REMEDIAL LAW

To recover possession, Estrella filed a complaint for ejectment with the

Municipal Trial Court (MTC), alleging that she is the true owner of the land as
evidenced by her certificate of title and tax declaration which showed the
assessed value of the property as P21,000.00. On the other hand, John
refuted Estrella’s claim of ownership and submitted in evidence a Deed of
Absolute Sale between him and Estrella. After the filing of John’s answer, the
MTC observed that the real issue was one of ownership and not of
possession. Hence, the MTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

On appeal by Estrella to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a full-blown trial was
conducted as if the case was originally filed with it. The RTC reasoned that
based on the assessed value of the property, it was the court of proper
jurisdiction. Eventually, the RTC rendered a judgment declaring John as the
owner of the land and, hence, entitled to the possession thereof.

Was the MTC correct in dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction? Why
or why not?

ANSWER:

The Metropolitan Trial Court was not correct in dismissing the

Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

As provide in Section 33, B.P. 129, Municipal Trial Courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. In
Sec. 16, Rule 70, the rules allow provisional determination of ownership in
ejectment cases when the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership. Cited in the case of Serreno vs. Spouses
Gutierrez, G.R. No. 162366, November 10, 2006, the inferior courts have
jurisdiction to resolve questions of ownership whenever it is necessary to
decide the question of possession in an ejectment case.

It is well settled that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations

contained in the complaint. The contention of defendant in his Motion to
Dismiss has nothing to do in the determination of jurisdiction. Otherwise,
jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the
defendant.

Hence, the Metropolitan Trial Court is not correct in dismissing the

complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

II

Pedro and Juan are resident of Barangay Ifurug, Municipality of Dupaci

Mountain Province. Pedro owes Juan the amount of P50,000,00. Due to non-
payment. Juan brought his complaint to the Council of Elders of said
barangay which implements the bodong justice system. Both appeared
before the council where they verbally agreed that Pedro will pay in
installments on specific due dates. Pedro reneged on his promise. Juan filed a
complaint for sum of money before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Pedro
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the case did not pass through
the barangay conciliation under R.A. No. 7160 and that the RTC, not the MTC,
has jurisdiction. In his opposition, Juan argued that the intervention of the
Council of Elders is substantial compliance with the requirement of R.A. No.
7160 and the claim of P50,000.00 is clearly within the jurisdiction of the MTC.
As MTC judge, rule on the motion and explain.

ANSWER:

The Motion to Dismiss should be denied.

As provided in Section42(a) of RA7160, no complaint involving any

matter within the authority of the Lupon shall be instituted or filed directly in
court for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation between the
parties in the barangay and no settlement was reached. However, in
section399 of the same statute, in barangays where majority of the
inhabitants are members of indigenous cultural communities, local systems
of settling disputes through their councils of datus or elders shall be
recognized without prejudice to the applicable provisions of the Local
Government Code. As for the collection of sum of money, cited in A.M. 08-8-
7- SC or the Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases," the small claims
courts handle actions where the amount of the claims is Php 1,000,000.00 or
less, exclusion of the interest, attorney's fees and costs. The same statute
provide the list of prohibited pleadings.
 Here, the customs and traditions of indigenous cultural communities
shall be applied in settling disputes between members of the cultural
communities, thus, the confrontation between Pedro and Juan before the
Council of Elders of their barangay is sufficient compliance with the
precondition for filing the case in court. Accordingly, Juan filed a complaint
for sum Of money in the MTC, he is deemed to have rescinded the
compromise agreement reached before the Council of Elders of the barangay.
Henceforth. Pedro is incorrect in alleging that the RTC, not the MTC has
jurisdiction over Juan's claim. Considering that the claim is only for
P50,000.00, the case is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC. Notably,
a motion to dismiss is among the prohibited pleadings.

Therefore, the motion to dismissed should be denied.

III

Lender extended to Borrower a Pl00,000.00 loan covered by a promissory

note. Later, Borrower obtained another Pl00,000.00 loan again covered by a
promissory note. Still later, Borrower obtained a P300,000.00 loan secured by
a real estate mortgage on his land valued at P500,000.00. Borrower
defaulted on his payments when the loans matured. Despite demand to pay
the P500,000.00 loan, Borrower refused to pay. Lender, applying the totality
rule, filed against Borrower with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, a
collection suit for P500,000.00. Did Lender correctly apply the totality rule
and the rule on joinder of causes of action?

ANSWER:

Yes, the lender correctly apply the totality rule and the rule on joinder
of causes of action.

According to the Rules of Court, Sec. 5(d), Rule 2, the claims in all the
causes of action are principally for recovery of sum of money, the aggregate
amount of the claim shall be the test of jurisdiction.

Here, the total amount of the claim is P500,000.00. Hence, the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila has jurisdiction over the suit. At any rate,
it is immaterial that one of the loans is secured by a real estate mortgage
because the Lender opted to file a collection of sum of money instead of
foreclosure of the said mortgage.
 Hence, the lender correctly apply the totality rule and the rule on
joinder of causes of action.

IV

Hanna, a resident of Manila, filed a complaint for the partition of a large tract
of land located in Oriental Mindoro. She impleaded her two brothers John and
Adrian as defendants but did not implead Leica and Agatha, her two sisters
who were permanent residents of Australia.

Arguing that there could be no final determination of the case without

impleading all indispensable parties, John and Adrian moved to dismiss the
complaint.

Does the trial court have a reason to deny the motion? Explain your answer.

ANSWER:

Yes, the trial court has reason to deny the motion.

Provided in Section 11, Rule 3 Rules of Court, states that neither

misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an
action.

Here, the petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading in order to
implead Leica and Agatha, for under the same rule, such amendment to
implead an indispensable party may be made on motion of any party or on
the trial court's own Initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms
as are just.

Therefore, the trial court has reason to deny the motion.

V
Eduardo, a resident of the City of Manila, filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila a complaint for the annulment of a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage he signed in favor of Galaxy Bank (Galaxy), and the consequent
foreclosure and auction sale on his mortgaged Makati property. Galaxy filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue alleging that the
complaint should be filed with the RTC of Makati since the complaint involves
the ownership and possession of Eduardo's lot. Resolve the motion with
reasons.

ANSWER:

The motion to dismiss should be granted.

As provided in Section 1, Rule 4, Rules of Court, a real action, it shall be

commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area
where the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.

Here, an action for nullification of the mortgage documents and

foreclosure of the mortgaged property is a real action that affects the title to
the property; thus, venue of the real action is before the court having
jurisdiction over the territory in which the property lies, which is in Makati.

Therefore, the motion to dismiss should be grated.

CIVIL LAW

Emmanuel and Margarita, American citizens and employees of the U.S. State
Department, got married in the African state of Kenya where sterility is a
ground for annulment of marriage. Thereafter, the spouses were assigned to
the U.S. Embassy in Manila. On the first year of the spouses’ tour of duty in
the Philippines, Margarita filed an annulment case against Emmanuel before
a Philippine court on the ground of her husband’s sterility at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.

A. Will the suit prosper? Explain your answer.

ANSWER:

No, the suit will not prosper.

Provided in Article 15 of the Civil Code, to a foreign nationals with

respect to family relations and status of persons, the nationality principle set
forth.

Since they are American citizens, the governing law as to the ground
for annulment is not Kenyan law which Margarita invokes in support of
sterility as such ground; but should be U.S. law, which is the national law of
both Emmanuel and Margarita as recognized under Philippine law. Hence, the
Philippine court will not give due course to the case based on Kenyan law.
The nationality principle as expressed in the application of national law of
foreign nationals by Philippine courts is established by precedents.

Hence, the suit will not prosper.

B. Assume Emmanuel and Margarita are both Filipinos. After their

wedding in Kenya, they come back and take up residence in the
Philippines. Can their marriage be annulled on the ground of
Emmanuel’s sterility?

ANSWER:

No, the marriage cannot be annulled in the Philippines.

As provided in Article 17 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine court

shall have jurisdiction over the action to annul the marriage not only because
the parties are residents of the Philippines but because they are Filipino
citizens. The Family Code, specify under Article 26, the Philippine court,
however, shall apply the law of the place where the marriage was celebrated
in determining its formal validity.

Since the marriage was celebrated in Kenya in accordance with Kenyan

law, the formal validity of such marriage is governed by Kenyan law and any
issue as to the formal validity of that marriage shall be determined by
applying Kenyan law and not Philippine law.
 However, while Kenyan law governs the formal validity of the marriage,
the legal capacity of the Filipino parties to the marriage is governed not by
Kenyan law but by Philippine law as provided in Article 15 of the New Civil
Code. Sterility of a party as a ground for the annulment of marriage is not a
matter of form but a matter of legal capacity. Hence, the Philippine court
must apply Philippine law in determining the status of the marriage on the
ground of absence or defect in the legal capacity of the Filipino parties. Since
sterility does not constitute absence or defect in the legal capacity of the
parties under Philippine law, there is no ground to avoid or annul the
marriage.

Hence, the Philippine court has to deny the petition.

II

Spouses Magtanggol managed and operated a gasoline station on a 1,000

sq.m. lot which they leased from Francisco Bigla-awa. The contract was for a
period of three (3) years. When the contract expired, Francisco asked the
spouses to peacefully vacate the premises. The spouses ignored the demand
and continued with the operation of the gasoline station.

One month after, Francisco, with the aid of a group of armed men, caused
the closure of the gasoline station by constructing fences around it.

Was the act of Francisco and his men lawful? Why?

ANSWER:

No, the act was not lawful.

As provide by the New Civil Code in Article 536 no case my possession

be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who
objects thereto and in Article 539 that every possessor has a right to be
respected in his possession .
 Here, even if the lessee’s right to occupy the premises has expired, the
lessor cannot physically oust the lessee from the leased premises if the latter
refuses to vacate. The lessor must go through the proper channels by filing
an appropriate case for unlawful detainer or recovery of possession. The act
of Francisco is an abuse of rights because even if he has the right to recover
possession of his property, he must act with justice and give the lessees their
day in court and observe honesty and good faith.

Hence, the act was not lawful.

III

Benjamin is the owner of a titled lot which is bounded on the north

by the Maragondon River. An alluvial deposit of two (2) hectares
was added to the registered area. Daniel took posses- sion of the
portion formed by accretion and claims that he has been in open,
continuous and undisturbed possession of said portion since 1923
as shown by a tax declaration. In 1958, Ben- jamin filed a Complaint
for Quieting of Title and contends that the alluvium belongs to him
as the riparian owner and that since the alluvium is, by law, part
and parcel of the registered property, the same may be considered
as registered property. Decide the case and explain.

ANSWER:

I will decide in favor of Daniel and dismiss the action to quiet title filed
by Benjamin.

Under Article 457 of the Civil Code, the owner of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters.

Here, the accretion however, does not automatically become

registered land. It must be brought under the Torrens system of registration
by Benjamin, the riparian owner. Since he did not, the then increment, not
being registered land, was open to acquisition through prescription by third
persons, like Daniel.

Hence, I will favor Daniel and dismiss the action to quiet title filed by
Benjamin.
 IV

Butch got a loan from Hagibis Corporation (Hagibis) but he defaulted in the
payment. A case for collection of a sum of money was filed against him. As a
defense, Butch claims that there was already an arrangement with Hagibis
on the payment of the loan. To implement the same, Butch already
surrendered five (5) service utility vehicles (SUVs) to the company for it to
sell arid the proceeds to be credited to the loan as payment. Was the
obligation of Butch extinguished by reason of dacion en pago upon the
surrender of the SUVs? Decide and explain.

ANSWER:

No, the obligation of Butch to Hagibis was not extinguished by the

mere surrender of the SUV’s to the latter.

Under Article 1245, dation in payment, whereby property is alienated

to the creditor in satisfaction of a debt in money, shall be governed by the
law of sales. In dacion en pago, as a special mode of payment, the debtor
offers another thing to the creditor who accepts it as equivalent of payment
of an outstanding debt.

Here, no mention in the facts that Hagibis has given its consent to
accept the SUVs as equivalent payment, the obligation of Butch is not
thereby extinguished by mere delivery of the SUVs. The undertaking really
partakes in one sense of the nature of sale, that is, the creditor is really
buying the thing or property of the debtor, payment for which is to be
charged against the debtor’s debt. As such, the essential elements of a
contract of sale, namely, consent, object certain, and cause or consideration
must be present. In dacion en pago there is in reality an objective novation of
the obligation where the thing offered as an accepted equivalent of the
performance of an obligation is considered as the object of the contract of
sale, while the debt is considered as the purchase price. In any case,
common consent is an essential prerequisite, be it sale or innovation to have
the effect of totally extinguishing the debt or obligation.

In summary, the obligation of Butch to Hagibis was not extinguished by the

mere surrender of the SUV’s to the latter.

V
Josefa executed a deed of donation covering a one-hectare rice land
in favor of her daughter, Jennifer. The deed specifically provides
that:

"For and in consideration of the love and service Jennifer has shown
and given to me, I hereby freely, voluntarily and irrevocably donate
to her my one-hectare rice land covered by TCT No. 11550, located
in San Fernando, Pampanga. This donation shall take effect upon my
death."

The deed also contained Jennifer's signed acceptance, and an

attached notarized declaration by Josefa and Jennifer that the land
will remain in Josefa's possession and cannot be alienated,
encumbered, sold or disposed of while Josefa is still alive. Advise
Jennifer on whether the deed is a donation inter vivos or mortis
causa and explain the reasons supporting your advice.

ANSWER:

The donation is a donation inter vivos.

Under Article 729 of the Civil Code when the donor intends that the
donation shall take effect during the lifetime of the donor, though the
property shall not be delivered till after the donor’s death, this shall be a
donation inter vivos.

Here, what is most significant in determining the type of donation is

the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donation; on the
contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be “irrevocable,” a quality
absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where
revocability is the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator cannot
lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation. The provisions of the deed of
donation which state that the same will only take effect upon the death of
the donor and that there is a prohibition to alienate, encumber, dispose, or
sell the same should be harmonized with its express irrevocability. Moreover,
mortis causa donations should follow the formalities of a will. Here there is
no showing that such formalities were followed.

Thus, it is favorable to Jennifer that the deed is a donation inter vivos.

VI
X, a dressmaker, accepted clothing materials from Karla to make
two dresses for her day. On the X was supposed to deliver Karla's
dresses, X called up Karla to say that she had an urgent matter to
attend to and will deliver them the next day. That night, however, a
robber broke into her shop and took everything including Karla's
two dresses. X claims she is not liable to deliver Karla's dresses or
to pay for the clothing materials considering she herself was a
victim of the robbery which was a fortuitous event and over which
she had no control. Do you agree?

ANSWER:

NO, I do not agree with the contention of X.

According to Article 1174 of the civil code, the law provides that except
when it is otherwise declared by stipulation or when the law provides or the
nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
liable for those events which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen
were inevitable.

In the case presented, X cannot invoke fortuitous event as a defense

because she had already incurred in delay at the time of the occurrence of
the loss.

Therefore, I do not agree with the contention of X.

VII

Jo-Ann asked her close friend, Aissa, to buy some groceries for her
in the supermarket. Was there a nominate contract entered into
between Jo-Ann and Aissa? In the affirmative, what was it? Explain.

ANSWER:

Yes, there was a nominate contract.

Under Article 1868 of the New Civil code provides that by the contract
of agency a person binds himself to render some service or to do something
in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the
latter.
 Here, the assumption that Aissa accepted the request of her close
friend Jo-Ann to buy some groceries for her in the supermarket, what they
entered into was the nominate contract of Agency.

Hence, there was a nominate contract.

VIII

Z, a gambler, wagered and lost P2 Million in baccarat, a card game.

He was pressured into signing a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
the winner covering a parcel of land with improvements worth P20
Million. One month later, the supposed vendee of the property
demanded that he and his family vacate the property subject of the
deed of sale. Was the deed of sale valid? What can Z do?

ANSWER:

The sale is valid.

Under Article1390(2) of the civil code, being pressured to sign the deed
of sale is not equivalent to vitiation of consent.

Here, a mere pressure cannot constitute intimidation because for

intimidation to arise, the party must be compelled by a reasonable or well-
grounded fear of an imminent & grave danger upon person & property of
himself, spouse, ascendants or descendants. It also cannot constitute undue
influence or when a person takes improper advantage of his power over will
of another depriving latter of reasonable freedom of choice because there
was no indication that the winner has moral ascendency or power over Z.
However, Z can recover his losses from the winner because the law provides
that no action can be maintained by the winner for the collection of what he
has won in any game of chance. But any loser in a game of chance may
recover his loss from the winner, with legal interests from the time he paid
the amount lost, as provided in Article 2014 in the same code.

Hence, the sale is valid.

IX
Tess leased her 1,500 sq. m. lot in Antipolo City to Ruth for a period of three
(3) years, from January 2010 to February 2013. On March 19, 2011, Tess sent
a letter to Ruth, part of which reads as follows:

"I am offering you to buy the property you are presently leasing at P5,000.00
per sq. m. or for a total of P7,500,000.00. You can pay the contract price by
installment for two (2) years without interest. I will give you a period of one
(1) year from receipt of this letter to decide whether you will buy the
property."

After the expiration of the lease contract, Tess sold the property to her niece
for a total consideration of P4 million. Ruth filed a complaint for the
annulment of the sale, reconveyance and damages against Tess and her
niece. Ruth alleged that the sale of the leased property violated her right to
buy under the principle of right of first refusal. Is the allegation of Ruth
tenable?

ANSWER:

NO, the allegation of Ruth is not tenable.

Under Article 1479 of the Civil Code, the option is not valid because it
was not supported by a cause or consideration distinct from the price of the
property.

Here, the letter written by Tess did not grant a right of first refusal to
Ruth. At most, it is to be construed as an option contract whereby Ruth was
given the right to buy or not to buy the leased property. An option is itself not
a purchase but it merely secures the privilege to buy. Also, Ruth does not
appear to have exercised her option before the offer was withdrawn by the
subsequent sale of the property to the niece of Tess.

Hence, the allegation of Ruth is not tenable.

X sold a parcel of land to Y on 01 January 2002, payment and delivery to be

made on 01 February 2002. It was stipulated that if payment were not to be
made by Y on 01 February 2002, the sale between the parties would
automatically be rescinded. Y failed to pay on 01 February 2002, but offered
to pay three days later, which payment X refused to accept, claiming that
their contract of sale had already been rescinded. Is X's contention correct?
Why?

ANSWER:

No, X is not correct.

Provided in Article 1592 of the civil code, in the sale of immovable

property, even though it may have been stipulated, as in this case, that upon
failure to pay the price at the time agreed upon the rescission of the contract
shall of right take place, the vendee may pay, even after the expiration of
the period, as long as no demand for rescission of the contract has been
made upon him either judicially or by a notarial act.

Since no demand for rescission was made on Y, either judicially or by a

notarial act, X cannot refuse to accept the payment offered by Y three (3)
days after the expiration of the period.

Therefore, X is not correct.