Doctrine: Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable for acts referred to in Article 21 of the Civil Code. Article 21 of
the Civil Code, in conjunction with Article 19 of the Civil Code, is part of the
cause of action known in this jurisdiction as "abuse of rights." The elements
of abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad
faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Title: SPOUSES GODFREY and GERARDINA SERFINO v. FAR EAST
BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, INC., now BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, G.R. No. 171845, October 10, 2012, J. BRION
Facts: Plaintiffs filed a collection of money case against the spouses
Domingo and Magdalena Cortez (collectively, spouses Cortez). By way of
settlement, they executed a compromise agreement in which the spouses
Cortez acknowledged their indebtedness to the spouses Serfino in the
amount of ₱ 108,245.71. To satisfy the debt, Magdalena bound herself "to
pay in full the judgment debt out of her retirement benefits. No payment
was made and instead, plaintiffs discovered that Magdalena deposited her
retirement benefits in the savings account of her daughter-in-law, Grace
Cortez, with the respondent, Far East Bank and Trust Company, Inc.
(FEBTC).
Plaintiff made a letter to the FEBTC and requested them to prevent the
delivery of the deposit to either Grace or the spouses Cortez until its actual
ownership has been resolved in court.
On April 25, 1996, the spouses Serfino instituted Civil Case No. 95- 9344
against the spouses Cortez, Grace, and her husband, Dante Cortez, and
FEBTC for the recovery of money on deposit and the payment of damages,
with a prayer for preliminary attachment.
On April 26, 1996, Grace withdrew ₱ 150,000.00 from her savings account
with FEBTC. On the same day, plaintiffs sent another letter to FEBTC
informing it of the pending action; attached to the letter was a copy of the
complaint filed as Civil Case No. 95-9344.
On February 23, 2006, the RTC issued the assailed decision (a) finding the
spouses Cortez, Grace and Dante liable for fraudulently diverting the
amount due the spouses Serfino, but (b) absolving FEBTC from any liability
for allowing Grace to withdraw the deposit. The RTC declared that FEBTC
was not a party to the compromise judgment; FEBTC was thus not
chargeable with notice of the parties’ agreement, as there was no valid
court order or processes requiring it to withhold payment of the deposit.
Given the nature of bank deposits, FEBTC was primarily bound by its
contract of loan with Grace. There was, therefore, no legal justification for
the bank to refuse payment of the account, notwithstanding the claim of the
spouses Serfino as stated in their three letters.
Issue: Whether FEBTC is liable for damages against plaintiffs
Held: No. The Supreme Court first ruled that no valid assignment of credit
took place between spouses Cortez and FEBTC. Plaintiffs cannot validly
claim ownership of the retirement benefits that were deposited with FEBTC.
The judgment debt was not extinguished by the mere designation in the
compromise judgment of Magdalena’s retirement benefits.
Plaintiffs invoke and American common law that imposes a duty upon a
bank receiving a notice of adverse claim to the fund in a depositor’s
account to freeze the account for a reasonable length of time, sufficient to
allow the adverse claimant to institute legal proceedings to enforce his right
to the fund. To adopt the foreign rule, however, goes beyond the power of
this Court to promulgate rules governing pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts.
In the absence of a law or a rule binding on the Court, it has no option but
to uphold the existing policy that recognizes the fiduciary nature of banking.
As current laws provide, the bank’s contractual relations are with its
depositor, not with the third party; "a bank is under obligation to treat the
accounts of its depositors with meticulous care and always to have in mind
the fiduciary nature of its relationship with them." In the absence of any
positive duty of the bank to an adverse claimant, there could be no breach
that entitles the latter to moral damages.
Doctrine: Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil
Code, a person must, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good
faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in bad faith, with intent to
prejudice another.
Title: TITUS B. VILLANUEVA v. EMMA M. ROSQUETA, G.R. No. 180764,
January 19, 2010, J. ABAD
Facts: Respondent, a former Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue
Collection and Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs (the Bureau),
tendered her courtesy resignation from that post on January 23, 2001,
shortly after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office. But five
months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her resignation, claiming that
she enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned against her will
on orders of her superior.
On July 13, 2001,Gil Valerawas appointed to respondent’s position.
Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition and
other remedies against petitioner. The RTC granted the injunction case
against petitioner.
On November 22, 2001 while the preliminary injunction in the quo warranto
case was again in force, petitioner issued Customs Memorandum Order
40-2001, authorizing Valera to exercise the powers and functions of the
Deputy Commissioner.
During the Bureau’s celebration of its centennial anniversary in February
2002, in a magazine, all the customs deputy commissioners, except for
respondent and the souvenir program - authorized by petitioner, had a
space where Rosqueta’s picture was supposed to be but it instead stated
that her position was "under litigation. The commemorative billboard
displayed at the Bureau’s main gate included Valera’s picture but not
respondents.
On February 28, 2002 respondent filed a complaint for damages before the
RTC against petitioner Villanueva alleging that the latter maliciously
excluded her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia. Further, she
claimed that he prevented her from performing her duties as Deputy
Commissioner, withheld her salaries, and refused to act on her leave
applications.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. Upon appeal with the Court of
Appeals, it was overturned.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is liable for damages.
Held: Yes. Petitioner claims that he merely acted on advice of the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) when he allowed Valera to assume the office.
The court does not agree with him stating that a government official of his
rank must know that a preliminary injunction order issued by a court of law
had to be obeyed, especially since the question of Valera’s right to replace
respondent had not yet been properly resolved.
The Supreme court finds petitioner ignored the injunction shows bad faith
and intent to spite respondent who remained in the eyes of the law the
Deputy Commissioner. His exclusion of her from the centennial anniversary
memorabilia was not an honest mistake by any reckoning. Indeed, he
withheld her salary and prevented her from assuming the duties of the
position.
The Court of Appeals correctly awarded moral damages to respondent.
Such damages may be awarded when the defendant’s transgression is the
immediate cause of the plaintiff’s anguish in the cases specified in Article
2219 of the Civil Code.
Doctrine: Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit
to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of
another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience." There is unjust enrichment under Art. 22 of the Civil Code
when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at
the expense of or with damages to another.
Title: LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALFREDO ONG, G.R. No.
190755, November 24, 2010, J. Velasco, Jr.
Facts: Spouses Johnson and Evangeline Sy secured a loan from Land
Bank for 16 million pesos. Subsequently, they could no longer pay their
loan and sold three (3) of their mortgaged parcels of land for PhP 150,000
to Angelina Gloria Ong, Evangeline’s mother, under a Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage.
Evangeline’s father, respondent, went to Land Bank to inform it about the
sale and assumption of mortgage. Land Bank told respondent that there
was nothing wrong with the agreement. Land Bank told respondent to pay
Php 750,000.00 for the principal. Respondent issued a check for the
mentioned amount and Land Bank gave him a receipt for the same. Land
Bank then told respondent that the certificate of title would be transferred in
his name but this never materialized. No notice of transfer was sent to him.
Respondent later found out that the application for assumption of mortgage
was not approved. Land Bank foreclosed the mortgage and respondent
only knew about it when he saw the subject mortgage properties included
in a Notice of Foreclosure of Mortgage and Auction Sale at the RTC. His
counsel then talked to Land Bank’s lawyer and was told that the PhP
750,000 he paid would be returned to him.
As the money was still not returned, respondent then filed an action for
recovery of sum of money with damages against Land Bank. The RTC
ruled in favor of respondent and upon appeal with the Court of Appeals, still
ruled in his favor.
Issue: Whether or not Land Bank should return the Php 750,000.00
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Land Bank should return the
money based on the principle of unjust enrichment. Land Bank is correct in
arguing that it has no obligation as creditor to recognize respondent as a
person with interest in the fulfillment of the obligation. But while Land Bank
is not bound to accept the substitution of debtors in the subject real estate
mortgage, it is estopped by its action of accepting respondent’s payment
from arguing that it does not have to recognize him as the new debtor. By
accepting respondent’s payment and keeping silent on the status of his
application, Land Bank misled him to believe that he had for all intents and
purposes stepped into the shoes of the Spouses Sy. The principle applies
to the parties in the instant case, as, respondent, having been deemed
disqualified from assuming the loan, had no duty to pay Land Bank and the
latter had no right to receive it.
Doctrine: Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in
agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use
of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or
high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who
thereby suffers damage."
Title: WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION v. JESICHRIS
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 195549, September 3,
2014, J. Peralta
Facts: Respondent engaged in the manufacture and distribution of plastic
and metal products, Since its registration in 1992, it has been
manufacturing in its Caloocan plant and distributing throughout the
Philippines plastic-made automotive parts. Petitioner is engaged in the
manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and
metal has its office near that of respondent. Respondent alleged that in
view of the physical proximity of their offices, and in view of the fact that
some of the respondent’s employees had transferred to petitioner,
petitioner had developed familiarity with respondent’s products, especially
its plastic-made automotive parts.
Sometime in November 2000, respondent discovered that petitioner had
been manufacturing and distributing the same automotive parts with exactly
similar designs, materials, and colors but was selling these products at a
lower price than respondent’s plastic-made automotive parts and to the
same customers.
Respondent filed a case with RTC for unfair competition wherein it ruled in
favor of the respondent. Upon appeal with the Court of Appeals, it was
ruled again in favor of respondent.
Issue: Whether or not there is unfair competition under human relations
when the parties are not competitors and there is actually no damage on
the part of respondent?
Held: There is unfair competition. The Supreme Court ruled that it is clear
that what is being sought to be prevented is not competition per se but the
use of unjust, oppressive or high- handed methods which may deprive
others of a fair chance to engage in business or to earn a living. Plainly,
what the law prohibits is unfair competition and not competition where the
means use dare fair and legitimate.
In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two
characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival,
and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good
conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in
the language of our law, these include force, intimidation, deceit,
machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The
public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears
to be a private wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means.
Here, both characteristics are present.
First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both being engaged in the
manufacture of plastic-made automotive parts. Second, the acts of the
petitioner were clearly "contrary to good conscience" as petitioner admitted
having employed respondent’s former employees, deliberately copied
respondent’s products and even went to the extent of selling these
products to respondent’s customers.
It is evident that petitioner is engaged in unfair competition as shown by his
act of suddenly shifting his business from manufacturing kitchenware to
plastic-made automotive parts; his luring the employees of the respondent
to transfer to his employ and trying to discover the trade secrets of the
respondent.
Doctrine: Damages can be awarded pursuant to Article 21 not because of
breach of promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it
and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter.
Title: GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
MARILOU T. GONZALES, G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993, J. DAVIDE,
JR.
Facts: Petitioner, an Iranian, courted and proposed to marry private
respondent. She accepted his love on the condition that they would get
married and subsequently agreed to get married after the end of the school
semester. Petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage.
Sometime in August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the
Lozano Apartments. She was a virgin before she began living with him. A
week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her
started to change. He maltreated and threatened to kill her and sustained
injuries. During a confrontation with a representative of the barangay
captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner
repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him
anymore. It was also alleged that petitioner is already married to someone
living in Bacolod City.
Petitioner, in his Answer, denied the allegations.
The RTC ruled in favor of private respondent. Upon appeal with the Court
of Appeals, the RTC ruling was affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise
to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Held: No. The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is
not an actionable wrong. But in the light of Article 21, the Supreme Court
ruled that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of
the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that
promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive
device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to
the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21
not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit
behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's
"fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to
live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part
that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage." In short, the private respondent
surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina,
not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated
by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to.
Doctrine: The concept of abuse of rights prescribes that a person should
not use his right unjustly or in bad faith; otherwise, he may be liable to
another who suffers injury.
Title: RAUL H. SESBREÑO v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN
I. COROMINA ET AL., G.R. No. 160689, March 26, 2014, J. BERSAMIN
Facts: In the afternoon of May 11, 1989, the Violation of Contracts (VOC)
Team of defendants-appellees Constantino and Arcilla and their PC escort,
Balicha, conducted a routine inspection of the houses at La Paloma Village,
Labangon, Cebu City, including that of plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño, for
illegal connections, meter tampering, seals, conduit pipes, jumpers, wiring
connections, and meter installations. After Bebe Baledio, plaintiff-appellant
Sesbreño’s maid, unlocked the gate, they inspected the electric meter and
found that it had been turned upside down. Defendant-appellant Arcilla took
photographs of the upturned electric meter. With Chuchie Garcia, Peter
Sesbreño and one of the maids present, they removed said meter and
replaced it with a new one. At that time, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño was in
his office and no one called to inform him of the inspection. The VOC Team
then asked for and received Chuchie Garcia’s permission to enter the
house itself to examine the kind and number of appliances and light fixtures
in the household and determine its electrical load. Afterwards, Chuchie
Garcia signed the Inspection Division Report, which showed the condition
of the electric meter on May 11, 1989 when the VOC Team inspected it,
with notice that it would be subjected to a laboratory test. She also signed a
Load Survey Sheet that showed the electrical load of plaintiff-appellant
Sesbreño.
But according to plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño there was nothing routine or
proper at all with what the VOC Team did. Their entry to his house and the
surrounding premises was effected without his permission and over the
objections of his maids. They threatened, forced, or coerced their way into
his house. They unscrewed the electric meter, turned it upside down, and
took photographs thereof. They then replaced it with a new electric meter.
They searched the house and its rooms without his permission or a search
warrant. They forced a visitor to sign two documents, making her appear to
be his representative or agent. Afterward, he found that some of his
personal effects were missing, apparently stolen by the VOC Team when
they searched the house.
Plaintiff filed a case of abuse of rights with the RTC. The RTC held in favor
of the respondents. Upon appeal with the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the
RTC was affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not Sesbreño is entitled to recover damages for abuse of
rights?
Held: No. Sesbreño’s main contention is that the inspection of his
residence by the VOC team was an unreasonable search for being carried
out without a warrant and for being allegedly done with malice or bad faith.
The constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures is
intended as a restraint against the Government and its agents tasked with
law enforcement. It is to be invoked only to ensure freedom from arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of State power.
It is worth noting that the VOC inspectors decided to enter the main
premises only after finding the meter of Sesbreño turned upside down,
hanging and its disc not rotating. Their doing so would enable them to
determine the unbilled electricity consumed by his household. The
circumstances justified their decision, and their inspection of the main
premises was a continuation of the authorized entry.
Sesbreño did not establish his claim for damages if the respondents were
not guilty of abuse of rights. Although the act is not illegal, liability for
damages may arise should there be an abuse of rights, like when the act is
performed without prudence or in bad faith. In order that liability may attach
under the concept of abuse of rights, the following elements must be
present, to wit: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty, (b) which is
exercised in bad faith, and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another. There is no hard and fast rule that can be applied to ascertain
whether or not the principle of abuse of rights is to be invoked. The
resolution of the issue depends on the circumstances of each case.
Doctrine: In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential
elements must be present: (1) that the defendant has been enriched, (2)
that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the
defendant is without just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no
other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.
Title: UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PHILAB INDUSTRIES, INC.,
G.R. No. 152411, September 29, 2004, J. CALLEJO, SR.
Facts: Sometime in 1979, UP decided to construct the Research Complex.
As part of the project, laboratory equipment and furniture were purchased
from BIOTECH. The FEMF then agreed to fund the acquisition of the
laboratory furniture, including the fabrication thereof.
Renato E. Lirio, the Executive Assistant of the FEMF, gave the go-signal to
BIOTECH to contact a corporation to accomplish the project. On July 23,
1982, Dr. William Padolina, the Executive Deputy Director of BIOTECH, to
give the go-signal to respondent PHILAB to proceed with the fabrication of
the laboratory furniture, and requested Padolina to forward the contract of
the project to FEMF for its approval.
By 1983, PHILAB made a report showing that they made 78% of the
project while they were only paid 40% of the total cost. Until around 1987,
PHILAB was still not paid.
PHILAB then filed a case against UP with the RTC in which the court ruled
against them. But on appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in their favor.
Issue: Whether or not there was unjust enrichment.
Held: None. It bears stressing that the respondent’s cause of action is one
for sum of money predicated on the alleged promise of UP to pay for the
purchase price of the furniture, which, despite demands failed to do.
However, the respondent failed to prove that the petitioner ever obliged
itself to pay for the laboratory furniture supplied by it. Hence, the
respondent is not entitled to its claim against the petitioner.
There is no dispute that the respondent is not privy to the MOA executed
by the petitioner and FEMF; hence, it is not bound by the said agreement.
Contracts take effect only between the parties and their assigns. A contract
cannot be binding upon and cannot be enforced against one who is not a
party to it, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with
knowledge thereof.
To substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must
unequivocally prove that another party knowingly received something of
value to which he was not entitled and that the state of affairs is such that it
would be unjust for the person to keep the benefit. The essential requisites
for the application of Article 22 of the New Civil Code is not present. The
respondent had a remedy against the FEMF via an action based on an
implied-in-fact contract with the FEMF for the payment of its claim. The
petitioner legally acquired the laboratory furniture under the MOA with
FEMF; hence, it is entitled to keep the laboratory furniture.
Doctrine: A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it.
Title: CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO
QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN v. FELIX ICAO, G.R. No. 26795, July
31, 1970, J. JBL REYES
Facts: Petitioner alleged that respondent, although married, succeeded in
having carnal intercourse with her several times by force and intimidation,
and without her consent. She became pregnant and had to stop studying.
Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint
did not allege that the child had been born. The CFI ruled in defendant’s
favor
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result
of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court,
sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable,
since the original complaint averred no cause of action.
Issue: Whether or not defendant’s contention of the plaintiff’s child being
unborn is meritorious.
Held: No. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as
explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors,
particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted
for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en
ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may
receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its
being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a
forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such
child should be born after the death of the testator.
Doctrine: A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution
of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon
which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues
raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal
case.
Title: IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS v. ISAGANI D. BOBIS, G.R. No.
138509, July 31, 2000, J. YNARES-SANTIAGO
Facts: On 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria
Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or
terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with
petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on 1996 and allegedly a third marriage
with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Petitioner filed a bigamy case against
respondent on 1998. Respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was
celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the
pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to
the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the
criminal case.
Petitioner then filed a certiorari on the RTC order hence this case.
Issue: Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of
nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal
case for bigamy.
Held: No. As ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the
criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a
civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, the
Supreme Court held that the pendency of a civil case for declaration of
nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question. This ruling applies here by
analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
Doctrine: An action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or
death pertains primarily to the one injured. If no action for such damages
could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it
received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or
heirs.
Title: ANTONIO GELUZ v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR
LAZO, J. REYES, J.B.L., G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961
Facts: Respondent’s wife, Nita Villanueva came to know the petitioner, a
physician through her aunt. When she became pregnant before their
marriage, she got an abortion, through petitioner, to conceal her
pregnancy. She got an abortion again when she was hired by the
COMELEC, through petitioner. Less than two years later, she had an
abortion again through petitioner but this time without the consent of
respondent.
Respondent filed for damages against petitioner in which the lower courts
ruled favor of respondent.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes respondent's basis in filing
this action and award of damages.
Issue: Whether the private respondent can claim for damages because of
the third abortion.
Held: No. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal
injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured if no action for such
damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the
injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its
parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of
the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since
no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical
personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is
no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child
(conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because
that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing
the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at
all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as
distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his
right to life and physical integrity.
Doctrine:
Title: CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION v.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO
and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL
CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR
EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), G.R. No. 182836,
October 13, 2009, J. CHICO-NAZARIO
Facts: Hortillano, an employee of petitioner and a member of respondent
Union filed on 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and
Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to their CBA.
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child who was
premature and died during his wife’s labor.
Petitioner immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but
denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits,
consisting of the death and accident insurance.
The Arbitration proceedings, the RTC, and the Court of Appeals ruled all in
favor of Hortillano.
Petitioner contends that the CBA is clear and unambiguous that its
meaning legal meaning of death should be applied. Only one with juridical
personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality.
Issue: Whether petitioner’s contention is correct.
Held: No. The Supreme Court held that the civil personality of the unborn
child herein since his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person
are not in issue. It is not a question before us whether the unborn child
acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that
were passed on to or assumed by the child’s parents. The rights to
bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain
directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s death.
