Journal of Islamic Ethics 8 (2024) 201–220

brill.com/jie

The Problem of Evil in the Early Modern Ottoman

Period: ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī’s Synthetic
Metaphysics of Faith and Disbelief
Hiroaki Kawanishi* | ORCID: 0009-0004-0955-5683
Center for Islamic Theology, University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany
alihiroaki1993@gmail.com

Received 9 May 2023 | Accepted 19 January 2024 |

Published online 6 February 2024

Abstract

The early modern Muslim world witnessed unparalleled development in theological

discussion, of which the problem of evil is a part. This paper aims to uncover a new
discourse on the problem of evil in the Ottoman period, by examining the eleventh/
seventeenth-century polymath ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī’s (d. 1143/1731) synthetic the-
ology of evil. More specifically, the study will analyze the way al-Nābulusī discusses
the issue of faith (īmān) and disbelief (kufr) in his Ashʿarī kalām and Akbarian Sufism.
Looking first at al-Nābulusī’s kalām metaphysics of īmān and kufr and then his mys-
tical metaphysics, the paper corroborates how between the two sciences, there is a
coherent logic in al-Nābulusī’s concordia theology.

Keywords

ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī – faith and disbelief – metaphysics – Ashʿarī kalām –

Akbarian Sufism

* I would like to thank Feriel Bouhafa for her careful editions and comments that greatly devel-
oped this paper. I also deeply appreciate Lejla Demiri and two anonymous reviewers for their
insightful feedback.

Published with license by Koninklijke Brill BV | doi:10.1163/24685542-20240004

© Hiroaki Kawanishi, 2024 | ISSN: 2468-5534 (print) 2468-5542 (online)
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license.
‫‪202‬‬ ‫‪Kawanishi‬‬

‫مشكلة الشر في العصر العثماني‪ :‬عبد الغني النابلسي و ميتافيز يقيا‬

‫الإيمان وا�لكفر‬

‫هيروأكي كاوانيشي‬
‫معهد العلوم الإسلامية‪ ،‬جامعة توبنغن‪ ،‬توبنغن‪ ،‬ألمانيا‬

‫الخلاصة‬

‫شهد العالم الإسلامي في العصر العثماني تطوّر ًا لا مثيل له في النقاش الكلامي‪ ،‬والذي تعد مسألة حدوث‬
‫الشر في العالم جزءًا منه‪ .‬تهدف هذه الورقة إلى ا�لكشف عن مشكلة الشر التي تبلورت في الفكر العثماني‪،‬‬
‫من خلال فحص النهج الكلامي والصّ وفي لمسألة حدوث الشر في القرن الحادي عشر‪/‬السابع عشر عند‬
‫العلامة عبد الغني النابلسي (ت‪ .)1731/1143 .‬على وجه التحديد‪ ،‬ستحل ِّل هذه الدراسة الطر يقة التي يناقش‬
‫بها النابلسي مسألة الإيمان وا�لكفر في علم الكلام الأشعري والتصو ّف الأكبري‪ .‬وبذلك تحدد الورقة أطر‬
‫العلاقة بين ميتافيز يقيا الإيمان وا�لكفر في علم الكلام وعقيدة النابلسي الصوفية لتأكد على منطق التماسك‬
‫والتوافق بين علم الكلام والتصوف عند النابلسي‪.‬‬

‫الكلمات المفتاحية‬

‫عبد الغني النابلسي – إيمان وكفر – ميتافيز يقيا – الكلام الأشعري – الطر يقة الأكبر ية‬

‫‪1‬‬ ‫‪Introduction‬‬

‫‪Islamic intellectual history has featured a substantial study of the issue of good‬‬
‫‪and evil (ḥusn wa-qubḥ/khayr wa-sharr). In particular, the problem in early‬‬
‫‪Islamic history has been explored relatively in-depth. In fact, there are a num-‬‬
‫‪ber of studies that examined the metaphysics of evil for scholars in the medi-‬‬
‫;‪eval period (Ormsby 1984; Steel 2002; Shihadeh 2006; 2014; 2019; Hoover 2007‬‬
‫‪Bouhafa 2021; Chowdhury 2021). Still, the existing literature overlooked the‬‬
‫‪theological discussions of evil and theodicy during the Ottoman period, which‬‬
‫‪remains a fertile ground to uncover new discourses.1 A scrutiny of this issue in‬‬

‫‪1 While the early modern period in the Ottoman world is still overlooked, some recent studies‬‬
‫‪have looked into the issue in the early modern Shīʿī tradition (Rizvi 2021; Terrier 2021).‬‬

‫‪Journal of Islamic Ethics 8 (2024) 201–220‬‬

The Problem of Evil in the Early Modern Ottoman Period 203

the early modern Ottoman world is needed to better grasp its development.
To our purpose, the problem of good and evil appears in a variety of Islamic
sciences. Despite an abundant accumulation of knowledge, most of the sec-
ondary literature tends to approach the subject of good and evil from a sin-
gle scientific discipline such as Qurʾānic exegesis (tafsīr), Islamic law ( fiqh),
Islamic legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh), speculative theology (kalām), and Sufism.
For example, some academic studies investigated ethics from the perspectives
of the Qurʾān (Moqbel 2021) and fiqh (Bou Akl 2021; Farahat 2021; Gleave 2021;
Opwis 2021). Unlike the medieval period, in the Ottoman period, an unpar-
alleled development in Islamic theology arose – namely, synthetic theology –
straddling kalām and Sufism in an intellectual quest for the problem of good
and evil.
Late Muslim scholarship in the Ottoman lands drew attention to the sig-
nificant development of multiple Islamic sciences. The problem of evil is
no exception. The eleventh/seventeenth-century Damascene ʿAbd al-Ghanī
al-Nābulusī (d. 1143/1731) represents the scholarly currents of the time and pro-
poses a unique theory on the problem of evil. Al-Nābulusī was a polymath who
had acquired expertise in a variety of sciences, among which fiqh, kalām, and
mysticism consolidated his great fame in Islamic intellectual history. In addi-
tion to his engagement in multiple sciences, he belonged to the Ḥanafī school
of law, the Ashʿarī creed, and significantly, was a devoted commentator of Ibn
al-ʿArabī (d. 638/1240). Al-Nābulusī, as the present study will demonstrate,
embraces an interdisciplinary framework to discuss the problem of evil. More
specifically, this paper shows how al-Nābulusī’s metaphysics resolves the prob-
lem of evil through a keen distinction between the creation of faith (īmān) and
disbelief (kufr) in relation to Divine Attributes such as Will, Power, Knowledge,
and Love, drawing from the perspective of both kalām and Sufism. In shed-
ding light on al-Nābulusī’s theological reasoning for the presence of kufr in this
world, I argue that al-Nābulusī’s mystical weltanschauung of the entire uni-
verse as perfect is greatly influenced by his spiritual master Ibn al-ʿArabī. In so
doing, al-Nābulusī’s engagement with the issue reconciles Ashʿarī kalām with
Akbarian mysticism. In what follows, I shall first examine his kalām metaphys-
ics of īmān and kufr and then analyze his mystical metaphysics.

2 Al-Nābulusī’s Kalām Metaphysics of Īmān and Kufr

Why does God create evil in this world? Al-Nābulusī’s metaphysics, in his kalām
works, offers a systematic explanation of the process by which evil comes into
existence. In this context, al-Nābulusī consistently admits that God is the sole

Journal of Islamic Ethics 8 (2024) 201–220

204 Kawanishi

creator of everything, including evil things. Everything exists by Divine Will. In

other words, nothing exists unless God wills it.
Al-Nābulusī elucidates the way Divine Will operates in the creation of evil.
A creature must conform to both Divine Power and Will to be brought into exis-
tence. The Omnipotent can create what He wills and does not have to create
what He dislikes. However, some things result in Divine Wrath or Discontent,
for example, disbelief and disobedience. In this context, al-Nābulusī explicitly
describes the beauty of īmān and the evil of kufr in his kalām metaphysics.
Al-Nābulusī places a sharp distinction between good and evil in the case of
one’s belief. He outlines how the īmān of certain individuals does not come
into existence. To illustrate this point, he discusses the creation of the īmān
of Abū Lahab (d. 2/623), Prophet Muḥammad’s uncle. Al-Nābulusī argues that
Abū Lahab was not a believer because Divine Knowledge was not connected
to his īmān. He adds that Abū Lahab was responsible for having his īmān in
this world (dunyā) – his īmān was contingent (mumkin). Divine Power and
Will were supposed to be connected to his īmān just like Divine Knowledge.
In this way, his īmān was supposed to actualize. However, Divine Knowledge
was connected to abstention from the actualization of his īmān, not to its actu-
alization. Consequently, this resulted in the absence of a connection between
Divine Power and Will to his īmān. Therefore, the īmān of Abū Lahab did not
come into existence (al-Nābulusī 2011, 69–70).
In Rāʾiḥat al-Janna Sharḥ Iḍāʾat al-Dujunna fī ʿAqāʾid Ahl al-Sunna (“Scent of
Paradise: Commentary on Illumination of the Darkness in the Sunnī Creeds”),
al-Nābulusī provides us with further explanation of how kufr comes into exis-
tence. In the process of God’s creation, there are the following five creative
factors that interrelate with each other: Divine Command (amr), Contentment
(riḍā), Will (irāda), Love (maḥabba), and Metaphysics (ilāhiyyāt). Of the five
factors, al-Nābulusī maintains that Divine Will is the primary cause of creation.
Divine Will is more dominant over Divine Command. Al-Nābulusī explains
the relationship between Divine Will and Command regarding God’s cre-
ation and claims that Divine Command includes the command of cre-
ation (amr al-takwīn) and the command of obligation (amr al-taklīf). Amr
al-takwīn accords with Divine Will as seen in God’s statement, “‘Be,’ and it is
(kun fa-yakūn)” (Q 2:117, 3:47, 3:59, 6:73, 16:40, 19:35, 36:82, 40:68, trans. Abdel
Haleem). He also adds that amr al-takwīn sometimes accords with Divine
Contentment and Love, and sometimes does not accord with them even
though a commanded thing actualizes, as God says, “and He is not pleased by
ingratitude in His servants” (Q 39:7, trans. Abdel Haleem). While amr al-taklīf
sometimes accords with Divine Will, but sometimes not, it is always in compli-
ance with Contentment and Love (al-Nābulusī 2011, 78; see Figure 1).

Journal of Islamic Ethics 8 (2024) 201–220

The Problem of Evil in the Early Modern Ottoman Period 205

Amr al-takwīn

Irāda Riḍā, Maḥabba Creation

Irāda - Creation

Amr al-taklīf

Riḍā, Maḥabba Irāda Creation

Riḍā, Maḥabba - -

Figure 1 A visualization of amr al-takwīn and amr al-taklīf

What is striking in Figure 1 is the second case of amr al-taklīf, in which

Divine Contentment and Love support the creation of X while Divine Will does
not desire the creation of X. As a result, X does not come into existence. In
this case, Divine Will plays a decisive role in creating X as opposed to Divine
Contentment and Love. In comparison with both cases of amr al-takwīn and
the first case of amr al-taklīf, the hypothetical case in question, i.e., the second
case of amr al-taklīf, does not meet Divine Will. Al-Nābulusī in the present
context emphasizes the decisive role of Divine Will in creation. In other words,
Divine Will alone suffices for the creation of X even though it stands in opposi-
tion to Divine Contentment and Love.
The second case of amr al-takwīn in Figure 1 indicates that Divine Content-
ment and Love do not follow the prior creative factor of Divine Will. This leads
us to the following question: Is it plausible that God commands a certain thing
that displeases Him? The author of the Iḍāʾat al-Dujunna fī ʿAqāʾid Ahl al-Sunna
(“Illumination of the Darkness in the Sunnī Creeds”), on which al-Nābulusī
wrote his commentary the Rāʾiḥat al-Janna Sharḥ Iḍāʾat al-Dujunna fī ʿAqāʾid
Ahl al-Sunna, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Maqqarī (d. 1041/1632)2 argues this
point concerning the example of someone’s obedience and disobedience.
Al-Maqqarī declares that while God’s Command for obedience (ṭāʿa) inclu-
sively addresses His servants (ʿibād), He does not intend the actualization of

2 Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Maqqarī was a teacher of al-Nābulusī’s father Ismāʿīl ibn ʿAbd
al-Ghanī ibn Ismāʿīl ibn Aḥmad al-Nābulusī (d. 1062/1652) (Styer 2019, 95).

Journal of Islamic Ethics 8 (2024) 201–220

206 Kawanishi

obedience of every servant. Indeed, God commands all servants to obey Him,
but He does not desire it from some of them. In support of his argument,
al-Maqqarī raises the example of Divine Contentment. God is displeased by
the disbelief of people with sick hearts (aṣḥāb al-qulūb al-marḍā) and does
not command individuals to do what He prohibits. Al-Nābulusī further under-
lines that God dislikes sin (ghayy) (al-Nābulusī 2011, 79). In short, Divine Will
is invariably the indispensable condition for creation. If this is so, how does
al-Nābulusī explain the presence of kufr?
Al-Nābulusī highlights the decisive role of Divine Will in the creation of evil.
He underlines that there are, in fact, sin and error that are actualized by Divine
Will, and not by Divine Contentment or Divine Love (al-Nābulusī 2011, 79).
It proves that God may bring something into existence, although His Content-
ment and Love oppose it. In other words, in creation, Divine Will seems to
prevail over other Divine Attributes. With respect to the above description of
al-Maqqarī, the command that every servant is obliged to obey God does not
justify the presence of the kufr of an unbeliever.
Here a serious theological question emerges. Why does God allow a thing
that displeases Him to come into existence, such as the kufr of an unbeliever?
Perhaps, this might mean that some Divine Commands are incapable of bring-
ing about the existence of something; but this premise would imply God’s
impotence. To this question, al-Nābulusī suggests a solution with the con-
crete example of the īmān of Abū Bakr (d. 13/634) and Abū Jahl (d. 2/624).
Al-Nābulusī demonstrates God’s creation of kufr referring to Divine Will. God
commands all His servants, who are responsible, to be obedient. Nonetheless,
He does not intend the obedience of some of His servants. This necessitates
that Divine Command turns out to be unwilled. Nothing exists unless God wills
it. For example, the īmān of Abū Bakr was commanded (ma‌ʾmūr) and desired
(murād) by God. As a result, Abū Bakr’s īmān occurred. In contrast, the īmān
of Abū Jahl was also commanded, as Divine Command inclusively addresses
all servants, among whom is Abū Jahl. However, the īmān of Abū Jahl was not
desired (ghayr murād). In the case of the īmān of Abū Jahl, Divine Will did not
correspond to Divine Command. Therefore, Abū Jahl’s īmān did not actualize
(al-Nābulusī 2011, 79; see Figure 2).
Similarly, in his Maṭālib al-Wafiyya bi-Sharḥ al-Farāʾid al-Saniyya (“The
Complete Quest: Commentary on the Sublime Gems”), al-Nābulusī fleshes
out his typology of amr al-takwīn and amr al-taklīf with an analogous exam-
ple of the īmān of Abū Bakr and Abū Jahl. Furthermore, al-Nābulusī, invoking
al-Maqarrī, criticizes the heretics (mulḥida) who believe Divine Will follows
(tābiʿ) Divine Command. Concerning the disbelief of an unbeliever (kufr
al-kāfir) and disobedience of a sinner (ʿiṣyān al-ʿāṣī), their kufr and ʿiṣyān are

Journal of Islamic Ethics 8 (2024) 201–220

The Problem of Evil in the Early Modern Ottoman Period 207

Īmān of • ma ʾmūr actualized

Abū Bakr • murād

Īmān of • ma ʾmūr not actualized

Abū Jahl • ghayr murād

Figure 2 A visualization of the īmān of Abū Bakr and Abū Jahl

murād but not ma‌ʾmūr, as God stipulates, “God does not command disgraceful
deeds” (Q 7:28, trans. Abdel Haleem). However, in their heretical opinion, kufr
al-kāfir and ʿiṣyān al-ʿāṣī are neither ma‌ʾmūr nor murād by God. As al-Nābulusī
describes, such opinion entails the existence of things that God does not will
in His creation – this is a doctrine attributed to the Muʿtazilīs (al-Nābulusī n.d.,
114b). In this context, al-Nābulusī persistently points out to the metaphysical
priority of Divine Will over Divine Command in the process of creation. In
addition, al-Nābulusī evidently notes the ugliness (qabīḥ) of kufr which occurs
as opposed to the Divine Command for every human being and jinn to obey
Him (al-Nābulusī n.d., 116a).
For a better assessment of al-Nābulusī’s contribution to the problem of the
creation of kufr, a contextualization of al-Nābulusī with his contemporary
Ibrāhīm ibn Ḥasan al-Kūrānī (d. 1101/1690) would be fruitful. Al-Nābulusī’s
contemporary in the Ottoman Ḥijāz Ibrāhīm ibn Ḥasan al-Kūrānī3 was also a
prominent kalām theologian and Akbarian Sufi. Al-Kūrānī discusses the cre-
ation of kufr with a reference to Divine Will. As Khaled El-Rouayheb observes,
al-Kūrānī elucidates the relationship between Divine Will and Knowledge.
Like al-Nābulusī’s demonstration, al-Kūrānī raises the issue of the īmān of
Abū Jahl in his argument. Al-Kūrānī proposes a thesis that Divine Will fol-
lows Divine Knowledge, and, in turn, Divine Knowledge follows the primor-
dial fact. In this sense, al-Kūrānī holds that “God Wills and Decrees that what

3 Al-Nābulusī recognizes al-Kūrānī’s scholarship well. Al-Nābulusī’s Natījat al-ʿUlūm wa-Naṣīḥat

ʿUlamāʾ al-Rusūm fī Sharḥ Maqālāt al-Sirhindī al-Maʿlūm (“The Result of Knowledge and the
Advice to the Exoteric Scholars concerning the Explanation of the Sayings of the Illustrious
al-Sirhindī”) addresses a controversial statement uttered by Aḥmad al-Sirhindī (d. 1034/1624).
In the treatise, al-Nābulusī expresses a similar opinion to al-Kūrānī. Atallah Copty examines
al-Kūrānī’s influence on al-Nābulusī (Copty 2003; 2019).

Journal of Islamic Ethics 8 (2024) 201–220

208 Kawanishi

Amr, Riḍā,
Irāda Maḥabba

Actualized!
Figure 3 A visualization of the interplay between irāda and amr,
riḍā and maḥabba

He knows from all eternity will come to pass” (El-Rouayheb 2015, 301–302).
According to al-Kūrānī, the īmān of Abū Jahl did not transpire for he was a pri-
mordial unbeliever in Divine Foreknowledge from eternity. Divine Will follows
and brings about Divine Foreknowledge when it is actualized. Al-Nābulusī
solves the problem of the īmān of Abū Jahl, by addressing Divine Command
and Will. Interestingly, al-Kūrānī invokes Divine Will and Omniscience on
the issue. Al-Kūrānī bases the problem of kufr on the theory of immutable
entities (al-aʿyān al-thābita) developed in the Akbarian theological tradi-
tion. According to the ontology of al-aʿyān al-thābita, every being is fixed in
Divine Knowledge. Divine Omniscience encompasses every existent/nonex-
istent being, including its particular details (Chittick 1989, 12; Demirli 2007,
46; Alkan 2021, 763). On this account, one could deduce that al-Nābulusī and
al-Kūrānī employ different demonstrations. Unlike al-Kūrānī, al-Nābulusī does
not provide Akbarian mystical reasoning to support his kalām argument on
the creation of kufr. Notably, there seems to be no contradiction between the
two Akbarian theologians on the core metaphysical doctrine that Divine Will
plays the most essential role in bringing a thing into existence. The essential
role of Divine Will in creation is agreed upon in the Ashʿarī theological tradi-
tion. The fifth/eleventh-century polymath Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111)
similarly highlights the significance of Divine Will in creation, “what He [God]
wills, is and what He does not will, is not” (as quoted in Ormsby 1984, 192).
The same description appears in the creed of the eponymous founder of the
Ashʿarī school Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/936) (Watt 1946, 149).

Journal of Islamic Ethics 8 (2024) 201–220

The Problem of Evil in the Early Modern Ottoman Period 209

Following the Ashʿarī doctrine, al-Nābulusī is persistent that Divine Will

plays a decisive role in creation. Based on the above demonstration of the role
of Divine Will and Power, one might inquire whether God has any specific
objective in His arbitrary creation. Significantly, al-Nābulusī disproves that
God has any objective in His creation.
Does God have any objective (gharaḍ, pl. aghrāḍ) for His creation of a cer-
tain creature? This question is closely relevant to the Muʿtazilī doctrine of God’s
creation of the optimum for humanity. In fact, such doctrine was rejected by
some scholars like Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna, d. 428/1037), who refuted the supposi-
tion that God has any objective in His creation. The implicit target of Ibn Sīnā’s
criticism is the Muʿtazilī doctrine. As Ayman Shihadeh explains regarding Ibn
Sīnā’s theory of Divine Providence (ʿināya), God acts “by way of munificence
( jūd) (as opposed to the Muʿtazilī principle of beneficence) which is the provi-
sion of what is proper to creatures not for a purpose” (Shihadeh 2019, 63–64).
Similarly, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 606/1210) refutation of objectives in God’s
Acts in part refers to the Muʿtazilī doctrine (Shihadeh 2006, 98).
In contrast to Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī, al-Nābulusī does not explicitly refer to the
Muʿtazilī doctrine but applies logical evidence to his argument. Al-Nābulusī’s
strong disapproval of any objective in God’s creation confirms God’s transcen-
dence. To this end, he exposes God’s transcendence beyond any objective by
showing a logical demonstration as follows:

Because God, the Exalted, is independent of the worlds (ghanī ʿan

al-ʿālamīn). If God had a motive (bāʿith) in an act or rule – that yields
a benefit for or removes harm from Him in status and wealth ( fī l-ḥāl
wa-l-māl), He would require it. That which requires a certain thing is
incapable (ʿājiz) of [bringing about that thing]. [Someone who is] inca-
pable of the thing cannot bring it into existence. That everything exists
proves God’s Power over everything. And it proves the nonexistence of His
incapability [to create everything]. The nonexistence of His incapability
proves God’s having no need for anything [i.e., God’s self-sufficiency]. His
self-sufficiency (istighnāʾ) proves that God has no motive for His creation.
Accordingly, an objective (gharaḍ) in God’s Acts and Rules, the Exalted,
is refuted.
al-Nābulusī 2011, 52

Al-Nābulusī cautions that we must not attribute absurdity (ʿabath) to Divine

Acts and Rules because ʿabath, which denotes deficiency (naqṣ) in Divinity
(rubūbiyya), is impossible for God. This assumption problematically denies
Divine Wisdom. Al-Nābulusī underlines that Divine Acts and Rules are

Journal of Islamic Ethics 8 (2024) 201–220

210 Kawanishi

invariably perfect and conform to Wisdom (mutqana muḥkama jāriya ʿalā

l-ḥikma) (al-Nābulusī 2011, 52–53).
Through the above case study on al-Nābulusī’s kalām metaphysics of īmān
and kufr, his understanding of the creation of good and evil has become clear.
Following the Ashʿarī doctrine, al-Nābulusī’s kalām metaphysics places a sharp
distinction between good and evil. However, al-Nābulusī’s theology of īmān
and kufr ought not to be reduced to the kalām discourse of good and evil.
Notwithstanding, his mystical metaphysics offers a totally opposite theory of
kufr. How does al-Nābulusī synthesize kalām metaphysics and mystical meta-
physics regarding the presence of kufr? Al-Nābulusī’s mystical observation of
īmān and kufr deserves a close analysis to understand his synthesis.

3 Al-Nābulusī’s Mystical Metaphysics of Īmān and Kufr

Throughout al-Nābulusī’s writings, we cannot ignore the evident presence of

Akbarian mysticism in al-Nābulusī’s theological Weltanschauung. In his texts in
the fields of tafsīr, fiqh, and kalām, his concepts, expressions, and use of terms
allude to the great influence of his spiritual master Ibn al-ʿArabī, even though
the texts ostensibly concern exoteric issues. El-Rouayheb defines al-Nābulusī
as “the most prominent advocate of waḥdat al-wujūd in the Arab provinces of
the Ottoman Empire” (El-Rouayheb 2015, 332).4 Akbarian mysticism developed
the waḥdat al-wujūd (unity of being) cosmology, which regards every single
being in the universe as a manifestation of God.5 In that system, the existing
creatures are manifestations of Divine Names and Attributes.
To begin with, in al-Nābulusī’s mystical metaphysics, the entire universe
is seen to be inclusively perfect. In al-Wujūd al-Ḥaqq wa-l-Khiṭāb al-Ṣidq
(“The True Being and the Truthful Address”), al-Nābulusī’s mysticism desig-
nates God the True Being (al-wujūd al-ḥaqq), the Unqualified Being (al-wujūd
al-muṭlaq), the Absolute Being (al-wujūd al-ṣirf), the Pure Being (al-wujūd
al-maḥḍ), they all signify God (al-Nābulusī 1995). God is the True Existence
in contrast with the existents, in which God is manifested. The transcendent
God is ineffably unique, and no modality such as good and evil can describe
Him. Good and evil exist in the domain of the created universe. To our end,

4 El-Rouayheb explains this in the context after the death of al-Kūrānī and Muḥammad ibn
ʿAbd al-Rasūl Barzinjī (d. 1102–1103/1691).
5 Aladdin claims that such an expression as waḥdat al-wujūd does not arise in Ibn al-ʿArabī’s
literature, although there are different expressions pertaining to it. Later theologians, such
as Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā al-Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191), Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī (d. 673/1274), and
Ibn Sabʿīn (d. 668 or 669/1269–1271) use waḥdat al-wujūd in a non-technical sense (Aladdin
2019, 36).

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The Problem of Evil in the Early Modern Ottoman Period 211

the question herein is how we account for the kufr of an unbeliever, or what is
its ontological description in Akbarian metaphysics. Referring to the waḥdat
al-wujūd system, al-Nābulusī suggests a unique ontology of īmān and kufr.
Al-Nābulusī’s mystical theology of evil is best seen in his theory of believ-
ers and unbelievers. In his al-Fatḥ al-Rabbānī wa-l-Fayḍ al-Raḥmānī (“Lordly
Openings and Merciful Emanations”) and al-Kashf wa-l-Bayān ʿan Asrār
al-Adyān fī Kitāb al-Insān al-Kāmil wa-Kāmil al-Insān (“Uncovering and
Explaining the Secrets of Religions in the Book of the Perfect Human Being
and the Perfection of the Human Being”), al-Nābulusī discloses the truth of
diversity of religions from the perspective of the waḥdat al-wujūd cosmology.
There is a dichotomy between believers (muʾminūn, sing. muʾmin) and unbe-
lievers (kuffār, sing. kāfir), or between Islam and other religions. Kalām theol-
ogy views the former as right and the latter as false.
The science of kalām concerns doctrinal issues and tends to be apologetic
in its discussions. In kalām metaphysics, Islam is deemed as the right reli-
gion, hence good, while the unbelievers and other religions manifest evil. As
argued above, al-Nābulusī describes the lack of belief of some individuals as
displeasing God. Also, in his kalām metaphysics, al-Nābulusī explicitly notes
the ugliness of kufr. Kufr basically opposes Divine Command which demands
obedience from every servant. However, al-Nābulusī’s mystical metaphysics
presents new insights into the kalāmic dichotomy of īmān and kufr.
In al-Fatḥ al-Rabbānī wa-l-Fayḍ al-Raḥmānī, al-Nābulusī presents two
kinds of religions: One is the true religion (dīn wāḥid ḥaqq) – namely Islam,
and the others are false religions (adyān jamīʿuhā bāṭila). However, Islam and
other religions are equally God’s creatures (al-Nābulusī 1985, 134). In al-Kashf
wa-l-Bayān ʿan Asrār al-Adyān fī Kitāb al-Insān al-Kāmil wa-Kāmil al-Insān,
al-Nābulusī offers a more systematic description of the truth of the unbeliev-
ers. Al-Nābulusī shows all religions as manifestations of two Divine Names:
al-Hādī (the Guide) and al-Muḍill (Who leads astray). Al-Hādī signifies Islam
while al-Muḍill represents the rest of the religions (Demiri 2018, 121–24;
al-Nābulusī forthcoming). Islam lies under Divine Content (riḍwān), but the
other religions under Divine Wrath (ghaḍab) – riḍwān and ghaḍab are equally
Divine Attributes. There is no difference between the two Attributes in terms
of their glory (ʿizza) and nobility (sharaf). The Divine Attribute riḍwān is as
noble as ghaḍab. Neither of the two Attributes is evil (qabīḥa) as all Divine
Names and Attributes are beautiful ( jamīla) and perfect (kāmila) with no defi-
ciency. All effects (āthār) of the two Divine Names or Attributes are perfect
(Demiri 2018, 121–24; al-Nābulusī forthcoming).
In elucidating the truth of īmān and kufr, al-Nābulusī bases his account
of all religions on the waḥdat al-wujūd metaphysics. According to the
waḥdat al-wujūd metaphysics, everything, namely the entire universe, is a

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212 Kawanishi

manifestation of perfect Divine Names and Attributes, and therefore per-

fect. As al-Nābulusī puts it, nothing imperfect originates from God. For a
better understanding of his system, his bipartite epistemology greatly mat-
ters. Al-Nābulusī’s theology synthesizes the two significant elements: divine
law (sharīʿa) and divine truth (ḥaqīqa). His mysticism discloses ḥaqīqa while
kalām explains Sharīʿa. Hence, his mystical metaphysics of disbelief and unbe-
lievers relies on the knowledge of ḥaqīqa in opposition to that of Sharīʿa. As
al-Nābulusī underlines, the truth of every religion – be it Islam or other reli-
gions – is attainable through the knowledge of the truth (ʿilm al-ḥaqīqa).
Conversely, the knowledge of Sharīʿa (ʿilm al-sharīʿa) approves only Islam as
the right religion and regards the other religions as kufr. The two methods of
knowledge are both right (Demiri 2018, 121–124; al-Nābulusī forthcoming). In
kalām metaphysics, al-Nābulusī follows the knowledge of Sharīʿa and therefore
maintains the truth of Islam and the falsity of other religions, or the beauty
of īmān and the evil of kufr. On the other hand, in his knowledge of ḥaqīqa,
al-Nābulusī holds the truth of every religion.
In al-Nābulusī’s distinction between Sharīʿa and ḥaqīqa, in other words,
between kalām and mysticism, which one is prior to the other? Ostensibly, the
two sciences bring him to two opposite conclusions on īmān and kufr. What is
clear is that only the knowledge of ḥaqīqa appreciates religious pluralism. Lejla
Demiri writes:

As a source of knowledge, ḥaqīqa unveils the way creation emanates

from God and the way God manifests himself in creation, while sharīʿa
informs us of good and bad deeds, obedience and disobedience, and dis-
tinguishes between belief and unbelief, right and wrong. These two ways
of knowing, ḥaqīqa and sharīʿa, are not in contradiction or conflict with
each other in al-Nābulusī’s understanding, since they deal with different
aspects of reality and are both ultimately derived from the book of God
and the sunna of his Prophet.
Demiri 2018, 122

As discussed earlier, by referring to Divine Will, al-Nābulusī discloses how kufr

comes into existence. At the level of Sharīʿa, al-Nābulusī describes the kufr of
certain individuals as evil. Abū Jahl and Abū Lahab did not have their īmān
because God did not desire its actualization. On the other hand, at the level of
ḥaqīqa, the kufr of unbelievers appears as perfect as the upright īmān of believ-
ers. In al-Nābulusī’s Akbarian mysticism, there is no contradiction between the
two different theological reasonings. None of which is wrong. Both are right as
they treat different aspects of reality.

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The Problem of Evil in the Early Modern Ottoman Period 213

Al-Nābulusī’s discourse of the knowledge of ḥaqīqa is inspired by Ibn

al-ʿArabī. Al-Nābulusī’s all-embracing approach to diverse religions is in great
part influenced by Ibn al-ʿArabī, who articulates that all human beings, regard-
less of their faiths, believe in God in different ways. Ibn al-ʿArabī reads, “not
one of God’s creatures is ignorant of Him, for He created them only to know
Him” (as quoted in Chittick 1989, 76). However, al-Nābulusī distinguishes him-
self from Ibn al-ʿArabī as to his approach to the science of kalām. The quoted
expression of Ibn al-ʿArabī opposes the kalām theological interpretation of the
religious others. Ibn al-ʿArabī disparages the science of kalām in the context
of his defense of the commoners’ beliefs (El-Rouayheb 2015, 285). However,
al-Nābulusī does not remove exoteric sciences nor rely exclusively on mysti-
cism. Nābulusian theology harmoniously encompasses Sharīʿa and ḥaqīqa.
The synthesis between kalām and mysticism is also observed in different
places in al-Nābulusī’s scholarship. In his study on al-Nābulusī’s classification
of believers, Steven Styer concludes that exoteric sciences are not ignored,
although Akbarian theology has greater significance in al-Nābulusī’s thought
(Styer 2019, 95). In this regard, al-Nābulusī’s theology is not the same as that of
Ibn al-ʿArabī. Rather, al-Nābulusī developed a synthetic system between exo-
tericism and esotericism.
In Akbarian cosmology, there are two kinds of evil: natural and moral.
Al-Nābulusī’s reckoning of the universe as perfect concerns Ibn al-ʿArabī’s the-
ory of natural evil. Similarly, Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī describes “everything God does
is of one kind, good and beautiful (al-khayr wa-l-ḥasan)” (Dumairieh 2022, 254).
Ibn al-ʿArabī explains absolute goodness and absolute evil in his cosmol-
ogy. Absolute goodness refers to the Truth, namely God, while nonexistence
(ʿadam) is thought of as absolute evil. He also employs different terms to signify
this dichotomy, for example, light and darkness. In this context, nonexistence
does not mean the opposite of existence, but that in which existence is not
(Efil 2011, 97–99). Good (khayr) denotes existence, and evil (sharr) is defined
to be the lack of good, hence, nonexistence. All existing beings are identical to
the Pure Good (al-khayr al-maḥḍ), i.e., God (Chittick 1989, 290). In contrast,
evil means nonexistence, thus, evil does not exist. Thus, Ibn al-ʿArabī under-
stands the ontology of good as an essential entity. In other words, all creatures
are inclusively good, as their essence is good. The two Akbarian theologians,
al-Nābulusī and al-Kūrānī, deem the universe as inclusively good following
this theory.
Ibn al-ʿArabī’s definition of evil, known as the privative theory of evil, is sub-
scribed to by Muslim peripatetic philosophers such as Abū Naṣr Muḥammad
al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) (Bouhafa 2021, 28–32) and Ibn Sīnā (Steel 2002, 173–186;

Journal of Islamic Ethics 8 (2024) 201–220

214 Kawanishi

Bouhafa 2021, 32–36; Chowdhury 2021, 15). Furthermore, an early description

of the theory was put forth by Plotinus (d. 270 CE), and gained its prominence
through medieval Western scholasticism (Hoover 2007, 2; Ormsby 1984, 14 and
27). Later, the privative theory of evil is observed in Ibn Rushd’s (d. 595/1198)
metaphysics (Bouhafa 2021, 36–39). The reception of the privative theory
of evil is not limited to Muslim peripatetic and Akbarian schools. The sev-
enth/thirteenth-century jurist Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328)
also refers to the privative theory of evil (Hoover 2007, 195–96). Similarly,
the eleventh/seventeenth-century illuminationist philosopher Mullā Ṣadrā
Shīrāzī (d. 1050/1640) bases his ontology of evil on the privative theory
(Kalın 2004, 70).
Still, one should note that Ibn al-ʿArabī does not reduce the problem of evil
to the privative theory but recognizes the moral ontology of evil in distinc-
tion from natural evil. Ibn al-ʿArabī demonstrates the process of the manifesta-
tion of moral evil. In his opinion, evil belongs to possible things as accidents
(ʿaraḍ, pl. aʿrāḍ). The essence of the possible things is good as mentioned
above. However, evil sometimes manifests as an accident because an accident
is sometimes found in existence but at other times in nonexistence. As William
Chittick quotes from Ibn al-ʿArabī:

“Evil” is failure to reach one’s individual desire (gharaḍ) and what is agree-
able (mulāʾim) to one’s nature. It stems from the fact that the thing’s pos-
sibility does not prevent it from becoming connected to nonexistence.
To this extent evil becomes manifest within the cosmos. Hence it only
becomes manifest from the direction of the possible thing, not from the
direction of God.
Chittick 1989, 291

When it comes to Nābulusian theology, the texts this study looks at do not
raise the discourse of moral evil. In his kalām metaphysics, al-Nābulusī adopts
the Ashʿarī doctrine of īmān and kufr. This does not seem to pertain to Ibn
al-ʿArabī’s theory of moral evil.
Al-Nābulusī’s synthetic theology established on the knowledge of Sharīʿa
and ḥaqīqa is not found in Ibn al-ʿArabī. Ibn al-ʿArabī’s theology of evil is
ḥaqīqa-oriented. However, al-Nābulusī addresses the problem of evil from
the knowledge of Sharīʿa as well, the validity of which he explicitly justifies.
In al-Nābulusī’s synthesis, the two ways of knowledge complement each
other by accessing different aspects of reality. The harmony between ḥaqīqa
and Sharīʿa enriches his discussion. Crucially what is common between Ibn
al-ʿArabī and al-Nābulusī is their description of the perfect universe. Since the

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The Problem of Evil in the Early Modern Ottoman Period 215

Akbarian cosmology regards everything as a manifestation of perfect Names

and Attributes of God. The concept of the perfect universe does not mean the
nonexistence of deficiencies, however, needs to contain some imperfections
in itself.

4 The Perfect Universe: al-Nābulusī’s Synthesis of the Problem of Evil

Al-Nābulusī’s synthesis between Ashʿarī kalām and Akbarian mysticism

is accomplished by the concept of “perfection.” In his kalām metaphysics,
al-Nābulusī is persistent in clarifying the distinction between the good of īmān
and the evil of kufr. On the other hand, his mystical metaphysics does not rec-
ognize the evil of kufr but views its righteousness as well as that of īmān. Thus,
al-Nābulusī reaches contradictory conclusions on the ontology of kufr in his
kalām and mystical metaphysics. How does he achieve the synergy between
two metaphysics? Al-Nābulusī explains his theory of the perfect universe with
reference to Divine Wisdom. In the Maṭālib al-Wafiyya bi-Sharḥ al-Farāʾid
al-Saniyya, on Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Ṣafadī al-Dimashqī’s (d. 1100/1690)6
statement “everything our Lord wills is right (ṣawāb),” al-Nābulusī comments
as follows:

All our Lord, Almighty and Exalted, wills for us – be it good (khayr), evil
(sharr), benefit (nafʿ), or harm (ḍurr), in the religion (dīn), this world
(dunyā), and the hereafter (ākhira) – is right and in accordance with
requirements of Divine Wisdom. Thus, God, the Exalted, joins (yalḥaq)
no blame (dhamm), no injustice (ẓulm), and no wrong (ḥayf) [in His
Will] because He is the governor in His possession the way He wills
(al-mutaṣarrif fī mulkihi kayfa yashāʾ). He is the One who makes the evil,
the good, the benefit, or the harm as they are (huwa l-ladhī jaʿala al-sharr
sharr wa-jaʿala al-khayr khayr wa-jaʿala al-nafʿ nafʿ wa-jaʿala al-ḍurr ḍurr).
None of the creatures necessitates itself to become good, evil, benefit, or
harm. He is the One who divides these states (aḥwāl) of His servants in
accordance with His Will and Choice.
al-Nābulusī n.d., 133a

Al-Nābulusī’s synthesis proposes a unique definition of perfection. For him,

the perfection of the universe does not seem to ignore the presence of evil, but

6 Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Ṣafadī al-Dimashqī was a student of al-Nābulusī’s father Ismāʿīl
al-Nābulusī (Qureshi 2019, 67).

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216 Kawanishi

rather, the perfect universe needs to contain both good and evil. As argued in
kalām metaphysics, evil is present in the universe, for example, the kufr of an
unbeliever. Al-Nābulusī’s above statement strikingly underscores the doctrine
that everything God does is right without ignoring the presence of evil. The
imperfect, which we perceive from our anthropocentric point of view, needs
to exist for the perfect universe to be perfect. The imperfect, such as the kufr
of an unbeliever, is ultimately a manifestation of God’s perfect Names and
Attributes. Al-Nābulusī’s use of the concept of “perfect” is noteworthy. What
does al-Nābulusī mean by the concept of perfect? Ibn al-ʿArabī’s explanation
of perfection helps us understand al-Nābulusī’s concept.
Chittick points out the difference between completion (tamām) and perfec-
tion (kamāl) as found in Ibn al-ʿArabī’s cosmology. Tamām signifies “the situ-
ation of something whose creation lacks nothing” while kamāl denotes not
only completion, but also it “lives fully the level pertaining to its creation by
actualizing the total range of possibilities inherent within it” (Chittick 1989,
296). Ibn al-ʿArabī deems the presence of evil to be necessary for the universe
(Efil 2011, 93–95). This approach to the imperfect within the perfect universe
appears to be a common doctrine in Sufism. Al-Ghazālī’s and Ibn al-ʿArabī’s
mystical theology maintains that the imperfect is all blessed by God. In Ibn
al-ʿArabī’s opinion, Divine Mercy (raḥma), represented by the Divine Name the
Merciful (al-Raḥmān), extends to everything with no exception. It indicates
that Divine Mercy universally embraces all creatures regardless of whether
they deserve it or not, and it even reaches that which has not yet come into
existence (Izutsu 1983, 116; Chittick 1989, 130–132; Ormsby 1984, 253). Besides,
al-Ghazālī describes evil as requisite for the good to be present, as he notes, “if
the evil were removed, the good contained within it would become nothing”
(as quoted in Ormsby 1984, 255). Al-Ghazālī also holds that every suffering has
a blessing in it (Ormsby 1984, 255).
Al-Nābulusī’s understanding of the perfect universe, which embraces the
presence of evil in it, suggests an interesting insight into God’s creation of
evil. Although evil may be present from the subjective perspective of a human
agency, al-Nābulusī warns us not to attribute evil to God. As argued earlier, with
respect to no objective in God’s creation, al-Nābulusī considers it inappropri-
ate to ascribe absurdity to Divine Acts and Rules. Similarly, Timothy Winter
offers an alternative account, “all that is created is from God,” to the discourse
attributing evil to God, which is thought of as an “oversimplification” or “a sin
of discourtesy” (Winter 2017, 241). Al-Nābulusī thinks of it as discourteous to
relate an evil thing to God although He is the sole Creator of the thing.
Al-Nābulusī’s scholarship bridges his synthetic theology between Ashʿarī
kalām and Akbarian mysticism. Bakri Aladdin assesses al-Nābulusī as “the

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The Problem of Evil in the Early Modern Ottoman Period 217

architect of the locus in which the theory of the Unity of Being should be set. It
is a specific setting within the framework of Ashʿarī kalām” (Aladdin 2019, 45).
As this paper has explored, al-Nābulusī argues the ontology of īmān and kufr
in different ways in his kalām and mystical metaphysics. Notably, his theology
does not reduce the problem of evil to nonexistence. However, his theory of
the perfect universe resolves the difference between good and evil, which is
indeed existent in the universe. Al-Nābulusī’s observation of the perfect uni-
verse through God’s manifestation is remarkable in the sense that he does not
ignore the present evil in the universe.

5 Conclusion

Al-Nābulusī’s kalām metaphysics highlights Divine Will as the sole causality

in creation and his argument on Divine Will serves to answer the presence of
kufr with reference to other Divine Attributes. In his kalām metaphysics, the
ontology of kufr is clarified. However, Nābulusian mysticism maintains there is
no difference between īmān and kufr for God. Everything is a manifestation of
perfect Divine Names and Attributes; therefore, the entire universe is perfect.
The mystical ontology of kufr differs from its kalām ontology.
In his kalām and mystical metaphysics, al-Nābulusī presents contradictory
conclusions about the ontology of kufr. Al-Nābulusī’s concordia theology is
completed on the basis of the concept of the perfect universe. In the perfect
universe, everything is inclusively good from a theocentric perspective. Not
just good and evil, but perfection is another key concept.
The present paper has addressed limited themes referring to a set of texts.
There remain plenty of overlooked texts that would contribute to a full grasp
of al-Nābulusī’s theology of evil. Still, al-Nābulusī’s synthesis between Ashʿarī
kalām and Akbarian mysticism is of great interest and deserves further research
to shed light on the development of the Islamic discourse of the problem of
evil in the early modern Ottoman world.

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