RUSSIA CONTINUES TO ADVANCE IN EASTERN UKRAINE
But it is encountering growing problems
1. Now that the excitement of Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk two months ago has faded, the prevailing
narrative has reasserted its grip. Ukrainian forces are retreating in the face of steady Russian advances
across the front line in the Donbas, thanks to Russia’s vast superiority in troop numbers and firepower.
2. The Ukrainian decision last week to pull its forces out of Vuhledar, a staunchly defended bastion that
lies on the hinge of the eastern and southern fronts, has added to the gloom about the country’s prospects.
The retreat was ordered to prevent their encirclement by the Russians. President Volodymyr Zelensky
praised the decision, saying that protecting the lives of the soldiers who had given “heroic service” was
“more important than any buildings”.
3. A similar situation appears to be developing to the north in Toretsk, a front-line city that Russian forces
have been advancing towards, village by village, since August, pulverising everything in their path with
glide bombs. On October 8th, a spokeswoman for the Ukrainian forces in the city reported that “The
fighting is taking place in Toretsk itself, the situation is unstable, literally every entrance is being fought
for.” Though Vuhledar was not of great strategic significance, Toretsk, which is on a hilltop, could be
used to obstruct Ukrainian supply routes behind the lines.
4. On the other hand, Russia has not made much progress in taking Chasiv Yar, some 40km to the north
of Toretsk, and appears to be stuck by the canal on the eastern side of the city. It is also making heavy
weather of its bid to take control of Pokrovsk, a key logistics hub that sits on a triangle of road and rail
links and which is the main focus of its offensive efforts. In August, there was much talk of the imminent
fall of Pokrovsk. But the pace of the Russian advance has noticeably slowed, with few territorial gains
in the past three weeks.
5. Nico Lange, a former chief of staff in Germany’s Ministry of Defence who has close links to the
Ukrainians, says that although Russian troops are now in artillery range of the city, they lack the force
numbers to make a concerted attack. While taking Pokrovsk would give Russia a launch-pad for
attacks deeper into central Ukraine and would worsen Ukraine’s logistical position in southern Donbas,
Mr Lange believes the operation, even if successful, will take many months and inflict extremely heavy
losses on the Russians.
6. Despite fears expressed in some quarters of a Ukrainian collapse, there is no sign of one. Ukraine’s
approach is to concede some ground while inflicting maximum casualties and equipment losses on Russia
and preserving its own forces to fight from newly fortified lines. It is also questionable how much longer
Russia can continue to lose more than a thousand men a day, despite huge signing-on bonuses for new
recruits. The seemingly inexhaustible stocks of mainly Soviet-era armoured vehicles and tanks it has
been able to draw on could be running low by next year. The Institute for the Study of War in Washington
reckons that in the Pokrovsk region alone Russia has lost at least five divisions’ worth of tanks and
armoured vehicles in the past year. Without sufficient armour, dismounted Russian soldiers are easy prey
for increasingly capable Ukrainian FPV drones.
7. There are also signs that Russia’s advantage in artillery has been declining, even as it increasingly
depends on unreliable North Korean munitions. Earlier this year, Russia was firing ten times as many
shells as the Ukrainians. But according to Ukrainian sources, the gap has now closed to 2.5:1. Ukraine is
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receiving more shells from its allies; its own production has speeded up; and strikes on Russian
ammunition storage depots have been both effective and spectacular. However, Ukraine, still forbidden
to use long-range Western missiles against targets in Russia, has no answer to the deadly glide bombs
launched by aircraft from Russian airspace that have become its adversary’s most potent battlefield
weapon.
8. For all the current despondency about Ukraine’s prospects, Russia is far from achieving its main
aim: of gaining control over Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, which make up the Donbas region, by the
end of this year. And despite setting the goal of driving Ukrainian forces from Kursk by the start of this
month, it now looks as if that will take much longer and require substantially greater forces than Moscow
has so far been able to commit.
9. The battle where Russia is unambiguously succeeding, says Mr Lange, is in the “information space”.
The notion that Ukraine cannot win, he argues, is becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy and an excuse for
Western leaders to withhold from Ukraine what it needs to prevail. A pattern has emerged in which
promised military support arrives late or not at all. As Phillips O’Brien, an American commentator, has
noted, American aid actually disbursed to Ukraine so far this year is sharply down on the amount sent in
2023.
Adapted from The Economist
I. Explain the meaning of the following expressions as used in the article (1.5 points)
1. the prevailing narrative has reasserted its grip (P1)
Russia has regained the upper hand in the Ukraine war
2. make a concerted attack (P5)
launch a well-organized and powerful offensive
3. despondency about Ukraine’s prospects (P8)
depressing outlook for Ukraine’s future
II. Comprehension (4.5 points)
Read the article and answer the following questions in your own words.
1. How have the Russian progressed into Ukrainian territory lately?
On the one hand, Russia holds the upper hand in Donbass and Toretsk because of their large number of
soldiers and weapons, forcing Ukrainian troops to withdraw (P1, 2, 3). This is advantageous for Russia,
as Toretsk, located on the top of a hill, is key to blocking supply to Ukrainian troops (P3). On the other
hand, the Russian has been slowing down in Chasiv Yar, appearing stalled at the canal in the east of the
city (P4). Similarly, Russian forces have lost momentum in Pokrovsk, unable to seize the crucial logistic
center connected to a vast network of roads and railway as expected (P4).
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2. Why are the Russian likely to be at a disadvantage in the Ukraine war?
Russian forces may risk losing their advantages in the war partly due to insufficient manpower to push
deeper into the central region of Ukraine and block supply routes (P5). Another reason is that Russia’s
stockpile of munitions, mostly produced years ago or unreliably supplied by North Korea, is anticipated
to dwindle next year due to the rapid use of weapons and battle vehicles (P6). This is likely to put weapon-
less troopers at risk, especially as Ukraine is holding certain advantages such as more effective FPV
drones, more weapons thanks to an increase in shell supplies from its Western allies and its own weapon
production output, and its successful big attacks on Russia’s depots (P6, 7).
3. How has the broader narrative of Ukraine losing affected the country, and what is an example of this
impact?
The more positive public perception of Russia’s victory has prompted Ukraine’s Western allies to refuse
to provide Ukraine with necessary resources to win the war. In fact, Western countries have been slow
or absent in providing military and financial aid. An example to illustrate this is the US having given
significantly less aid to Ukraine this year compared to last year (P9).
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III. Summary (2 points).
Summarize the main ideas of paragraphs 6 and 7 into 3-4 sentences (60-80 words).
Ukraine’s strategy includes conceding territory while maximizing casualties on Russian forces and
saving its own. Moreover, Russia is expected to face military vehicle shortages next year, increasing
risks for its troops. Meanwhile, Ukraine benefits from effective FPV drones, additional weapons from
Western allies, and boosted domestic weapon production. Ukraine has also successfully attacked Russian
depots, while Russia’s artillery advantage is waning despite its growing reliance on unreliable North
Korean supplies. In spite of these gains, Ukraine struggles against Russia’s glide bombs due to no
extended-range Western missiles.
IV. Translation (2 points).
Translate paragraph 7 into Vietnamese.
Ngoài ra, có các dấu hiệu cho thấy ưu thế về pháo đạn của Nga đang dần suy giảm, ngay cả khi Nga đang
ngày càng phụ thuộc vào nguồn đạn dược không đáng tin cậy từ Triều Tiên. Vào đầu năm nay, Nga bắn
pháo nhiều gấp 10 lần Ukraine. Tuy nhiên, theo số liệu từ Ukraine, tỉ lệ chênh lệch về sử dụng pháo giữa
Nga và Ukraine thu hẹp xuống mức 2.5:1 do Ukraine đang nhận nhiều pháo hơn từ các đồng minh, tăng
cường tự sản xuất pháo, và đạt được thành công lớn khi tấn công các kho đạn dược của Nga. Tuy vậy,
Ukraine, vốn bị cấm sử dụng tên lửa tầm xa của phương Tây để đánh các mục tiêu ở Nga, vẫn chưa thể
nào đối phó được bom lượn chết chóc phóng bởi máy bay Nga từ không phận Nga. Loại bom này đang
được coi là vũ khí chiến trường mạnh nhất của đối thủ của Ukraine.
