Title: India’s Water Diplomacy for National Security: Legal Dimensions of Suspending the

Indus Waters Treaty

Introduction
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed in 1960 in Karachi and mediated by the World Bank (then IBRD),
remains a historic symbol of cooperation between India and Pakistan, governing the distribution and usage
of the Indus River system. However, recent geopolitical developments have prompted India to suspend its
obligations under the treaty. This note examines the legal, strategic, and political underpinnings of India’s
suspension—grounded strictly in the treaty’s language and customary international law.

Overview of the Treaty and Water Allocation Framework

The treaty allocates six rivers of the Indus Basin: the Eastern Rivers—Ravi, Beas, Sutlej—to India, and the
Western Rivers—Indus, Jhelum, Chenab—to Pakistan, while granting both countries limited rights to
construct hydroelectric facilities in accordance with specified treaty clauses.

Post-partition, Pakistan became the lower riparian state, while key irrigation headworks like Madhopur and
Ferozepur were retained by India, triggering early disputes. The treaty was signed by Jawaharlal Nehru,
Mohammad Ayub Khan, and W.A.B. Iliff of the World Bank, and came into force on 1 April 1960.

Key Features of the Treaty:

 Perpetual Duration: The treaty has no expiry clause. Article XII allows termination only through
mutual consent, with no unilateral withdrawal provision.

 Permanent Indus Commission (PIC): A bilateral body with annual meetings and monthly data
exchange, comprising one commissioner from each country.

 Three-Tier Dispute Resolution Mechanism (Article IX):

1. Questions resolved by the PIC;

2. Differences referred to a Neutral Expert (appointed by the World Bank);

3. Disputes escalated to a Court of Arbitration (under Annexure G).

However, the treaty lacks any enforcement mechanism, which is a recurring shortcoming in many
international agreements.

India’s Strategic Shift: Timeline of Geopolitical Triggers

 2013: A Court of Arbitration ruled that India must maintain minimum flows from the Kishanganga
dam (Jhelum tributary) and cannot draw down the reservoir below a specific level to protect
Pakistan’s downstream interests.

 2016 (Post Uri attack): India suspended PIC meetings and committed to maximizing its Eastern
Rivers’ share—marking the first explicit linkage of water diplomacy with national security.

 2019 (Post Pulwama attack): India reiterated plans to fully utilize its share under the treaty. Though
legal, this move indicated increasing politicization of the water-sharing regime.

 2022: With dispute resolution mechanisms stalling, the World Bank simultaneously appointed both
a Neutral Expert and a Court of Arbitration, showing procedural breakdown.
  2023: India invoked Article XII(3), proposing modifications to the treaty citing climate change,
national development, and Pakistan’s alleged obstruction. Pakistan rejected the proposal.

 2024: India issued formal notice to amend the treaty, terming it outdated and skewed in Pakistan’s
favour.

 2025 (Post-Pahalgam attack): India announced suspension of its obligations under the treaty,
demanding action from Pakistan on cross-border terrorism.

Legal Arguments in Favour of India’s Position

1. Absence of Explicit Exit Clause

Article XII(4) does not mention unilateral suspension but only speaks of mutual termination. The treaty’s
silence allows India to argue that temporary suspension is not expressly prohibited and therefore falls
outside the treaty’s framework—particularly in cases of fundamental change or national threat.

2. Goodwill and Cooperation as Treaty Bedrock

The Preamble sets the tone: cooperation "in a spirit of goodwill and friendship." India can argue that
repeated hostile actions by Pakistan, especially support for cross-border terrorism, constitute a breach of
this foundational principle.

3. Article II(1): Exclusive Rights over Eastern Rivers

India enjoys unrestricted rights over the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej. India’s measures only seek to maximize this
lawful allocation, which it is entitled to under the treaty.

4. Right to Self-Preservation and National Security

India may argue that adherence to the treaty amidst escalating terrorist threats compromises its
sovereignty. The suspension aligns with its right to self-defence and national security under international
law. Legitimate measure to protect its sovereignty and citizens

5. Abuse of Article IX’s Dispute Mechanism

India can cite Pakistan’s manipulation of the dispute process—such as seeking Neutral Expert and Court of
Arbitration simultaneously—as frustrating the treaty’s intent. India can argue that when resolution
becomes procedurally impossible, suspension may become a legitimate last resort.

6. Conditionality of Data Exchange (Article VI(1))

India may lawfully suspend data exchange if mutual trust breaks down. If data shared under peaceful
obligations is misused by a hostile state, the rationale for cooperation collapses.

7. Customary International Law Support- Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties prominent treaty
used for interpretation of international treaties in case any particular treaty is silent on an issue),

 Article 60 (VCLT): A material breach—such as sponsoring terrorism—may justify suspension.

 Article 62 (VCLT): Fundamental change of circumstances (“rebus sic stantibus”) supports India's
position given the transformed geopolitical context since 1960 when the treaty was concluded.

Arguments Against India’s Position and India’s Rebuttals

1. No Provision for Unilateral Suspension

Pakistan may argue Article XII(4) permits termination only by mutual agreement, making unilateral
suspension legally impermissible.
  India’s Rebuttal: Silence on suspension does not equate to prohibition. ‘Suspension’ is distinct from
‘termination’ and may be justified under extraordinary circumstances.

2. Undermining the Dispute Resolution Framework

By suspending the treaty, India may appear to bypass the three-tiered resolution process.

 India’s Rebuttal: Pakistan’s procedural abuse and invocation of parallel forums have rendered Article
IX ineffective, warranting exceptional responses.

3. Violation of Pacta Sunt Servanda (Good Faith in Execution of International Treaties)

Unilateral suspension may seem inconsistent with the obligation to perform treaties in good faith.

 India’s Rebuttal: Good faith must be mutual. Pakistan’s hostile conduct, including acts of war and
terror, amounts to a material breach of the spirit and letter of the treaty. India can’t act in good
faith, while Pakistan acts in Bad faith.

4. Risk of Eroding International Norms

India’s move may be viewed as setting a dangerous precedent, potentially destabilizing other shared-
resource treaties.

 India’s Rebuttal: Under customary international law, especially Articles 60 and 62 of the VCLT,
suspension due to material breach or fundamental change is permitted. India’s case falls within this
framework and does not erode norms but applies them.

Impacts of India’s Suspension

On Pakistan:

 Major dependence on Indus system (80% of freshwater needs).

 Adverse effects on hydropower, irrigation, flood control, and food security.

 Weak water infrastructure amplifies vulnerability.

On India:

 Legal freedom to exploit Eastern Rivers and maximize permissible use of Western Rivers for non-
consumptive purposes.

 No obligation to share flood-related data.

 Suspension of Pakistan’s site visits to Indian hydropower projects.

 However, India currently lacks adequate infrastructure to block or divert all flows efficiently.

Conclusion
While the Indus Waters Treaty is among the most enduring transboundary water-sharing agreements, its
resilience relies on peaceful coexistence and mutual cooperation. India’s suspension, though
unprecedented, is supported by the treaty’s textual gaps, evolving security dynamics, and principles of
international law. The move asserts India's sovereign right to recalibrate treaty obligations in light of
existential security threats and procedural deadlock.