1

Department of Political Science

Rabindranath Tagore University, Hojai

For B.A 2nd Sem (Honours)

Paper: Pol.HC 2026 (Political Process in India)

Secessionist Movements of India

Secession in India typically refers to state secession, which is the withdrawal of
one or more states from the Republic of India. Some have argued for secession
as a natural right of revolution.

Many independence movements exist with thousands of members, however,

with moderate local support and high voter participation in the democratic
elections. The Khalistan movement in Punjab was active in the 1980s and the
1990s, but is now largely subdued within India. Insurgency has occurred in
North-East India, in the states of Tripura, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Manipur,
Assam and Nagaland.

India has introduced several Armed Forces Special Powers Acts (AFSPA) to
subdue insurgency in certain parts of the country. The law was first enforced
in Manipur and later enforced in other insurgency-ridden north-eastern states.
It was extended to most parts of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir in
1990 after the outbreak of an armed insurgency in 1989. Each Act gives
soldiers immunity in specified regions against prosecution under state
government unless the Indian government gives prior sanction for such
prosecution. The government maintains that the AFSPA is necessary to restore
order in regions like Indian territories Kashmir, Manipur Nagaland and Assam.

Jammu and Kashmir

Historical Background

Maharaja Hari Singh became the ruler of the princely state of Jammu and
Kashmir in 1925, and he was the reigning monarch at the conclusion of British
rule in the subcontinent in 1947. With the impending independence of India,
the British announced that the British Paramountcy over the princely states
would end, and the states were free to choose between the new Dominions of
India and Pakistan or to remain independent. It was emphasized that
independence was only a `theoretical possibility' because, during the long rule
of the British in India, the states had come to depend on British Indian
government for a variety of their needs including their internal and external
security.

Jammu and Kashmir had a Muslim majority (77% Muslim by the previous
census in 1941). Following the logic of Partition, many people in Pakistan
expected that Kashmir would join Pakistan. However, the predominant political
movement in the Valley of Kashmir (Jammu and Kashmir National Conference)
 2

was secular and was allied with the Indian National Congress since the 1930s.
Guha, Ramachandra (2008), India after Gandhi: The History of the World's
Largest Democracy, "Pakistan naturally expected Kashmir, with its Muslim
majority, to join it. India thought that the religious factor was irrelevant,
especially since the leading political party, the National Conference, was known
to be non-sectarian." The Maharaja was faced with indecision.

On 22 October 1947, rebellious citizens from the western districts of the State
and Pushdown tribesmen from the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan
invaded the State, backed by Pakistan. The Maharaja initially fought back but
appealed for assistance to India, who agreed on the condition that the ruler
accedes to India. Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession on
26 October 1947 in return for military aid and assistance, which was accepted
by the Governor General the next day. While the Government of India accepted
the accession, it added the provision that it would be submitted to a "reference
to the people" after the state is cleared of the invaders, since "only the people,
not the Maharaja, could decide where Kashmiris wanted to live." It was a
provisional accession.

Once the Instrument of Accession was signed, Indian soldiers entered Kashmir
with orders to evict the raiders. The resulting Indo-Pakistani War of 1947
lasted till the end of 1948. At the beginning of 1948, India took the matter to
the United Nations Security Council. The Security Council passed a resolution
asking Pakistan to withdraw its forces as well as the Pakistani nationals from
the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, and India to withdraw the majority of its
forces leaving only a sufficient number to maintain law and order, following
which a plebiscite would be held. A ceasefire was agreed on 1 January 1949,
supervised by UN observers.

A special United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was set
up to negotiate the withdrawal arrangements as per the Security Council
resolution. The UNCIP made three visits to the subcontinent between 1948 and
1949, trying to find a solution agreeable to both India and Pakistan. It passed a
resolution in August 1948 proposing a three-part process. It was accepted by
India but effectively rejected by Pakistan. In the end, no withdrawal was ever
carried out, India insisting that Pakistan had to withdraw first, and Pakistan
contending that there was no guarantee that India would withdraw afterward.
No agreement could be reached between the two countries on the process of
demilitarization.

India and Pakistan fought two further wars in 1965 and 1971. Following the
latter war, the countries reached the Simla Agreement, agreeing on a Line of
Control between their respective regions and committing to a peaceful
resolution of the dispute through bilateral negotiations.

On 31 October 2019 the State of Jammu and Kashmir was transformed into a
Union Territory. The state has been bifurcated into a separate union territory
for Jammu and Kashmir while the other Union Territory is Ladakh. The
decision to change the status of Jammu and Kashmir into two separate union
 3

territories came on August 5, 2019, when the Government of India abrogated

Article 370 and 35A. This marks the end of the special autonomous status
granted by the Constitution of India. This day also marks the birthday of
Sardar Vallabhai Patel.

Factors Responsible for Rise of Secessionist Movement in Kashmir

Secessionist movement in the Kashmir Valley started in April 1988 on account

of a combination of various factors, both external and internal, around that
time which can be discussed below.

1. External Factors.

Resurgence in the activities of the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)
following the return of Amanullah Khan (Chairman, JKLF) from UK to Pakistan
in early 1987 and the nexus between the JKLF and Pakistan.

Involvement of the intelligence agencies of Pakistan (Inter Services Intelligence

Directorate and Field Intelligence Unit) in giving arms training to Kashmiri
youth beginning February 1988.

2. Internal factors

Return of Pakistan-trained Kashmiri youth to Kashmir Valley from around

April 1988 onwards.

Leadership provided to the secessionists in initial stages by Shabir Ahmed

Shah following his release from detention in May 1988.

Expulsion of the J&K JEI from the Muslim United Front giving a new vigour to
its anti-national activities since it was no longer inhibited by electoral
constraints.

Tactical alliance of the J&K JEI with the secessionist forces, including the
People's league (PL), Islamic Students' League (ISL) and Islami Jamaat-e-Tulba
(IJT).

Estrangement between Dr. Farooq Abdullah and Maulvi Farooq (Chairman,

Awami Action Committee) in early 1988 driving the latter to adopt a pro-
militant stance.

A political vacuum that was created following the alliance between the NC-F
and the Cong(I) which was exploited by the secessionist and anti-national
forces.

3. Other factors.

(i) Support of People's Conference, Awami Action Committee and Ummat-e-

Islami to the movement for the removal of the Farooq Abdullah government.

(ii) Growing pro-Islamic content of the secessionist movement and increasing

exploitation of religion by the secessionists and fundamentalists.
 4

(iii) Inter and intra-party dissensions among the alliance partners (NC-F and
Cong-I) and inadequate political and administrative response to firmly tackle
the situation.

Secessionist Movement in Kashmir: An Overview

Since April 1988, a distinct momentum was imparted to the Secessionist

movement, largely on account of the activities of the JKLF and the People's
League. Infiltrations were still few and smuggling of sophisticated weapons was
still in a nascent stage. Some amount of explosives were however, brought in,
using smuggling routes with smugglers acting as conduits. It was after the
release of Shabir Ahmed Shah in May 1988 that the various secessionist
groups began to take an organized approach in their actions and activities.
There was no coordinated leadership as yet, but JKLF elements were being
guided and instigated from Pakistan. This was essentially a preparatory stage
and the failure of the State administration to take action at the incipient stage
was clearly an encouragement to the militant elements.

By the end of August 1988, the JKLF, the People's League and the ISL had
acquired a capacity to engage in organised violence. This was well
demonstrated by the violent incidents lasting for nearly 5 days, following the
death of General Zia. The violence crippled activities in several parts of the
Valley. The violent incidents of August were followed by a series of explosions
in parts of Srinagar city during September. There was also evidence of better
planning and well-directed attacks against individuals. DIG Kashmir, A.M.
Watali, was one such target of an armed attack, though he escaped. There was
also enough evidence to show increasing interest and directions from the
Pakistani intelligence agencies to build up a coordinated movement with a
single focus.

There was a qualitative change in the pattern of violence after January 1989.
The use of sophisticated fire-arms and extensive use of explosives, mostly
imported from Pakistan, greatly transformed the situation. Selective explosions
were used to create an atmosphere of tension or panic. The number of
infiltrations by Pakistan-returned Kashmiri youth also went up.

1989 saw a succession of agitations by the various secessionist groups. Some

of the calls were given by individual groups but almost all were endorsed by the
various militant formations. 26 January was observed as 'Black Day'.
Considerable violence occurred all over the Valley on 11 February on the
occasion of the death anniversary of Maqbool Butt. Serious violence erupted
again in several parts of the valley in protest against Salman Rushdie's book
despite the fact that the book had already been banned in India. For nearly 5
days almost all activity in the valley came to a halt. Even more serious violence
occurred during April-May, the first lasting for nearly a week protesting against
the arrest of Kashmiri youth by the police and the second, for 4 days in the
name of the 'Quit Kashmir' movement.
 5

Meanwhile, Kashmiri youth continued to cross over to Pakistan and Pakistan

Occupied Kashmir in small groups. These youth were trained in the use of
explosives to blow up bridges and buildings and were also given training in
sophisticated fire-arms. Considerable quantities of sophisticated explosives
including timing devices and AK-47 rifles were also made available to these
individuals. Guidance by Pakistani intelligence agencies was also forthcoming
and it was suggested that the targets should be selective and intended to make
the Kashmiri people rise against the Indian government and bring down the
State government in Kashmir. Threatening letters were also sent to non-
Kashmiris and Hindus asking them to quit the valley. Thereafter, a major
campaign began for a pro-Islamic reform movement led by the JEI J&K and its
front organisations like Hizb-e-Islami and Hizb-e-Mujahideen. This was
accompanied by selective attacks against pro-accession political activists,
police/security agencies, government establishments and members of the
minority community (Hindus). With the advent of strong reformist threats, the
level of subversion went up.

The nature and content of the subversive threat in the valley acquired a
momentum of its own. By the last quarter of 1989, the agitations were
increasingly characterised by spontaneity, and incidents of violence became
extensive and affected larger areas, including rural places. In the Kashmir
Valley, Srinagar remained the focus of violence followed by Baramulla,
Anantnag, Pulwama, Badgam and Kupwara districts. Following the rise in the
intensity of militant violence, including assassinations and intimidation of
political opponents, the traditional political parties became inactive and
marginalised. As a result, the poll boycott call given by the secessionist groups
was successful. Most of the electorate also refrained from exercising their
franchise. In the two Poling Centres (Baramulla and Anantnag) where elections
were held, the percentage of polling was 5%.

The growing pro-Islamic content of the secessionist movement and the

increasing fundamentalism of the J&K JEI provided further fillip to the
secessionist movement in the valley. The militant faction of the J&K JEI led by
S.A.S. Gillani (ex-MLA) steadily gained ground in 1990-91 and also maintained
a rapport with the militants in the secessionist movement. The J&K JEI
systematically extended its influence to the Muslim majority districts of the
Jammu region, particularly Doda district. In the wake of the increasing
fundamentalist thrust, Hindus and their establishments became the targets of
attack in the Kashmir Valley as also in Doda district of Jammu region,
particularly after the 'Shilanyas' (9 November 1989) at Ayodhya. This created
panic among the Hindus in the valley.

The administrative response to growing threats of secessionism, subversion

and terrorism, which was inadequate to start with, had by and large collapsed
by the middle of 1989. Some initial successes during 1988 and early months of
1989 that resulted in the capture of arms and arrests of Pak-trained militants,
could not be sustained. Since the successful observance of a 4-day 'Quit
Kashmir Movement' (11-14 May 1989), the subversives gradually acquired full
sway over the valley with both the State administration and secular parties in
 6

the retreat. With the growing failure of the State government to meet the
secessionists' challenge, the pace of subversion including those in government
services - police, acquired momentum and by the end of 1989, it was the
secessionist elements whose writ ran in the valley. Efforts to confront them led
to large scale violence and resistance.

During January, following the promulgation of Governor's rule (January 19),

attempts of the State Government to assert its authority through deployment of
security forces and curfew restrictions resulted in resistance and confrontation.
Secessionists, in a change of tactics, organised a large number of processions
and demonstrations which submitted a memorandum to the UN office at
Srinagar. This was followed by attempts to inject elements of civil disobedience
affecting the functioning of government offices. Mosques and the clergy
gradually became a very significant component in mobilising the support of the
masses for the movement. The morale of the secessionists and the people were
sustained by a propaganda blitz from across the border, holding out hope of
intervention and support of the Islamic world. The feeling of alienation among
the common people was further sustained on the plank of alleged excesses by
security forces.

Since March 1990, militant violence which was earlier confined to Srinagar city
proliferated to rural belts in all parts of the Kashmir Valley. In a bid to wipe out
nationalist forces and disrupt political process in the Kashmir Valley, the
militants subjected political activists and their property to continuous attacks.
The militants assassinated a number of pro-accession political leaders
including Abdul Sattar Ranjoor (State C.P.I leader- 23 March ) Ghulam Nabi
Butt (Ex-MLA, Cong I- 24 March ), Anwar Khan (NOT leader- 25 March ), Mir
Mustafa (Ex MLA- 25 March ), Sheikh Abdul Jabbar (Ex Minister- 18 April ),
Shiekh Mohd Mansoor (Ex MLA NC/F- 11 May ), Maulvi Mohd Farooq
(Chairman, Awami Action Committee- 21 May ) and Maulana Masoodi (veteran
NC leader- 13 Dec ). The sudden spurt in political assassinations led to large
scale resignations from the pro-accession parties. Thus, normal political
activities gradually came to an end.

Simultaneously, the militants intensified attacks against government

employees and offices to demoralise the administration. By December 1990,
around 300 government employees including 131 security personnel were
killed by militants. Prominent among those killed were A.K. Raina (Dy Director
Supplies- 20 March ), H.L. Khera (G.M. HMT Factory Zainakote- 10 April ),
Prof. Musheer-ul-Haq (V.C., Kashmir University), J.N. Raina (Jt. Director
Sericulture, 26 June ), Abdul Aziz (Addl Dy. Commissioner, Srinagar- 29 June )
and Parvez Qadiri (Conservator of Forests- 20 Aug ). These killings generated
unprecedented fear psychosis among the government employees and paralysed
the normal functioning of the administration. The militants also forced the
State government employees to go on strike on one pretext or the other. The
last spell of the 72-day strike (15 Sept to 25 Nov) was unprecedented.

Growing communalisation of the secessionist movement in the valley coupled

with the killing of Hindus (173 till Dec) by the militants caused panic among
 7

non Muslims leading to a mass exodus. Over 40,000 Hindus and 1500 Sikh
families left the valley. Most of them traversed to Jammu causing considerable
strain on the communal situation in the city and its environs, besides socio-
economic complications.

Proliferation of a large number of militant groups, mostly at the behest of

Pakistani intelligence agencies, led to growing confusion and splintering among
their ranks during 1990. Efforts to float a United Front, politically through the
J&K Tehrik-e-Hurriat (a conglomerate of 11 secessionist bodies) and on a
militant plane, through the United Jehad Council, both pro-Pakistan bodies,
suffered due to the JKLF (pro- Independence) remaining outside their purview.
Worried over persisting intra and inter group dissensions among the major
militant groups of JKLF, PL and Hizbul Mujahideen, Pakistani authorities
initiated a series of discussions with Kashmiri militant leaders in Pakistan and
Kathmandu after September 1990. Plans to close ranks and coalesce a United
Front to sharpen the militant struggle remained major areas of consideration.
The higher intensity of violence since August 1990, coinciding with
upgradation in induction of sophisticated arms, was generally sustained. This
was despite the large number of arrests of Kashmiri militants and increasing
recovery of arms. Sustained pressure of security forces to an extent contained
the situation and the trend of violence. Despite strengthening border vigil,
clandestine movement of men and material continued.

During the period from 2004 to 2008, Prime Minister Singh initiated several
confidence building measures with the Kashmiris. In 2006, he organized three
crucial Round Table Conferences with the Kashmiri political leadership,
although key dissident leaders boycotted them. He also announced the setting
up of five working groups to examine various aspects of the Kashmir conflict.
The groups were tasked to deal with ‘improving the Centre’s relations with the
State, furthering the relations across the Line of Control (LoC), giving a boost to
the State’s economic development, rehabilitating the destitute families of
militants and reviewing the cases of detainees and ensuring good
governance’.By early 2008, there was a feeling that Kashmir was changing for
good, especially due to the improved relationship between the Kashmiris and
New Delhi, and between India and Pakistan. Even the 2008 agitation, which
started out as an agitation by Kashmiri Muslims against the transfer of land to
a Hindu shrine, the Shri Amarnathji Shrine Board, by the J&K government,
followed by an economic blockade of Muslim-dominated Kashmir by Hindu-
dominated Jammu did not fundamentally transform the positive vibes that
were visible in Kashmir. In other words, after 20 years of insurgency, Kashmir
was changing for the better. The differences between 1989 and 2008 were
huge.

Reflecting on these changes, that in 1989, India found itself on the losing side
of the Cold War, weak and friendless. The international community was
negatively disposed towards India vis-à-vis the Kashmir issue. The Kashmiri
dissidents, Pakistan and the militants in Kashmir had managed to
‘internationalize’ their cause and garnered significant levels of sympathy for it.
India was being pushed into a corner. This was no more the case by 2008.
 8

India was an emerging power and considered to be a key stabilizing player in

the South Asian subcontinent. The international community was no longer
keen to discuss Kashmir or force a solution; it knew India would not be pushed
in that direction. Furthermore, unlike in the late 1980s, Pakistan was a much-
weakened power in 2008 without many reliable strategic partners and widely
feared to be heading for failure, primarily due to the fallout of its promotion of
terrorism. And for the international community, Kashmir was no more a pet
issue. Over the years, Kashmiri views on Pakistan had changed. Kashmiris had
entertained a certain fascination for Pakistan, especially due to the iron hand
used by the Indian state in putting down the insurgency. This was also
changing in the late 2000s, thanks to the existential problems that Pakistan
was facing, the atrocities that Pakistan-sponsored terrorists had committed in
Kashmir and the general perception that joining Pakistan may not be the best
option for Kashmir. Hence, Pakistan no longer enjoyed much support in the
Valley in the late 2000s. More importantly, by the end of the decade (2007–
2008), the political climate in Kashmir had also undergone radical
transformation. The ‘mainstreaming of dissent’ was a significant phenomenon
that started taking roots in the Valley. From being completely anti-India in the
early 1990s, separatist politics and ‘azadi’ sentiments became more nuanced,
more complex than before and manifested in many forms, ranging from the All
Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) to the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). Set
up in 1999, the PDP was widely seen as a ‘pro-azadi’, ‘separatist’ or even ‘soft-
separatist’ party. However, having ruled the state for three years, the PDP was
very much a mainstream Kashmiri political party with clear links to the Indian
state. On the other side of the divide, the dissident APHC often raised
governance-related issues. This crossing of traditional political boundaries by
the hitherto opposed political groups indicated the complexity of Kashmir’s new
politics. In other words, there was a feeling by the late 2000s that it was
perhaps possible to chart a new future for Kashmir given the changes
underway in the Valley as well as bilaterally. The events from 2008 until the
2016 uprising indicate that this favourable atmosphere has been wasted.
Among other things, the non-serious manner in which the central government
treated the reports submitted by the working groups appointed by the Prime
Minister’s Round Table Conferences had a negative impact on the Kashmiri
polity.There was yet another uprising in Kashmir in 2010.

It was triggered by the killing of three civilians in an alleged fake army

encounter. Subsequently, with the killing of a Kashmiri student, Tufail Mattoo
in June 2010, Kashmir witnessed an unrest that claimed 130 Kashmiri lives.
New Delhi responded by appointing a team of interlocutors to hold discussions
with Kashmiris and suggest solutions to the conflict, which they did, but the
government refused to act on the report. Then, in February 2013, the Congress
government in New Delhi executed Mohammad Afzal Guru, convicted by the
Indian Supreme Court in the 2001 Parliament attack case, leading to protests
and shutdowns in the Kashmir Valley. The incident deepened the divide
between New Delhi and Kashmir, as the separatists and the general public in
 9

Kashmir called Guru a martyr. The LoC and International Border continued to
witness incessant ceasefire violations by both sides, with scores of casualties
and civilian displacement.

BJP-led Government of Narendra Modi and the Issue of Kashmir

When the new BJP-led government in Delhi came to power under the
leadership of Narendra Modi in May 2014, there was some hope that India
Pakistan relations would improve since it was believed that it would take a
strong leader to make a lasting deal with Pakistan. This belief was
strengthened when Modi invited the Pakistani Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, to
Delhi for his swearing-in ceremony in May 2014. However, this bonhomie did
not last long as terror strikes against India continued, and so did the Cease
Fire Violations. But, Mr Modi’s surprise visit to Pakistan in December 2015 to
meet Nawaz Sharif in a private function was seen as a breakthrough, which
took place after the two National Security Advisors started holding private
parlays between themselves to iron out the key differences. Kashmiris in the
meantime were upset once again when relief from the union government did
not reach them in time during the 2014 Kashmir floods. What upset them even
more was the PDP, the so-called soft-separatist party, entering an alliance with
the BJP to form a government in J&K. Given how vigorously the PDP had
campaigned against Mr Modi and his party, many Kashmiris were convinced
that this was an opportunistic alliance purely for the sake of gaining power.
And yet, when these two ideologically opposed parties came together to form a
coalition government in early 2015, there was hope that things would get better
for J&K, given the PDP’s popularity in south Kashmir and the BJP’s historic
mandate at the national level. Close to two years since the coalition came to
power, there is a great deal of scepticism today about the ability of the coalition
to fulfil the hopes of Kashmiris. The PDP leadership repeatedly reminded the
BJP of the need to deliver on the promises enshrined in the ‘Agenda of
Alliance’, including ‘to facilitate and help initiate a sustained and meaningful
dialogue with all internal stakeholders, which will include all political groups
irrespective of their ideological views and predilections’. However, the key
objectives outlined in the document have not been taken up for implementation
by the coalition so far. This has led to a delegitimization of the elected
government in J&K. Indeed, according to an account, ‘Police records confirm
that some of the young men who have recently become militants had actively
canvassed for the PDP in the 2014 general elections’ .

Since trouble began in July 2016, the Kashmir Valley was under lockdown for
several months, mobile Internet services were suspended and curfew was
imposed by the government for most part of the day. The agitators, disparate
groups and ideologies brought together by their pent-up anger against the
Government of India, followed an ‘anarchic’ protest movement, with
uncontrollable crowds attacking security forces with stones. This was often
 10

responded to by the security forces with disproportionate use of force, leading

to deaths, thousands of injured and many blinded for life.3 Since July, close to
90 people, including two police personnel, were killed in 2016 alone.

Conclusion

The 2016 uprising has shown that the insurgency in Kashmir is far from over.
The key reason why the insurgency, which was contained in the mid- to late
1990s, started getting a new lease of life is because of the failure of conflict
resolution between India and Pakistan as well as India’s political mishandling
of the internal

52 International Studies 51(1–4)dimensions of the Kashmir conflict. Today the

Indian state faces a major security threat from the repeated uprisings in
Kashmir even though the government in New Delhi does not seem to have
seriously diagnosed its implications.The current policy of using force to
dissuade protesters and of waiting for them to tire out does not seem like a
long-term strategy. An unmanaged rebellion in Kashmir could prove to be
expensive for India due to a variety of external factors. Pakistan’s behaviour in
the past one year has shown that it would utilize any given opportunity to fan
the flames in Kashmir, both materially and politically. More significantly, with
the new insurgency showing clear signs of being influenced by religious
dogmas, unlike in the later 1980s and early 1990s, New Delhi would be ill-
advised not to resolve the conflict politically while it still can. The ISIS factor,
though not yet a serious threat in the context of Kashmir, could potentially
make the insurgency harder to handle in the years ahead.While it is true that
the Pakistani involvement has ensured that the Kashmiri demands are still
heard by New Delhi and the international community, it is also true that
Pakistani involvement has made it difficult for New Delhi to make any
concessions due to domestic political/electoral implications. In other words,
had the Kashmir issue not had a Pakistan angle to it, it would have been easier
for the government in New Delhi to resolve it. Paradoxically, however, it would
have not have bothered with Kashmir had there been no Pakistan angle to it.In
2016, the BJP government signed a peace accord with the Nationalist Socialist
Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) or NSCN (IM), the Naga insurgents in the
northeast of the country, which has been demanding for ‘a “Greater Nagalim”
comprising “all contiguous Naga-inhabited areas”, along with Nagaland’,
including several districts of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur, ‘as also
a large tract of Myanmar’ (Kashyap, 2015). The government in New Delhi was
able to make peace with NSCN (IM) because of the lack of domestic political
costs and external angle to the issue. But there is nothing to indicate that
Pakistan is likely to wind down its involvement in Kashmir in the days ahead
making it exceptionally hard for New Delhi to resolve Kashmir.Conflict
resolution in J&K is easier said than done. Since the beginning of 2016, and
especially the outbreak of the latest uprising in Kashmir, India and Pakistan
have hardened their positions. There is hardly any talk about the Musharraf
formula nor are the backchannel parlays working. This will pose a major
challenge for the bilateral resolution of the conflict over Kashmir
 11

North East India

Assam

Though the Assamese speaking indigenous people of the State, known by the
generic name of Assamese, are not the only ethnic constituency in India to
have a secessionist group, it is the largest among ethnic groups in the country
which have rebel elements practicing armed activities for avowedly secessionist
goals. The Government of India (GOI) has shown remarkable flexibility in
dealing with secessionist outfits elsewhere – the five-year old cease-fire with the
National Socialist Council of Nagaland–Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), which is yet to
renounce secessionism, being the most glaring and geographically proximate
example in the context of Assam. By contrast, the proposal for so-called talks
with the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) – an organisation whose
activities have kept the security forces engaged in the State since 1990 –
though much desired by the Assamese, has received only lukewarm response
from the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).1 Consequently, the popular
perception, presently, is that the GOI is not really interested in solving the
problems of Assam, echoing the old, though disputable, refrain of the Centre’s
‘step-motherly attitude’ towards the State. While the MHA might have its own
reasons for its apparent intransigence, the continuance of this perception is
succeeding in deepening the feeling of alienation amongst the Assamese vis-à-
vis Delhi. In this context, the old adage ‘justice should also appear to be done’
may be worth noting.

Contrary to the secessionist movements among some tribes and nationalities in

the Northeast since the emergence of independent India, Assam is a late
entrant to the arena of separatism. Despite appeals by the then leadership of
the Naga secessionists, the Assamese, on the whole, with odd exceptions only
proving the general rule,2 remained quite satisfied and optimistic about their
Indian citizenship in the early decades of independence. In fact, Partition,
conceived as a necessary evil in other parts of India, was seen as much-sought-
after relief because, with the ceding of Sylhet to erstwhile East Pakistan, the
Assamese gained a comfortable dominance over the affairs of the State by
virtue of their newfound relative majority in the post-Partition demography of
Assam.3

Though the ULFA was founded on April 7, 19794, it came to be noticed as a

nascent-armed organisation only in late 1983, when it commenced a series of
political assassinations and audacious bank robberies, often abortive. 5
Following the bulldozing through of elections to the State Legislative Assembly
by the then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, in spring 1983, secessionist
sentiments were rising amongst the normally timid Assamese. Though quite a
few secessionist insurgent outfits appeared on the scene in Assam at this
stage,6 only ULFA survived the Assam Accord7 signed between the GOI and the
Assamese nationalist leaders of the famous or notorious (as the perspective
might be) Assam Agitation against unabated and unchecked illegal immigration
 12

from the erstwhile East Pakistan and present-day Bangladesh. Other linguistic
ethnic groups in Assam have since sprouted their own secessionist-insurgent
organisations like the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) among
the Bodos, United People’s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) among the Karbis and
Dima Halim Daoga (DHD) among the Dimasas.8 Nevertheless, for the Assamese
– the single largest linguistic group in Assam – the ULFA remains the most
serious issue. Irrespective of the level of activity of ULFA, not a single week
goes by in Assam without the demand being made in one or the other widely
circulated Assamese dailies for the GOI to negotiate a settlement with ULFA. It
is also to be noticed that, though the ULFA has come up with some
uncompromising pre-conditions for negotiations with the GOI, the basic thrust
of most of the local commentators, including some leading Assamese
intellectuals, is towards the GOI accepting the pre-conditions rather than of
ULFA withdrawing them.9 Till a few years ago, criticising the ULFA was an
assured means of earning unpopularity in Assam.

Statistically speaking, the ULFA does not possess the lethality that other
insurgent groups in India have. Its armed activities are, in general, more in the
nature of selective assassinations and acts of sabotage against State-owned
economic assets like the oil pipeline, rather than aimless terror tactics. Of
course, it is known that ULFA did carry out some typical terrorist attacks
against the Hindi-speaking people of Assam in year 2000.10 Though a hitherto
unknown group calling itself the Assam Tiger Force claimed responsibility for
the attacks, the State government and a large section of the people of Assam
believe that the attacks were carried out by the ULFA, albeit clandestinely. The
number of deaths resulting from attacks by the ULFA is quite low compared to
some other insurgencies. The importance of ULFA lies, rather, in the sympathy
it gets from the Assamese or, as M.S. Prabhakara expresses it, "ULFA is a state
of mind in Assam."11 Though the strength of ULFA lies more in the sympathy
factor it gets among its home-population (despite lack of empathy for its
declared goal) than in cadres and weapons, it is believed to have a cadre-
strength of around 5,000 trained insurgents and, according to Indian
intelligence agency reports, possesses thrice the number of weapons suitable
for guerrilla activities.12

Continued operations against ULFA by the security forces (SFs) since

December 1990 have contained the firepower of ULFA. According to
government claims, till date, more than 8,000 ULFA cadres have surrendered.13
However, the recruitment of ULFA has also continued unabated.14
Furthermore, ULFA remains an influential factor in the electoral politics of
Assam. Following deliberated strategies, ULFA has extended selective and
conditional support to different political parties alternately, or rather, has
attacked selected political parties and candidates, thereby restricting the
activities of the target party’s workers during election campaigns to subvert its
poll prospects, thus increasing the comparative advantage of its favoured
political party or candidates.15

Political parties have, more often than not, fallen prey to ULFA’s tactics, unable
to resist the temptation of securing the tacit support of the insurgents. ULFA
 13

has been able to regularly influence electoral outcomes since 1991.16 This has
led to a periodical breakdown of morale amongst the State police, who are
sometimes unsure of their political bosses’ inclination towards curbing
insurgency. The recurring phenomenon of newly elected State governments
going soft on the insurgents has been quite visible in Assam. The invisible but
strongly felt power of ULFA to further or hamper individual political careers has
often made politicians hostage to ULFA. Similar pressures are also experienced
among the local intelligentsia. This unhealthy trend is destroying the
democratic atmosphere of Assam and such destruction renders the ground
more fertile for insurgency, with the resultant stultifying affect is gradually
making important issues like large-scale corruption to be non-issues. ULFA’s
importance lies more in its all-pervasive effect on the Assamese society than in
its immediate armed activities

The militant organization United Liberation Front of Assam demands a

separate country for the indigenous people of Assam. The Government of India
had banned the ULFA in 1990 and has officially labelled it as a terrorist group,
whereas the US State Department lists it under "Other groups of concern".
Military operations against it by the Indian Army that began in 1990 continue
to the present. In the past two decades, some 10,000 people have died in the
clash between the rebels and the government. The Assamese secessionists have
protested against the illegal migration from the neighboring regions. Since the
mid-20th century, people from present-day Bangladesh (then known as East
Pakistan) have been migrating to Assam. In 1961, the Government of Assam
passed legislation making use of Assamese language compulsory; it had to be
withdrawn later under pressure from Bengali speaking people in Cachar. In the
1980s the Brahmaputra valley saw six years of Assam agitation triggered by
the discovery of a sudden rise in registered voters on electoral rolls.

The Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA), established in 1996,

advocates a separate country for the Muslims of the region. The United People's
Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) demands a sovereign nation for the Karbi people.
It was formed in March 1999 with the merger of two militant outfits in Assam's
Karbi Anglong district, the Karbi National Volunteers (KNV) and Karbi People’s
Front (KPF). The United People's Democratic Solidarity signed a cease-fire
agreement for one year with the Union Government on 23 May 2002. However,
this led to a split in the UPDS with one faction deciding to continue with its
subversive activities while the other commenced negotiations with the
Government.

Nagaland

The Nagalim is a proposed independent country for the Naga people. In the
1950s, the Naga National Council led a violent unsuccessful insurgency
against the Government of India, demanding a separate country for the Nagas.
The secessionist violence decreased considerably after the formation of the
Naga-majority Nagaland state, and more militants surrendered after the
Shillong Accord of 1975. However, the majority of Nagas, operating under the
 14

various factions of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, continue to

demand a separate country.

2014 General Elections of India recorded a voter turnout of more than 87% in
Nagaland, which was the highest in India.

Tripura

The National Liberation Front of Tripura (or NLFT) is a Tripuri nationalist

organisation which seeks for Tripura to secede from India and establish an
independent Tripuri state. It has actively participated in the Tripura Rebellion.
The NLFT manifesto says that they want to expand what they describe as the
Kingdom of God and Christ in Tripura. The Tripura National Volunteers (also
known as the Tribal National Volunteers or Tripura National Volunteer Force)
was founded in 1978 with assistance from the Mizo National Front.[29]
Punjab

Khalistan

The Khalistan movement aimed to create a separate Sikh country. The

territorial definition of the proposed country Khalistan consists of both the
Punjab, India along with Punjab, Pakistan and includes parts of Haryana,
Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, and Rajasthan.

After the partition of India, the majority of the Sikhs migrated from the
Pakistani part to the Indian province of Punjab, which then included the parts
of the present-day Haryana and Himachal Pradesh. Following India's
independence in 1947, the Punjabi Suba movement led by the Sikh political
party Akali Dal led to the trifurcation of the Punjab state. The remnant Punjab
state became Sikh-majority and Punjabi-majority. Subsequently, a section of
the Sikh leaders started demanding more autonomy for the states, alleging that
the central government was discriminating against Punjab. Although the Akali
Dal explicitly opposed the demand for an independent Sikh country, the issues
raised by it were used as a premise for the creation of a separate country by
the proponents of Khalistan.

In June 1984, the Indian Government ordered a military operation, Operation

Blue Star to clear Harmandir Sahib, Amritsar and thirty other Gurdwaras (Sikh
places of worship) of armed Sikhs who were with many other pilgrims in
Gurdwaras. The Indian Army used 3,000 armed troops of the 9th Division of
the National Security Guards, the 175 Parachute Regiment and artillery units,
and 700 CRPF Jawans. During this operation, the Indian army had around
700 casualties with 220 injuries, and 200–250 Sikh militants were killed. The
handling of the operation, damage to the holy shrine and loss of life on both
sides, led to widespread criticism of the Indian Government. The Indian Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her two Sikh bodyguards in
retaliation. Following her death, thousands of Sikhs were massacred in the
1984 anti-Sikh riots.[33] The subsequent Punjab insurgency saw several
secessionist militant groups becoming active in Punjab, supported by a section
 15

of the Sikh diaspora. Indian security forces suppressed the insurgency in the
early 1990s.
 16

The Secessionist Movement and Insurgency in Assam

Though the Assamese speaking indigenous people of the State,

known by the generic name of Assamese, are not the only ethnic constituency
in India to have a secessionist group, it is the largest among ethnic groups in
the country which have rebel elements practising armed activities for avowedly
secessionist goals. The Government of India (GOI) has shown remarkable
flexibility in dealing with secessionist outfits elsewhere – the five-year old
cease-fire with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland–Isak-Muivah (NSCN-
IM), which is yet to renounce secessionism, being the most glaring and
geographically proximate example in the context of Assam. By contrast, the
proposal for so-called talks with the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) –
an organisation whose activities have kept the security forces engaged in the
State since 1990 – though much desired by the Assamese, has received only
lukewarm response from the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).
Consequently, the popular perception, presently, is that the GOI is not really
interested in solving the problems of Assam, echoing the old, though
disputable, refrain of the Centre’s ‘step-motherly attitude’ towards the State.
While the MHA might have its own reasons for its apparent intransigence, the
continuance of this perception is succeeding in deepening the feeling of
alienation amongst the Assamese vis-à-vis Delhi. In this context, the old adage
‘justice should also appear to be done’ may be worth noting.

Contrary to the secessionist movements among some tribes and nationalities in

the Northeast since the emergence of independent India, Assam is a late
entrant to the arena of separatism. Despite appeals by the then leadership of
the Naga secessionists, the Assamese, on the whole, with odd exceptions only
proving the general rule,2 remained quite satisfied and optimistic about their
Indian citizenship in the early decades of independence. In fact, Partition,
conceived as a necessary evil in other parts of India, was seen as much-sought-
after relief because, with the ceding of Sylhet to erstwhile East Pakistan, the
Assamese gained a comfortable dominance over the affairs of the State by
virtue of their newfound relative majority in the post-Partition demography of
Assam.

Though the ULFA was founded on April 7, 1979, it came to be noticed as a

nascent-armed organisation only in late 1983, when it commenced a series of
political assassinations and audacious bank robberies, often abortive.
Following the bulldozing through of elections to the State Legislative Assembly
by the then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, in spring 1983, secessionist
sentiments were rising amongst the normally timid Assamese. Though quite a
few secessionist insurgent outfits appeared on the scene in Assam at this
stage, only ULFA survived the Assam Accord signed between the GOI and the
Assamese nationalist leaders of the famous or notorious (as the perspective
might be) Assam Agitation against unabated and unchecked illegal immigration
from the erstwhile East Pakistan and present-day Bangladesh. Other linguistic
ethnic groups in Assam have since sprouted their own secessionist-insurgent
 17

organisations like the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) among

the Bodos, United People’s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) among the Karbis and
Dima Halim Daoga (DHD) among the Dimasas. Nevertheless, for the Assamese
– the single largest linguistic group in Assam – the ULFA remains the most
serious issue. Irrespective of the level of activity of ULFA, not a single week
goes by in Assam without the demand being made in one or the other widely
circulated Assamese dailies for the GOI to negotiate a settlement with ULFA. It
is also to be noticed that, though the ULFA has come up with some
uncompromising pre-conditions for negotiations with the GOI, the basic thrust
of most of the local commentators, including some leading Assamese
intellectuals, is towards the GOI accepting the pre-conditions rather than of
ULFA withdrawing them. Till a few years ago, criticising the ULFA was an
assured means of earning unpopularity in Assam.

Statistically speaking, the ULFA does not possess the lethality that other
insurgent groups in India have. Its armed activities are, in general, more in the
nature of selective assassinations and acts of sabotage against State-owned
economic assets like the oil pipeline, rather than aimless terror tactics. Of
course, it is known that ULFA did carry out some typical terrorist attacks
against the Hindi-speaking people of Assam in year 2000. Though a hitherto
unknown group calling itself the Assam Tiger Force claimed responsibility for
the attacks, the State government and a large section of the people of Assam
believe that the attacks were carried out by the ULFA, albeit clandestinely. The
number of deaths resulting from attacks by the ULFA is quite low compared to
some other insurgencies. The importance of ULFA lies, rather, in the sympathy
it gets from the Assamese or, as M.S. Prabhakara expresses it, "ULFA is a state
of mind in Assam." Though the strength of ULFA lies more in the sympathy
factor it gets among its home-population (despite lack of empathy for its
declared goal) than in cadres and weapons, it is believed to have a cadre-
strength of around 5,000 trained insurgents and, according to Indian
intelligence agency reports, possesses thrice the number of weapons suitable
for guerrilla activities.

Continued operations against ULFA by the security forces (SFs) since

December 1990 have contained the firepower of ULFA. According to
government claims, till date, more than 8,000 ULFA cadres have surrendered.
However, the recruitment of ULFA has also continued unabated. Furthermore,
ULFA remains an influential factor in the electoral politics of Assam. Following
deliberated strategies, ULFA has extended selective and conditional support to
different political parties alternately, or rather, has attacked selected political
parties and candidates, thereby restricting the activities of the target party’s
workers during election campaigns to subvert its poll prospects, thus
increasing the comparative advantage of its favoured political party or
candidates.

Political parties have, more often than not, fallen prey to ULFA’s tactics, unable
to resist the temptation of securing the tacit support of the insurgents. ULFA
has been able to regularly influence electoral outcomes since 1991. This has
 18

led to a periodical breakdown of morale amongst the State police, who are
sometimes unsure of their political bosses’ inclination towards curbing
insurgency. The recurring phenomenon of newly elected State governments
going soft on the insurgents has been quite visible in Assam. The invisible but
strongly felt power of ULFA to further or hamper individual political careers has
often made politicians hostage to ULFA. Similar pressures are also experienced
among the local intelligentsia. This unhealthy trend is destroying the
democratic atmosphere of Assam and such destruction renders the ground
more fertile for insurgency, with the resultant stultifying affect is gradually
making important issues like large-scale corruption to be non-issues. ULFA’s
importance lies more in its all-pervasive effect on the Assamese society than in
its immediate armed activities.

Bypassing Semantics

Before embarking on an attempt to analyse the insurgency related situation in

Assam, one should be clear about what one means by these words. The
semantics of non-state armed activity has remained a quagmire of conflicting
and overlapping definitions. That is why the oft-repeated phrase that "one
man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom-fighter" circulates. Xanana Gusmao,
currently elected President of the newly formed state of East Timor, was a
guerrilla commander. He is not, quite justifiably, termed a terrorist by anybody
now, but even while he was active in his earlier incarnation as commander of
an armed secessionist-insurgent group, the sympathetic Western press did not
use the term ‘terrorist’ for him. Yasser Arafat wears a military uniform and
carries a pistol, but the anti-Israeli world does not term him a terrorist. For
some, Ariel Sharon is the mad terrorist, while Yasser Arafat is a sinister
terrorist leader for others. The subjectivity is starkly apparent.

Moreover, the careless use of terminology by a section of the media and

intelligentsia has created a veritable comedy of errors, which does not,
however, lead to innocuous mirth. Rebels, militants, insurgents, terrorists are
the words which have been used as freely interchangeable nomenclature for
any arms wielding non-state group professing political goals. The somewhat
overlapping, generally accepted meanings of the words have also not been
helpful. If the belief is upheld that proper analysis of a problem is a sure step
towards its solution, then definitions should be unambiguously laid down
beforehand. As such, without going into pure semantics, it is useful to state
what we understand by particular words in the present discussion:

1. Secessionism: Desiring secession from a larger sovereign political entity,

with the goal of creating a separate sovereign political entity for one’s own
people, as perceived. It should be noted that secessionism is not necessarily an
armed activity. Examples include the ULFA, NSCN (both the factions), NDFB,
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), Hizb-ul–Mujahideen (HM), etc.
The left-wing extremist People’s War Group (PWG) and Maoist Communist
Centre (MCC), practising insurgency through armed struggle to install
communism, would not fall under such a definition.
 19

2. Insurgency: Active rebellion against the state waged from the territory
and population under the declared control of the particular State. Very often,
but not necessarily, armed.
Example: ULFA, NSCN, NDFB, JKLF, HM, PWG and MCC.

3. Armed struggle: Using collective armed activity as means to an end,

normally, but not necessarily, political.
Example: All organisations in the above-mentioned examples.

4. Guerrilla activities: Armed activity against enemy combatants and

utilities. It should be noted that guerrillas generally hit selected targets only.
Though the same armed insurgent individual guerrilla or guerrilla group may
practice terrorist tactics simultaneously, guerrilla activities and terrorist
activities differ in the matter of targets and methodology. State armed forces
may also use guerrilla tactics and often do in counter-insurgency campaigns.
Example: NSCN, to a certain extent ULFA and NDFB.

5. Terrorism: Armed activity generally carried out against unexpected and

unprepared non-combatants not directly involved with the conflict, instilling a
sense of terror among a targeted population, to stimulate coercion. The
intentions of spreading fear being given priority over the objective qualification
of the targets as the enemy. Armed insurgents tend to adopt terrorist tactics,
thereby becoming terrorists, when losing and on the run. The scrupulous
guerrilla becoming a terrorist and using terror tactics is an oft-repeated
phenomenon. So are the phenomena of state forces using terrorist tactics in
counter-insurgency campaigns to subdue populations perceived to be
sympathetic to the rebels.

Example: HM, Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) are non-state examples. The killings of

some relatives of ULFA members are examples of pro-state terrorism.

Historical Background

For those who are not acquainted with the history of Assam, a brief note on the
relevant historical factors, which have contributed to the evolution of the
present demographic scenario of the State, might be of use to follow the
analysis and argument.

In 1826, the colonial East India Company annexed the erstwhile Ahom
kingdom of ‘upper’ Assam, i.e. the eastern part of Assam, starting from Nagaon
to the Naga foothills. ‘Lower’ Assam, from the western boundary of the Ahom
kingdom to the north eastern frontier of the then British province of Bengal
was already under British control following a transfer of power by the erstwhile
Mughal rulers. Initially, Robert Clive, the British officer responsible for this
expansion of the colonial domain, faced disapproval by the Board of Directors
of the Company, as the then famine stricken and sparsely populated
Brahmaputra valley did not yield enough revenue to cover the administrative
costs of retaining the expansion. Quite soon, however, the British stumbled on
tea and oil in the Brahmaputra valley and realised the need for labour in order
 20

to exploit the natural bounty of the land. The local Assamese were an easy-
going lot contented with the cultivated bounty of the fertile valley. The British
entrepreneurs embarked on a policy of actively encouraging landless peasants
of the neighbouring populous province of Bengal to migrate and settle in the
Brahmaputra valley. Tribals from the Chotanagpur plateau and other parts of
India were enticed and often forced to come to Assam to work as labourers in
the newly grown tea gardens of Assam. The flurry of economic activity led to
the laying down of railway lines in far-off corners of the province. The arrival of
the poor Bengali peasants and tribal labourers was of no concern to the rising
Assamese middle-class deliberately patronised by the British to counter-act the
influence of the erstwhile ruling feudal class of Ahom nobility. Bengali petty
officers and clerks, disparagingly called ‘Babus’ by the British, were the
immediate rivals for the residuary scraps of the colonial administration open to
the ‘natives’ for grabs. The British adopted cautious neutrality in the tussle
between the Bengali Babus and the Assamese middle-class in pursuance of
their notorious policy of ‘divide and rule’. Christian missionaries, on the other
hand, actively helped the Assamese nationalists in establishing the unique
credentials of Assamese language, initially replaced by Bengali language in the
courts and offices till 1872. The fond hope of the missionaries of spreading
Christianity amongst the Assamese were, however, belied due to the strong
influence of the 15th century neo-Vaisnavism prevalent among the Assamese,
and the missionaries gradually moved on to greener pastures among the tribes
of adjacent hills, where success did not elude them. The rivalry between the
Assamese and Bengali middle class continues till date, but the bitter
antagonism between the two neighbouring nations has not led to violent
clashes since 1983, bringing to an end, it is hoped, the occurrence of violent
clashes between the two linguistic communities.

While the immigrants, goaded on by the colonial British, continued to arrive in

Assam, the indigenous people ignored this movement since the then-sparsely
populated Brahmaputra valley could easily absorb the newcomers. However,
the locals started taking adverse notice of the ubiquitous migrant settlements
when availability of fallow land diminished noticeably. In their perception, the
lack of easy availability of fallow land, crucial for the required expansion of
agriculture and grazing of livestock, was related to the ever-increasing number
of immigrants.

By the 1920s, the Provincial Council reverberated with heated debates on the
issue between Assamese leaders (most of them Hindus) and Bengali leaders
(predominantly Muslim). Nearly all the migrant peasants from Bengal were
Muslims, naturally because Muslim peasants were the most destitute segment
of the teeming population of land-starved Bengal. The rise of the Muslim
League in contemporary Indian politics galvanized the migrant Muslim
peasants, who rallied around a charismatic, though rustic, leader called
Maulana Bhasani. The decade preceding the advent of Indian Independence
was an uninterrupted political battle between the Muslim League’s Sir
Saidullah (scion of an indigenous Muslim family), propped up by Maulana
Bhasani, and Gopinath Bordoloi, leader of the Assam Pradesh Congress,
 21

heading the Assamese nationalist camp, dominated by upper caste Hindus.

When Independence and Partition came simultaneously, Assam escaped being

clubbed with East Pakistan by a whisker. The ultimate losers were Maulana
Bhasani and his followers. Though the pre-dominantly Muslim district of
Sylhet opted for Pakistan in a referendum, the Muslims of Brahmaputra valley
were left in the Indian State of Assam, where Gopinath Bordoloi and his camp
were the unchallenged ruling class by virtue of the new-found majority of the
Assamese, after the populous district of Sylhet separated from India. In fact,
the Assamese leadership discreetly rejoiced after the result of the Sylhet
referendum was declared. At this point of time, Maulana Bhasani, the
influential leader of the Brahmaputra valley’s Muslim migrants, announced a
directive to his followers, which had a far-reaching effect on the demographic
politics of Assam, and which is followed to this day. The Maulana, bitter at the
desertion by the central leadership of the All India Muslim League, directed his
followers to accept Assamese as their mother tongue, and to assimilate into the
indigenous population of Assam. The Assamese middle classes, who were more
wary of Hindu Bengali Babus than of the lowly Muslim peasants, accepted this
overture, much to the chagrin of the Hindu Bengalis.

This demographic equation continued till the late nineteen seventies when a
sudden discovery of a substantial number of names of illegal immigrants from
the newly created Bangladesh in the voters’ list led to a mass agitation against
the immigrants. This led to a souring of relations between the migrant
community and the Assamese mainstream. The Muslim migrant community
who had sought shelter under the Congress umbrella during Indira Gandhi’s
leadership felt jilted when Rajiv Gandhi reached an accord with the leaders of
the agitation and practically allowed them a ‘walk-over’ to the seat of the State
government. They formed their own political party and contested the elections
as a separate block. With the gradual erosion in the popularity of the agitation
leadership after it became the ruling party, however, their threat perception
was significantly toned down. The disaffection among the migrant community,
however, seriously affected the numerical majority of the Assamese vis-à-vis the
Bengali, with many migrants declaring Bengali as their mother language before
the census enumerators. Jolted by the 1991 census, the Assamese nationalist
camp rediscovered the virtues of the migrants, and deliberate efforts by a
changed leadership of the socio-cultural apex body, the Assam Sahitya Sabha,
has resulted in a renewed spate of amity between the two socio-political
groups. The Assamese-Bengali relation, a constant cause of worry to
administrators earlier, is going through a period of unprecedented calm. In
fact, from all appearances, one is emboldened to presume that violent clashes
between these two formerly antagonistic ethno-linguistic communities are a
closed chapter.

The mitigation of traditional antagonisms, however, has been replaced by newly

aroused tensions running along perceived ethnic lines. The latest in this series
is the mutually irreconcilable stand taken by the Bodos and the Koch-
Rajbongshis, both indigenous local ethnic entities, hitherto abiding in non-
 22

antagonistic relationships, over the issue of the formation of the Bodo

Territorial Council (BTC) under a revised 6th Schedule of the Indian
Constitution. While the ULFA goes on waging a secessionist rebellion for an
independent Assam, most of the indigenous ethnic groups of Assam are
demanding a separate autonomous territory, if not a separate state. The ULFA
rejects these differences of interests among the indigenous people, by
conveniently, but unconvincingly, claiming that these problems would be
amicably sorted out after the attainment of sovereignty.

Rise and Growth of ULFA

As already stated, the Assamese had neither empathy nor sympathy for the
secessionist insurgency launched by the Naga leadership immediately after the
advent of independent India. The Assamese never fancied themselves to be any
different from the other Indian citizens and States. Gradually, however, the
feeling that the Union government is neglecting Assam gained currency after
Assam was deprived of major industrial projects being set up by the Indian
state to fulfil the Nehruvian vision. It is a fact that the general perception
among the policy makers of India was that the Northeast was not a safe place
for major industrial ventures, given its proximity to quite a few foreign
countries. The feeling of alienation of the Assamese gained strength following a
grossly misunderstood speech by Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Prime Minister,
when the Indian Army and the administration evacuated the Assamese town of
Tezpur, retreating after a debacle at the hands of the invading Chinese. The
consolidation of this ambiguous feeling of alienation into full-blown
secessionism was achieved by Jawaharlal Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi,
when, as Prime Minister, she imposed State Assembly elections on the
unwilling Assamese in 1983. In the context of the ongoing agitation, the
demand of the Assamese was that the issue of illegal immigrants should be
solved before holding any election in Assam, since elections would have the
effect of legitimising the presence of the names of the illegal immigrants in the
voters’ list, thereby entitling them to citizenship. Indira Gandhi, however,
unleashed brute state power to go through the motions of holding a sham
election, with unbelievably low voter turnout, particularly in Assamese
dominated areas. The lack of a provision in the Indian Constitution stipulating
a required minimum number of votes to win led to a State government duly
coming into being. For all practical purposes, this government had no
legitimacy in the minds of the vast number of Assamese, the largest ethno-
linguistic group in Assam. The Assamese, for the first time since Independence,
had no say in the State’s governance. Consequently, while the mature
segments of Assamese society became vehemently anti-Congress, the youth
rejected Indianness altogether. Suddenly, there was a spurt of secessionism in
Assam, and a number of separatist outfits announced their appearance
through petty violence. The mainstream of the anti-immigrant agitation was
avowedly non-violent, officially subscribing to the Gandhian methodology of
political mobilisation and protest. Though over-enthusiastic young supporters
 23

of the agitation sometimes engaged in stray violence, the same young men
would also dutifully participate in non-violent agitation programmes like
hunger strikes. The 1983 elections changed all this. A section of the youth
completely rejected non-violent methods of protest and dedicated themselves to
preparation for armed struggle. The newfound secessionism and attraction of
arms was a heady cocktail and attracted many otherwise-sober and intelligent
young men to a dangerous path.

The mushrooming of secessionist outfits dedicated to armed guerrilla methods

gradually consolidated into two comparatively well-organised outfits, the ULFA
and the Assam People’s Liberation Army (APLA). The APLA was larger and
better organised at first, and it concentrated on cadre-formation. ULFA,
utilising its geographical advantage, gained from having most of its founder
members from areas adjacent to the inter-State border with Nagaland, and
established contact with the NSCN (then a united entity, before the subsequent
split in April 1988). The last days of the year 1983 witnessed the first batch of
Assamese youth crossing the international boundary with Burma (now
Myanmar), to receive training at the NSCN Head Quarters. The NSCN and the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur, another secessionist insurgent
organisation sharing the NSCN camp, received the new rebels warmly. The
hosts were aware of the immense advantage of friends in the largest State of
the Northeast.

Most of the APLA leaders gave up the path of armed secession following the
Assam Accord and installation of the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) government
under Prafulla Kumar Mahanta. In fact, the general feeling among the
Assamese after the perceived victory of the agitation, with the agitation
leadership controlling government, was that everybody should return to their
normal lives. APLA vanished with the majority of its member returning home
and a few obstinate ones joining the ULFA, which had declared that the Accord
and the AGP government were of no consequence to their goal of a separate
and sovereign Assamese state. The ULFA leadership painstakingly mobilised
recruits from different parts of Assam and kept sending fresh batch of trainees
to the NSCN camp. Before the completion of two years of the AGP regime,
considerable disillusionment had set in among the Assamese, with the
inevitable unfulfillment of the unrealistically high hopes reposed on the
agitation leaders turned politicians of the ruling AGP.

With rising disenchantment against the AGP regime, ULFA was able to regain
some amount of public support and sympathy for their ‘cause’. The year 1988
saw a spectacular rise in the popularity and influence of the ULFA amongst the
Assamese. There was competition – at times bitter – between district and local
committees to send more recruits for training. In the spring of 1987, the first
batch of 80 selected ULFA cadres went to the Kachin State of Burma for
advanced training under the Kachin Independent Army (KIA). KIA was a battle-
hardened fighting force, engaged in a secessionist war with the Burmese
government, and was experienced in the art of guerrilla fighting since the
Second World War. The Kachin connection helped ULFA create a cadre of well-
 24

trained guerrilla fighters. The State police and the para-military forces could
not match the zeal of these trained young men. The AGP government, failing on
all fronts, sought to reach a tacit understanding with the rebels, so that their
own interests would not be harmed by the ULFA. The ill-concealed
understanding between their political masters and the insurgents led to the
further evaporation of the already depleted morale of the police. With the
government firmly keeping its eyes shut, the ULFA commenced ‘implementing
social reforms’, such as the ban on consumption of alcohol, which made them
popular amongst women. It is often said that, in the late nineteen eighties, the
ULFA ran a parallel government in Assam. It would, however, be more
appropriate to say that ULFA was the government in those days.

The state of affairs, however, abruptly changed after the Union government
dismissed the AGP government in the State, imposed President’s Rule and
commenced counter-insurgency operations by the Army in the last days of the
year 1990. Though elections to the State Legislative Assembly were held within
six months, and a Congress government was installed, the Army stayed on. To
cut a long story short, by 1992, the ULFA was on the run, with many cadres,
including scores of district level leaders and a few central committee members
surrendering before the government. In the immediate aftermath of the 1992
surrenders, ULFA appeared to be a spent force.

It regained strength, however, to become a force to reckon with after a

downswing that lasted no more than a couple of years. It has been forced to
abandon its previous high-profile ‘social-reform’ activities, but has
continuously engaged the security forces, primarily through hit and run
tactics. The Assamese, who have had to face the brunt of unabated counter-
insurgency operations through over a decade, now increasingly wish to see a
negotiated settlement between ULFA and the GOI. The romantic fascination for
secessionist insurgency has all but evaporated. The quelling of the secessionist
tendency by security forces, at times with brute force, has resulted in a sullen
silence. Gradually, the initial attraction of the armed ‘boys’ was replaced by
consternation at their obstinacy regarding a negotiated settlement.
Furthermore, terrorist actions by ULFA have led to a further erosion of its
already emaciated support base. The discernible turning point was the ULFA
leadership’s posture during the Kargil war in 1999. ULFA declared the
Pakistani intruders in Kargil to be Kashmiri ‘freedom fighters’ and issued a call
to Assamese men serving in the Indian Army to desist from fighting against
them. The timing could not have been more inauspicious for ULFA. While its
leaders were siding with the Pakistanis, the dead body of Captain Jintu Gogoi,
an Indian Army officer, killed during action in Kargil, was brought to Assam.
Huge crowds of people gathered to pay their last respect to the brave soldier,
and ULFA was publicly denounced for advocating support for the Pakistanis.

Current Situation

The last State government, led by Prafulla Kumar Mahanta, started off by being
 25

openly soft towards the ULFA. Quite a few top-ranking ULFA cadres, who had
been captured earlier and incarcerated, were released. The honeymoon,
however, did not last long, and towards mid-1998, the State government was
waging a vicious counter-insurgency (CI) campaign against the ULFA with the
help of Army and surrendered ULFA militants (SULFA). Till the change in the
State government in spring 2001, three years of lethal CI operations had made
a mess of ULFA’s organisational structure and confidence. The multiple
terrorist attacks on targets in the US on September 11, 2001, and their
aftermath have further aggravated its woes, since no regime in the world is now
willing to be seen as being soft towards armed non-state actors in the current
scenario. The ULFA has been maintaining an unprecedented and
uncharacteristically low profile for some time now. From the outward
appearances of the present situation, it may be construed that a GOI initiative
to negotiate a solution with the ULFA could well prove fruitful.

Unfortunately, appearances are often deceptive. Like most other rebel entities,
ULFA too has the phoenix-like habit of rising anew from its ashes. According to
reports, fresh recruitment by the ULFA is going on unabated. All its important
leaders, barring Anup Chetia, the General Secretary, who is under-going a jail
sentence in Bangladesh, are active. It is quite probable, moreover, that Chetia
might be allowed to walk away and ‘disappear’ after completing his sentence,
which is nearing its end.

Although the Assamese do not support or empathise with ULFA at present,

tacit sympathy for the local ‘boys’ has not vanished completely. Though very
few support the use of terror tactics by ULFA, there is a general feeling that
ULFA’s demand for sovereignty is understandable, given the unacceptable
attitude of the Union government towards Assam. And if the ULFA has lost
popularity amongst the Assamese, this does not mean that the GOI has won
wide acceptability either. The CI operations of the last three years, while
succeeding in debilitating the ULFA, have also, unfortunately but inevitably,
sharpened the feeling of alienation amongst the common people through the
use of counter-terror through ‘secret killings’, a term used in Assam to describe
‘mysterious’ lethal attacks on supporters and relatives of ULFA leaders and
members. Nearly 200 young men have ‘disappeared’ after being picked up by
unrecognised persons, reportedly security forces concealing their identity,
aided by the SULFA. The total difference in approach of the GOI towards Naga
insurgents and the secessionist agenda in Assam, too, have not gone
unnoticed. Though the scale is currently tilted in favour of the GOI, there is no
guarantee that the status quo will be permanent.

The most worrying probability is that of the transformation of ULFA into a

purely terrorist outfit. At first glance, it might seem that the detachment of
ULFA from the public is good for peace, but the experience in many parts of the
world is that a purely terrorist outfit is a more sinister problem than an ethnic
insurgency. The difference between a dictator and a democratically elected
leader answerable to the public is quite similar to the difference between a
terrorist and an insurgent guerrilla. Whereas an insurgency cannot survive
 26

without popular support, a terrorist outfit does not depend on such support. A
handful of terrorists are enough to create chaos. Terrorism undermines
democratic processes and vitiates the political atmosphere, bringing society to
a virtual standstill. The resultant stagnation leads to disruption of economic
activity leading to a chronic lack of development. With foreign bases and
foreign friends, ULFA is in a position to carry out terrorist activities against the
Indian state for an indefinite period. If MHA entertains the fond belief that the
ULFA leadership may lose steam with the aging of the top leadership,36 it
should also keep in mind that, with continuous recruitment to the ULFA cadre,
fresh and young insurgents are coming up, who would be only too willing to
step into the positions of an ageing leadership. Though the actors would
change, the morbid saga would continue.

A Critique of the Official Approach towards Conflict Resolution

The present approach of the GOI towards a negotiated settlement with the
ULFA does not give much scope to commend it. The word ‘talks’ in MHA lexicon
means withdrawal, undeclared if necessary, of the demand for secession. As
with the GOI-NSCN-IM talks, the priority seems to be that ULFA should
renounce its secessionist demand, not its armed activities. This is evident in
the case of the peace-process with the NSCN-IM, which has merrily continued
using the threat of weapons against the common public while maintaining a
temporary silence on the aim of secession. While officials may construe the
apparent ‘neutralising’ of secessionist forces as a success, the civil society
continues to suffer from the continuance of armed activity by insurgents, who
become more of a menace after cessation of CI operations against them
following a cease-fire with the GOI. To reach a permanent solution, the Indian
state shall have to change its mindset. The common people, who are in
overwhelming majority against armed insurgency, will have to be taken into
confidence. The need of the hour is mutual trust and confidence between the
people of the region and the Indian state. The Northeast has long suffered due
to the imposition of certain special Acts, like the Disturbed Areas Act, 1955,
and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958, admittedly necessitated by
abnormal situations. Suspicion amongst the Assamese about the Centre’s
antipathy towards the State precedes the appearance of the ULFA’s
secessionist insurgency. The ULFA has only been cashing in on the general
discontentment prevalent in society against perceived injustices. The vitiated
democratic environment, inevitable after arming the State police and other
security forces, including the Army, with quasi-judicial powers, has been a
fertile ground for the growth of secessionism amongst the Assamese in general
and armed secessionism amongst the Assamese youth in particular. The
common people, though coerced into silence by extra-constitutional exercise of
state power, develop sympathy for the armed insurgents as a reaction to this
arm-twisting by the state. The insurgents have been extracting full advantage
of this harmful situation and the irresponsible utterances by certain MHA
officials exhibiting disdain for Assamese sentiments have not been particularly
helpful.
 27

While it is correct that underdevelopment preceded insurgency in Assam, it is

equally true that the continuance of insurgent violence has led to an outflow of
scarce capital from the State. The resultant stagnation in economic
development has, in turn, created a vast horde of unemployed youth, which is
a potential source of fresh recruits into the insurgent ranks. Thus, Assam has
entered a full circle of underdevelopment leading to insurgency, which in turn
leads to more underdevelopment. This vicious cycle has to be broken to
liquidate insurgency from the State. It is obvious that if the ready cause of the
perceived ‘exploitation and neglect by Delhi’ had not been easily available, the
ever-increasing pool of frustrated youth-power in Assam would have discovered
other ‘causes’ to serve as an excuse for embarking on a career in illegal armed
activities. Without going into statistical details, one can say, on the basis of
first hand knowledge and experience, that more than 90 per cent of the present
ULFA cadre consists of educational drop-outs hailing from a rural poor
background. Gone are the days when well-educated boys and girls of all
economic segments of the Assamese society were attracted to the romantic
notion of becoming a ‘rebel with a cause’. The real threat to life has undone the
earlier romantic appeal of being an ULFA cadre, and only the really desperate
among these join the ULFA now. Unfortunately, with a stagnating economy and
no scope for earning a livelihood, there is no dearth of desperate youngsters
opting for an alternative career. It would not be off the mark to say that ULFA,
and for that matter, the various ethnic insurgent outfits cropping up in Assam
and in the entire Northeast region actually serve as an arena for alternative
employment. Those who could have earned a decent living without becoming
insurgents are a fast disappearing species among the underground cadres now.
The dismal economic scene, coupled with popular disenchantment against the
state, has created an ideal environment for the growth and sustenance of
collective armed activity in the name of secessionist insurgency.

At the same time, consequent to the fading of the initial admiration for ‘our
boys’ amongst the common people, the insurgents have replaced voluntary
support with coerced co-operation. In rural areas, where the state is not
omnipresent and omnipotent, people have to continue cooperating with the
armed ULFA cadres under the threat of the gun, normally discreet or implicit
but, if necessary, openly expressed. If they resist the ULFA, when asked for
shelter, food and other services, they risk being harmed by the cadres. On the
other hand, if they acquiesce to the demands, they are punished by the
security forces for ‘supporting’ ULFA. Though this situation has alienated the
people from the ULFA, insofar as genuine support and sympathy is concerned,
it has also not endeared the state and its agencies to the common people, who
perceive the latter as a malevolent punitive authority, rather than a benevolent
benefactor.

The urban segment of the society has its own problems. The insurgent gun,
unchecked by legal or constitutional constraints, is feared and the rebel diktat
is surreptitiously obeyed, though, vocally, loyalty is proclaimed to the state. A
section of the intelligentsia, however, uses the insurgent influence as a
shortcut to secure personal objectives and fame. It is not a rare exception in
 28

Assam to find a respected intellectual advocating the insurgent cause, of

course from a safe distance and carefully balancing constitutional restrictions
and revolutionary babble. Many among the more sober intellectuals in Assam
prefer to maintain a deliberate silence on the issue. The most harmful effect
comes from the general criticism of the Union government, which is a common
refrain amongst the Assamese intelligentsia.39 The insurgents and their
supporters amongst the intelligentsia have to merely increase the tone of this
general criticism by a few notches to convert it into rebel propaganda. Many
Assamese intellectuals thus unconsciously provide propaganda material to the
insurgents by openly condemning the Union government for its perceived
negative attitude towards the State. From personal experience gathered while
interacting with the MHA, this author, however, holds the opinion that the lack
of a proper attitude amongst some officers of the Union government has more
to do with an individual lack of sensitivity and administrative efficiency, rather
than a deliberate government policy. The prevailing mistrust between the GOI
and the Assamese, which has been stirred up over a period of time, leads to a
negative interpretation of most of GOI’s activity vis-à-vis Assam. This brings us
back to the earlier refrain that ‘justice should also appear to be done.’

Conclusion
It is hoped that the preceding discussion has been able to specifically
characterise the problem arising out of ULFA’s secessionist-insurgency in
Assam. Within the context of this analysis, it is felt that an unbiased approach
to ‘secessionist insurgency’ – a political problem – and ‘terrorism’ – a heinous
method of registering protest and conducting insurgency – is needed to tackle
the problem of violence in the forms currently prevailing in Assam. Romantic
and idealistic youth with a rebellious inclination and lumpen elements with
criminal and terrorist tendencies co-habit the insurgent camp. It is certain that
the insurgent, whose priority lies in the ends rather than the means, would
accept a peaceful and easier method of propagating secessionism. The
terrorists, for whom the goal of secession is just an excuse to indulge in
inhuman violence, would be effectively isolated and denied any popular
sympathy. Though secessionism itself is harmful to the concept of a united
India or India as a nation, the pan-Indian nationalism preferred and
propagated by the Indian state is more a matter of winning hearts than
imposing constitutional restrictions on freedom of speech. It should be
remembered that though freedom of speech may be partially suppressed by
statutory restrictions, no power on earth can suppress freedom of thought,
unexpressed though it might be. Whispers and murmurs carry ideas as
effectively as open discussions.

The continued existence of democracy and a democratic state ultimately

depend on the freedom of speech and expression, in practice as well as in
theory. The restrictive clauses applied to the freedom of speech and expression
as enshrined in the Indian Constitution have provided a valid excuse for all
secessionists to practice armed rebellions which have, more often than not,
degenerated into terrorism. While the practice of terrorism has effectively
 29

unmasked the secessionist-insurgent organisations as unworthy leaders, the

people of the affected areas have not been provided with an unambiguous
method of expressing a convincing verdict on the worthiness of the goal itself.
This has led to the revival of the insurgent movements like the mythical
phoenix, and has in turn led to certain areas of the country being permanently
labelled as unsafe places for investment.

Tottering along second-generation economic reforms, India can ill-afford a

disgruntled populace. Rebellions start in the weakest moments of the state.
And a succession of such weak moments is a strong possibility before India can
successfully complete the process of its economic reforms.

It is sensible to remove disgruntlement among the people to the extent that this
is practicable, rather than to expend the nation’s resources in quelling
rebellions after they occur. Very few areas of India actually have a population
that desires secession. It is the lack of a convincing democratic apparatus to
gauge public sentiments that has deprived the Indian state of the means to
effectively project the microscopic support actually enjoyed by the separatists
in most cases of secessionist-insurgencies.

Unadulterated freedom of speech, including the right to peaceful and

democratic propagation of secession, would effectively liquidate the excuse to
take up arms for secessionism. While, in all probability, this might boost the
morale of the Kashmiri separatists in the Kashmir Valley, it can be confidently
assumed that, it would only be an exception to the general rule of rejection of
secessionism by the majority in States like Assam and Punjab.

The process of bringing in a proposed change in the constitutional law of India

could begin by repealing the sixteenth amendment to the Constitution of
India,40 which brought in the so-called ‘reasonable restrictions’ to the freedom
of speech and expression, as also to the freedom of association laid out in
Article 19, clause 1, sub clause ‘a’ through ‘c’. Such a repeal cannot be deemed
a radical change, as it only restores the Constitution to its original form as
envisaged by its founders in the Constituent Assembly. In plain language, the
law of the state should be suitably rectified to make peaceful and democratic
propagation of political ideas, including secession, a legal exercise, without the
provision of any punitive reaction by the state. The recalcitrant rebels who cling
to their guns and lumps of RDX after the availability of democratic and
peaceful means of propagating their professed cause, would lose the last
remnants of any goodwill or sympathy they may have among their own people.
There is, of course, the theoretical possibility of the populace of a particular
area expressing its desire to secede through the means newly made available to
them, but this cannot be something that the Indian state should be intimidated
by.

This proposal, most probably, would have to run the gauntlet of hostility from
many quarters. But the exploration of every probable avenue of conflict
resolution is an unavoidable necessity to arrive at a suitable solution. Holding
man-made concepts and laws as sacrosanct has the same affect as that of
 30

putting pre-conditions before negotiations. Every concept should be clinically

analysed before retaining or discarding it. In fact, a logically explained
repudiation of the proposal proffered here would itself contribute in
strengthening Indian democracy. The plurality of India necessitates an open
mind on the part of its intelligentsia. Loyalty extracted from convinced minds is
always a better option than coerced allegiance. It would be immensely
beneficial if this debate could be taken further.

Compiled by
Dijamani Saramh
Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
Rabindranath Tagore University