Ap 12232
Ap 12232
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10.1111/ap.12232
Abstract
The subtle relationship between feeling and thinking, affect and cognition has
fascinated philosophers and writers since time immemorial, yet empirical research on
this topic was relatively neglected by psychologists until recently. There have been many
affect. More recent work suggests that negative affect may also facilitate optimal
adaptive signalling function of various affective states. This paper reviews traditional and
current psychological theories linking affect to social thinking and behaviour. A variety of
empirical studies from our laboratory will also be presented, demonstrating that in
many situations, negative affect promotes optimal performance in cognitive and social
tasks, including tasks such as memory, social judgments, motivation, and strategic
theory that predicts that negative affect promotes a more accommodative, vigilant, and
externally focused thinking strategy. The relevance of these findings for recent affect-
cognition theories will be discussed, and the practical implications of negative affect
promoting improved social thinking and performance in a number of applied fields will
be considered.
Introduction
What is the role of affective states in guiding our reactions to the manifold challenges of
everyday social life? And in particular, are there any demonstrable adaptive benefits that flow
from the temporary experience of mild negative mood states? Evolutionary theorists have long
assumed that all affective reactions serve important adaptive functions, operating like
functional ‘mind modules’ that spontaneously spring into action in response to various
environmental challenges (Forgas, Haselton & von Hippel, 2007; Frijda, 1986; Tooby &
Cosmides, 1992). Interestingly, the human emotional repertoire seems heavily skewed towards
negative emotions. Four of the six basic emotions are negative - fear, anger, disgust and
sadness. The first three of these emotions clearly serve important adaptive functions preparing
the organism for flight, fight or avoidance. But what is the adaptive role of sadness, perhaps the
most ubiquitous of our negative emotions, and the one practising psychologists most often
This paper will survey a number of experimental studies providing convergent, and
somewhat counterintuitive evidence for the often useful and adaptive consequences of mild
negative affect for social cognition, judgments, motivation and interpersonal behaviour. The
evidence will show that mild sadness can have important adaptive consequences by triggering
more focused cognitive, motivational and behavioural strategies that help us deal with
demanding social situations (Frijda, 1986). In particular negative moods such as sadness may
often recruit a more attentive, accommodating thinking style that produces superior outcomes
whenever detailed, externally oriented, inductive thinking is required (Bless & Fiedler, 2006;
This pattern is consistent with evolutionary, functionalist theories of affect that argue that
affective states "exist for the sake of signalling states of the world that have to be responded
to" (Frijda, 1988, p. 354). The paper begins with a brief review of theoretical approaches linking
the sometimes beneficial effects of negative affective states for social thinking and behaviour.
It is the influence of mild mood states rather than distinct emotions that will be of interest
here, as moods are more common, more enduring and typically produce more uniform and
(Forgas, 2002, 2007). Moods are low-intensity, diffuse and relatively enduring affective states
without a salient antecedent cause and therefore little conscious cognitive content. In contrast,
emotions are more intense, short-lived and usually have a definite cause and conscious
cognitive content and recruit more conscious and context-dependent responses (Forgas, 1995,
2002).
Relatively few early experiments looked directly at affective influences on cognition and
behaviour. However, interest in the cognitive and behavioural consequences of affect increased
exponentially in recent years. Contemporary theories linking affect to cognition identify two
kinds of affective influences: (1) informational or valence effects (such as affect congruence),
when an affective state directly influences the valence of information people access and use,
and (2) processing effects, when affect influences the way information is processed.
Valence Effects
Affect can influence the valence of thinking and behaviour according to two complementary
theories, the affect priming, and the affect-as-information models. The affect-priming account
(Bower, 1981) argues that affect is integrally linked to an associative network of memory
constructs previously linked to that affect, and such affect-congruent ideas are more likely to be
memories, inferences and judgments. Numerous studies found that people selectively
remember more mood-congruent details from their childhood, and recall more mood-
congruent events from the recent past (Bower, 1981). Mood congruence can also influence how
people interpret social behaviours (Forgas, Bower & Krantz, 1984) and form impressions of
others (Forgas & Bower, 1987). However, affect priming is also subject to several boundary
conditions, and is most reliably obtained when tasks require open, elaborate and constructive
processing, as is the case with many inferences, associations, impression formation, and
interpersonal behaviours (e.g., Forgas, 2002, 2007; Forgas & Eich, 2012).
(1988; Clore, Schwarz & Conway, 1994) suggesting that "rather than computing a judgment on
the basis of recalled features of a target, individuals may ... ask themselves: 'how do I feel about
it? [and] in doing so, they may mistake feelings due to a pre-existing state as a reaction to the
target" (Schwarz, 1990, p. 529). Thus, people may misattribute a pre-existing affective state to
an unrelated stimulus. Such affective misattribution is most probable when “the task is of little
personal relevance, when little other information is available, when problems are too complex
to be solved systematically, and when time or attentional resources are limited” (Fiedler, 2001,
p. 175), as is the case, for example, when people are asked to perform simple, personally
uninvolving off-the-cuff judgments (Forgas & Moylan, 1987; Schwarz & Clore, 1988).
Processing Effects
Affect may also influence the process of cognition, that is, how people think (Clark & Isen,
1982; Forgas, 2002; Forgas & Eich, 2012). A recent and comprehensive explanation for these
processing effects by Bless and Fiedler (2006) suggests that different moods have an
this theory negative moods call for accommodative, bottom-up processing, focusing attention
on the details of the external world. In contrast, positive moods recruit assimilative, top-down
processing and greater reliance on pre-existing internal schematic knowledge and heuristics
(Bless, 2000; Bless & Fiedler, 2006; Fiedler, 2001). This affectively induced assimilative /
challenges. For example, Fiedler, Asbeck and Nickel (1991) found that those in a positive mood
were more likely to engage in constructive processing and were more influenced by prior
priming manipulations when forming judgments about people, while negative mood reduced
this tendency. In contrast negative affect, by promoting attention to new external information,
can reduce judgmental mistakes (Forgas, 1998a), reduce halo effects and primacy effects in
impression formation (Forgas, 2011a,b), improve the quality and efficacy of communication
strategies (Forgas, 2007), and also improve eyewitness memory (Fiedler et al., 1991; Forgas,
Vargas & Laham, 2005). The theory thus implies that both positive and negative mood can
produce processing advantages albeit in response to different situations that require different
strategies. This model explicitly affirms that negative affect does have important adaptive
Integrative Models
Integrative theories such as the Affect Infusion Model (AIM; Forgas, 1995; 2002) seek to link
the informational and processing effects of mood and also specify the circumstances that
facilitate or inhibit affective influences on cognition and behaviour. The AIM predicts that
situations that can differ in terms of two features: the degree of effort, and the degree of
openness of the information search strategy they recruit. By combining processing quantity
(effort), and quality (openness, constructiveness) the model identifies four distinct processing
styles: direct access processing (low effort, closed, not constructive), motivated processing (high
effort, closed, not constructive), heuristic processing (low effort, open, constructive), and
substantive processing (high effort, open, constructive). Affect infusion should be most likely
when constructive, substantive or heuristic processing is adopted. In contrast, affect should not
infuse thinking and behaviour when motivated or direct access processing is used.
two-stage procedure. Participants are first induced into a positive or negative mood using films,
music or autobiographic memories. The effects of mood are then explored in subsequent tasks
in what is described as a separate, unrelated experiment. Evidence for the potentially adaptive
benefits of negative affect will be summarized in four sections, dealing with (1) memory, (2)
Memory – the ability to access previously encoded knowledge – is perhaps the most
fundamental cognitive faculty (Forgas & Eich, 2012). Accurately remembering the past is a
difficult and demanding task, such memories can be of crucial importance in everyday life, as
well as in forensic and legal practice (Loftus, 1979; Neisser, 1982). Negative mood, by recruiting
a more accommodative and externally focussed processing style, should result in improved
memory performance. Eyewitness memory in particular is often distorted by what people pay
attention to, as well contamination by subsequent incorrect information (Fiedler et al., 1991;
Loftus, 1979; Wells & Loftus, 2003). In one experiment we showed participants photos of a car
crash scene (negative event) or alternatively, a wedding party scene (positive event; Forgas et
al., 2005, Exp. 1). One hour later, they were induced into happy or sad moods and then received
questions about the scenes that either did, or did not contain misleading, false information (eg.
‘Did you see the stop sign at the scene?’ when there was no stop sign). After a further 45-
As expected, negative mood reduced, and positive mood increased the tendency to
incorporate false, misleading information into eyewitness memories. In fact, negative mood
almost completely eliminated the common “misinformation effect” (Loftus, 1979). A signal
detection analysis confirmed that negative mood actually improved the ability to accurately
We found a similar pattern in a subsequent experiment, when students witness a staged but
highly realistic 5-minute altercation between a lecturer, and a female intruder (Forgas et al.,
2005, Exp. 2). Misleading information was introduced one week later, when happy and sad
eyewitnesses responded to questions about the incident that either did, or did not contain
false, planted information (eg., ‘Did you see the young woman in a brown jacket? when the
intruder wore a black jacket). We tested eyewitness memory after a further interval and found
that those in negative mood while exposed to misleading information were less influenced by
the planted details, and retained more accurate eyewitness memory (Figure 1), as also
confirmed by a signal detection analysis. Interestingly, people seem unable to control this mood
effect, even when explicitly instructed to do so according to a third experiment suggesting that
negative affect can improve memory performance, consistent with the assimilative /
The effects of mood on memory were further confirmed in a realistic field experiment, in a
small suburban shop (Forgas, Goldenberg & Unkelbach, 2009). We were curious whether happy
and sad people might remember differently a number of small unusual objects (little trinkets,
toys, matchbox cars, etc.) we placed near the check-out counter. Mood was induced naturally,
by carrying out the experiment on cold, rainy and unpleasant days (negative affect), or bright,
sunny, warm days (pleasant affect; Schwarz & Clore, 1988). We asked shoppers as they left the
shop to try to remember as many of these items as possible. As expected, people in a slightly
negative mood (on rainy days) had significantly better memory for the objects they saw in the
shop than did happy people questioned on a bright, sunny day (Figure 2). Thus, it seems that
mild, natural moods indeed have an effect on memory accuracy, with negative mood improving
Judgmental effects
The fundamental attribution error (FAE) refers to the common tendency to infer
accommodative processing, should reduce the incidence of the FAE by directing greater
attention to external, situational information (Forgas, 1998b). When happy or sad participants
were asked to make inferences about the writer of an essay advocating a popular or unpopular
position (for or against nuclear testing) that they believed was either assigned, or was freely
chosen (eg. Jones & Harris, 1967), negative affect reduced the FAE. This was further confirmed
in a follow-up field study. Participants feeling good or bad after seeing happy or sad movies
read and made attributions about the writers of popular and unpopular essays (arguing for, or
against recycling). Once again, those in a negative mood were less likely to make incorrect,
dispositional inferences based on assigned, coerced essays. Further (Forgas, 1998a, Exp. 3),
negative mood also improved memory for essay details, consistent with a more accommodative
processing style. A mediational analysis confirmed that processing style was a significant
Halo effects occur because judges tend to assume that a person having some positive
features is likely to have others as well. In another experiment we (Forgas, 2011b) asked happy
or sad judges to read a one-page philosophical essay. We also attached a photo of the writer
showing either a casually dressed young female, or a tweedy, bespectacled older male,
expecting that the appearance of the ‘writer’ should exert a halo effect on judgments. This
indeed was the case, but those in a negative mood were much less influenced by the
appearance of the writer than were judges in a positive mood. Positive mood in turn magnified
halo effects – both the essay, and the writer more positively evaluated when the photo showed
a middle-aged male (typical philosopher) rather than a young female (Figure 3.)
Primacy effects occur because people prematurely form a superficial impression based on
early details, and fail to process later stimulus information carefully and attentively (Asch, 1946;
Luchins, 1958). As moods can play an important role in triggering qualitatively different
processing strategies (Bless & Fiedler, 2006; Forgas, 2002, 2007), primacy effects should be
reduced by the more attentive, accommodative thinking style promoted by negative mood
(Forgas, 2011a. We asked happy and sad participants to form impressions about a target
character, Jim described with the order of two paragraphs describing him first as an extrovert
and then as an introvert, or in the reverse order (Luchins, 1958). There was a significant overall
primacy effect - but negative mood completely eliminated this common judgmental bias.
Conversely, primacy effects were consistently accentuated in a positive mood. (Figure 4).
If negative affect promotes attention to stimulus details, it should also improve people’s
ability to detect deception (eg. Lane & de Paulo, 1999). We asked happy or sad participants to
detect deception in the videotaped statements of people accused of theft (Forgas & East,
2008b). Negative affect enhanced judges’ ability to correctly discriminate between deceptive
and truthful targets according to a signal detection analysis, confirming the beneficial cognitive
consequences of mild negative affect (Forgas & East, 2008b; Figure 5).
Mood may well influence how people perceive and interpret inherently ambiguous
interpersonal communications. For example, we found that those in a negative mood were
significantly less likely to accept facial expressions as genuine than were people in the neutral or
happy conditions. Indeed, negative affect may well function as a general defence against
excessive gullibility and increasing scepticism. In one experiment happy or sad participants judged the
likely truth of a number of urban legends and rumours such as ‘power lines cause leukaemia’ or ‘the CIA
murdered Kennedy’ (Forgas & East, 2008a). As expected, negative mood increased scepticism and reduced
gullibility for new and unfamiliar claims (Forgas, 2002). In another experiment participants were informed
about the likely truth of 25 true and 25 false general knowledge trivia statements. Two weeks later, after a
mood induction, only participants in a negative mood could correctly distinguish between the true and false
claims they had seen previously. Thus, negative mood, by promoting a more accommodative, systematic
processing style (Fiedler & Bless, 2001) produced a more accurate subsequent discrimination between true
Evaluating the truth or falsity of information may also be influenced by subjective ease of
processing, or fluency (Unkelbach, 2006; Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). Can negative affect
reduce the extent to which people rely on heuristic cues, such as fluency in their truth
judgments (Koch & Forgas, 2012) ? In this study, after a mood induction participants judged the
truth of 30 ambiguous statements presented with high or low visual fluency (against a high or
low contrast background). Judges in a neutral and positive mood rated fluent (presented with
high contrast) claims as significantly more true than disfluent claims (presented with low visual
contrast; Figure 6). However, negative affect completely eliminated this fluency effect,
consistent with Bless and Fiedler’s (2006; Fiedler, 2001) assimilative/accommodative processing
dichotomy.
study happy or sad people made rapid shoot or don’t shoot responses to targets that did, or did
not appear to be Muslims. In this ‘shooter bias’ paradigm (Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink,
2002), we found a significantly greater tendency overall to shoot at Muslims rather than non-
Muslims, but interestingly, negative affect actually reduced this tendency (Unkelbach, Forgas, &
Denson, 2008; Figure 7). It was positive affect that increased a selective ‘shoot’ bias against
Muslims, consistent with more top-down, assimilative processing that facilitates reliance on
pre-existing knowledge such as stereotypes in subliminal responses (Bless & Fiedler, 2006;
There is a great deal of anecdotal and some scientific evidence suggesting that negative
mood may sometimes trigger greater effort than positive affect (Clark & Isen, 1982). In one
experiment we explored the possibility (Goldenberg & Forgas, 2012) that negative affect should
in a positive affective state, this may result in the discounting of the expected hedonistic value
may result in placing greater value on the expected hedonistic benefit of success, improving
motivation. In one study, happy or sad participants were allowed to work on a cognitive abilities
task as long as they liked. Participants in the positive mood spent significantly less time working
on the task compared to those in a negative mood, attempted fewer items, and scored fewer
correct answers (Figure 8). A mediational analyses supported the hedonistic discounting
hypothesis, confirming that it was mood-induced differences in task-value beliefs about the
Negative affect may also help to eliminate some counter-productive strategies such as self-
handicapping (Jones & Berglas, 1978). In one study (Alter & Forgas, 2007), we predicted and
found that positive mood increased, and negative mood decreases defensive self-handicapping.
When participants had reason to doubt their ability to perform well, positive affect significantly
Figure 9). In contrast, negative affect reduced self-handicapping. Given the pervasive role of
and self-handicapping received little prior attention. In terms of the hedonistic discounting
hypothesis, feeling happy may compromise the desire to work harder to obtain further
hedonistic benefits. It now appears that in some circumstances, negative affect may actually
One of the possible benefits of negative affect may have to do with its interpersonal
that negative affect may provide hidden social benefits by possibly arousing interpersonal
sympathy, and reducing the likelihood of interpersonal challenges and competition (Forgas,
Haselton & von Hippel, 2007; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). More recent work demonstrated a
coordinating our interpersonal strategies presents a demanding cognitive task that requires
open, constructive thinking. According to the AIM, affective states should have a mood-
congruent influence on many interpersonal behaviours (Forgas, 1995, 1999a,b). Positive affect
may selectively prime more optimistic, positive but also more confident, assertive and
sometimes, selfish behaviours. In contrast negative affect should prime more pessimistic,
negative interpretations and produce more cautious, polite and considerate interpersonal
self-disclosure) positive affect may confer distinct benefits (Forgas, 2002, 2011c). However,
there is growing evidence that in other situations where more cautious, more considerate and
less assertive behaviour is appropriate, it may be negative affect that produces real
interpersonal benefits.
Language Use
Can temporary negative mood improve people’s communication strategies and language
conform to the maxims of quantity, relevance, quality, and manner. In three experiments (Koch,
Forgas & Matovic, 2013) we predicted and found that participants in a negative mood complied
significantly better with Grice’s normative maxims than did participants in a positive mood
when using natural language to describe previously observed social events (Figure 10).
Experiments 2 and 3 further confirmed that negative mood actually improved the quality of
language production, and this effect was not merely due to improvements in the encoding (Exp.
2) and retrieval (Exp. 3) of the relevant information. These findings are consistent with affect–
cognition theories predicting that positive affect promotes a more internally focused and
assimilative thinking and communication style, and negative mood promotes more externally
focused and accommodative thinking, in this instance resulting in the closer observance of
communication norms.
These mood effects may apply not only to language production, but negative mood may also
improve people’s ability to monitor and understand language. Two experiments (Matovic, Koch
& Forgas, 2014) explored mood effects on people's ability to correctly identify ‘bad’ sentences
that are ambiguous and lack clear meaning in the absence of further contextual information
(ambiguous anaphora). We predicted and found that negative affect, induced by film clips,
indeed improved people's ability to detect linguistic ambiguity in target sentences (Figure 11).
Figure 11 here
An analysis of response latencies (Studies 1 & 2) also confirmed that negative mood
produced longer and more attentive processing, and a mediational analysis suggested that
processing latencies mediated mood effects on detecting linguistic ambiguity. These results are
again consistent with negative affect selectively promoting a more concrete, vigilant and
externally focused and accommodative information processing style, producing closer attention
Request Strategies
Moods may also influence strategic langue use such as formulating effective requests.
Requesting is a complex interpersonal task that must be formulated with just the right balance
between assertiveness vs. politeness to maximize compliance without risking giving offence.
While positive mood may increase subjective confidence which may produce a more assertive
and less polite requesting style, sad mood should lead to more polite and considerate requests
(Forgas, 1999a). We found that when happy or sad persons were asked to formulate requests in
various situations (Forgas, 1999a), sad persons used more polite while happy participants
preferred more assertive and impolite request forms. These mood effects on requesting were
magnified by more difficult rather than easy and routine interpersonal situations that required
These mood effects on requesting were also replicated in real-life interactions (Forgas,
1999b, Exp. 2). Participants who first viewed happy or sad films were asked by the experimenter
to get a file from a neighbouring office. When entering the room, their natural requests were
surreptitiously recorded; negative mood again resulted in significantly more polite, elaborate
and hedging requests, whereas those in a positive mood used more direct and less polite
Of course, negative affect will not always result in more considerate and effective
interpersonal strategies. Several experiments show that in some contexts, positive affect
provides clear interpersonal benefits. For example, those in a positive mood tend to be more
effective and integrative negotiators (Forgas, 1998a), tend to respond more positively to
requests directed at them in a natural setting (Forgas, 1998b), are better at managing
interpersonal self-disclosure (Forgas, 2011c), and may be more effective in some organizational
situations (Forgas & George, 2001). However, these effects are not universal. In some situations
where more caution, tact, consideration and attention to external norms is required, it is
negative rather than positive affect that seems to promote more effective interpersonal
behaviours.
Interpersonal Fairness
Selfishness versus fairness is a basic dimension when relating to others. Several studies
looked at mood effects on the level of selfishness vs. fairness people display in strategic
interactions such as the dictator game and the ultimatum game. In the dictator game the
allocator has the power to allocate a scarce resource (eg. money, etc.) between himself and
another person in any way they see fit. In the ultimatum game, proposers face a responder who
has a veto power to accept or reject the offer. As Bless and Fiedler (2006) suggested, negative
affect should promote greater attention and accommodation to the external demands of
fairness norms. In contrast, positive affect should recruit a more internally oriented, assimilative
In several experiments we found (Tan & Forgas, 2010) that happy players were significantly
more selfish and kept more resources (eg. raffle tickets) to themselves than did sad players. The
same pattern was confirmed when a series of 8 allocations to different partners were analysed:
overall, those in a sad mood were again consistently more fair and less selfish and gave more
resources to their partner. Further, as the trials progressed, happy individuals actually became
more selfish, and sad individuals became more fair (Figure 13).
These mood effects on fairness also occurred in the more complex decisional environment
faced by players in the ultimatum game, where proposers must necessarily consider the
willingness of responders to accept or reject their offers (Forgas & Tan, 2013). As hypothesized,
those in a negative mood were more fair and allocated significantly more resources to others
than did happy individuals. These mood effects could be directly linked to differences in
processing style, as sad individuals also took significantly longer to make allocation decisions
than did happy individuals, consistent with their expected more accommodative and attentive
processing style.
How does mood influence responders? In the final experiment in this series (Forgas & Tan,
2013), all participants were ‘randomly’ allocated to be responders rather than proposers.
Overall, 57% of those in negative mood rejected unfair offers compared to only 45% in the
positive condition, consistent with processing theories that predict that negative mood should
increase and positive mood reduce attention to external fairness norms even by responders.
These results are also in line with recent findings showing that negative mood increases
attention to external information (Forgas, 1998a,b; 1999a,b; Forgas et al., 2009; Unkelbach et
al., 2008), further challenging the common assumption in much of applied, organisational,
clinical and health psychology that positive affect has universally desirable social and
interpersonal consequences.
Persuasion
One of the most ubiquitous influence strategies in everyday life is verbal persuasion. Despite
long-standing interest in how persuasive messages are processed by recipients (eg. Eagly &
Chaiken, 1993), the question of how affect influences the production of persuasive messages
attracted far less attention (but see Bohner & Schwarz, 1993). In a series of studies, we
predicted that accommodative processing promoted by negative affect should result in more
concrete, factual and therefore more effective and successful persuasive messages (Forgas,
2007). For example, negative mood participants who were asked to write persuasive arguments
for or against an increase in student fees, or Aboriginal land rights produced higher quality
arguments (as rated by trained observers) on both issues than did happy participants. A
that influenced argument quality. Negative affect also resulted in better persuasive arguments
for or against Australia becoming a republic, and for or against a right-wing party (see Figure
14), consistent with negative mood promoting a more concrete processing style (Bless &
Were these ‘negative mood’ arguments actually also more effective? When the arguments
producing a real change in attitudes than were arguments produced by happy participants. This
was also the case when happy or sad participants typed on-line persuasive arguments to a
‘partner’ in what they believed were real interactions. A mediational analysis again confirmed
that negative mood induced more accommodative thinking, and more concrete and specific
information processing, and it is an intriguing possibility that mild negative affect may actually
The experiments reviewed here provide convergent evidence that negative affective states
can provide distinct adaptive advantages in many everyday social situations. These results are
consistent with recent evolutionary theories that suggest that the affective repertoire of human
beings has been largely shaped by the functional demands of our ancestral environment, and all
of our affective states – including the unpleasant ones – function as ‘mind modules’ and can be
The evidence reviewed here stands in stark contrast with the overwhelming intuitive
emphasis on the benefits of positive affect in the recent literature, as well as in popular culture
(Forgas & George, 2001). It is clear that positive affect is not universally desirable: people in a
negative mood are less prone to judgemental errors (Forgas, 1998b), are more resistant to eye-
witness distortions (Forgas et al., 2005), can be more motivated (Goldenberg & Forgas, 2015),
are more sensitive to social norms (Forgas, 1999a,b), and are better at producing high-quality
and effective communication strategies (Forgas, 2007; Koch et al., 2013; Matovic et. al., 2014).
Given the consistency of the results across a number of different experiments, tasks and mood
Of course, we do not claim that negative affect is always beneficial, or that positive affect
does not have adaptive consequences in some settings. Clearly, intense, enduring and
debilitating negative affect such as depression have very negative consequences. We focused
here on the cognitive, motivational and interpersonal consequences of mild, temporary mood
states, of the kind that we all regularly experience in everyday life. Our findings are broadly
consistent with the notion that over evolutionary time, affective states became adaptive,
functional triggers that promote motivational and information processing patterns that are
considerable importance to pursue and expand this line of research in order to discover the
boundary conditions of the cognitive benefits of negative affect. Based on prior work (Forgas &
Eich, 2012) it is reasonably likely that strong pre-existing motivational states may well override
the processing consequences of mood states (Forgas & Fiedler, 2007). The potential processing
benefits of more intense emotional states, as distinct from moods, also deserve further inquiry.
The work presented here also has some implications for the practice of psychology. Dealing
with negative affectivity is perhaps the most important task of many practicing and applied
psychologists could include a clearer recognition of the potential benefits of mild negative
affective states, as demonstrated here. Given the one-sided cultural emphasis on the ready
attainability of enduring happiness, and the preponderance of self-help books promising its
achievement, perhaps our cultural views about the human affective repertoire also need to be
revised. A wider dissemination of information about the need to accept mild negative moods as
a normal part of the human condition could well be helpful to many laypersons who may have
Dealing with the demands of our social environment is necessarily a complex and
challenging task that requires a high degree of elaborate processing (Forgas, 1995; 2002). The
empirical studies presented here suggest that in many situations, negative affect may increase,
and positive affect decrease the quality and efficacy of cognitive processes and interpersonal
behaviours. Much has been learned about the way affective states influence memory, thinking
and judgements in recent years, yet not enough is known about the evolutionary mechanisms
that are responsible for the way we respond to various affective states.
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eyewitness memory (Experiment 2): negative mood reduced, and positive mood increased
eyewitness distortions due to misleading information (false alarms; after Forgas, Vargas &
Laham, 2005).
Figure 2. The effects of good or bad mood, induced by the weather, on correct and incorrect
Figure 3. Mood moderates the incidence of halo effects on the evaluation of an essay:
positive mood increased, and negative mood eliminated the halo effect associated with the
Figure 4. The effects of mood and primacy on the evaluation of a target person: positive
mood increases, and negative mood reduces the primacy effect on evaluative judgments
Figure 5. The effects of mood and the target’s veracity (truthful, deceptive) on judgments of
guilt of targets accused of committing a theft (average percentage of targets judged guilty in
each condition (After Forgas & East, 2008b).
negative negative mood significantly reduced the tendency for people to rely on visual fluency
Figure 6. The interactive effects of mood and perceptual fluency on truth judgments:
0.200
Differential Response Bias Beta
0.160
0.120
0.080
0.040
0.000
Mood
Figure 7. The turban effect: Stimulus figures used to assess the effects of mood and wearing or
not wearing a turban on subliminal aggressive responses. Participants had to make rapid shoot /
don’t shoot decisions in response to targets who did or did not hold a gun, and did or did not
wear a Muslim head-dress (a turban). Those in a positive mood were more likely, and those in a
negative mood were less likely to selectively shoot at targets wearing a turban.
Figure 8. Positive affect reduces perseverance: The effects of induced mood on (a) the time
spent (in seconds) on persevering with a cognitive abilities task, (b) the number of tasks
attempted, and (c) the number of questions correctly answered (After Goldenberg & Forgas,
2012).
Figure 11. Mood effects on ability to detect ambiguous communication: negative mood
promoted the more accurate recognition of ambiguity in communicative sentences compared
to positive mood (After Matovic, Koch & Forgas, 2014).
mood decreases the degree of politeness, elaboration and hedging in strategic communications
Figure 12. Mood effects on naturally produced requests: Positive mood increases, and negative
Positive
Neutral
Negative
7
Mean argument quality
4
Quality Concreteness
Figure 13. Mood effects on the quality and concreteness of the persuasive messages
produced: negative affect increases the degree of concreteness of the arguments produced,
and arguments produced in negative mood were also rated as more persuasive (After Forgas,
2007, Experiment 2).
Figure 14. The effects of mood on selfishness vs. fairness: happy persons kept more rewards