EPR Core Reactor
EPR Core Reactor
Abstract
The nuclear industry has to face the increasing impact of deregulation, competition and new products like the EPR
have to rely on all possible means to reduce the generation costs for compensating the high initial investment. As far
as the core is concerned this reduction of generation costs is obtained mainly under given power level boundary
conditions by increasing the burn-up of the fuel and by providing the margins needed to the operator to adopt all
types of fuel managements which will allow to maximize the availability of the plant. Essentials of the EPR core
design basis and some representative results of basic design neutronic and thermal hydraulic studies are described in
the present paper for illustrating the potentials of the EPR under the boundary conditions prevailing at the end of
the Basic Design Phase. © 1999 Published by Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
0029-5493/99/$ - see front matter © 1999 Published by Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
PII: S 0 0 2 9 - 5 4 9 3 ( 9 8 ) 0 0 2 5 9 - 3
80 G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119
core flexibility with respect to the duration of the The nuclear design for the moment concen-
fuel cycles, the capacity to fulfil European grid trates on cores featuring some of the most de-
requirements, the recycling of significant quanti- manding types of fuel managements. It is
ties of Pu and simultaneously the objective to postulated that this approach gives sufficient free-
minimize as much as reasonably achievable the dom to accomodate later a large spectrum of
fuel cycle costs mainly by improving the neutron other types of less demanding managements. The
ecomony and increasing the fuel burn-up. neutronic and thermalhydraulic designs consist of
The more detailed EPR core data today avail- defining the major core parameters and associated
able are the results of first nuclear and thermalhy- systems characteristics which allow to meet under
draulic design analyses performed with the the above mentioned boundary conditions the
following orientations and assumptions: following safety or decoupling criteria:
1. The steam pressure in the steam generator For normal operating conditions (PCC1)2, con-
shall be of 72.5 bar under best estimate or trols, surveillance and limitation systems are
thermal hydraulic (conservative) assumptions maintaining automatically the plant within the
concerning the coolant flowrate. LCO3 limits postulated for accident analyses and
2. The core is designed for reaching a batch- thus far from the integrity limits of the fuel clad-
burn-up of at least 55 and possibly ] 60 ding. These systems are relying on efficient, accu-
GWd/tHM. This objective is consistent with rate and reliable instrumentation concepts.
the expected improvements of fuel perfor- In case of PCC2 events (anticipated operational
mances in progress on existing plants. occurences), in general, automatic countermea-
3. Margins are available to provide large flexibil- sures (limitations) will be actuated with the aim to
ity for defining the loading schemes. OUT/IN terminate the abnormal transients at an early
and IN/OUT types of loadings are possible. stage and to return as far as possible the plant in
4. The cycle length of 18 months is taken as PCC1 conditions without tripping the plant. The
design basis for optimization. trip function (protection) relying on the accurate
5. Two years cycles are feasible. monitoring of essential core parameters is actu-
6. Extended Pu recycling is possible up to a 50% ated only when there is no other solution or when
MOX-core, on the basis of the 18 months-cy- the first automatic actions did not succeed to
cle and the two types of loadings. terminate the transient.
7. A systematic stretch-out operation of up to 70 For both PCC1 conditions and PCC2 events,
EFPD is allowed. there shall be no loss of integrity of the fuel. For
8. The core control is defined for meeting the PCC2 events and events of lower probability of
manoeuvrability requirements expressed in the occurrence which are resulting in a plant shut-
EUR grid requirements: capacity for sched- down, the target as far as the shutdown capabili-
uled or unscheduled large and fast power vari- ties are concerned is to bring and maintain the
ations over the total range of 20 – 100% RP, plant in subcritical conditions up to and during
capacity for permanent primary and secondary the safe shutdown state relying on safety grade
control in a range of 9 12.5% between 50 and means in the frame of the safety demonstration.
100% RP (Lisdat, Miossec1, Sengler, POWER-
GEN 96: Flexibility of Power generation with 3.2. Neutronic design
the EPR based on the French and German
experience). It is optimized for minimizing the 3.2.1. Number and type of fuel assemblies
mechanical and thermal stresses and the excess The large size of the core characterized by:
of core margins needed to cover the complete fuel assemblies of the type 17× 17 and,
spectrum of corresponding types of operation.
2
1
Claude Miossec: EDF–EPN Site Cap–Ampère, 1 place PCC stands for plant condition category.
3
Pleyel 93282 St Denis Cedex, France. LCO stands for limiting conditions of operation
G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119 83
an active length of 420 cm, tions category 1 and 2 events including the
was selected mainly for economical reasons maximum overpower condition,
(Forêt, Schlosser, Sengler, TOPNUX 96: EPR 4. the fuel management will be such that the
Fuel Cycle cost reduction). It significantly con- resulting power and burn-up distributions will
tributes to improve the neutron economy, by of- be consistent with the assumptions taken for
fering a low surface to volume ratio and lowering demonstrating the mechanical integrity of the
the power density which results in a lower xenon fuel rods.
poisoning and a reduced Doppler feedback. The Based on past experiences, as a first de-coupling
implemention of a heavy reflector with an average assumption for starting the neutronic and ther-
thickness of 19.4 cm provides an additional neu- malhydraulic design, the target fixed for defining
tron economy corresponding to an equivalent sav- the loading patterns was not to exceed a best
ing of 0.15 and 0.06 wt% of U5 enrichment, estimate value of 1.6 for the F N DH (integrated
respectively for the first and later equilibrium relative fuel pin power after reconstruction of the
cycles. The low linear heat generation rate of 3-D pin by pin power map) for the most demand-
154.9 W cm − 1 additionaly provides margins ing types of fuel managements. The performed
which allow to increase the burn-up by increasing neutronic calculations for all relevant types of
the U5 enrichment up to 5.0 wt% and conse- loadings, including the transition cycles have
quently the reciprocal reload fraction. shown that this target can be met (as illustrated in
The requested cycle lengths of 12, 18 and 24 Table 3, column 10).
months are reached approximately with reciprocal In fact the justification of the design is based on
the calculation of extreme power shapes which
reload fractions of, respectively, 6, 4 and 3. This
may affect fuel design limits. These calculations
means that even with very long fuel cycles one can
are performed with proven methods verified fre-
meet the requested fuel burn-up target.
quently with measurements from operating reac-
It can be seen also in Table 3 that for the
tors. The conditions under which limiting power
envisaged types of loadings characterized in
shapes are assumed to occur are chosen conserva-
columns 1–4, the operational and economical
tively with regard to any permissible operating
targets with respect to cycle lengths and fuel
state. In addition, uncertainties are considered for
burn-up are reached (respectively, columns 8 and covering calculation uncertainties and allowances
9). for manufacturing tolerances.
The calculation of the power distributions is
3.2.2. Fuel managements and power distributions relying on a two-energy group 3-D model diffu-
The margins mentioned above are sufficient sion code incorporating the most recent nodal
also to cover more demanding 50% MOX-cores technologies. In this modelization, the fuel assem-
and low leakage loadings which are improving the bly is represented radially by four nodes and by
fuel cycle economy in the average by at least 2.5% 20 nodes in axial direction, from which 18 for the
compared to OUT/IN loadings (see examples of active part. The local reconstruction of the flux,
different types of studied loading patterns in Figs. power, burn-up and reaction rates is based on a
3 – 9) with respect to the power distribution, the combination of homogeneous intranodal fluxes
nuclear design basis is that, with at least a 95% computed at each step and tabulated power form
confidence level: factors. The homogeneous intranodal flux is re-
1. the fuel power density remains below 450 W constructed using surface currents, surfaces fluxes,
cm − 1 under normal conditions (Fq 52.90), corner point fluxes and the nodal average flux.
2. the fuel peak power under abnormal condi- The power form factors are the results of lattice
tions including the maximum overpower con- computations performed by a 2-D code solving
dition will not cause local fuel melting, the Boltzmann transport equation using a multi-
3. the fuel will not operate with a power distribu- group formalism and a collision probability
tion that violates the departure from nucleate method for various 2-D geometries and burn-up
boiling (DNB) design basis under plant condi- conditions.
84 G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119
Table 1
Essential core and primary system parametersa,b
BE-conditions TH-conditions
Table 1 (Continued)
BE-conditions TH-conditions
In 15.0%
Cd 5.0%
Density (g cm−3) 10.17
Absorber outer diameter (mm) 7.65
Length (mm) 1000
2) B4C part (upper part) composition: natural boron with 19.9 atoms of B10 percent
Density (g cm−3) 1.79
Absorber diameter (mm) 7.47
Length (mm) 3110
Pu239+Pu241
a
The fissile Pu enrichment is defined as:e = .
(U+Pu+Am)
b
It is important to note that hybrid AIC-B4C control rods are considered only as a calculation reference absorber in term of
integral worth. This type of rods may be replaced later on by new types resulting from R&D work and having at least the same
efficiency.
The target of the core designer is always to find in a way to avoid axial power peaks.
appropriate solutions for minimizing the local As far as radial power distributions are con-
power peaks. In this attempt, the classical way is cerned, the shape in horizontal section is a func-
to consider separately the means to reduce radial tion of:
peaking factors and the means to operate the core the loading pattern of fuel assemblies,
the location of poisoned rods,
the insertion of rod cluster control assemblies
the core burn-up,
the power level and the moderator density,
the concentration and the distribution of xenon
and samarium.
On the contrary, the effect of non-uniform flow
distribution is negligible.
With respect to radial power distributions the
designer defines the fuel management (loading
pattern, introduction of Gd-rods...) and the loca-
tion of the control rods which at the same time
correspond to the best compromise between eco-
nomical optimization and minimization of radial
peaks.
For illustration, the figures Figs. 10–23 are
showing the radial power distributions per assem-
bly for one eighth of the core for different burn-
up steps of the cycle 1 and of the equilibrium
cycle of the different types of fuel managements.
These distributions are obtained by integrating
the nuclear power over the core height.
As already mentioned above, the power of the
hot channel in the core results from the superim-
position of the macroscopic power distribution in
Fig. 3. First core loading pattern. the core and the pin by pin distribution in the
86 G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119
assembly. For the purpose of illustration, assembly are shown in Figs. 28 and 29, corresponding to full
pin by pin power distributions at beginning of life power states without rods inserted.
and end of cycle 1 are given for the same assembly The means to limit the axial power distribution
in Figs. 24 and 25, respectively. Other examples are mainly linked to the core control principles.
Figs. 26 and 27 are, respectively given for an Signals are available from neutron flux incore or
assembly with Gd pins and for a Mox assembly. excore instrumentation. These signals are used for
With respect to the radial power distribution used the core control during normal operation to deter-
for DNB calculations, a single reference radial mine the average axial power distribution of the
design distribution is selected for reasons of sim- core which is characterized either by the axial offset
plification. This design power distribution is chosen (AO) or the axial power difference DP:
to be conservative, enveloping all types of calcu-
PT − PB
lated power distributions and minimizing the AO=
PT + PB
benefits or flow redistributions.
On the other hand, the shape of the power where PT and PB are the power fraction in the top
distribution in the axial direction depends mainly and bottom halves of the core.
on:
DP= PT − PB = AO× Pr
the insertion of control rods,
the power level, where Pr is the relative power level in comparison
the axial xenon distribution, with the nominal power level.
the feedback effects resulting from Doppler For minimizing axial power distributions, the
effect and moderator density, core control has to be designed appropriately
the fuel burn-up. (Section 3.4). This is the case for the EPR where
For the purpose of illustration representative control rods are nearly totally withdrawn at full
axial power shapes for cycle 1 at different burn-ups power. In addition, axial oscillations due to Xe
G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119 87
are prevented by maintaining automatically the 3.2.3. Boron concentration, reacti6ity coefficients,
axial offset within a narrow operating band, keep- shutdown efficiency
ing the axial Xe-distribution in phase with the Following the defense in depth concept, the core
actual power distribution. is designed to have stabilizing reactivity coefficients
Finally, the worst or limiting power distributions and to have an efficiency of the shutdown system
which can occur during normal operation (plant which allows to meet the safety objectives.
condition category 1 events) have to be considered Typical values for boron concentrations (ex-
as the starting point for analysis of plant condition pressed considering natural boron) and moderator
category 2, 3 and 4 events. These limiting power temperature coefficients are shown for illustration
distributions are at the present stage of design in Table 3, respectively in the columns 5–7 for the
generated in a conservative way; later on, on the different types of fuel managements. The number
real plant, the limitations of the maximum linear of burnable poisons indicated in column 3 is
power density Q(z) and of the DNBR, based adjusted at present partly to limit the critical boron
mainly on fixed incore instrumentation, will ensure concentration at HZP, all rods out at BOL, in such
that the real power distributions measured online a way that the moderator temperature coefficient
are remaining less penalizing than those generated temperature under these conditions remains nega-
for the design (Section 3.5.3.2). In practice, due to tive, including consideration of uncertainties. This
the the conservative approach on power distribu- is at present an overconservative constraint which
tions, there are margins available which may be could be relaxed by taking appropriate counter-
used in an appropriate way in a next iteration step. measures, e.g. by performing the accident analyses
The major core characteristics, important for the with more positive moderator temperature coeffi-
nuclear design are gathered in Table 1. cients. All the other feed back coefficients (fuel
88 G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119
temperature coefficient, power coefficient, void assumption based in a first stage on past expe-
coefficient) are negative. rience with respect to the analysis of subcool-
The requirements for the design of the shut- ing accidents of plants of the previous
down system are the following: generation and confirmed later by real accident
Maintain subcriticality assuming one stuck rod analyses for the EPR). This subcriticality in-
after actuation of the reactor trip until condi- cludes, as before, a 500 pcm margin for provid-
tions are reached at which the boration with ing additional flexibility for the reloadings and
safety classified systems is effective. This crite- transition cycles.
rion consists in reaching a subcriticality of 500 Maintain in the long term the plant succritical
pcm after reactor trip and cooldown of the at HZP after a reactor trip from full power.
primary circuit to 260°C (conservative decou- This means that with all rods in, the subcriti-
pling assumption) for all types of fuel manage- cality after trip has to be sufficient to cover the
ments with consideration of an additional 500 long term depletion of the xenon in order to be
pcm margin for covering the variability of the able to cope with a loss of the operational
reshuffling in a real plant (in order to minimize boration function.
possible constraints on reshufflings). The sizing of the shutdown system is taking
Compliance with PPC 4 design criteria after a into account as well allowances for covering ini-
main steam line break, assuming one stuck rod. tial conditions of accidents in accordance with the
In this case, a temporary return to criticality is defined limiting conditions of operation as uncer-
considered being acceptable. In terms of reac- tainties of the design tools and of measurement
tivity, this criterion corresponds to request a systems. To the limiting conditions of operation
subcriticaity of 2500 pcm at HZP after reactor considered for this purpose are belonging parame-
trip from full power (conservative decoupling ters like:
G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119 89
the reactor power, long fuel cycles on the other, high boron con-
the initial insertion of control rods (maximum centrations are needed at the beginning of cy-
needed negative reactivity inserted for control cles. These high boron concentrations might not
purposes), be suitable from the point of view of the clad-
the initial axial power and Xe distributions. ding corrosion. It is therefore envisaged under
A RCCA pattern which inclusively covers the these conditions to operate the plant with B10
needs for MOX-cores is shown in Fig. 30. Mini- enriched boron.
mum shutdown margins calculated at bounding At present, the proposal would be to operate
end of cycle conditions for the relevant fuel the plant with at least 28.50 wt% of B10 for UO2
managements are shown in Table 3, column 12. cores with the highest U5 enrichment and 36
It can be seen that the requirements are over wt% of B10 in case of 50% Mox cores. These
fulfilled for uranium cores for which less RC- boron enrichments would allow to operate the
CAs would in fact be needed. plants at boron concentrations B 1400 ppm at
The shutdown and the boration systems are BOL without Xe.
designed also to satisfy long term requirements For covering all the needs, the theoretical
after reactor trip, corresponding to subcriticality boron concentration of the IRWST has to be in
requirements for all types of shut down condi- the range of 3200 ppm when considering natural
tions covering operational and accidental scenar- boron, 2260 ppm when considering enriched
ios.Due to the relatively low efficiency of the boron. The real IRWST boron-concentration
boron observed for high enriched uranium cores will be somewhat higher to account for uncer-
and its even lower efficiency in case of MOX- tainties and partial dilutions which may inter-
cores on the one hand and the consideration of vene in some accidental scenarios.
90 G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119
3.3. Thermal hydraulic design and core parameters The major parameter from thermal hydraulic
point of view is the DNB (departure from nucleate
The purpose of the thermal hydraulic design is boiling), depending on main parameters such as
to provide an adequate heat transfer, coherent with the mean heat generation, the power distribution,
the distribution of the heat generation such that the coolant temperatures and pressures and the
the heat removal by the reactor coolant system or core flowrate.
by the safety injection system allow to fulfill: The DNB also depends on the detailed geomet-
on the one hand operational targets in terms of rical characteristics of the real fuel, location of
available margins to minimize the constraints mixing grids and efficiency of mixing vanes etc.
on core loadings and allow easy load follow and Empirical DNB correlations are generally estab-
lished by every fuel supplier for a given fuel, based
frequency control operation,
on extensive DNB tests performed on thermal
and on the other hand to meet the safety targets.
hydraulic test loops.
The thermal hydraulic design consists in princi-
For the EPR the main fuel characteristics are
ple of defining the main thermal hydraulic parame- known, but not the details which are specific for a
ters and then of sizing the setpoints of limitation given supplier. Thus the thermal hydraulic design
and protection functions in an iterative optimiza- of the EPR is not based on a specific DNB
tion process in order to meet these design targets. prediction correlation.
In fact, for the EPR with its large core and low The way selected to overcome this situation was
linear heat rate, there is no major problems to meet to make use of CHF tables of the open literature
all these targets, so that there was no need for and to apply them to reactor design calculations
iterative work since the main primary components after having performed appropriate validation
were selected to rely on already existing designs. tests and set an appropriate criterion in terms of
G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119 91
DNBR. For doing that, the CHF values obtained By preventing DNB, an adequate heat transfer
by the tables were compared to the results of tests between the fuel clad and the reactor coolant is
performed on real rod bundles of different sets of ensured. The prevention of DNB is relying on
presently known advanced fuels. The resulting appropriately sized limitation and protection
DNB predictor is enveloping all considered fuels functions based on on-line DNBR calculations.
and can be considered conservative at the present These I and C functions are using fixed incore flux
stage of the design, providing margins for future measurements to reconstruct the local thermal
actual fuel applications. hydraulic conditions and to calculate the CHF.
The DNBR values characterizing the operation The reconstruction uncertainties as well as un-
of the EPR and preliminary setpoints of limita- certainties related to the fuel geometry and to the
tion and protection functions where obtained via thermal hydraulic modelization are considered for
this particular methodology and cannot be com- sizing the setpoints, the principle of sizing being
pared directly with values obtained for other that there is a 95% probability at a 95% confi-
plants with DNBR correlations applying for spe- dence level that the DNB will not occur when the
cific fuels. on-line calculated DNBR threshold is reached or
when other protective functions have been actu-
3.3.1. Thermal hydraulic design with respect to the ated.
DNBR The methodology used for defining the
The design basis on DNB is to ensure with a thresholds of the I and C functions used to ensure
probability of 95% that DNB will not occur on the thermal hydraulic design criteria is based
the limiting fuel rods during normal operation mainly on the analyses of events of PCC 2 for
and anticipated transients (PCC 1 +2) at a confi- which the integrity of the first barrier is manda-
dence level of 95%. tory. But there are also some other particular
92 G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119
Fig. 10. Normalized power density distribution near beginning of life unrodded core, hot full power, equilibrium xenon for cycle 1.
G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119 93
Fig. 11. Normalized power density distribution near end of life unrodded core, hot full power, equilibrium xenon for cycle 1.
94 G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119
Fig. 12. Normalized power density distribution near beginning of life unrodded core, hot full power, equilibrium xenon for
UO2-OUTIN-18 months.
G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119 95
Fig. 13. Normalized power density distribution near end of life unrodded core, hot full power, equilibrium xenon for UO2-OUTIN-
18 months.
96 G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119
Fig. 14. Normalized power density distribution near beginning of life unrodded core, hot full power, equilibrium xenon for
UO2-INOUT-18 months.
G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119 97
Fig. 15. Normalized power density distribution near end of life unrodded core, hot full power, equilibrium xenon for UO2-INOUT-
18 months.
98 G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119
Fig. 16. Normalized power density distribution near beginning of life unrodded core, hot full power, equilibrium xenon for
UO2-INOUT-12 months.
G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119 99
Fig. 17. Normalized power density distribution near end of life unrodded core, hot full power, equilibrium xenon for UO2-INOUT-
12 months.
100 G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119
Fig. 18. Normalized power density distribution near beginning of life unrodded core, hot full power, equilibrium xenon for
UO2-INOUT-24 months.
G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119 101
Fig. 19. Normalized power density distribution near end of life unrodded core, hot full power, equilibrium xenon for UO2-INOUT-
24 months.
102 G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119
Fig. 20. Normalized power density distribution near beginning of life unrodded core, hot full power, equilibrium xenon for
MOX-OUTIN-18 months.
G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119 103
Fig. 21. Normalized power density distribution near end of life unrodded core, hot full power, equilibrium xenon for MOX-OUTIN-
18 months.
104 G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119
Fig. 22. Normalized power density distribution near beginning of life unrodded core, hot full power, equilibrium xenon for
MOX-INOUT-18 months.
G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119 105
Fig. 23. Normalized power density distribution near end of life unrodded core, hot full power, equilibrium xenon for MOX-INOUT-
18 months.
106 G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119
Fig. 24. Rodwise power distribution in typical assembly near beginning of life, hot full power, equilibrium xenon for cycle 1.
events of PCC 3 and 4 for which this integrity is protection channel used to protect the core. Three
requested too for reasons of simplification of the cases are considered:
safety demonstration (decoupling assumption) in Transients of type 1 for which the DNBR
particular in case of a failure of another barrier. protection is efficient. These transients occur at
The methodology used for sizing with respect to power and are relatively slow. For these tran-
DNB in fact depends on the types of reactor sients, the DNB is avoided by setting the
G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119 107
Fig. 25. Rodwise power distribution in typical assembly near end of life, hot full power, equilibrium xenon for cycle 1.
DNBR threshold of the DNBR protection pared to the response time of this protection:
channel at a limit which guarantees non occur- For these transients, the protection is based on
rence of DNB, under consideration of all types specific protections detecting the event (like
of uncertainties. ‘low pump speed’, for detection of loss of RCS
Transients of type 2 which occur at power but flow). In this case, one has to consider that
for which the DNBR protection channel is not once the setpoints for these specific protections
efficient. These transients are too fast com- have been fixed, the minimum DNB during the
108 G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119
Fig. 26. Rodwise power distribution in typical assembly with 20 GD pins at HFP, BOL.
corresponding transients only depends on the DNBR is belonging to these parameters which
initial conditions at which the event occurs. In are submitted to operational constraints. A
order not to overshoot the DNB-limits during surveillance/limitation function is in charge to
the transient, the limiting conditions of opera- ensure that the actual DNBR always exceeds
tion which are defining the worst initial condi- the DNBR threshold fixed for initial conditions
tions for these events have to be defined by of accidents also called DNBRLCO (mainly with
appropriate accident analyses. The actual regard to the loss of flow event). This setpoint
G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119 109
Fig. 27. Rodwise power distribution in typical MOX assembly at HFP, BOL.
is defined taking into account all the conditions. For these events, the methods
uncertainties linked to the fuel geometry, and defined for the previous types cannot apply.
those related to the surveillance/limitation Here, specific protection functions and safety
functions. systems must intervene. The aim of the
Transients of type 3 occuring at very low corresponding accident analyses will be the
power level or at subcritical conditions or sizing of these protections and systems for
leading to recriticality at low temperature ensuring that the minimum DNBR limits
110 G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119
Table 2
Thermal hydraulic design data
Batch size No. of FA per No. of Gd Enrichments amod BOL- CB at BOL CB at BXL Cycle length Average dis- Max Fxy over Max Fq over Subcriticality
type pins per FA U5, Pu in HZP-ARO (ppm) assum- (ppm) assum- (MWd charge BU cycle, BE, cycle, BE, (pcm) at
wt% (pcm °C−1) ing natural ing natural tHM−1)/ (MWd ARO ARO HZP/ at
boron boron EFPD tHM−1) 260°C after
trip from
HFP (N-1)
Column No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
UO2-core, 1st 109 0 1.9 U5 −6.0 960 688 16060/468 16880 1.505 2.246 6007/3956
cycle 84 20 3.0 U5
111
112 G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119
concentration. Fast reactivity changes necessary The control of RCCA-position with respect to
for adapting the power level are obtained by shutdown efficiency.
modifying the RCCAs insertions. The essential features of the core control
The core control relies on the three main closed systems are the following:
loop controls: All the RCCAs are ‘black’ rods.
The reactor coolant temperature control. At rated power, no control rods shall be deeply
The axial power distribution control. inserted.
114 G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119
The power defect reactivity due to power level plant operation by adjusting appropriately the
variations is essentially covered by movement setpoints.
of control rod groups (temperature control). The part load temperature diagram is defined
During load follow operation long term to favour load variations between 50 and 100%
reactivity changes (BU, Xe) are mainly of rated power. Over this range, the mean
compensated by modifications of the boron coolant temperature is maintained approximately
concentration. At partial load the RCCAs are constant at : 308.7°C. This reduces the thermal
remaining inserted as much as necessary for and thermomechanical stresses in systems and
meeting the spinning reserve required by the components (less volume contractions, less
dispatching. actuations of fluid systems, less steps of control
The axial power distribution is mainly rods for compensation of reactivity variations).
controlled at high power levels by moving In this range the plant has its highest capacity
slightly inserted control groups and at lower to perform fast load variations with high
power levels by adjusting the overlap of the amplitudes or numerous load variations of
already inserted control groups. smaller amplitudes associated to primary and
In order to ensure sufficient shutdown margins, secondary frequency control.
the amount of negative reactivity inserted by Over the range of 20–50% of rated power, the
RCCAs is automatically adjusted by modifying secondary pressure is maintained nearly
the boron concentration in the coolant water. constant, whereas the average primary
Rod dropping is used for fast power reductions temperature is reduced from : 308.7°C at 50%,
in case of perturbed operating conditions. to : 303°C at 20% of rated power (for a
The core control is fully automated. temperature at HZP of 299.1°C). In this range
The operator is in charge of optimizing the where the primary temperature is moving with
G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119 115
the reactor power, the capacity for load The capacity to predict and to ‘measure’ the
variations is somewhat reduced compared to the 3-dimensional power distribution relies, on the
power range between 100 and 50% of rated other hand, essentially on two types of incore
power for reducing the mechanical and instrumentations:
thermomechanical loads (Lisdat, Miossec, 1. The ‘movable’ instrumentation which is also
Sengler, POWERGEN 96: Flexibility of Power called the reference instrumentation, which is
generation with the EPR based on the French principally used for validating the core
and German experience). models used for the core design and for
calibrating the other sensors used for core
3.5. Core instrumentation/core sur6eillance/core surveillance and core protection purposes.
protection 2. The fixed incore instrumentation used for
delivering the necessary online information to
3.5.1. General the different core surveillance and core
As far as the protection of the core is protection systems which are in charge to
concerned, the safety approach relies partly on actuate the appropriate actions or
the capacity to predict and to ‘measure’ as well countermeasures when anomalies are detected
the nuclear power level (or level of neutron or when predefined limits are exceeded.
fluxes) as the three dimensional power In fact, the strict differentiation of functions
distribution. between excore and incore instrumentations does
The measurement of the nuclear power level not totally apply: excore instrumentation can be
(or neutron flux level) is essentially performed partially used for providing information about
by the so called excore instrumentation which is the ‘macroscopic’ power distribution (axial and
based on the temperature measurements in the azimuthal tilts) and the fixed incore
loops and wide range excore flux-measurements instrumentation can as well be used for meas-
as it is classically done on PWRs. uring the power level.
116 G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119
‘surface-barrier’ semi conductors per column. information necessary for characterizing the
These detectors are equally distributed over the power distribution and the thermal hydraulic
active length and are integrating the activity conditions is distributed to all the surveillance and
over a length of :6 cm protective channels simultaneously. This solution
Operational power range of the aeroball system. is acceptable due to the intrinsic system
The electronic part of the measuring system redundancy, the overlapping of information, the
consists in pulse counters. This technique diversity of sensors and the independence of their
combined with the short period of the V52 calibration procedures. This will allow to detect
isotope (3.7 min) which is serving as indicator, degraded operating conditions and failures of
restricts the range of power at which accurate sensors and to differentiate these two types of
events.
3-D-flux mapping is possible. In practice,
The fixed incore instrumentation which is a part
acceptable 2-D-flux maps can be obtained at
of these systems consists of SPNDs and COTCs.
: 5% RP and the necessary accuracy for
The SPNDs have a fast response time. At every
3-D-flux maps is reached at some 30% RP.
radial location at least six SPNDs are placed in a
PDD-finger where they cover appropriately the
3.5.3.2. The fixed incore instrumentation. The active core height. Each of the yokes of the
specific core surveillance and core protection aeroball system can contain one PDD-finger,
systems are based on digital equipment which which is replaceable in case of detector defects. As
are aimed at elaborating the relevant limiting shown in Fig. 35, 12 of those fingers are used in
core parameters. These systems are relying on total for ‘covering’ the core.
more or less sophisticated models or data The COTCs are axially located in the top
processing (e.g. 3-D-core model for core nozzle of the instrumented fuel assemblies and are
surveillance and simplified algorithms for core on principle radially distributed over the core in
protection) for elaborating the safety relevant the same way than PDD fingers. This is an
state parameters of the core like peak power, already proven mechanical solution but the
DNBR, etc. pertinence of this radial distribution with respect
These systems are operating properly in case to the functions of these sensors has still to be
of relatively slow core related PCC2 events and confirmed. At every location, there is space for
were introduced in order not to penalize more three thermocouples. These sensors are mainly
than necessary the operation of the plant. As a used for post accident measurement purposes but
consequence, they are able to operate without they may be also used for getting additional radial
significant loss of accuracy, under conditions like information on the radial power distribution and
dropped control rods, RCCA-misalignments, loss on the local thermalhydraulic conditions.
of one RCP, and in case of single failures.
In addition, the fixed core instrumentation
provides the core surveillance and core
4. Conclusions/outlook
protective systems with sufficient redundant and
diverse information:
The major features of the EPR-core as resulting
on RCCA positions,
from a first loop of iterations were presented in
on temperatures, flowrates, power level,
this paper.
on axial power distributions, They are corresponding to the status reached
on radial power distributions, mid 1997 and are pointing out the large flexibility
for allowing these systems to cover PCC1 and with respect to the selection of the cycle lengths,
PCC2 events, even in case of partial unavailability of different types of fuel managements including
of sensors. significant MOX recycling etc. This core contains
For reaching these targets, the available even margins in excess which could be used under
G. Sengler et al. / Nuclear Engineering and Design 187 (1999) 79–119 119