REVISIT OF INDUS WATER TREATY

“Blood & Water can‟t flow together at the same time”

- PM Narendra Modi during meeting with
Water Ministry officials on Indus Water Treaty1

1. Post the trt initiated incident in Uri, as India was considering an appropriate reply
to Pak, PM Narendra Modi made the above quoted statement indicating the possibility
of reviewing the decades old treaty2. Since then, few other statements have been made
by the members of the govt, calling for review of the treaty or the optimum utilisation
(expl) of the treaty‟s provisions
in favour of India. These
remarks against the treaty,
which even Stephen Cohen
referred to as „a model for
future regional cooperation‟ 3
and often touted as a shining
example amongst the various treaties existing around the world for its unwavering
status despite the wars between the two nations, have met with opprobrium from Pak.
The calls for mod of the treaty are being seen as continuation of India‟s belligerent
attitude and devious manipulations which may possibly escalate to the point of „water
war‟ between the two nations4.

2. The IWT was mediated by the World Bank in 1960. The idea of joint
management of the Indus river basin by means of certain mechanisms, later referred to
as the „Indus Water Treaty‟ was given its initial push by David Lilienthal in 1951. He
visited both India & Pakistan & offered his recommendations for development of the
basin & also suggested international financing in his article titled „Kashmir: Another
“Korea” in the Making‟ 5 . World Bank took up the idea & thus began protracted
negotiations. Both nations were asked to put up their respective proposals; however
they were widely contrasting in the allotment of share. The negotiations continued for
nine years till 1960 & on 19 Sep 1960, the IWT was signed. IWT has been a leverage
with India over Pak being an upper riparian state and has been used to apply pressure
in „Eco‟ domain of CNP.

1
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/blood-and-water-cant-flow-together-pm-narendra-modi-gets-tough-
on-indus-treaty/articleshow/54534135.cms accessed on 15 Apr 23.
2
Ibid.
3
Stephen P. Cohen, The US & South Asia, http://www.india-
seminar.com/2005/545/545%20stephen%20p.%20cohen1.htm accessed on 15 Apr 23.
4
Syed Ali Zafar, Weaponizing Water Warfare, ISPR Press Review, Mar 2023, pg No 22.
5
Daniel Haines, Indus Divided: India, Pakistan and the River Basin Dispute (India: Penguin Random House, 2017),
pg No 112.
 2

Aim

3. Aim of the paper is to analyse the dynamics of the IWT in view of India‟s notice to
Pak for review of the treaty.

Scope

4. The paper will be covered in the fwg parts:-

(a) Part I. Salient aspects of IWT.

(b) Part II. Alteration of IWT - India‟s Notice to Pak.

(c) Part III. Pak Perspective.

(d) Part IV. Way Fwd.

PART I : SALIENT ASPECTS OF IWT & DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS

5. Indus River is one of the largest river basins in the world & a lifeline for the
regional economies. It consists of the Indus River & its five major tributaries namely,
Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas & Sutlej, depicted in Fig-1 below. The river basin has been
considered as a key to the socio-economic devp of the region. The British devp a cnl
network further west into the present day Pak to create irrigation sys, which sustained
the population primarily dependent on agriculture.

Fig 1: Indus River System

 3

Salient Aspects of IWT

6. The IWT effectively divided the Indus river system betn the two nations, with almt
of three rivers each to both countries. The Eastern rivers comprising only 20 percent
water share were allotted to India & the Western rivers comprising almost 80 percent of
water share to Pak. The annual average flow of the Indus river sys & water allotment
are given below in Table-1 & Fig-2 respectively.

Eastern Rivers Western Rivers Total

41 BCM (33 MAF) 166 BCM (136 MAF) 207 BCM
20% 80% (169 MAF)

Table 1: Annual Average Flow of Indus Rivers

07
9:
:0
18
25
20
2/
/0
03

Fig 2: Water Distribution Chart6

6
Arshad H Abbasi, Indus Water Treaty Between India and Pakistan, PILDAT, 2012, ISBN 978-969-558-243-5.
 4

7. Provisions of the Eastern Rivers. As per Article II, India was allowed
unrestricted use of the Eastern rivers post the transition pd. The key aspects of Article II
are given below.

(a) All the waters of the Eastern rivers shall be available for the unrestricted
use of India, except as otherwise expressly provided in this Article7.

(b) Except for Domestic Use and Non-Consumptive Use, Pakistan shall be
under an obligation to let flow, and shall not permit any interference with, the
waters of the Sutlej Main and the Ravi Main in the reaches where these rivers
flow in Pakistan and have not yet finally crossed into Pakistan8.

(c) Except for Domestic Use, Non-Consumptive Use and Agricultural (as
specified), Pakistan shall be under an obligation to let flow, and shall not permit
any interference with, the waters (while flowing in Pakistan) of any Tributary
which in its natural course joins the Sutlej Main or the Ravi Main before these
rivers have finally crossed into Pakistan9.

8. Provisions of Western Rivers. As per Article III, these were allotted to

Pakistan and waters of these rivers would be allowed to flow for unrestricted use by
Pakistan except for some limited use by India such as Domestic Use, Agriculture use,
non-consumptive use and hydro-electric power run of the river plants provided it does
not diminish water flow to Pakistan.

(a) Restrictions on Agricultural Use. India was allowed to irrigate from

the Western rivers areas which were so irrigated as on the effective date 10 and
addl allotment was allowed for withdrawal from Chenab Main (Ranbir & Pratap
Cnl) upto prescribed limit11. Further to the above mentioned withdrawals, Indian
rights to irrigate from the Western Rivers basin was restricted to specifications as
given in Table-2 below.

Permissible Irrigated Crop Area (ICA)

River
(in acres)
Indus 70,000
Jhelum 4,00,000
Chenab 2,25,000 + 6,000
Total 7,01,000
Table 2: Permissible Irrigated Crop Area for India12

7
The Indus Waters Treaty 1960, Article - II, Para (1).
8
Ibid, Article - II, para(2).
9
Ibid, Article - II, para (3).
10
Ibid, Annx C, para 4.
11
Ibid, Annx C, para 3.
12
Ibid, Annx C, para 5.
 5

(b) Restrictions on Storage for Hydroelectric Projects. Under the

treaty, the storage of water for generation of HEP is permitted with certain
restrictions. India can build storage facilities to the tune of 3.6 MAF in addition to
the already existing storage. This restrictive clause limits the construction of large
storage, however, run-of-river type HEP can be constructed. Designs for the
same are required to be shared with Pakistan six months in advance 13 . The
details of storage permitted on various rivers are as given below:

Storage Capacity Flood Total

Gen Storage Power Storage Storage Storage
Rivers Capacity Capacity Capacity Capacity
(MAF) (MAF) (MAF) (MAF)
Indus 0.25 0.15 Nil 0.40
Jhelum (excl Jhelum
0.50 0.25 0.75 1.50
main)
Jhelum Main Nil Nil Nil Nil
Chenab (excl
0.50 0.60 Nil 1.10
Chenab main)
Chenab Main Nil 0.60 Nil 0.60
Total storage permitted on Western Rivers by India 3.6

Table 3: Permissible Water Storage by India14

9. Certain key provisions of the IWT having a bearing on the rights & obligations of
both nations are as under:-

(a) Transition Pd. It would be of 10 years and further extendable upto

maximum of three years and end on 31 Mar 1970 or if extended then not later
than 31 Mar 1973 15.

(b) Exch of Data. Under the provisions of this treaty both the parties are
reqd to exch monthly data wrt the flow & utilisation of waters of the rivers to
include daily gauge & discharge data relating to the flow, daily release from
reservoirs, daily withdrawals at head of canal & daily deliverables from link
canals16.

(c) Permt Indus Commission (PIC). Under the Article VIII, of the
treaty both India & Pakistan were to create the post of Commissioner for Indus
Waters & the two commissioners together would form the Permt Indus

13
Ibid, Annx D, para 9.
14
Ibid, Annx E, para 7.
15
Ibid, Article II, para (6).
16
Ibid, Article VI, para (1).
 6

Commission17. PIC is reqd to est & maint coop arngs for the implementation of
the treaty18 and was mandated to meet atleast once a yr19.

(d) Settlement of Differences & Disputes. IWT laid out the

differences & dispute resolution mech.

(i) Question. Any question regarding the interpretation or

application of the treaty would be examined by the PIC. If the PIC does
not reach an agreement, then a difference would be deemed to have
arisen20.

(ii) Difference. Any difference dependent on certain provisos would

be settled by a neutral expert who would be appointed jointly by both
parties. If the difference is beyond the scope of the neutral expert or if the
said expert informs the commission to treat the difference as a dispute,
then a dispute would be deemed to have arisen21.

(iii) Dispute. Dispute would be informed to the two govts by the

commission. The govts may agree to resolve the dispute by agreement or
be referred to Court of Arbirtration (CoA) 22.

(e) Mod or Termination of IWT. Article XII: Final Provisions, allow for
mod of the provisions of the treaty but the same need to be duly ratified by both
the govts. The Article also stipulates that, the treaty shall continue to be in force
until terminated by a duly ratified treaty between the two govts 23.

17
Ibid, Article VIII, para (1) & (3).
18
Ibid, Article VIII, para (4).
19
Ibid, Article VIII, para (5).
20
Ibid, Article IX, para (1).
21
Ibid, Article IX, para (2).
22
Ibid, Article IX, para (3), (4) & (5).
23
Ibid, Article XII, para (3) & (4).
 7

PART II : ALTERING OF IWT - INDIA’S NOTICE TO PAK

10. The demands for mod of the IWT are not new and similar demands have been
made quite a few times in the past also. One such demand was made post the attack
on the Indian Parliament in Dec 2001. Haryana Chief Minister Om Prakash Chautala
urged the scrapping of the IWT in view of Pak‟s continued attempts to vitiate the
peaceful envt in India24. Post the Uri & Pulwama trt initiated incidents, the demands for
abrogation of the IWT as a means of punishing Pak resurfaced, but, remained mostly in
the paradigm of pol hyperbole.

11. Thus, when on 25 Jan 23, India issued a notice to Pak, calling for a review of the
IWT under Article XII (3) of the treaty, the absence of a trt incident was conspicuous. It
is pertinent to note that the reasons for the call for modifying the IWT is steeped more in
technical & legal issues25, which have been expl by Pak, going against the spirit of the
treaty. It is quite evident that India has not been able to fully capitalise on the „Eastern
Rivers” due to inadequacy of infra & slippages. Case in pt being leakage from
Madhopur HW on Ravi R which provides Pak with water for irrigation. Ipso facto, NSCS
in 2019 along with Min of Water proposed devp of addl cnl nw from Shahpur Kandi Dam
on Ravi R downstream from Ranjit Sagar Dam which is to be completed in 2023.

12. The treaty allows India to build HEP projs on the Western Rivers, premised on
certain stipulations. The same also allows Pakistan to raise objections to any such proj
if it violates the treaty. Pak has over the yrs protested every proj initiated by India,
starting from Salal HPP to Tulbul Navig proj to Baglihar Dam, Kishenganga & Ratle
projs. The objections raised and the subsequent process of arbitration cause inordinate
delays leading to cost overruns for India. This has been the typical tac emp by Pak, expl
the provisions of the treaty to frustrate India.

13. Kishenganga HEP. Construction of the Kishenganga HEP commenced in

2007 and in 2008 Pak raised six concerns related to the project. One of the concern
was resolved by the Commission while two being considered as disputes were taken to
the Court of Arbitration (CoA) by Pak. In 2013, the Court ruled in favour of India on both
counts and allowed for the construction to re-commence. At this time the discussions on
the bal three issues were undergoing. In 2015, Pak gave notice for appt of a neutral
expert which it withdrew in Feb 2016 & took up the issue with the Court of Arbitration.26

14. It would, at this pt, be pertinent to bring out the difference betn referral to a
Neutral Expert & the CoA. In case of a neutral expert‟s referral, the project under
dispute is not stopped. But in case where the proj is referred to the CoA, it can be
stopped27.

24
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/scrap-indo-pak-water-treaty-chautala/articleshow/931123865.cms
accessed on 17 Apr 23.
25
Sushant Sareen, Indus Waters Treaty: Opening the Water Front, ORF, 28 Jan 2023.
26
Indus Waters Treat 1960, Reference Note, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, No. 04/RN/Ref./January/2017.
27
Raashid Wali Janjua, Hydropolitics of Hate, ISPR Press Review, Mar 2023, pg No 20.
 8

15. Ratle HEP. Ratle HEP was planned to be devp as a run-of-the-river proj which
was objected to by Pak in 2012 on aspects of pondage & other design features.
Secretary level negotiations of both countries could not resolve the issues and Pak
decided to resolve the issue through other means i.e. neutral expert & CoA.

16. In 2016, India had requested World Bank for appt of a neutral expert, while at the
same time, Pak had requested the issues to be taken up by CoA. This put the World
Bank, as a guarantor of the treaty in a quandary. The treaty explicitly states that a CoA,
or other mediation efforts, do not apply to a „difference‟ that was being addressed by the
neutral expert28. The World Bank sought to fulfil its procedural obligations with respect
to both the CoA and the Neutral Expert. The Treaty does not empower the World Bank
to decide whether one procedure should take precedence over the other; rather it vests
the determination of jurisdictional competence on each of the two mechanisms29.
17. Considering the above mentioned challenges, on 12 Dec 2016, World Bank
announced a pause in the separate processes intiated by both the countries. World
Bank Group President, Jim Yong Kim stated, „this is an opportunity for the two countries
to begin to resolve the issue in an amicable manner & in line with the spirit of the treaty
rather than pursuing concurrent processes that could make the treaty unworkable over
time‟ 30.
18. With both the countries having failed to make any progress in resolution of the
dispute, World bank resumed the process in 2022 by appointing a Neutral Expert and
Chairman of the CoA. Two separate hand-over mtgs were held with the Neutral Expert
and the Chairman of CoA on 21 Nov 22 with the reps from both India & Pak 31.

19. India’s Contention. India opines that the „parallel processes‟ instead of a
„graded mech‟ had led to a stalemate, leaving India with no choice but to demand that
Pak come to the table to negotiate amdts to the treaty32. While India has been suffering
from Pak‟s intransigence in resolution of the Kishenganga & Ratle HEP disputes, in
India‟s perception the concurrent running of two dispute resolution mechanisms, is
entangled with the risk of divergent results which threaten the treaty itself, a concern
shared by World Bank too, which agrees that, „carrying out the two appts concurrently
may pose practical & legal risks‟ 33. This, India deems to be a mtrl breach of the treaty
and hence, the notice calling for its review was issued by India on 25 Jan 23. Also, in
view of these contentions, India declined to participate in the CoA proceedings held on
27 & 28 Jan 23 34.

28
India raises the heat on the Indus Waters Treaty, The Third Pole accessed on 18 Apr 23.
29
https://www. worldbank.org/en/region/sar/brief/fact-sheet-the- IWT accessed on 17 Apr 2023.
30
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/12/12/world-bank-declares-pause-protect-indus-
water-treaty accessed on 18 Apr 2023.
31
https://www. worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/12/21 /world-bank-holds-handover-meetings-under-
indus-waters-treaty accessed on 18 Apr 2023.
32
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-notifies-pakistan-on-modification-of-indus-waters-treaty/
article66438780.ece accessed on 16 Apr 23.
33
https;//www. Worldbank.org/en/region/sar/brief/fact-sheet-the-IWT-1960 accessed on 18 Apr 23.
34
Ahmer Bilal Soofi & Ayesha Malik, India’s First Shot at the IWT, ISPR Press Review, Mar 2023, pg No 8.
 9

PART III : PAK PERSPECTIVE

20. IWT, having survived numerous conflicts between the two nations, is termed as a
success, however, the irony is that the treaty left both sides dissatisfied. Pakistani critics
charged their govt with selling „Pakistani‟ rivers to India, while Indian politicians accused
theirs of appeasing Pakistani aggression 35 . India feels that despite being the upper
riparian state, the larger share of water resources have been provided to Pak & not
allowing India to harness the hydroelectric power from dams being constructed over the
western rivers would magnify the unfairness. Pak‟s objection to the treaty stems mainly
from its fear of India gaining a strat advantage by constr of dams on Indus Rivers. It
feels the treaty did not adequately address the future projected growth & incr reqmts of
water. Pak has always suffered from lower riparian anxiety & thus despite the signing of
the treaty there have been contentions between the two nations arising primarily out of
varied interpretations of the treaties‟ clauses36.

21. In the present context of concurrent processes too, Pak‟s perception is at

variance from that of India.

(a) Dispute Resolution Mech. Pak does not look at the dispute
resolution process as a graded mech from the PIC to Neutral Expert & then onto
the CoA. In Pak‟s perception, there is no graded apch or nesting doll sys of
dispute resolution. Instead, there is more of a fork in the rd process under which
different issues can proceed to different forums37.

(b) Difference Vs Dispute. Article XI of IWT defines the dispute resolution

mech giving the definition of question, difference & dispute as given in para 9 (f)
in Part 1 of the paper. However, Pak believes that it is the commission which
decides whether the issue is a „difference‟ or a „dispute‟ 38.

(c) Role of World Bank. India opines that the World Bank is not in a
posn to interpret the agreement, however, Pak believes that World Bank, a
guarantor of the treaty, has decided to allow these processes concurrently & thus
the same should be accepted by India39.

22. The initial reaction of Pak to India‟s notice calling for review of the IWT has been
more or less dismissive, probably owing to the on-going internal pol & eco turmoil.
There is also an element of denial or, if you will, belief that India cannot unilaterally alter
the treaty, much less abrogate it 40. However, the alarm bells are ringing, India‟s recent

35
Dr Daniel Haines, Do no renegotiate India & Pakistan’s Indus Waters Treaty, Policy Bristol.
36
Haider Omar Hayat, Indus Water Treaty: The past, present & future, ISPR Press Review, Mar 2023, pg No. 17.
37
Ahmer Bilal Soofi & Ayesha Malik, India’s First Shot at the Indus Water Treaty, ISPR Press Review, Mar 2023,
pg No 8.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
40
Sushant Sareen, Indus Waters Treaty: Opening the Water Front, ORF, 28 Jan 2023.
 10

pitch to „modify‟ and „amend‟ the 1960 IWT without offering any specifics has been
viewed with immense concern by Islamabad41.

23. Contrary to the common belief, there have been frequent calls in Pak for re-exam
of the treaty. The Pak Senate, on 7 March 2016 passed a resolution asking India to
revisit the treaty. However on the advice of the Chairman, Indus River Sys Auth (IRSA),
who explained to the committee that such a step would be not be in favour of Pakistan
in fact that it would be just the other way, the proposal never materialised 42.

24. Unilateral Action By India. The primary concern in Pak is India‟s unilateral
actions, be it abrogation or mod of the treaty. Article XII (3) & (4), do not allow for any
unilateral actions by any of the parties, & this clarification is the pivotal respite to Pak 43.

25. Third Party Resolution. India prefers bilateral resolution of any dispute,
however, Pak believes that in order to ensure transparency & justice, such matters
should be placed before a CoA. There is a fear that without intervention of an unbiased
third party for dispute resolution, Pak risks being bulldozed in negotiations44.

26. Delays in Resolution. While India feels that Pak‟s objections to Indian projs
are purposefully done, expl the tech & legal aspects of the treaty, with the aim to create
obsts for India45 (delaying the projs). However, Ali Tauqeer Shiekh brings out in his
article that the delays in decision-making have infact been detrimental to Pak. The
pause in the proceedings by World Bank in 2016 allowed India the time to complete the
contentious Kishenganga project which was completed in 2018 46.

27. Leverage China’s Influence. As brought out in Para 22 above, the primary
concern for Pak is unilateral abrogation of the treaty by India. In such a scenario, Pak, in
addn to appealing to the World Bank, may leverage its relation with China to ensure
intervention by China in its favour47.

28. Pak suffers from „Lower Riparian Anxiety‟ which is accentuated by its deep
mistrust for India. Pakistan is extremely sensitive to the aspect of cont over Indus river
sys & storage projs, which India could expl. The objections to India‟s HEPs, stems from
this fear, of use of water as a coercive tool by India. Pak suspects that India is
constructing Hydroelectric run-of-the-river dams in the garb of power genr to enhance
its storage capb and withhold water in times of scarcity & to release it during floods48.

41
Ozer Khalid, India’s weaponisation of the Indus Water Treaty, ISPR Press Review, Mar 2023, pg No 11.
42
Tilak Devasher, “Pakistan: Courting the Abyss,” (India: Harper Collins, 2016), p. 223-224.
43
Sana Taha, Amendments to the Indus Waters Treaty - Threat by India or Opportunity for Pakistan, Research
Society of International Law (RSIL), 20 Feb 23.
44
Haider Omar Hayat, Indus Water Treaty: The past, present & future, ISPR Press Review, Mar 2023, pg No. 17.
45
Sushant Sareen, Indus Waters Treaty: Opening the Water Front, ORF, 28 Jan 2023.
46
Ali Tauqeer Sheikh, Saving the IWT, ISPR Press Review, Mar 2023, pg No. 23.
47
Ahmer Bilal Soofi & Ayesha Malik, India’s First Shot at the Indus Water Treaty, ISPR Press Review, Mar 2023,
pg No 8.
48
Raashid Wali Janjua, Hydropolitics of Hate, ISPR Press Review, Mar 2023, pg No 20.
 11

PART IV: PROGNOSIS

29. As covered in para 9 (g) of Part I above, the treaty does allow for mods of the
provisions of the treaty. However, any such steps need to be duly ratified by both the
govts. The prevailing conditions of distrust betn the two nations make such a task a
challenging proposition. Even if undertaken, the same is likely to be a long drawn
process, as it was the first time in the 1950‟s. The primary cause for such a sit is the
divergent end-state envisioned by both the nations.

30. Pak. If Pak agrees to India‟s demand for reviewing the treaty, the likely end-
states it would envision at the end of the process would be along fwg lines:-

(a) Prevent the possibility of coercive use of water by India.

(b) Secure additional long-term sup of water.

(c) Deny India the freedom of constructing infrastructure on the western

rivers, even incl „run-of-the-river projs, thereby securing itself against any
diversion or flooding schemes that Pakistan perceives India to be plotting.

(d) The stopping of constr of hydro-electricity projs in J&K will also hurt the
state which has not been able to tap the available hydropower resources. The
discontentment amongst local population against the Indian government would
be in favour of Pak.

(e) Win a diplomatic victory over its „arch nemesis‟, India.

31. India. Indian interests or aims from re-examination of the treaty would be along
fwg lines:-

(a) Create leverage over Pak.

(b) Secure additional long-term supplies of water.

(c) Exploit the hydro power generation capb of the Indus Rivers to the
optimum.

(d) Securing of addl water sup, constr of storage & hydroelectric infra on the
Indus Rivers would aid the devp of J&K & reduce discontentment amongst
people.

32. Despite the challenges of overcoming the huge trust deficit & the likely divergent
end-states, diplomacy has, even in the past overcome greater problems. In the present
scenario, with India having given notice to Pak for review of the treaty, future actions will
be dictated by Pak‟s response. On 06 Apr 23, India has recd Pak‟s response to its
notice, i.e. letter written by Pak‟s Indus Water Commissioner to his counterpart49. The

49
https://indianexpress.com/article/india/pakistan-responds-to-indias-notice-on-indus-waters-treaty-review-
8543229/ accessed on 18 Apr 23.
 12

detls of the letter have not been made public and are being examined. Possible
reactions by Pak are given below in Table-4.

Response Likelihood India’s Avlb Responses

Accepts proposal for Review Unlikely Review of the Treaty
 Unilateral Abrogation
Rejects proposal for Review Less Likely  Maint Status Quo (Expl tech
aspects of the treaty)
 Unilateral Abrogation while maint
Status Quo
Non-Committal – Delaying tac Most Likely
 Explore options to push Pak to
join negotiations

Review of the Treaty

33. Given the growing water scarcity in the subcontinent, a review of the treaty to
ensure inclusion of new tech, studies and reform the dispute resolution mech are no
longer a desired action but a necessity. As difficult or challenging as the proposition
may seem, it should be the preferred option. However, the key aspect which both India
& Pak must gd against is the high jacking of the review process by pol hyperbole. The
review process must be under the realms of tech & legal aspects governed or cont by
SMEs i.e. engrs, lawyers, hydrology experts, etc.

34. In terms of India & Pak, it is crucial that both the nations review the IWT
dispassionately & free from their historical prejudices. A new & evolved treaty could
prove to be beneficial to all riparian nations & also provide a platform for cooperative
dialogue.

(a) Inclusion of All Riparian Nations. Pak‟s fear of being bulldozed by

India in case of bilateral negotiations would be laid to rest with the inclusion of
China as a signatory of the treaty. China despite being the upper riparian rejects
multilateral water treaties & is not a signatory to the UN Convention on Non-
Navig Uses of Intl Water courses50. This would lead to an epochal change in the
geostrategic scenario in the Indian subcontinent. The inclusion of Afghanistan
would not benefit India in any water related aspect but would be beneficial in the
strat realm & provide a platform for greater cooperation & involvement of all
nations. Also India & Afghanistan could counter any Sino-Pak collusion. A water
treaty is mostly in favour of the lower riparian, as it is the rights of the lower
riparian state which are threatened. Thus the inclusion of China, would create a
safegd for India against any water aggression by China.

(b) Dispute Resolution Mechanism. The dispute resolution

mechanism also needs to be empowered to implement or ensure the execution
50
Dr David J Devlaeminck, China’s Water Sharing Treaties – Reciprocity in Practice, China Water Risk.
 13

of its orders or decisions. The inordinate delay in resolution of the disputes can
be resolved by ensuring a time-bound process at each level, post which they
would be referred to the next level. The decisions would be binding & non
acceptance of the same could be handled by imposition of penalties such as
reduction in water share for a particular duration or financial penalty.

(c) Jt Indus Commission. Presently an Indus Commission exists in each

country, with only ltd jt functioning. The growing water crisis calls for a jt
commission to be est involving all riparian nations as members. The commission
could incl participation of all member nations with a panel of water experts,
scientists, economists, lawyers & scholars.

(d) Transparency in Data Sharing. The biggest challenge of trust deficit

betn the nations could be assuaged to some extent by ensuring transparency in
data sharing. Modern tech advancements such as satl based monitoring under
the control of the Jt Indus Commission could ensure the smooth flow of info. With
the Indus emanating in China, the inclusion of China is extremely imp.

(e) Jt Mgt of Indus Basin. The present treaty divides the rivers between
the two nations instead of allocation of water shares. This allows for limited coop
in basin mgt & devp. This arng is favourable to India as it allows India immunity
from the reduction in the water flow to a certain degree. Presently each nation
indep identifies the projs on the Indus basin based on indl interests, w/o
considering the degradation of the watershed. Jt mgt would ensure a coord &
holistic devp of the basin.

(f) Review. While incorporating the IWT in 1960, no stipulation of a

periodic review was built into the treaty. The revised treaty could incorporate a
periodic review after a fixed duration such as five years. This would allow iden of
the emerging challenges & address them in a timely manner.

Unilateral Abrogation

35. Unilateral abrogation of IWT & blocking of the waters is likely to have drastic &
strong reactions from not just Pak but also from World Bank being a guarantor of the
treaty and from the Global community. The action would constitute a violation of not just
the treaty‟s conventions but also international conventions. It would likely be labelled as
an encroachment on the basic human rights, resulting in an IW nightmare. Also, on
grnd, such a move will have minimal impact on Pak atleast for a few yrs, as India
presently does not have the requisite structures to either block or divert the waters for
use in India51.

51
Sushant Sareen, Indus Waters Treaty: Opening the Water Front, ORF, 28 Jan 2023.
 14

36. Jus Ad Bellum for Pak. The Indus water is Pak‟s lifeblood as 70% of rural Pak
depends on the Indus River & any unilateral changes by Delhi will escalate tensions
betn India & Pak 52. Pak is the 3rd most water stressed country in the world with only
enough water storage to last 30 days if India was to shut off the water, thereby
prompting the intl community to intervene53.

37. Jus Ad Bellum for China. China, controls the „Water Tower‟, Tibet & is the
upper riparian to nine nations in the region incl India. Given the growing Sino-Pak
proximity & the ever expanding rift in Sino-India relns, any unilateral action is likely to
provide China with the license to indulge in water aggression by erecting infra to prevent
water from flowing downstream into India 54.

Maint Status Quo

38. Maint a status quo is the easiest option; however with the water situation in the
sub-continent deteriorating fast, a status quo might only be able to delay an armed
conflict & not prevent it. Also, the same is not in favour of India as while India „bleeds
from a thousand cuts‟ from Pak, Pak continues to thrive on waters flowing through India.
While use of water as a strat wpn to coerce Pak is a dangerous proposition, India lacks
a key leverage to coerce Pak to stop its unabated sponsoring of terrorism. Thus, even if
India maint status quo, it must expl all the provisions in the treaty.

(a) Withdrawals from Western Rivers. The IWT allows restricted usage
of waters from the western rivers by India for purposes of domestic use, non-
consumptive use, agricultural use & generation of hydro-electric power 55. India
must identify methods to fully utilise these waters for the uses as are allowed by
the treaty.

(b) Controlling Flow of the Eastern Rivers. The IWT allows Pak
restricted use of eastern rivers for domestic use, non-consumptive use &
agricultural use but does not give Pak any right to claim the waters. Owing to
poor maint the existing barrages have leakages which allow almost 3 MAF of
water flows into Pak from the eastern rivers which India can utilise as per the
provisions of the treaty56. Also there is a need for additional diversion structures
on the eastern rivers which would allow to India to optimally utilise the waters in
accordance with the treaty.

52
Ozer Khalid, India’s weaponisation of the Indus Water Treaty, ISPR Press Review, Mar 2023, pg No 11.
53
Ahmer Bilal Soofi & Ayesha Malik, India’s First Shot at the Indus Water Treaty, ISPR Press Review, Mar 2023,
pg No 8.
54
Ozer Khalid, India’s weaponisation of the Indus Water Treaty, ISPR Press Review, Mar 2023, pg No 11.
55
Indus Water Treaty, Article III, para (2).
56
IDSA Task Force Report, Water Security for India: The External Dynamics (New Delhi: IDSA,2010), Chapter 2,
pg No 37.
 15

(c) Optimal Utilisation of Storage Capacity. The provisions of the

treaty allow India a storage capacity of 3.6 MAF on the western rivers as
permitted in the Annexure D & E, which has not been fully exploited 57. India
must ensure that it builds the storage facility on the rivers as is stipulated within
the treaty provisions (as given in Table-3, Para 8(b)).

(d) Linkages Betn IWT & Terrorism. Pak brazenly continues to abet
terrorism. India should advance its attempts to call out Pak for its illegal activities.
Creating linkages betn IWT & terror would allow India to est a base on which it
can at a later stage call for the abrogation of the treaty.

Leverage Pak’s Rejection of Proposal

39. In a scenario where Pak rejects India‟s proposal for review of the treaty or delays
it using tech manipulations, this would be the best possible option avlb to India. This
option however, would be premised on India‟s capb to create an IW narrative in its
favour. The IW narrative would be based on failure of democracy in Pak, its abetment of
terror & the drastic mismanagement of its water resources leading to the emerging
water crisis in Pak.

40. While calling for the abrogation of the treaty, India would unambiguously state
that it would continue to adhere to the spirit of the treaty & not block or divert any of the
waters. India would also declare that it would not proceed with any of the HEP projs
objected to by Pak and adhere to the judgements of the CoA in any issue which is
pending before it. This apch would allow India to break the status quo and a few yrs
later (post the probation pd) based on Pak‟s continued intransigence, take the next step
fwd. It would also be advisable to India to not expl any of the provisions as discussed in
Para 37 during the probation pd.

Push Pak to Join Negotiations

41. This step would be in place concurrently with any of the options given above. The
main aim of the entire ex incl the notice given by India to Pak is to bring Pak out of its
sedation. Presently a status quo exists not only wrt the IWT but also wrt Indo-Pak relns
and Pak‟s abetment of terror activities. And amidst all this humdrum, the IWT takes a
backseat.

57
Ibid.
 16

Leverages Avlb With India

42. Over and above the Shahpur Kandi Dam (to be completed by 2023), Ujh R is a
perennial river which is one of the main tributary of Ravi R draining into it south of
Madhopur HW and provides addl water to Pak. In order to cap this water drainage,
another dam is being proposed on the Ujh R under the „Ujh Multipurpose Proj‟ with a
total installed cap of 212 MW for hydropower genr, irrigation & drinking water. This dam
would further lower the water flow into Ravi R. The third proj in this effort is Sutluj-Beas
Link proj (2nd stg). These three projs will help India utilise the 5% of water which flows
into Pak.

43. These projs can not be objected by Pak and still be used as a leverage both for
starving Pak rivers or „flushing‟ them in case reqd to be used as a vector of war.

44. Pak‟s opposn to Kishanganga & Ratle will require arbitration but we have already
created adequate leverages with constr of Bagliar damwith 17 days pondage cap which
can be used to starve Chenab R which has a pondage of five days at Marala HW. The
issue of water as a wpn in war with Pak has often been debated but would be a strat
decision and not in mil domain.

45. The debate on IWT keeps Pak on tenterhooks in the cognitive domain and this
pressure must be persisted with as Pak transitions from water stable to world‟s 14th
most water scarce state58. The shortage of water for irrigation in Pak has already shot
upto 47% as on 01 Jun 23. The heartland of Pak i.e. Punjab province comprising of
Jhelum – Chenab Zone consists of 13 Mn acres of agricultural land, which is more than
the total agricultural land of Sindh Province and water shortage in Punjab shall cause
serious food security issues for entire Pak. The water avlb of Pak per capita has
dropped drastically from 5260 m3 / pers in 1951 to 500 m3 / pers in 2025 (estimated).
The effect of this is as follows :-

(a) 12 Mn acres of land in Thatta & Badin distt of Sindh lost to reverse flow of
sea water.

(b) Water storage cap of Pak is 30 days compared to 220 days of India.

(c) 4% of Pak GDP is spent every yr in mgt of water.

58
Agha Khan university research paper dt May 23 and UN Report – “Pak is critically water insecure” dt 27 Mar 23
 17

CONCLUSION

"Fierce national competition over water resources has prompted fears that water issues
contain the seeds of violent conflict. If all the world's peoples work together, a secure
and sustainable water future can be ours."
- Kofi Annan, Former UN Secretary-General

46. The IWT is hailed as one of the most successful water sharing treaty in the world.
However, a closer analysis reveals a few faultlines, which when combined with the grim
water situation as existing in Pak, emerge as a threat to the stability of the region.
Pakistan has tried to avert the culpability by blaming India for its worsening water crisis.
The key to the crisis rests with Pak itself which incl poor mgt policies, inefficient
irrigation practices, lack of maint of the existing storage sys & corrupt practices. These
are few of the areas which require urgent reforms for Pak to manage the water crisis
which threatens its very existence.

47. The historical data of water not being the primary reason for a maj conflict & the
effectiveness of IWT in dispute mgt & resolution cannot be juxtaposed to any future
scenario. The exploitation of water resource has become prominent only in the last few
decades & history is replete with examples of bloodshed for control of resources. But
the complex geostrategic scenario as existing in the region further complicates the issue
of its re-examination. But short of any provocative action by India such as unilateral
abrogation of IWT, there are numerous measures which can propel Pak towards a more
comprehensive treaty. The Indian hierarchy needs to understand the seriousness of the
sit & institute measures to tackle the issue proactively.