Frost v.
Knight (1872) LR 7 Ex 111: Case Summary
Introduction
The case of Frost v. Knight (1872) LR 7 Ex 111 is a landmark English contract law
case that established the doctrine of anticipatory breach for contracts with contingent
obligations. Heard in the Court of Exchequer Chamber, the case addressed whether a
party could sue for breach of contract before the performance was due, based on the
other party’s expressed intent not to perform. This document summarizes the facts,
issues, judgment, and significance of the case.
Facts
In Frost v. Knight, the defendant, Mr. Knight, promised to marry the plaintiff, Miss
Frost, upon the death of his father, making the contract contingent on a future event.
While Knight’s father was still alive, Knight informed Frost that he would not marry
her and subsequently married another woman. Frost sued Knight for breach of promise
to marry, arguing that his actions constituted an anticipatory breach of contract, even
though the time for performance (the father’s death) had not yet arrived.
Issues
The court considered the following key issues:
1. Can a party sue for breach of contract before the performance date if the other
party clearly indicates they will not perform their obligations?
2. What are the rights of the innocent party when faced with an anticipatory breach?
3. Does the doctrine of anticipatory breach, as established in Hochster v. De La Tour
(1853), apply to contingent contracts, such as a promise to marry upon a future
event?
Judgment
The Court of Exchequer Chamber, led by Chief Justice Cockburn, ruled in favor of Miss
Frost, establishing the following principles:
• Anticipatory Breach: Knight’s declaration of intent not to marry Frost, rein-
forced by his marriage to another woman, constituted an anticipatory breach. This
allowed Frost to treat the contract as repudiated and sue for damages immediately.
• Precedent from Hochster v. De La Tour: The court applied the principle
from Hochster v. De La Tour (1853), extending it to contingent contracts. It held
that anticipatory breach applies to both commercial and personal contracts.
• Options for the Innocent Party: The innocent party (Frost) could either:
(a) Accept the repudiation, terminate the contract, and sue for damages immedi-
ately, allowing mitigation of losses.
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(b) Keep the contract alive, remain bound by its obligations, and sue for damages
when the performance date arrives, risking potential liability if they fail to
perform.
• Practicality and Mitigation: Allowing immediate action for anticipatory breach
was deemed practical, as it enabled Frost to mitigate losses (e.g., by seeking other
marriage prospects) rather than waiting indefinitely for Knight’s father’s death.
The court awarded Frost the right to seek damages, affirming that she did not need to
wait for the contingency to occur.
Significance
Frost v. Knight solidified the doctrine of anticipatory breach in English contract law,
particularly for contingent contracts. It clarified that a clear repudiation before the
performance date constitutes a breach, giving the innocent party flexibility to either
terminate the contract or keep it alive. The decision has been widely cited in common
law jurisdictions and influenced provisions like Section 39 of the Indian Contract Act,
1872, which addresses repudiation of contracts.
Conclusion
Frost v. Knight remains a foundational case in contract law, emphasizing the impor-
tance of allowing the innocent party to respond proactively to a breach of promise. By
recognizing anticipatory breach in contingent contracts, the court provided a practical
framework for addressing repudiatory conduct, ensuring fairness and efficiency in contract
enforcement.
