Assess the role that nationalism played in the development of the modern state

system in the Middle East.

Nationalism is not a system, but a powerful tool when wielded correctly. Acknowledging

the many forms of nationalism, such as diaspora nationalism like Zionism, this paper focuses on

Arab nationalism and its role in the formation of the modern Arab state system. Though Pan-

Arabism was another driving form of nationalism, this paper limits its discussion to the basic

formation of internationally recognized statehood. Weber defines the modern state as one that

achieved monopoly, legitimacy, and through concentration of power the authority to use force.1

This paper further frames its argument to focus on the relationship between rising Arab interests,

Britain’s role as a case study of a Western actor, the Ottoman Empire, and the importance of

political leverage to achieve political change. Though nationalism played an important role in the

development of the modern state system in the Arab world, it was essential for the Arab world to

be in an environment where movements and leaders could use political leverage.

Anti-Ottomanism was a nationalist force that further weakened the Ottoman Empire and

strengthened Britain. The Ottoman Empire’s growing debt to Britain and other Western

European actors, and reactionary reforms to its military failures, set conditions for several

separatist movements within the Empire. Between 1854 and 1874, the Ottoman Empire

borrowed from fifteen different foreign actors to modernize its military and civil systems. 2 By

1875, 66% of Ottoman revenue was used to meet debt payments, largely to British bankers.3

Birdal notes that British infiltration and growing manipulation of Ottoman systems through legal

and economic leverage angered Ottoman nationalists, who saw the Empire as subservient to

1 André Munro, “State Monopoly on Violence | Political Science and Sociology,” in Encyclopædia Britannica,
2019.
2 Ilias Luursema, “In Debt: How the Ottoman Empire Became Beholden to European Capital,” The Collector,
January 20, 2023.
3 Ibid.
Britain.4 Though the Ottoman Empire embraced modernization and quasi-Westernization, its

policies did not align with the more traditional Islamic community.5 Sultan Hamid II recognized

the Empire’s decline and attempted to use Pan-Islamism as a tool to regain imperial control over

his territories.6 However, Hamid II’s large non-Muslim population further politically divided his

community and helped create the unintended effect of re-encouraging political Islam in the

1880s through the importance of a caliphate.7 Whereas the Caliph was a religious title associated

with a claim to rule, the Ottoman Empire’s use of “caliph” as a political title rather than a

religious title created an identifiable marker for one’s right to rule.8 Furthermore, as Hamid II

appointed Hussein Ali as the Emir of Mecca, he created an unintended effect of setting

conditions for Ali’s aspiration to be Caliph.9 Essentially, by WWI, the Ottoman Empire created

perfect conditions for an anti-Ottoman rebellion through decades of disintegrating national

integrity to foreign debtors and giving religious and political legitimacy to an Arab leader who

would then self-proclaim himself Caliph and lead a revolt.

Britain’s succession into the Middle East as early as the 1880s filled the waning Ottoman

Empire’s growing void, thus preventing Arab nationalism from achieving autonomy. Britain’s

intervention in Egypt achieved two effects. First, it illustrates that Britain had enough influence

and ties with the Ottoman Empire to mount an expeditionary invasion into sovereign territory.

Second, recognizing the dangerous implications of grassroots nationalism, Britain exercised

unofficial control of Egypt until WWI when it formally declared those territories British. Britain

4 Murat Birdal, The Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt: Insolvency and European Financial Control in the
Late Nineteenth Century (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2010), 7.
5 Frederick E Anscombe, “Islam And The Age Of Ottoman Reform,” Past & Present, no. 208 (2010): 159–89.
6 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 337.
7 ibid
8 Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream : The History of the Ottoman Empire (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 111.
9 Joshua Teitelbaum, “Sharif Husayn Ibn Ali and the Hashemite Vision of the Post-Ottoman Order: From
Chieftaincy to Suzerainty,” Middle Eastern Studies 34, no. 1 (1998): 103–22.
and the Ottoman Empire recognized the powerful nature of nationalism as a force. However,

without proper political leverage, nationalist movements could not succeed.

Arab nationalism through World War I was more successful in the early development of

the modern state system because there was political leverage. When Hussein Ali declared

himself Caliph, he was able to use Western recognition to consolidate his power in 1916 because

Britain needed his support.10 Granted, Ali would later lose control to Abdulaziz, it nonetheless

showcases an instance where Arab actors leveraged Western powers in conjunction with Arab

nationalism to achieve a lasting modern state system.

The Arab world, post-WWII, experienced new comparative advantages in political

leverage over their European counterparts, setting conditions for successful nationalist

revolutions. Decolonization forced Britain to balance control in the Middle East while presenting

an image of transition.11 Furthermore, Cold War bipolarity created an environment where Arab

leaders could play sides to achieve their goals. Unlike 1882, Nasser’s populist movement in 1952

successfully toppled a British backed leader without British armed intervention in part due to

U.S. support for Nasser.12 As the United States relied on Middle Eastern oil to help pay for

Western Europe’s reconstruction, Nasser negotiated foreign investment to pay for his own civil

development.13 He then used the Suez crisis to firmly remove any remaining British influence in

Egypt and furthered Egyptian nationalism through presenting himself as a staunch anti-

imperialist.14 Like Hussein Ali’s political maneuvering and employment of local nationalism to

establish his modern state, Nasser relied on populism for domestic control.

10 Isaiah Friedman, “The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence and the Question of Palestine,” Journal of
Contemporary History 5, no. 2 (1970): 83–122.
11 John W Young and John Kent, International Relations since 1945 : A Global History (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2019), 80-90.
12 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know : Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press ; New York, 1997),
164.
13 Gaddis, 165
14 Ibid.
 While Nationalism is a powerful force, the Cold War was equally powerful in that former

empires had to negotiate with the United States, changing the political dynamic in the Middle

East. The United States’ primary strategic aim during the early 1950s was to contain the Soviet

Union. When Marshall outlined the Truman administration’s policy in 1947, he stated that the

United States saw colonialism as “outmoded.”15 Kent notes that British Foreign Secretary Bevin

opposed a joint Anglo-American policy in the Middle East and considered the area as, “primarily

of strategic and economic interest to the United Kingdom.”16 Though the United States would

place greater attention towards the Middle East during the Eisenhower Administration in the

1950s, its policy of containment meant that the United States more willingly accepted

concessions when negotiating than its British counterparts. For example, during the Suez Crisis,

the United States pressured Britain to end their operation in Egypt to prevent Soviet escalation.

Gaddis argues that the United States’ decision unintentionally hastened Britain’s removal from

Egypt and solidified Nasser’s nationalist position.

The discovery and proliferation of oil in the Middle East, along with the Cold War,

changed the political dynamic between Arab and Western actors. The Cold War also shifted

Britain’s mindset away from territorial retention, where British leaders balanced de-colonization

with control over their oil company interests.17 Britain and other powers understood the strategic

importance of oil as early as 1917.18 Hankey wrote to Balfour arguing that, “control of these oil

supplies becomes a first-class war aim.”19 Oil politics gave Arab actors leverage as they

witnessed the fallout from the Suez Crisis, further increasing their bargaining power over

15 Gary R. Hess, “The First American Commitment in Indochina: The Acceptance of the ‘Bao Dai Solution,’
1950,” Diplomatic History 2, no. 4 (1978): 331–50.
16 Young and Kent, 86
17 Young and Kent, 86-90
18 James Paul, “Great Power Conflict over Iraqi Oil: The World War I Era,” archive.globalpolicy.org, October
2002.
19 Ibid.
Western actors. Arguably, Nasser’s long-term success in nationalizing the Suez Canal Company

and the United States’ response helped encourage other Arab actors to nationalize their

industries. Furthermore, nationalism arguably played a role behind OPEC’s creation in 1960 to

resist Western backed oil companies, but equally acknowledge the role of Arab resistance to

profit sharing.20 Therefore, economic interests and oil politics also play a role in helping shape

the modern state system in the Middle East.

In conclusion, nationalism is not a system nor was it the decisive force solely responsible

for political change in the Middle East. Early anti-Ottomanism saw several flavors of religious

and political nationalist movements. Though these movements existed, conditions were not set to

adequately leverage these forces to achieve change as other empires such as Britain readily filled

the growing political gap. Rather, the Arab community in the Middle East needed to balance

political leverage with populist nationalism to develop the modern state system. As the Cold War

escalated and British influence diminished, Arab leaders used nationalism as a populist tool to

help spearhead their efforts to change the political landscape in the Middle East. Nationalism did

play a role in the development of the modern state system, but it equally required a ripe greater

political landscape to take hold. Without the Cold War and changing international norms like

decolonization, it is likely that nationalism would not have been a force strong enough to bring

about independent Arab state systems.

Word count: 1560

20 Daniel Yergin, The Prize : The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power (London ; New York: Simon & Schuster,
1991), 499-503.
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