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Sedition under Section 124-A of the Indian Penal

Code: An Analysis
Prenavpreet Kaur
University Institute Of Legal Studies, Panjab University,
Chandigarh, India

ABSTRACT:
Freedom of speech is one of the most important aspect of a democracy. The law of sedition under section 124 of Indian
Penal Code violates this very fundamental freedom. This section has been used by British administration for stifling
freedom fighters‟ voices and one would hope that it would not make its way into the independent India. However it still
found its way through Indian Legal system. Indian judiciary has tried to limit its ambit and interpret it in a constitutional
manner. Regardless, the government has launched unnecessary proceedings against innocent individuals due to political
vendetta. The suffering of these individuals caused by harassment under this section is blatant violation of human rights
and is testimony why this law needs to be repealed. Furthermore, Indian laws provide sufficient safeguards for
maintaining security and sovereignty of the state.

I. INTRODUCTION
John Stuart Mill once said, “If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the
contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power,
would be justified in silencing mankind.”

Such is the importance of freedom of speech of an individual in the society. The Indian Constitution guarantees
this freedom of speech to Indian citizen so that they can fulfill their potential and reach their highest selves. It
also protects state from encroaching upon this right of an individual. Indian judicial system acts as a safeguards
and provider of remedies against any arbitrary administrative containment of these rights. The problem arises
when state encroaches upon this sphere by protecting itself from judicial scrutiny. This is made possible by
various oppressive and regressive laws which enable the state to act in a capricious manner.

Sedition under S.124-A is such a law which needs a full discussion in today‟s time. This law of colonial times
was used to curb people‟s freedom, it is being utilized in the same way in independent India the only difference
being nature of the state. We need to understand the history of this law, how its application has troubled
innocent people and why it needs to be omitted from the Indian Penal Code.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Law in England

Originally, the common law principles regarding sedition evolved from some of Britain‟s oldest laws, such as
the Statute of Westminster 1275, when the divine right of the King and the principles of a feudal society were

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not questioned. Seditious libel was established by the Star Chamber case De Libellis Famosis of 1606. Not
only was truth no defense, but intention was irrelevant, as was the actual harm (reputational or otherwise) done
by the libel. Later, the Criminal Libel Act 1819 made statutory provisions for the seizure, confiscation and
destruction of all seditious materials. Before 1832, the English law of “seditious libels” was actually quite
expansive. A person could be convicted for sedition for saying anything that brought the Government into
“hatred or contempt” or even for merely raising “discontent or disaffection” against the government. In other
words, it was not necessary for a person to say something that was actually likely to make people take up arms
against the government. Seditious libel and Criminal libel are common law offences in the United Kingdom. A
seditious libel is a statement which brings into “hatred or contempt” the Monarch, her heirs, the Government or
its officials.

The definition of sedition in Stephen‟s Digest of the Criminal Law is a widely cited text:1

Sedition consists of any act done, or words spoken or written and published which:

 has or have a seditious tendency and;

 is done or are spoken or written and published with a seditious intent. A person may be said to have a
seditious intent if he has any of the following intentions, and acts or words may be said to have a
seditious tendency if they have any of the following tendencies:
o an intention or tendency to bring into hatred or contempt, or to excite disaffection against the
person of,
o her Majesty, her heirs or successors, or the government and constitution of the United Kingdom,
as by law established, or either House of Parliament, or the administration of justice, or to excite
Her Majesty‟s subjects to attempt, otherwise than by lawful means, the alteration of any matter
in Church or State by law established, [or to incite any person to commit any crime in
disturbance of the peace] or to raise discontent or disaffection among Her Majesty‟s subjects, or
to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between difference classes of such subject.

However, this changed after 1832. In his authoritative 19th century treatise on the history of English criminal
law, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen wrote that prosecutions for sedition in England since 1832 were “so rare that
they may be said practically to have ceased”. “In one word,” he wrote, “nothing short of direct incitement to
disorder and violence is a seditious libel.” Ironically, Stephen was the Law Member of the Viceroy‟s Council
who would introduce sedition into the IPC.

1
Stephen, Digest of the Criminal Law, Art. 114 (9th ed.).
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Law in India under the British Administration

The original draft of the IPC was drawn up in 1837 by the Indian Law Commission headed by T.B. Macaulay.
Macaulay„s Draft Penal Code 1837 consisted of section 113 that corresponded to section 124-A IPC. Section
113 of this draft made it an offence to “excite feelings of disaffection against the government”. Macaulay‟s
definition of sedition was not as broad as the pre-1832 English law of seditious libels. For instance, Macaulay
did not make it an offence to excite hatred, contempt or ill will against the government, choosing only the
vague word “disaffection” to describe sedition. The punishment proposed was life imprisonment. Sir John
Romilly, Chairman of Second Pre-Independence Law Commission commented upon the quantum of the
punishment proposed for sedition, on the ground that in England the maximum punishment had been three
2
years and he suggested that in India it should not be more than five years. However, this section was not
included in the IPC when it was enacted in 1860. This omission was attributed to a clerical error. This was
surprising for many. Mr. James Stephens when asked about this omission referred to the letter written by Sir
Barnes Peacock to Mr. Maine, where he had remarked that:

―I have looked into my notes and I think the omission of a section in lieu of section 113 of the original Penal
Code must have been through mistake […] I feel however that it was an oversight on the part of the committee
not to substitute for section 113.3

Mr. James Stephen thereafter set out to rectify this omission. An amendment was introduced to the IPC in 1870,
and Section 113 of Macaulay‟s draft was inserted into the code as Section 124-A. There is some evidence to
suggest that sedition was finally made an offence in British India because the colonial government feared a
Wahabi uprising. While introducing the amendment to the Viceroy‟s Council, Law Member Stephen made a
specific reference to a man who had preached “jehad or holy war against Christians in India” and of how the
man had been in the habit “for weeks and months and years, of going from village to village, and preaching in
every place he came to that it was a sacred religious duty to make war against the Government of India”. Later,
in 1898, the Lieutenant Governor of Calcutta similarly said that it was “the Wahabi conspiracy and the open
preaching of jehad or religious war against the government” in 1870 that had prompted the introduction of
sedition into the IPC.4

Consequently, sedition was included as an offence under section 124A IPC through special Act XVII of 1870.
This section was in line with the Treason Felony Act 1848 that penalized seditious expressions. One of the
reasons cited by Mr. Stephen for introducing this section was that in the absence of such provision, this offence

2
2 Dr. Hari Singh Gour, Penal Law of India, 1232, (Law Publishers (India) Pvt. Ltd., 11th ed.).
3
Law Commission of India, Consultation paper on “Sedition” (Aug30, 2018).
4
Abhinav Chandrachud, History of Sedition, FRONTLINE
(Sept 16, 2019 ), https://frontline.thehindu.com/the-nation/history-of-sedition/article9049848.ece.
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would be penalized under the more severe common law of England. 5 Therefore, the adoption of this section
was projected as an obvious choice for protecting freedom of expression from the stricter common law.
According to Mr. Stephen, the adopted clause was much more compressed, much more distinctly expressed,
and freed from great amount of obscurity and vagueness with which the law of England was hampered. The
“intent” of the section was to punish an act of exciting feelings of disaffection towards the government, but this
disaffection was to be distinguished from disapprobation. Thus, people were supposedly free to voice their
feelings against the government as long as they projected a will to obey its lawful authority. However,
Macaulay‟s draft did not reflect the current state of the law in England either, according to which only direct
incitements to violence against the state were considered seditious. Hence it was misconstrued greatly by the
Courts and used as an instrument to oppress Indians and to cause a hindrance in the freedom struggle.

Section 124A IPC was amended in 1898 by the Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Act 1898 (Act V of 1898)
providing for punishment of transportation for life or any shorter term. While the former section defined
sedition as exciting or attempting to excite feelings of disaffection to the Government established by law,
the amended section also made bringing or attempting to bring in hatred or contempt towards the Government
established by law, punishable.6

The West Minster Parliament enacted the Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act, 1907, in order to prevent
public meetings, likely to lead the offence of sedition or to cause disturbance as in many parts of India,
meetings were held against the British rule, with the main objective of overthrowing the Government.

The Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act, 1911, repealed the Act 1907. Section 5 thereof enabled the statutory
authorities to prohibit a public meeting in case such meeting was likely to provoke sedition or disaffection or to
cause disturbance of public tranquility. Violation of the provisions of the Act was made punishable with
imprisonment for a term, which could extend to six months or fine or both.

The history of enactment of Sedition shows that it was clearly meant to suppress the voices of freedom fighters
and anyone who dared raise their voice against the inhumane, exploitative and structurally discriminatory
practices against Indian people. Even though the provision under IPC allowed for disapprobation of the
government but any serious disapprobation or criticism of the government was construed as disaffection. The
term “disaffection” was given a very wide meaning. This was seen in various pre-Independence hearings where
biases of various Judges were used to Indian‟s disadvantage.

It was hoped that once India gained independence and the Constitution comes into force, all the draconian laws

5
Queen Emperess v. Jogendur Chandra Bose (1892) 19 ILR Cal 35.
6
K.I. Vibhute & P.S.A. Pillai‟s Criminal Law 335 (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2012).

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forced upon the Indian populace would cease to exist. Freedom promised people not only a sovereign country
but a democratic government; a government by and for the people remains open to criticism and performance
analysis. However, sedition was still considered an offence under the IPC after independence. Even after seven
decades of independence, sedition is still considered an offence under s.124-A of the Indian Penal Code.

III. SEDITION UNDER SECTION 124-A OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE UNDER CURRENT
INDIAN LAW
Section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code defines sedition. It states that whoever, by words, either spoken or
written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise brings or attempts to bring into hatred or
contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards, the Government established by law in India
shall be punished with imprisonment for life, to which fine may be added, or with imprisonment which may
extend to three years, to which fine may be added, or with fine. Sedition has been defined under many statutes
but the general provision of law is similar in all the provisions and Section 124-A would suffice to our purpose.

The Explanation 1 to this section state that the expression “disaffection” includes disloyalty and all feelings of
enmity. Explanation 2 reads that comments expressing disapprobation of the measures of the Government with
a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means, without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or
disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this section. Explanation 3 states that comments expressing
disapprobation of the administrative or other action of Government without exciting or attempting to excite
hatred contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this section.

Explanation 1 sets out the scope of disaffection and Explanation 2 and 3 state what is not considered sedition.
The word sedition however does not occur in the body of the section. It finds place only as a marginal note. The
section places absolutely on the same footing the successful excitation of disaffection and the unsuccessful
attempt to excitation. The offence consists in making use of any means for the purpose of bringing Government
into hatred or contempt.

Ingredients of Sedition

The following are the essential ingredients of the section,

 Bringing or attempting to bring into hatred against the Government;

 Exciting or attempting to excite disaffection against the Government of India;

 Such act or attempt may be done by words, either spoken or written , or by signs or by visible
representation , and

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 The act must be intentional7

Whoever – Apart from the composer or writer of the article alleged to be seditious, every other person who
uses in any way, words or printed matter, for the purpose of exciting feelings of disaffection towards the
Government is guilty under Section 124-A.

By words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation or otherwise – In the word
“written” print is included by the General Clauses Act (10 of 1986).the words “otherwise” indicate the
universality of the means by which the offence may be committed. The offence may be committed by means of
words spoken, written, or by visible representations such as pictures, or by dramatic performances even in
dumb show, wh.ere no words are spoken, where the feelings of the audience are excited, any gestures and
motions and dramatic actions of the performers.

Attempt – It is not necessary to bring the case within Section 124-A that it should be shown that the attempt
was successful. Whether the attempt has achieved the result is immaterial. 8 The term “attempt” used in its
ordinary connotation in Section 124-A means some external act, something tangible and ostensible which can
be an act in the eye of law showing progress towards the actual commission of the offence. It does not matter
that the progress was uninterrupted.9

‘Hatred’ or ‘Contempt’- Hatred implies an ill will, while contempt implies a low opinion. The hatred and
contempt in order to be punishable under this section must relate to the hatred and contempt of the State, or of
the established form Government.

Government established by law - Government established by law" has to be distinguished from the person's
for the time being engaged in carrying on the administration. "Government established by law" is the visible
symbol of the State.10 The word „Government‟ denotes both State and Centre Government. The “Government
established by law” means the existing political system as distinguished from any set of administration. 11
Government here does not mean an official of the government working in its capacity. It means all the officials
working in their collective capacity. It does not refer to the person or persons exercising control or authority,
rather it means the executive mechanism of the State itself.

Disaffection – Explanation 1 to Section 124A does not define the word disaffection. It only talks about its
circumference by including disloyalty and all feelings of enmity. Disaffection is never used for individuals, and
is always used for the government.

7
K.D Gaur, Commentary on the Indian Penal Code, (Universal Law Publishing Co., 2 nd ed.).
8
Emperor v. Bhaskar, (1906) 8 BOMLR 421.
9
Emperor v. Ganesh, (1910) 12 BOMLR 105.
10
Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 965: (1962) 2 Cr LJ 103.
11
Queen Empress v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, (1899) 22 ILR Bom 112.
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The meaning of this word needs to be understood in order to assess whether a particular act is seditious or not.
The courts have interpreted the word, „disaffection‟12 widely as stated below:

1. It signifies political alienation or discontent, that is to say, a feeling of disloyalty to the Government or
existing power, which tends to dispose a person not to obey, but rather to resist and attempt to subvert that
Government or power. It cannot be construed to mean an absence or contrary of affection, or love, that is to say,
dislike or hatred.

It is a positive political distemper, and not a mere absence or negation or love or goodwill. It is a positive
feeling of aversion which is akin to disloyalty, a defiant insubordination of authority, or when it is not defiant,
secretly seeks to alienate the people, and weaken the bond of allegiance, and prepossesses the minds of the
people with avowed or secret animosity towards the Government, a feeling which tends to bring the
Government into hatred or contempt by imputing base or corrupt motives, it makes men indisposed to obey or
support the laws of the realm, and promotes discontent and public order.13

“There is a very wide difference between the meaning of the two words disaffection and disapprobation.
Whenever the prefix 'dis' is added to a word, the word formed conveys an idea the opposite to that conveyed by
the word without the prefix. Disaffection means a feeling contrary to affection; in other words, dislike or hatred.
Disapprobation means simply disapproval. It is quite possible to disapprove of a man's sentiments or action and
yet to like him.”14

Intention – The essence of the crime of sedition consists in the intention with which the language is used15, and
such intention has to be judged primarily on the basis of the language used. In arriving at its conclusion as to
the intention of the accused in making a speech, the Court must obviously have regard to the class of audience
to which, and the circumstances in which, the speech was made and must then decide as to the probable effect
of the speech, the speech must be read as a whole.16 The Court should in every case consider the book or
newspaper article as a whole, and in a fair, free and liberal spirit and not dwell too much upon isolated
passages, or upon a strong word here or there, which may be qualified by the context, but endeavour to gather
the general affect which the whole composition would have on the minds of the public. 17 The speech has to be
seen as whole and not in pieces.

Liability of printer and publisher – the printer and publisher of a seditious act are also liable for sedition
under Section 124A. It is not open for the publisher of seditious matter to contend that it is not my work. The

12
Ratanlal and Dhiraj Lal, Law of Crimes, (24th edition).
13
Emperor v. Ramchandra Narayan, (1887) 22 LLR Bom 152.
14
Pethram, C.J. in Queen Empress v Jogendur Chander Bose (1892) 19 ILR Cal 35.
15
Arjun Arora v. Emperor, AIR 1935 All 295.
16
Fakrulal Islam v. Emperor, AIR 1943 All 246.
17
Per Lord Kenyon, C.J. in R v. Reeves, 26 How St. Tr 592.
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publisher is prima facie liable for whatever material appears in his paper and if he seeks to get rid of that
liability, the onus lies on him. What is necessary for him to establish is that the article published was published
without his knowledge or authority or consent or without any acquiescence or intention on his part. Mere
absence is insufficient to state in answer for the charge.

Comments expressing disapprobation of the administrative measure, administrative and other action of
the Government (Explanation 2 and 3) – Under Explanations 2 and 3 to Section 124A, IPC, comments
expressing disapprobation of the measures of the government with a view to obtain lawful means, and
comments expressing disapprobation of the administrative or other action of the Government without exciting
or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection towards the Government do not constitute an offence
under this section. The object of this explanation is to protect the bona fide criticism of public measures and
institutions with a view to their improvement, and to remedying of grievances and abuses. A mere criticism or
denunciation of the Government established by law is not objectionable. It is not seditious to criticize
administrative machinery, public measures or the officers of the Government within the limits of fair
criticism.18

IV. JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE ON AND INTERPRETATION OF S.124-A

Judicial interpretation of any legislation plays an imperative part in application of that legislation. It is the fine
line between freedom as a right and freedom as an exception. Judicial interpretation of a time also gives the
model of the nature of the state at the time, whether it is oppressive or progressive. This difference is mirrored
in the Privy Council‟s interpretation of S.124-A and the Supreme Court of India after independence.

PRE-CONSTITUTIONAL HEARINGS

The British Government used S.124-A as one of its most potent weapons to silence the voices criticizing its
inhumane actions and unparalleled suppression. It launched a crusade against freedom fighters advocating „self
government‟ which was assisted by biased laws blatantly suppressing free speech, one sided judicial decisions
and institutionalized policies of oppression.

Emperor v Bal Gangadhar Tilak19

Bal Gangadhar Tilak‟s trial was one of the first cases to end in a conviction for sedition in India. Judicial bias,
manipulation of the facts, censure of free speech on honest criticism of the Government are the elements which
came together to bring Bal Gangadhar Tilak‟s speech under S.124-A. After being convicted by the District
Magistrate, Tilak filed for a leave petition. His contentions read,

18
Vishambhar Dayal v. Emperor, AIR 1941 Oudh 33.
19
(1898) 22 ILR Bom 528.
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“The learned Judge should have told the jury to keep in mind the question— was the spirit, in which the words
were alleged to have been designed to engender, compatible or incompatible with the disposition to obey lawful
authority? The contention now was that the articles, and the rhetorical verses, were merely intended as
comments upon the course of Government, and upon the change in social habits and institutions which had
been brought about since the days of Maratha rule; and that there was nothing to be found in the words used
which necessarily tended to excite a disposition not to render obedience to lawful authority.”20

Tilak faced two sedition trials, one in 1897 and the other in 1908. He was convicted in both. In 1897, Kesari, of
which by that time Tilak was the publisher, proprietor and editor, carried an article called „Shivaji‟s
Utterances‟. The paper had resurrected 17th century‟s iconic Hindu Maratha king Shivaji and recorded his
putative statements at the existing state of affairs in colonial India. In 1894, a scholar called Prof RP Karkaria
read a paper on Shivaji before the Royal Asiatic Society in Bombay. Two years later, the movement acquired
shape of a festival to honour Shivaji. The Shivaji festival began in June 1897. Tilak presided over the festival
and also spoke. A poem was also sung by someone. These were carried out as „Shivaji‟s Utterances‟ in Kesari
by Tilak. A week later, president of the Plague Relief Committee WC Rand and one Lt CE Ayerst were
murdered at midnight while returning home. Media insinuated it to Tilak‟s speech and „Shivaji‟s Utterances‟.
Interestingly at that time, the government had just confirmed his election to the Legislative Council. Within a
month, the government gave sanction to Tilak‟s prosecution for sanction. The place of trial was chosen to be
Bombay instead of Poona from where Kesari was published. The case was committed to sessions in the
Bombay High Court. Advocate-General Basil Lang conducted the prosecution. Dinshaw D Davar appeared for
the defense. The nine-member jury (as opposed to 12 in England) comprised of five European Christians, two
Hindus, one Parsi and one European Jew. Justice Arthur Strachey at the Bombay High Court delivered the
charge to the jury. The two charges against Tilak were publication of „Shivaji‟s Utterances‟ in Kesari on 15
June 1897 and the report of the meeting on 13 June 1897. The meaning, scope and width of sedition were
discussed at length. The Marathi translation caused a lot of furor because the majority of jurors did not
understand or have any knowledge of the Marathi language. By a majority of 6:3, with all three Indians
supporting Tilak, he was adjudged guilty. Interestingly, the then Criminal Procedure Code gave Indians the
right to be tried by a jury consisting of a majority of Indian jurors. However, some cases were determined by
the government discretionally and the trial judge could be tried by a „special jury‟. These special juries had a
majority of non-Indian jurors on them. Furthermore, neither the judge nor the jurors knew Marathi. Justice
Arthur Strachey readily accepted the jury‟s verdict and sentenced Tilak to 18 months‟ rigorous imprisonment.
Justice Strachey laid several grounds; including presumed intent, bad feelings, incitement not being mandatory,

20
(1898) 22 ILR Bom 534.
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impact’s inconsequentiality, class of readers, speech as a whole, immaterial truth and evidence for spoken
word. Tilak was, however, persuaded to accept conditional release and was released on 6th September 1898.
The ambit of S.124-A was widened by a few explanations by Justice Strachey himself by including the words,
„hatred‟ or „contempt‟. Tilak was convicted again in 1908.21

Tilak‟s reply to this conviction was, “All I wish to say is that, in spite of the verdict of the jury, I maintain
that I am innocent. Here are higher powers that rule the destiny of things and it may be the will of
Providence that the cause which I represent may prosper more by my suffering than by my remaining free.”

MAHATMA GANDHI’s Trial for Sedition

The account of this trial is in substance taken from an admirable summary of it given by Sir Thomas
Strangman in his book "Indian Courts and Characters".

On 29th September 1922, Gandhi published under his own name an article in his paper "Young India". "I have
no hesitation in saying," Gandhi proceeded, "that it is sinful for anyone, either soldiers or civilian, to serve this
Government which has proved treacherous to the Mussalmans of India, and which has been guilty of the
inhumanities of the Panjab. I have said this from many a platform in the presence of sepoys". The sepoy has
been used more often as a hired assassin than as a soldier defending the liberty or the honour of the weak and
the helpless."

Gandhi wrote and published another article in his paper in which he answered Lord Reading, the Viceroy, who
had, in a public speech, said that he felt perplexed and puzzled by the activities of a section of the Indian
community. Lord Reading had stated: "I ask myself what purpose is served by flagrant breaches of the law for
the purpose of challenging the Government and in order to compel arrest?" Gandhi's answer was: "We seek
arrest because the so-called freedom is slavery. We are challenging the might of this Government because we
consider its activity to be wholly evil. We want to overthrow the Government. We want to compel its
submission to the people's will. We desire to show that the Government exists to serve the people, not the
people the Government.”22

Mahatma Gandhi read in his statement ,”Section 124 A, under which I am happily charged, is perhaps the
prince among the political sections of the Indian Penal Code designed to suppress the liberty of the citizen.
Affection cannot be manufactured or regulated by law. If one has no affection for a person or system, one
should be free to give the fullest expression to his disaffection, so long as he does not contemplate, promote,

21
Namit Saxena,A look back at Tilak’s sedition trials, LIVE LAW.in (July 8, 2018, 1:20 PM) https://www.livelaw.in/a-look-back-at-
tilaks-sedition-trials.
22
Trial of Mahatma Gandhi 1922,
https://bombayhighcourt.nic.in/libweb/historicalcases/cases/TRIAL_OF__MAHATMA_GANDHI-1922.html.
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23
or incite to violence.”

POST- CONSTITUTIONAL HEARINGS

One had hoped that the section responsible for large scale suppression of voices for justice and against the
British tyranny would not make its way to the independent India. But surprisingly, it not only made its way but
once again became a weapon for bureaucracy to suppress any criticism rising against the Government. The
judicial approach has, however, softened largely and acted as a shield and a savior from such unnecessary
prosecution launched by the Government under S.124-A of the Indian Penal Code.

Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar24

The decision in this case becomes very important in understanding the ambit of S.124-A in an independent
democracy where rule of law prevails and no one is above the constitution. The Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of S.124, its interpretation while keeping in mind the history of this section. The head note of
the judgment reads:

“Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code which makes sedition an offence is constitutionally valid. Though the
section imposes restrictions on the fundamental freedom of speech and expression, the restrictions are in the
interest of public order and are within the ambit of permissible legislative interference with the fundamental
right. There is a conflict on the question of the ambit of s. 124A between decision of the federal Court and of
the Privy Council. The Federal Court has held that words, deeds or writings constituted an offence under
s.124A only when they had the intention or tendency to disturb public tranquility. to create public disturbance
or to promote disorder, whilst the Privy Council has taken the view that it was not an essential ingredient of
the offence of sedition under s.124A that the words etc, should be intended to or be likely to incite
public disorder. Either view can be taken and supported on good reasons. If the view taken by the Federal
Court was accepted s.124A would be use constitutional but if the view of the Privy Council was accepted it
would be unconstitutional. It is well settled that if certain provisions of law construed in one way would
make them consistent with the constitution, and another interpretation would render them unconstitutional,
the Court would lean in favour of the former construction. Keeping in mind the reasons for the introduction of
s.124-A and the history of sedition the section must be so construed as to limit its application to acts
involving intention or tendency to create disorder, or disturbance of law and order; or incitement to
violence.”

This abstract principle found concrete application in-

23
Statement In The Great Trial Of 1922, March 18, 1922, MANI BHAVAN GANDHI SANGRAHALYA
http://www.gandhi-manibhavan.org/gandhicomesalive/speech3.htm.
24
AIR 1962 SC 955
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25
Balwant Singh & another v. State of Punjab

The Supreme Court observed:

“It appears to us that the raising some slogan only a couple of times by the two lonesome appellants, which
neither evoked any response nor any reaction from anyone in the public can neither attract the provisions
of Section 124A or Section 153A IPC Some more overt act was required to bring home the charge to the two
appellants, who are Government servants. The police officials exhibited lack of maturity and more of sensitivity
in arresting the appellants for raising the slogans.”

These cases limited the ambit of S.124-A clearly stating the situations in which it can be invoked. However, the
Centre and State Governments in clear violation of the stated rules, continues to launch frivolous cases against
people merely expressing their views. The court has thrown out majority of these cases while criticizing the
Government numerous times. Even so, the harassment and mental trauma that innocent individuals face from
arrest to trial is barefaced violation of human rights and freedom of speech and country, the likes of which no
individual living in a sovereign democratic republic being run on the wheels of the constitution should have to
face. Some of such unfortunate cases are discussed here-

Sedition case against AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INDIA (2016)

Amnesty International had organized an event in Bengaluru to seek justice for victims of human rights
violations in Jammu & Kashmir. There were heated arguments between two groups which resulted in pro-azadi
sloganeering. A police complaint was filed by an ABVP representative. The police charged Amnesty
International with Sedition under S.124-A.26But the Court directed the case to be closed.

“A court order directing the closing of a sedition case filed against Amnesty India brings an end to a
disgraceful attempt to stifle freedom of expression, the organization said today.

On 8 January, a trial court in Bengaluru ordered that the case filed against Amnesty India on 15 August 2016,
on the basis of a complaint filed by a representative of the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), be
closed.”27

Sedition case against Kashmiri Students cheering for Pakistan cricket team

“The police in northern India briefly filed sedition charges against 67 Kashmiri students after some of them
cheered for the Pakistani cricket team during a televised match with India on Sunday night. The charges were

25
1995 (1) SCR 411
26
An Anachronistic law, THE HINDU
(Aug 22, 2016, 12:50 AM)https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/An-anachronistic-law/article14582044.ece.
27
Sedition case against Amnesty India closed by Court, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
( Jan 11, 2019, 12:45 PM)https://amnesty.org.in/news-update/sedition-case-against-amnesty-india-closed-by-court.
International Journal of Law Management & Humanities Page 12
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initially filed after an official complaint was lodged against the students by Manzoor Ahmed, vice chancellor of
Swami Vivekanand Subharti University in Meerut, according to M. M. Baig, a Meerut police official. In
addition to sedition charges, the students were charged with “instigating hate between two communities.” But
after the police and local officials reviewed the case, the sedition charges were dropped on Thursday, according
to local media reports.”28

Sedition case against cartoonist Aseem Trivedi

Aseem Trivedi was charged with sedition under the Indian Penal Code as well as with violating the Prevention
of Insult to National Honour Act, 1971 and Section 66(A) of Information Technology Act, for displaying a
number of cartoons at a public meeting organized by India Against Corruption on November 27, 2011, in
Mumbai. Following an FIR lodged against him, he was arrested on September 8, 2012, and produced before a
Metropolitan Magistrate. However, Trivedi refused to accept bail until the sedition charge was dropped. The
judgment provided relief to the petitioner challenging the charge against the cartoonist. It further added- 'A
citizen has a right to say or write whatever he likes about the Government, or its measures, by way of criticism
or comments, so long as he does not incite people to violence against the Government established by law or
with the intention of creating public disorder', the judgment said, adding that the state Home Department must
issue guidelines to the police, in the form of pre-conditions to the invoking of Sec 124 A only if words, signs or
representations that bring the Government (Central or State) into hatred or contempt or must cause or attempt
to cause disaffection, enmity or disloyalty to the Government ‘must also be an incitement to violence or must be
intended or tend to create public disorder or a reasonable apprehension of public disorder.’29

V. SEDITION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH

From the Constituent Assembly Debates it is understood that there had been serious opposition for inclusion
of sedition as a restriction on freedom of speech and expression under the then Article 13 of the draft Indian
Constitution. Such a provision was termed as a shadow of colonial times that should not see light of the day in
free India. The Constituent Assembly was unanimous in having the word sedition deleted from Article 13 of the
draft Constitution. During the discussions Shri M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar said:

If we find that the government for the time being has a knack of entrenching itself, however bad its
administration might be it must be the fundamental right of every citizen in the country to overthrow
that government without violence, by persuading the people, by exposing its faults in the administration, its

28
GARDINER HARRIS, KASHMIRI STUDENTS BRIEFLY CHARGED WITH SEDITION FOR ROOTING FOR WRONG CRICKET TEAM, NY TIMES,
MAR 06, 2014.
29
MERE CRITICISM IS NOT SEDITIOUS: BOMBAY HIGH COURT ON ASEEM TRIVEDI'S CARTOONS, THE HOOT
(MAR 18, 2015) HTTP://ASU.THEHOOT.ORG/MEDIA-WATCH/LAW-AND-POLICY/MERE-CRITICISM-IS-NOT-SEDITIOUS-BOMBAY-HIGH-
COURT-ON-ASEEM-TRIVEDI-S-CARTOONS-8177.

International Journal of Law Management & Humanities Page 13

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method of working and so on. As a result of the vehement opposition in the Constituent Assembly, the word
sedition does not find a place in our Constitution.30

In the case of Shreya Singhal v.Union of India31, section 66A of the Information and Technology Act, 2000,
was declared unconstitutional on the ground that it was in direct conflict with the fundamental right of
freedom of speech and expression. The Supreme Court held that under the Constitutional scheme, for the
democracy to thrive, the liberty of speech and expression ―is a cardinal value and of paramount importance.

Similarly, in Javed Habib v. State of Delh32i, it was held: Holding an opinion against the Prime Minister or
his actions or criticism of the actions of government or drawing inference from the speeches and actions of
the leader of the government that the leader was against a particular community and was in league with certain
other political leaders, cannot be considered as sedition under Section 124A of the IPC. The criticism of the
government is the hallmark of democracy. As a matter of fact the essence of democracy is criticism of the
Government.

VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR REVISING S.124-A

Various agencies and leaders have acknowledged that there needs to be revision in the Sedition law of the
country. The Law Commission in its report on „sedition‟ has also suggested for a revision in S.124-A.

In the year 2011, a private member Bill titled the Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Bill, was introduced in the
Rajya Sabha by Mr. D. Raja. The Bill proposed that section 124A IPC should be omitted. It was reasoned that
the British Government used this law to oppress the view, speech and criticism against the British rule. Thus, to
check the misuse of the section and to promote the freedom of speech and expression, the section should be
omitted.

Another Private member Bill titled The Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Bill, 2015, was introduced in Lok
Sabha by Mr. Shashi Tharoor to amend section 124A IPC. The Bill suggested that only those actions/words
that directly result in the use of violence or incitement to violence should be termed seditious. This proposed
amendment revived the debate on interpretation of sedition. The courts through various judgments have settled
that the language of this section does not imply that only words, either spoken or written, or signs, or visible
representation that are likely to incite violence should be considered seditious.

VII. WHY SHOULD SEDITION UNDER S.124-A BE OMITTED: AN OPINION

The National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) shows a rise in arrests for sedition between 2014 and 2016.

30
Law Commission Of India, Consultation Paper on “Sedition”, (Aug 30, 2018).
31
AIR 2015 SC 1523.
32
(2007) 96 DRJ 693.
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Between 2014 and 2016, 179 people were arrested and 112 sedition cases filed with only two of the cases
resulting in conviction. The point of the matter is that when a law instead of being constructively used is being
misused by the authorities to marginalize their critics, such law should be deleted before it becomes a potent
weapon of oppression. Most of the cases of Sedition do not make it to court, let alone result in conviction.
While the Courts understand the exact principles under which S.124-A can be invoked, this has not stooped the
Government from charging innocent individuals. Even though the authorities know that there case would not
have a standing in Court, they use this opportunity to torture individuals with arrest and harassment, in malefic
of setting a deterrent for anyone who dares speak against them. Majority of the cases reek of political
propaganda under the garb of nationalism. One cannot be so naive to believe that S.124-A exists solely to
protect the sovereignty of the country and to maintain public order. There are various other laws which fit the
criteria, then what is the need of S.124-A particularly when its history is the witness of how potent it is to
muffle the voices rising against injustices of the administration.

Reasonable restrictions provided under Article 19(2), Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967,
Sections 121,122,123,131,141,143,153-A, Contempt of Court Act, 1971 and Prevention of Insults to
National Honour Act, 1971, provide more than enough safeguards for acts likely to come under Sedition.
Then why is a draconian law of pre-independence era, under a false pretense, being used to hound the populace
of an independent and democratic country. It is ironic that the country, England, which planted the seeds of
S.124-A on Indian Soil, has since long repealed the same out of the fear of being associated to draconian laws.

S.124-A violates one of the basic facets of a democracy i.e., holding a government accountable. In a country
where citizens cannot voice the criticism of their government‟s actions, demand accountability, raise questions
and point at wrongdoings cannot, be a functional democracy. Citizens cannot be lulled into a false sense of
security to enforce their fundamental rights and then be prosecuted for doing the same. This section is the fine
line between a democratic and an authoritarian government and one incident in a charged political climate can
change the setting. We must keep in mind that S.124 does not only violate freedom of speech but also aids the
government in nakedly disenfranchising it political rivals and critics. As citizens, it is our responsibility to be
aware of such political abuse and it is our duty to guard our own freedom.

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The Law of Sedition and India: An Evolutionary Overview

SAPTARSHI BHATTACHARYA

An artist’s impression of Bala Ganghadhar Tilak’s second trial for sedition case being argued at the Bombay High Court in 1908. Tilak was
sentenced to six years of transportation. (Circa 1908). From The Hindu Archives.
Article 124A, characterised aptly by the Father of the Nation, Mahatma Gandhi, as the “prince among the
political sections of the Indian Penal Code designed to suppress the liberty of the citizen”, has a long legal
history, originating from English Law.

In this article, Saptarshi Bhattacharya, Senior Coordinator, The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public
Policy, traces the journey of the law from 13th century England through the colonial rule in India and the
developments in independent India to its present status where the operation of the law has been put on
hold by the Supreme Court of India on May 11, 2022.

Bhattacharya throws light on the key doctrines that directed the sedition law, the manner in which it was
applied to suit the times over the centuries, the judicial pronouncements that shaped its application, and
the manner in which it has been easily used as a political tool to thwart dissent in free India.

I. A law of political origin under a monarchy

From their inception, laws suppressing dissent have been political in nature. The earliest known such
decree was under The First Statute of Westminster, 1275, which came into being as a direct outcome
of a “rebellion of the barons” 1 against the monarch who “was considered the holder of the Divine
Right.” 2 This was aimed at safeguarding the ruling establishment, including the nobility, from popular
uprisings that challenged the existing order. The doctrine of Scandalum Magnatum (Latin for ‘scandal of
the magnates’) became the basis for this law, which placed curbs on scandalising or criticising royalty,
judges or peers. According to the thirty fourth chapter of the First Statute:

“none be so hardy to tell or publish any false news or tales, whereby discord, or occasion of
discord or slander may grow between the King and his people, or the great men of the realm.” 3

Over the subsequent centuries this made its journey through the Statues of Treason (1352 and 1534)
and evolved into the offence of seditious libel in 1606 at a Star Chamber decision in de Libellis Famosis 4,
the law of libel or written defamation. In this case, the court held that criticism of public officials and
the government would inculcate disrespect for public authority. Interestingly, this case evaded some of
the safeguards laid down in the offences of Treason and Scandalum Magnatum. 5 The 18 th century,
Hamburger 6 points out, saw the increased usage of sedition against the printed word. It continued to
be a part of the English law until it was abolished in new millennium.

II. Doctrine of ‘Chilling Effect’ and Abolition of Sedition in the UK

A notable judicial framing of sedition laws came from the U.S. Frank Askin, retired Professor Emeritus
at Rutgers University, points out that the Supreme Court of the United States
 “developed and explained the chilling effect doctrine in several opinions issued during the
McCarthy era involving legislation and regulations aimed at suspected communists and so-
called subversives.” 7

In Dombrowski v Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), the US Supreme Court, while hearing a petition from
James Dombrowski seeking relief from prosecution under Louisiana’s Subversive Activities and
Communist Control Law, invoked the overbreadth doctrine, wherein “a regulation of speech can
sweep too broadly and prohibit protected as well as non-protected speech” 8 and discussed the need to
protect the First Amendment rights from a ‘chilling effect’. The court said:

“A chilling effect upon First Amendment rights might result from such prosecution regardless
of its prospects of success or failure, as is indicated by appellants’ representations of the
actions taken under the statutes.” 9

Although sedition survives as an offence in the US, “it is very narrowly construed and can even said to
have fallen in disuse.” 10

Related Article and Resources

Article:

Dissent & Democracy: Why the Sentinel Should Strike Down IPC Sec. 124A, Eklavya Vasudev,
August 5, 2022.
Resources:

1. The Sedition Law in India - Select Resources.

2. Resources on Sedition from The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy.

The Law Commission of U.K., in a working paper in 1977, scrutinised the sedition law (p 48) and
expressed its “provisional view” that “there is no need for an offence of sedition in the criminal
code.” 11 In 2009, the crime of seditious libel was abolished through the enactment of the Coroners and
Justice Act, 2009, in the United Kingdom. 12

III. Sedition in India

The sedition law in its present form owes its origin to the 1830s when codification of Indian laws
started. Prior to codification, Indian laws were “a complex array of Parliamentary Charters and Act,
Indian Legislation (after 1833), East India Company Regulations, English common law, Hindu law,
Muslim law, and many bodies of customary law.” 13

The Draft Indian Penal Code, 1837, by Thomas Babington Macaulay included a section on Sedition.
This Draft’s Section 113 was similar in its framing to the current Sec. 124A of the Indian Penal Code
(IPC). The punishment proposed was life imprisonment. However, the section was not included in the
IPC when it was enacted in 1860 due to what was subsequently attributed to an “oversight”. Sec. 124A,
which criminalises “disaffection towards the Government established by law” or sedition, was finally
introduced through an amendment in 1870, by the then Law Member of the Governor-General’s
Council, James Fitzjames Stephen. 14, 15

The first case to be tried under the law of sedition in India was 20 years after its introduction in Queen-
Empress v Jogendra Chunder Bose, 1891. 16 The proprietor, editor, manager, and printer of the Bengali
magazine, Bangobasi, were tried under the law for publishing an article criticising the British
government’s Age of Consent Act that raised the age of consent for sexual intercourse. In this case,
however, there was no conviction. The jury could not come up with a unanimous verdict. W. Comer
Petheram, Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court, said that “he would not take any verdict that was
not unanimous in this case” and Bose was let out on bail.

IV. The Tilak Trials – differing interpretations

As in England, so in India, the law was used extensively to curb political dissent. Bal Gangadhar Tilak,
a nationalist, teacher, and a key activist in the independence movement, was charged with sedition
twice, and once more under the Criminal Procedure Code. In 1897, he was convicted by the Bombay
High Court for publishing an article in Kesari, the Marathi newspaper he founded in 1888, invoking the
example of Maratha warrior Sivaji to incite overthrow of the British rule. 17 This judgment broadened
the scope of disaffection towards the government to include “disloyalty”, which influenced an
amendment to the IPC in 1898 to include disloyalty and feelings of enmity in the definition of
disaffection. Tilak was convicted of sedition once again in 1908 by the same court for his writings
in Kesari.

Tilak’s brush with the law on matters relating to sedition did not end here. In 1916, he had to face the
court for the third time “to revise an order” by the District Magistrate of Poona under Sec. 108 of the
Criminal Procedure Code. This Section provided for a security bond to be provided for “good
behaviour” including not speaking, writing or disseminating any matter that can be punished under
Sec. 124A of the IPC. Tilak was required to pay Rs. 20,000 with two sureties each for “good behaviour
for a year” as the District Magistrate had held that he “disseminated seditious matter in three
speeches”. This case also had a political context in that Tilak was represented by Mohammed Ali
Jinnah. Although issues such as “disaffection” and “Government by law established in British India”,
were discussed in this judgment, the important outcome was that the Court held that a speech should
be seen in its full context:

“they must be read as a whole. A fair construction must be put upon them, straining nothing
either for the Crown or for the applicant, and paying more attention to the whole general effect
than to any isolated words or passages.” 18

Taking this view, the Court cancelled the order by the District Magistrate and quoted extracts from
Tilak’s speeches demanding Swaraj and noted:

“not only is there nothing illegal, but there is a distinct pleading that the political changes
advocated should be obtained by lawful and constitutional means.”19

V. “Affection cannot be manufactured” and “wounded vanity of Governments”

The most historic case, and the one most often cited by those opposing the sedition law was in 1922,
when Mahatma Gandhi was charged with sedition and tried at the Sessions Court in Bhadra, Gujarat,
for his politically sensitive articles in Young India. Pleading guilty, Gandhiji said:

“Section 124A under which I am happily charged is perhaps the prince among the political
sections of the Indian Penal Code designed to suppress the liberty of the citizen. Affection
cannot be manufactured or regulated by law. If one has no affection for a person or system,
one should be free to give the fullest expression to his disaffection, so long as he does not
contemplate, promote or incite violence… I have no personal ill will against any single
administrator; much less can I have any disaffection towards the King’s person. But I hold it
to be a virtue to be disaffected towards a Government which in its totality had done more
harm to India than any previous system.” 20

From the judicial perspective, the most important pronouncement, which is of continued relevance,
came in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v the King-Emperor in 1942. The Chief Justice of the Federal Court of
India, Maurice Gwyer, observed that
 “This [sedition] is not made an offence in order to minister to the wounded vanity of
Governments, but because where Government and the law cease to be obeyed because no
respect is felt any longer for them, only anarchy can follow. Public disorder, or the reasonable
anticipation or likelihood of public disorder, is thus the gist of the offence.

The acts or words complained of must, either incite to disorder or must be such as to satisfy
reasonable men that that, is their intention or tendency.” 21, 22

VI. Sedition’s uneven journey in free India

As free India sat to chart its own Constitution, the fundamental rights sub-committee, headed by
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, placed a Draft Interim Report on Fundamental Rights before the Constituent
Assembly for its consideration on April 29, 1947. 23 In this Report’s annexure on Justiciable
Fundamental Rights, Article 8 (a) mentioned seditious speech as one of the restrictions on free speech
saying, “Provision may be made by law to make the publication or utterance of seditious, obscene,
blasphemous, slanderous, libellous or defamatory matter actionable or punishable”. 24

The Constituent Assembly debated the Article on Freedom of Speech and Expression on December
1 25 and 2 26, 1948. Several rights and restrictions, including “freedom of the press” and banning of
“beggary” were debated. Specifically with regard to “sedition”, an amended Clause 2 of Article 13
before the Assembly read:

“Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of this article shall affect the operation of any existing
law, or prevent the State from making any law relating to libel, slander, defamation, offences
against decency or morality or sedition or other matters which undermine the security of the
State.”

Munshi wanted this to be further amended to read:

“Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of this article shall affect the operation of any existing
law, or prevent the State from making any law relating to libel, slander, defamation, or any
matter which offends against decency or morality or which undermines the security of, or
tends to overthrow, the State.”

Munshi’s speech at the Constituent Assembly on December 1, when he moved the amendment is
quoted in extenso as it is a pointer to the minds of the founders of the Constitution:
 “Sir, the importance of this amendment is that it seeks to delete the word ‘sedition’ and uses
a much better phraseology, viz. “which undermines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the
State.” The object is to remove the word ‘sedition’ which is of doubtful and varying import
and to introduce words which are now considered to be the gist of an offence against the
State.

I was pointing out that the word ‘sedition’ has been a word of varying import and has created
considerable doubt in the minds of not only the members of this House but of Courts of Law
all over the world. Its definition has been very simple and given so far back in 1868. It says
“sedition embraces all those practices whether by word or deed or writing which are
calculated to disturb the tranquility of the State and lead ignorant persons to subvert the
Government”. But in practice it has had a curious fortune. A hundred and fifty years ago in
England, holding a meeting or conducting a procession was considered sedition. Even
holding an opinion against, which will bring ill-will towards Government, was considered
sedition once. Our notorious Section 124-A of Penal Code was sometimes construed so widely
that I remember in a case a criticism of a District Magistrate was urged to be covered by
Section 124-A. But the public opinion has changed considerably since and now that we have
a democratic Government a line must be drawn between criticism of Government which
should be welcome and incitement which would undermine the security or order on which
civilized life is based, or which is calculated to overthrow the State. Therefore the word
‘sedition’ has been omitted. As a matter of fact the essence of democracy is Criticism of
Government. The party system which necessarily involves an advocacy of the replacement of
one Government by another is its only bulwark; the advocacy of a different system of
Government should be welcome because that gives vitality to a democracy. The object
therefore of this amendment is to make a distinction between the two positions.”

Speaking further, Munshi invoked Chief Justice Gwyer’s 1942-framing of the sedition law as on that
was “not to minister to the wounded vanity of Governments” in Niharendu. On December 2, 1948,
Munshi’s amendment was adopted.

Early judgments and the First Amendment

Meanwhile, governments in independent India continued filing sedition cases. On March 1, 1950, the
Government of Madras banned the entry and circulation of a journal, Cross Roads, published by Marxist
ideologue, Romesh Thapar, and was critical of Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru’s policies, especially
foreign policy 27. Thapar went on appeal to the Supreme Court – the first case in Independent India
relating to Sec. 124A of the IPC. In Romesh Thapar v State of Madras (1950), the Supreme Court
invalidated the ban by the Madras government and declared that unless the freedom of speech and
expression threaten the ‘security of or tend to overthrow the State’, any law imposing restrictions upon
the same would not fall within the purview of Article 19(2) of the Constitution. 28

In another case, this time involving the official publication of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh, Organiser, the Chief Commissioner of Delhi had asked Brij Bhushan, the Printer and Publisher
of the magazine, and K.R. Halkani, its Editor,

“to submit for scrutiny, in duplicate, before publication, till further orders, all communal matter and news
and views about Pakistan including photographs and cartoons other than those derived from official sources
or supplied by the news agencies, viz., Press Trust of India, United Press of India and United Press of
America.” 29

On appeal, the Supreme Court’s judgment, delivered on the same day as Thapar, said: “The imposition
of pre-censorship on a journal is a restriction on the liberty of the press which is an essential part of
the right to freedom of speech and expression declared by Art. 19 (1)(a).” In both cases, the majority
judgments were delivered by Justice Patanjali Sastri, and Justice Fazl Ali dissented.

The majority judgment delivered by Sastri struck down the ban on the entry and circulation of Cross
Roads in the State of Madras as the State government’s order “falls outside the scope of the authorised
restrictions under Clause 2”. It further went on to rule that Sec. 9 (1-A) was “wholly unconstitutional
and void” with the following reasoning:

“(ii) Where a law purports to authorise the imposition of restrictions on a fundamental right
in language wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of
constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting such right, it is not possible to uphold
it even so far as it may be applied within the constitutional limits, as it is not severable. So
long as the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution
cannot be ruled out must be held to be wholly unconstitutional and void. Section 9 (1-A) is
therefore wholly unconstitutional and void.” 30

In the Bhushan majority judgment, Sastri quashed the pre-censorship order:

 “There can be little doubt that the imposition of pre-censorship on a journal is a restriction
on the liberty of the press which is an essential part of the right to freedom of speech and
expression declared by article 19 (1)(a).”

The Judgment also pointed out from Blackstone that

“the liberty of the press consists in laying no previous restraint upon publications, and not in
freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted
right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the
freedom of the press.” 31

Ali’s dissent note said the ban on the entry and circulation of Cross Roads by the State of Madras was
“not unconstitutional or void” as they were within the purview of Clause 2 of Art. 19 of the
Constitution. In Bhushan, Ali held that the framers of the Constitution had included terms that had
wider connotations “which are detrimental to the security of the State as sedition” and that “it would
be difficult to hold that it [the order requiring pre-publication censorship on the Organiser] falls outside
the ambit of Art. 19 of the Constitution”. The following year, the Punjab High Court declared section
124A of IPC unconstitutional in Tara Singh Gopi Chand v The State for contravening freedom of speech
and expression. 32

The First Amendment in 1951, added two additional restrictions — ‘public order’ and ‘friendly
relations with foreign State’ — to Article 19(2), which reflected the pronouncements in Romesh
Thapar and Brij Bhushan. Prime Minister Nehru, who was incarcerated under the same law during the
British rule, said: “The sooner we get rid of it [Sec 124A] the better.” 33 With regard to the punishment
under Sec. 124A, an amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code in 1955, replaced “transportation for
life or for a shorter period”, with “imprisonment for life and/or with fine or imprisonment for 3 years
and/or with fine”. 34

The first time the constitutionality of section 124A of IPC was challenged after the First Amendment,
was in the case of Kedar Nath v State of Bihar. The appellant was convicted of sedition and inciting public
mischief because of a speech where he criticised the ruling Congress party and advocated for the
Forward Communist Party. The Constitution Bench upheld the validity of section 124A and kept it at
a different pedestal. The Court drew a line between the terms ‘the Government established by law’ and
‘the persons for the time being engaged in carrying on the administration’ observing:
 “‘Government established by law’ is the visible symbol of the State. The very existence of the
State will be in jeopardy if the Government established by law is subverted. Hence, the
continued existence of the Government established by law is an essential condition of the
stability of the State. That is why ‘sedition’, as the offence in Section 124-A has been
characterised, comes, under Chapter VI relating to offences against the State. Hence any acts
within the meaning of Section 124-A which have the effect of subverting the Government by
bringing that Government into contempt or hatred, or creating disaffection against it, would
be within the penal statute because the feeling of disloyalty to the Government established by
law or enmity to it imports the idea of tendency to public disorder by the use of actual violence
or incitement of violence.” 35

The Court also struck a balance between the right to free speech and expression and the power of the
legislature to restrict such right observing:

“…the security of the State, which depends upon the maintenance of law and order is the very
basic consideration upon which legislation, with view to punishing offences against the State,
is undertaken. Such a legislation has, on the one hand, fully to protect and guarantee the
freedom of speech and expression, which is the sine quo non of a democratic form of
Government that our Constitution has established. This Court, as the custodian and
guarantor of the fundamental rights of the citizens, has the duty cast upon it of striking down
any law which unduly restricts the freedom of speech and expression with which we are
concerned in this case. But the freedom has to be guarded against becoming a licence for
vilification and condemnation of the Government established by law, in words, which incite
violence or have the tendency to create public disorder. A citizen has a right to say or write
whatever he likes about the Government, or its measures, by way of criticism or comment, so
long as he does not incite people to violence against the Government established by law or
with the intention of creating public disorder.” 36

VII. The Law Commission and “the most powerful Supreme Court in the World”

In recent years, the law of sedition made its way into the public discourse after a spate of FIRs were
registered against journalists, activists, students, social workers, prominent intellectuals and even a folk
musician, invoking article 124A of IPC. As Anushka Singh points out the law has also been used
against protestors.
 “The mass cases of sedition against the anti-nuclear protesters in Kudankulam, Tamil Nadu
between 2011 and 2016; against members of pro-reservation agitation like the Jats in Haryana,
the Patidars in Gujarat in 2015 and 2016; against pathalgadi protesters in Khunti, Jharkhand
in 2019; against anti-Citizenship (Amendment) Act protesters in Delhi, Assam and other parts
of India in 2020 and 2021, are examples that reveal the political function performed by the
police through the use of the law.” 37

Statistics by The National Crime Records Bureau’s Crime in India, 2019, showed that 93 cases were
filed under the sedition law in 2019, (33 in 2016), registering an increase of 165 per cent. 38 Also, the
rate of conviction dropped to 3.3 per cent in 2019 from 33.3 per cent in 2016. 39

The Law Commission of India, on August 30, 2018, came out with a consultation paper tracing the
history of the sedition law and drew comparisons with the U.K., the U.S. and Australia. The paper
raised several questions for further deliberations, including the wisdom of retaining the provision as a
criminal offence. “In a democracy, singing from the same songbook is not a benchmark of patriotism,”
it noted. 40

The year 2021 saw several petitions challenging the constitutionality of the sedition law. These include
one by two journalists, Kishore Wangkhemcha from Manipur and and Kanhaiya Lal Shukla from
Chhattisgarh, who filed a petition in the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of sedition
law. The one by the Editors’ Guild of India sought directions to declare sections 124A and 505 of the
IPC as unconstitutional for being violative of fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. S.G.
Vombatkere, a retired army general, filed a Public Interest Litigation before the Supreme Court
challenging the constitutional validity of section 124A of IPC. Others to file petitions were The
Journalists Association of Assam; Arun Shourie, former Minister of Communications and former
Editor of the Times of India and The Indian Express; The People’s Union for Civil Liberties; Mahua
Moitra, Member of Parliament from the Trinamool Congress; Patricia Mukhim, the Editor of
the Shillong Times; and Anil Chamadia, Chairman of the Media Studies Group. 41

At a hearing related to the Vombatkere v Union of India and the other cases on May 7, 2022, Attorney
General Tushar Mehta, submitted in writing that the judgment in Kedar Nath Singh v State of Bihar was a
good precedent and that the petitioners had not shown any justification based on which the court
could record a finding that Kedar Nath Singh was patently illegal and required reconsideration. 42

However, just two days later on May 9, 2022, an affidavit filed by the Additional Home Secretary,
Mritunjay Kumar Narayan, before the court, submitted:
 “The Government of India, being fully cognizant of various views being expressed on the
subject of sedition and also having considered the concerns of civil liberties and human rights,
while committed to maintain and protect the sovereignty and integrity of this great nation,
has decided to re-examine and re-consider the provisions of Section 124A of the Indian Penal
Code which can only be done before the competent forum.” 43

In view of the submission on May 9, the court passed an interim order on May 11, asking for restraint
from the state and central governments from registering FIRs under the provision. The court said:

“…it is clear that the Union of India agrees with the prima facie opinion expressed by this
Court that the rigors of Section 124A of IPC is not in tune with the current social milieu, and
was intended for a time when this country was under the colonial regime. In light of the same,
the Union of India may reconsider the aforesaid provision of law.

We hope and expect that the State and Central Governments will restrain from registering any
FIR, continuing any investigation or taking any coercive measures invoking Section 124A of
IPC while the aforesaid provision of law is under consideration.” 44

The 152-year old law, which has its origins in monarchical England of the 13 th century, has now been
placed on hold by the Supreme Court of India, described as “the most powerful court in the world” by
William Hubbard of the University of Chicago, Editor of the Journal of Legal Studies, and an author
of The Supreme Court of India: An Empirical Overview. In an interview to The Economic Times, he elaborates:

“We aren’t the first to make this observation, but the Supreme Court of India (SCI) holds a
unique status for several reasons. It is the apex court of the largest common-law court system
in the world. The Indian Constitution grants it far-reaching authority to initiate actions and
to exercise direct appellate authority over all other courts in the country. The basic structure
doctrine gives it the power to review constitutional amendments. These features distinguish
it from other powerful Supreme Courts, such as the Supreme Court of the United States
(SCOTUS). And the SCI remains a highly respected institution by the people of India (and
beyond), giving it legitimacy when it exercises its broad powers.” 45

The long legislative, judicial, constitutional, executive, and political journey of this “prince among the
political sections of the IPC” has now been put on hold by this “most powerful” Supreme Court. The
different arms of government have often varied on how they view the law. What stands out in the long
history of the law and its usage is that it has more often been used to stifle free speech, especially
dissenting voices that are raised against regimes, irrespective of whether they have been colonial rulers
or elected representatives.

(Note: This article was updated on August 6, 2022, after correcting formatting and editing errors.)

[Saptarshi Bhattacharya is Senior Coordinator, Programmes and Administration, The Hindu Centre
for Politics and Public Policy. He is a former Chief Sub-Editor and a former Chief Reporter of The
New Indian Express . He had been a journalist for the past 20 years, most of which were spent as a
reporter with The Hindu and a Correspondent for national television channels Aaj Tak and Headlines
Today. saptarshi.bhattacharya@thehinducentre.com].

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16. Law Commission of India, op. cit. p. 11.

17. Ibid.

18. Bombay High Court. 1916.Bal Gangadhar Tilak vs Emperor on 9 November, 1916. (Source:
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19. Ibid. Para 16.

20. Supreme Court of India. 2021. S.G. Vombatkere v. Union of India. [op. cit].
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24. Ibid. p 441.

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28. Supreme Court of India. 1950. Romesh Thappar Vs. The State of Madras, May 26.
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29. Supreme Court of India. 1950. Brij Bhushan and Another Vs. The State of Delhi, May 26.
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30. Supreme Court of India. 1950. Romesh Thappar Vs. The State of Madras, May 26.
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31. The Founders’ Constitution. 1769.Amendment I (Speech and Press): Document 4- William
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32. Ibid. p. 16.

33. Supreme Court of India. 2021. S.G. Vombatkere v. Union of India. [op.cit.] Source: Supreme
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34. Ibid.

35. Supreme Court of India. 1962. Kedar Nath Singh Vs. State of Bihar, January 20
[https://main.sci.gov.in/judgment/judis/4007.pdf]. Return to Text.

36. Ibid. Return to Text.

37. Singh, A. 2022. Sedition and Its Political Functions - The Law of the Executive, Economic &
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27/perspectives/law-executive.html].

38. Supreme Court of India. 2021. Editors Guild of India & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. Writ
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content/uploads/2021/09/Sedition_WritPetition_EditorsGuildofIndia.pdf].

39. Supreme Court of India. 2021. S.G. Vombatkere v. Union of India. [op.cit.] Source: Supreme
Court Observer. [https://www.scobserver.in/wp-
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40. Law Commission of India. 2018. op. cit. p. 30.

41. Supreme Court Observer. 2021. Constitutionality of Sedition: SG Vombatkere v Union of India,
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