1

Special Conflict Report

T he Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:
Historical and Prospective
Intervention Analyses
October 18-20, 2002
W aging Peace. Fighting Disease. Building Hope.

T he Carter Center strives to relieve suffering

by advancing peace and health worldwide;
it seeks to prevent and resolve conflicts, enhance freedom
and democracy,
and protect and promote human rights worldwide.

T he Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:
Historical and Prospective
Intervention Analyses
October 18–20, 2002
One Copenhill
453 Freedom Parkway
A tlanta, GA 30307
(404) 420-5185
Fax (404) 420-3862
www.cartercenter.org
July 2003

T he Carter Center
T he Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Foreword
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one environment may be useful in addressing similar

eptember will mark the 25th anniversary
issues in a totally different environment. In this of the Camp
David Peace Accords. That
report, we strive to distill the most important historic moment
remains the high-water
elements that emerged from two days of discussions mark for
diplomacy in the Middle East.
into a brief and useful document that may provide To this
day, not one element of that agree- S
insights on how to advance discussions regarding ment has
been violated; Egypt and Israel remain at
the final settlement of the Israel-Palestine conflict peace.
September also will mark the 10th anniversary
once that stage is reached. of the Oslo Peace Accords, which
provided the first
I would like to express my appreciation to those real
opportunity to resolve perhaps the most difficult
participants: Professor Mari Fitzduff from INCORE of the
remaining elements required for regional peace
in Belfast; Joseph Montville, formerly director of and stability:
an agreement between Israel and its
the Program on Preventive Diplomacy, Center for Palestinian
neighbors. Current attempts to advance
Strategic and International Studies in Washington; a Road
Map for peace, created through the
Professor William Zartman from the School of combined
efforts of the United States, the United
 3

Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins Nations, the

European Union, and Russia, now
University; Dr. Bruce Jones from the Center on occupy our
attention, as diplomacy continues to
International Cooperation, New York University, compete with
violence in the latest campaign to
formerly chef de cabinet to the U.N. special coordi- move
toward a lasting peace in the region.
nator for Middle East negotiations; Professor William Looking
for ways to contribute to the resolution
Quandt from the University of Virginia, formerly a of
intractable conflicts is a focus of attention for the
member of the National Security Council staff during Carter
Center’s International Council for Conflict
my administration; and John Marks, president, and Resolution
(ICCR), a body composed of leading
Susan Collin Marks, executive vice president, of
ex-politicians, diplomats, and academics as well as
Search for Common Ground in Jerusalem. Their technical
experts in the field of conflict resolution.
contributions to this program were inspiring, and In October
2002 a small group that brought together
their continued cooperation with, and interest in, ICCR
members with leading regional experts met at
our activities have been most gratifying. The Carter Center in
Atlanta to discuss the ongoing
The Carter Center’s Conflict Resolution Program conflict
between Israelis and Palestinians. The
 4

hosted this event as the first in what will be a series purpose

was to examine the situation using a com-
of small group symposia on intractable wars. Program
parative analysis of other violent struggles, seeking
staff continually monitor the world’s conflicts, to identify
common threads of thought that could
large and small alike, in an effort to maintain their inform
policy-makers engaged in peacemaking efforts
readiness to engage in direct mediation when called in the
Middle East. This comparative analysis, always
upon by the parties involved, either on their own or
recognizing the specific concerns unique to the area,
by providing support to me. I am grateful for their proved to be
a fruitful point of departure for what
work, with the assistance of members of the ICCR, turned out
to be a remarkable two days of intense
in holding this symposium and assembling this report.
discussion among the participants.
While some concepts are limited in their appli-
cation to specific conflicts, others prove to be
more universally applicable. Lessons learned in
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T he Carter Center
T he Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
T he Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:
W here Do We Stand?
 5

was able to stop their rivals from influencing the By Dr. Bruce
D. Jones
selection of party candidates for parliamentary Center on
International Cooperation
elections. Netanyahu’s support in Likud’s Central
Committee enabled him to place several loyalists s we enter
2003, the Israeli-Palestinian
on the Likud list, creating a list considerably more context is
defined by a series of inter-
rightist than Sharon’s public posture. Simultaneously, related
phenomena: a continuing
defeated Labor leader Ben-Eliezer used his influence loss of
Israeli and Palestinian lives; A
to oust key doves, such as party stalwart Yossi Beilin. political
turbulence (and some convergence) in
Adding to the confusion, Likud has become Israel; progress,
after much debate, on the question of
embroiled in a scandal about reported extortion reform and
Chairman Arafat’s leadership; a factional
of cash for placement on party lists. Though the struggle for
dominance of Palestinian popular politics;
scandal temporarily weakened Likud’s prospective
devastation of the Palestinian economy, and a lesser
seat gains, it had little impact on the final polls. but still
damaging corrosion of the Israeli economy;
The turbulence masked an important degree of and public
attitudes on both sides defined by the
 6

convergence. The Labor Party leadership race, for concept of

“tactical hawks, strategic doves” — but
example, began as a contest between Ben-Eliezer with trends
showing a worrying erosion of support
(who projected a tough-on-terrorism image) and for peaceful
solutions. The international context is
Haim Ramon, from the dovish faction of the Labor defined by
growing consensus on substantive issues
Party. Mitzna came in as an alternative dovish among
international, Arab, and some U.S. officials;
candidate, albeit one who as a former senior Israel some
remaining tactical and presentational differ-
Defense Forces general was able to project a credible ences
within this group; a rise of anti-Semitic and
image on security. Notwithstanding Labor’s compara-
anti-Arab attitudes; and uncertainty about the
tively dovish stance on talks with the Palestinians,
consequences of regime change in Iraq. The
the result of interfactional politics within Labor combination —
alongside President Bush’s decision
1 was “a Labor list that even Sharon could lead.” to publish
the Road Map following the confirmation
of the new Palestinian Cabinet — potentially Similarly, to win
the leadership of Likud, Sharon
represents a turning point. defeated former Prime Minister
Netanyahu by staking
out a position as a Likud moderate: tough on terror-
 7

ism but willing to make political progress with the Political

Turbulence, Political
Palestinians. Sharon has presented a moderate face
Convergence in Israel
on such issues as a Palestinian state and a Road Map
his report is being finalized some months after
for creating it (on which, more below). A Palestinian
Israeli elections returned Likud Prime Minister T
terrorist attack during the election led to the odd
Ariel Sharon to power with a strengthened Knesset
spectacle of the Labor Party head criticizing Sharon
presence. In the lead-up to elections, both Sharon
for the lack of a tough response.
and Amram Mitzna endured bitter leadership feuds
On the Palestinian issue, the main differences
within their parties, revealing significant cleavages
between Sharon and Mitzna, as articulated during the
with their parties and considerable similarities across
the parties. Though both won their contests, neither 1 Yossi
Verter, Ha’aretz, 11 December 2002.
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T he Carter Center
T he Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
reformer; after June 24, “anti-Arafat” equals campaign, related
to (i) the size of an acceptable
“American agent.” (See page 6.) Of senior officials,
Palestinian state; (ii) the nature of its “attributes of
 8

only Abu Mazen has consistently been willing to sovereignty”;

(iii) the timetable for achieving it; and
criticize Arafat on the use of violence and terrorism. (iv) the
question of Palestinian sovereignty in East
It was this willingness that generated both internal Jerusalem.
Both Likud and Labor reject any com-
and external support for the campaign to appoint promise on
the question of right of return. A further
Abu Mazen as prime minister designate — in effect difference
was Mitzna’s willingness to unilaterally
creating an alternative leadership structure alongside
withdraw from the territories if negotiations don’t
Arafat. As this report is being finalized, Abu Mazen achieve
results, while Sharon has rejected unilateral
(with U.S., U.N., E.U., and Egyptian support) has separation.
The substantive differences are significant
presented Arafat with a quasi-reformist Cabinet but not
insurmountable. During the election cam-
which incorporates such figures as Mohamed Dahlan paign,
the difference on which most emphasis was
and Salaam Fayyed, now put in charge of security placed
was a tactical one: that Mitzna would begin
and finances, respectively, which have traditionally
discussions immediately, while Sharon continued to
been the two sources of Arafat’s power. A down-to- insist on a
prior halt to violence.
the-wire stand-off between Abu Mazen and Arafat After the
elections, efforts to forge a coalition
 9

over the composition of the Cabinet gave a first government

revealed still further intersections and
indication of the degree of difficulty Abu Mazen will cleavages
— but largely on domestic issues, particu-
face in trying to develop a new political direction for larly
related to the level of state financial resources
the Palestinians. devoted to concerns of the religious parties.
Mitzna
At the popular political level, political life early on rejected any
possible coalition participation,
continues to be dominated by competition between and
despite pressure within the party, stayed firm on
Fatah and Hamas for leadership of the Palestinian the point.
The coalition that resulted is a turbulent
national movement. In the early phase of the mix of religious,
right-wing, and moderate parties
Intifada, this competition had the ugly aspect of that appear to
have, collectively, a harder line on
being defined by violent one-upmanship. In some the
Palestinian issue than Sharon has publicly taken.
Palestinian circles, Israel’s withdrawal from southern The
presence in the Cabinet of two parties that
Lebanon was seen as a victory for Hezbollah’s tactics,
espouse a very hard line on Palestinian issues may
leading to their adoption by factions in Gaza and constrain
Sharon’s room for maneuver.
the West Bank. Fatah quickly got drawn into this
 10

dynamic. (Islamic Jihad is the leading proponent of P

alestinian Reform?
these tactics but is less influential in Palestinian
alestinian leadership politics, meanwhile, has
popular politics.) Recently, Fatah has begun talks
been dominated by the elaborate shadow dance P
with Hamas to forge a national consensus around
that led to recent changes to Arafat’s leadership.
limiting their fight with Israel to the territories east
Privately, many Palestinian officials have long
of the Green Line. However, these talks have not
admitted to deep concerns about Arafat’s leadership.
produced results, and Egyptian-brokered talks in
Publicly, all profess loyalty to Arafat, partially
Cairo are seen by some as actually having bolstered
because he has controlled the purse strings and
Hamas, rather than contained them, by raising their
partially because the anti-Arafat agenda has been
profile and perceived legitimacy in the Arab world.
“Americanized”; to be anti-Arafat before President
W ithin Fatah, there continues to be serious debate
Bush’s June 24 speech was to be a courageous
over both strategy and tactics, with some factions
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T he Carter Center
T he Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
 11

one instance: On the day the Arab League was emphasizing

that to retain control over the
endorsing the Saudi peace plan, which would involve
Palestinian national movement and to keep alive the
recognition of Israel, Islamic Jihad detonated a prospect of
peace with Israel, there may ultimately
massive bomb in Netanya, during the Passover Seder, have
to be a forceful confrontation with Hamas. The
killing more than 20 Israeli civilians — the suicide ultimate
outcome of this factional competition
bombers spoke more persuasively than did the diplo- remains
to be seen, but will be greatly influenced by
mats at the Arab League.) More basically, Israelis movement
toward a political process; in the absence
broadly share their government’s concern that if they of
credible peace talks, Hamas retains a considerable
negotiate and make concessions under pressure, while
tactical advantage over the moderate wing of Fatah.
terrorist acts continue, this will simply lead to more Even in
the context of a renewal of dialogue, the
support for terrorist tactics and more attacks on strength
gained by Hamas in the past two years
Israel, rather than any viable peace. will mean that they will
pose a serious challenge to
At the same time, however, polls consistently any new
political direction taken by the incoming
show that a majority of Israelis support an eventual Cabinet,
which will ultimately have to confront
 12

peace deal involving the creation of a Palestinian Hamas — a

tough challenge indeed.
state, based on a withdrawal of Israeli forces from
the West Bank and Gaza and the removal of settle-
Underlying Trends
ments. It is also true, however, that the majority for
mong both Palestinians and Israelis, public
peace is less solid than it was a year ago, and there
attitudes are currently characterized by two A
are important issues that remain unresolved in the
aspects, characterized by one Israeli analyst as
Israeli public mind. The concept of a divided
“tactical hawks, strategic doves.”
Jerusalem continues to polarize public opinion,
Israeli public attitudes are unsurprisingly heavily
with a majority opposed to accepting Palestinian
shaped by suicide bombings. Faced with continuing
sovereignty over East Jerusalem in the context of a
terrorist attacks in Israeli cities, a large majority of
peace settlement. Moreover, there is a worrying rise
Israelis support tough measures to combat terrorism,
in discussion of more radical long-term options, like
including reoccupation of Palestinian areas and
“transfer” — i.e. the forced movement of Palestinians
targeted assassinations (notwithstanding periodic
from the West Bank to other parts of the Arab world,
American critique of both tactics). Of vital impor-
possibly Jordan.
 13

tance to understanding current dynamics is the

Israeli voters are also increasingly preoccupied by
fact that suicide bombings, especially the huge surge
the erosion of the Israeli economy, which has been
in bombings that occurred in March 2002, have
badly hurt by two years of declining tourism, investor
convinced many Israelis who formerly believed
uncertainty, a weak shekel, recession, and rapidly
otherwise that the Palestinians (or at least the
rising unemployment. Businesses are being lost;
Palestinian leadership) remain committed to the
the number of Israeli companies listed on NASDAQ
destruction of the state of Israel. This attitude is
has declined dramatically (far more than can be
sometimes dismissed by non-Israelis, based on a
explained by NASDAQ’s overall decline). Senior
belief that Palestinians by and large do not still seek
Israeli officials have expressed fears of a growing
a destruction of Israel. (See page 6.) However,
“brain drain,” as Israeli entrepreneurs and young
whether or not it is true that Palestinian violence
leaders look to the United States and other
constitutes an existential threat to Israel, the fact is
economies for their future.
that this is widely believed by Israelis, and this belief
The Palestinian population also has a “tactical
constitutes a critically important reality. (To take just
hawks, strategic doves” aspect. Public opinion polling
 14

T he Carter Center
T he Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
continues to show a popular majority in favor of the T he
International Dimension
Intifada in its current form, i.e. including terrorism.
ust as in Israel political turbulence masks an
This number has grown steadily over the past two
important underlying convergence, so in the inter- J
years, reflecting a population that is increasingly
national arena, public tensions between the U.S.
being radicalized by its perception of occupation and
administration and their Arab and European allies
violence. The economic dimension is also acute: The
divert attention from the development of a robust
Palestinian economy has been so devastated by Israeli
international consensus around many key dimensions
closures that Palestinian living conditions are similar
of the Arab-Israeli conflict — or at least, its solution.
to those which prevailed before 1967. Yet it is not
The consensus that has emerged was best
the economy, but Israel’s reoccupation of Palestinian
articulated in a speech delivered by President Bush
areas that defines Palestinian resentment and anger.
on June 24, 2002. The speech is widely acknowledged
The fact that Prime Minister Sharon has accepted,
to have had two parts: a first segment that called for
 15

in principle, the idea of a two-state solution is less

the removal of Arafat and a halt to terrorism; and a
persuasive than the fact that Israeli tanks have
second segment that called for a two-state solution
entered Beit Hanoun. Of major significance to
within a three-year timetable. Most Arab and
Palestinian public opinion is continued land appro-
European diplomats publicly endorsed the second
priation for settlement infrastructure, an ongoing
half of the speech while privately agreeing with
activity that seems to many Palestinians to belie the
the first half (though believing that a public call
Israeli government’s stated willingness ultimately to
to oust Arafat was counterproductive).
accept a Palestinian state.
Issues on which an international consensus has
Also worrying is a slow erosion of Palestinian
emerged include the need for a two-state solution;
support for a two-state solution. Palestinian violence
regional recognition of Israel; a security package
is often depicted as aimed at the eradication of Israel.
for Israel, as well as Palestinians; limitations on
In recent history, this has not been the case. During
Palestinian sovereignty, particularly with respect
the first 18 months of the Intifada, a solid majority
to demilitarization; reform of the Palestinian institu-
supported an end of conflict once Israel withdrew
tions; and a solution for Palestinian refugees that
 16

to the 1967 borders and reconciliation with Israel

is “agreed” — to use the Arab code for solutions
in that context. The good news is that polling still
not based on the right of return. The last point is
shows a majority of Palestinians supporting a two-
controversial, but even the Saudi formula for peace
state solution. The bad news is that the scale of this
was fairly explicit on the point (more explicit than
majority is steadily slipping (from the 70s – 80s in
the ultimate Arab League resolution), and among
2000, to the 50s today). This erosion leads some
many international diplomats, it is understood that
Palestinian analysts to conclude that time is running
a solution will be based on no actual return to Israel.
out for a peaceful solution. Other voices have started
Of course, there are important, sometimes sharp,
to propagate a shift away from a two-state stance,
differences between the U.S. administration and its
recognizing that demographic trends will soon result
allies. Many Arabs are uncomfortable espousing an
in a situation in which Palestinian claims could be
anti-Arafat line, though they were willing to do so
achieved in a one-state solution. However, a return
before the policy was adopted by the United States.
to a one-state approach has so far not attracted much
(See, for example, President Mubarak’s several, harsh
support domestically and is well outside the bounds of
comments about Arafat in spring 2002.) Arabs and
 17

what is acceptable internationally (to say nothing of

Europeans are more critical of Israeli military tactics
within Israel).
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T he Carter Center
T he Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
and the tactics of negotiations, rather than the end than is the
U.S. administration (in public; in private,
goals espoused by the Quartet’s Road Map (them- there are
frequent tensions between U.S. and Israeli
selves based on Bush’s vision). officials). And while European
(and some Arab)
At the international level, it would be remiss not diplomats
vigorously condemn terrorism against
to also mention an important, though fortunately Israelis, they
do not see the current conflict as having
still limited, phenomenon: a growth in anti-Semitic been
launched by Palestinian terrorism (noting, for
attitudes and a lesser, but notable, rise of anti- example, that
dozens of Palestinians and Israelis had
Arab/Muslim attitudes. Though European officials been killed
during several weeks of street clashes and
downplay the issue (correctly noting that policies gun battles
between security forces before the first
have not changed and that firm action has been terrorist
attack occurred). In the U.S. administration,
 18

taken against those who have desecrated religious there is

greater sympathy for the Israeli viewpoint
sites), there is reason to be worried about the growth that
irrespective of how the Intifada started, Arafat’s
of anti-Semitic, as well as anti-Arab, language and decision in
November 2000 to release from prison
actions and, moreover, that anti-Semitic rhetoric several
Hamas activists constituted a deliberate
has a growing role in the lexicon and media of decision on his
part to use terrorism as a tool to gain
even fairly moderate Arab states. A disturbing political
advantage — a move they refuse to reward.
theme of anti-Arab sentiment can also be discerned
Consensus and difference between the United
in American and European public dialogue. States and its
allies are increasingly managed
through a tool established in late 2001, namely “the
Quartet,” comprised of U.S., E.U., U.N., and Russian A
Turning Point?
representatives. This body came into being around an
ut if there is more consensus than difference
initiative to orchestrate collective pressure on Arafat
in the international community; if both Likud B
to renounce terrorism, resulting in a joint demarche.
and Labor acknowledge the need for a Palestinian
In the subsequent year, the Quartet has grown into
state (albeit with limitations on its attributes of
a high-level body for the coordination of diplomatic
 19

sovereignty), and a majority of Israelis agree; if a

positions, frequently consulting with Jordan, Egypt,
majority of Palestinians still support a two-state
and Saudi Arabia. The Quartet developed a Road
solution; and if key international diplomats and
Map to implement Bush’s June 24 speech, spelling
Arab leaders are prepared to support a solution based
out steps designed to produce an end to terrorism,
on no actual Palestinian refugee return to Israel
Palestinian reform, negotiations, and the establish-
(which remains the key to Israeli popular support
ment of a Palestinian state. The recent dispute
for a deal); and if Bush remains committed to the
between the United States and the other members
Road Map — are we then at a place where we can
about the timing of the introduction of the Road
envisage new progress in the peace process? Far from
Map was tactical and presentational, rather than
it, though perhaps not as far as many would imagine.
strategic — as have been most items of disagreement.
Far, for two reasons. First, because even where
W ithin the U.S. administration, the Quartet itself is
there is consensus about substance and end-states
controversial in some quarters, particularly because it
within the international community, there is a
is seen by some as representing a watering down of
continuing divide over process, with the United
U.S.-Israeli coordination on the peace process. It is
 20

States and Israel emphasizing security performance

notable, however, that even its sharpest critics focus
of the incoming Palestinian cabinet, and Arab and
their differences on the membership of the Quartet
European diplomats emphasizing a parallel process
7

T he Carter Center
T he Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
raised by Hezbollah’s presence in southern Lebanon of
reform coupled with political negotiations. Though
remains, and it is possible under some scenarios seemingly
tactical in aspect, this dispute remains a
that Hezbollah’s backers will find reasons to escalate key
difference between the United States and its
tensions along Israel’s northern border, possibly using
partners and has hobbled the prospects for negotia-
a now substantial reserve of medium-range missiles. tions for
almost two years. It may continue to do so
This would, without doubt, provoke Israeli action in context of
the implementation of the Road Map;
in Syria and possibly Lebanon, which in turn could indeed, in
the post-9/11 environment, the issue
complicate the regional diplomatic situation. (Some is not
tactical or procedural but strategic, as it is
Israeli strategists continue to view the risk of a increasingly
viewed by the United States through
 21

“northern” war as far more worrying than the the lens of the
broader war against terrorism.
Palestinian conflict.) Second, while there are some positive
elements as
Y et a resumption of political talks may not be outlined above,
there are also worrying trends. The
as far away as many would imagine. Although Sharon gradual
erosion of the Palestinian majority for a
is demonized in the Arab world and has a negative two-state
solution is certainly worrying. So, too, is
image in Europe, there are grounds for believing that the
increased frequency with which one hears, in
he may take the initiative in his second term and Israel,
language that demonizes Arabs and propagates
move forward on the political front. He is under such
concepts as forcible transfer of the Palestinians
pressure to do so for economic reasons and will have to
Jordan. Moreover, there are growing tensions
to commit to some concrete steps if Bush does indeed
between Jewish and Arab Israelis. All of this poses
re-engage. More negative viewpoints of Sharon’s what many
see as the main threat to Israel: a demo-
likely attitudes are, of course, possible. But given that graphic
threat that arises from the fact of a growing
Sharon represents a broad political spectrum in Israel, Arab
minority in Israel west of the Green Line and
the reality is that if there is to be political progress an Arab
majority in the West Bank and Gaza. On
 22

between Palestinians and Israelis in the current the left, the

demographic threat is taken as reason
juncture, it is likely to happen on Sharon’s terms, enough to
spur a negotiated or unilateral evacuation
if not necessarily his timetable. from the territories. On the
right, there is more
Of course, there are still major differences between focus on
U.S.-led pressure to oust Arafat and induce
the maximal Sharon position and the minimum democratic
reform among the Palestinian institutions,
Palestinian position. However, new international combined
with strong action against terrorism.
discussions — for example, about the attributes of Among
Palestinians, the continued expansion of
interim states, and even about an international settlements
and continued building of settlement
transitional administration of an interim Palestinian
infrastructure seems to threaten the possibility of the
state — may provide some useful ideas for bridging eventual
emergence of a viable Palestinian state, one
some of these gaps. of the stated goals of the Road Map.
In the long term, a political package based on the There are
also regional factors. It is too early yet to
international consensus spelled out above remains know fully
the implications of the rapid U.S. victory
possible, even viable. But it also remains remarkably in Iraq.
Certainly, it can be argued that removing
 23

difficult in the absence of trust between Israelis and a regime

that posed a military threat to Israel, and
Palestinians, given the complex role played by third doing so
in a way that demonstrated decisive U.S.
parties, and in the uncertainty of the effects of the will and
force, diminishes the prospect of any Arab
war in Iraq. In either the short or long term, if threat to Israel
and thereby enhances the chances for
progress is to be possible, it will require political peace. On
the other hand, the destabilizing potential
8

T he Carter Center
T he Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
must be addressed; peace versus justice issues can be
courage from the key state actors; full engagement
very destabilizing in post-settlement stages. from the U.S.
administration, leading the Quartet
Peace processes are usually phasal and deliver and the
moderate Arab states; and robust supporting
incrementally, with one step forward and perhaps two efforts
from civic actors. Here, international second
back. Evidence shows, however, that a step forward track
actors have a critical role to play (as they
usually yields an additional agreement that will assist
potentially do in creating more conducive conditions
movement toward an eventual solution. Gains are for political
progress).
 24

not lost, but will accumulate. Often, finding the

solution to a conflict is not the major obstacle to Peace
Process Dynamics
an agreement; in fact, there are usually many solu-
hile many view the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
tions to a conflict. However, getting leaders and
as not only a special case, but a hopeless W
constituents to pick up the solution together can be
one as well, it is important to realize that there are
problematic — timing and relationships are key to
existing dynamics in this conflict that are common
this. The ground must be prepared for compromises
to other conflicts and thus open themselves to com-
to sustain a lasting peace, and this usually requires
parison and observation. Careful analysis of these
a lot of time.
dynamics can be of use to peacemakers who seek
to encourage intelligent official and unofficial
Spoilers
diplomacy in the pursuit of sustainable resolutions.
Below are elements common to most peace processes, eace
processes are often accompanied by
which can readily be applied to the Israeli-Palestinian
violence, usually by those that feel they will P
case more specifically as peacemakers contemplate lose if
compromises are reached. Its cessation
next steps to reinvigorate and support a viable cannot be a
prerequisite for peace talks, as this
 25

peace process. gives veto power to spoilers. Peace

processes,
instead, should include those who can destroy
them through violence, though it may be necessary Process
Progression
to circumvent them at times, bringing them in
eace processes begin when each side realizes it
later to enhance sustainability.
must include the opposing side in the solution. P
W ithin the category of spoilers, there are dealers
In reality, solutions are seldom win-lose or win-win;
and zealots. Dealers often come on board with the
more often than not, they are lose-lose with each side
right incentives; it may be necessary to bypass or
making concessions to reach a deal. Thus, the main
contain zealots. Spoiler groups are usually best
task of each side becomes to lose least on what it
neutralized with the active involvement of other
wants, which, in part, prolongs the nature of most
former, current, or potential spoilers, such as ex-
peace processes. Parties will often take every oppor-
militants and settlers.
tunity possible to squeeze out of peace processes and
avoid compromises, but that does not negate the
Delivering Compromise
necessity of coming to terms with what must be
given up in order to reach a deal. To this end, it is eaders’
main job is to deliver their own people to
 26

important to realize that conflicts do not end but the

compromises that must be made in order to L
change, the goal being the conflict’s movement reach a
solution. Leaders should also recognize each
from violence into politics so that it becomes less other’s
problems and help each other to sell the
destructive. In this process, however, victim needs
compromises, though they rarely do, as leaders usually
9

T he Carter Center
T he Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
think the other side has the easier task. Thus, leaders
Ripeness
often face pressure from within their own parties to
onflict evolution is characterized by problems
resist making compromises.
of ripeness, a necessary but insufficient condition C
One must realize that conflict is also functional
for negotiations to begin. Ripeness involves a per-
and provides meaning and alternative meaning to
ceived mutually hurting stalemate and a perceived
those involved. This creates a need to find societal
way out of the conflict. If a conflict is not ripe
integration for both state and nonstate actors.
for effective mediation, the mediator or potential
However, there is usually no point in moral argu-
mediator must work to ripen it. If ripening is not
 27

ments; what are often needed are political incentives.

possible, the mediator must position himself for
This process is lengthy, however, particularly as
intervention later on. Peace processes begin when
followers often elect leaders that promise that they
each side realizes that it must include the other
will not have to give up on their dreams.
in the solution, beginning at least some minimal
level of dialogue.
Groundwork
Parties in conflict need help. In most cases, they
ccording to comparative evidence, it is clear are unable to
prevail unilaterally but have a hard
that Track 2 groups are often better able to A time recognizing
it, as they are so deeply engrossed
deliver upon project goals when they have existing or and
committed to the conflict that it becomes
eventual leverage with leaders and politicians. Track
overwhelmingly difficult to communicate, much less
2 work is often pre-political and helps leaders to sell reach, a
bilateral solution. But for the same reasons,
necessary concessions by working to increase con- parties do
not welcome mediation. Mediators are
stituent understanding, acceptance, and absorption often
considered meddlers and have little leverage
of those compromises, making this work circularly over the
parties. They are at the mercy of the
 28

beneficial to both Track 1 and 2 actors. Thus, parties’ felt

need for a way out, which relates
facilitating a link between Track 1 and 2 strengthens back to
ripeness. If a mutually hurting stalemate
their respective activities. pushes parties into a mediation
process, it takes
It is important for leaders to identify and come to mutually
enticing opportunities to pull them
terms with issues that will require compromise, which toward
a positive conclusion.
in itself can be a difficult task. Upon identification,
T rack 2 groups can begin gentle, unofficial media
work to gauge immediate constituent reactions and
prospective movement on those issues, followed by
activities that seek to create spaces and give rise to
open discussions about coming to terms with what
must be ceded to move peace processes forward.
Unofficially working people through political options
before leaders must sell them makes the politicians’
jobs a bit easier and is often something that Track 1
groups cannot undertake in the immediate attentive-
ness to politics and negotiations.
10

T he Carter Center
T he Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
us that peacemakers come from the ranks of bold
 29

Recommendations leaders. An essential part of their job is to

prepare
their constituencies for compromise. This can be a n the
following recommendations, no settlement
difficult task in the context of existing negotiations, proposals
are put forth, but what is presented
which can move forward at a fast pace and at a are
recommendations that have both long-
high level with little time for constituency-building and
short-term implications for the Israeli- I
exercises. In this respect, unofficial actors can engage
Palestinian peace process specifically and the
in work that contributes to filling this gap, preparing T rack 1
and 2 actors involved therein. These
the ground before, during, and after compromises.
recommendations relate primarily to the ultimate
What must be present when Track 1 presents question of
final status discussions. Many of the
proposals is a propensity for the Israeli and recommendations
are inextricably linked both in
Palestinian publics to respond positively, acknow- nature and
results. While official Track 1 diplomacy
ledging positive gestures and supporting leaders to is the
dominant stage on which the negotiations
further negotiate issues to successful conclusions. process
will play out, the actors will not be per-
In this context, it becomes extremely crucial for forming in a
vacuum. There are clearly voids that
 30

Arab states to assist the Palestinians in this process T rack 2

actors can fill separately, in support of
and for similar support for any bold Israeli leader and/or in
collaboration with Track 1 — voids
from the United States. This makes it all the more that must
be filled to nurture a peace process and
important to convene Arab groups as well as uphold a lasting
peace. It should be noted that these
Americans and Europeans to work through political
recommendations came before the publication of
options ahead of negotiations. This support would the Road
Map. Potential tactical approaches to its
enable Palestinian leadership to pick up on positive
implementation were discussed only in general
Israeli gestures and proposals as well as pressure terms
during the symposium.
Israeli leadership to respect international momentum Official
and unofficial actors from the inter-
toward peace as well as consensus around actions national
community should seek to create forums
mandated in peace initiatives. Additionally, and spaces that
promote brainstorming and the
T rack 2 groups can and do engage in activities exchange of
ideas within and between Israeli and
that, if properly exploited, can contribute to the Palestinian
communities with regard to peace and
type of constituency building that can ease the the means to
achieve it. This not only raises the
 31

way for leaders to take bold steps for peace. awareness of

each other’s grievances but also allows
There is also a need for leaders and communities for the
formation of equal and strong networks in
to face the hard truths of this conflict. The basic spaces where
ideas are voiced without consequence.
issues, such as borders, security, Jerusalem, refugee These
sessions must be facilitated in a way that levels
return and resettlement, and prisoner releases, are the
playing field, allowing there to be some parity
not going away and must be faced in the next round in the
floating of ideas. These spaces could also be
of peace efforts. Efforts must address the security of used to
promote the reformation and/or removal
Israel and the finality of any agreement, making it of cultural
and political barriers to negotiations
clear to Palestinians and other Arabs that it is final. and
coexistence through informative debate and
The agreement must end occupation and result in discussion
of historically divisive issues.
a Palestinian state. These are hard truths, and Communities
and leaders must be prepared for,
leaders must admit these facts to their publics, and and
encouraged to make, the compromises that must
communities must be prepared for them. This is be made in
order to achieve peace. History teaches
11
 32

T he Carter Center
T he Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
of discussions, if facilitated appropriately, would allow where
Track 1 and 2 can move peace efforts forward
them to speak with some parity. in a parallel and collaborative
direction, through
To this end, there is work to be done with and ground
preparation and the promotion of safe spaces
through the media. Track 2 groups are currently where
communities and leaders can work through
conducting significant polling that is making its way political
options before making official, binding
into political discussions. In creating an environment decisions
and declarations.
that is safe for political compromises, effective polling Efforts
must be extended to assist moderate
and media campaigns that touch base with Israeli Israelis
and Palestinians to enlist and increase the
and Palestinian communities can legitimize those support of
public opinion in order to mobilize a
compromises. While the extreme elements’ concerns viable
peace constituency. Tactically, it becomes
need to be addressed in political negotiations, important to
identify and promote activities to assist
media campaigns and polling can help to marginalize more
moderate Palestinians to regain the leadership
them with the general public, which will aid in the of public
opinion in favor of peace. Building the
 33

creation of space for political leaders to address the base for

a viable solution is linked to realizing the
compromises that will eventually need to be made. possibility
of a viable solution. This requires an
This marginalization might also give extremists the extensive
investment in time and effort. Without
incentive they need to become more aligned with that
investment, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other
mainstream views or join discussions so as not to be similar
groups can continue to play the role of
precluded from a settlement. spoiler, seeking to build on their
existing support
Reconciliation should be prioritized within the in the broader
Palestinian community.
Israeli and Palestinian communities as preparation There is
also a generational shift occurring in
for cross-cultural reconciliation, with a view toward Israel from
which more moderate voices are emerging,
peaceful coexistence. Historical and psychological advocating
a political conceptualization of security
aspects of ethnic conflict tend to defy traditional as opposed
to conceptions based only on military
diplomatic attempts to resolve them. There is a
considerations. On the Palestinian side, there are
need for activities that create and supplement an many who
are growing frustrated with current
environment that fosters the notions of peace and Palestinian
leadership and are looking for ways to
 34

healing in the face of existential fears and political be heard

so as to reform Palestinian leadership and
circumstances that make reconciliation appear a governance
in preparation for a coming peace with
bleak possibility. During a peace process, Track 1 Israel.
Creating more space for those who might
actors are often not empowered or able to address seek to
articulate alternative political options is
the deeper aspects of conflict, such as historical desperately
needed. Tapping into these new voices
memory, not out of spite or lack of concern, but and engaging
them on issues such as the nature of
because of the time-consuming nature of this work. a final
settlement between Israel and Palestine,
It takes both time and commitment to achieve a constitutional
issues for an emerging state, engaging
deeper understanding not only of the history of in
relationships with other countries, security issues,
the conflict, but also how that history affects the and
functional interim measures for the transitional
psyches of those living in conflict today. process to a final
settlement are crucial to fostering a
peace between Israelis and Palestinians. These kinds
12

T he Carter Center
T he Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
 35

Palestinian leadership issues unequivocal statement

Addressing grievances, including the senses of loss
reiterating Israel’s right to exist in peace and security and and
injustice, is critical to bridging the differences
calling for an immediate end to the armed Intifada and that
divide Israelis and Palestinians. It is critical to
all acts of violence against Israelis everywhere. raise the
awareness of this work’s importance to the
political and diplomatic levels so that leaders can •W hile
issuing a statement of this nature is
make conciliatory and symbolic gestures that might obviously
necessary, such statements before have
begin to address the anxieties of the Israeli and done little to
curb spoiler violence. As the conflict
Palestinian peoples. As several notable Track 2 exists now,
Hamas is a leader of the national
groups are currently undertaking this kind of work, movement,
and external groups are providing
official and unofficial support should be increased to
incentives to further violence. These spoilers
enable them to expand and amplify their activities must be
accounted for in peace calculations
as appropriate. and strategies developed to contain their
tactics,
Unofficial actors should develop and coordinate possibly
including them at later stages of the peace
activities in order to aggressively support Road Map process.
Further to spoilers, the Palestinian ground
 36

implementation. The Quartet Road Map is coming must also

be prepared to accept Israel’s right to
on the heels of President Bush’s June 2002 speech exist as
well as to cease violence. Forums for
and is widely viewed as the newest vehicle to discussion of
political options and innovative
reinvigorate the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The ideas
must be available, and new, moderate
Quartet, comprising representatives from the United voices in
leadership and the communities
States, the European Union, the United Nations, and must be
articulated and aired.
Russia, would assume the responsibility of monitoring
the Road Map’s implementation. Efforts to curb GOI
dismantles settlement outposts erected since
hesitation among Israeli and U.S. officials to establishment of
the present Israeli government and in
aggressively pursue implementation need to be contravention
of current Israeli government guidelines.
addressed. (In the case of the Israeli government,
• Though many settlers would abandon the
there are ongoing efforts to renegotiate the terms.)
settlements with the right incentives, others
There is room in this process, however, for significant
would persistently and violently hold steadfast
and supportive work by both Tracks. Indeed, it
to their homes. Leaders will need to sell this com-
may well be advisable for Track 2 organizations,
 37

promise not only to settlers, whose homes and

in order to act more effectively, to communicate
communities have often been propagated by the
in an ongoing effort to develop a Road Map of their
Israeli government, but also to the Israeli public,
activities. Clearly they will want to retain their
who in the face of Palestinian violence might
independence of action, but effective communication
be reluctant to give up land the government has
can assist in ensuring that activities are targeted to
told them is theirs by birthright and sovereignty.
effectively support Road Map implementation.
Israeli and Palestinian leadership and communities
Excerpts from the Road Map follow, though this
must be prepared for possible violence and be
list is neither exhaustive nor exclusive and will likely
able to work through it, possibly circumventing
undergo modification in the event that the Road
or containing Israeli settlers that would pose as
Map is officially adopted and pursued.
13

T he Carter Center
T he Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Revival of multilateral talks (regional water, environ- spoilers
to disrupt the implementation of this
mental, economic development, refugees, arms clause.
Again, this would likely require recon-
 38

control issues). ciliation through forums and dialogue, as well

as
effective media campaigns and polling to ensure •W ork on
these issues through issue-based task
that moderate voices are heard. forces should proceed at
official levels, but there
is room for considerable assistance from unofficial
Independent Commission circulates draft Palestinian actors
who can provide technical expertise of a
government reforms, based on strong parliamentary
nonpolitical nature. This can serve to prepare
democracy, for public comment/debate. leaders, as well as
domestic constituencies,
for compromise. • The Palestinian community, after years of
economic hardship and repression, will need an
Arab state acceptance of normal relations with Israel
articulated propensity to contemplate and respond
and security for all the states of the region, consistent to
sweeping governmental reforms. There is
with Beirut Arab Summit. substantive and necessary
pre-political, interim,
and post-political work to be done in this area. • There is a
significant need for support on the
This will include the creative development of a ground on this
issue. Reconciliation efforts
broader civil society, which will assist communities must be
undertaken. Though considerably
 39

to work through political options and compro- time-consuming,

there are immediate gestures
mises. Educated debate and strong community of
reconciliation that might crystallize the need
discussions with appropriate media exposure could for
reconciliation among Arabs and Israelis,
not only put pressure on Palestinian leaders to see namely
symbolic gestures such as Sadat’s 1977
reforms through, but also assist in the emergence trip to
Jerusalem. This would obviously require
of new leaders in an emerging Palestine. Equally
considerable media exposure and international
important at this stage is international financial support.
Parallel to immediate acts of recon-
support, which has been considerable but must ciliation,
forums and spaces for intra- and
also be sustained. intercommunity dialogues would need to
be created, so as to work through pending
Palestinians hold free, open, and fair elections for PLC.
reconciliation.
• Creative space bolstered by effective media
campaigns could provide the necessary venues
for the Palestinian public to voice its concerns
and assist in the emergence of Palestinian
leaders whose views are more closely aligned
to moderate Palestinians.
14
 40

T he Carter Center
T he Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
T he Carter Center at a Glance
Overview: The Carter Center was founded in Donations: The
Center is a 501 (c)(3) charitable
1982 by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and
organization, financed by private donations from
his wife, Rosalynn, in partnership with Emory individuals,
foundations, corporations, and interna-
University, to advance peace and health worldwide. tional
development assistance agencies. Contributions
A nongovernmental organization, the Center has by U.S.
citizens and companies are tax-deductible as
helped to improve life for people in more than 65 allowed by
law.
countries by resolving conflicts; advancing democracy,
Facilities: The nondenominational Cecil B. Day
human rights, and economic opportunity; preventing Chapel
and other facilities are available for weddings,
diseases; improving mental health care; and teaching
corporate retreats and meetings, and other special
farmers to increase crop production. events. For information,
(404) 420-5112.
Accomplishments: The Center has observed Internships: The
Center’s internship program
45 elections in 23 countries; helped farmers double has been
rated one of America’s best by the
 41

or triple grain production in 15 African countries; Princeton

Review.
mediated or worked to prevent civil and international Location:
In a 35-acre park, about 1.5 miles east
conflicts worldwide; intervened to prevent unneces- of
downtown Atlanta. The Jimmy Carter Library
sary diseases in Latin America and Africa, including and
Museum, which adjoins the Center, is owned
the near eradication of Guinea worm disease; and and
operated by the National Archives and
strived to diminish the stigma against mental illness. Records
Administration and is open to the public.
Budget: $33.9 million 2001-2002 operating budget. (404)
331-3942.
Staff: 150 employees, based primarily in Atlanta.
Martin Frank
15

T he Carter Center
T he Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
T he Carter Center Mission Statement
he Carter Center, in partnership with
Emory University, is guided by a funda-
mental commitment to human rights T
and the alleviation of human suffering; it seeks to
prevent and resolve conflicts, enhance freedom
and democracy, and improve health.
While the program agenda may change, The
 42

Carter Center is guided by five principles:

■ The Center emphasizes action and results.
Based on careful research and analysis, it is
prepared to take timely action on important
and pressing issues.
■ The Center does not duplicate the effective
efforts of others.
■ The Center addresses difficult problems
and recognizes the possibility of failure as an
acceptable risk.
■ The Center is nonpartisan and acts as a
neutral in dispute resolution activities.
■ The Center believes that people can improve
their lives when provided with the necessary skills,
knowledge, and access to resources.
The Carter Center collaborates with other
organizations, public or private, in carrying out
its mission.
INFO PACK
From Past to Present:
The Israeli-Palestinian
Burak Elmalı Conflict

DISCUSSION PAPER
From Past to Present:
The Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict
Burak Elmalı
 43

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
© TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
WRITTEN BY
Burak Elmalı
PUBLISHER
TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE
TRT WORLD İSTANBUL
AHMET ADNAN SAYGUN STREET NO:83 34347
ULUS, BEŞİKTAŞ
İSTANBUL / TURKEY
TRT WORLD LONDON
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TRT WORLD WASHINGTON D.C.
1819 L STREET NW SUITE 700 20036
WASHINGTON DC
www.trtworld.com
researchcentre.trtworld.com
The opinions expressed in this report represent the views of
the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
TRT World Research Centre.
4

From Past to Present:

 44

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict

Contents
Introduction
06
Part One: A Timeline
07
Part Two: The Origins of the Conflict
11
Part Three: Israeli Massacres of 1948
13
Part Four: The Battle of Narratives
15
Part Five: Peace Plans and Processes
21
Part Six: Issues
24
Part Seven: Actors
26
Part Eight: What Happened on October 7, 2023
30
Part Nine: The Reaction of the International Community
32
Conclusion
34
5

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
 45

n the morning of October 7, 2023, the

al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing
of Hamas, initiated ‘Operation al-Aqsa
Flood’ against Israel. This operation be-
O gan with the launch of 5,000 missiles
in its initial phase and involved Hamas members cross-
ing the Israeli border through land, air, and sea routes.
They seized control of border crossings such as Kerem
Shalom and Erez, taking captives to Gaza, including
high-ranking military officials.
Within hours, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
addressed the nation, formally declaring that Israel was in
a ‘state of war’ and would respond with an unprecedented
measure. In response, Israeli counteroffensives
were
launched, targeting various locations in Gaza, which
unfortunately led to significant civilian casualties, including
a considerable number of children. Furthermore, power,
water, and internet disruptions left the Gaza Strip under a
near-complete blockade.
With Israel’s offensive in Gaza showing no signs of abating,
this info pack seeks to provide an in-depth analysis of the
conflict, spanning from its historical origins to the current
crisis. It will focus on the conflict’s origins, the differing
narratives surrounding it, peace proposals and plans,
critical issues at the heart of the conflict, the key actors
involved, the Hamas operation, and the international
community’s responses. Introduction
 46

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
Part One:
A Timeline
n the past century, a multitude of local and interna- 1939-1948
| Jewish Terror
tional actors have been involved in the shaping of
Campaign the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A comprehensive
During this phase, Zionist militants created several terrorist
analysis of contemporary events is difficult with-
organisations. One of them went by the name of Irgun. This I
out thoroughly examining the historical back -
terrorist organisation proclaimed a revolt, on 1 February
ground. This historical overview encompasses the period
1944, against the British mandatory government. The
of the British Mandate preceding the establishment of Isra-
leader of this terrorist organisation was Menachem Begin, el,
the subsequent escalation of oppression and violence
who later became the Prime Minister of Israel. Begin
was against Palestinians, resistance against settler
colonialism,
described by the British government as the “leader of
the and different actors that played a role over the last
century.
1 notorious terrorist organisation” . Among the terror actions
 47

The timeline presented below includes critical events

orchestrated by Irgun, is the bombing of the offices of the
spanning approximately a century, providing a panoramic
British Mandate’s Immigration Department and the Income
view of this long historical process. Tax Offices in Jerusalem,
Tel Aviv, and Haifa, followed by a
series of attacks on police stations in which six policemen
were killed. Then, Menachem Begin ordered an attack
on
the British military and administrative headquarters at the
1917 | Balfour Declaration
King David Hotel, destroying the building’s southern wing,
The letter written by British Foreign Secretary Arthur
and 91 people, mostly British, were killed.
Balfour to Lionel Walter Rothschild, commonly known
as the Balfour Declaration, contained the following
Another terrorist leader, Yitzhak Shamir, who became
statement: “His Majesty’s Government view with favour
the seventh prime minister of Israel, serving two terms,
the establishment in Palestine of a national home
for had orchestrated several terror operations through
the
the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to
Stern Gang. Of the key targets was Lord Moyne,
the
facilitate the achievement of this object.” British Resident
Minister in the Middle East, who was
assassinated. Shamir was also among the plotters behind
 48

the assassination of the United Nations representative in

the Middle East, Count Folke Bernadotte, who was killed in
1923-1948 | British Mandate
September 1948. During its period of control, Britain facilitated
a significant
Jewish immigration process to Palestine, including those
fleeing Nazi Germany, and initiated land confiscation. This
period aimed at a substantial demographic transformation
1947 | UN Partition Plan for
and intensified pressure on the Palestinian population.
Palestine
The partition of the land between Palestinians and Jews
was proposed through United Nations Resolution 181.
1936-1939 | The Arab Revolt The Palestinian people
objected to the plan because it
The newly formed Arab Higher Committee called for
allocated approximately 55% of the land to the Jewish state,
a general strike and boycott among the Palestinian
which included the fertile coastal areas. At that time, the
population. Despite the resistance from peasants and the
1 general populace, the British Mandate responded with
Oren, Amir (7 July 2011). “British Documents Reveal: Begin
Refused
house demolitions, mass arrests, and killings. Entry to U.K. in
1950s”. Haaretz. https://www.haaretz.com/2011-07-
07/ty-article/british-documents-reveal-begin-refused-entry-to-u
-k-
in-1950s/0000017f-da79-d718-a5ff-fafd12270000
 49

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
Jewish population was roughly equivalent to 33% of the
1967 | The Popular Front for the
Palestinian population. After the plan, the first Arab-Israeli
Liberation of Palestine War broke out.
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),
a
leftist Palestinian political and militant organisation, was
founded in 1967. It is known for its role in armed resistance
1947-1949 | The Arab-Israeli
against Israel and its commitment to a socialist and anti-
War and Nakba imperialist ideology.
The Nakba, meaning “catastrophe” in Arabic, refers to
the
forced displacement and dispossession of hundreds of
thousands of Palestinians during and after the 1948 Arab-
1973 | Yom Kippur War
Israeli War. It led to the establishment of the State of Israel
It is also known as the October War or the 1973 Arab-Israeli
and the displacement of an estimated 700,000 to 800,000
War. The war began on October 6, 1973, when Egypt
and
Palestinians, creating a large population of Palestinian
Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel on the holiest
refugees who lost their homes and property. The total
 50

day in Judaism, Yom Kippur. The war lasted for about three
share of Palestinian land was reduced to approximately
weeks and resulted in a significant loss of life and territory,
22%, which now corresponds to the occupied territories of
leading to a ceasefire under the mediation of the United
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
States and the Soviet Union.
1949-1967 | Egyptian Control of the
1978 | Camp David Accords
Gaza Strip The Camp David Accords were signed as
a series of
Between 1949 and 1967, what is now recognised as the
negotiations between Israel and Egypt mediated by the
Gaza Strip within the contemporary Palestinian territory
United States in 1978. The accords led to a peace
treaty
was under the control of Egyptian forces, initially from the
between Israel and Egypt in 1979, the first between
Israel
Kingdom of Egypt and subsequently, starting in 1958, from
and an Arab state. They also established a framework
the United Arab Republic. for autonomy for the Palestinian
territories, although the
Palestinian issue was not fully resolved at that time.
1964 | The Palestine Liberation
1978 | Israel’s Invasion of Lebanon Organisation (PLO)
 51

Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1978, known as

“Operation The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)
was founded
Litani,” was prompted by what is known as the Coastal Road
in 1964 to represent the Palestinian people and advocate for
massacre in Israel and aimed to push Palestinian resistance
self-determination and the establishment of a Palestinian
groups, particularly the PLO, away from the Israeli border.
state. Over time, the PLO evolved, officially recognising
Israeli forces advanced into southern Lebanon, creating a
Israel and engaging in peace negotiations, with its main
buffer zone along the Litani River. The operation led to the
faction, Fatah, which was founded as a political party in
establishment of UNIFIL and marked the beginning of a
1965.
series of conflicts in the region.
1967 | The Six-Day War or the Third
1982-2000 | Second Israeli Invasion
Arab-Israeli War
of Lebanon
The Six-Day War of 1967 was a brief but significant conflict
The Second Israeli Invasion of Lebanon, also known as the
between Israel and a coalition of Arab states, including
1982 Lebanon War, lasted from June 1982 to May 2000.
It Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. Israel captured
territories
began when Israel launched a full-scale military invasion
including the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank, East
 52

of Lebanon with the primary objective of driving the PLO

Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.
8

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
out of Lebanon and establishing an occupied zone by
separated Palestinian regions. Also, as part of the Oslo
Israel in the south. This invasion resulted in the expulsion
Accords, Israel divided the West Bank into three areas
of the PLO from Lebanon. It also led to the emergence
of (A, B, and C) and increased its control over the
occupied
Hezbollah as a resistance group sponsored by Iran.
After, territories and key checkpoints.
two decades of guerrilla operations, Israel withdrew from
most of Lebanon in 2000, but the conflict continued in the
form of sporadic clashes and hostilities until a ceasefire
1996 | First General Elections
was reached in 2006.
It was the first election of the PA and marked an important
step in the peace process between Israel and the PLO.
Yasser Arafat, the leader of the PLO, was elected
as
1987-1993 | The First Intifada President, and the Fatah party
won the majority of seats in
The First Intifada, which began in 1987, was a
Palestinian the Palestinian Legislative Council.
 53

uprising against Israeli rule in the occupied territories,

primarily the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Widespread
civil disobedience, protests, and acts of resistance by
2000-2005 | The Second Intifada
Palestinians marked this episode. The First Intifada played a
The Second Intifada commenced in 2000 following
significant role in raising international awareness about the
Ariel Sharon’s contentious visit to the Al Aqsa Mosque,
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and contributed to subsequent
accompanied by a large Israeli security presence in
peace negotiations known as the Oslo Accords.
Jerusalem. Israel’s forceful response to
escalating
Palestinian resistance resulted in the reoccupation of
previously Palestinian-administered territories. This period
1987 | Hamas witnessed a significant increase in
Jewish settlement
Hamas is a Palestinian political and militant organisation
construction and the displacement of Palestinians.
established in 1987 during the First Intifada, with Sheikh
Ahmed Yassin among its founders. Known for its Muslim
Brotherhood ideology, it has governed the Gaza Strip
2005 | Presidential Elections since 2007, following its
electoral victory and subsequent
conflict with Fatah. It is recognised as a legitimate political
The second general elections after 1996 were held
in
 54

entity by some and designated a terrorist organisation

Palestine and the PLO leader Mahmud Abbas became the
by others. İsmail Haniyeh is the current leader of
Hamas. President of the Palestinian National Authority
for a four-
The Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades is the military wing
of year term.
Hamas.
2006 | Legislative Elections and The
1993 | Oslo Accords
Fatah-Hamas Rift
The Oslo Accords were a series of agreements between
The Fatah-Hamas civil war in 2006 was primarily rooted
Israel and the PLO that aimed to establish a framework for
in political and ideological differences between the two.
Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The
The conflict emerged after the 2006 Palestinian legislative
accords marked a significant step in the Israeli-Palestinian
elections, which Hamas won decisively. Fatah, the rival
peace process, leading to the creation of the Palestinian
faction, refused to accept the election results, leading to a
Authority and the hope for a future comprehensive peace
power struggle. This struggle escalated into violence, with
agreement.
both sides vying for control of the Palestinian territories,
resulting in a brief but intense conflict. The international
community made various attempts to mediate the conflict
 55

1995 | Electronic Fence Built-Up and

and imposed sanctions.
Division of the West Bank
Israel built up an electronic fence and wall encircling the
Gaza Strip, effectively severing connections between the
9

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
2007 | Gaza Blockade 2023 | Operation Al Aqsa Flood
After the Fatah-Hamas civil war, Hamas seized control
On the early morning of October 7th, Hamas’s Qassam
over the Gaza Strip and Israel, in collaboration with Egypt,
Brigade executed a daring incursion into southern Israel
imposed a large-scale blockade on the Gaza Strip by land,
from the besieged Palestinian enclave of Gaza, operating
air, and sea. The siege has been going on to date. under the
banner of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation. This
involved land, air, and sea infiltrations, accompanied by a
barrage of thousands of missiles. This escalation resulted
in a tragically high number of casualties on both sides,
2008-2021 | Israeli attacks on the
with Hamas taking Israeli captives, including military
Gaza Strip personnel, for potential use as bargaining
chips in future
negotiations. Meanwhile, Israel’s actions in Gaza continued
Between 2008 and 2021, Israel launched four major
 56

to target civilians and facilities, including hospitals, actions

offensives in the Gaza Strip in 2008, 2012, 2014, and 2021,
that are widely considered to be violations of international
resulting in significant Palestinian casualties, including
l aw. children, and extensive destruction of homes, schools,
and
offices. Reconstruction has been hindered by a blockade
preventing essential building materials from entering
Gaza. The 2008 attack employed banned weapons like
phosphorus gas, and in 2014, over 2,100
Palestinians,
including 1,462 civilians and nearly 500 children, lost their
lives, exacerbating Palestinian displacement and illegal
Israeli occupation.
The 2008 attack
employed
2018-2019 | Great March of Return
banned weapons
The Great March of Return is a sequence of
weekly
demonstrations in the Gaza Strip near the Gaza-Israel
like phosphorus
border, spanning from March 30, 2018, to December
gas, and in 2014, 27, 2019, during which Israeli forces
were responsible
for the loss of 223 Palestinian lives. The demonstrators
over 2,100
passionately advocated for the right of Palestinian refugees
 57

to return to the lands from which they had been displaced,

Palestinians ,
now part of Israel and voiced their opposition to Israel’s
including 1,462 land, air, and sea blockade of the Gaza Strip,
as well as the
United States’ recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of
civilians and
Israel. It is important to note that while the majority of these
protests were conducted peacefully, Israel’s response often
nearly 500
involved the disproportionate use of force.
children, lost
their lives ,
2021 | Sheikh Jarrah Evictions
exacerbating The series of conflicts in 2021 between Israel
and Palestine
originated when, on May 6, 2021, the Israeli Supreme
Palestinian
Court ordered the forced eviction and relocation of
certain Palestinian families living in the Sheikh Jarrah
displacement
neighbourhood of Jerusalem. This decision led to protests
and illegal Israeli by Palestinians at the Al-Aqsa Mosque,
which escalated
due to disproportionate responses, eventually turning into
occupation.
reciprocal attacks and an ongoing state of conflict.
10
 58

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
Part Two:
The Origins of the Conflict
declared Israel’s independence. After delving into this
1. Zionism
fundamental ideology, let’s also discuss the concept of
ionism, as the nationalist ideology of the settler
colonialism, which was planned to materialise this
State of Israel, is fundamentally dedicated ideological
foundation in the Palestinian territories and
to the creation and strengthening of a constituted the
key origin of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Jewish state in what is considered their
Z ancestral homeland, which is situated in
the region of Palestine. The term “Zion” has
religious
2. Establishing a Settler Colonial roots and historically
referred to one of the ancient hills
in Jerusalem. The political facet of Zionism began to
take
State
shape in the latter part of the 19th century in continental
The goal of state-building envisaged by
Zionism Europe. Austrian activist Theodor Herzl was
recognised as
 59

transitioned to consolidating the newly established state

the pioneering figure who unified political Zionism into an
of Israel following its formation. The most significant
ideological movement. He convened the inaugural Zionist
Congress in Basel, Switzerland. The movement’s epicentre
obstacle to this endeavour was the relatively small Jewish
was initially in Vienna until his passing in 1904, after which
population compared to the Palestinian population and
it transitioned to Cologne and later Berlin. the limited
amount of land, which corresponded to this
demographic composition. One of the core tenets of
Zionism was the necessity to
facilitate a significant migration of Jews from Europe and
In 1947, one year before the establishment of the State
of
other parts of the world to Palestine to constitute a majority
Israel and the mass expulsion of the Palestinian population
of the population. This strategic shift was motivated by the
from Palestinian territories, the total population of
fact that the Jewish population in Palestine was a minority
approximately 1.9 million was composed of roughly 1.1
in comparison to the Muslim population. Critics of Zionism
2 million Palestinians and approximately 590,000 Jews . This
have suggested its systematic violence and oppressiveness
demographic composition persisted despite incentives for to
cleanse the territory on which it aims to form a state
migration and the extreme violence of the Special Night
from the Palestinians. One valid aspect of the criticism
 60

against the Zionist ideology, which aims to displace the

Squads, a paramilitary organisation formed by Captain
native population from their lands, is exemplified by Herzl’s
Orde Wingate through British-Jewish collaboration during
diary entry dated June 12, 1895: the era of the British
Mandate. Even during the period of
the 1936-1939 Arab Revolt, when this paramilitary structure
“When we occupy the land, we shall bring immediate
was responsible for the deaths of more than 5,000
benefits to the state that receives us. We must expropriate
Palestinians, the injuring of tens of thousands, and the
gently the private property on the estates assigned to
destruction of more than 2,000 homes, the demographic
us. We shall try to spirit the penniless population
across
balance remained in favour of local Palestinians. the border
by procuring employment for it in the transit
countries while denying it any employment in our own
Jewish mass migration was encouraged to address the
country. The property owners will come over to our side.
issue of population imbalance between the Palestinians
Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the
and Jews, especially starting from the era of Nazi Germany.
poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly. Let
the owners of immovable property believe that they are
Over the years, Jewish migration became a form of
cheating us, selling us things for more than they are worth.
demographic re-engineering. Achieving this objective
 61

But we are not going to sell them anything back.” necessitated

the forced displacement of Palestinians and
the resettlement of the Jewish population in their place.
*The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl I-V
This process fits the definition of settler colonialism.
The establishment of the state that Zionism aimed for 2
For more information about the demographic composition of
the
became a reality on May 14, 1948, when the leader of
the Mandatory Palestine, refer to Hagopian, E. & Zahlan, A.
B. (1974). Pales -
World Zionist Organisation (WZO), David Ben-Gurion,
tine’s Arab Population: The Demography of the Palestinians.
Journal of
who would later become Israel’s first Prime Minister,
Palestine Studies, 3(4), 32–73.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2535449
11

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
Since the 1947 UN Partition Plan, Israel’s policy of colonial
the broader Palestinian conflict, continues systematically,
settlement has continued to escalate. While the Jewish
despite Israel’s application of its legal framework in
population accounted for 33% of the total plan, they only
occupied East Jerusalem –which is against international
 62

owned 6% of the land before the plan’s implementation.

law, discrimination against Palestinians in property laws,
However, they were allocated 56%, and following the 1967
and other forms of institutionalised inequality. Therefore,
Arab-Israeli War, Israel increased this share to 78%, dividing
settler colonialism constitutes an embedded legal and
the remaining 22% into the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
institutional character through which Israel perpetuates its
Despite this, the colonial settlement policy persisted, and
resettlement policies by shrinking the public and private
Israeli court decisions have been used to justify systematic
sphere of the Palestinian people.
dispossession and displacement in the neighbourhoods
where Palestinians reside.
One of the most recent and glaring examples is the forced
eviction orders in the Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood of
East Jerusalem. This issue, essentially a microcosm of
12

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
Part Three:
Israeli Massacres of 1948
his info-pack delves into these massacres concentrated
Zionist-Jewish minds, and provided
committed by Israel in 1948 as a microcosm the security,
military and strategic explanations
 63

of a much more systemic behaviour. It will and justifications

for purging the Jewish state and
3 take volumes to document all massacres dispossessing
the Palestinians.
T committed by Israeli forces in the past
Some of the Israeli massacres committed against the
seven decades. As a colonial state, Israel adopted the
Palestinian population in 1948 are briefly examined below.
massacre of civilians as a state policy countless times since
1948.
However, delving into the historical backdrop and the
The Deir Yassin Massacre
genesis of the conflict, the atrocities committed against
The Deir Yassin Massacre, which took place on April 9,
the Palestinians in 1948 reveal this state policy in action,
1948, was a significant event during the 1948
Arab-Israeli
leading to the establishment of the State of Israel.
War and the lead-up to the establishment of the State of
Israel. It involved an attack on the Palestinian Arab village
These acts of brutality transcend the mere intent of
of Deir Yassin, located near Jerusalem. Jewish terror
inducing fear and issuing warnings to the Palestinian
groups, including the Irgun and Lehi, launched the assault
inhabitants; they manifest as unequivocal acts of ethnic
on the village. cleansing of a population from their lands.
During the operation, a significant number of Palestinian
The primary objective in hundreds of these mass killings
 64

villagers were killed, including women, children, and the

was evidently to create an atmosphere of existential
elderly. The exact number of casualties remains a subject
insecurity, prompting the indigenous Palestinian
of historical debate, with estimates ranging from around
population to abandon the region. This deliberate and
100 to several hundred. Many reports indicated that the
systematic policy fundamentally served as a crucial means
massacre included acts of brutality, such as rape and to
fulfil the goals formulated by the Zionist narrative for this
mutilation. area, and it was advocated by many Israeli
actors deeply
committed to this ideology.
The Deir Yassin Massacre had a profound impact on the
Palestinian population, leading to widespread fear and
Palestinian-American scholar Naseer Aruri explains this
panic among Palestinians in other villages. It also played
intertwined dynamic that is responsible for the ethnic
a role in fuelling the Palestinian Arab exodus, known as
cleansing of the Palestinian people as the following:
the Nakba, as many Palestinians fled their homes due to
The overwhelming facts show conclusively the the
violence and the fear of further attacks. This event is
primary responsibility of the Zionists for the often
cited as an example of the violence and brutality
displacement and dispossession of the Palestinians that
occurred during the war and its consequences for the
 65

in 1948. In particular, Ben-Gurion emerges as

Palestinian people.
both an ‘obsessive’ advocate of ‘compulsory
transfer’ in the late 1930s and the great expeller
of the Palestinians in 1948. Israel was primarily
The Al-Dawayima Massacre
responsible for the creation of the Palestinian
The Al-Dawayima massacre was also a significant event
refugee problem; the exodus was largely the
during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and the broader conflict
deliberate creation of Jewish leaders (principally
between Israelis and Palestinians. It occurred in the village
Ben-Gurion) and military commanders; it
of Al-Dawayima in October 1948, a few months after the
was an outcome of Zionist ‘transfer thinking’,
Deir Yassin massacre. transfer mentality, transfer
predisposition and
premeditation. The 1948 war simply provided an 3
Aruri, N. (Ed.). (2001). Palestinian Refugees: The Right of
Return. Pluto
opportunity and the necessary background for the
Press.
creation of a Jewish state largely devoid of Arabs; it
13

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
 66

The Al-Dawayima massacre took place when Israeli

The Balad al-Shaykh Massacre
forces, specifically units of the 89th Commando Battalion,
The Balad al-Shaykh massacre is just another brutal Israeli
occupied the village during the war. This group consisted
massacre that unfolded during the initial phases of the
of the members of the former Irgun and Lehi terror groups.
1947–1948 civil war in Mandatory Palestine. It transpired
Reports and accounts describe widespread violence and
shortly after the Haifa Oil Refinery massacre, distinguishing
killings, including the deaths of many Palestinian civilians,
itself as one of the earliest and most extensive
massacres
women, children, and the elderly. The exact death toll
in the context of the 1948 Palestine war. The massacre
from the massacre is uncertain, ranging from 200 to 1,000
was intended as a response to the murder of Jewish oil
victims, depending on various sources like the Egyptian
refinery employees on the preceding day, allegedly carried
garrison and the American consul in Jerusalem. The
out by Palestinian colleagues. The Haganah, a terrorist
village’s mukhtar (local leader) reported 455 victims and
organisation, was responsible for the tragic loss of life in
mentioned other casualties, but their exact number is
the Palestinian Arab village of Balad al-Shaykh.
unknown.
This tragic incident occurred in the early hours, resulting
The Al-Dawayima massacre, like the Deir Yassin massacre,
 67

in the killing of 21 to 70 adult Arab men, in addition to

at
had a significant impact on the Palestinian population and
least two women and five children. The psychological
contributed to the atmosphere of fear and displacement
impact of these distressing events on the Palestinian
during the 1948 war. It is often cited as an example of
the
civilian population in the Haifa region was significant.
systematic Israeli violence in the early stages of the
state
Notably, two Haganah terrorists were killed, and two others
formation.
were injured.
The Tantura Massacre
The Ein al-Zeitun Massacre
The Tantura massacre is another painful episode in the
The Ein al-Zeitun massacre transpired on May 1, 1948,
history of the Palestinian people during the early stages of
within the Palestinian Arab village of Ein al-Zeitun,
Israel’s formation. In 1948, the Palestinian coastal village of
situated to the north of Safed, which was then under the
Tantura witnessed a horrifying event that forever scarred
jurisdiction of the British Mandate for Palestine. Various
the collective memory of the Palestinian people. Israeli
historical accounts suggest that a group of Arab prisoners,
forces captured Tantura in May 1948, and what followed
numbering between 23 and 70 individuals, lost their
 68

was a tragedy of immense proportions. Numerous

lives during the incident at the hands of the Palmach,
Palestinian villagers, including innocent civilians, women,
considered an elite faction associated with the Haganah
and children, were caught up in the violence. Reports
terrorist organisation.
suggest that many lost their lives during or after the battle,
and there are allegations of heinous crimes committed
While these massacres were taking place, the British
against the people, such as rape and other brutalities.
Mandate administration in the region, in its final days,
adhered to its conventional stance and maintained a
For Palestinians, the Tantura massacre represents not just
pro-Jewish posture. For instance, when Adib Shishaqli,
a historical event but a haunting memory that underscores
the commander of the Arab Liberation Army’s northern
the suffering and loss endured. It is a reminder of the forced
region at the time, requested permission from the Mandate
displacement and dispossession of the Palestinian people.
administration to launch attacks against Jewish garrisons
identified near villages close to Ein al-Zeitun, his request
While Israeli authorities have disputed the claims
4 was met with rejection . This shows how the
British-
and portrayed the events as a military engagement,
Zionist cooperation was intended to make the Palestinian
for Palestinians, the memory of Tantura stands as a
 69

resistance unable to resist the growing Zionist footprint in

stark example of the broader injustices and hardships
the region. experienced by our people during the
Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.
4 Abbasi, M. (2004). The Battle for Safad in the War of 1948:
A Revised
Study. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 36(1),
21–47.
14

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
Part Four:
The Battle of Narratives
he first part of the historical panorama division of
Palestine into Jewish and Arab states.
outlined key events from the past century.
The historical aspect of the Zionist narrative points to
the Throughout this course, both the narratives
long and ancient history of Jewish presence in the region. of
the Palestinians and the Zionist
It refers to the time of the biblical Israelites, who are
seen T movement have played a significant role
as having established a kingdom in the area, including the in
shaping how these events are interpreted on the world
historical city of Jerusalem. The connection to historical
stage through media, academics, and political debates.
 70

figures and events in the Hebrew Bible is often cited to

This part explores what these narratives are basically
substantiate these claims. The historical narrative also
about and how their differences impact the key events that
takes into account the Jewish diaspora, where
Jewish happened over the last century.
communities spread across the world following the
destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE and subsequent
dispersal. During the diaspora, Jews faced persecution,
1. The Zionist Narrative discrimination, and expulsion from
various countries,
According to the Zionist narrative, the existence of the state
which is often used to emphasise the need for a homeland
of Israel was a necessity, primarily aimed at preventing
where Jews can find refuge and self-determination.
the assimilation of the Jewish people who were scattered
The confluence of these religious, legal, and historical
throughout various parts of the world, particularly in
aspects in the Zionist narrative provided the ideological
Europe. The establishment of an Israeli state would provide
foundation for the establishment of the State of Israel a
living space for all Jewish people worldwide, thus ending
in 1948. Delving into the nature of the Zionist narrative
their dispersion. This objective originated from various
from a critical perspective, we can discern its significant
religious, historical, and legal references and justifications.
impact on political discourse. During the prolonged
 71

The religious aspect of the Zionist narrative draws on

period of attacks on Gaza, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
the deep historical and spiritual connection of Jews to
Netanyahu frequently used biblical references in various
Eretz Israel (the land of Israel). It is based on the
biblical public statements, crafting a narrative rooted
in this
and historical ties of the Jewish people to the region,
context. “The Bible says that ‘there is a time for peace
with Jerusalem as the central religious and historical
and a time for war.’ This is a time for war,” Netanyahu
told
focal point. Prominent in this narrative is the belief in
the a press conference, quoting Ecclesiastes, a book in
both
biblical promise of the land of Israel to the Jewish people, the
Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) and the Old Testament of the
as articulated in the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh). The idea of a
Christian Bible.
“Promised Land” was used to support Jewish return and
This situation underscores a fundamental paradox within
sovereignty in their ancestral homeland. The Western Wall
the Zionist narrative. On the one hand, the narrative aspires
in Jerusalem and the historical Jewish presence in the city
to act and seeks legitimacy within the contours of an
have profound religious significance for Jews, contributing
international system whose principal actors, nation-states, to
the desire for a Jewish state with Jerusalem as its capital.
 72

are supposed to be rational actors. The system’s whole

The legal aspect of the Zionist narrative emphasises
political and legal structure takes this “rationality” paradigm
the international legal framework, including the Balfour at
the very centre of its foundation. On the other hand,
Declaration of 1917 and the League of Nations mandate for
there exists a faction that selectively approaches historical
Palestine in 1922. The Balfour Declaration expressed British
decisions within this system and, when it aligns with their
support for “the establishment in Palestine of a national
interests, endeavours to construct a legitimacy framework
home for the Jewish people. The League of Nations
by invoking biblical references in their discourse. This
mandate recognised the historical connection of Jews to
incongruity, wherein we witness a divergence between
Palestine and entrusted Britain with the administration of
rational actors and seemingly irrational rhetoric, represents
Palestine to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish national
one of the narrative’s perplexing dimensions.
home. The UN Partition Plan in 1947 further provided a legal
basis for the establishment of Israel by recommending the
15

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
of international legal principles, and devoid of a solid 2.
The Palestinian Traditional
foundation of legitimacy.
 73

Narrative
Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that the
The Palestinian Traditional Narrative counters the Zionist
traditional Palestinian narrative, from a cultural, historical,
narrative by emphasising the historical and cultural ties of
and ideological perspective, has played a defining role in
Palestinians to the land of Palestine. It provides a different
the official position of Palestine on various peace plans
perspective on the history of the region and the Israeli-
and processes that have emerged over time5. For instance,
Palestinian conflict. First and foremost, the Palestinian
this narrative emphasises the deep-rooted connection
narrative centres that Judaism is a religion of revelation,
of the Palestinian people to their homeland, highlighting
like Christianity, and has no inherent tie to a particular land.
an ancestral bond, which, in diplomatic terms, has been
Jews are not a nation but rather a community of believers.
vocalised as the right of return for more than six million
The traditional Palestinian narrative asserts that Palestinian
Palestinian diaspora. Consequently, the focal points of
people have a deep and ancient connection to the land of this
narrative have exerted a significant influence on
Palestine, dating back centuries. It points to the continuity
subsequent developments and peace initiatives.
of Arab and Palestinian communities in the region,
even during periods of foreign rule, and argues that this
presence predates the Zionist immigration. Accordingly,
3. “A Land without a People for a
 74

this narrative considers the waves of Jewish immigration

People without a Land” to Palestine during the late 19th
and early 20th centuries,
which were driven by the Zionist movement, as disruptive
The phrase ‘a land without a people for a people
without
and threatening to their existing communities and
a land’ holds significant relevance in the Zionist narrative
way of life because it relies on systemic dispossession,
concerning the roots of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This
confiscation, and displacement of the Palestinian people.
narrative incorporates a colonial theme that is underpinned
The Palestinian narrative also emphasises the Ottoman
by two invalid claims about Palestinian territories. The first
and Arab rule of Palestine for many centuries before the
claim asserts that they established their aspirations on
establishment of Israel. Palestinians argue that they had a
unpopulated land due to the absence of an independent
coherent and functioning society with their own culture,
Jewish state. However, both Ottoman-era population
language, and traditions. records and British records during
the Mandatory Palestine
period indicate that these lands hosted well-established
The Palestinian narrative highlights the resistance of the
Arab populations. Throughout the Mandatory Palestine
local Arab population to the Zionist movement, as they
administration, the Muslim population consistently
 75

saw it as a threat to their land and rights. This

resistance outnumbered Jews. The Interactive
Encyclopaedia of the
included protests, strikes, and later armed confrontations
Palestine Question’s population chart, based on historian
with Zionist militias and Israeli forces. Additionally, this
Justin McCarthy’s work, The Population of Palestine:
narrative opposes the systematic displacement policies
Population History and Statistics of the Late Ottoman
that have continued from the establishment of the State of
Period and the Mandate, illustrates the following graph.
Israel to the present day. It advocates for the right to
self- This figure shows the population records during the
British
determination and statehood on international platforms. rule
between 1917-1947:
The way the Palestinian narrative stands in opposition to
the Zionist narrative underscores the profound influence
of European colonialism in the making of the Zionist
narrative. This influence has led to a critical examination of
the ideological foundations underpinning both the Balfour
Declaration and the UN Partition Plan. In essence, the
colonial approach championed by the United Kingdom
during that era effectively turned a blind eye to the
presence of Palestine for various reasons and claimed a
right that had no basis here—granting a homeland to the
 76

Jewish people. From the vantage point of the Palestinian

5 Scham, P., Pogrund, B., & Ghanem, A. (2013). Introduction
to Shared
narrative, the League of Nations’ pro-Jewish
stance
Narratives—A Palestinian-Israeli Dialogue. Israel Studies,
18(2), 1–10.
is viewed as lacking historical context, running afoul
16

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
Graph 1: Population in Palestine by Religious Community
Certainly, this phrase addresses not only the aspect that
By centring on this European-originated colonial narrative,
can be easily refuted with statistical data but also the
the Zionist narrative initiates a process of statehood in
core of the colonial narrative, which contains a second
Palestine as the Jewish population increases, asserting
claim. According to this claim, despite the obvious Arab
that civilisation has arrived and, therefore, they have the
population, Palestine is considered terra nullius, meaning
greatest claim to these lands. They even present statements
“land belonging to no one,” due to being perceived as
like Mark Twain’s in his 1869 travelogue, The Innocents
backward, primitive, and lacking signs of civilisation. This
Abroad, where he described Palestine as “a
hopeless,
 77

narrative directly resonated with the initial motivations

dreary, heart-broken land” and “desolate and unlovely”
behind the colonisation movements in 15th-century
as a form of evidence. However, when one examines
the
Europe and was frequently used as a legitimising ground
writings of others who have travelled to the region, such
by the British Empire. When Chaim Weizmann, who later
as the Scottish artist David Roberts, it becomes apparent
became Israel’s first president, was asked about the Balfour
that the region was also described differently. For instance,
Declaration process and his thoughts on the presence in
Roberts’ notes, he expressed the region as “across the
of the Palestinian population in the region, he provided
plain of Sharon, through a richly-cultivated country. The
the following response to Arthur Ruppin, the head of the
ground is carpeted with flowers—the plain is studded with
colonisation department of the Jewish Agency: small villages
and groups of palm trees, and, independent
of its interesting associations, the country is the loveliest
“The British told us that there are some hundred thousand I
ever beheld.” This colonial narrative, which essentially
6 negroes [‘kushim’] and for those, there is no value.”
carries a colonial character, sought validation by drawing
from various expressions. However, as past travel notes
6 See Masalha, N. (2001). The Historical Roots of The
Palestinian Refu - reveal, facts on the ground continue
to rebuff those
 78

gee Question. In N. Aruri (Ed.), Palestinian Refugees: The

Right of Return unsubstantiated claims.
(pp. 36–68). Pluto Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt18fs9x9.7
17

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
4. The Nakba 5. The Battle over History
This profound divergence in narratives has naturally
The historical claim of Jews to the land that is now
Israel
and parts of the Palestinian territories is deeply rooted in
resulted in differences in understanding and interpretation
religious and historical narratives. This claim is primarily
of key events in the historical process. For instance, while
based on the Hebrew Bible, which describes the land
May 14, 1948, marks the establishment of the State of Israel,
of Canaan as a divine promise to Abraham and his
for Palestinians, it signifies the Nakba. Nakba, an Arabic
descendants. The biblical account narrates the Exodus
word meaning “catastrophe,” represents the day when
from Egypt, the conquest of Canaan under Joshua, and the
approximately 700,000 Palestinians were mass expelled
establishment of the Hebrew Kingdom with Jerusalem as
from their homeland. The official Israeli government
its capital, including the construction of the First Temple by
perspective does not use the term “Nakba” and instead
King Solomon. The First Temple in Jerusalem, also known
 79

emphasises the establishment of the State of Israel as a

as Solomon’s Temple, was destroyed by the Babylonians in
momentous and just event. According to this view, the
586 BCE. The Babylonian King Nebuchadnezzar II led the
Palestinian exodus was largely a result of the war and not
invasion and destruction of the First Temple. The Second
Temple, also known as Herod’s Temple, was destroyed by a
deliberate policy of expulsion. Israel often highlights its
the Romans in 70 CE. The Roman general Titus led the
willingness to accept the UN Partition Plan, which was
siege and destruction of the Second Temple during the
rejected by Arab states, as evidence of its desire for peace.
First Jewish-Roman War. This event marked the end of
Within Israeli society, there is a wide range of perspectives.
the Jewish presence in the Second Temple in Jerusalem.
Some Israelis view the Nakba as a tragic but necessary
Throughout history, Jews maintained their connection to
outcome of the conflict and Israel’s struggle for survival.
the land through religious rituals and traditions, fostering
Others are more critical of Israel’s actions during the 1948 a
deep sense of longing for their historical homeland. This
war and its treatment of Palestinian Arabs. In addition
biblical and cultural narrative forms the foundation of the
to the official ideology of Israel embodied in the Zionist
Jewish historical claim to the Palestinian lands.
narrative, the Nakba, viewed through historical references,
The Palestinian counterargument to the Jewish historical
is often likened to one of many conflicts, wars, and resulting
 80

claim over the land of Israel rests on a narrative that

migration movements in history. In this manner, Nakba is
underscores their alleged deep-rooted ties to the region.
somewhat normalised in a way that it is one of the events in
Palestinians assert their status as the indigenous people
the course of history, among numerous other events.
of historic Palestine, emphasising their uninterrupted
presence over thousands of years and their vibrant, multi-
Within the Israeli narrative, Nakba is not merely refuted as
ethnic, and multi-religious history in cities like Jerusalem,
an “Arab fabrication” or a means to “justify terrorism.” This
Hebron, and Bethlehem. They recognise the Arab influence
denial transcends mere rhetoric, finding reinforcement in
through the 7th-century Arab conquest and emphasise
institutional, legal, and diplomatic aspects. For instance, in
that the arrival of Jewish immigrants and the establishment
2009, the Israeli Ministry of Education proscribed the use of
Israel in 1948 were influenced by European colonialism.
of the term “Nakba” in textbooks prepared for Palestinian
The Nakba, symbolising the displacement and suffering
students. In 2011, the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, passed
of Palestinian Arabs, is regarded as a historical injustice.
legislation forbidding the commemoration of Nakba Day
Palestinians also highlight the shared religious and cultural
heritage in the region, especially within Christianity
within any institution, contending that marking this day
and Islam, and assert their rights to self-determination,
constituted an affront to Israel’s identity as a “democratic
 81

statehood, and international recognition. This narrative

Jewish state.” Furthermore, in 2023, when the United
serves to challenge the Jewish historical claim
by Nations declared its intention to commemorate Nakba
Day
emphasising the importance of acknowledging the
on May 15, Israel responded vehemently, and 30 countries,
Palestinian people’s historical presence, cultural richness,
including the United States, the United Kingdom, and
and the injustices they have faced throughout the conflict’s
Canada, voted against it. history.
These instances underscore the implausibility of Nakba’s
In historical accounts, the first inhabitants of the region,
acceptance within the purview of the conventional Zionist
known as Canaan, were not Jewish, and there was a
vast
7 narrative. From this standpoint, this tragic event serves as .
Arab settlement long before they came to settle the region
The Zionist narrative officially adopted by Israel attempts
a symbol of Israel’s establishment based on a systematic
to propagate the idea that they were the original settlers
catastrophe of the Palestinian people.
7 Hitti, P. K. (1946). Zionist Claims and Arab Rights. World
Affairs, 109(1),
7–9. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20664248
18

From Past to Present:

 82

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict

in the region, even going so far as to instrumentalise
sentiment that the Palestinian population’s resolve was
archaeological findings to strengthen and legitimise their
progressively assuming a marginalised guise, with the
historical claims. To this end, particular emphasis is placed
Israel-Palestine conflict increasingly framed within the
on Judeo-Christian relics, and the names of cities in the
context of securitisation. The following table pertains
regions of Palestine, Negev, and Arabah are changed to
to the casualties recorded during the First and Second
Hebrew names, thus attempting to substantiate the claim
Intifadas:
that the Jewish population was the first to inhabit this
region in the past. Palestinian Israeli Death
Death Toll Toll
1376 94 First Intifada
(1987-1993)
6. The First and the Second
Second Intifada 3256 958
Palestinian Intifadas (2000-2005)
The First Intifada (1987-1993) and the Second
Intifada
Table 1 Palestinian and Israeli death toll during the Intifadas
(2000-2005) represent two significant phases of social
resistance by the Palestinian people, mostly
young,
 83

*Retrieved from The Israeli Information Centre for Human

Rights in against systematic Israeli occupation of the
Gaza Strip
the Occupied Territories and the West Bank. As mentioned
earlier, including in the
timeline, these events played a crucial role in increasing
Just before the onset of the Second Intifada, Palestinian
international awareness of the Palestinian issue and
Authority President Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime
spreading the traditional Palestinian narrative to a wider
Minister Ehud Barak engaged in a two-week-long
audience. When viewed through the lens of the Palestinian
negotiation session at Camp David under the mediation
narrative, therefore, the First Intifada can be associated
of then-American President Bill Clinton. These talks, which
with the following three points:
revolved around critical issues such as East Jerusalem
and the return of Palestinian refugees, failed to yield a
• Social unrest out of the ongoing Israeli occupation in
conclusive agreement. the Gaza Strip and the West Bank
The catalyst for the Second Intifada can be traced to the visit
• The collective desire for self-determination in these
of then-Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon to the Al-Aqsa
areas
Mosque, accompanied by hundreds of security staff. After
this visit, demonstrations erupted, during which, despite •
Aim to garner international attention and awareness
 84

Palestinian non-violent demonstrations at the initial stages,

for the Palestinian cause
Israeli forces responded violently. Over approximately five
These objectives were similarly embraced by Palestinians
years, the Zionist Israeli narrative framed its actions as “self-
during the Second Intifada as well. Nevertheless, the
defence” against escalating security threats. It held that the
persistent impasse can also be ascribed to the inability of
opposing side was responsible for disrupting the peaceful
the 1993 Oslo Accords to realise the envisaged peace and
climate fostered by the Oslo and Camp David processes.
a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders.
Although Conversely, the Palestinian narrative, although
diplomatic
the Oslo process initially engendered optimism by
processes claimed to have generated such an atmosphere,
culminating in the establishment and acknowledgement
instead emphasised Israel’s ongoing settlement plans and
of the Palestinian National Authority, the formal
escalating violence during this period.
recognition of Israel’s existence, and the initiation of mutual
collaboration in realms like water, electricity, energy, trade,
and transportation, it faltered in concluding core issues,
7. The Two-State Solution such as the delineation of the
Palestinian state’s borders
and the division of Jerusalem. Contrary to expectations,
The Two-State Solution refers to a proposed resolution
to
 85

there was an observed surge in Israeli

settlements the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that envisions
the creation
following this agreement, accompanied by criticisms
of two separate and independent states: one for the Jewish
regarding corruption and deteriorating standards within
people (Israel) and one for the Palestinian people. Under
the Palestinian Authority (PA). this framework, Israel would
exist alongside a sovereign
and viable Palestinian state.
When interpreting the Intifadas through the lens of the
aforementioned narratives, it is noteworthy that both
When viewed from a Zionist and Palestinian narrative
collective resistance movements were perceived in the
perspective, thoughts on the two-state solution differ
Zionist narrative as acts of insurrection and security
both between the narratives and within each narrative.
threats. The Israeli Military’s markedly disproportionate
Some Zionists emphasise the importance of recognising
interventions in both episodes were met with the
Israel’s right to exist as a sovereign Jewish state. They view
19

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
the Two-State Solution as a means to secure Israel’s
long- This narrative points out the establishment of
an
 86

term existence and protect its Jewish character, as well

autonomous Palestinian state with its capital in East
as establish the grounds for peaceful coexistence. On the
Jerusalem, based on the pre-1967 borders, including both
other hand, hard-liner Zionist perspectives interpret the
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Furthermore, it
brings
two-state solution as a concession that would contradict
into focus the contentious issue of the return of Palestinians
Israel’s national interests. Their focus is generally placed
who, as a consequence of the 1948 Nakba,
found
on the idea of a Greater Israel, indicating an
expansionist themselves displaced from their ancestral
homeland. This
agenda, not a compromising one. This notion of Greater
event holds a paramount position within the annals of the
Israel contends that the establishment of a Palestinian
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, constituting a narrative that
state near Israel would pose a security threat. They
argue remains unacknowledged and even reversed within
the
that a Palestinian state could potentially become a base
Zionist discourse. The issue of return is an integral facet of
for terrorism and hostile actions against Israel. Also, they
the ongoing deliberations regarding a two-state solution.
express concerns about demographic shifts and the
 87

From the Palestinian standpoint, the initial stride toward

possibility of Jews becoming a minority within a single bi-
engaging in discussions about a two-state solution
national state. This demographic argument underscores
hinges upon the cessation of the current occupation
the importance of maintaining a Jewish majority in the
and the systematic withdrawal of Israeli
security entire territory.
forces from territories under their control, including
The Palestinian narrative of the two-state is about the
neighbourhoods where Jewish settlements continue
establishment of an independent Palestinian
state to proliferate. Consequently, the notion of a
two-state
alongside Israel to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
solution, as elucidated in this narrative, signifies a political
This narrative is rooted in the historical and political
framework that can only be forged after the recognition
context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and reflects
and rectification of certain imperfections by the opposing
the aspirations and demands of the Palestinian people,
party, which is Israel.
including borders, the right to return, and the status of
Jerusalem.
Graph 2: Decline in Palestinian Support for a Two-State
Solution (Source: GALLUP)
20
 88

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
Part Five:
Peace Plans and Processes
he peace processes initiated and withdrawals
from West Bank cities and towns, security
conducted to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian cooperation
mechanisms, economic collaboration, and
conflict, although nearly as old as the Palestinian
self-rule.
conflict itself - dating back to the 1947
Nevertheless, like its predecessor, Oslo II faced
its T UN Partition Plan - have seen their most
challenges, including outbreaks of violence and disputes
significant developments following the post-First Intifada
regarding the execution of its terms. It was designed as
period in the early 1990s. In these peace
processes,
an interim step toward a final peace settlement, but final
mediators have generally included multilateral institutions
status negotiations, encompassing critical issues, such
such as the United Nations, the Arab League, and the
as Jerusalem, refugees, borders, and settlements, were
Quartet, as well as special initiatives launched by some US
deferred for future discussions. Despite their limitations, the
presidents under their initiative. Here is the list of some of
Oslo Accords established the framework for subsequent
the key peace plans and processes:
 89

peace efforts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, even as

the ultimate goal of a comprehensive peace agreement
remained elusive.
Oslo Accords (1993-1995)
The Oslo I Accords, also known as the “Declaration of
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements,”
Camp David Summit (2000)
marked a historic moment in the Israeli-Palestinian peace
Facilitated by then-US President Bill Clinton, the 2000
process. Signed in Washington on September 13, 1993, the
Camp David Summit represented a crucial juncture in the
accords emerged from secret negotiations between Israeli
Israeli-Palestinian peace process, with direct negotiations
and Palestinian representatives. The Oslo I agreement
between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian
outlined a transitional period during which the Palestinian
Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat. These negotiations
Authority (PA) would be established to govern portions of
sought to address the core issues of the Israeli-Palestinian
the West Bank and Gaza Strip for a maximum of five years
conflict, including borders, the status of Jerusalem, the
while both sides negotiated a final peace settlement. The
return of Palestinian refugees, and the establishment of
agreement included provisions for Israel’s gradual military
a Palestinian state. Discussions encompassed sensitive
withdrawal from these areas, democratic elections for the
matters such as the city of Jerusalem and territorial
Palestinian Legislative Council and President (electing
 90

compromises while also tackling security arrangements

Yasser Arafat), security cooperation, and an understanding
and the contentious issue of Israeli settlements in the West
that critical issues like the status of Jerusalem, refugees, and
Bank. Despite intensive efforts, the Camp David Summit
borders would be addressed in future negotiations. Despite
did not yield a final peace agreement. The subsequent
its optimistic nature, the Oslo I Accords encountered
of the accords is the eruption of the Second Intifada as
a challenges, including violence, disputes over the ongoing
result of the ongoing Israeli oppression and settlement. Israeli
settlements, and difficulties in implementation,
ultimately failing to culminate in a final peace agreement.
Building on the progress of Oslo I, the Oslo II Accords,
Arab Peace Initiative (2002)
formally titled the “Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement
The Arab Peace Initiative, first presented by the
Arab
on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,” were signed in Taba,
League during the 2002 Arab League Summit in Beirut
Egypt, on September 28, 1995. These accords
further
and re-endorsed in 2007, is a comprehensive peace plan
developed the peace process, dividing the West Bank into
designed to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and
three areas with varying degrees of Palestinian control.
foster normalised relations between Israel and the Arab
Area A was granted full Palestinian control, Area B was
 91

states. This initiative offers the prospect of a comprehensive

placed under joint Israeli-Palestinian control, and Area C
peace agreement, with Arab states committing to recognise
remained under Israeli control. Gaza was also placed under
Israel and establishing diplomatic relations in exchange
Palestinian control. The agreement elaborated on Israeli
21

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
for a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including
demand for the disarming and dismantling of Palestinian
the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.
security forces and Hamas. It is worth noting that there
It calls for a complete Israeli withdrawal from territories
were no specific provisions related to curbing Israeli
occupied during the 1967 Six-Day War, encompassing the
violence in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Additionally,
West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and East Jerusalem.
Israel saw its conditional position as a prerequisite for
The plan also emphasises a “just solution” to the Palestinian
advancing to the second phase and then the third
phase.
refugee issue in line with UN General Assembly Resolution
Subsequent conditions included the waiver of the right
194, which addresses their right to return or compensation. of
return, monitoring of the process by the United States
 92

While Israel did not accept the initiative in its entirety, it has
rather than the Quartet, and the design of a
demilitarised
served as a reference point in subsequent negotiations,
provisional Palestinian state. In summary, Israel’s stance
underlining the commitment of Arab states to a two-state on
this roadmap reflected a highly asymmetric position in
solution and a comprehensive resolution to the Israeli-
the peace process, ultimately hindering its ability to bring
Palestinian conflict. a solution to the conflict.
The Palestinian Authority swiftly embraced the initiative
under the leadership of Yasser Arafat. Subsequently,
The Annapolis Conference (2007 ) his successor, Mahmoud
Abbas, also threw his support
The Annapolis Conference, convened in November
behind the plan and officially requested US President
2007 by the United States, marked another diplomatic
Barack Obama to incorporate it into his Middle East policy.
effort to revive Israeli-Palestinian negotiations to achieve
However, Hamas, which governed the Gaza Strip, was
a comprehensive resolution to the enduring Israeli-
deeply divided, with the majority of its factions rejecting
Palestinian conflict. The central objective of the conference
the plan. On the Israeli side, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
dismissed the initiative primarily due to its requirement for
was to re-establish direct negotiations between Israel and
Israel to withdraw from the pre-June 1967 borders. In 2015,
the Palestinian Authority that started in 2003 with the Road
 93

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu tentatively

Map for Peace, addressing core final status issues, including
expressed support for the initiative. However, by 2018,
he borders, security, the status of Jerusalem,
Palestinian
had rejected it as a basis for future negotiations with the
refugees, and settlements. Underlying the discussions
Palestinians. was a steadfast commitment to a
two-state solution,
envisioning an independent and viable Palestinian state
alongside Israel. The parties agreed to a timeline that
The Road Map for Peace (2003) aspired to reach a final
peace agreement by the end
of 2008, with international leaders and organisations
The Road Map for Peace, presented by the Quartet
providing their support and participation, underscoring on
the Middle East (comprising the United States,
the global interest in finding a resolution. European Union,
United Nations, and Russia) in 2003,
offers a comprehensive framework to address the Israeli-
Hamas and Iran boycotted the Annapolis Conference
Palestinian conflict. Central to the plan is the commitment
because it was designed to serve the interests of Israel.
to a two-state solution, aiming to establish an independent,
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert faced pressures,
democratic, and viable Palestinian state. It adopts a phased
especially from right-wing parties and actors in domestic
approach, encompassing three main stages: the cessation
 94

politics, over the debates on potential concessions on East of

violence, the resumption of Palestinian security
Jerusalem. The ultra-Zionist Shas Party, which was part of
cooperation, the creation of a Palestinian state with
Olmert’s coalition at the time, stated that it would withdraw
provisional borders, and negotiations on final status issues,
from the coalition if concessions regarding Jerusalem
including borders, refugees, the status of Jerusalem, and
settlements, culminating in a comprehensive peace
were made. The United Nations withdrew a draft resolution
agreement. that aimed to support the peace process
targeted by the
conference due to objections from Israel and the United
The Road Map for Peace, while accepted by the Palestinian
States.
Authority under the leadership of Mahmoud Abbas, faced
reservations from the right-wing Likud Party government
led by Ariel Sharon at the time. The Israeli government
United Nations Resolutions stated that it accepted the
roadmap’s phased approach
rather than the entire plan and introduced various
The first UN resolution on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
conditions. Notable among these conditions was the
although it did not include any peace plans or proposals,
22

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
 95

is Resolution 181, widely known as the UN Partition

Plan.
It proposed a plan to partition Palestine into separate
Jewish and Arab states, with international administration
of Jerusalem. The plan was accepted by Jewish leaders but
rejected by Arab leaders, leading to the 1947-1949 Arab-
Israeli War.
United Nations resolutions about the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict have, over the years, shaped the diplomatic
landscape of peace processes by providing a coherent
framework for both parties. Starting with UN Resolution
Since 1945 , the
242 in 1967, these resolutions have
consistently
emphasised the impermissibility of territorial acquisition
Israeli-Palestinian
through war, urging Israel’s withdrawal from territories
conflict has
occupied during the Six-Day War and advocating for
secure borders and a just refugee settlement. Building on
witnessed the
this, UN Resolution 338 in 1973 called for an immediate
exercise of ceasefire, reinforcing the principles of Resolution
242 and
the necessity of negotiations for a just and enduring peace.
veto power
In 2002, UN Resolution 1397 marked a crucial milestone
 96

in the United by endorsing the vision of a two-state solution

for the first
time, coexisting within secure and recognised boundaries.
Nations Security
Subsequently, Resolution 1515 in 2003 reiterated the
Council on 36 commitment to a two-state solution, urging
an end to
violence and a return to negotiations while also endorsing
occasions. These
the Quartet’s roadmap for peace. Resolution 1850 in 2008
occurrences have further underscored the importance of
international and
regional efforts to support a two-state solution and bring
involved one of
an end to the protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Finally,
the five permanent UN Resolution 2334 in 2016 reiterated
the international
community’s condemnation of Israeli settlements in the
UNSC members:
West Bank and East Jerusalem as a breach of international
law, called for an immediate halt to settlement construction,
The United
and reaffirmed the unwavering commitment to a two-
States, Russia,
state solution. Even if they are not comprehensive peace
plans, these resolutions represent critical principles and
China, the United
guidelines that have underpinned peace negotiations and
 97

Kingdom, and have underscored the international

community’s stance
on the imperative of a two-state solution and the need
to France.
address critical issues through negotiations.
Since 1945, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has witnessed
the exercise of veto power in the United Nations
Security
Council on 36 occasions. These occurrences have involved
one of the five permanent UNSC members: The United
States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France.
The majority of these vetoes, specifically 34 of them, were
employed by the United States, with Russia and China
each exercising this power on two separate occasions.
23

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
Part Six:
Issues
West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem.
Pre-1967 ithin the context of the Israel-
borders, commonly referred to as the Green Line, have
Palestine conflict, a plethora of
been a point of reference in negotiations. Yet, disputes
pivotal issues have surfaced, serving
persist regarding the establishment of a Palestinian
as both catalysts for the conflict
 98

state, the borders of that state, and the sovereignty of

the W and consequential developments
land. Despite numerous peace talks and United Nations
over time. These issues have held a significant position in
resolutions pointing towards a solution, the operation of
shaping the trajectory of the conflict and peace initiatives,
Israeli courts in a manner that facilitates the expansion of
bearing great significance in terms of the consensus they
illegal settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem,
demand.
contrary to international law, has contributed to the
departure of this issue from the path of reconciliation.
Palestinian Refugees
The issue of Palestinian refugees is at the heart of the
Wat e r Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Dating back to the 1948
Arab-
Israeli War, the Nakba, and the subsequent Arab-Israeli
The issue of water in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
is
conflicts, approximately 700,000 Palestinians were
a multifaceted challenge deeply rooted in the region’s
displaced from their homes. Now, the estimated number
geography, politics, and history. The scarcity of water
of the Palestinian diaspora is about 6 million, registered as
resources is exacerbated by the arid climate, making access
refugees in different countries. The debate centres on their to
water a critical concern. A core aspect of this problem
 99

right to return to their ancestral lands, with Palestinians

lies in the unequal distribution of water, as Israel has
advocating for their return and Israelis concerned about
developed advanced water infrastructure and technology
the demographic and security implications of such a
that enables effective management of its water supply. In
move. The refugee issue is central to any
comprehensive contrast, Palestinians often grapple with
water scarcity
peace resolution, with various proposals and international
due to insufficient infrastructure, restrictions on drilling
initiatives aimed at addressing the needs and rights of
wells, and other limitations, resulting in disparities in
Palestinian refugees and addressing Israeli objections to
access to clean water. The situation is further complicated
the subject, mainly about security and demographics. by the
shared nature of critical groundwater sources, like
the Mountain Aquifer in the West Bank. The control and
management of water resources carry significant political
implications, as Israel, as the occupier in the West Bank
Jerusalem
and Gaza Strip, plays a central role in regulating access
Jerusalem is a city of immense religious and historical
to water sources in these territories. This has given rise
significance to both Palestinians and Israelis. It is
claimed
to allegations of discriminatory water allocation where
as a capital by both parties, and the status of Jerusalem has
 100

Israel systematically weaponises the water sources.

been a central point of contention in the conflict. The city’s
Water scarcity also extends to its economic and social
historical and religious importance, including the Western
ramifications, affecting agriculture, development, and
Wall and the Al-Aqsa Mosque, makes it a focal point for
economic growth, as individuals and businesses rely on
negotiations and disputes. Resolving the Jerusalem issue
water for basic needs and activities. Efforts have been
involves finding a way for both Palestinians and Israelis to
made to address the water issue through cooperation on
share the city, a challenge that has proven to be one of the
water projects, desalination initiatives, and international
most difficult in the peace process.
mediation.
Territory and Borders
The Economy
The issue of territory and borders is a fundamental aspect
The economic dimension of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It revolves around the
is marked by profound and long-lasting consequences
24

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
that have affected every facet of life in the region. This
The Blockade of Gaza
multifaceted issue encompasses trade and economic
 101

The Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip, in place

since
relations that have been severely disrupted due
to
2007, has had a severe impact on the people living in
the
restrictions on movement, goods, and people, making it
area. The blockade restricts the movement of goods and
challenging for Palestinians to engage in normal economic
people, contributing to an economic and humanitarian
activities with the rest of the world. According to the World
crisis. It has resulted in significant hardships for Gazans,
Bank, the annual GDP remains only 19.11 billion dollars
as
including limited access to essential services, high
of 2022. Infrastructure development has been hampered,
unemployment rates, and food and energy shortages. The
with ongoing military conflicts and insecurity impeding
blockade remains a contentious issue, with Israel citing
the construction of critical infrastructure like roads, energy
security concerns, while critics argue that it has resulted
networks, and water facilities. High unemployment rates,
in collective punishment and human rights violations.
particularly among Palestinians in the West Bank and
Addressing the blockade is a vital element in the pursuit
Gaza Strip, have persisted as economic instability and
of a comprehensive peace agreement and improved living
restrictions on labour movement limit job opportunities.
 102

conditions for Gazans.

The economic repercussions of the conflict have touched
the daily lives of the population by compromising access
to basic services, including healthcare and education. In
the context of a potential two-state solution, addressing
the economic challenges becomes essential, not only for
achieving peace but also for fostering economic stability,
sustainable development, and improving the overall
quality of life for people in the region.
25

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
Part Seven:
Actors
Commissioner for Human Rights to the Human Rights
ince the outbreak of the conflict, multiple
Council, some current information about the expansionist
actors have been involved in the Israeli-
acts of the Israeli settler movement is noteworthy: Palestinian
conflict. In this part, the focus
will be on three key actors of the conflict:
• “Through the manipulative use of land laws
S The Israeli settler movement, The Palestinian
applicable in the West Bank, Israel has declared more
Authority (PA), and Hamas.
than 750,000 dunams of land in the West Bank as
“State land”, including lands that would have been
 103

classified as private property. Under local laws, land

1. The Israeli Settler Movement registered as “State land”
is intended for public use.
The Israeli Settler Movement comprises Israeli Jews who
Nevertheless, according to Yesh Din, an Israeli human
have established communities, commonly known as
rights organisation, 99.76 per cent of the State land
settlements, primarily in the West Bank and, to a lesser
allocated for use has been allocated for the benefit of
extent, in East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. These
Israeli settlements.”
settlements have grown in number since the aftermath
• “Israel has spent billions of dollars on consolidating of
the 1967 Six-Day War, with motivations among settlers
settlement blocs with networks of so-called bypass
varying widely. Many settlers are motivated by religious
roads, which are designed to circumvent the
and ideological beliefs, drawing upon historical and
Palestinian presence in the West Bank. A 1997
biblical connections to the land. In contrast, others are
Israeli planning document explained that separate
attracted by economic incentives such as government
roads were a preferred planning model because
subsidies and affordable housing provided by the Israeli
they “provide a better solution for the issue of
government to attract more settlers to these lands. The
segregation”. Indeed, some roads are only for Israeli
settler movement remains a deeply contentious issue
 104

use, segregating Jewish and Palestinian travellers.

in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Palestinians and the
Even when Palestinians are allowed to travel on
international community often view the settlements as
some roads, they are primarily designed to connect
illegal under international law and a significant obstacle
settlements and outposts, to Israel and Jerusalem. to a
potential two-state solution, given their expansion and
In addition, an extensive system of checkpoints
impact on the geographic contiguity of a future Palestinian
and roadblocks allows Israel to control access to the
state.
bypass roads and the main highways in the West
In this context, the Israeli government has provided: Bank.
Furthermore, some roads segment Palestinian
governorates into isolated enclaves of village clusters,
• Financial incentives,
hindering connectivity and restricting Palestinians’
movement in the West Bank in a manner that severely •
Infrastructure development that is double that of the
infringes upon their freedom of movement and
people living in East Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, and
access to livelihoods and services, with negative
• Security to promote settlement growth. results. For
example, people who experience gender-
based violence are not able to access life-saving
This policy has been a major source of controversy, as
it services and quality care.”
 105

is often viewed as an obstacle to peace, undermining

the
viability of a potential Palestinian state and leading to •
“Over the past ten years, Israel has failed in its
international criticism, as many consider these settlements
obligation to promptly, effectively and independently
illegal under international law. The policy has varied across
investigate and prosecute crimes against Palestinians
different Israeli governments, with some administrations
committed by settlers and related violations by
promoting settlement expansion more vigorously than the
Israeli security forces and to provide justice
others. to the victims...Failure to protect Palestinians
and
deficiencies in the justice system to hold settlers
In this year’s report presented by the UN High
accountable for violence against Palestinians, with
26

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
particular obstacles to access to justice for women much
more asymmetric in favour of settler colonialism at
and girls, have been reported previously. Palestinians the
expense of Palestinian residents.
submit few complaints as they distrust the Israeli
As of the recent data on the Israeli settlement in the
legal system and because of fear of reprisals. Overall,
 106

occupied West Bank, the number is 700,000, and it is

these deficiencies sustain and exacerbate a climate
reported that the Israeli government intends to double this of
impunity for settler violence, encouraging the
by 2027. In the Zionist framework of Israeli policymaking,
continuation of attacks. Additionally, the above-
the general attitude towards the consecutive UN
mentioned attacks against Palestinians by settlers
resolutions describing the settler movement as illegal
shooting side by side with the Israeli security forces,
under international law is the complete rejection and
add to such a climate. Settler violence against
arrangement of the domestic legal framework in a way
Palestinians serves as a method to take over land in
that allows the settler expansion in the West Bank, East
the West Bank.”
Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.
The settler movement against the Palestinian population
is empowered by the Israeli legal system and bureaucracy,
making the trajectory of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
Many
settlers are
motivated by
religious and
ideological
beliefs ,
drawing upon
historical
 107

and biblical
connections
to the land.
27

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
In 2006, Hamas achieved a significant political milestone
2. The Palestinian Authority (PA)
by winning parliamentary elections. This electoral victory
Following the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority (PA)
signalled a potential shift towards more comprehensive
was established in 1994 to serve as the governing body for
political engagement. Notably, Hamas leader Ismail
certain areas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, known
as
Haniyeh, in a 2006 article in The Guardian, expressed a
Areas A and B. Its primary purpose is to administer civil
belief in the possibility of a peace process rooted in the
order, essential services, and local institutions, functioning
principles of equal rights.
as a limited self-governing body with varying degrees of
autonomy. Under its jurisdiction, it manages daily life in
The electoral victory in 2006 was a significant factor in
these areas, overseeing aspects such as law and order,
their rise to power in Gaza. The international community,
education, healthcare, and infrastructure. Originally
including Israel and the United States, largely opposed
 108

intended to govern the entire Palestinian territories, it lost

Hamas’s participation in the elections due to its
control of the Gaza Strip in 2007 to Hamas, which remains
classification as a terrorist organisation. In June
2007,
the de facto authority there. Led by President Mahmoud
after a series of clashes, Hamas seized control of Gaza
Abbas, the PA has played a central role in the Israeli-
from Fatah, solidifying its grip on the territory. This event
Palestinian peace process, seeking a two-state solution
marked a turning point in Palestinian politics and left
and international recognition as the State of Palestine.
Hamas in control of the Gaza Strip while Fatah retained
However, it faces significant challenges, including political
power in the West Bank. Hamas has also gained
support
divisions with Hamas, economic difficulties, and the
in Gaza through its provision of social services and welfare
ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. programs, which helped it
build a base of popular support
among some Palestinians. This included things
like
education, healthcare, and food distribution.
3. Hamas
The conflicts between Israel and Hamas remained volatile,
Hamas, originally the Islamic Resistance Movement, was
with sporadic ceasefire talks initiated through the efforts
 109

founded in 1987 during the early days of the First

Intifada of mediators like Israeli peace activist Gershon
Baskin.
by Sheikh Ahmed Yasin and Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, among
However, the assassination of Hamas leader Ahmed
others, including Mahmoud Zahar and Mohammad Taha.
Jabari during Israel’s Operation Pillar of Defence in 2012
Its roots can be traced to The Mujama al-Islamiya, a social
disrupted these diplomatic efforts and led to a resumption
charity organisation established as a wing of the Muslim
of armed struggle.
Brotherhood in 1973. The incident in which an
Israeli
military truck struck and killed four Palestinians in 1987
The 2006 elections exacerbated the ideological and
was one of the tragic events that influenced the formation
methodological differences between Hamas and Fatah.
of Hamas. The conflict between the two sides erupted
into a civil
conflict. Despite multiple reconciliation efforts in various
Initially, Hamas focused on non-violent solutions and
locations like Mecca, Sana’a, Doha, and Cairo since
2007,
even proposed truce and peace proposals, including
full unity has remained elusive. One of the foundational
discussions with Israeli leaders. They emphasised the
elements shaping Hamas’s method and approach, as
 110

need for an independent Palestinian state on the basis

of enshrined in its charter, was its staunch opposition to
equal rights and the principle of sovereignty. However, the
Israel’s right to exist. Fatah’s approach during the Oslo
tragic losses of Palestinian lives during the First Intifada,
Accords process, viewed by Hamas, essentially amounted
coupled with Israel’s disproportionate use of force, pushed to
making concessions to attain statehood, a right it
Hamas towards armed resistance. Hamas viewed the 1993
believed Palestinians already deserved, with little faith in
Oslo Accords as a departure from its core principles and as
the process of bringing about a resolution.
a concession that did not adequately address what it
saw
as the rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people.
As Throughout this period, Hamas continued its use of
suicide
a result, it opposed the Accords and continued to pursue
bombings and attacks, leading to constant pressure on
its agenda, including armed resistance against Israeli
Palestinian Authority leader Yasser Arafat to impel Israel
occupation. and the US to halt Hamas’s actions. Even before
the Second
Intifada, Hamas faced substantial pressure, including from
The Second Intifada saw Hamas maintain its commitment
Jordan, resulting in the arrest of its leaders, Khaled Mashal
to armed struggle against Israel, resulting in a significant
and Ibrahim Ghosheh, upon their return from an Iran visit.
 111

disparity in casualties, with Palestinian losses

far Ghosheh was deported to Qatar in 1999, while
Mashal
outnumbering Israeli casualties. resided in Damascus until
the outbreak of the Syrian Civil
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From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
War, then he moved to Qatar. These anecdotes illustrate that
a challenging political landscape in Palestine and, upon
the Hamas-Fatah ideological and methodological divide
gaining control in Gaza, became the dominant authority
took shape as Hamas gradually became marginalised and
here, facing various regional and international reactions
faced increasing regional and international pressure. that
culminated in a land, sea, and air blockade on the
movement of goods and people in and out of the Gaza
In light of this background, it is observed that Hamas
did Strip by Egypt and Israel for nearly two decades.
not resort to violence in the early stages of its
formation.
However, especially with the First Intifada, it underwent
a shift in its stance and methods in response to
the
increasing Israeli violence. Additionally, Hamas has faced
29
 112

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
Part Eight:
What Happened on October 7, 2023?
he Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades of document
from the Israeli Ministry of Intelligence indicates
Hamas initiated the ‘Operation Al-Aqsa that the forced
migration of 2.2 million Palestinians in Gaza
Flood’ in the early hours of October 7th, to northern
Sinai in Egypt is the ultimate target of Israel
targeting the southern regions of Israel through the
continuation of its large-scale attacks on the
T and penetrating the border from air, land, Gaza Strip.
This leaked plan resembles a modern-day
and sea. Commencing with approximately 5,000 missiles
Nakba, constituting the strategies of ethnic cleansing and
in the initial hours of the operation, which coincided
forced displacement, both of which are considered crimes
with the 50th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War,
Hamas under all aspects of international humanitarian law.
subsequently took 240 Israelis, including soldiers, as
captives upon entering southern Israeli territories. Despite
the prominent positions of the Israeli domestic intelligence
agency, Shin Bet, and the foreign intelligence network,
Mossad, in the region, criticism arose, suggesting that these
attacks were a result of a serious security vulnerability.
Hours later, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
announced that a state of war had been declared, marking
 113

Notably, the the first such declaration since the Yom Kippur
War of 1973.
The conflict began on that day.
attack on Al Ahli
Since the first day, the Israeli military (IDF) has conducted
Baptist Hospital
intense aerial attacks in the Gaza Strip, operating within
the framework of a principle of disproportionality. This on
the night of
has resulted in serious humanitarian consequences, such
October 15th as a high number of civilian casualties and
targeting of
hospitals, places of worship, and civilian residential areas.
resulted in the
Notably, the attack on Al Ahli Baptist Hospital on the night
of October 15th resulted in the loss of 300 to 500 lives, and
loss of 300 to
the strikes on the Jabalia refugee camp on October 31st
500 lives, and claimed the lives of over fifty civilians.
the strikes on the Among the narratives most frequently
used by Israel in
these attacks are counterterrorism and self-defence. The
Jabalia refugee
IDF’s attacks, targeting civilian settlements indiscriminately,
have turned out to be collective punishment of the
camp on October
Palestinian people. Additionally, Amnesty International
 114

31st claimed the and Human Rights Watch assessments

have established
the repeated use of white phosphorus bombs near civilian
lives of over fifty
settlements, which constitutes a war crime. Instead of
conducting a large-scale ground operation, the Israeli
civilians.
army has opted for a partial ground operation, yet it still
encounters significant resistance, and the continuation of
the war in the foreseeable future is highly anticipated.
Despite calls for a ceasefire from the United Nations
and its affiliated bodies, numerous leaders,
and
various independent organisations, Israel continues its
disproportionate and non-discriminatory warfare. A leaked
30

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
While world focuses on
humanitarian crisis in Gaza, Western
powers oppose cease-fire
While US and UK have blocked cease-fire
efforts in Israel-Palestine conflict at UN
Security Council, European countries, except
for some, have not voiced support for
cease-fire
31
 115

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
Part Nine:
The Reaction of the International
Community
British nationals in Israel should follow travel advice. (1)
nternational responses to Hamas’ attacks
and Israel’s conflict in Gaza have exhibited
As the barbarity of today’s atrocities becomes clearer, we
considerable diversity. When examining the
stand unequivocally with Israel. This attack by Hamas
stance of Western nations, it becomes evident
is cowardly and depraved. We have expressed our full I
that state leaders, diplomatic channels, and
solidarity to @Netanyahu and will work with international
international organisations have extended their support
partners in the next 24 hours to coordinate support. (2) to
Israel, primarily invoking grounds of “counterterrorism”
and “self-defence,” all the while disregarding the historical
The scenes we have seen in Israel over the last 36
hours
backdrop of pressure and violence. It should be noted
are truly horrifying. I spoke to Prime Minister @Netanyahu
that this support, albeit merely rhetorical in some cases,
earlier today to assure him of the UK’s steadfast support as
has also manifested in practical terms, particularly in the
Israel defends itself against these attacks. Terrorism will
 116

actions of states like the United States and the United

not prevail. (with a video statement) (3)
Kingdom, who have actively supplied military aid. Below
is a snapshot of various reactions from the international
UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak
community:
Joint Statement by the leaders of
United States of America France, Germany, Italy, the United
“This morning, I spoke with Prime Minister Netanyahu
Kingdom, and the United States of about the horrific and
ongoing attacks in Israel. The United
America States unequivocally condemns this appalling
assault
against Israel by Hamas terrorists from Gaza, and I
made Today, we — President Macron of France, Chancellor
Scholz
clear to Prime Minister Netanyahu that we stand ready
to of Germany, Prime Minister Meloni of Italy, Prime Minister
offer all appropriate means of support to the government
Sunak of the United Kingdom, and President Biden of the
and people of Israel. Terrorism is never justified. Israel has
United States — express our steadfast and united support
a right to defend itself and its people. The United States
to the State of Israel, and our unequivocal condemnation
warns against any other party hostile to Israel seeking
of Hamas and its appalling acts of terrorism. We make clear
advantage in this situation. My Administration’s support
that the terrorist actions of Hamas have no justification,
 117

for Israel’s security is rock solid and unwavering. Jill and

no legitimacy, and must be universally condemned.
I are keeping in our prayers all of the families who have
There is never any justification for terrorism. In recent
been hurt by this violence. We are heartbroken by the lives
days, the world has watched in horror as Hamas terrorists
that have been tragically cut short and hope for a swift
massacred families in their homes, slaughtered over 200
recovery for all those who have been wounded. My
team young people enjoying a music festival, and
kidnapped
and I are tracking this situation closely, and I will remain in
elderly women, children, and entire families, who are now
close touch with Prime Minister Netanyahu.” being held as
hostages. Our countries will support Israel
in its efforts to defend itself and its people against such
US President Joe Biden
atrocities. We further emphasise that this is not a moment
for any party hostile to Israel to exploit these attacks to seek
advantage. All of us recognise the legitimate aspirations
United Kingdom of the Palestinian people and support
equal measures
I am shocked by this morning’s attacks by Hamas terrorists of
justice and freedom for Israelis and Palestinians alike.
against Israeli citizens. Israel has an absolute right
to But make no mistake: Hamas does not represent
those
 118

defend itself. We’re in contact with Israeli authorities, and

aspirations, and it offers nothing for the Palestinian people
32

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
other than more terror and bloodshed. Over the coming
on both sides, and ultimately the search for peace will
days, we will remain united and coordinated, together as
always end in disappointment. Israel’s approach, which
allies, and as common friends of Israel, to ensure Israel
is disregards the fundamental rights of the
Palestinian
able to defend itself, and to ultimately set the conditions for
people, also threatens the security of its own
people,
a peaceful and integrated Middle East region. as seen in the
latest incident. Just as we are against the
oppression, cruelty, extrajudicial killings, and threats to life
and property imposed on Palestinians by Israeli security
forces and illegal settlers, we are also against random
United Nations
actions against Israeli civilians. The destruction of Gaza
It is time to end the vicious circle of bloodshed, hatred,
by disproportionate air and ground attacks, the bombing
and polarisation in the Middle East. Israel must see its
of mosques, and the deaths of innocent children, women,
legitimate needs for security materialized, and Palestinians
 119

elderly, and civilians are completely unacceptable. If

must see a clear perspective for the establishment of their
similar scenes have occurred in the actions against Israeli
own state realized. I recognise the legitimate grievances
cities, we definitely do not approve of them. We ask the
of the Palestinian people. But nothing can justify acts of
Israeli administration to stop its bombardments against
terror and the killing, maiming, and abduction of civilians.
Palestinian lands, especially Gaza, and the Palestinians
to I reiterate my call to immediately cease these attacks
&
stop their harassment of civilian settlements in Israel. This
release all hostages. While I recognise Israel’s legitimate
moderate step will also open the door to peace. This is the
security concerns, I also remind Israel that military
day to act not impulsively, but with state reason, coolness,
operations must be conducted in strict accordance
and human conscience. I would like to state that, as Türkiye,
with international humanitarian law. Civilians must be
we are ready for all kinds of mediation, including prisoner
respected and protected at all times. Civilian infrastructure
exchange, if the parties request it. We are also making the
must never be a target.
necessary preparations for the supply of humanitarian
aid materials that the people of Gaza will need. Today, I
UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres
had very productive telephone conversations with the
President of Palestine, Mr Abbas, and the President of
 120

Israel, Mr Herzog. Again today, we met with the Emir of

Türkiye
Qatar, Mr Sheikh Tamim, the Prime Minister of Lebanon,
We are deeply concerned about the violence and tension
Mr Mikati, and the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mr Anwar
that occurred in Israel and Palestine today (October 7).
Ibrahim, and discussed how we can stop the bloodshed.
We attach high importance to the restoration of calm in
We will hopefully continue to increase our diplomatic
the region as soon as possible and strongly condemn
the contacts and will make every effort to end the conflicts
and
loss of civilian lives. We underline that acts of violence and
restore calm as soon as possible.
associated escalations will not benefit anyone, and call on
the parties to act with restraint and avoid impulsive steps.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
As Türkiye, we are always ready to contribute to the best of
our ability to ensure that these developments can be taken
under control before they escalate further and spread
Saudi Arabia
to a wider area. In this regard, we continue our
intensive
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is closely following the
contact with the relevant parties. These sad developments
developments of the unprecedented situation between a
once again show the importance of the two-state solution
 121

number of Palestinian factions and the Israeli occupation

vision. We call on the parties to renounce the use of force
forces, which has resulted in a high level of violence on
and work for a lasting solution in line with this vision
several fronts there. The Kingdom calls for an immediate
without further delay.
halt to the escalation between the two sides, the protection
of civilians, and restraint. The Kingdom recalls its repeated
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
warnings of the dangers of the explosion of the situation
The problem in the region cannot be solved by constantly as
a result of the continuation of the occupation, the
harassing the Palestinian people, disregarding the safety of
deprivation of the Palestinian people of their legitimate
life and property, seizing their homes and lands, destroying
rights, and the repetition of systematic provocations
their infrastructure, and preventing their development.
against its sanctities. The Kingdom renews the call of
the
Such an approach will only lead to increased conflicts
international community to assume its responsibilities and
caused by deepening unrest, and constant bloodshed
activate a credible peace process that leads to the two-
33

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
 122

state solution to achieve security and peace in the

region
and protect civilians.
Qatar
The State of Qatar expresses its deep concern over the
developments in [the] Gaza Strip and calls on all parties to
de-escalate and exercise maximum restraint. The Ministry
of Foreign Affairs holds Israel solely responsible for the
ongoing escalation due to its ongoing violations of the
rights of the Palestinian people, the latest of which was the
repeated incursions into the Al-Aqsa Mosque under the
protection of the Israeli police. The Ministry stresses the
need for the international community to act [urgently] to
compel Israel to stop its flagrant violations of international
law, respect the resolutions of international legitimacy
and the historical rights of the Palestinian people, and to
prevent these events from being used as a pretext to ignite
a new asymmetric war against Palestinian civilians in Gaza.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterates the firm position
of the State of Qatar regarding the justice of the Palestinian
cause, and the legitimate rights of the brotherly Palestinian
people, and to establish their independent state on the
1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.
Conclusion
The Israel-Palestine conflict, a protracted
and multifaceted struggle, has witnessed the
involvement of various stakeholders across
different epochs. At its core, it is characterized by
 123

systematic colonial practices of Israel seeking to

displace the indigenous Palestinian population,
which has given rise to a resilient spirit of resistance.
In essence, the recent events, commencing with
the Hamas attacks on October 7th and Israel’s
onslaught on Gaza, notable for its disproportionate
use of force against civilians and deliberate
targeting of hospitals, public buildings, and civil
residential areas, are events that find their roots in
the extensive historical backdrop of the conflict.
This info pack delved into the conflict’s historical
trajectory and its contemporary status, offering a
multidimensional panorama that encompasses
the Zionist narrative and the traditional Palestinian
narrative, thereby underscoring the profound and
enduring nature of this issue.
34

From Past to Present:

The Israeli-Palestinian Conıict
35