Media Law
Media Law
The Indian Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of speech and expression to all
citizens under Article 19(1)(a). This right is considered a cornerstone of democracy as it
allows individuals to express their thoughts, opinions, and beliefs without fear of censorship
or restraint. The right encompasses not only verbal and written communication but also
symbolic speech, such as gestures and art forms. Additionally, it is the foundation for various
other rights, such as the freedom of the press and the right to information.
The freedom of the press, although not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, is implied
under Article 19(1)(a). This ensures that journalists and media organizations can disseminate
information and critique governmental policies without undue interference. Similarly, the
right to information has been recognized as intrinsic to this article, empowering citizens to
seek transparency and accountability in governance. The judiciary has also extended the
ambit of Article 19(1)(a) to include commercial speech, such as advertisements, as these
contribute to the free flow of information in society.
Numerous landmark judgments have shaped the interpretation of this article. For instance, in
Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras (1950), the Supreme Court held that freedom of speech
and expression is essential for the proper functioning of democracy. In Bennett Coleman &
Co. v. Union of India (1973), restrictions on newsprint imports were invalidated as they
curtailed press freedom. Similarly, in Secretary, Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal (1995), the court affirmed that broadcasting
rights are integral to the freedom of speech.
Although Article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech, it is not absolute. Article 19(2)
permits the state to impose reasonable restrictions to balance individual liberty with collective
societal interests. These restrictions are justified on eight specific grounds: sovereignty and
integrity of India, security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states, public order,
decency or morality, contempt of court, defamation, and incitement to an offense.
The sovereignty and integrity of India justify restrictions to prevent any speech that threatens
the unity of the nation. This ground is often invoked in cases of sedition, as seen in
Kedarnath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962), where the court upheld the sedition law but
clarified that only speech inciting violence or rebellion against the government could be
penalized. Similarly, restrictions based on the security of the state aim to prevent espionage,
terrorism, and other activities that endanger national security. In Indira Das v. State of
Assam (2011), the court emphasized that laws restricting speech must have a direct nexus
with national security concerns.
The public order exception safeguards peace and tranquility by prohibiting speech that incites
violence or communal unrest. In Superintendent, Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia
(1960), the court distinguished between "law and order" and "public order," ruling that
restrictions must be narrowly tailored to address disruptions in public order specifically.
Decency and morality are other grounds under which obscenity is restricted. For instance, in
Ranjit Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra (1965), the Supreme Court upheld the ban on the
book Lady Chatterley's Lover, holding that obscenity could harm societal morality.
Further, restrictions under contempt of court are intended to protect the judiciary's authority
and dignity. In EM Sankaran Namboodiripad v. T. Narayan Nambiar (1970), the court
highlighted the need to balance free speech with judicial respect. Restrictions on defamation
ensure the protection of an individual's reputation, as reaffirmed in Subramanian Swamy v.
Union of India (2016), where the court upheld criminal defamation as a reasonable
restriction. Lastly, incitement to an offense prevents speech that provokes criminal activity,
as addressed in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), where the Supreme Court struck
down Section 66A of the IT Act for being overly broad and vague.
In recent years, the advent of the internet has significantly expanded the scope of freedom of
speech and expression. The judiciary has acknowledged the internet as a vital medium for
exercising this fundamental right. In the landmark case of Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of
India (2020), the Supreme Court ruled that access to the internet is an integral part of
freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a). The court emphasized that any restriction on
internet access must meet the test of proportionality and reasonableness.
The internet has transformed how individuals access information and express themselves. It
enables participation in social, political, and economic discourse, making it indispensable for
democracy. However, this freedom is accompanied by challenges, including the spread of
misinformation, hate speech, and cybercrime. Governments worldwide, including in India,
have introduced regulations to address these issues while ensuring that restrictions comply
with constitutional safeguards under Article 19(2).
The regulation of digital platforms, such as social media, has raised debates about balancing
free speech and accountability. The judiciary has played a crucial role in striking this balance,
ensuring that digital rights align with constitutional freedoms.
BLASPHEMY- the act of insulting or showing contempt or lack of reverence for God
In the constitution of India, the word “secular” was added in the preamble by the 42nd
Amendment, which made it crystal clear that India is a secular country and the state will not
indulge in the religious matter of the people as all religions are equal to the state.
If a person does any of the act mentioned in the aforementioned list then a case of Blasphemy
can be instituted against that individual. One can go to District Court.
Section 153A of IPC- Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion,
race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance
of harmony.
The purpose of the Section 153A is to punish persons who indulge in wanton vilification or
attacks upon the religion, race, and place of birth, residence, language etc of any particular
group or class or upon the founders and prophets of a religion. shall be punished with
imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
Section 153B of the IPC safeguards the interests of the “national integration” by providing
punishment against imputations and assertions prejudicial to national integration.
(c) makes or publishes any assertion, counsel, plea or appeal concerning the obligation of any
class of persons, by reason of their being members of any religious, racial, language or regional
group or caste or community, and such assertion, counsel, plea or appeal causes or is likely to
cause disharmony or feelings of enmity or hatred or ill-will between such members and other
persons, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine,
or with both.
(2) Whoever commits an offence specified in sub-section (1), in any place of worship or in any
assembly engaged in the performance of religious worship or religious ceremonies, shall be
punished with imprisonment which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.]
Section 295 of the I.P.C makes destruction, damage, or defilement of a place of worship or an
object held sacred, with intent to insult the religion of a class of persons, punishable with
imprisonment which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. This section has been
enacted to compel people to respect the religious susceptibilities of persons of different
religious persuasion or creeds.
With the aforementioned concept of secularism, section 295 A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC),
1860 criminalizes insult to any religion. It allows up to three years imprisonment and fines
for “whoever, with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of
any class of citizens of India, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible
representations or otherwise, insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of
a class.” But the laws should not be read in their strict sense and should not be applied strictly
going by the words. It should be interpreted keeping in mind the relevant facts of the respective
cases.
The aforementioned section does not stipulate everything to be penalized and any and every
act would tantamount to insult or attempt to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of a class
of citizens, it only penalizes malicious acts which are deliberate in nature.
If a person intentionally causes disturbance to any lawful religious assembly and ceremonies
thereof, he shall be punishable under this section and he can be imprisoned for one year or
fined or both.
If a person intentionally trespasses any burial place knowing that this act of his may hurt the
religious sentiments of any class of citizens is punishable under this section. This provision is
said to protect the religious rights of even dead persons. Punishment under this section is
imprisonment up to one year or fine or both.
Any person, who intentionally utters any words, makes any sound or signs, visible or audible,
as the case may be, to the aggrieved, as to hurt the religious feelings of the person, may be
punished under this section.
With parliament exhibiting no intention of reforming or repealing the law, the only other
option is the judiciary. Indeed, last year, Subramanian Swamy filed a petition asking for
various hate speech provisions in the Indian Penal Code to be declared unconstitutional.
With respect to Section 295A, however, there is a significant problem: in 1957, in Ramji
Lal Modi v State of UP, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court upheld its
constitutionality. This means that, if the Supreme Court were to change its mind, it would
need a bench of at least seven judges to overrule Ramji Lal Modi, and strike down the law.
Procedurally, this would require the challengers to 295A to first convince a two-judge bench
(before which any petition originally goes) that there are sufficient reasons for doubting the
correctness of Ramji Lal Modi. If convinced, this two-judge bench would need to refer the
question to a five-judge bench which, in turn (if convinced), would have to refer it to a
seven-judge bench, which would finally hear the case on merits.
While this entire process is procedurally daunting, and quite unlikely to materialise, there
are good arguments, in law, for the court to revisit and consider overruling the Ramji Lal
Modi decision.
FACT-Mr. Ramji Lal was the editor of the magazine called “Gauraksha”. Herein the
petitioner had published a cartoon and an article which was derogatory to the Muslim
community and it had posed a potential threat to disharmonize the public order.
The court held that: the court held that Section 295A was constitutionally valid since, in
accordance with Article 19(2) of the constitution, it was a ‘reasonable restriction’ upon the
freedom of speech, ‘in the interests of public order’. The core of the court’s reasoning was
that the phrase ‘in the interests of’, as required by Article 19(2), was of very wide ambit,
and allowed the state to make a variety of laws that bore some relation to maintaining public
order.
“[Section 295A] only punishes the aggravated form of insult to religion when it is
perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of
that class. The calculated tendency of this aggravated form of insult is clearly to disrupt the
public order and the section, which penalizes such activities, is well within the protection of
clau
se (2) of Art. 19 as being a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right
to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(a).”
It was argued before the court that in order for a law to be a reasonable restriction upon the
freedom of speech in the interests of public order, it would need to be limited to situations
where there was a degree of proximity between the proscribed speech, and the possibility of
public disorder (for instance, inciting an armed mob to destroy public property would
qualify, but writing an article in a magazine in defense of the Naxalite movement would
not). This argument was drawn from the court’s previous decisions, where it had been held
that the requirement of ‘reasonableness’ meant that there must be a degree of
proportionality between the speech, and the actual harm that the state feared.
But striking down Section 295A is a huge obstacle as the judiciary consisting of five-judge
bench upheld the constitutional validity of this section in the case of Ramji Lal Modi vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh, 1957. So, if the judiciary wants to overturn the ruling, it would
require a seven-judge bench to do so and strike down the section.
In this case, a picture of the cricketer, Mahendra Singh Dhoni was displayed as Lord
Vishnu and was circulated in a magazine with the words Divine force(god) of Big Deals.
The prosecution argued that the picture was insulting the religious sentiments of the
devotees of Lord Vishnu. Explaining further, the 3-judge bench of Dipak Misra,
A.M.Khanwilkar and M.M. Shantanagouda, JJ said that insults to religion offered
unwittingly or carelessly or without any deliberate or malicious intention to outrage the
religious feelings of that class do not come within the Section. Emphasis has been laid on
the calculated tendency of the said aggravated form of insult and also to disrupt the public
order to invite the penalty.
Quashing the complaint, The court held that Section 295A does not criminalize every act
which insults religious sentiments, but those acts which are said or written with the
malicious intention of hurting religious feelings of that class.
United Kingdom
Blasphemy laws in the United Kingdom were specific to blasphemy against Christianity.
In 1985, the Law Commission (England and Wales) published a report, Criminal Law:
Offences against Religious and Public Worship, that concluded that the common law
offenses of blasphemy and blasphemous libel should be abolished without replacement.
On 5 March 2008, an amendment was passed to the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act
2008 which abolished the common law offenses of blasphemy and blasphemous libel in
England and Wales.
USA
A prosecution for blasphemy in the United States would be a violation of the U.S.
Constitution and no blasphemy laws exist at the federal level.
SEDITION
The following are some laws which cover Sedition law:
The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (Section 2(o) (iii)).
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Section 95)
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Section 124A)
The Seditious Meetings Act, (1911)
Section 124A of the erstwhile IPC detailed the offence of sedition. While Section 152 of the
BNS provides for a similar offence, the BNS refrains from naming this as Sedition and
recharacterizes the offence of Sedition under the as acts endangering the sovereignty, unity
and integrity of India. Section 152 reads as follows:
“Whoever, purposely or knowingly, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by
visible representation, or by electronic communication or by use of financial means, or
otherwise, excites or attempts to excite secession or armed rebellion or subversive activities,
or encourages feelings of separatist activities or endangers sovereignty or unity and integrity
of India; or indulges in or commits any such act shall be punished with imprisonment for life
or with imprisonment which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.”
The net cast by the insertion of the phrase endangering ‘sovereignty or unity and integrity of
India could be wide and misused as the BNS doesn’t set out a list of activities that could be
seen as a threat to sovereignty or unity and integrity of the country or even provide an
illustration to demonstrate what could be construed as such a threat. The language of Section
152 of the BNS suggests that any act that, “excites or attempts to excite, secession or armed
rebellion or subversive activities” is a criminal act. In contrast, the BNS also widens the room
for interpretation by the authorities to decide what acts could fall under the purview of this
Section, thereby leading to ambiguity.
Another change implemented is the inclusion of the terms “electronic communication” and
“financial means”, both of which are tools that can be used to excite secession, armed
rebellion or separatism and penalised under Section 152 of the BNS.
Queen Empress v Jogendra Chunder Bose (1891) [5]
Jugendra Bose criticised the Age of Consent Act of 1891 in a piece of writing.
However, once he was granted bail, the matter was subsequently withdrawn.
The Supreme Court ruled that it was unconstitutional for a statute to limit speech if it
may disrupt public order. So, the clause "undermining the protection of the State"
was restricting speech even on- (that mere potential disruption of public order was not
enough to justify limiting this fundamental right).
Citizens who condemn the government with the aim of creating public disorder are
permitted to do so, so long as they do not incite people to engage in violence against
the government.
the Court pointed out, the essence of the crime of “sedition” is the incitement to
violence or the inclination or the intention to cause public disorder through words
spoken or in a written form that has the potential or the impact of inciting hatred or
contempt for the government established by law, or of causing disaffection in the
sense of distrust to the state.
Balwant Singh who was the Director of Public Instructions (DPI) in Punjab,
Chandigarh among other two, was speculated to have shouted pro-Khalistan slogans
on the day of former PM Indira Gandhi's assassination.
The apex court held that unless there's public disorder merely sloganeering can't
attract punishment under Section 124A.
S.G. Vombatkere vs Union of India was a landmark Supreme Court case that challenged
the constitutionality of Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which criminalizes
sedition. The case was filed by a number of petitioners, including retired Army General
S.G. Vombatkere, the Editor Guild of India, and TMC MP Mahua Moitra.
The court suspended the operation of Section 124A, directing the state and central
governments to stop registering FIRs, continuing investigations, and taking coercive
measures under this section.
HATE SPEECH
It is important to find the right balance between speech that is offensive, yet important for
freedom of expression and dissent, and speech which constitutes impermissible hate speech.
What is Hate Speech?
About:
o In the 267th Report of the Law Commission of India, hate speech is stated as an
incitement to hatred primarily against a group of persons defined in terms of race,
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religious belief and the like.
o It can cause harm to the targeted individuals and groups, as well as to the society at
large, by inciting hatred, violence, discrimination, and intolerance.
Article 19(2) imposes reasonable restrictions on this right, balancing its use
and misuse.
The Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo v. Prabhakar
Kashinath Kunte, dealt with the scope of the word ‘decency’ in Article 19 (2) and it
stated:
“Thus, the ordinary dictionary meaning of `decency’ indicates that the action must be in
conformity with the current standards of behaviour or propriety, etc. In a secular polity,
the requirement of correct behaviour or propriety is that an appeal for votes should not
be made on the ground of the candidate’s religion which by itself is no index of the
suitability of a candidate for membership of the House
Make the publication and circulation of content that may cause ill will or
hatred between different groups an offence.
Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 in India deals with
disqualification of representatives for conviction in certain offenses (u/s 153A,
171 E & F, 376, 376A, 376B, 376C, 376D, 505)
Section 123 of Representation of people act (RPA), 1951 deals with corrupt
electoral parties. Under this Act, various sections refrain any candidate himself
or by his consent through another person from corrupt electoral practices,
where such corrupt practices would annul the election if any such appeal was
in the name of the candidate’s religion or the religion of the election agent or
that of the opponent or that of the voter’s (ref: Abhiram Singh v C.D.
Commachen).
Background
The case involved the interpretation of Sections 153A and 505 of the Indian Penal
Code (IPC).
The appellant, Bilal Ahmed Kaloo, was accused of making inflammatory speeches
against the Indian government and army in relation to their actions in Kashmir.
Key Issues
Court's Observations
1. The Court emphasized that for an offense under Section 153A, there must be two or
more "groups" involved.
3. The Court stressed the need for a strict interpretation of these sections to prevent
misuse.
Judgment
1. The Court held that Kaloo's speeches, while critical of the government and army, did
not fall under Section 153A as they did not promote enmity between different groups.
2. However, the Court upheld the conviction under Section 505 for making statements
conducive to public mischief.
2. For Section 153A to apply, there must be two or more groups based on religion, race,
language, etc.
3. Courts should be cautious in applying these sections and should consider the context
and impact of the statements.
o The SC did not penalize hate speech as it does not exist in any of the pre-
existing legislation in India. Instead, the Supreme Court requested the Law
Commission to address this issue in order to avoid its stepping into the forum
of judicial overreach.
o Background
o The case was brought before the Supreme Court of India by an NGO, Pravasi
Bhalai Sangathan.
o Key Issues
o Court's Observations
o The Court recognized the harmful impact of hate speech on the social fabric of
the nation.
o The Court emphasized the need to balance free speech with the harm caused
by hate speech.
o Judgment
o The Court declined to frame guidelines itself, stating it was not within its
domain to legislate.
o Instead, it directed the Law Commission of India to examine the issue of hate
speech.
o The Court asked the Law Commission to define hate speech and make
recommendations to Parliament for strengthening the legal framework.
o Impact
o This case led to the 267th Report of the Law Commission on "Hate Speech."
o It brought national attention to the issue of hate speech and the need for clearer
legal provisions.
o Issues were raised about Section 66A of the Information Technology Act,
2000 relating to the fundamental right of free speech and expression
guaranteed by Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution, where the Court
differentiated between discussion, advocacy, and incitement and held that the
first two were the essence of Article 19(1).
o The SC has expressed concern over the growing incidents of hate speeches in
the country and has directed the governments and police authorities to
take suo motu action in such cases without waiting for the lodging of formal
complaints.
Note: The parliamentary privileges are not extended to the President, although he/she is
an integral part of the Parliament.
These privileges are aimed to ensure that the legislative system of the country functions
smoothly and effectively, without any undue interference or intimidation. Their needs can
be seen as follows:
To maintain the authority, dignity, and honour of the houses of the Parliament.
To protect the persons associated with Parliamentary functioning from any obstruction
in the discharge of their parliamentary responsibilities.
– They cannot be arrested during the session of Parliament, 40 days before the beginning and 40
days after the end of a session.
a. This privilege is available only in civil cases and not in criminal cases or preventive detention
cases.
– They have freedom of speech in Parliament. No member is liable to any proceedings in any court
for anything said or any vote given by him/her in Parliament or its committees.
a. This freedom is subject to the provisions of the Constitution and to the rules and standing orders
regulating the procedure of Parliament.
– They are exempted from jury service. They can refuse to give evidence and appear as a witness in
a case pending in a court when Parliament is in session.
– It has the right to publish its reports, debates, and proceedings and also the
right to prohibit others from publishing the same.
a. However, the 44th Amendment Act of 1978 restored the freedom of the
press to publish true reports of parliamentary proceedings without prior permission
of the House. But this is not applicable in the case of a secret sitting of the House.
– It can exclude strangers from its proceedings and hold secret sittings to discuss
some important matters.
– It can make rules to regulate its procedure and the conduct of its business and
to adjudicate upon such matters.
– It can punish members as well as outsiders for breach of its privileges or its
contempt by reprimand, admonition, or imprisonment (also suspension or
expulsion, in the case of members).
– It has the right to receive immediate information on the arrest, detention,
conviction, imprisonment, and release of a member.
– It can institute inquiries, order the attendance of witnesses, and send for relevant
papers and records.
– The courts are prohibited from inquiring into proceedings of a house or its
committees.
– No person, either a member or outsider, can be arrested, and no legal process,
civil or criminal, can be served within the precincts of the house, without the
permission of the Presiding Officer.
Originally, the original Constitution, under Article 105, explicitly mentioned two
Parliamentary Privileges:
With regard to other privileges, Article 105 provided that they were to be the same as
those of the British House of Commons, its committees, and its members on the date
of its commencement i.e. 26th January 1950, until defined by Parliament.
Later, the 44th Constitutional Amendment Act of 1978 provided that the other
privileges of each House of Parliament, its committees, and its members are to be
those which they have on the date of its commencement until defined by Parliament.
Thus, the Amendment has made only verbal changes by dropping a direct reference to
the British House of Commons, without making any change in the implication of the
provision.
The Indian Parliament has not yet made any special law to codify all the privileges
exhaustively. Thus, as of now, the position with respect to other privileges remains the
same as it was on the date of commencement of the Constitution.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
At present, the Parliamentary Privileges in India are based on the following five sources:
Constitutional provisions,
P.V. Narasimha Rao vs State (CBI/SPE) Case, 1998 – In this case, the Supreme
Court ruled that the lawmakers, who accepted bribes, could not be prosecuted for
corruption if they followed through with voting or speaking in the House as agreed.
Case Background:
o In the 1993 P V Narasimha Rao case, certain members (MPs) of
the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) were accused of accepting bribes
in exchange for voting against a No-Confidence motion.
o This case highlighted allegations of corruption within the parliamentary
system, raising concerns about the integrity of legislative processes and the
accountability of elected representatives.
Court’s Observation in 1998 Case:
o The Supreme Court's ruling in 1998 established immunity for MPs
(Members of Parliament) and Member of Legislative
Assembly (MLAs) from prosecution in bribery cases as long as they
fulfilled their end of the bargain.
The Supreme Court held that the bribe takers who cast their vote
against the no-confidence motion were immune from criminal
prosecution under Parliamentary Privilege (Article 105(2)).
o This decision underscored the importance of stability in governance and
the functioning of parliamentary democracy.
o The court's observation prioritised the smooth operation of the government
over individual accountability, suggesting that prosecuting lawmakers for
bribery could potentially disrupt the stability of the government.
State of Kerala Vs. K. Ajith and Others 2021 – The Supreme Court has observed
that parliamentary privileges and immunities are not gateways to claim exemptions
from the general law of the land which governs the action of every citizen.
Sita Soren Vs Union of India Case, 2024 – In this case, the Supreme
Court overturned its judgment in the P.V. Narasimha Rao vs State (CBI/SPE)
Case, 1998. The court said that the parliamentarians do not enjoy Parliamentary
Immunity for acts of bribery.
The 7-Judge Constitution Bench overturned the 5-Judge Bench verdict of P.V.
Narasimha Rao v. State Case, 1998.
o Wherein it was established that the Member of Parliaments and Member of
Legislative Assemblies enjoyed immunity if they cast vote in the House
after taking bribes for it.
The SC emphasised the detrimental impact of bribery on democratic
principles and governance.
The court highlighted that accepting a bribe is a separate criminal act, unrelated
to the core duties of lawmakers within the Parliament or legislative assembly.
o The Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, deals with ‘offence
relating to public servant being bribed’.
Therefore, the immunity provided under Articles 105 and 194 of the
Constitution does not extend to cases of bribery.
o This decision signifies a shift towards prioritising accountability and
integrity in governance over stability alone, aiming to uphold the ideals of
a responsible, responsive, and representative democracy in India.
Significance of Parliamentary Privileges
Parliamentary privileges in India are essential for the effective operation and autonomy of
the Parliament. They serve several key purposes:
Hinders Public Scrutiny – Critics argue that parliamentary privileges can sometimes
be used to shield proceedings from public scrutiny, potentially hiding misconduct or
decisions that should be transparent to the public.
Potential for Abuse – There is concern that the broad scope of these privileges can
lead to abuse, with members potentially using them to avoid legal accountability or to
suppress freedom of speech and press under the guise of protecting parliamentary
operations.
Loss of Flexibility – A rigid codified system could limit the parliament’s ability to
adapt to unique situations or emerging political challenges, as the flexibility inherent
in the current system allows for a dynamic response to unforeseen events.
Introduction
Censorship has been a highly debated topic for a long time ever since the inception of
visual acts. Thus, it has been commonly defined as an act or a mechanism that establishes
a system of restriction over public expression of ideas, opinions, and conceptions. The
main objective of censorship is to restore and control what kind of morals and values are
portrayed amongst the public at large as the portrayal of an idea or opinion which is
inconsistent with the social morals and norms have the capacity to incite violence as well
as the breeding of wrong ideals. The government controls various portals of media via
censorship.
The Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) executes this very objective of
censorship. This article will also deal with the role of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 and
the setting up of CBFC under it. The Cinematograph Act, 1952 was enacted by the
Parliament to ensure that films are exhibited in accordance with the limits of tolerance of
Indian society i.e. within the walls of Article 19(1)(a) and 19(2) of the Indian
Constitution.
DEFINITION
A law designed to establish guidelines for certifying movies for public screening and to
regulate the screening of films using cinematic equipment.
HISTORY
The Indian Cinematograph Act was put into effect in 1920, seven years subsequent to the
release of India’s first film, “Raja Harishchandra,” directed by Dadasaheb Phalke.
Initially, censorship boards operated as distinct entities under the supervision of police
chiefs in cities such as Madras (now Chennai), Bombay (now Mumbai), Calcutta (now
Kolkata), Lahore (now in Pakistan), and Rangoon (now Yangon in Myanmar). Following
India’s independence in 1947, these regional censor boards were amalgamated into the
Bombay Board of Film Censors. The enactment of the Cinematograph Act of 1952 led to
the restructuring of the Bombay Board, establishing the Central Board of Film Censors.
The CBFC is a statutory body which regulates the public exhibition of films in India
according to the provisions under the Cinematograph Act, 1952.
The Cinematograph Act of 1952 enshrines certain guidelines that tame the public
expression of ideas, opinions and imagination via films by filmmakers. Cinema has
opened up to new possibilities and debatable themes in the social and political arenas.
With the rapid technological advancement, it is easy to abuse the wonders of technology
and portray themes that are hurtful to social conformations.
The film censorship is technically a Colonial concept. Initially in British India silent films
were a source of private entertainment. However, with the passage of time cinema
became an Indian fancy. Thus, regulations had to be put on the exhibition of films. The
first Cinematograph bill was proposed in 1917 with the purpose of protecting public
morality from the exhibition of objectionable films.
It is interesting to note that the Indian legislative Council opposed the passage of such a
bill for the sake of liberty. Regardless, the colonial state approved the Cinematograph Act
in 1918. This Act came into effect from 1 August 1920 and it inaugurated the concept of
film censorship in India. The 1918 Act dealt with two issues:
A separate authority was set up; without the authority’s permission, no film could be
exhibited.
Post India’s independence in 1947, the new government felt the necessity to retain film
censorship. However, few amendments were made to the Cinematograph Act 1918 in
1949. Two categories of film certification were created, ‘A’ certificate for restricting
viewership to adults and ‘U’ certificate for an unrestricted exhibition. The 1949
amendment also provisioned for the setting up of a central censorship board instead of a
regional one. In 1951 the Central Board of Film Censor was formed by the Ministry of
Information and broadcasting.
Subsequently, a consolidated statute, the Cinematograph Act was enacted in 1952 which
empowered the central government authority to constitute a censorship board.
Formation of CBFC
The Central Board of Film Censors was renamed into the Central Board of Film
Certification on June 1, 1983. This board implements and follows the provisions under
the Cinematograph Act, 1952. The chairperson and other members are appointed by the
Central Government.
Board certifies films without which they are not eligible for public exhibition. Section
5B(1) of the CA, 1952 empowers the CBFC to examine and implement principles of
sovereignty and integrity of India while certifying a film. It also requires the board to
check works against the security of the States, friendly relations with foreign States etc.
Section 5B(2) lays down the principles to be followed by the CBFC while sanctioning
films. The guidelines require the CBFC to ensure that-
6. The CBFC must judge the film in its entirety and not from a one-track biased
perspective.
Board of CBFC
The actual statutory power to certify films lies with the Board of CBFC. The main CBFC
Board consists of a Chairman and other members 12 to 25 in the number who are
appointed by the Central Government1. It is interesting to note that there are no prescribed
minimum qualifications required to be a member of the CBFC as under the
Cinematograph Act. Tenure of members is also very flexible and no maximum or
minimum tenure is set. The tenure is in fact subjected to the pleasure of the Central
Government. The Central Government can terminate tenure whenever possible on
reasonable grounds. The chairman, however, holds office for a period of 3 years only. On
exception, the chairman continues until his successor is appointed.
The nine Regional Offices have a particular regional officer who supervises it. They are
situated at Kolkata, Bangalore, Chennai, Guwahati, Cuttack, Mumbai, Hyderabad, New
Delhi and Thiruvananthapuram.
The provisions of the Cinematograph Act, 1952, determines whether a film is fit for
public exhibition or not. The CBFC must satisfy this question on the basis of a few
parameters while certifying a film. There are 4 categories under which the CBFC can
classify and certify a film or even may not sanction the film at all. The CBFC has the
liberty of reasonable discretion.
1. S- (special) for public exhibition restricted to members of any profession or any class
of persons
3. A-(adult) for public exhibition restricted to adults only (persons who have attained
majority, completing their 18 years of age)
4. U/A- for unrestricted public exhibition with an endorsement of caution to the parents
or guardians of children below 12 years of age.
1
Entry 60 of the Union List reads, "Sanctioning of cinematograph films for exhibition. "In the Assembly,
Ambedkar explained that the purpose of inserting this item in the Union List was to ensure" a uniform
standard" of censorship and to protect producers whose films "may not be sanctioned by any particular
province by reason of some idiosyncrasy. "The Cinematograph (Amendment) Act of 1949 made two changes to
the Act of 1918. First, the regional Boards were replaced by the Central Board of Film Censors (Central Censor
Board), a censorship authority headquartered in Bombay. 5 Second, the British practice of issuing "U" and "A"
certificates was adopted
Under the provisions of the Act, just like the Board can decide to not certify a certain film
or even disapprove a particular scene of the film; it is competent enough to even order the
deletion of a film in its entirety or a particular scene. Sometimes the Censor Board take
steps to assess the reactions of the public in order to determine whether the principles on
the basis of which films are certified need any change or not. There are provisions under
the CA, 1952 that empower the CBFC to:
1. hold symposia or seminars of film critics, community leaders, film writers and any
other relevant person engaged in the film industry.
The FCAT considers appeals from applicants who have been harmed by a Central
Board of Film Certification order (CBFC).
An aggrieved party has 30 days from the date of the CBFC order to submit an appeal.
The Chairman of the FCAT is usually a retired Supreme Court judge. He or she is
aided by other Tribunal members.
To bring about uniformity in the categorisation of films and content across platforms.
The certification once given will be perpetual rather than the 10 years limit as of now.
It will make the act provisions in line with the provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir
Reorganisation Act, 2019 to maintain uniformity.
It will classify films on the basis of age group instead of rating them “U” (unrestricted
public exhibition), “A” (restricted to adult audiences), and “UA” (unrestricted public
exhibition subject to parental guidance for children below the age of 12).
Added new categories – ‘UA-7+’, ‘UA-13+’, and ‘UA-16+’ in place for 12 years.
In addition to imprisonment, an offender shall also be liable to a fine not less than ₹3
lakh but which may extend to 5 percent of the audited gross production cost.
However, certain “fair use” exemptions enumerated in the Copyright Act, 1957 will
apply to the two offences, implying that unauthorised exhibition of films can be
allowed for private use, reporting of current affairs, or for the purpose of critique or
where the copyright owner has consented.
With such provisions, the Bill attempts to bring the Cinematograph Act into line with
existing laws that cover piracy or aspects incidental to it, namely the Copyright Act
and the Information Technology Act, 2000.
Re-certification- Currently, films certified ‘A’ are prohibited from exhibition on television.
According to the amended provision, anyone willing to exhibit a film “or such other
media as may be prescribed” certified ‘A’, may make an application to the CBFC,
which may issue a new certificate to the film.
While re-certifying a film, the board may direct the applicant to carry out “such
excisions or modifications in the film as it may think fit”.
Duration of certificate- The 1952 Act provided for a certification granted by the CBFC
to an applicant to be valid for a period of 10 (ten) years. Under the Amendment Act, that
validity period of 10 (ten) years has now been extended to perpetuity.
Judicial Pronouncements
The petitioner, K. A. Abbas, was a journalist, playwright, author, as well as a film maker
who was GD Khosla Film Censorship Committee's member established in 1969 and who
directed This film called 'A Tale of Four Cities', popularly regarded as "Chaar Sheher Ek
Kahani," Which depicted the conflicting manner of living of some portion of people
which depicted the conflicting manner of living of some portion of people belonging to
those Four metropolitan cities in contrast to the sumptuous lives of them, including
Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, and Delhi at a later period.
The petitioner wanted the 'U' certificate, which means unrestricted permission for every
Group and class of society to watch the movie, which was in disagreement with the
Central Board of Film Certification's notion. The contrasting opinion between the
petitioner and the Board seismically quivered the Indian judiciary's contentions about the
attenuation of the Right to freedom of expression by pre-censorship involvement in this
contentious film release.
Main issue: The case centered on whether pre-censorship of films was constitutional
and whether it violated the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under
Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution.
Judgment: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of film censorship in India.
However, it also laid down important guidelines for censorship.
Reasoning: The court recognized that films were a powerful medium that could
influence thoughts and actions more deeply than other forms of art. Therefore, some form
of prior restra
Guidelines: The court emphasized that censorship should not be exercised in a way
that muzzles creative expression. It should be reasonable and in line with the principles
laid down in Article 19(2) of the Constitution, which allows for reasonable restrictions on
free speech.
Bandit Queen (1994)- Bobby Art International v. Om Pal Singh Hoon & Ors (1996)
4 SCC 1. (see here)
The Bobby Art International, a film production company, in 1994, made a film
called Bandit Queen based on the true story of a well-known bandit- Phoolan Devi
('Devi'). The film narrated the instances of gang rape, brutality and violence suffered by
Devi.
The film contained some explicit scenes of gang rape and frontal nudity and therefore, the
Board agreed to grant Adult only (A) certificate to the film on the condition that all scenes
depicting nudity, r
ape, any form of violence or indecency would be deleted or modified. after the case
reached the appellate tribunal which held that such scenes are permissible and
granted 'A' certificate to the film without any deletion or modification.
Thereafter, a member of a specific community filed a petition in the Delhi High Court
challenging the exhibition of the film on the ground that it depicted the protagonist in an
abhorrent and questionable manner and degraded the status of womanhood in India.
Besides, he contended that his rights under Article 14, 19 and 21 have been infringed.
The Delhi High Court, in Bobby Art International v. Om Pal Singh Hoon & Ors., (1996) 4
SCC 1, 13. subsequently while holding that, the scene of violent rape was disgusting and
revolting and it denigrated and degraded women and that the scenes of nudity were
indecent, ordered the Board to grant A certificate to the film only after the required
modifications and deletions.
The petitioner preferred an appeal against this judgment in the Hon'ble Supreme Court
which set aside the judgment of the Delhi High Court and held that the scenes depicting
frontal nudity, indecency or even immorality were an important artistic expression (in the
present case) for narrating the true story of Devi and that the producer's right guaranteed
under Article 19(1)(a) cannot be restricted only because it poses threat to the moral
system of the society.
Relevant Section: Section 5A: The applicant for the certificate to whom the rights in the
film have passed shall not be liable for punishment under any law relating to obscenity in
respect of any matter contained in the film for which certificate has been granted.
Summary Judgment:
Facts: The complainant alleged that the film Satyam Shivam Sundaram was fascinating,
misleadingly foul and beguiled the guideless into degeneracy and that obscenity,
indecency and vice were writ large on the picture, constituting an offence. The Magistrate
after examining some witnesses took cognizance of the offence and issued notice to the
appellant-producer of the film. Thereupon the appellant moved the High Court on the
score that the criminal proceeding was an abuse of the judicial process and that no
prosecution could be legally sustained as the film had been duly certified for public show
by the Central Board of Film Censors. The High Court however dismissed the petition
and so appeal present.
Held: The Supreme Court held that a certificate issued under Section 5A of the
Cinematograph Act amounts to a justification in law for public exhibition of a film and
the initiation of criminal processes for obscenity is not sustainable if the film has been
passed by the censor board. However, the court also maintained that the bar is not
absolute, and the filmmaker has to participate in the legal proceedings and claim the
safeguard
Relevant Section: Section 5E: The Central Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette suspend a certificate granted to the film if it was being exhibited in a
form other than the one in which it was certified.
Key Issue: Whether the suit filed against the Defendant for breach of contract, invasion
to right of privacy, tort of defamation and malicious falsehood is justified?
Summary Judgment:
Facts: A film, titled ‘Ek Chhoti Si Love Story’ was the subject matter of dispute. The
story of the film was about an adolescent boy who was obsessed with a girl who was 26
years old and shared an intimate relationship with a man. Plaintiff, an actress, played a
central character in the film. The Defendant was the Director of the film. The film had
been cleared by the Censor Board with ‘A’ certificate. Plaintiff had acted throughout the
movie except for the four scenes, which were enacted by a double and to which the
Plaintiff has objected as being vulgar and obscene. Thereafter a letter was addressed by
Defendant to the Plaintiff in regards to the film, informing, that portions of the film has
been shot by a duplicate, which involves a certain level of physical exposure, stating that
If she has any objection to any particular section, they stand to replace it with alternate
shots. Therefore, Plaintiff filed this suit against the Defendant for breach of contract,
invasion to right of privacy, tort of defamation and malicious falsehood.
Held: Firstly, it is apparent that there was a story board and the Plaintiff was aware that
the film was sensitive and would require certain degree of exposure. There is no material
before the court to establish as a term of contract and the letter does not amount to a
binding contract and only serves as intimation that the scenes shot with the double, if
objected to would be replaced by alternate shots, which has been done with Defendant
and on other hand the fact that the Plaintiff has agreed to act in the film after being aware
of the theme, the same would not amount to a case of defamation. In the same what is
sought to be contended is that the scenes involving the film artist would result in an action
of malicious injurious falsehood by associating the Plaintiff with the scenes which she
had not enacted. It is difficult for this court to appreciate on the facts of this case that the
Defendant is liable for malicious falsehood. However, the scenes of which objection is
taken do not involve the Plaintiff’s presence, therefore the court came to the conclusion
that the tort of defamation is not proved, it will be difficult to hold that there is an
invasion of the Plaintiff’s right to privacy.
CASE STUDIES
Film Synopsis: "Shadows of War" is a gritty war drama set during a fictional modern
conflict. The film contains intense battle scenes, depictions of war crimes, and explores
themes of PTSD among soldiers. It also includes scenes of substance abuse and brief
nudity in a non-sexual context.
Analysis:
1. Violence: The film contains graphic depictions of warfare and its consequences.
2. Mature themes: It deals with complex issues like war crimes and mental health.
3. Substance abuse: There are scenes showing characters using drugs and alcohol to
cope with trauma.
Principles involved:
Reasoning: Due to the intense violence, mature themes, substance abuse, and nudity, this
film would likely receive an "A" certification. The content is deemed too strong for
younger viewers but has artistic and social merit for adult audiences.
Analysis:
1. Themes: The film deals with family dynamics and cultural shifts, which are relatable
but may require some maturity to fully appreciate.
3. Substance use: Social drinking is depicted, but not glorified or shown excessively.
4. Conflicts: The interpersonal conflicts are mostly verbal and do not escalate to
violence.
Principles involved:
Age-appropriate content
Cultural relevance and social commentary
Reasoning: While the content is not inappropriate for most audiences, the themes and
some elements (like social drinking and mild language) may require parental guidance for
younger viewers. The "U/A" certification allows for a wider audience while still alerting
parents to potential concerns.
Film Synopsis: "The Last Protest" is a political drama that depicts a fictionalized account
of student protests against government policies. The film contains scenes of police
brutality, political speeches with strong language, and a subplot involving a love story
between two student leaders from different religious backgrounds. There are also scenes
of mob violence and a climactic sequence where a main character self-immolates in
protest.
Analysis:
1. Political content: The film portrays sensitive political issues and criticizes government
actions.
3. Strong language: Political speeches and heated debates contain strong language.
4. Sensitive social issues: The interfaith romance subplot touches on religious tensions.
5. Disturbing imagery: The self-immolation scene is graphically depicted.
1. Political content: The CBFC has previously allowed political criticism in films like
"Gulaal" (2009) and "Shanghai" (2012), certifying them as "A".
2. Violence depiction: In the case of "Udta Punjab" (2016), the Bombay High Court
overruled excessive CBFC cuts, stating that the depiction of social reality shouldn't be
curtailed.
3. Interfaith relationships: Films like "Kedarnath" (2018) with interfaith romances have
been certified, though they often face controversy.
4. Suicide depiction: The CBFC generally requires cautionary notes for scenes depicting
suicide, as seen in "Chhichhore" (2019).
Reasoning: Given the intense political themes, violence, and disturbing imagery, this film
would likely receive an "A" certification. The CBFC would likely require a disclaimer
about the fictional nature of the events and a warning about the graphic content.
Analysis:
1. Social issues: The film deals with contemporary social changes that may be
considered controversial.
2. LGBTQ+ content: There are open discussions about LGBTQ+ rights and footage
from pride events.
3. Sexual health: The film includes educational content about sexual health.
4. Family issues: Changing family dynamics, including divorce, are discussed.
2. Sexual health education: The CBFC has generally been more lenient with educational
content. For instance, "PadMan" (2018), which dealt with menstrual hygiene, received
a "U/A" certification.
3. Social documentaries: Films like "India's Daughter" (2015) faced initial bans but were
later allowed with appropriate certifications, showing a trend towards allowing social
commentary.
4. Balanced perspective: The CBFC often looks favorably on content that presents
multiple viewpoints on sensitive issues.
Reasoning: While the topics are mature, the educational and social awareness nature of
the content aligns with films that have received "U/A" certifications in recent years. The
lack of explicit content and the documentary style would likely prevent an "A" rating, but
the mature themes necessitate parental guidance for younger viewers.
4. The educational value of the content, especially in the case of the documentary.
These case studies reflect the evolving nature of film certification in India, where there's a
growing trend towards allowing more diverse and challenging content, especially when it
has social or educational value. However, the CBFC still maintains a cautious approach to
ensure that potentially sensitive content is viewed by appropriate audiences.
Criminal Contempt of Court
Article 129 of the Constitution, makes the Supreme Court “a court of record” and confers
power to punish for contempt of itself. Whereas, Article 142 empowers the Court to provide
punishment for contempt, subject to any other law made in this behalf by the Parliament.
Similar powers have been vested in the High Court by the virtue of Article 215 which makes
the High Court “a court of record”, implying that only Supreme Court and High Courts are
empowered to adjudicate criminal contempt proceedings.
Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 specifically empowers the High Courts to
punish contempt of subordinate courts. Similarly, Section 15(2) says even in the case of
criminal contempt of subordinate court, proceedings for contempt are to be initiated by the
High Court on a reference made to it by the subordinate court or on a motion made by the
Advocate-General (or Law officer in cases of Union Territory). It is pertinent to mention here,
High Court, for the purpose of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 would include the Court of
Judicial Commissioner.
The rational of criminal contempt
The object or jurisprudence of contempt of court is to safeguard the interest of the public, which
would be adversely affected, if the authority of the court is degraded or denigrated and public
confidence in the administration of justice is weakened. The object is not to shield judges from
imputation or criticism but to protect the confidence of people. Because common people of
India having great faith in judiciary and it must be protected at any cost.
It is true that freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution
is one of the most precious liberties in democracy. But equally important is the maintenance of
respect for judicial independence which alone would protect the life, liberty and reputation of
its citizen. So on the basis of national interest it can be said that that the criticism of the judiciary
must be measured on the basis of following.
Innocent publication: Section 3 of Contempt of Court,1971, shows that immunity attaches to
certain statements or certain matter which may interfere or tend to interfere or obstruct or tend
to obstruct the course of justice in connection with any civil or criminal proceedings pending
at the time of the publication. However, if the persons so publishing had at the time of its
publication no reasonable grounds for believing that the proceeding was pending, the
publication is described by this section as “innocent”, Prabhakar Laxman Mokashi v.
Sadanand Trimbak Yardi, 1973 SCC Bom 79.
2) Fair and Accurate Report of Judicial Proceeding – Section 4 states that a person shall not
be guilty of contempt of court for publishing a fair and accurate report of a judicial proceeding
or any stage thereof.
Section 7 refers to leakage of information whereas Section 4 refers to reporting of court
proceedings. Leakage defeats very purpose of hearing in chambers or in camera, Sahara India
Real Estate Corp. Ltd. v. SEBI, (2012) 10 SCC 603
3) Fair Criticism – Section 5 Kunal Kamra wrote in his defence, “…constitutional offices −
including judicial offices − know no protection from jokes. I do not believe that any high
authority, including judges, would find themselves unable to discharge their duties only on
account of being the subject of satire or comedy.” What he was willing to imply by this defence
was public accountability of judges.
It is the privileged right of the Indian citizen to believe what he considers to be true and to
speak out his mind, though not, perhaps, always with the best of tastes; and speak, perhaps,
with greatest courage than care for exactitude. Judiciary is not exempt from such criticism. But
there is no justification to resort to this freedom and privilege to criticise the proceedings during
their pendency by persons who are parities and participants. Sheela Barse v. Union of
India, (1988) 4 SCC 226
Complaint against Presiding Officer – Section 6
A person shall not be guilty of contempt of court in respect of any statement made by him in
good faith concerning the presiding officer of any subordinate court to—
1. Chairperson:
The Chairperson is usually a retired judge of the Supreme Court, nominated by a
committee that includes the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, the Chairman of the Rajya
Sabha, and a representative of the PCI.
2. Members:
The Council consists of 28 members, including:
o 20 members from the press: Representing editors, journalists, and proprietors of
newspapers.
o 5 members from the legislature: Nominated by the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha.
o 3 members from other fields: Representing legal, educational, and cultural domains.
The Press Council has both advisory and quasi-judicial functions. Its key functions and
powers include:
The Press Council Act, 1978, has played a pivotal role in maintaining the integrity and
independence of the Indian press. By promoting ethical journalism and addressing
grievances, the PCI has helped balance press freedom with accountability. However, its
limited jurisdiction and lack of enforcement powers highlight the need for reforms, especially
in the digital age, where media dynamics have evolved significantly.
Introduction to Advertisement
1. Misleading Advertisements:
False claims regarding products and services continue to mislead consumers.
2. Digital Media Regulation:
The growing influence of social media and influencer marketing lacks comprehensive
legal oversight.
3. Targeting Vulnerable Groups:
Advertisements often exploit children, the elderly, and uneducated consumers by
exaggerating benefits or omitting risks.
4. Ethical Concerns:
Objectification, stereotyping, and promotion of harmful products remain contentious
issues.
Recent Developments
The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) was established under the Telecom
Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997, to regulate the telecommunications sector in
India. It functions as an independent statutory body to ensure orderly growth, fair
competition, and consumer protection in the telecom and broadcasting sectors.
Functions of TRAI
TRAI performs regulatory, advisory, and judicial functions to maintain transparency and
efficiency in the telecom and broadcasting industries. These functions can be categorized as
follows:
1. Regulatory Functions
TRAI is responsible for framing policies and rules for the smooth functioning of telecom
services:
Tariff Regulation:
o Decides tariffs for telecom and broadcasting services to ensure affordability and fair
competition.
o Ensures that prices are reasonable, especially for essential services like mobile calls
and internet.
Licensing Recommendations:
o Advises the Central Government on granting, renewing, and revoking licenses for
telecom service providers.
Interconnection Regulation:
o Sets guidelines for interconnectivity between service providers to ensure seamless
communication and avoid disputes.
Spectrum Management:
o Recommends measures for efficient use of the spectrum, including auction and
pricing mechanisms.
Quality of Service (QoS):
o Establishes benchmarks for service quality and monitors compliance to ensure
consumer satisfaction.
o Imposes penalties on service providers failing to meet QoS standards.
Broadcasting and Cable Services:
o Regulates content, tariffs, and technical standards for broadcasting services,
including cable TV and direct-to-home (DTH) services.
2. Advisory Functions
TRAI advises the government on policy and administrative matters related to telecom and
broadcasting:
Policy Formulation:
o Provides recommendations for new telecom policies and amendments to existing
ones.
Technological Advancements:
o Advises on adopting and promoting advanced technologies like 5G, broadband
expansion, and internet penetration.
Rural and Remote Access:
o Suggests policies to ensure affordable and reliable telecom services in rural and
underserved areas.
Consumer Protection Measures:
o Offers suggestions to improve grievance redressal mechanisms and protect
consumers from unfair trade practices.
Redressal of Complaints:
o Monitors the complaint-handling systems of service providers and ensures they
comply with TRAI’s directives.
Prevention of Unfair Practices:
o Issues regulations to prevent practices like hidden charges, misleading
advertisements, and abrupt tariff changes.
Awareness Campaigns:
o Educates consumers about their rights, service options, and grievance redressal
mechanisms through public awareness programs.
4. Developmental Functions
Encouraging Competition:
o Formulates rules to prevent monopolistic practices and ensure a level playing field
for all operators.
Infrastructure Development:
o Advocates for the establishment of infrastructure like telecom towers, fiber
networks, and broadband services.
Promoting Digital Inclusion:
o Encourages digital literacy and works toward increasing internet penetration across
all demographics.
5. Judicial and Dispute Resolution Functions
Adjudication of Disputes:
TRAI resolves disputes among service providers regarding interconnection, revenue
sharing, and spectrum allocation.
Enforcement of Rules:
It has the authority to penalize operators for violations of regulatory norms and
policies.
Grievance Redressal:
Although TRAI does not directly handle consumer grievances, it ensures service
providers have an effective grievance redressal mechanism.
Monitoring Compliance:
o Tracks the performance of service providers against set benchmarks.
Data Collection and Analysis:
o Collects industry data to study market trends, consumer behavior, and the impact of
regulations.
Publishing Reports:
o Releases periodic reports on industry performance, service quality, and policy
impact.
The Act outlines several key responsibilities for cable operators, which include technical,
operational, and ethical obligations:
1. Registration Requirements
Mandatory Registration:
o Every cable operator must be registered with the Postmaster General of the region
to operate legally.
o Unauthorized operation of cable networks is strictly prohibited under the Act.
Renewal and Validity:
o The operator must ensure timely renewal of registration and compliance with all
related requirements.
4. Prohibition on Piracy
Mandatory Digitalization:
o Operators are required to provide set-top boxes for digital transmission, ensuring
better signal quality and allowing subscribers to access only the channels they pay
for.
o They must offer transparency in pricing and not compel consumers to purchase
unnecessary services.
8. Transparency in Pricing
Publishing Tariffs:
o Cable operators must disclose all tariffs, including subscription charges and channel
pricing, as mandated by TRAI.
o Hidden charges or non-transparent billing practices are prohibited.
Program Logs:
o Operators must maintain a log of all transmitted programs for a specified period,
which can be inspected by the licensing authority.
Subscriber Data:
o They must maintain accurate subscriber records and submit periodic reports to
regulatory authorities.
Non-compliance with the provisions of the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act,
1995, attracts penalties, including:
1. Fines:
Monetary penalties for minor violations.
2. Imprisonment:
For grave offenses such as unauthorized broadcasting or airing prohibited content,
operators may face imprisonment up to 2 years.
3. Cancellation of Registration:
Persistent non-compliance can result in the suspension or cancellation of the
operator's registration.
The Act indirectly encourages whistleblowing by allowing citizens to expose corruption and
misuse of public resources.
The RTI Act recognizes that not all information can be disclosed due to concerns about
national security, privacy, and other sensitive matters. These exemptions are detailed in
Section 8 and Section 9 of the Act.
Disclosure of commercial or trade secrets that harm the competitive position of a third party
is exempt.
Example: Proprietary information of a government contractor.
Information that relates to personal matters and has no public interest in disclosure.
Example: Medical records or tax returns of individuals, unless required in the public interest.
Cabinet papers, including deliberations of ministers and secretaries, are exempt until the
decision is made public.
Example: Budget deliberations before the official announcement.
Certain agencies like RAW, IB, and CBI are excluded unless information pertains to corruption
or human rights violations.
Balancing these rights is essential to ensure that one person's freedom of expression does not
unjustifiably infringe on another's right to privacy.
1. Foundation of Democracy:
o Freedom of speech and expression is the cornerstone of democracy, enabling
individuals to express opinions, dissent, and ideas.
2. Reasonable Restrictions (Article 19(2)):
o This freedom is not absolute and can be curtailed under specific circumstances,
including:
National security.
Public order.
Decency and morality.
Defamation or contempt of court.
3. Impact on Privacy:
o Exercising freedom of speech can sometimes encroach on an individual's right to
privacy, such as in cases of media coverage, public disclosures, or surveillance.
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of criminal defamation laws, recognizing the need to
balance free speech with an individual’s right to reputation, a component of privacy.
The Court struck down Section 66A of the IT Act, which curbed online speech but
emphasized the need to balance free expression with protection against harassment and
privacy breaches.
1. Legislative Measures:
o Enacting comprehensive data protection laws to regulate the collection, storage, and
use of personal data.
o The proposed Data Protection Bill seeks to ensure that privacy is upheld while
allowing reasonable restrictions for public purposes.
2. Ethical Journalism and Media Accountability:
o Media must adhere to ethical guidelines, balancing investigative reporting with
respect for personal privacy.
3. Consent-Based Data Sharing:
o Individuals should have greater control over how their personal data is used or
shared.
4. Strengthening Cyber Laws:
o Laws addressing cyberstalking, doxing, and privacy breaches on digital platforms
must be enforced robustly.
5. Proportionality in Restrictions:
o Any restriction on free speech or privacy must be proportionate, ensuring that
neither right is disproportionately curtailed.
Principles of CBFC
The Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) operates on certain guiding principles to
balance artistic expression with public sensibilities. These principles, outlined under the Act,
include:
1. Respect for Sovereignty and Integrity of India:
o Films must not contain content that questions the sovereignty, unity, or security of
the nation.
2. Prevention of Hate Speech:
o Content that promotes communal hatred or disrupts religious harmony is prohibited.
3. Prohibition of Obscenity:
o Films must avoid excessive obscenity, vulgarity, or content degrading to women.
4. Protection of Public Morality and Decency:
o Content that offends public sensibilities or promotes indecency is not permitted.
5. Avoidance of Glorification of Crime or Violence:
o Depiction of violence, drug abuse, or criminal activities must not glorify such actions
or corrupt public minds.
6. Encouragement of Creativity:
o While maintaining public order, the CBFC encourages artistic and cultural expression.
7. Suitability for Audiences:
o The certification process ensures content is appropriate for the age group for which
it is intended.
Categories of Certification
Under the Cinematograph Act, films are classified into four categories based on content
suitability:
1. U (Universal):
o Suitable for all age groups.
o Content avoids violence, nudity, or distressing themes.
2. U/A (Parental Guidance):
o Suitable for children above 12 years, but parental guidance is advised.
o May contain mild violence or themes requiring adult supervision.
3. A (Adults Only):
o Restricted to viewers aged 18 and above.
o May include mature themes, strong language, or explicit content.
4. S (Special Audience):
o Restricted to specific professionals or groups, such as doctors or scientists, for
educational or professional purposes.
1. Submission of Application:
o Filmmakers submit an application along with the film to the CBFC.
2. Formation of Examining Committee:
o An examining committee, consisting of a chairperson and members, previews the
film.
3. Screening for Certification:
o The committee evaluates the film against the principles mentioned in the Act.
4. Recommendations by the Committee:
o The committee may recommend:
Certification under one of the categories (U, U/A, A, or S).
Cuts, modifications, or disclaimers in specific scenes.
Denial of certification for films violating legal or ethical boundaries.
5. Grant of Certificate:
o After compliance with suggested edits, the certificate is granted.
6. Appeals Process:
o Filmmakers dissatisfied with the decision can appeal to the Film Certification
Appellate Tribunal (FCAT) or approach the judiciary.
Case Studies
Issue:
o The film, centered on drug abuse in Punjab, faced 89 suggested cuts, including the
removal of abusive language and state references.
Outcome:
o The Bombay High Court intervened, upholding creative freedom and reducing the
number of cuts to one. The film was certified as A with minimal changes.
Significance:
o Highlighted the judiciary's role in balancing censorship and artistic freedom.
2. Padmaavat (2018):
Issue:
o Historical inaccuracies and perceived disrespect to Rajput heritage led to public
protests and demands for a ban.
Outcome:
o CBFC suggested changes, including a disclaimer emphasizing the film's fictional
nature. Certified as U/A post-edits.
Significance:
o Demonstrated how sensitive historical or cultural subjects require nuanced handling.
Issue:
o Explicit scenes depicting sexual violence and strong language sparked controversy.
Outcome:
o The Supreme Court upheld the certification, recognizing the film's social relevance
and intent to highlight oppression. Certified as A.
Significance:
o Established a precedent for allowing bold content in films with a significant social
message.
1. Subjectivity in Certification:
o Decisions are often influenced by personal or political biases.
2. Balancing Freedom and Sensitivity:
o Difficulties arise in reconciling creative freedom with societal norms and legal
restrictions.
3. Overreach of Censorship:
o Filmmakers often argue that the CBFC's role should be limited to certification, not
censorship.