No.

2025-1812
______________________________________________________________

__________________________________________

V.O.S. Selections, Inc., et al.,

Petitioners-Appellees,

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of

the United States, et al.,
Respondents-Appellants
_________________________________________

On appeal from the United States Court of International Trade

No. 1:25-cv-00066-GSK-TMR-JAR;
No. 1:25-cv-00077-GSK-TMR-JAR,

====================================================

BRIEF OF JOHN DOE AS AMICUS CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS-APPELLEES

___________________________________________

JOHN DOE,
Pro se
(Contact information filed under seal)
@manncoulter.fox@gmail.com
 CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

Amicus curiae certifies that, in addition to those listed in Appellees’ Certificate

of Interested Persons, the following persons and entities have an interest in the
outcome of this case. These representations are made in order that the judges
of this Court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal:

1. Amicus Curiae John Doe is a natural person, who received no funding

from any person or entity toward the funding of this brief.
2. The same John Doe (identity filed under seal) is the Plaintiff in a matter
styled Doe v. Flores, No. 25-cv-01042 (JEB) (D.D.C. filed Apr. 2,
2025). Amicus is proceeding in that matter under a pseudonym; a mo-
tion to proceed pseudonymously has not been resolved at this writing.

Amicus hereby certifies that no party’s counsel authored this brief in

whole or in part, and no party or party’s counsel contributed money in-
tended to fund its preparation or submission.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Cases and Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Required Disclosures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Summary of the Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

I. Appellant Trump Cannot Be President as a Matter of Law . . . . . 10

II. Only a Lawfully Elected President Can Wield

the Executive Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

III. Supreme Court Justice Have No Lawful Authority

to Rewrite the Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

A. Sola Scriptura: The People Wrote the Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

B. Any Attempt by Judges to Write Law is Void Ab Initio . . . . . . 23

C. A Constitutional ‘Murder Mystery’

Starring Clarence Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

IV. If a Case or Controversy Can Be Adjudicated,

It Must Be Adjudicated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

V. Standing—In the Way . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

1
 TABLE OF CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES

CASE PAGE

Anderson v. Griswold, No. 23CV32577

(Dist. Ct., City & Cnty. of Denver, Nov. 17, 2023) . . . . . . . 11

Ashby v. White [1703], 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (H.C.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29, 32

Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. 243 (1833) . . . . . . . 10

Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . various

Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Cordova v. City of Albuquerque, 816 F.3d 645 (10th Cir. 2016) . . . . . 25

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215 (2022) . . . . 13, 19, 25

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. 603 (1813) . . . . . . . . . 17

Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. 678 (2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25-27

Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Hollander v. McCain, No. 08-cv-99-JL (D.N.H. Aug. 8, 2008) . . . . . 14

Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

2
CASE PAGE

Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . various

Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Nat. Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) . . . . . . . 24

Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Norton v. Shelby Cnty., 118 U.S. 425 (1886) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 15, 31

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) . . . . 26

Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1884) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Robinson v. Bowen, No. 3:08-cv-03836-WHA

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. 684 (2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) . . . . . . . 29

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Trump v. Anderson, 601 U.S. 100 (2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . various

Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 31

United States v. Stanley (Civil Rights Cases), 109 U.S. 3 (1883) . . . 10

United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

3
CASE PAGE

United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Vallely v. N. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920) . . . . . . . . . 22

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) . . . . . 31

_______________________________________________________

4
 STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES

PAGE

STATUTES

3 U.S.C. § 19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

28 U.S.C. § 453 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 23

The Treason Act, 11 Hen. VII [1495], c. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . various

U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Adams, John, Novanglus No. 5, Feb. 20, 1775 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Andersen, Hans Christian, The Emperor’s New Clothes (1837) . . . . 10

Bacon, Francis, Essays LVI (Of Judicature) (1620) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Barrett, Amy C., Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement,

91 Tex. L. Rev. 1711 (2012-13) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Berger, Raoul, Impeachment of Judges and “Good Behavior”

Tenure, 79 Yale L.J. 1475 (1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

-- Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional

Requirement?, 78 Yale L.J. 816 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Biographical Directory: Forty-First Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

5
Blackstone, William, Commentaries on the Laws
of England 69 (1765) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 21

Bork, Robert H., Our Judicial Oligarchy,

67 First Things 21 (Nov. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Chin, Gabriel J., Why Senator John McCain Cannot Be President:

Eleven Months and a Hundred Yards Short of Citizenship,
107 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 1 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Coke, Edward, Institutes of the Lawes of England (1642) . . . . . . . . . . 21

Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr.

to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55-56 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr.

To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 465 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Elliot, Jonathan, The Debates in the Several State Conventions . . . . . 22

Geyh, Charles, When Courts and Congress Collide

(U. Mich. Press 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Gibbon, Charles, The History of the Decline and Fall

of the Roman Empire (1776-89) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Kentucky Resolution (1798) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Lincoln, Abraham, Speech

(on the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Springfield, IL), Oct. 16, 1854 . . . . 20

Llewellyn, Karl, The Bramble Bush (1960) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Locke, John, Second Treatise of Government (1689) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

MSNBC, MNBC Highlights – May 30 (YouTube video)

(Jun. 1, 2025), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Acy-3xqtBvI . . 31

6
Orwell, George, New Adelphi, Vol. 15-16 (Jan. 1939) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Paine, Thomas, Common Sense (1776) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Plutarch, The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Prakash, Saikrishna & Smith, Steven D., How to Remove

a Federal Judge, 116 Yale L.J. 72 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Rupar, Aaron (@atrupar.com), Tweet, Bluesky (Apr. 15, 2025) . . . . . . 33

Sachs, Stephen E., Why John McCain Was a Citizen at Birth,

107 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 49 (2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Scalia, Antonin G., Historical Anomalies in Administrative Law,

Y.B. Sup. Ct. Hist. Soc’y. 103 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Somin, Ilya, A Victory for Separation of Powers,

The Atlantic (May 31, 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Story, Joseph, Commentaries on the Constitution of

the United States (1838) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Suetonius, De Vita Caesarum [The Lives of the Twelve Caesars] . . . . 14

The Federalist No. 78 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21-23

The Federalist No. 84 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Thomas, Clarence, A Conversation with Justice Clarence

Thomas, 36-10 Imprimis (Oct. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19, 30

Washington, George, Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796) . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Van Alstyne, William, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison,

1969 Duke L.J. 1 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

7
 INTEREST OF AMICUS

Amicus is Plaintiff in a matter styled Doe v. Flores, No. Case No. 25-cv-
01042(JEB) (D.D.C. filed Apr. 2, 2025). The constitutionality of tariffs im-
posed by a man who is ineligible to be President as a matter of law is one of
the matters at issue therein. As the first issue in any judicial determination is
whether it has proper parties and jurisdiction, and a man who is not our Presi-
dent de jure cannot appear in an official capacity anywhere, Norton v. Shelby
County, 118 U.S. 425, 443 (1886), judicial economy will be served by consid-
eration of this submission.

A separate motion seeking permission to file this brief is enclosed.

Amicus is proceeding in that matter under a pseudonym; a motion to pro-

ceed has not been resolved at this writing. Especially in light of Judge Wilker-
son’s trenchant opinion in Abrego-Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-1404, slip op. at 5
(4th Cir. Apr. 17, 2025) and the experience of Ruby Freeman, see Freeman v.
Guiliani, 1:21-cv-03354 (D.D.C.) (settled), Amicus is taking Voltaire’s famous
bromide seriously: “Il est dangereux d’avoir raison dans des choses où des
hommes accrédités ont tort.” Voltaire, Le Siècle de Louis XIV, ch. 28(1751).

Simply put, Amicus does not want his wife to end up like Daniel Anderl.

8
 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Amicus writes to draw the Panel’s attention to a foundational question that

no one in this tsunami of litigation has addressed: How can one reason from the

Constitution to “an oathbreaking adjudged insurrectionist who has not been ab-

solved by Congress serve as President?” Amicus submits that this is logically

impossible. In turn, that is dispositive of this matter, as the actions of a usurper

to the national throne are void ab initio, Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425,

443 (1886), and as he has no standing, he cannot act in an “official” capacity.

ARGUMENT

This matter is resolved by resort to the bulletproof reasoning of Chief Justice

Marshall, in the first case we all studied in law school:

The constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordi-

nary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other
acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.

If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary
to the constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written consti-
tutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its
own nature illimitable.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

Whether this was a tautology, an essential element of the ratio decedendi,

or mere dictum, see, William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v.

Madison, 1969 Duke L.J. 1, 17 (1969), is beside the point. There is no support

9
in precedent or logic for the proposition that a constitutional provision must be

activated by formal legislation to become effective. E.g., United States v. Stan-

ley (Civil Rights Cases), 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (“the Thirteenth amendment, as

well as the Fourteenth, is undoubtedly self-executing without any ancillary leg-

islation”), City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997) (Fourteenth);

South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966) (Fifteenth); cf., Barron

ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) (Bill of Rights orig-

inally not enforceable as against the States—by design). The unambiguous text

of the foundational law we the People enacted controls. Connecticut Nat’l Bank

v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (per Thomas, J., collecting cases).

I. APPELLANT TRUMP CANNOT BE PRESIDENT AS A MATTER

OF LAW.

“But he hasn’t got anything on,” a little child said.

~ Hans Christian Andersen1

We all recall the tale from our childhood. A vain and self-absorbed emperor

was obsessed with fine clothing. Two swindlers, posing as weavers, convince

him they can make a suit so exquisite, it is invisible only to those unfit for their

position or foolish. The emperor, eager to display his sophistication, hires them.

1
Hans Christian Andersen, The Emperor’s New Clothes, in Hans Christian Andersen’s
Complete Fairy Tales 57 (Jean Hersholt trans., Canterbury Classics 2014) (1837).

10
The swindlers pretend to weave, and though no one—including the emperor,

his court, and townspeople—can see the fabric, they all feign admiration, to

avoid seeming incompetent or foolish.

But then, a child speaks truth to power.

Here, the ‘two swindlers’ in our real-life adaptation are Chief Justice Rob-

erts and five of his colleagues. They wove a magnificent legal negligee in

Trump v. Anderson, 601 U.S. 100 (2024), out of the constitutionally groundless

claim that Congress must pass a law to effectuate Section 3 of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Everyone with a law degree can see right through it, but no one

has the child-like audacity to speak truth to power in a courtroom.

Appellant Donald John Trump had previously taken an oath as President “to

support the Constitution of the United States,” and was found by a competent

court upon a trial on the merits via clear and convincing evidence that he had

engaged in insurrection, as that term is used in Section 3 of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Anderson v. Griswold, No. 23CV32577, ¶¶ 241, 298 (Dist. Ct.,

City & Cnty. of Denver, Nov. 17, 2023). Thus, as a matter of law and in accord-

ance with established precedent, Trump cannot currently serve as our President

unless and until Congress affirmatively removes that disability.

Why? Because THE CONSTITUTION says so.

11
 This is proven conclusively by the saga of Col. Nelson Tift (D-GA), who

was a public official before the War, and served as an officer in the Confederate

Navy. He was elected to Congress and then, the Amendment was ratified. Ra-

ther than send him home, the Fortieth Congress enacted a private bill to allow

him to serve out his term. But when he came back after getting re-elected by

the good people of Georgia, the Forty-First Congress promptly sent both him

and five of his colleagues home.2

The Tift saga is conclusive proof that the framers of the Amendment under-

stood it to be self-executing. Otherwise, the Fortieth Congress wouldn’t have

needed to pass a private bill to let Tift in, and the Forty-First had no power to

keep him out. As the Constitution is self-executing, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.

at 177, the only power Congress has with respect to potential officeholders

barred from serving pursuant to Section 3 is the power to remove the disability.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3.

2
Upon the readmission of Georgia to representation, Tift was elected as a Democrat to the
Fortieth Congress. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified on July 9, 1868—presumably,
while Tift was en route. But rather than remove Tift’s disability, Congress passed a private
bill enabling him to serve out that Term—but no more. “Congress enacted a private bill
to remove the Section 3 disability of Nelson Tift of Georgia, who had recently been elected
to represent the State in Congress. See ch. 393, 15 Stat. 427. Tift took his seat in Congress
immediately thereafter. See Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 4499-4500 (1868).” Trump
v. Anderson, 601 U.S. 100, ___, 144 S. Ct. 662, 669 & n.2. But Georgia sent six secessionists
to the Forty-First Congress which the members refused to seat, including Nathan Tift. Bio-
graphical Directory: Forty-First Congress at 179 & fn. 11, https://www.govinfo.gov/con-
tent/pkg/GPO-CDOC-108hdoc222/pdf/GPO-CDOC-108hdoc222-3-41.pdf.

12
 As the only question of law properly before the Supreme Court in Trump v.

Anderson was whether “the Colorado Supreme Court err[ed] in ordering Pres-

ident Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential primary ballot,” Trump v. An-

derson, No. 23–719, 601 U.S. 100 (2024), Pet. Br. at (i), the question of whether

Trump could legally serve as President was never before the Court. Defendant

Roberts knew better. And he even said so: "If it is not necessary to decide

more to dispose of a case, then it is necessary not to decide more." Dobbs v.

Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215, 348 (2022) (Roberts,

C.J., concurring in the judgment).

The Colorado Supreme Court was in error, for the reason foreshadowed in

the precedent set by the saga of Colonel Tift. Like Tift, Appellant Trump was

a public official, swearing an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution, prior

to having been found as having engaged in insurrection. As all the elements of

Fourteenth Amendment disqualification were met, Trump is disqualified from

serving as a matter of law. But that disqualification could have been removed

at any time via the same two-thirds vote of Congress that previously allowed

Tift to serve. As there was nothing preventing Congress from doing this after

Trump nominally became President-elect on January 6, 2025, there was no need

to remove him from the Colorado ballot. The Supreme Court got this right, and

to that extent, Trump v. Anderson, supra., is binding precedent.

13
 In a manner of speaking, we’ve attended this rodeo before. Back in 2008,

there was a substantial question as to whether Republican candidate John

McCain was a “natural-born citizen,” and could be barred from serving on this

ground. Cf., Gabriel J. Chin, Why Senator John McCain Cannot Be President:

Eleven Months and a Hundred Yards Short of Citizenship, 107 Mich. L. Rev.

First Impressions 1 (2008); Stephen E. Sachs, Why John McCain Was a Citizen

at Birth, 107 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 49 (2008). As he lost his bid to

become President, we never had to answer the question of whether the remedy

was “President Sarah Palin,” but pre-election challenges to his eligibility were

dismissed as premature and on standing grounds. Robinson v. Bowen, No. 3:08-

cv-03836-WHA (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2008); Hollander v. McCain, No. 08-cv-

99-JL (D.N.H. Aug. 8, 2008) (neither party appealed). As it was a case or con-

troversy within the competence of the courts, the matter could have and should

have been decided at One First Street. Whether Senator McCain’s status could

have been changed by legislation is also an open question, but that is beside the

point. Congress could have and should have addressed Trump’s status when

they had a chance. But sadly, they didn’t. Iacta alea est.3

3
Translated, “The die has been cast." Suetonius, De Vita Caesarum [The Lives of the Twelve
Caesars], Bk. I, ¶ 32, at https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/L/Roman/Texts/Sueto-
nius/12Caesars/Julius*.html.

14
II. ONLY A LAWFULLY ELECTED PRESIDENT CAN WIELD
THE ARTICLE II EXECUTIVE POWER.

The Constitution is our national catechism. Thereunder, an oathbreaking

adjudged insurrectionist not absolved by Congress literally cannot be our Pres-

ident de jure. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3. And if Appellant Trump is not our

President, all his actions—and, those of his agents—are void ab initio, as an

act of a usurper is void:

[W]hen the constitution or form of government remains unaltered and su-

preme, there can be no de facto department, or de facto office. The acts of
the incumbents of such departments or office cannot be enforced conform-
ably to the constitution, and can be regarded as valid only when the gov-
ernment is overturned.

Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. at 443.

Norton is not just binding because it is precedent; it is binding because it is

consonant with constitutional theory. Specifically, it is consistent with Amer-

ica’s unique concept of popular sovereignty, foreign to our British forebears.

The Framers’ views were consonant with that of Locke, who maintained that a

usurper could never attain legitimate power. John Locke, Second Treatise of

Government ch. XVIII (1689). E.g., John Adams, Novanglus No. 5, Feb. 20,

1775; Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolution (1798) (acts in excess of juris-

diction are void ab initio); George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 19,

1796) (the Constitution is the outer boundary of popular consent); The Feder-

alist No. 84 (Hamilton) (same). The stirring prose of Thomas Paine distills the

15
thought. “[I]n America THE LAW IS KING. For as in absolute governments

the King is law, so in free countries the law ought to be King; and there ought

to be no other.” Thomas Paine, Common Sense (Philadelphia, R. Bell, 1776)

(emphasis in original), reprinted in pt. III, ¶ 103 (Project Gutenberg, 1994). As

long as we remain governed by the Constitution, either an occupant of an office

has a legal right to discharge the duties of an office, or s/he does not. There is

no third option.

This is in direct contrast to the experience in medieval England during the

Wars of the Roses (1455-1487), where factions vied over the kingship. As it

wasn’t entirely clear who the actual King was, Parliament enacted The Treason

Act, 11 Hen. VII [1495], c. 1 (“noe person going wth the Kinge to the Warres

shalbe attaynt of treason”), creating the de facto officer doctrine. Translated

from the Middle English, it forbade legal punishment of subjects who followed

the orders of the de facto king, irrespective of whether he was legitimate or a

usurper. Importantly, it is NOT a common-law doctrine.

Under the Framers’ Constitution, any American citizen could have sauntered

into any U.S. District Court on January 21, seeking a declaration that Appellant

Trump could not serve as our President as a matter of law. Citizen standing in

public interest cases was a given. Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Ac-

tions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 Yale L.J. 816, 819 (1969) (“No

16
English court, so far as I can discover, has ever … denied that a writ of prohi-

bition may be granted at the suit of a stranger.”). The common law, with its

array of remedies, was an integral part of our law. "The common law ... ought

not to be deemed to be repealed, unless the language of a statute be clear and

explicit for this purpose," Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. 603,

623 (1813); accord, United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (quota-

tions and citations omitted). All the common law writs were available.4 A law-

suit could have been filed before the ink on the first Executive Order was dry,

and the damage litigated in this case would have been averted. The practice is

consistent with the Framers’ design, the common law, and the concept of pop-

ular sovereignty. But then, our black-robed bishops rewrote our Gospel to suit

their pleasure.

III. SUPREME COURT JUSTICES HAVE NO LAWFUL AUTHORITY

TO REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION.

4
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (1789) (including “all other writs not
specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective
jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law”).

17
 To many, this was a confession in a criminal conspiracy. At level best, a

litigant thanking a judge for issuing a ruling favoring him is unseemly, and de-

grades the institution. But thankfully, we need not indulge that debate here. We

expect judges to be as above reproach as Caesar’s wife.5 Umpires, who duti-

fully call balls and strikes. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John

G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S.

Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55-56 (2005) (statement of John G. Rob-

erts, Jr., Nominee to Be Chief Justice of the United States).

This standard is not aspirational. This is a warranty, implicit in the nature

of Article III and the judicial oath, 28 U.S.C. § 453, and a clear directive from

the citizenry you work for.

A. Sola Scriptura: The People Wrote the Law

We have now sunk to a depth at which the restatement of the obvious

is the first duty of intelligent men.
~George Orwell6

While the Supreme Court has declared that insurrectionist Trump is eligible

to ascend to the Presidency, Trump v. Anderson, supra, and enjoys an immunity

from criminal prosecution that is breathtaking in scope, Trump v. United States,

5
“I wished my wife to be not so much as suspected.” Plutarch, The Lives of the Noble Gre-
cians and Romans 674 (Arthur Hugh Clough ed., Project Gutenberg 2024) (1996),
https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/674/pg674-images.html#chap48.
6
George Orwell, The Taming of Power (book review), New Adelphi, Vol. 15-16 (Jan. 1939)
205.

18
603 U.S. 593 (2024),7 the Constitution does not and as such, they had no lawful

authority to rule as they did. For if a “decision is manifestly absurd or unjust,

it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law, but that it is not law.” 1

Wm. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *70 (1765) (emphasis

added). Or to distill the law to essentials,

The Constitution is NOT what judges say it is;

it is what THE CONSTITUTION says it is.

“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made

in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the

Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” U.S.

Const. art. VI, cl. 2. “Governments are instituted among men, deriving their

just powers from the consent of the governed.” Declaration of Independence,

para. 2 (U.S. 1776). As Lincoln famously declared, "no man is good enough

to govern another man, without the other’s consent,” Abraham Lincoln, Speech

7
As Justice Thomas observes, "[w]e should always start, when we read the Constitution, by
reading the Declaration [of Independence], because it gives us the reasons why the structure
of the Constitution was designed the way it was." Clarence Thomas, A Conversation with
Justice Clarence Thomas, 36-10 Imprimis (Oct. 2007). The Framers designed their Consti-
tution to prevent unchecked executive power—a principle rooted in their experience under
King George III, as chronicled in the Declaration.
Consistent with this aim, the Framers made it a point not to grant immunity from criminal
prosecution to the President. No reference can be found in the Constitution, its penumbrae,
or its emanations. See Antonin G. Scalia, Historical Anomalies in Administrative Law, Y.B.
Sup. Ct. Hist. Soc’y. 103 (1985). Presidential immunity has no “grounding in constitutional
text, history, or precedent.” Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 280. But without any colorable support in
or reference to the law—and in inexplicable disregard of their own public positions—six
Justices decided sua sponte that Presidents ought to be above the law. Objectively inexpli-
cable, particularly in light of Anderson.

19
(on the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Springfield, IL), Oct. 16, 1854, and the Framers’

Constitution marks the outer limit of our consent.

Thereunder, “We the People of the United States” write our own laws, pur-

suant to the processes specified therein. We make the big calls, leaving the

day-to-day process of lawmaking to our legislators. We hire a President to run

this leviathan and judges, to resolve disputes. And we expect our authorized

agents to stay in their lanes. The President can administer the law, but Con-

gress controls the purse strings. The President has discretion in the discharge

of his duties, but he is bound by the law, and must acquiesce to the decisions

of our courts. “All the officers of the government, from the highest to the low-

est, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it.” United States v. Lee,

106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882). And the system is designed to bind them.

For five centuries, it has been universally understood that the office of the

judge "is jus dicere, and not jus dare; to interpret law, and not to make law, or

give law." Francis Bacon, Essays LVI (Of Judicature) (1620). Mindful that “the

discretion of the judge is the first engine of tyranny," 4 C. Gibbon, The History

of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire 385 (1776-89) (Philips Samson,

and Co. 1856), Alexander Hamilton argued that to "avoid an arbitrary discre-

tion in the courts, it is indispensable that [judges] should be bound by strict

rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every

20
particular case before them." The Federalist No. 78, 470 (I. Kramnick ed. 1987)

(Alexander Hamilton). Blackstone asserted that the judge’s duty to follow prec-

edent derived from the nature of the judicial power itself: a judge is "sworn to

determine, not according to his own judgments, but according to the known

laws." 1 Blackstone, Commentaries at 69. A century earlier, Coke observed that

"[i]t is the function of a judge not to make, but to declare the law, according to

the golden mete-wand of the law and not by the crooked cord of discretion." 1

E. Coke, Institutes of the Lawes of England 51 (1642).

Professor (Justice) Story adds that “A more alarming doctrine could not be

promulgated by any American court, than that it was at liberty to disregard all

former rules and decisions, and to decide for itself [what the law is], without

reference to the settled course of antecedent principles.” 1 J. Story, Commen-

taries on the Constitution of the United States 350 (1838). The judge was ex-

pected to be little more than an administrator, playing what Professor Llewellyn

called “the game of matching cases.” Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 49

(1960).

Under our system, the judicial power is “to decide what the law is, not to

declare what it should be,” Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874), for

as long as judges are at liberty to “substitute their own pleasure to the con-

stitutional intentions of the legislature,” The Federalist No. 78 at 440

21
(Alexander Hamilton)—or the people—it can no longer honestly be said that

we are a nation governed by laws.

The rewriting of the Constitution under a false pretense of interpreting it is

“a flagrant perversion of the judicial power.” Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312,

331 (1932). In the timeless words of Justice Holmes, it is ‘an unconstitutional

assumption of powers by courts of the United States which no lapse of time or

respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct.” Erie R.R. Co.

v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938). "Courts are constituted by authority and

they can not go beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that

authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are

regarded as nullities." Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S.

348, 353 (1920). There is no contrary authority.

Under the Framers’ Constitution, the citizen was not an idle spectator. If a

judge violated his condition of good behavior, the citizen could remove him

pursuant to a writ of scire facias.8 This was the Framers’ approach to judicial

8
See generally, Raoul Berger, Impeachment of Judges and “Good Behavior” Tenure, 79
Yale L.J. 1475 (1970); Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a Federal
Judge, 116 Yale L.J. 72, 88-128 (2006). This remedy has fallen into desuetude, but consti-
tutional rights and remedies do not extinguish solely due to the passage of time.
The conventional view that Congress enforces “good behavior” through impeachment is
misplaced. During the Chase impeachment debate, Senator Hemphill noted that to allow
Congress to enforce good behavior tenure would constitute a de facto power of address and
accordingly, that power could not lie with Congress. 5 Elliot’s Debates 444. This was rein-
forced in the 1913 investigation of Judge Emory Speer, where Congress concluded that ju-
dicial abuses (e.g., “despotism, tyranny”) were not impeachable despite violating good

22
discipline—they didn’t trust judges as far as they could throw them, but they

didn’t trust the legislature to lord their power over judges, as was the case in

Britain. Alexander Hamilton opined that “the standard of good behavior for

the continuance in office of the judicial magistracy, … [and] the best expedient

which can be devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright, and im-

partial administration of the laws.” The Federalist No. 78 at 437 (Alexander

Hamilton).

The Framers’ Constitution was the governmental equivalent of Luther’s

Ninety-Five Theses, which ultimately distill to “sola scriptura.” Thereunder,

We Citizens write the law, and You Judges interpret it. And if you fail in that

charge, we can fire you.

B. Any Attempt by Judges to Write Law is Void Ab Initio.

The illegitimacy of the Court's departures from the Constitution is un-

derscored by the fact that no Justice has ever attempted a justification
of the practice. At most, opinions have offered, as if it solved some-
thing, the observation that the Court has never felt its power confined
to the intended meaning of the Constitution. True enough, but a long
habit of abuse of authority does not make the abuse legitimate. That
is particularly so when the representative branches of government
have no effective way of resisting the Court's depredations.
~Judge Robert Bork9

behavior tenure. Charles Geyh, When Courts and Congress Collide, 160–61 (U. Mich. Press
2008). The oath of office, unchanged since 1791, Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. at 81, pro-
vides fair notice of judicial obligations, supporting citizen-driven remedies like scire facias.
9
Robert H. Bork, Our Judicial Oligarchy, 67 First Things 21, 24 (Nov. 1996).

23
 The question posed by the Anderson dictum is not one of whether it is per-

suasive, but if it is even permissible. And no less an expert than one John

Glover Roberts, Jr. assures us that it is not. Writing for the Court, Roberts

asserted that “Members of this Court are vested with the authority to interpret

the law; we possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make policy

judgments. Those decisions are entrusted to our Nation's elected leaders, who

can be thrown out of office if the people disagree with them.” Nat. Fedn. of

Indep. Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012).

To put it more pragmatically, the rule Defendant Roberts espouses is that

his job is to interpret the Constitution we have, as opposed to the one he might

prefer. There might be compelling arguments for settling the question of a

candidate’s eligibility at the outset of a campaign, or for uniform rules applying

to all states. But those are lawmaking decisions, expressly entrusted to the

people and the other branches of government, as a matter of constitutional Gos-

pel. Infringing on their prerogative is way above an Article III judge’s pay

grade.

Every Justice in the Anderson majority—Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch,

Kavanaugh, Barrett—has publicly admitted that they can’t change the Consti-

tution to suit their pleasure. (Roberts: “Judges have power to say what the law

is, not what it should be.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 135 S.Ct. 2584,

24
2811 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Thomas: “Judicial power… is never

exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judge.” Gamble v.

United States, 587 U.S. 678, 139 S.Ct. 1960, 1982 (2019) (Thomas, J., concur-

ring); Alito: “It is the job of a judge… to interpret the Constitution, not distort

[it],” Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. To Be

an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before

the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 465 (2006) (statement of Samuel

A. Alito, Jr.); Gorsuch: “Ours is the job of interpreting the Constitution… ac-

cording to its original public meaning,” Cordova v. City of Albuquerque, 816

F.3d 645, 661 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J, concurring); Kavanaugh: “The

Constitution does not grant [us] unilateral authority to rewrite” it, Dobbs, 597

U.S. 215, __, 142 S.Ct. 2228, 2306 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J. concurring); Bar-

rett: “Partisan politics are not a good reason for deciding a case.” Amy C. Bar-

rett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1711, 1729

(2012-13)). There is no contrary authority.

C. A Constitutional ‘Murder Mystery’ Starring Clarence Thomas

[N]o government official is "tempted" to place restraints upon his own

freedom of action, which is why Lord Acton did not say "Power tends
to purify." The Court's temptation is in the quite opposite and more
natural direction—towards systematically eliminating checks upon its
own power; and it succumbs.

25
 ~Justice Antonin Scalia10

In three decades on the bench, Clarence Thomas has had a relative eternity

to develop and refine his approach to jurisprudence; his soliloquy in Gamble,

139 S.Ct. at 1980-87 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted). is a

master class in judicature.

Thomas provides the rule that this Court should follow when confronted by

bloody juridical abortions like Trump v. Anderson: “When faced with a demon-

strably erroneous precedent, my rule is simple: We should not follow it.” Gam-

ble, 587 U.S. 678, 139 S.Ct. at 1984. “This view of stare decisis follows directly

from the Constitution's supremacy over other sources of law—including our

own precedents … [as it] necessarily limits ‘the power of a court to give legal

effect to prior judicial decisions’ that articulate demonstrably erroneous inter-

pretations of the Constitution because those prior decisions cannot take prece-

dence over the Constitution itself.” Id. at 1984-85 (citations omitted; emphasis

added).

Thomas incisively laments that “the Court's typical formulation of the stare

decisis standard does not comport with our judicial duty under Article III be-

cause it elevates demonstrably erroneous decisions—meaning decisions

10
Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 981 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).

26
outside the realm of permissible interpretation—over the text of the Constitu-

tion and other duly enacted federal law.” Id. “[W]e are not entitled to interpret

the Constitution to align it with our personal sensibilities.” Id. at 1980. “By

applying demonstrably erroneous precedent instead of the relevant law's

text…the Court exercises "force" and "will," two attributes the People did not

give it.” Id. at 1981 (citing The Federalist No. 78). “It is always "tempting for

judges to confuse our own preferences with the requirements of the law.’" Id.

(citation omitted). He goes on to observe:

A proper understanding of stare decisis in our constitutional structure re-

quires a proper understanding of the nature of the "judicial Power" vested
in the federal courts. That "Power" is—as Chief Justice Marshall put it—
the power "to say what the law is" in the context of a particular "case" or
"controversy" before the court. Phrased differently, the "judicial Power" "is
fundamentally the power to decide cases in accordance with law." It refers
to the duty to exercise "judicial discretion" as distinct from "arbitrary dis-
cretion."

Id. at 1982 (citations omitted).

“Judicial discretion is not the power to "alter" the law; it is the duty to cor-

rectly "expound" it.” Id. (citation omitted). As he observed, “there are right and

wrong answers to legal questions," Id. at 1984 (citation omitted), and it is the

task of the judge to ascertain and apply the right ones, because judicial opinions

are not the supreme Law of the Land. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.

27
 The mystery is how a judge who has embraced the judicial philosophy of

originalism with such clarity and force would murder it in such a high-profile

case as Trump v. Anderson.

IV: IF A CASE OR CONTROVERSY CAN BE ADJUDICATED,

IT MUST BE ADJUDICATED.

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821). It is the decision that made Marbury

v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), into binding precedent, thereby Americanizing

Ashby v. White [1703] 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 136 (H.C.) (for every right, there must

be a remedy):

We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given,

than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason
to the constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid, but
we cannot avoid them. … We find no exception to this grant [of jurisdic-
tion], and we cannot insert one.

Cohens, 19 U.S. at 404.

The Constitution is a stern mistress, brooking no infidelity. When a litigant

has a right that can be vindicated, this Court owes a concomitant duty to provide

a remedy, for “[t]o take away all remedy for the enforcement of a right is to

take away the right itself.” Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 303 (1884).

The “political question” doctrine, when scrupulously applied, is a principled

application of Cohens, as some matters are constitutionally committed to the

other branches. E.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (Senate has

28
sole power to try impeachments, and can write its own rules); Goldwater v.

Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (per curiam) (foreign affairs are the exclusive

province of the President); cf., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (“the mere

fact that the suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean it presents

a political question”). Judges committing “treason to the constitution”11 occurs

with distressing regularity, but that does not make it permissible.

V. STANDING—IN THE WAY

Before a judicial panel can even reach the merits of a case under modern

rules, it must first satisfy itself that the party bringing the claim has standing to

be heard, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006); Steel Co. v.

Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (hypothetical jurisdic-

tion violates Article III); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992),

and as a matter of law and logic, a person who cannot serve as an elected offi-

cial cannot sue in an official capacity. For the reasons presented above, neither

11
Cohens, 19 U.S. at 404. The most comical and floridly partisan example of the Court’s
abnegation of its duty was in Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. 684 (2019). The central
problem, lamented Roberts, was not determining whether a jurisdiction has engaged in par-
tisan gerrymandering. It is "determining when political gerrymandering has gone too far."
Id. at 685. That, of course, is reminiscent of the Court’s struggles with how to define ob-
scenity. There, the Court’s “duty admits of no "substitute for facing up to the tough individ-
ual problems of constitutional judgment involved,” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 188
(1964), wherein Justice Stewart famously remarked, “I know it when I see it.” Id. at 197
(Stewart, J., concurring). Rucho was every bit as justiciable as Jacobellis, but in politically
charged cases like this and Anderson, you can always count on a judge to “dance with the
gurl that brung ‘im.” Rucho does not alter the Cohens rule, so much as it does expose judges
who violate their oaths.

29
Appellant Trump nor his authorized agents can appeal the case below, and as

the Executive Order at issue is void ab initio, all that is left for this Court to

remand the matter with appropriate instructions, and for the United States to

refund the monies improperly collected.

CONCLUSION

The Universe has a sense of humor.

Justice Thomas observed that "[w]e should always start, when we read the

Constitution, by reading the Declaration [of Independence], because it gives us

the reasons why the structure of the Constitution was designed the way it was."

Clarence Thomas, Conversation, supra. Americans endured the capricious rule

of King George III, whom historians describe as “the Mad King,” for forty

years. They consciously designed their government to ensure that no one man

would wield unchecked power. And until recently, that foundation of liberty

was affixed in granite.

30
 Inadvertently, the normally precise Professor Somin’s historical faux pas12

betrays a point: Whereas the British were stuck with King George III for sixty

years because their law said so, we are not stuck with our Mad King because

our law says so. Bullets or briefs—Amicus prefers briefs—makes no differ-

ence; we had to use bullets in 1776, but our law does not countenance the rule

of a usurper.

Amicus does not pretend that unraveling the legal train wreck our leaders

left us will be easy. But there is no provision in the Constitution that ratifies

lawless actions because undoing them will be hard. Fiat iustitia, ruat cœlum!

Let justice be done, though the heavens fail. The law is pellucid: The acts of a

usurper are void. Norton, supra. This is a justiciable question, which this Court

is not at liberty to avoid. Cohens, supra.

The system is designed to handle this request. First, courts have been in-

validating Executive Orders forever. E.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.

Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); Little

v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804). Second, our government is designed to function

despite upheaval; Speaker Mike Johnson would be President pursuant to 3

U.S.C. § 19, and day-to-day operations of the executive branch can easily be

12
Ilya Somin, A Victory for Separation of Powers, The Atlantic, May 31, 2025 (paywall).
The graphic was aired by MSNBC. MNBC Highlights – May 30 (YouTube video), MSNBC,
Jun. 1, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Acy-3xqtBvI

31
delegated to subordinate officers not implicated in the usurpation. Tariffs can

be refunded by simply writing checks.

Finally, it has been suggested that courts should not act when it otherwise

has a duty to because it somehow might make America look bad. Baker v. Carr,

369 U.S. at 217. But truth be told, we’ve done a decent job of that even when

judges have acted. E.g., James Stanley, a master sergeant stationed at Fort

Knox, was secretly administered doses of LSD under an Army scheme to study

its effects on humans, and denied a remedy. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S.

669, 671 (1987). Linda Sparkman was secretly sterilized without her consent

or semblance of medical necessity, pursuant to a judicial order issued in direct

contravention of statutory law, and denied a remedy. Stump v. Sparkman, 435

U.S. 349 (1978). And then, there was the time we imprisoned 120,000 Japanese

Americans in internment camps during World War II on the charge of bigotry.

Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The specter of looking bad

has never stopped our courts from doing the wrong thing. Still, courts can do

the right thing when they try. E.g., Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347

U.S. 483 (1954).

If enduring national embarrassment is an actual factor in constitutional ju-

risprudence, Amicus submits that nothing will ever compare to the shame we

will all feel when we lose our precious Republic to a coup because judges

32
feared that enforcing the Constitution might cause a little embarrassment. Sen-

ator Chris Murphy (D-CT) recently elaborated: "We can't be preparing for the

2026 election. It might not come. All of our focus right now has to be on pro-

tecting the democracy, about stopping the corruption." Aaron Rupar (@atru-

par.com), Bluesky (Apr. 15, 2025, 08:21 EDT), https://bsky.app/profile/atru-

par.com/post/3lqt6abivw42h.

The stakes have never been higher.

Respectfully submitted this 6th day of June, 2025,

_____/s/_____________________
(Signature under seal)

33