition of undue delegation of legislative power to
the Board. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification for the BIR and BOC, as
they are bureaus under the Department of Finance. The court also settled issues on the security of
tenure of affected officials and employees, ensuring they cannot be dismissed for unattained
target collection. Due process is essential for a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard and
explain one's side in administrative proceedings. The court also resolved the issue raised by
BOCEA, which was whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder proscribed under Section 22,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The court found that BOCEA's petition was replete with
allegations of defects and anomalies in allocation, distribution, and receipt of rewards.

4
  Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos.
168056, 168207, 168461, 168463 & 168730,
September 1, 2005

The Court has upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9337, also known as the VAT
Reform Act, in three cases. The first case involves petitioners challenging the removal of "no
pass on provisions" for the sale of petroleum products and power generation services, while the
second case concerns Bataan Governor Enrique T. Garcia Jr.'s argument that burdening
consumers with higher prices under a VAT regime renders the law unconstitutional. The third
case involves the Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., who argue that the court erred in
upholding the constitutionality of Section 110(A)(2) and Section 110(B) of the NIRC, as
amended by the EVAT Law, imposing limitations on the amount of input VAT that may be
claimed as a credit against output VAT. The Court ruled that the House of Representatives'
decision to introduce amendments to the VAT law made the current VAT law more in line with
its nature. The Court also found no reason to reverse the earlier ruling that the Senate introduced
amendments that are germane to the subject matter and purposes of the house bills. Petitioners
argue that the right to credit input VAT is a statutory privilege, not a vested right that the State
cannot remove. The Court stated that the right to credit input tax is a mere creation of law,
protected against arbitrary state action, and the state is free to distribute the burden of a tax
without regard to the particular purpose for which it is to be used.

 Gerochi v. Department of Energy, G.R. No.

159796, July 17, 2007

Network, Inc. is arguing the unconstitutionality of Section 34 of Republic Act (RA) 9136, also
known as the "Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001" (EPIRA), which imposes the
Universal Charge on all electricity end-users. The charge is imposed for various purposes,
including payment for stranded debts, missionary electrification, equalization of taxes and
royalties applied to indigenous or renewable energy sources, an environmental charge equivalent
to one-fourth of one centavo per kilowatt-hour (₱0.0025/kWh), and a charge to account for
cross-subsidies for a period not exceeding three years. The EPIRA was enacted in June 2001 and
took effect on June 26, 2001. In 2002, National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities
Group (NPC-SPUG) filed a petition for the availment from the Universal Charge of its share for
Missionary Electrification. The Energy Reform Commission (ERC) authorized the National
Power Commission (NPC) to draw up ₱70,000,000.00 from PSALM for its 2003 Watershed
Rehabilitation Budget, subject to the availability of funds for the Environmental Fund
component of the Universal Charge.
PECO charged petitioner Romeo P. Gerochi and other end-users with the Universal Charge,
which they argue are unconstitutional. They argue that the Universal Charge is a tax collected
from all electric end-users and self-generating entities, and that the ERC has complete
discretionary legislative authority. PSALM contends that the Universal Charge is not a tax
because it is levied for a specific regulatory purpose, ensuring the viability of the country's
electric power industry. The Supreme Court has ruled that the Electric Power Regulatory

5
Commission (ERC) has not unduly delegated legislative power to the Electric Power Regulatory
Commission (ERC) to implement the Universal Charge. The court found no clear violation of the
Constitution that would warrant a pronouncement that Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and Rule 18 of its
IRR are unconstitutional and void. The court concluded that the EPIRA provides a framework
for restructuring the electric power industry, including privatization of the National Power
Corporation's assets, transitioning to a competitive structure, and delineating the roles of
government agencies and private entities.

 The Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies,

Inc. v. Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, G.R. No. 114714 April 21, 1995

The Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an association of licensed

Filipino manning agencies, has called for the annulment of Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and POEA Memorandum Circular
No. 05, series of 1994. The petitioners argue that the POEA lacks the authority to fix and
promulgate rates affecting death and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen working in
ocean-going vessels, violating the standards for its exercise. They also argue that the resolution
and memorandum circular are unconstitutional, violating the equal protection and non-
impairment of obligation of contracts clauses of the Constitution. The court argued that the
authority to issue the regulation was clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No.
797, which mandates the governing Board of the Administration to promulgate necessary rules
and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration. The
challenged resolution and memorandum circular strictly conform to the sufficient and valid
standard of "fair and equitable employment practices" prescribed in E.O. No. 797. The petition is
dismissed with costs against the petitioners for lack of merit.

6
 CASE DIGEST
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156 (1936)

FACTS: In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the
National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of
canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935,
he took his oath of office. On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8,
which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before
the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things,
that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of
said position be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No.
6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution
confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of
contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no
jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of
a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created
by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent
of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art.
VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the
election protest filed by Ynsua.

7
  Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisma, G.R. No.
166715, August 14, 2008

Facts:
Republic Act (RA) 9335, known as the “Attrition Act of 2005,” aimed to enhance the revenue
generation capability and collection efficiency of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the
Bureau of Customs (BOC) through a system of rewards and sanctions. This law established a
Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board within these
agencies, based on reaching or exceeding revenue targets determined by the Development
Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Officers and members of the Abakada Guro Party
List, citing their taxpayer’s rights, filed a petition directly to the Supreme Court challenging RA
9335’s constitutionality on four main grounds: it transforms BIR and BOC officials into
“mercenary” type officials, violates the equal protection clause, constitutes undue delegation of
legislative power to the President, and the creation of a congressional oversight committee
intrudes upon the executive’s domain.
The proceedings initiated by the petitioners moved directly to the Supreme Court as they invoked
judicial review over the alleged unconstitutionality of RA 9335. Respondents, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General, defended the law’s constitutionality, arguing its necessity for
public interest and dismissing the claims of it breeding mercenary-like behavior among tax
officials, violating the equal protection clause, unlawfully delegating power to the President, and
infringing upon the separation of powers doctrine.

### Issues:
1. Whether RA 9335 unjustly converts BIR and BOC officers into “mercenaries” by offering
incentives for exceeding revenue targets.
2. Whether RA 9335 violates the equal protection clause by solely applying its rewards and
sanctions mechanism to BIR and BOC personnel.
3. Whether RA 9335 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President by
lacking sufficient standards for setting revenue targets.
4. Whether the congressional oversight committee established under RA 9335 infringes upon the
principle of separation of powers.
### Court’s Decision:
1. **On the Allegation of Creating “Mercenaries”:** The Supreme Court held that RA 9335
does not turn BIR and BOC employees into “mercenary” types but instead aligns with the public
policy of optimizing revenue collection efficiency through a system of incentives, noting
safeguards against abuse.

8
2. **On the Violation of the Equal Protection Clause:** The court found the law valid,
reasoning that the BIR and BOC have unique, revenue-generating functions distinct from other
government agencies, thus justifying the law’s exclusive application to them.
3. **On Unconstitutional Delegation of Legislative Power:** The court upheld the
constitutionality of the delegation of power to set revenue targets, pointing out that RA 9335
provides enough standards and guidelines, thereby not constituting an undue delegation of
legislative power.
4. **On the Congressional Oversight Committee:** The court ruled Section 12 of RA 9335,
creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the law’s implementing rules
and regulations, as unconstitutional, infringing on the executive’s domain and violating the
principle of separation of powers, while the rest of RA 9335 remains effective.

 Dalamal v. Deportation Board, G.R. No. L-16812,

October 31, 1963

Facts:

Kishu Dalamal, a British national, was charged along with other aliens for
alleged violations of the Central Bank Rules and Regulations. The complaint
was filed by a Special Prosecutor from the Department of Justice before the
Deportation Board. Following this, the Chairman of the Deportation Board
issued a warrant for Dalamal's arrest under the authority of Section 1(b) of
Executive Order No. 398. He was arrested on August 5, 1958, but was
released after posting a bond of P10,000.

Dalamal contested the legality of the arrest warrant, claiming it violated

Section 1(3), Article III of the Philippine Constitution, which stipulates that
only judges can issue warrants of arrest based on probable cause
determined through examination under oath. He argued that the warrant
was illegal for two main reasons: (1) the authority granted to the Deportation
Board by Executive Order No. 398 was inconsistent with the constitutional
provision, and (2) even if the President had the power to order the arrest of
an alien for deportation purposes, this power could not be delegated to the
Deportation Board.

The historical context of deportation powers in the Philippines was also

discussed, tracing back to the American colonial period when the Governor-
General had the authority to deport aliens. The relevant provisions from the
Administrative Code of 1917 were cited, particularly Section 69, which
outlines the procedure for deportation, including the requirement for prior
investigation and the rights of the alien involved.

9
Legal Issues:

1. Is the warrant of arrest issued by the Deportation Board valid under

the Philippine Constitution?
2. Can the President delegate the power to issue arrest warrants to the
Deportation Board in the context of deportation proceedings?

Arguments:

Petitioner (Kishu Dalamal):

 The warrant of arrest is unconstitutional as it was issued by the

Deportation Board rather than a judge, violating the constitutional
requirement for probable cause.
 The delegation of the power to issue arrest warrants to the Deportation
Board is unlawful, as it contravenes the principle that a power
delegated by Congress cannot be further delegated.

Respondent (Deportation Board):

 The Deportation Board, under Executive Order No. 398, has the
authority to issue warrants of arrest as part of its mandate to
investigate deportation cases.
 The issuance of the warrant is a necessary measure to ensure the
presence of the alien during the investigation process.

Court's Decision and Legal Reasoning:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Dalamal, declaring the warrant of arrest
issued by the Deportation Board null and void. The Court emphasized that
the power to issue arrest warrants is a judicial function that cannot be
delegated to an administrative body. It reiterated that the Constitution
explicitly reserves this power for judges, who must determine probable
cause through proper legal procedures.

The Court further clarified that while the President has inherent powers
related to deportation, including the authority to order the arrest of an alien,
this power cannot be delegated to another entity, such as the Deportation
Board. The principle of "delegata potesta non potest delegari" was invoked,
underscoring that powers requiring discretion and judgment must be
exercised personally by the authority to whom they are granted.

Significant Legal Principles Established:

10
 1. The issuance of arrest warrants is a judicial function that must be
performed by judges, as mandated by the Constitution.
2. The power to issue arrest warrants in deportation proceedings cannot
be delegated to administrative bodies, reinforcing the principle of non-
delegability of powers that require discretion.
3. The decision highlights the importance of due process rights for
individuals facing deportation, ensuring they are informed of charges
and allowed to prepare a defense.

 Bureau Of Customs Employees Association

(BOCEA) v. Teves, G.R. No. 181704, December 6,
2011

Facts:

On January 25, 2005, Republic Act (RA) No. 9335, known as the “Attrition Act of 2005,” was
signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and became effective on February 11,
2005. RA No. 9335 aimed to enhance the revenue-collection capabilities of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by establishing a system of rewards
and sanctions. To implement the Act, the Department of Finance (DOF) and other agencies
issued Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), which were approved on May 22, 2006, and
became effective on June 14, 2006.

Petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA), comprising rank-and-file

employees of the BOC, challenged the constitutionality of RA No. 9335 and its IRR, alleging
that the Act violated various constitutional protections. BOCEA objected to the dissemination
and signing of Collection District Performance Contracts, which required employees to meet
specified revenue targets under threat of dismissal. They claimed the targets were unattainable
due to policies like reduced tariff rates and natural calamities. The petition was initially filed
with the Supreme Court on March 3, 2008. BOCEA emphasized that several BOC employees
were coerced into signing these contracts and that the law was discriminatory and punitive
without providing adequate procedural protections. Respondents, represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), argued that RA No. 9335 and its IRR provided reasonable grounds
for dismissal, complied with due process requirements, and upheld their constitutionality. They
cited the presumption of constitutionality and argued that the law was designed to optimize
revenue collection.
Procedural Posture:

11
1. **Petition Filed:** On March 3, 2008, BOCEA filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the Supreme Court.
2. **Motions and Replies:** BOCEA filed various letters and sought consultations with BOC
officials to ease tensions. Respondents countered the constitutional challenges with comments
that emphasized procedural and substantive due process in the law’s application.
3. **Memoranda Submitted:** Both parties complied with the Supreme Court’s resolution to
submit their respective memoranda, raising multiple constitutional issues.
4. **Supreme Court Decision:** The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of RA
No. 9335 and its IRR in light of similar challenges previously decided in the case of Abakada
Guro Party List v. Purisima.
Issues:
1. Whether RA No. 9335 and its IRR violate the right to due process of BIR and BOC officials
and employees.
2. Whether RA No. 9335 and its IRR violate the right to equal protection of the laws.
3. Whether RA No. 9335 and its IRR violate the right to security of tenure.
4. Whether RA No. 9335 involves undue delegation of legislative powers.
5. Whether RA No. 9335 constitutes a bill of attainder by punishing a specific group without
judicial trial.

Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of RA No. 9335 and its IRR, addressing each
issue comprehensively:

1. **Due Process:** The Court reiterated that the law provided for procedural due process,
including the setting of criteria for performance evaluation and the right to appeal adverse
decisions.
2. **Equal Protection:** The classification of BIR and BOC employees was found to have a
reasonable basis, given their unique role in revenue generation for the state. The Court noted that
such a classification met the demands of equal protection.
3. **Security of Tenure:** The Court held that the law provided a reasonable standard for
removal based on inefficiency, subject to civil service laws. Procedural safeguards ensured that
dismissals were not arbitrary.
4. **Delegation of Legislative Powers:** The Court found that RA No. 9335 passed the
“completeness” and “sufficient standard” tests necessary for valid delegation to administrative
bodies.

12
5. **Bill of Attainder:** RA No. 9335 was not considered a bill of attainder. It did not impose
punishment without judicial trial but rather established criteria for performance-based retention
and dismissal.
Doctrine:
RA No. 9335 and its IRR were validated under the framework of the separation of powers
doctrine, ensuring that sufficient standards and complete statutory guidelines supported
delegation to administrative bodies. The principles of equal protection, due process, security of
tenure, and non-delegation of legislative power were upheld and reiterated.
Class Notes:
– **Non-Delegation Doctrine:** Legislative power cannot be delegated without providing clear
standards and sufficient guidelines.
– **Equal Protection Clause:** Reasonable classification is allowed if it is based on
substantial distinctions relevant to the law’s purpose.
– **Due Process:** Procedural protections and the right to appeal are essential components.
– **Security of Tenure:** Reasonable grounds for removal must be outlined by law and
supported by procedural due process.
– **Bill of Attainder:** Legislation that punishes specific individuals or groups without a trial
is unconstitutional.

Historical Background:The case reflects broader administrative reforms and anti-corruption

measures pursued by the Philippine state to enhance public revenue collection critical for
national development. It involves balancing employee rights with governmental efficiency in a
historically evolving regulatory landscape.

 Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos.

168056, 168207, 168461, 168463 & 168730,
September 1, 2005

Facts:
This case consolidates several petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
9337 or the VAT Reform Act, which seeks to raise revenue to address the fiscal deficit and other
governmental financial concerns. The law amends various sections of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC) by increasing the Value-Added Tax (VAT) rate and restructuring the
VAT system. The petitioners—an association of party-list representatives, senators, gasoline

13
dealers, and civil service officials—assert that R.A. 9337 contains provisions which delegate the
legislative power of taxation to the executive branch, specifically granting the President the
authority to increase the VAT rate under certain conditions. This, along with other provisions on
the imposition of VAT, input tax credits, and final withholding tax, is claimed to be
unconstitutional. The procedural journey to the Supreme Court involved the petitions being filed
against the Executive Secretary, Secretary of Department of Finance, and the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue. The Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) upon the effectivity
of R.A. No. 9337 and heard oral arguments on the matter. The main contentions revolve around
the grant of presidential authority to raise the VAT rate, the alleged arbitrariness of certain VAT-
related provisions, and the claim that they violate the constitutional principles of due process,
equal protection, and progressive taxation.
Issues:
1. Whether the provisions in R.A. No. 9337 delegating the President the power to increase the
VAT rate are unconstitutional.
2. Whether the procedural requirements were met in the passage of R.A. No. 9337.
3. Whether the imposition of the VAT and limitations on creditable input tax under R.A. No.
9337 violates the due process clause and equal protection clause of the Constitution.
4. Whether the law violates the constitutional principle of progressive taxation.

Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337, dismissing all petitions. The
Court found no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the
Bicameral Conference Committee’s actions leading to the enactment of the law. The grant of
authority to the President to increase the VAT rate, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance and subject to specified conditions, was deemed not to be an undue delegation of
legislative power. The Court reasoned that it is the nature of the power that determines the
validity of its delegation, and the President’s role is merely to ascertain the existence of specific
conditions predefined by Congress—the operation of the law relies on objective and verifiable
facts.
Doctrine:
The delegation of legislative power is permissible when it is merely the ascertainment of facts
upon which enforcement and administration of an increase in the tax rate are contingent. The
power to tax cannot be delegated, but the legislature may declare the implementation of a tax
suspended until advised by the executive that a specified contingency has occurred.
Class Notes:
– The doctrine of separation of powers implies the non-delegation of powers, but specific rules
allow for delegation within limited confines.

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– The “completeness” and “sufficient standard” tests are used to determine the validity of a law
delegating power.
– The imposition of a tax rate based on conditions outside the control of the President is not an
undue delegation.
– “Final withholding tax” means the amount withheld is to be considered full and final payment
of the due tax.

Historical Background:
R.A. No. 9337 was enacted in response to pressing financial needs of the government,
particularly the rising national budget deficit. Fiscal reform, primarily to improve revenue
generation and tax collection efficiency, was the key motivator for the amendments to the NIRC.
The law represented a legislative effort to balance both revenue increase and a just tax burden
distribution across different sectors. It was against this backdrop of fiscal crisis management that
the petitions challenging the law were evaluated.

 Gerochi v. Department of Energy, G.R. No.

159796, July 17, 2007

Facts:
On June 8, 2001, the Philippine Congress enacted the Electric Power Industry Reform Act
(EPIRA), which took effect on June 26, 2001. Section 34 of EPIRA introduced the Universal
Charge, a fee to be determined, fixed, and approved by the Energy Regulatory Commission
(ERC) to support various objectives in the restructuring of the industry. Upon implementation,
Romeo P. Gerochi and other petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the Universal Charge,
leading to the petition filed before the Supreme Court. They argued that the charge was a tax, the
imposition of which constituted the undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC, and was
oppressive and confiscatory. Procedurally, the National Power Corporation (NPC) and others
filed petitions with the ERC to avail of the Universal Charge for missionary electrification and
environmental management funds. ERC ruled in favor of these petitions, and as a result, the
Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO) began reflecting the Universal Charge in their consumers’
electric bills. The petitioners elevated the case directly to the Supreme Court, bypassing the
traditional hierarchy of courts and without alleging grave abuse of discretion.
Issues:
1. Whether the Universal Charge under EPIRA constitutes a tax.
2. Whether there is undue delegation of legislative power to the Energy Regulatory Commission
(ERC).

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Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, finding that the Universal Charge
is not a tax but an exaction in the exercise of the State’s police power. The purposes of the
charge are regulatory, intending to ensure the viability of the country’s electric power industry.
The Court determined that the imposition of the Universal Charge passes the completeness test
and the sufficient standard test, implying no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC.
Doctrine:
The imposition of the Universal Charge under Section 34 of EPIRA does not constitute a tax but
rather an exaction under the State’s police power. There is no undue delegation of legislative
power as the law provides sufficient standards for the ERC to implement the power to tax entails
sovereignty and is a legislative function, while police power is the State’s power to regulate for
public welfare. – Imposition labeled as a charge does not necessarily mean it is a tax; the purpose
behind the imposition determines its nature. – Delegation of legislative power is restricted, but
administrative agencies can be granted specific powers if guided by a complete law and
sufficient standards. – The validity of delegation can be assured through the completeness test
and the sufficient standard test. – “Undue delegation” occurs when the law does not provide
adequate guidelines or boundaries for the delegated authority. – The Universal Charge under
EPIRA meets the standards for valid delegation: it is complete in all its terms and has sufficient
standards or guidelines for the ERC to follow.

Historical Background:
The Gerochi case arose within the context of implementing the Electric Power Industry Reform
Act (EPIRA) of 2001 in the Philippines. EPIRA aimed to restructure the Philippine electric
power industry, encourage competition, and ensure reliable and affordable electricity supply. The
enactment of EPIRA marked a significant shift towards deregulation and privatization in the
electric power sector, which necessitated regulatory measures such as the Universal Charge to
ensure the transition and address financial obligations of the National Power Corporation (NPC).
The case addressed the sensitive balance between the State’s power to impose fees for regulation
and the need to respect legislative boundaries and due process.

 The Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies,

Inc. v. Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, G.R. No. 114714 April 21, 1995

Facts:

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The Governing Board of the POEA enacted Governing Resolution No. 01 s. 1994 fixing for the
rates of workmen’s compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels.
Consequently, Memorandum Circular No. 05 was issued on 19 January 19942 by POEA
Administrator adjusting the rates of compensation and other benefits of Filipino seafarers.
Petitioners assailed both issuances on the following grounds:

1. The POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and promulgate rates affecting death
and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels; only Congress
can.
2. Even granting that the POEA has that power, it, nevertheless, violated the standards for its
exercise.
3. The resolution and the memorandum circular are unconstitutional because they violate the
equal protection and non-impairment of obligation of contracts clauses of the Constitution.

4. The resolution and the memorandum circular are not, valid acts of the Governing Board
because the private sector representative mandated by law has not been appointed by the
President since the creation of the POEA.

Public respondents contend that the petition is without merit and should be dismissed because (a)
the issuance of the challenged resolution and memorandum circular was a valid exercise of the
POEA's rule-making authority or power of subordinate legislation.

Issue:
Does the POEA have the power to fix and promulgate rates of Filipino seamen.

Held:
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order
No. 797: “The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided, shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory
functions of the Administration (POEA).” It is true that legislative discretion as to the
substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to
determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. But due to increasing
complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly
with the myriad problems demanding its attention, delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With this power, administrative bodies may
implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Congress
may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one
such administrative regulation. The power of the POEA is not unlimited as there is a sufficient
standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority, that standard is discoverable in
the executive order itself which is "fair and equitable employment practices”. The challenged
resolution and memorandum circular, which merely further amended the previous Memorandum

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Circular No. 02, strictly conform to the sufficient and valid standard of "fair and equitable
employment practices" prescribed in E.O. No. 797 can no longer be disputed.

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