Introduction

The study of International Relations (IR) has long been dominated by Eurocentric paradigms,
particularly the rationalist-reflectivist divide articulated by Robert Keohane (1988). While
rationalist theories (e.g., Neorealism) emphasize material power and systemic constraints,
reflectivist approaches (e.g., Postmodernism) focus on discursive constructions of reality.
Alexander Wendt’s Social Constructivism (1999) bridges this divide by arguing that anarchy
and power are socially constructed through intersubjective identities and norms. Deepshikha
Shahi’s Kautilya Reincarnated: Steering Arthaśāstra Toward an Eclectic Theory of
International Relations demonstrates that Kautilya’s ancient Indian treatise not only
anticipates Wendt’s constructivism but also transcends it by integrating pragmatic statecraft,
moral-ethical frameworks, and methodological eclecticism. This essay critically examines
Shahi’s arguments, illustrating how Kautilya’s Arthaśāstra offers a non-Western, holistic IR
theory that remains relevant today.

●​ Kautilya’s Proto-Constructivism: Identities, Norms, and the Mandala System

Shahi demonstrates that Kautilya’s Arthaśāstra aligns with Wendt’s three core constructivist
claims:
1. States as Principal Units with Personified Identities
Like Wendt, Kautilya treats the state (embodied by the vijigishu, or potential conqueror) as
the primary actor in a socially structured mandala (states-system) (Kangle 1997).
The vijigishu is an intentional agent whose actions depend on intersubjective perceptions of
others’ identities (ari [enemy], mitra [friend], udāsīna [neutral]) (Shamasastry 1915).

Corporate Identity: The state is personified through the king, reflecting a "group Self"
(Behravesh 2011).

2. Social Construction of Anarchy

Wendt’s "anarchy is what states make of it" mirrors Kautilya’s fluid categorization of states
(e.g., enemy today, ally tomorrow). Material power matters, but discursive strategies (e.g.,
espionage, diplomacy) shape interstate relations (Olivelle 2013).

Example: A weak king feigns submission to deceive a stronger enemy, manipulating

intersubjective perceptions (Shahi 2018).

3. Norms and Moral-Ethical Constraints

Both Wendt and Kautilya emphasize moral-ethical limits on violence:
Wendt’s "Kantian culture" discourages war among friends.

Kautilya’s dharma (duty) demands just rule to prevent disaffection (Rangarajan 1992).

Kautilya warns against excessive violence, as oppressed subjects may rebel (Kangle 1997).
 ●​ Beyond Constructivism: Kautilya’s Eclectic Contributions
While Wendt bridges rationalism and reflectivism, Kautilya’s framework is more expansive:

A. Multidimensional Power
Kautilya outlines three forms of power:

Intellectual (counsel, strategy).

Physical (military, treasury).

Psychological (moral authority, dharma).

This anticipates Joseph Nye’s soft power but adds a karmic dimension (detachment as
strategy).

B. Methodological Pluralism
Kautilya blends:

Rationalist techniques: Hypothesis-testing (pūrva paksha), cost-benefit analysis.

Reflectivist methods: Discourse analysis (spies deciphering "signs and symbols").

This eclecticism mirrors modern multi-method research (Jackson 2011).

C. Dynamic Statecraft: The Sadgunya Doctrine

Kautilya’s six-fold foreign policy adapts to shifting identities:

Sandhi (treaty) for weaker enemies. asana, yana,samrasya

Vigraha (hostility) for stronger ones.

Dvaidhibhava (dual policy: ally one, fight another).

This strategic flexibility surpasses Waltz’s static "balance of power."

Comparative Analysis: Kautilya vs. Western IR Theories

1. Ontology: The Nature of Reality in IR

Kautilya’s Arthaśāstra: Embraces a dual ontology, integrating both material (e.g., military
strength, treasury) and intersubjective (e.g., identities like ari [enemy] or mitra [friend])
dimensions. For Kautilya, power dynamics are shaped not just by tangible resources but also
by perceptions, alliances, and moral-ethical norms (dharma).
Wendt’s Constructivism: Focuses primarily on intersubjectivity, arguing that structures like
anarchy are socially constructed through shared ideas, identities, and norms. While Wendt
acknowledges material factors, he insists they derive meaning from ideational frameworks
(e.g., "anarchy is what states make of it").

Neorealism (Waltz): Purely materialist, treating anarchy as an objective, unchanging structure

that dictates state behavior. States are functionally similar units reacting to systemic
pressures, with no role for ideational or cultural factors.

Key Difference: Kautilya’s framework is more inclusive than Wendt’s or Waltz’s, as it

accounts for both material capabilities and ideational constructs (e.g., mandala as a socially
negotiated states-system).

2. Power: Conceptualization and Sources

Kautilya: Identifies three forms of power:

Intellectual (strategic counsel, wisdom).

Physical (military, economic resources).

Psychological (moral authority, dharma).

This tripartite model anticipates modern concepts like soft power (Nye 1990) but adds a
unique karmic dimension (e.g., detachment as a strategic virtue).

Wendt: Views power as ideational + material, emphasizing how shared norms and identities
(e.g., "cultures of anarchy") shape state behavior. For Wendt, material power (e.g., nuclear
weapons) only matters if states interpret it as threatening.

Neorealism: Reduces power to material capabilities (military/economic strength). Waltz

dismisses ideational factors, arguing that anarchy forces states to prioritize survival through
self-help.

Key Difference: Kautilya’s inclusion of psychological power (dharma) offers a richer, more
nuanced understanding of influence than Wendt’s ideational focus or Waltz’s materialist
reductionism.

3. Anarchy: Structure of the International System

Kautilya: Treats anarchy as socially constructed through the mandala system, where states’
identities (enemy, ally, neutral) are fluid and negotiated. The mandala is not a fixed hierarchy
but a dynamic web of relationships shaped by discourse and strategy.

Wendt: Similarly argues anarchy is socially constructed, proposing three

cultures—Hobbesian (enmity), Lockean (rivalry), Kantian (friendship)—that states create
through interaction.
Neorealism: Sees anarchy as a fixed, material structure that dictates uniform state behavior
(e.g., balancing, self-help). For Waltz, anarchy is immutable and apolitical.

Key Difference: Both Kautilya and Wendt reject Waltz’s static view, but Kautilya’s mandala
is more pragmatic, incorporating realpolitik tactics (e.g., espionage, deceit) alongside
normative constraints (dharma).

4. Methodology: Approaches to Studying IR

Kautilya: Eclectic, blending:

Rationalist methods: Hypothesis-testing (pūrva paksha), cost-benefit analysis.

Reflectivist methods: Discourse analysis (interpreting spies’ reports, symbols).

This mirrors modern multi-method research (e.g., process-tracing + textual analysis).

Wendt: Leans reflectivist, prioritizing interpretive analysis of how ideas shape reality. Though
Wendt engages with positivist IR, his core claims are rooted in social theory.

Neorealism: Positivist, relying on parsimonious theories and empirical testing (e.g.,

balance-of-power models). Waltz explicitly rejects interpretive methods.

Key Difference: Kautilya’s methodological pluralism bridges the rationalist-reflectivist divide

more effectively than Wendt’s reflectivist tilt or Waltz’s positivism.

Shahi’s analysis reveals Kautilya’s Arthaśāstra as a groundbreaking IR theory that:

●​ Anticipates Social Constructivism by privileging identities, norms, and

intersubjectivity.

●​ Transcends Eurocentric IR through its eclectic blend of power, ethics, and

pragmatism.

●​ Offers Policy Relevance with dynamic doctrines like sadgunya.

KAUTILYA'S ARTHASHASTRA AS AN ECLECTIC THEORY

1. Ethos of Pragmatism and Fallibilism in Arthaśāstra
Shahi argues that Kautilya’s Arthaśāstra operates within an ethos of pragmatism, mediating
between two competing Indian philosophical traditions:

Sāṃkhya-Yoga: A spiritual tradition that views God (Iśvara) as an object of meditative

practice, emphasizing detachment and cosmic order.
Lokāyata: A materialist philosophy focused on empirical reality and hedonistic pleasures,
rejecting metaphysical abstractions.

These traditions represent an unresolvable metaphysical divide (āstik vs. nāstik), yet Kautilya
reconciles them through anvikshaki (rational inquiry), which embraces fallibilism—the
recognition that all knowledge is provisional and subject to revision (Brown 2008). This
aligns with modern IR’s concept of bounded rationality (Simon 1957), where
decision-makers operate under imperfect information and must adapt their strategies
accordingly.

Key Implications:
Anti-Dogmatism: Unlike Morgenthau’s classical realism, which treats power as an immutable
force, Kautilya’s framework is flexible, acknowledging that political truths are
context-dependent.

Moral-Ethical Temperance: Kautilya’s realism is tempered by dharma (moral duty), ensuring

that power is exercised responsibly. This contrasts with Machiavelli’s realpolitik, which often
divorces morality from politics.

2. Complex Causal Stories: Karman Theory and Moral Retribution

Shahi highlights Kautilya’s synthesis of:

Sāṃkhya-Yoga’s parināma-vāda: The idea that causes transform into effects (e.g., clay
becoming a pot), linking actions (karman) to cosmic consequences.

Lokāyata’s emergentist causality: The belief that effects are new creations, emphasizing
human agency over fate.

This synthesis produces a pan-Indian karman theory, where rulers’ actions have both material
and moral repercussions. Kautilya insists that rulers must balance:

Artha (material well-being, wealth, power).

Dharma (spiritual well-being, justice, ethical duty).

Example from Arthaśāstra:

A ruler (vijigishu) must progress from decline → stability → growth (Olivelle 2013) while
maintaining detachment—a concept resembling Weber’s ethics of responsibility (Weber
1919), where leaders must weigh the moral costs of their decisions.

Comparison with Western IR:

Neorealism (Waltz 1979): Focuses solely on material power and systemic anarchy, ignoring
moral-ethical dimensions.
Constructivism (Wendt 1999): Emphasizes ideational factors but lacks Kautilya’s karmic
framework, which links actions to cosmic and social consequences.

Thus, Kautilya’s theory offers a more holistic understanding of international politics,

integrating agency, structure, and morality.

3. Eclectic Methodology: Rationalist + Reflectivist Synthesis

Shahi identifies Kautilya’s Arthaśāstra as methodologically eclectic, blending:

A. Rationalist Methods (Positivist IR)

Pūrva paksha (hypothesis testing).

Hetvartha (logical reasoning).

Upmāna (analogical reasoning).

Samsaya (doubt as a critical tool).

B. Reflectivist Methods (Interpretive IR)

Arthápatti (textual hermeneutics, implied meanings).

Viparyaya (contrariety, examining opposing interpretations).

Vakyasesha (ellipsis, filling gaps in textual meaning).

Why This Matters:

Challenges the Positivist-Postpositivist Divide: Kautilya’s blend of methods anticipates
modern multi-method research (e.g., process-tracing + discourse analysis) (Jackson 2011).

Example: Kautilya’s analysis of the mandala (states-system) combines:

Rationalist power calculations (alliances, warfare).

Reflectivist identity construction (enemy, friend, rival).

This mirrors neoclassical realism (Rose 1998) but is grounded in deeper philosophical
traditions.

4. Unconventional Contributions to Global IR

Shahi argues that Kautilya’s theory disrupts Eurocentric IR in three key ways:

A. Reconciling Realpolitik and Moralpolitik

Western IR often treats power and morality as antithetical (e.g., Machiavelli vs. Kant).
Kautilya integrates them via lokasamgraha (universal welfare), where:

Power must serve dharma (ethical duty).

Violence is minimized but justified if it ensures yogakshema (survival and welfare).

Critique: Morgenthau’s "moral restraint" is vague; Kautilya provides a structured ethical

framework (viśesa dharma vs. sāmānya dharma).

B. Psychological Power as a Distinct Category

Kautilya’s threefold power includes:

Intellectual (counsel, strategy).

Physical (military, treasury).

Psychological (moral-energetic action).

Western IR neglects psychological power until Nye’s soft power (1990), which lacks
Kautilya’s karmic dimension.

C. Detached Engagement of Rulers

Kautilya advises rulers to be actively engaged yet emotionally detached—a Stoic pragmatism
absent in Weber’s vocation of politics.

This ensures rulers remain strategic without being corrupted by power.

Shahi’s analysis reveals Kautilya’s Arthaśāstra as a groundbreaking IR theory that:

●​ Anticipates Social Constructivism by emphasizing identities, norms, and

intersubjectivity.

●​ Transcends Eurocentric IR through its eclectic blend of power, ethics, and

pragmatism.

Offers Policy Relevance with doctrines like sadgunya (six-fold foreign policy).
By recovering Kautilya’s insights, Shahi not only decolonizes IR theory but also expands its
conceptual toolkit, proving that non-Western thought is indispensable to understanding global
politics. For contemporary scholars, Kautilya’s work challenges IR to move beyond rigid
paradigms and embrace pluralism, pragmatism, and ethical statecraft.
Sources of India’s Foreign Policy Derived from the Mahabharata and Ramayana

India’s foreign policy, while shaped by modern geopolitical realities, also draws deeply from
its ancient civilizational ethos, particularly the teachings of the Mahabharata and Ramayana.
These epics are not just religious texts but repositories of statecraft, diplomacy, and ethical
governance, offering timeless principles that continue to influence India’s strategic culture.
Below are the key sources of India’s foreign policy derived from these epics:

1. Dharma-Centric Diplomacy: Ethical Foundations

Concept: Dharma (righteous duty) is the cornerstone of both epics, shaping how rulers
engage with allies and adversaries.
Foreign Policy Implications:

Non-aggressive but firm stance: Like Rama and Yudhishthira, India often positions itself as a
moral power, advocating for justice in global forums (e.g., support for decolonization,
anti-apartheid movements).

Adherence to international law: The Mahabharata’s emphasis on rules of war (e.g., no night
attacks, no harm to non-combatants) mirrors India’s advocacy for UN Charter principles and
humanitarian laws.

Example:

India’s Panchsheel Agreement (1954) with China reflects the Mahabharata’s idea of peaceful
coexistence (despite later conflicts).

2. Strategic Alliances: The Importance of Trusted Partnerships

Concept: Both epics highlight the need for strong alliances while being cautious of deceit.
Foreign Policy Implications:

Balancing friendships: The Mahabharata shows the Pandavas forming alliances with diverse
groups (e.g., Krishna’s Yadavas, Draupadi’s Panchala kingdom). Similarly, India maintains
multi-aligned diplomacy (e.g., ties with Russia, the US, and the Global South).

Non-alignment with a purpose: Like Krishna’s neutral-yet-pivotal role before the Kurukshetra
war, India’s Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) stance allowed strategic autonomy during the
Cold War.

Example:

India’s strategic partnership with the US (post-1991) while retaining ties with Russia reflects
a Mahabharata-style balancing act.

3. Realism and Pragmatism: The Krishna-Arjuna Model

Concept: The Bhagavad Gita (within the Mahabharata) teaches duty over emotion—Krishna
advises Arjuna to fight for justice, not hatred.
Foreign Policy Implications:

Hard decisions in national interest: India’s 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War (supporting
Mukti Bahini against Pakistan) mirrors Krishna’s counsel—moral duty (protecting Bengalis)
over fear of war.

Nuclear policy: Like the Mahabharata’s strategic use of divine weapons (astras), India’s
no-first-use nuclear doctrine combines restraint with deterrence.

Example:

Pokhran nuclear tests (1998) were justified as necessary for security, akin to Arjuna taking up
arms for dharma-yuddha (righteous war).

4. Soft Power and Cultural Diplomacy

Concept: The Ramayana’s spread across Southeast Asia (e.g., Thailand’s Ramakien,
Indonesia’s Wayang) shows India’s ancient cultural influence.
Foreign Policy Implications:

Buddhist diplomacy: India leverages shared heritage (e.g., promoting Nalanda University,
pilgrimages to Bodh Gaya).

Yoga and Ayurveda diplomacy: Like Rama’s ideal governance (ramarajya), India exports soft
power through wellness and spirituality.

Example:

International Yoga Day (UN Resolution 2015) reflects India’s Ramayana-inspired cultural
outreach.

5. Conflict Resolution and Mediation

Concept: The Mahabharata shows multiple peace efforts before war (Krishna’s failed Shanti
Mission to Hastinapur).
Foreign Policy Implications:

Preference for dialogue: India often mediates disputes (e.g., India-Sri Lanka Accord 1987,
though flawed, was an attempt at peace).

Non-interference but moral support: Like Rama helping Sugriva regain Kishkindha without
direct rule, India supports democracy abroad (e.g., Nepal’s peace process) without imposing
solutions.
Example:

India’s role in Bangladesh’s independence was framed as supporting self-determination, not

conquest.

6. Fear of Anarchy (Matsyanyaya) and Multilateralism

Concept: The Mahabharata warns of chaos (matsyanyaya—big fish eating small fish) without
just rule.
Foreign Policy Implications:

Support for UN and global order: India advocates for multipolarity to prevent hegemony
(e.g., demand for UNSC reforms).

Neighborhood First Policy: Like Rama’s alliance with vanaras (forest tribes), India invests in
SAARC and BIMSTEC for regional stability.

Example:

India’s humanitarian aid (e.g., COVID-19 "Vaccine Maitri") reflects Ramayana’s ideal of a
benevolent ruler.

Conclusion: Ancient Wisdom in Modern Statecraft

The Mahabharata and Ramayana provide India’s foreign policy with:

A moral compass (dharma over aggression).

Strategic flexibility (alliances without permanent enemies).

Soft power tools (cultural influence).

Pragmatic realism (hard power when necessary).

Multilateral engagement (preventing global anarchy).

Underlying Themes in India’s Foreign Policy
Civilizational Identity and Self-Image

India’s foreign policy has long been shaped by a belief in its moral and civilizational
exceptionalism. Swami Vivekananda’s vision of India as a spiritual leader and Nehru’s
emphasis on its ancient wisdom framed its global role as a normative power, distinct from
Western material dominance.

This self-image persists today, as seen in Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao’s reference to
India-China relations in "civilizational time frames." Postcolonial scholars (Chatterjee,
Chacko) argue this reflects a resistance to colonial narratives of inferiority.

However, critics note contradictions—e.g., while India claims moral superiority, its regional
actions (e.g., interventions in Sri Lanka, Nepal) often reflect realpolitik (Ahmad, 1993).

Non-Alignment: Idealism vs. Strategy

Non-alignment, rooted in Gandhi’s anti-colonialism and Nehru’s 1946 speech, was both a
moral stance (rejecting Cold War power blocs) and a strategic tool to maximize autonomy
(Rana, 1976).

Post-Cold War, debates erupted over its relevance:

Obsolete? Critics (Pant, Rajamohan) argue unipolarity rendered it ineffective.

Readapted: Others (Abraham) see its principles in today’s "omni-alignment"—engaging

multiple powers (US, Russia, ASEAN) without formal alliances.

Regional Hegemony vs. Global Aspirations

India’s dual approach: Advocates Panchsheel (peaceful coexistence) globally but asserts
dominance in South Asia (e.g., Indira Gandhi’s "Monroe Doctrine," IPKF in Sri Lanka).

Gujral Doctrine (1990s) attempted to soften this with non-reciprocity and non-interference,
but selective application (e.g., backing Sri Lanka’s regime vs. ignoring Myanmar’s junta)
revealed lingering realpolitik (Tanhem, 1992).

Scholars link this to a subcontinental worldview—seeing neighbors as part of "Akhand

Bharat" (undivided India), justifying intervention (Krishna, 1999).

Strategic Culture: Absence or Pluralism?

Tanhem (1992) controversially claimed India lacked strategic thinking due to "fatalist" Hindu
culture, sparking rebuttals citing Kautilya’s Arthashastra and Mughal statecraft
(Vivekanandan, 2010).

Bajpai (2006) identifies three schools:

Nehruvians (idealism),

Hyper-realists (militarism, e.g., Karnad),

Liberals (economic interdependence).

Today, India’s nuclear doctrine ("no first use") and multi-vector diplomacy reflect this
strategic pluralism

Contemporary Issues in India’s Foreign Policy

1. Bilateral Relations and Strategic Partnerships

India’s foreign policy today is heavily shaped by its engagements with key powers:

United States: The 2008 Civilian Nuclear Deal marked a watershed, signaling strategic
alignment. However, India avoids full-fledged alliance-building to retain autonomy, reflecting
its historical aversion to "external balancing" (Mehta, 2009). Suspicion persists that closer US
ties aim to counter China (Rajagopalan, 2006).

China: Tensions arise from territorial disputes (e.g., Line of Actual Control), China’s "string
of pearls" strategy (encirclement via ports in Pakistan, Sri Lanka), and stapled visas for
Kashmiris (Harrison, 2010). Despite this, India refrains from overt containment, focusing on
internal balancing (military modernization) rather than joining US-led alliances (Mehta,
2009).

Pakistan: Relations remain adversarial, rooted in existential anxieties. Pakistan is framed as

India’s "anti-thesis"—a "jackal" (Chellaney, 2000) embodying instability, contrasting India’s
self-image as a responsible power.

2. Multi-Vector Diplomacy and Regional Engagements

Post-Cold War, India adopted a "multi-vector" policy to diversify partnerships:

Look East Policy (1990s): Prioritized ties with ASEAN for economic and strategic leverage,
countering Chinese influence (Rajamohan, 2003).

Africa and Central Asia: Driven by energy security needs, India expanded engagements in
Africa (e.g., oil investments) but lagged behind China’s aggressive resource diplomacy
(Sahni, 2010). In Central Asia, nuclear energy and gas imports (e.g., from Kazakhstan)
gained prominence.

3. Economic Policy and Neoliberal Shifts

The 1991 economic reforms reoriented foreign policy toward market-driven goals:

From Statism to Neoliberalism: The Rao-Singh reforms discarded Nehruvian socialism,

integrating India into global markets. Foreign policy now prioritizes attracting FDI and
securing energy resources (Mallavarapu, 2006).

Critique: Left scholars argue this shift compromised equity, as policy caters to "turbo elites"
and international markets, neglecting domestic poverty (Chimni, forthcoming; Ramakrishnan,
2009).

4. Global Governance: From Third World Champion to Selective Pragmatist

India’s stance in international institutions has evolved:

From Naysayer to Coalition-Builder: Historically, India critiqued "Western-dominated"

regimes (e.g., NPT, CTBT) as discriminatory. Post-2000s, it joined BRICS, BASIC, G-20,
reflecting pragmatic coalition-building (Narlikar, 2006).

Climate Change: Initially aligned with G-77, India later partnered with China, Brazil, and
South Africa (BASIC) at Copenhagen (2009), signaling issue-based flexibility (Rajamohan,
2010).

Nuclear Diplomacy: While still rejecting NPT, India softened its rhetoric post-2008 nuclear
deal, emphasizing "no-first-use" and global disarmament (Rajagopalan, 2008).

5. Nuclear Policy: Security vs. Prestige

India’s nuclear program embodies its status-seeking and security dilemmas:

Doctrine: "Credible minimal deterrence" with "no-first-use" (except against

chemical/biological attacks) aims to balance China and Pakistan (Rajagopalan, 2008).

Debates: Questions linger over what constitutes "minimum" (targeting Pakistan alone or also
China?) and "credible" (yield controversies post-1998 tests).

6. The "Idea Deficit" in a Multipolar World

As India rises materially, critics highlight its lack of a unifying global vision:

Past vs. Present: Nehru’s non-alignment offered an ideational framework, but today’s policy
lacks comparable clarity (Mehta, 2009).
Institutional Weaknesses: A small foreign policy bureaucracy, underfunded think tanks, and
disinterested media hinder strategic innovation (Markley, 2009).

Five approaches to IFP

1. Post-Colonial Sovereignty Lens

This lens highlights India’s deep concerns about territorial integrity, national identity, and the
freedom to make independent decisions. These concerns have been strongly shaped by
India’s colonial past and its desire to protect sovereignty after independence.

🔹 India–Pakistan:
The conflict is primarily centered around Kashmir, which is seen by both countries as a
symbol of national identity.

For India, Kashmir represents secular nationalism, showing that Muslims can live peacefully
in a Hindu-majority country.

For Pakistan, it symbolizes religious nationalism, reinforcing the idea of a separate Muslim
identity.

While Kashmir may not be very valuable economically or even strategically, its symbolic
importance has made it a persistent issue.

Although Pakistan is often seen as the aggressor due to its irredentist claims, India’s firm
emotional and political attachment to Kashmir is equally significant.

🔹 India–China:
Key issues include border disputes (Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh) and Tibet.

Both countries were shaped by experiences of colonialism, which makes them extremely
sensitive to any threat to territorial sovereignty.

India's granting of asylum to the Dalai Lama and its cultural sympathy with Tibet are seen by
China as interference in internal affairs.

While India has no territorial ambitions over Tibet, its moral responsibility and the symbolic
value of Tibet continue to cause friction.

🔹 India–United States:
Although there is no territorial dispute, India has long had concerns about US interference in
its domestic and foreign policy.
After independence, India feared neo-imperialism, with the US replacing the British Empire
as a dominant global power.

India's suspicion increased due to US support for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue.

Even today, India remains cautious of US influence, fearing a repeat of Cold War-era
alliances that might go against Indian interests.

2. Alliance Politics Lens

This lens focuses on how Cold War and post-Cold War alliances have shaped India’s foreign
policy decisions, especially in relation to Pakistan, China, and the United States.

🔹 India–Pakistan:
During the Cold War, Pakistan joined US-led military alliances like SEATO and CENTO,
receiving military and economic support.

India saw this as an attempt by Pakistan to use its alliance with the US to strengthen its
position on Kashmir, making India reluctant to compromise.

India responded by promoting non-alignment, seeking Soviet support, and avoiding formal
alliances.

After 9/11, the US once again strengthened ties with Pakistan, designating it a major
non-NATO ally, raising concerns in India about external intervention.

🔹 India–China:
In the 1950s and 60s, China viewed India’s close ties with both the US and USSR with
suspicion.

The 1962 war can be partly seen as China’s reaction to India’s growing closeness with
Western powers.

By 1971, India allied with the Soviet Union, while China supported Pakistan and the US,
deepening the divide.

Even today, India–China relations are influenced by broader geopolitical dynamics, including
India’s potential role in the US–China strategic rivalry.

🔹 India–United States:
India adopted non-alignment early on, believing that joining any alliance could provoke
internal instability or external threats.

Aligning with the West could have antagonized Indian communists, while tilting towards the
USSR could have alienated the political right.
India’s decision was also influenced by a historical distrust of great powers, given its colonial
experience.

The US expected India, as a former British colony, to naturally side with the West, and was
frustrated by India’s neutral stance.

In response, the US allied with Pakistan, deepening India’s mistrust.

Post-Cold War, India remains cautious of US policies, especially regarding non-proliferation,

human rights, and US–Pakistan relations.

There is also concern about a possible US–China partnership that could sideline Indian
interests in Asia and globally.

Power Distribution and India’s Foreign Policy

One important approach to understanding Indian foreign policy is through the lens of power
asymmetry—that is, the unequal distribution of power between India and countries like
Pakistan, China, and the United States. This approach argues that differences in population,
military strength, GDP, and global influence have shaped India’s relationships with these
countries in unique and often conflictual ways.

India–Pakistan Relations
India and Pakistan have had a conflict-prone relationship, which can partly be explained by
the regional power imbalance. Before 1971, India was already about four times larger than
Pakistan in terms of population and GDP. After the formation of Bangladesh, the gap
widened, with India becoming eight times bigger.

This massive disparity gave Pakistan incentives to "borrow power" from external actors like
the US, China, Iran, and broader Muslim world alliances. Pakistan used both conventional
military strategies and asymmetric means like terrorism and insurgency to counterbalance
India’s power. T.V. Paul argues that although India is more powerful, it is not powerful
enough to completely dominate or force Pakistan to change its behavior. Instead, Pakistan has
relied on alliances, nuclear weapons, and irregular tactics to keep up. The 1971 war, in which
India played a major role in creating Bangladesh, was seen by Pakistan as an attempt to “cut
Pakistan down to size,” prompting Islamabad to pursue nuclear weapons and deepen ties with
China, leading to further crises in 1986–87, 1990, 1999 (Kargil), and 2001–02.

India–China Relations
The India–China relationship is also shaped by power imbalance, but here India is the weaker
party. In the 1950s, both nations had similar power, but since the 1980s, China has surged
ahead economically and militarily. Today, its GDP is around 4.5 times larger than India’s.
However, instead of being subdued, India responded proactively. After the 1998 nuclear tests,
India began military reforms, economic liberalization, and sought strategic
partnerships—especially with the United States. India’s response resembles how Pakistan
deals with India: by trying to balance a more powerful neighbor. However, unlike Pakistan,
India has not engaged in asymmetric warfare, though China sometimes views India’s hosting
of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan refugees as an asymmetric tactic.

India–US Relations
In the case of the US, the power imbalance did not start as a direct conflict, but rather created
mistrust. After World War II, India viewed the US as the main imperial power and distrusted
its role in global politics. During the Cold War, India felt the US prioritized anti-communism
over decolonization, and saw it as unsympathetic to the Third World.

India's non-alignment often tilted towards the Soviet Union, especially when the US
supported Pakistan on Kashmir, formed alliances with Pakistan and China, and acted in ways
India found imperialistic (e.g., in Korea and Vietnam). While the US saw India as a difficult
upstart, India saw the US as arrogant and domineering.

Conflict over Political Values

Another important approach focuses on differences in political values. India’s tensions with
Pakistan, China, and the US can also be seen as ideological or value-based conflicts.

India–Pakistan
Here, the key issue is the role of religion in politics. The Congress Party wanted a secular
India, while the Muslim League pushed for a separate Islamic state, leading to deep-rooted
ideological conflict. Over time, this evolved into Pakistan becoming more Islamicized, which
India viewed as dangerous, especially with the rise of terrorism and military dominance in
Pakistan’s politics.

The Pakistan Army is seen as benefiting from continued tension with India—keeping the
"India threat" alive for its own institutional power and interests. This situation has become
worse with Pakistan’s internal extremism, making the country unstable and increasing risks
for India.

India–China
India is a pluralist democracy, while China is an authoritarian one-party state. Each sees itself
as a model for Asia—India values democratic messiness, while China highlights its efficient
developmental model. These ideological differences deepen their rivalry beyond mere border
disputes. Until one system gains broader acceptance in Asia (or globally), this value-based
competition is likely to continue.

India–US
Although they’re both democracies, their economic and development philosophies differed
sharply. India followed a socialist, state-led model with central planning and import
substitution, while the US championed capitalism, free trade, and private enterprise.

These differences affected development aid, global trade policies, and how India viewed US
intentions—often seeing the US as an exploitative capitalist power, especially during the
Cold War.

Domestic Politics

Finally, India’s foreign relations are also shaped by domestic political factors in all countries
involved.

India–Pakistan
Both India and Pakistan are seen as "weak states"—meaning their institutions and leadership
often lack the capacity to make or implement peace. Even when rational solutions are found,
domestic politics, public opinion, and institutional weakness prevent their execution.

Leaders like Nehru, Indira Gandhi, Ayub Khan, and Bhutto had some success due to their
political strength and legitimacy, but such leadership has been rare. Today, rising nationalism
and media influence make any compromise much harder.

India–China
The 1962 war is often attributed to domestic pressures: Nehru toughened his stand due to
Indian public opinion, while Mao used the war to consolidate his position after the failure of
the Great Leap Forward. After Indira Gandhi and Deng Xiaoping, there’s been no leadership
strong enough to resolve the conflict. Rising nationalism and aggressive media in both
countries make diplomacy even more difficult today.

India–US
In both democracies, domestic attitudes shaped foreign policy. In India, a deep-seated
anti-Americanism existed among intellectuals, the bureaucracy (especially the Foreign
Service), the Congress Party, and the media. This stemmed from US support for Pakistan and
China, cultural arrogance, and fears about CIA interference.

Similarly, Americans were often dismissive or hostile toward India, seeing it as poor, chaotic,
and spiritually strange. India’s criticism of US actions during the Cold War and its closeness
to the Soviet Union didn’t help either.

Even today, while Indian public opinion about the US has improved, elites in government and
media still harbor mixed views—part admiration, part suspicion.
DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN POLICY

National Security Determinants of Indian Foreign Policy

India’s foreign policy is fundamentally aligned with achieving its national
objectives—especially rapid and equitable economic growth, and the goal of becoming a
developed nation. While much of this progress depends on domestic efforts, the external
environment—particularly regional and global security—can either support or obstruct it.

Role of National Security in Foreign Policy

A secure domestic and external environment enables development. Hence, foreign policy
becomes a tool to:

Sustain favorable external relationships.

Promote security and stability.

Expand India’s strategic autonomy to pursue growth-oriented policies.

Managing the Neighbourhood

India’s immediate priority is to maintain a security equilibrium in its neighborhood. This
includes:

Building mutual trust and cooperation with neighbors.

Curbing cross-border issues like terrorism, drug trade, arms smuggling, and fake currency
circulation.

Ensuring that neighboring countries do not support Indian insurgents.

A stable neighborhood also enhances India’s confidence in engaging with major powers
globally.

Challenges in the South Asian Region

India, being the largest country in South Asia, faces a “small-neighbor syndrome”—smaller
countries fear domination by India. To counterbalance, they:

Sometimes ally with China.

Provide support or refuge to Indian insurgents.

Try to play India and China against each other to gain strategic space.

Examples of Regional Complexities:

Bangladesh: Internal political divide affects India relations—issues like river water sharing
and transit routes are politicized.

Nepal: The Madhesi issue draws India’s involvement, prompting other Nepali groups to seek
Chinese support.

Sri Lanka: The Tamil issue connects to domestic politics in Tamil Nadu, leading Colombo to
deepen ties with Pakistan and China.

To address these issues, India must:

Offer non-reciprocal cooperation where feasible.

Reassure neighbors while safeguarding core interests.

Pakistan: A Perennial Security Challenge

India–Pakistan relations remain deeply conflict-ridden due to:

Terrorism and cross-border incursions, often state-sponsored.

Public pressure in India for strong responses to terrorism.

International pressure (especially from the US and the West) to pursue dialogue.

India’s Pakistan policy requires careful balancing between domestic expectations and foreign
diplomatic pressures.

Afghanistan: An Extension of India–Pakistan Rivalry

Afghanistan has been used by Pakistan to gain strategic depth.

India’s active presence in Afghanistan counters this influence.

India supports economic reconstruction and anti-terrorist efforts.

In response, Pakistan has attacked Indian interests in Afghanistan.

India also engages global powers—USA, Russia, Europe, and China—to pressure Pakistan to
stop supporting terrorism. However, India opposes third-party mediation.

The China Factor

India–China relations are one of India’s most complex foreign policy challenges:

Border disputes remain unresolved (e.g., Arunachal Pradesh, Doklam).

China supports Pakistan militarily and economically, including its nuclear program.

Projects like the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) challenge India’s sovereignty
and influence.

China builds ties with Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Bangladesh to counter India.

Despite this rivalry, India–China interdependence is real:

China is India’s largest trading partner.

India imports pharma inputs, solar tech, smartphones, and relies on rare earths.

Yet, China’s economy and military are far stronger, creating a strategic asymmetry.

India’s China policy must:

Stand firm on sovereignty, as in Doklam (2017).

Deepen economic and military strength.

Enhance ties with the US, Russia, and other Asian nations wary of Chinese expansion.

India’s policy aims to balance these relationships to maintain strategic autonomy. This means
engaging with both powers while protecting national interests. India also plays an active role
in West Asia, which is critical for energy security, remittances, and counterterrorism.
Strategic projects like the Chabahar port and the International North-South Transport
Corridor (INSTC) improve India’s access to Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan.

India’s security policy also involves developing indigenous defence manufacturing to reduce
dependence on foreign suppliers. Increasing self-reliance in defence will prevent
vulnerabilities and reduce external pressure. Additionally, India is promoting international
cooperation in cybersecurity, space, and 5G technology through forums like BRICS, SCO,
and BIMSTEC.

The National Security Council (NSC), headed by the Prime Minister, coordinates all these
aspects, ensuring that foreign policy aligns with national security goals. The National
Security Advisor (NSA) and the NSC Secretariat (NSCS) work across ministries to provide
expert advice, manage cyber security, and maintain strategic dialogues with partner countries.

In today’s interconnected world, foreign policy is no longer just the job of diplomats. It
involves defence, economy, technology, and security experts working together under the
leadership of the NSC. This whole-of-government approach helps India manage global
challenges while safeguarding its strategic autonomy and national interests.
Non-Alignment in Indian Foreign Policy — A Critical Understanding (as per Misra, 1981)
Non-Alignment, as explained by K.P. Misra in “Towards Understanding Non-Alignment”
(1981), is not just a foreign policy choice but a complex worldview shaped by India's
historical experiences, moral values, and practical concerns. It reflects India’s aspiration for
autonomy, justice, and an equitable world order, especially in the context of decolonization
and Cold War politics.

1. Evolution and Context of Non-Alignment

Misra notes that Non-Alignment must be understood against the backdrop of post-World War
II realities, especially the emergence of the Cold War and decolonization. Newly independent
countries like India were not willing to be drawn into bipolar conflicts. Instead, they wanted
to assert their sovereignty and independence in both domestic and international spheres.

2. Non-Alignment: More Than Neutrality

The author emphasizes that Non-Alignment is often misunderstood as neutrality, but India’s
policy was never about passivity. It was a deliberate and active engagement with international
affairs, without aligning militarily with any power bloc. India participated in global debates
and took moral stances — for example, on anti-colonialism, racial equality, and disarmament.

3. Core Objectives of India’s Non-Alignment Policy

Misra outlines several foundational objectives:

Preserving national independence and sovereignty

Promoting world peace and disarmament

Reducing international tensions

Encouraging economic development and cooperation among developing nations

Opposing colonialism, racism, and imperialism in all forms

4. Positive and Negative Dimensions

Misra describes Non-Alignment as both positive and negative. Negative, in the sense that it
rejected alignment with superpower blocs; positive, because it advocated for restructuring
international relations on just and peaceful lines.

India supported peaceful resolution of conflicts (e.g., Korean crisis, Congo), called for a New
International Economic Order (NIEO), and took part in the formation of the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM) to voice the concerns of the Global South.

5. Autonomy and Flexibility

Another key point is foreign policy autonomy. Misra stresses that India’s goal was not
isolation but the freedom to choose its course of action. This flexibility allowed India to
support the USSR on some issues (like Suez Canal crisis) while criticizing it on others (e.g.,
Afghanistan), and similarly with the US.

6. Ethical and Value-Oriented Policy

According to Misra, India’s policy was deeply rooted in ethical and moral dimensions drawn
from its civilizational heritage and leaders like Nehru and Gandhi. The focus was on
universalism, cooperation, and justice, not on power politics or opportunism.

7. Criticism and Relevance

Misra also acknowledges criticisms: that India’s Non-Alignment sometimes lacked clarity or
consistency, or that it tilted towards the USSR in practice. However, he argues that these were
tactical deviations, not strategic shifts.

The enduring relevance of Non-Alignment, he concludes, lies in its emphasis on equity,

independence, and peaceful global order — values that remain crucial even today in a
multipolar world.

Conclusion
Misra's analysis shows that Non-Alignment was not just a Cold War strategy but a
comprehensive worldview reflecting India’s national interests and moral commitments. It
gave India the space to assert itself globally while promoting peace, justice, and cooperation
among nations.
The Five Lenses of Indian Foreign Policy

India’s foreign policy is shaped by five distinct but interrelated lenses, each rooted in
historical experiences, geopolitical realities, and normative commitments. These lenses help
understand the motivations, behaviors, and strategic choices of Indian diplomacy on the
global stage.

1. Postcolonial Sovereignty
Core Idea: The legacy of colonialism plays a major role in shaping India's emphasis on
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and strategic autonomy.

Application:

India resists any interference in its internal matters (e.g., Kashmir).

Strongly supports the principles of non-intervention and equal respect for all states in
international forums.

Impact: This lens influences India’s stance on global norms, its cautious approach to
international intervention, and its sensitivity to foreign criticism.

2. Power Asymmetry
Core Idea: India’s foreign policy reflects its experience of being relatively weaker than major
powers like the US and China, and relatively stronger than its smaller neighbors.

Two-Level Strategy:

With stronger states: India emphasizes autonomy, negotiation, and multi-alignment to avoid
dependency.

With smaller neighbors: India seeks influence through regional leadership while balancing
against being perceived as hegemonic.

Impact: Shapes India’s pursuit of strategic partnerships without formal alliances (e.g., Quad,
BRICS), and its diplomacy in South Asia.

3. Political Values
Core Idea: India seeks to be seen as a responsible, democratic actor, upholding moral
authority rooted in its democratic identity and Gandhian traditions.

Application:

Support for decolonization, anti-apartheid movements, and development issues at the UN.
Promotion of South-South cooperation, and development partnerships with African and
Asian countries.

Impact: India combines realism with normative ideals, balancing national interest with
principled diplomacy.

4. Alliance Politics
Core Idea: India traditionally rejected formal military alliances, especially during the Cold
War, favoring non-alignment.

Current Approach: India now engages in issue-based alignments, pursuing strategic

autonomy while collaborating with powers like the US, France, and Japan.

Impact:

India's foreign policy remains non-aligned in spirit but pragmatic in practice.

Embraces multilateralism without permanent bloc commitments.

5. Domestic Politics
Core Idea: Internal political dynamics—public opinion, electoral politics, party ideologies,
and media—significantly influence foreign policy decisions.

Examples:

Political parties may adopt different stances on Pakistan, China, or the US.

Diaspora considerations, national pride, and public sentiment shape government responses to
crises or international developments.

Impact: Foreign policy is often used for domestic political messaging and nation-building
narratives.

Conclusion:
These five lenses—postcolonial sovereignty, power asymmetry, political values, alliance
politics, and domestic politics—together form a multidimensional framework through which
India's foreign policy can be analyzed. They reveal a balance between normative aspirations
and strategic pragmatism, enabling India to navigate a complex global order while
safeguarding its interests and identity.
NONALIGNMENT AFTER NEHRU

After Nehru, the policy of nonalignment in Indian foreign relations underwent a series of
shifts and recalibrations, shaped by changing international circumstances and domestic
pressures. Although Nehru’s overarching vision of nonalignment was broadly supported by
India’s political elite during his tenure, his approach to China in particular became a
contentious issue. Following China’s invasion of Tibet in 1950, Nehru was subject to intense
criticism, notably from within his own party and from figures such as Sardar Patel and J.B.
Kripalani. Critics argued that India’s passive acceptance of China’s control over Tibet
undermined regional security and ignored the reality of an aggressive, ideologically driven
Chinese state. The failure to foresee China’s strategic ambitions led to accusations that
Nehru’s idealism blinded him to the practical necessities of national security.

Significantly, the Nehruvian era’s engagement with China provided a platform for the Hindu
Right, particularly the Bharatiya Jana Sangh led by Deendayal Upadhyaya, to formulate an
alternative vision for India’s foreign policy. Upadhyaya denounced what he viewed as
Nehru’s naïveté, calling for a more robust and security-focused strategy. He advocated for
severing diplomatic ties with China, revoking recognition of Chinese control over Tibet, and
aiding Tibetan resistance. Moreover, he challenged the sanctity of nonalignment, warning that
in a changing global order, clinging rigidly to old principles could leave India isolated and
vulnerable.

These criticisms began to resonate more strongly following the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the
1965 war with Pakistan, leading to a gradual transformation of India’s foreign policy. While
India remained formally nonaligned, the realpolitik of the time compelled New Delhi to build
military capacity and to seek more dependable international partnerships. After the 1965
conflict, India’s mistrust of the United States grew, especially following Washington’s
decision to halt arms supplies to both India and Pakistan, treating them as equally responsible
for the hostilities. In contrast, the Soviet Union played a more constructive role by facilitating
the Tashkent Agreement, paving the way for closer Indo-Soviet cooperation. Over the
subsequent decade, India strengthened its defense capabilities, conducted its first nuclear test
in 1974, and signed the 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet
Union—steps that signaled a partial departure from nonalignment in practice, if not in
principle.

Simultaneously, India pursued a more interventionist posture within South Asia, as seen in its
involvement in the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, and later interventions in Sri Lanka and
the Maldives. These actions reflected an emerging regional doctrine akin to the Monroe
Doctrine, aimed at asserting India’s primacy in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. While
remaining a vocal proponent of the Non-Aligned Movement and championing the cause of a
New International Economic Order, India’s growing reliance on the Soviet Union—especially
for military and economic support—illustrated a pragmatic compromise with its earlier
ideological commitments.
This trend toward pragmatic adaptation intensified in the 1990s, particularly after two
transformative events in 1991: the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The
economic turmoil triggered by these events, combined with a deepening political crisis at
home, forced India to reevaluate its approach. Under Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, and
with Manmohan Singh as Finance Minister, India undertook major economic reforms that
liberalized the economy and reduced state control. These domestic changes were paralleled
by a reorientation in foreign policy. With the Soviet Union gone, India had to diversify its
partnerships. Rao’s government launched the ‘Look East’ policy, reaching out to East and
Southeast Asian nations for trade, investment, and strategic engagement, marking a departure
from India’s earlier indifference to regional economic blocs and its hesitancy to engage with
capitalist economies.

Although Rao remained committed to the idea of nonalignment, his decision to prepare for a
nuclear weapons test—though ultimately aborted under US pressure—revealed the growing
priority of national security and strategic autonomy. This shift culminated in 1998 under Atal
Bihari Vajpayee, whose government conducted a successful nuclear test, effectively ending
India’s long-standing policy of nuclear ambiguity.

Finally, the brief tenure of I.K. Gujral introduced a doctrinal refinement to India’s
neighborhood policy. The Gujral Doctrine emphasized non-reciprocal goodwill toward
smaller South Asian neighbors, a recognition of the need to rebuild trust in a region long
dominated by Indian hegemony. It acknowledged that India must break free from its
historical obsession with Pakistan and instead invest diplomatic energy in broader global
engagement.

In essence, the post-Nehru trajectory of Indian foreign policy illustrates a complex evolution.
While the rhetoric of nonalignment persisted, the practical demands of a changing
international system, national security threats, and economic transformation led India to adapt
its strategy in significant ways. This period reflects a gradual shift from Nehru’s idealistic and
normative approach toward a more pragmatic, interest-based foreign policy, one that laid the
groundwork for India’s eventual embrace of multialignment in the 21st century.

Strategic autonomy and multialignment:

Together, partial economic liberalisation and opening up, the Look East
policy, the Gujral Doctrine, the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the
improvement of relations with Washington, shifted India away from the
overtly ideological and reflexively anti-Western approach it had taken in
the latter half of the Cold War toward a more pragmatic approach

After the Cold War, Indian foreign policy entered a new, more assertive phase—marked most
visibly by the 1998 nuclear tests at Pokhran. These tests were a bold declaration of India’s
strategic autonomy. Although they invited international condemnation, including sanctions,
they also marked the beginning of India stepping confidently into the global strategic
landscape. The motivations were layered: rising concerns over Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions,
growing unease with China’s power projection, and a desire to resist a world order where
nuclear power was the privilege of only a few.

Interestingly, these very tests, which at first distanced India from many Western powers,
ended up initiating a deeper strategic dialogue with the United States. What followed was a
series of high-level diplomatic talks, notably between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott,
which slowly began to reshape the India–US relationship. The 1999 Kargil War became a
turning point. The US openly criticized Pakistan’s aggression, reinforcing India’s position
and opening the door for trust and cooperation. By the early 2000s, India had positioned itself
as a “natural ally” of the United States. This culminated in the 2005 civil nuclear deal—a
groundbreaking agreement that, in many ways, recognized India as a responsible nuclear
power even though it lay outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) framework.

Meanwhile, India remained deeply conscious of China’s rising global stature. Although both
countries had resumed formal diplomatic relations in 1979, their border issues remained
unresolved. The 1993 Peace and Tranquility Agreement was a step towards reducing
tensions, but suspicions lingered—especially due to China’s strategic closeness with Pakistan,
particularly in the nuclear and missile domains. Thus, India’s nuclear tests of 1998 were also
a message to Beijing, affirming that India would not remain strategically vulnerable.

Under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, a more refined foreign policy doctrine began to take
shape. This approach was less about ideology and more about economic pragmatism. Singh
believed that India's foreign engagements should serve its domestic development goals. His
vision included liberalizing the economy further, ensuring access to global markets and
energy resources, building regional cooperation within South Asia, and subtly promoting
India’s democratic ethos abroad. At its core, this was about using foreign policy as a tool for
economic growth and greater global integration.

One of the most important shifts during this period was India’s movement away from its
earlier policy of nonalignment. Instead of choosing sides in global power rivalries, India now
opted for what scholars call “multialignment.” This meant engaging flexibly and strategically
with all major global players—from the United States and Russia to France, Japan, and
ASEAN countries. By 2014, India had established strategic partnerships with over thirty
countries, each serving different goals—be it defense, trade, energy security, or diplomatic
influence.

India also began playing a more active role in multilateral and regional forums. It joined the
IBSA Dialogue Forum with Brazil and South Africa, became a founding member of BRICS,
and participated more robustly in organizations like the East Asia Summit and the G20. This
marked a shift from an earlier hesitation towards global institutions to a more confident and
pragmatic embrace of them—recognizing India’s growing stature in the international system.

Finally, throughout this period, India adopted what could be called a strategy of “normative
hedging.” That is, it neither fully embraced nor completely rejected global norms like
humanitarian intervention or liberal trade. Instead, it approached such issues cautiously,
engaging with them when they served national interest while retaining the flexibility to resist
them when they did not. All the while, India continued its long-standing demand for reforms
in global governance institutions like the United Nations.

In sum, Indian foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, especially after the 1998 nuclear tests,
reflected a complex balancing act—asserting independence while engaging the world,
resisting power imbalances while embracing cooperation, and moving beyond rigid
ideologies toward a pragmatic pursuit of national interest.

MODI ERA:
The foreign policy of the Modi government presents an interesting paradox. On the surface,
Prime Minister Narendra Modi seemed to bring an energetic, dramatic shift to India’s global
presence. From the moment he took office in 2014, he invested heavily in
diplomacy—travelling extensively, holding meetings with major world leaders, attending
high-level summits like the G20 and the East Asia Summit, and unveiling a bold and often
theatrical style of international engagement. He fast-tracked defense agreements with the
United States that had been pending for years, stood firm against China during the Doklam
standoff, and ordered retaliatory military strikes after terrorist attacks from Pakistan-based
groups. At the same time, he and his team began reimagining Indian foreign policy in
ideological terms, rooting it in a Hindu nationalist worldview and presenting India as a
civilizational power, rich in ancient wisdom and cultural depth.

All of this gave rise to the idea that Indian foreign policy was undergoing a kind of
“Modi-fication”—a reinvention driven by Modi’s personal vision and political ideology.
There was talk of “Brand India,” soft power diplomacy rooted in yoga, Ayurveda, and
Sanskrit, and the promotion of India as a “vishwa guru”—a global teacher.

However, beneath the bold gestures and new language, there was also a strong continuity
with the approaches of previous governments. Modi, like his predecessors Manmohan Singh,
Vajpayee, and even I.K. Gujral, emphasized economic growth as a central goal of foreign
policy. His administration focused on securing energy supplies, building trade partnerships,
attracting foreign investment, and creating an international environment favorable to India’s
development. This was not a radical break, but a continuation—albeit with more spectacle
and symbolism. In fact, Modi’s own words at the Raisina Dialogue in 2017 reflect this
continuity: he said that India’s transformation at home could not be separated from its choices
in the international arena.

Modi also followed his predecessors in giving special attention to India’s neighborhood. He
tried to strengthen bilateral ties with South Asian countries, promote regional connectivity,
and frame India as a partner in mutual development. His slogan “Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas”
(Everyone’s support, everyone’s development) was extended beyond domestic politics to
reflect a vision for regional cooperation.
Where Modi did mark a notable departure was in his handling of security threats and his
ideological framing of soft power. His response to Chinese assertiveness at Doklam in 2017,
where Indian troops confronted Chinese forces for over two months, was seen as unusually
bold. Likewise, his response to terrorist attacks in 2016 and 2019—through so-called
“surgical strikes” and air strikes—broke with the traditional Indian approach of strategic
restraint. These actions were widely praised by nationalist audiences at home and contributed
to the perception of a more muscular, assertive India.

His government also pushed a new cultural agenda, tying foreign policy to Hindu nationalist
ideas. This included promoting India’s civilizational heritage not just as a matter of pride, but
as a kind of global offering—an idea that India’s ancient traditions and values could serve the
world in meaningful ways. While previous governments had used soft power too, under
Modi, this effort took on a clearer ideological tint.

Yet, despite the ambitions and rhetoric, the transformation many expected did not fully
materialize. Structural challenges remained: India’s Ministry of External Affairs continued to
be understaffed and under-resourced, and coordination between ministries was often weak.
Moreover, the vision behind Modi’s foreign policy—shaped by a Hindu nationalist lens—had
its own limitations, making it harder to build truly inclusive or widely appealing global
partnerships.

In essence, the Modi government’s foreign policy was both new and familiar: new in its tone,
symbols, and ideological framing—but familiar in its strategic aims and its dependence on
long-standing tools like diplomacy, multilateralism, and balancing major powers. It promised
transformation, and while it certainly changed the way India spoke to the world, it didn’t
always change the substance of what India was doing.