History of Strategic Study

This passage explains how books—especially those on strategy, security studies, and public
policy—are deeply shaped by the time in which they are written, reflecting the hopes, fears, and
concerns of both authors and policymakers. The authors of the book aimed to show that
strategic thinking is still important in understanding modern global issues, even though, back in
2000, some believed that strategy belonged to the past and would fade away in a more peaceful
future. However, that belief was quickly challenged by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
by al-Qaeda, which shattered the idea of a stable "New World Order." The following years saw
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, and North Korea’s
development of nuclear weapons—all proving that strategic thinking remained crucial. By 2011,
the decade of al-Qaeda’s dominance seemed to be ending, but new concerns began to appear,
such as rising tensions in the Pacific, potential conflict with Iran over its nuclear program, and
the growing threat of cyberwarfare. By the time the sixth edition of the book was being
prepared, the world faced even more complex challenges: ISIS had risen from the remains of al-
Qaeda, new technologies like drones were changing warfare, and ‘gray zone’ conflicts—those
that blur the lines between war and peace—had become more common. Moreover, the feared
return of great power competition, not only in Asia but also in Europe, had become a harsh
reality. All these developments showed that strategy was not a thing of the past but a necessary
tool to understand and respond to ongoing and evolving global threats.

This passage provides a comprehensive overview of how interest in strategic studies has
evolved over time, reflecting the political and historical context of each era. Strategic studies
became especially prominent during the Cold War, a time when the threat of nuclear war made
the question of survival extremely urgent. Political leaders, academics, and officials focused on
how states could use their power to protect their interests without triggering global destruction.
Realism, a way of thinking that sees international relations as a struggle for power in an
anarchic world, dominated this period. Realist thinkers like Herman Kahn, Henry Kissinger, and
Thomas Schelling developed theories such as deterrence, limited war, and arms control, all
aimed at preventing nuclear catastrophe while maintaining state security. However, there was
an ongoing debate: did these theories shape actual government policies, or did policies inspire
the theories? Likely, both influenced each other. A strength of this realist strategic thinking was
its grounded approach to the harsh realities of power politics. Its weakness, however, was a
conservative mindset that treated the Cold War status quo as the best possible world and
feared change, which might lead to nuclear disaster.
After the Soviet Union collapsed peacefully in the early 1990s, this realist approach began to
lose popularity. A new generation of thinkers, often labeled “utopians” by realists, began to
challenge the idea that military power was central to security. Instead, they emphasized
economic, political, societal, and environmental aspects of security and questioned the motives
behind military-focused strategies. Some critics suggested that the push for military power
often came from those who benefited financially or politically from war—military contractors,
government departments, and the military establishment itself. By the mid-1990s, these
criticisms had gained traction, and security studies emerged as a broader academic field. Unlike
traditional strategic studies, which focused mainly on state security and military power, security
studies explored how individuals, societies, and even the global community could achieve
safety, often through non-military means.

This shift also introduced a more optimistic tone, with some scholars, especially post-positivists,
arguing that peaceful change was not only possible but already happening. The Cold War’s end
seemed to prove them right, and for a time, the belief spread that military force was becoming
less relevant. This “end of history” idea, made popular by Francis Fukuyama, suggested that
major conflicts were a thing of the past. However, the 1990s and early 2000s soon brought a
reality check. The Gulf War, the violent breakup of Yugoslavia, civil wars in Africa, and finally, the
9/11 attacks, reminded the world that military power had not disappeared. These events
sparked a renewed interest in strategic studies, just as the first edition of the book being
introduced here was published. While earlier writings focused heavily on non-military aspects of
security, this book argued that military force remained a key part of world politics and that
strategic thinking was still highly relevant.

Nature of Strategic Studies (Descriptive Explanation)

Strategic studies is a multidisciplinary field that deals with the use of military power in the
service of political objectives. Its nature is both complex and evolving, shaped by history,
politics, economics, psychology, and military science. The core concern of strategic studies is not
just warfare itself, but how states use force—or the threat of it—to influence international
affairs and achieve national goals.

At its heart, strategic studies is concerned with violence and coercion. It recognizes that
military power, when used, causes destruction and suffering. Strategy does not determine who
is morally right but decides whose political will prevails. As such, the study of strategy involves
understanding how military force can be applied to produce specific political outcomes. But this
process is inherently destructive, even though modern discussions often hide this reality behind
technical or bureaucratic language.

However, strategic studies is not limited to studying war. It encompasses a broader view of
how states use all instruments of power—military, diplomatic, economic, and psychological—to
pursue their interests. Especially in the nuclear age, strategy has increasingly focused on
preventing war rather than waging it. The potential for catastrophic destruction in a nuclear
conflict has shifted the emphasis of strategic thinking from military victory to political stability
and conflict management.

As a result, the field has expanded beyond its traditional military boundaries. Modern
strategic studies now closely overlaps with foreign policy, international relations, and security
studies. It is no longer the exclusive domain of soldiers or generals. Civilians—historians,
economists, political scientists, and physicists—have made major contributions, particularly in
the post-World War II era. Scholars like Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling, and Henry Kissinger
reshaped strategic thinking by applying social science methods to military and political
problems.

Strategic studies is also practical and policy-oriented. It is concerned not just with abstract
theory but with real-world decisions—how to deter enemies, manage alliances, respond to
threats, and maintain national security. This means it cannot be separated from political
judgment. Strategy must take into account the values, resources, and constraints of the state. It
is deeply influenced by historical experience and political context.

While strategy traditionally operated under the political leadership’s guidance—following

Clausewitz’s view that war is a continuation of politics—modern strategic thought emphasizes
the need for dialogue between political leaders and strategic experts. Strategists do not decide
national goals, but their input is crucial in assessing whether those goals are achievable and
what the costs might be.

There are concerns, however, about the potential for experts in strategy—especially those with
military backgrounds—to gain too much influence in democratic societies. Yet the text argues
that consulting strategists does not threaten democracy. Instead, it strengthens policy by
ensuring that decisions are informed by professional knowledge.

Finally, the field of strategic studies has grown into a global academic and policy community.
Research institutions, think tanks, and universities contribute to the development of strategic
thought. In some places, like the United States, think tanks like RAND have played a central role,
while in the UK, institutions like the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) lead the
way. Still, there is ongoing debate about what to call this discipline—whether “strategic studies”
still accurately reflects its broader and more political nature.
Criticism
1. Too Focused on War and Violence:
Critics say strategists are overly obsessed with military force and conflict. They focus so much on
war that they ignore peaceful and cooperative sides of international relations. Some even
accuse strategists of being fascinated by violence.

2. Ignoring Ethics:
Strategic studies often avoid discussing the morality of war. For example, books like On
Thermonuclear War were called "guides to mass murder." Critics say strategists act too coldly
and ignore the human suffering caused by war.

3. Not Truly Academic:

Some believe strategy doesn’t belong in universities because it lacks true scholarly value. Critics
argue that it pretends to be scientific but actually isn’t. They also distrust strategists who work
closely with governments, accusing them of being biased and promoting harmful policies.

4. Part of the Problem, Not the Solution:

Strategists are blamed for supporting ideas that justify war, such as deterrence and limited war.
These ideas, critics say, help keep military thinking alive and make disarmament harder.

5. Pessimistic About Peace:

Strategists often assume that war will always be part of global politics. Critics argue that this
attitude kills hope for peaceful change and becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy—if you expect
war, you prepare for it, and then war becomes more likely.

6. Too State-Centric:
Strategic studies focus mostly on the security of states. Critics say this ignores real threats faced
by individuals, such as terrorism or civil wars. They argue we should think more about "human
security" or "global security," not just the state.

7. Narrow Theoretical Focus:

The field is mostly based on realist theory, which emphasizes power and national interest. This
limits new ideas. Critics suggest including other views like constructivism, feminism, critical
theory, and poststructuralism to make the study of strategy richer and more open-minded.

In summary, critics believe that strategic studies are too focused on war, ignore ethical
questions, are too close to government interests, and rely too much on a narrow realist view of
the world. They call for a broader, more human-centered, and more peaceful approach to
security studies.

Sun Tzu’s Influence on Mao Zedong (Simple Explanation)

Sun Tzu was a Chinese military thinker who wrote The Art of War. His ideas about war—like
using deception, intelligence, and winning without fighting—inspired many people over time.
One of the most famous people influenced by him was Mao Zedong, the leader of the Chinese
Communist Revolution.

Mao did not write one big book, but in many of his writings, he explained how a weaker group
(like poor farmers or rebels) could defeat a stronger army using smart strategies. He took ideas
from Sun Tzu and added his own political beliefs.

Mao’s military doctrine is best understood through his three-phase model of protracted war:

1. Strategic Defensive Phase: In the initial stage, revolutionary forces are weak and
vulnerable. Their focus is on survival, political organization, and establishing support in
rural and remote areas. Inspired by Sun Tzu's advice on avoiding direct confrontation
when weak, Mao advocated for patience and secrecy during this phase, where the goal
is to preserve strength and build legitimacy.

2. Strategic Stalemate Phase: As the movement gains strength, it shifts to more active
guerrilla warfare. Small-scale, hit-and-run attacks are used to wear down the enemy and
spread revolutionary ideals. This phase relies heavily on Sun Tzu’s concepts of deception,
flexibility, and psychological manipulation, exploiting the enemy’s weaknesses while
avoiding large-scale engagements.

3. Strategic Counteroffensive Phase: Once the balance of power begins to shift, the
revolutionary forces move into a phase of conventional warfare to directly confront and
defeat the state’s military. At this stage, Mao emphasized the importance of mass
mobilization, unity, and political consolidation, culminating in the overthrow of the
enemy regime.

Importantly, Mao's understanding of warfare extended far beyond the battlefield. He

believed that political, social, and economic conditions were inseparable from
military success. For Mao, war was not just a clash of armies, but a comprehensive
struggle involving ideology, class struggle, and the transformation of society. This
holistic view echoes Sun Tzu’s warning that war must align with the broader interests of
the state and the morale of the people.
Mao’s adaptation of Sun Tzu’s strategies became a model for revolutionary movements
worldwide, especially in the postcolonial era. His methods were studied and emulated by
insurgent and guerrilla groups in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, from the Viet Minh in
Vietnam to the FARC in Colombia. In more recent decades, elements of Maoist strategy
have also been adopted by jihadist insurgent groups, who see in Mao’s doctrine a
viable blueprint for resisting stronger state forces through long-term, ideological, and
decentralized conflict.
In conclusion, Mao Zedong’s military and revolutionary strategies show a clear
intellectual debt to Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. By merging classical Chinese military
thought with modern revolutionary ideology, Mao developed a strategic doctrine that has
reshaped the theory and practice of insurgency across the globe.