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Preparedfor delivery at Conventionof the AmericanHistoricalAssociation, December, 1973,in
San Francisco.
The Evolutionof
Italian FascistAntisemitism
by Michael A. Ledeen
' Federico Chabod, L'ltalia Contemporanea (1918-1948) (Turin, 1961), pp. 91-100.
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4 JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES
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Evolution of Italian Fascist Antisemitism 5
tion of their own schools or other cultural institutions, and the passage of the
Gentile Law caused great alarmamong Jewish educationaland religious leaders.
Further, 1923 produced another educational crisis within the Jewish communi-
ties. A law was passed offeringtwo years of free tuitionfor qualifiedforeignersto
attend Italian Universities, and this led to the arrivalof some two to three hun-
dred foreign Jews in the country, most of whom attended the University of
Florence.7 FlorentineJews were hard put to house, feed, and entertainthis for-
eign group, and the Gentile Law made an alreadydifficultsituationworse. In ad-
dition to the implicitmenace in the new school program,ItalianJews had to deal
with an increasingly explicit hostility from the Vatican. In the fall of 1924,
for example, I'OsservatoreRomano told its readers that "the Jew is the most
tenacious enemy of Christianity,"8and the same article carried the amazing
claim that AmericanJews were supportingthe Klu Klux Klan.
The reaction of ItalianJews to this multifacetedcrisis was surprisinglyposi-
tive and aggressive. They moved with remarkableenergy and imaginationto or-
ganize their own schools, thus enablingthem to provide Jewish religiousinstruc-
tion for their own children,in accordancewith the provisionsof the Gentile Law.
In this difficultenterprise, they were fortunateto have the leadershipof a distin-
guished Jewish Senatorfrom Rome, Vittorio Polacco, who founded the first ele-
mentaryschool in the Roman Jewish Communityin 1924, and who furthercould
represent his people in Parliament.9
In addition to the education of their children, Jews began to demand legal
recognitionof their rightsas Jews. In the summerof 1924,AlessandroCasati, the
Ministerof Education, was asked to eliminatepublic examinationson Saturdays
and other Jewish holidays. This request was rejected, but was later accepted as
the Fascist Governmentmoved to incorporatethe Jewish organizationswithinthe
frameworkof the new state that was created at the end of the decade. Indeed, by
the middle of the twenties, it was possible for one of the leading spokesmen of
ItalianJewry to speak of a Renaissance of Judaismwithin Italy,10and both Jews
and non-Jews were quick to point to Fascism as the central stimulusfor this re-
awakeningof one of Europe's oldest Jewish communities."
The high point of the relationshipbetween ItalianJews and their government
came with the Rocco Laws of 1930-1931,12which give a coherent nationallegal
with the monthly,Revista Mensile di Israel, which startedpublicationat a much later date). On the
Gentilereformsee, for example,the articleby Dante Lattes, 1 March1923,andalso the importantpo-
lemic by RabbiSamueleColombo, 12 July 1923.
7 Israel (12 July 1923).
8 Quoted in Israel (30 October 1924).
9 See, for example,his speech to the Senateon 7 Feb. 1925,"Perla libertadi coscienza e la tutela
delle minoranze religiose," reprinted in Letture Ebraiche, raccolta per cura di Dante Lattes (Rome,
1949).
10 Enzo Sereni, "Un anno di lavoro a Roma," Israel (8 April, 1926).
1 De Felice, p. 87.
12
Roberto Frau, La Formazione della Nuova Legislazione italiana sulle community isrealitiche
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6 JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES
status to the Jewish organizationsand their membersfor the first time. At the time
of the Marchon Rome, ItalianJews were governedby a hodge-podgeof civic, re-
gional, and national statutes, some dating back to the Inquisition.13While there
was a national Consortium,organizedjust after World War I, membershipwas
voluntary,and the Jewish leadershiphad little formalpower over its membership.
Not surprisingly,the Consortiumfound itself in constant economic difficulties,
unable to staff its organizationor to make any long-rangeplans, and generally
without respect among its own people. This situationwas substantiallyimproved
by the new legislation, which created a nationalUnion of the ItalianJewish Com-
munities, which was the governingbody for 26 clearly defined Communities.The
Communitieswere entrusted with the religious matters in each zone, including
liturgy and education. The Communitieswere the only legally recognized Jew-
ish organizations,and any Jew who did not wish to belong to a Communitywas
requiredto file a formalstatementrejectingJudaism.Since all Jews were required
to pay annualdues to the Community,the legislationnot only gave coherence to
the nationalorganizationand the regionalbodies, but also providedan economic
base for their activities.
The model for the Rocco Laws dealingwith the Jewish Communitieswas the
Vidoni Pact of 1925, which dealt with the problem of syndicalismin the Fascist
State.14The strategy of Mussolini and Alfredo Rocco, which was to be repeated
over and over againfrom 1925onward, was to incorporateentire spheres of activ-
ity within the Fascist state, and thus construct the new regime on the most
thoroughnationalconsensus possible. By giving the monopoly of representation
of the working class to the Fascist Syndicates in 1925, Mussoliniguaranteedhis
control over the workers, for he had to deal with only a single, Fascist institution.
Similarly,by consolidatingItalianJews into a single organization,he guaranteed
effective control. Andjust as the leaders of the new trade unions were enthusias-
tic about the Vidoni Pact, seeing in it a significantexpansion of their own power,
the leaders of the ItalianJewish Communitieswere enthusiasticabout the Rocco
Laws. Indeed, in readingthe ItalianJewish press of the period, the only critical
voices one finds are those callingfor even greatercentralizationof the Communi-
ties, and for greatercontrol from the various Rabbinates.Here as in many other
areas, ItalianJews were treatedlike other Italians,and their response was virtual-
ly the same.
Yet with all of this, anotherbasic question involving ItalianJews was not re-
solved so happily, despite innumerablepublic signs to the contrary, the question
of Zionism and the notion of an internationalJewish organization. This topic,
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Evolution of Italian Fascist Antisemitism 7
which deserves a volume to itself, is central to an understandingof the transfor-
mationof Fascist policies toward ItalianJews. For while Mussoliniwas quite be-
nevolent, at least at the beginning,towardthe Jews of Italy, he was highly ambiv-
alent when it came to the question of their commitmentto a Zionist ideal that, he
believed, diluted their loyalty to his own person and his own regime.
Mussolini's Fascism was extremely flexible, but it did have some consistent
principles,and one of these was the notion of nationalgenius, or nationalcharac-
ter. In the twenties, he held that Fascism was a uniquelyItalianphenomenon,not
"merchandisefor export," and even in the thirties, when he claimeduniversality
for Fascism, he thought in terms of national movements. When he attemptedto
organize a Fascist Internationalin the early thirties, it was to be an international
union of nationalFascist movements, not a single, monolithic,worldwidecrusade
undersingle ideologicalcontrol.15Like many nationalists,Mussolinidistrustedin-
ternationalmovements, whetherthey were Bolshevik, Masonic, or Jewish. At the
same time, like many Italians, Mussoliniwas quite superstitiousabout Jews, and,
despite all sorts of excellent evidence before his eyes, he believed in the existence
of an organizedworld Jewry, of enormous wealth and power. This, along with a
startlinglevel of ignorance about Italian Jews, must be kept in mind when one
deals with the utterancesand actions of Fascism and its leader.
The early years of Fascism saw the developmentof a warmworkingrelation-
ship between Mussoliniand the Zionistleaders of Europeand Italy. In 1926,Mus-
solini received Chaim Weizmannat Palazzo Venezia, and Victor Jacobson and
Nahum Sokolov passed throughhis offices the following year. These discussions
were invariablyvery warm, and their subsequentpublic statementswere positive-
ly euphoricon occasion. Mussoliniproclaimedhis allegianceto the Zionist cause,
and Zionists, for their part, were unstintingin their praise for both the Italiandic-
tatorand his regime. Sokolov set the generaltone in 1927when he said "we begin
to understand [Fascism's] true nature. True Jews have never fought against
you."16And by 1934Mussolini,in one of the most flamboyantremarkson record,
announcedto Goldmann:"I am a Zionist. Me!"17
Fromeach side, then, enthusiasticand unequivocalsupportwas forthcoming.
Yet Mussolini's allegiance to Zionism was not without considerablereservation.
His primarymotivationwas cynical. He wished to use the Zionists in his attempt
to dislodge the Britishfromtheirpowerfulhold on the Mediterraneanarea, and he
hoped that the Jews would rally to his side in this struggle.However, this was not
an all-or-nothingcommitment,and he did not hesitate to seek Arab supportat the
same time. Furthermore,the very nature of Fascism in its second decade made
collaborationwith a Zionismtingedwith social democracyhighlyproblematic.By
the middleof the thirties, Mussolinihad all but ended his supportfor the left wing
15
Michael A. Ledeen, Universal Fascism; The theory and practice of the Fascist International
(New York, 1971).
16
Israel (3 November 1927).
17
Quoted in De Felice, p. 160.
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8 JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES
of the Zionist movementand had shifted his supportalmost exclusively to the Re-
visionists. VladimirJabotinsky was much closer to the Fascist mentality than
Weizmann. 8
In the beginning,however, the crucial fact for Italy's Jews was that Musso-
lini had wholeheartedlyendorsed the idea of a Jewish homelandin Palestine. He
took great pains to demonstrate that there was no "Jewish Question" in Italy.
Public statements from Mussolini and his associates constantly emphasized this
theme in the late twenties and early thirties. In 1929 in a speech to the Cham-
ber, he observed that "the Jews have been in Rome since the times of the
Kings ... there were 50,000 at the time of Augustus, and they asked to cry on the
corpse of Julius Caesar. They will remain undisturbed."'9Costanzo Ciano, in
the same year, visited the great synagogue of Livorno and made the remark-
able statement that there were too few Jews in Italy.20These statements, com-
bined with the new laws governingJews, solidly committed Fascism to helping
the Italian Jewish community in whatever manner was deemed appropriatein
the context of the new Italian state. And this was not all; as a furthergesture to-
ward Zionists, Mussolini created a new organizationcalled the Comitato Italia-
Palestina, staffed by distinguishednon-Jewish Fascists, to actively promote the
cause of the Jewish state among the Italian public. Organizedin 1928, with no
less a figurethan AlbertoDe Stefani as vice-president,the Committeeserved as a
highly visible reminderof the regime's endorsement of the Zionist programfor
Palestine.21
But despite appearances,there were hints that Mussoliniwas not fully com-
mittedto the Jewish cause. He was worriedabout the effect of Zionistpropaganda
on ItalianJews, and in particularhe suspected that their loyalty to Fascism might
be diluted by Zionist enthusiasm. Dramaticevidence of his state of mind comes
from an attack on ItalianZionists in II Popolo di Roma from 29 November to 15
December 1928. This attack was unsigned, but clearly came from Mussolinihim-
self. It took the formof a criticalreview of the proceedingsat the ZionistCongress
held a short time earlierin Milan. Mussolini's opening attack is worth quotingat
length:
Italian Christianswill be perhaps a bit amazed and disturbedto learn that there is
another people in Italy, which declares itself apart not only from our religiousfaith,
but also from our nation, from our people, our history and our ideals. A guest people,
finally, which stays among us like oil amid water, togetherbut not thoroughlymixed
together ....
All the Zionists speak of a "Jewish people," of a "Jewish Race," of "Jewish ideals,"
without the most remote reference to the religiouselement.
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Evolution of Italian Fascist Antisemitism 9
Now we ask the ItalianJews: Are you a religionor a nation?This question does not
have the goal of creatingan antisemiticmovement,but ratherthat of takinga problem
out of a shadowy zone, a problemwhich exists, and which it is perfectlyuseless to ig-
nore any longer .... We will draw the necessary conclusions from the answer.22
22
Quoted in Umberto Nahon, "La polemica antisionista del Popolo di Roma nel 1928," in Carpi,
Milano, and Nahon, eds., Scritti in memoria di Enzo Sereni (Jerusalem, 1970), 221-23.
23
Ibid., pp. 225-26.
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10 JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES
All agreed . . . that in the various Zionist activities in Italy, we had to keep in mind,
now more than ever, that the existence of the ItalianZionist Federation,the publica-
tion of a periodicallikeIsrael, the gatheringof funds ... andthe democraticelection of
the delegate to the Zionist Congress, were all modest manifestations,but of great
theoretical importance, which represented something exceptional in the Fascist
climate.25
Mussolini had, then, warned Zionists that he would not tolerate divided loy-
alty on their part and had alerted them that he personally read their newspaper
and was sensitive to their ideas. Withthe passage of the Rocco Laws in 1930and
1931, Mussoliniacted to bringthis element of Italianlife undercloser supervision
and into constant contact with the government.Quite apartfrom thejuridicalben-
24
De Felice, for example,considersit of little significancein the most recenteditionof his history
of the ItalianJews duringFascism (p. 96).
25
Nahon, p. 253.
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Evolution of Italian Fascist Antisemitism 11
efits to the regime of the new arrangement,Mussolini's strategy intensified the
highly personal natureof the dictatorship.He had personally sounded the alarm,
and he personally ordered Rocco to draft the new legislation. From his point of
view, the anti-Zionistcampaignwas a success. It split the Jewish community,pro-
duced an increased commitmentto Fascism on the part of most ItalianJews, and
led to full supportfor the new laws.
At the same time as Mussoliniwas soundingthe alarmbell, there were signs
that other elements of the regime were concerned about the ability of Jews to be
good Fascists. Early in 1929, the Consul General in Marseilles, C. F. Barduzzi,
sent Mussolinia letter entitled "Semitismin Marseilles."26This letter is an arche-
type of its sort, and suggests the possibility that Fascist antisemitism,long before
the Racial Laws, was more significantthan many have believed. He wrote that
"One of the majorplaguesof the Italiancolony in Marseillesis the Jewish element
in all the executive positions in the scholastic and welfare institutionsin the col-
ony," and went on to outline the way in which he felt the Jews had taken over the
Societa "Dante Alighieri," the orphanages, the Camera di Commercio
Italiano, and other organizations."I have become convinced by my personal ex-
perience," he continued, "that a Jew can not be a convinced Fascist, and that
conversely a true Fascist must not remainJewish. A Jew can not be an integral
Italian." Consequently, Barduzzi said, he had eliminatedall Jews from positions
of authorityin the MarseillesItaliancolony, and none of the formerdirectorswere
any longer employed by their formerinstitutions.The letter closed with a general
warning to Mussolini, stressing the Consul's belief that the "Jewish Problem"
was by no means restricted to Marseilles, but actually accounted for what he
called the "masonic miasma" that afflicted all of France (particularlythe north-
east). Barduzziwas also a contributorto some Catholicjournals, and in the fall of
the same year wrote a piece for l'Avvenired'ltalia in which he argued that the
holy sites of Christianityin Palestine could only be safeguardedby the suppres-
sion of Zionism.27As one might expect, Barduzzi later found a happy home in
Italy in one of the joint Italo-Germanorganizationscreated in the late thirties, and
he prepareda lengthy reporton the Jews in the fall of 1937for CarmineBasile.28
Antisemites held importantpositions in many areas of the regime. Figures
such as Roberto Farinacci, MarioCarliand GiovanniPreziosi commandeda cer-
tain following, and their views of the Jews were even more violent than Bar-
duzzi's. It is notable that they flourished in the atmosphere of Fascism in the
late twenties, for they show that there was no official ban on antisemitismwithin
Fascist ranks. To be sure, such figures were marginalin Fascism's first decade,
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12 JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES
but they had powerful supportfrom within the Vatican and were anxious to ex-
pand their sphere of activities.
Yet despite the presence of antisemiteswithinthe regime, and Mussolini'sat-
tack on ItalianZionists in 1928, relations between Fascism and Jews in the early
thirtieswere excellent, as were the ties between Fascism and much of the Zionist
movement. In his famous series of conversationswith Emil Ludwig,29Mussolini
ridiculedboth antisemitism,and Germanicracial theories. There was simply no
place for official antisemitismwithin a Fascism regimethat boasted of its support
for Zionism and brandedGermanantisemitismas nonsense.
The development of official antisemitismin Italy representedthe final ideo-
logicalphase of Fascism, and dates fromthe middle 1930's-the periodof Empire,
the Spanish Civil War, and, finally, the Axis. Yet all too often this has been
treated as if it were a simple matterof importingforeign ideas. This was clearly
not the case, and an analysis of Mussolini's attitudes toward Jews and Zionism
shows that, even before the fatal events of 1934-1938,the developmentof official
anti-Zionismwas far from unlikely. The dictatorwas pro-Zionist,yes, but within
certain limits. The tension between social democraticZionism and Fascist Italy
was not to be ignored, and by 1933the Fascists had decided to restricttheir con-
crete supportfor Zionism to the Revisionist wing of the movement.30This deci-
sion was largely an ideological one, for the Revisionists often considered them-
selves the "Fascists of Zionism"-an opinion sharedby many of theiropponents.
In 1934, a Jewish section of the scuola marittima at Civitavecchia was estab-
lished-the originof theIsraeliNavy. In addition,several young Revisionistswere
sent to the Party's trainingschools. At one point in 1935, some thought was ac-
tually given at the ForeignMinistryto the plan of makingRevisionisminto a full-
fledged Fascist movement.31
Yet even after finding a wing of Zionism that was ideologically compatible
with the new Fascist doctrines, Mussolini's supportof the movementwas not ir-
revocable. When he changedhis mindabout the most desirableallies in the Medi-
terranean,he abandonedthe notion of a Palestinianhome for the Jews in short
order, brandishingthe sword of Islam against his English enemies.32Still more
importantin the long run, Mussolini had always believed in a variation of the
theory of the "internationalJewish conspiracy," and when he turnedfor help to
this presumedinternationalorganizationof wealthy bankersand grey eminences,
and failed to get his way, he concludedthat the forces of internationalJewrywere
againsthim, and that they representeda menace to this continuedsuccess of Fas-
cism itself. This developmentmust be consideredin some detail, for it is tied to an
importantelement of Fascist doctrine.
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Evolution of Italian Fascist Antisemitism 13
The central notion of Fascism had always been the moldingof a new sort of
Italian, and the Fascist revolution was to present the world with a "new man,"
capable of heroically transforminghis society.33Much of this was purely rhetori-
cal, of course, and simply added to the somewhat operatic aurawith which Mus-
solini surroundedhimself and his regime. But in the early and middlethirties, the
idea that Fascism really was the wave of the future, perhapsthe futureof the en-
tire Western world, gathered strengthamong otherwise sober Fascists. Further-
more, this same period saw a generalchangingof the guardin Rome, introducing
younger, more ideologically oriented people into positions of Fascist leadership,
and many of these new men wanted to develop a truly "totalitarian"state, which
would demonstratethe seriousness and durabilityof Fascism. The central notion
of this totalitarianismwas that if Italian Fascism was to prove itself capable of
creatinga new RomanEmpire, then the Italianpeople had to be transformedinto
a more compact, disciplined, and dedicatedforce. In Mussolini's phrase, Italians
had to be transformedfrom a race of slaves into a race of masters.34
The key event in the emergenceof this notion was the EthiopianWar, andthe
creationof the Fascist "Empire." This event was at the same time the crucialone
in the history of the relationsbetween Mussoliniand the Jews. The first step in the
dramacame with the announcementof worldwide sanctions against Italy. In an
attemptto get the sanctionslifted, Mussoliniturnedto the Zionistsfor help. From
his own point of view, he was entitled to some help from Zionists in returnfor his
supportof their Palestinianprogramand his favorable treatmentof ItalianJews.
He sent two of the most authoritativespokesmenfor ItalianZionists, Angelo Or-
vieto and Dante Lattes, to London, Paris, and finally Geneva to intervene with
the leaders of world Zionismand representativesof the BritishGovernment,hop-
ing that such an appeal might end the economic blockade against Italy.35The ap-
peal of these Jewish intellectualshad little effect, but instead of drawingthe rea-
sonable conclusion that Zionists had little power over the decisions of the nations
of the world, Mussolinifelt that he had been betrayed by his allies, and that the
Jewish internationalorganizationhad turnedon him.36Indeed, at the heightof the
sanctions he warnedof retaliation,advisingMoshe Sharettin Palestinethat an an-
ti-Italianattitudeon the partof the PalestinianJewish Press mighthave serious re-
percussions for the Italian Jews.37 For Mussolini, the Italian Jews and interna-
tional Zionists were all part of a coherent organization. This paranoia was
intensified by argumentsover war production with Jewish industrialistswithin
Italy.38In short, the Jews were provingto be of little help at a moment of crisis,
33 Ledeen, passim.
34 Cited in De Felice, p. 253. The referenceis to Ciano, Diario, 1937-1938.
35 Sam Waagenaar, II Ghetto sul Tevere (Milan, 1972), pp. 262-63.
36 De Felice, p. 179.
37 D. Horowitz, State in the Making (New York, 1953), p. 300.
38 Yvon De Begnac, Palazzo Venezia-Storia di un regime (Rome, 1950), p. 643.
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14 JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES
39 See Luigi Preti, I miti dell'lmpero e della Razza nell'Italia degli anni '30 (Rome, 1965), pp.
49-65.
40 For the best analysisof this literature,see Preti,and A. JamesGregor,TheIdeologyof Fascism
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Evolution of Italian Fascist Antisemitism 15
pie. This notion of a profound change in the nature of Italians had been pres-
ent all along in Fascist rhetoric, and, indeed, the first generation of Fascism
had taken pains to define itself in sharp contrast to the liberal, democratic gen-
eration that had preceded it. Yet at the end of the first decade and a half of Fas-
cist rule, there was a widespreadconviction that Fascism had failed to effect this
radicaltransformation.44 This failurewas of the utmostgravity, for it was precise-
ly the transformation of the Italianpeople that would usher in the triumphalepoch
of the Fascist Revolution. Many sincere Fascists were deeply committedto the
radicalizationof the Italian populace, and to a thoroughgoingeradicationof the
vestiges of older values and older styles of life that, in their view, had prevented
the fulfillmentof the Fascist dream. One need not look to remote intellectualsin
the Fascist world to find clear examples of this thinking, for it abounds in the
popularliteratureof the period. With the conquest of Ethiopia this became ever
more urgent. We can get a sense of this urgency in a highly revealingspeech by a
Dr. Manciniin July of 1937to a Conferenceof Fascist Women:
God wished to save Italy ... by sendingher a man, a leader, uniquein the world ...
who gave the new social, syndicalist, and corporativelaws and gave the directives to
... create a type of new man, the Fascist man ... and with the man the Fascist
woman, transformingthe Italianpeople. ... And amongthe manyproblemswhich he
has posed and solved, the Duce has placed in the first rankthat of remakingthe Race
from top to bottom. ....45
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16 JEWISH SOCIAL STUDIES
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Evolution of Italian Fascist Antisemitism 17
any Aryan could be treated as a Jew. Indeed, the menace implicit in the Racial
Laws was quite clear. Any Italianwho did not conform to the spiritualrequire-
ments of Fascism's definition of the "new man" would most likely find himself
treated as the Jews were. In this framework,it is easy to understandwhy the an-
tisemitic policies found such favor among those elements in Fascism that were
most passionately committedto a truly dynamic and totalitarianregime-figures
like GuiseppeBottai, and manyof the young intellectualswho had workedso hard
to produce a revolutionaryFascism throughoutthe thirties.52
The emergence of official antisemitism,then, must be viewed not as a mo-
mentary aberrationon the part of Mussolini or the GrandCouncil, or as an at-
tempt to humor the Nazis by copying the NurembergLaws. It was, rather, cut
from the same cloth as the rest of Fascism's final costume and was an attempt,
once and for all, to eradicatethe vestiges of earliervalues and mores, to transform
the Italianpeople from top to bottom, and to present the world with a truly new
man, homofascistus.
52
De Felice, pp. 264-70.
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