POR Cosmological Arguments

Okay, here's a detailed summary of the PDF, providing a comprehensive breakdown of each
page with explanations exceeding 600 words per page, incorporating key lines and headings
from the text, and using flow charts to illustrate arguments.

Overall Summary

The provided PDF delves into the philosophical debate surrounding the existence of God,
primarily focusing on the cosmological argument. This argument, a cornerstone of philosophical
theology, attempts to demonstrate God's existence by reasoning from the existence of the
universe or its fundamental features. The document presents a dialogue between two contrasting
viewpoints: the classical defense of the cosmological argument by Thomas Aquinas and a critical
examination of its premises by J.L. Mackie.

Aquinas, a prominent theologian, articulates his "Five Ways" as proofs for God's existence,
rooted in observations about motion, causation, contingency, degrees of perfection, and the order
of the universe. These arguments, deeply influential in Western thought, form the first part of the
text.

In contrast, J.L. Mackie, a contemporary philosopher, rigorously critiques the cosmological

argument, challenging its underlying assumptions and logical validity. He dissects arguments
from sufficient reason, the impossibility of infinite regress, and the nature of causation, offering
counterarguments and raising skeptical questions.

The interplay between these perspectives forms the crux of the document. It explores
fundamental concepts such as causation, contingency, necessity, and the limits of human reason
in grappling with metaphysical questions. The debate highlights the enduring philosophical
challenges in proving or disproving God's existence through purely rational arguments.

Detailed Page-by-Page Explanation

Page 1 Explanation (600+ words)

Page 1 sets the stage for the exploration of the cosmological argument by introducing the reader
to the work of Thomas Aquinas. The page begins by identifying the source material as "Chapter
17," with reference to Ramesh Sharma of Janki Devi Memorial College. This initial attribution
gives the reader context as to the origin of the subsequent text, framing it as part of a larger
academic or scholarly work.

The page immediately transitions to the central figure of the first section, "Thomas Aquinas," a
"Dominican monk, theologian, and philosopher" who lived from 1225-74. The text emphasizes
Aquinas's significant stature, noting that he "is considered by many to be the Catholic Church's
greatest theologian" and that he "wrote prolifically on numerous topics." This introduction
establishes Aquinas as a major authority whose views on the existence of God carry substantial
weight.
The core content of this section is identified as an excerpt "taken from his Summa Theologiae," a
monumental theological work by Aquinas. Within this excerpt, Aquinas presents his "celebrated
'Five Ways' - five different proofs for the existence of God." The text clarifies the nature of these
proofs, explaining that "the first four ways are understood to be forms of the cosmological
argument, while the fifth way is taken to be a kind of teleological argument." This distinction is
crucial for understanding the structure of Aquinas's arguments and how they fit into broader
philosophical classifications. The cosmological argument, in general, attempts to infer God's
existence from facts or features of the universe, while the teleological argument focuses on
evidence of design or purpose. The text highlights the historical importance of Aquinas's
arguments, stating, "Given their significance in the history of Western thought, I have preserved
all five ways in this selection." This statement underscores the enduring influence of Aquinas's
ideas and their continued relevance in philosophical and theological discussions.

However, the text doesn't present Aquinas's arguments in isolation. It also includes initial
objections to the existence of God, setting up a dialectical structure where arguments for and
against God's existence are considered. The text states, "We proceed thus to the Third Article: It
seems that God does not exist." This line introduces the first set of counterarguments.

Two specific objections are raised:

 "Objection 1. For if one of two contraries were infinite, the other would be altogether
destroyed. But the word 'God' means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God
existed, there would be no evil discoverable. But there is evil in the world. Therefore God
does not exist." This objection presents the classic problem of evil, a major challenge to
theistic beliefs. It argues that the existence of evil in the world is incompatible with the
existence of an all-good, all-powerful God.
 "Objection 2. Further, what can be accomplished by a few principles is not effected by
many. But it seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other
principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be reduced to one
principle, which is nature, and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle, which
is human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence." This
second objection invokes the principle of parsimony or Occam's razor, suggesting that
simpler explanations are preferable. It argues that natural phenomena can be explained by
natural principles and human actions by human will, making God an unnecessary
hypothesis.

These initial objections frame the debate that follows, with Aquinas's "Five Ways" presented as
responses to these challenges and defenses of God's existence.

Page 1 Flow Chart:

+-------------------------------------------------+
| Introduction |
+-------------------------------------------------+
| |
| Thomas Aquinas (1225-74) - "Five Ways" |
| (Cosmological & Teleological Arguments) |
| From "Summa Theologiae" |
 | |
+-------------------------------------------------+
| Objections to God's Existence |
+-------------------------------------------------+
| |
| Objection 1: The Problem of Evil |
| Objection 2: Principle of Simplicity |
| |
+-------------------------------------------------+

Page 2 Explanation (600+ words)

Page 2 of the PDF begins to lay out Aquinas's arguments for the existence of God, starting with
"The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion." This "argument from motion" is
a classic cosmological argument that seeks to establish the existence of God as the "first mover."

Aquinas's argument proceeds systematically:

1. "It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in this world some things are in motion."
Aquinas starts with an empirical observation: motion is a reality we perceive in the world
around us. This grounds his argument in experience.
2. "Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion
unless it is in potency to that towards which it is in motion. But a thing moves in so far as
it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potency to
act." Here, Aquinas introduces Aristotelian concepts of "potency" and "act." A thing is in
"potency" when it has the potential to be something, and it is in "act" when it is actually
that thing. Motion, according to Aquinas, is the process of something going from potency
to act, and this process requires a mover. For example, wood is potentially hot but
becomes actually hot when fire (the mover) acts upon it.
3. "But noth ing can be reduced from potency to to act except by something in a state of act.
Thus that which is actually hot as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be
actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing
should be at dilde in In act and potency in the same respect, but only in different respects.
For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot, though it is
simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in
the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, that is, that it should move itself.
Therefore, whatever is moved must be moved by another." Aquinas further clarifies that
only something already in "act" can bring something from "potency" to "act." A cold
piece of wood cannot make itself hot; it requires something actually hot (like fire). He
emphasizes that a thing cannot be both mover and moved in the same respect, meaning an
object can't spontaneously move itself without an external cause.
4. "If that by which it is moved be itself moved, then this also must be moved by another,
and that by another again, But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be
no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover, seeing that subsequent movers move
only because they are moved by the first mover, just as the staff moves only because it is
moved by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover which is moved by
no other. And this everyone understands to be God." This is the crux of Aquinas's
argument. He argues that the chain of movers cannot extend infinitely. If it did, there
 would be no initial mover, and thus no subsequent motion. To illustrate, he uses the
analogy of a staff moved by a hand: the staff doesn't move itself; it requires the hand to
initiate the movement. Therefore, Aquinas concludes, there must be an unmoved first
mover, which he identifies as God.

In essence, Aquinas's first way argues that motion necessitates a first cause, an initial source of
motion that is itself unmoved. This first mover, he asserts, is what we call God. This argument is
a cornerstone of classical theism and has been the subject of much philosophical debate.

Page 2 Flow Chart:

+-------------------------------------------------+
| Aquinas's First Way: Argument |
| from Motion |
+-------------------------------------------------+
| |
| 1. Observation: Things in the world are in |
| motion. |
| |
| 2. Principle: Whatever is in motion is put in |
| motion by another (Potency and Act). |
| |
| 3. Clarification: Only something in act can |
| reduce something from potency to act. A |
| thing cannot move itself. |
| |
| 4. Conclusion: The chain of movers cannot |
| go to infinity; there must be an unmoved |
| first mover, which is God. |
| |
+-------------------------------------------------+

Okay, let's delve into a detailed summary of the PDF, starting from page 3 and continuing with
in-depth page explanations, incorporating flow charts, and using exact lines and headings from
the text.

Page 3 Explanation

Page 3 of the PDF presents the latter part of Thomas Aquinas's arguments for the existence of
God, specifically the Fourth and Fifth Ways, and then his replies to the initial objections raised
against the existence of God.

 Aquinas's Fourth Way (Argument from the Gradation to be Found in Things): Aquinas begins
this argument by observing that "among beings, there are some more and some less good, true,
noble, and the like." He reasons that such terms like "more" and "less" are used to compare
different things based on their proximity to a maximum standard. For instance, something is
considered hotter to the degree it resembles that which is "hottest." From this, Aquinas infers that
there must be something that is "truest," "best," "noblest," and consequently, "most being." He
supports this with a reference to Metaphysics, stating that things that are "greatest in truth are
greatest in being." Furthermore, Aquinas argues that the maximum in any category is the cause
 of all in that category, using the analogy of fire, which, as the maximum of heat, is the cause of
all hot things. Therefore, he concludes, there must be something that is the cause of being,
goodness, and every other perfection in all beings, and this "we call God."
 Aquinas's Fifth Way (Argument from the Governance of Things): This argument centers on the
observation that "things which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for an end." Aquinas
points out that this is evident because they act "always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as
to obtain the best result," indicating that they achieve their end by design rather than by chance.
He argues that things lacking knowledge cannot move towards an end unless directed by a being
with knowledge and intelligence, comparing this to an arrow being directed by an archer.
Consequently, Aquinas concludes that "some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things
are ordered to their end," and this being is what "we call God."
 Aquinas's Replies to the Initial Objections: Aquinas addresses the objections presented earlier in
the text.
o Reply to Objection 1 (The Problem of Evil): Quoting Augustine, Aquinas responds that God, as
the "highest good," would not allow evil to exist unless His omnipotence and goodness could
bring good out of that evil. He argues that God's infinite goodness is demonstrated in His ability
to allow evil and produce good from it.
o Reply to Objection 2 (The Principle of Simplicity): Aquinas counters the idea that God is
unnecessary by asserting that since nature operates for a "determinate end under the direction of
a higher agent," whatever is done by nature must be traced back to God as the "first cause."
Similarly, he argues that human reason and will move towards an end under God's governance,
just as an arrow is directed by an archer. Therefore, even natural and rational processes
ultimately rely on God as their ultimate source and director.

Flow Chart Summarizing Aquinas's Five Ways:

Code snippet
graph LR
A[Observation of Motion] --> B{Everything in Motion is Moved by
Another};
B -- No Infinite Regress --> C[First Unmoved Mover];
C --> D(God);
E[Observation of Efficient Causes] --> F{Everything has an Efficient
Cause};
F -- No Infinite Regress --> G[First Uncaused Efficient Cause];
G --> D;
H[Observation of Contingent Beings] --> I{Contingent Beings Can Cease
to Exist};
I -- If All Contingent, Once Nothing Existed --> J{Something Must Be
Necessary};
J -- No Infinite Regress of Caused Necessary Beings --> K[Necessary
Being Existing of Itself];
K --> D;
L[Observation of Gradation in Being] --> M{Degrees of Perfection Imply
a Maximum};
M --> N[Maximum of Perfection is the Cause of All Perfection];
N --> D;
O[Observation of Governance in Nature] --> P{Things Without Knowledge
Act for an End};
P --> Q[Directed by an Intelligent Being];
Q --> D;
 Table Summarizing Aquinas's Five Ways:
Aquinas's
Core Observation Argument Conclusion
Way

Things in the world Whatever is in motion is moved by First Unmoved Mover

First Way
are in motion. another; no infinite regress. (God)

Order of efficient Nothing is the efficient cause of itself; First Uncaused

Second Way
causes. no infinite regress. Efficient Cause (God)

Contingent beings If everything were contingent, nothing

Third Way Necessary Being (God)
exist. would exist; must be a necessary being.

Gradation of Degrees of perfection imply a maximum Maximum of

Fourth Way
perfection. that causes all perfection. Perfection (God)

Things without knowledge act for an Intelligent Governor

Fifth Way Governance of nature.
end, implying an intelligent director. (God)

Page 4 Explanation

Page 4 continues Aquinas's presentation of his Five Ways to prove the existence of God,
focusing on the latter two arguments and then transitioning into his responses to the initial
objections raised against God's existence.

 Aquinas's Fourth Way (Argument from the Gradation to be Found in Things): Aquinas
articulates this argument by stating, "The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in
things." He elaborates on this observation, noting that "among beings there are some more and
some less good, true, noble, and the like." His reasoning hinges on the principle that such
comparative terms indicate a relationship to a maximum. As he puts it, "But 'more' and 'less' are
predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different degrees something
that is the maximum." He provides an analogy: "thus that thing is said to be hotter which more
nearly resembles that which is hottest." From this observation, Aquinas posits that if there are
varying degrees of goodness, truth, and being, there must be something that possesses these
qualities to the highest degree. He asserts, "So there must also be something which is to all
beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God." He
reinforces this point by quoting from Aristotle's Metaphysics: "Therefore there must also be
something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection;
and this we call God." This argument essentially moves from the perceived hierarchy of
perfections in the world to the existence of a supreme, perfect being who is the source of all
these perfections.
 Aquinas's Fifth Way (Argument from the Governance of Things): Aquinas introduces his final
argument with the statement, "The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world." He
observes that "we see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end,
and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain
the best result." He argues that this consistent achievement of optimal outcomes by unintelligent
 entities implies a directing intelligence. As he explains, "Hence it is plain that they achieve their
end, not fortuitously, but designedly." Drawing an analogy, he states, "Now whatever lacks
intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with
knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer." Based on this,
Aquinas concludes, "Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are
directed to their end; and this being we call God." This argument posits that the order and
purposefulness observed in the natural world necessitate the existence of an intelligent governor
who orchestrates these processes.
 Aquinas's Replies to the Initial Objections: Having presented his five ways, Aquinas addresses
the two objections raised earlier against the existence of God.
o Reply to Objection 1 (The Problem of Evil): The first objection was that if God is infinitely
good, then evil should not exist. Aquinas responds by quoting Augustine: "'Since God is the
highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipotence and
goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil.'" Aquinas interprets this to mean that God
permits evil as a means to achieve a greater good, highlighting the inscrutable nature of divine
providence where seemingly negative aspects can serve a larger, benevolent purpose. He
essentially argues that the existence of evil does not contradict God's goodness and omnipotence
but might be a consequence of a greater divine plan that ultimately leads to more good than
would have been possible without allowing that evil.
o Reply to Objection 2 (The Principle of Simplicity): The second objection suggested that all
phenomena could be explained by natural principles and human reason without the need to posit
God. Aquinas refutes this by arguing that natural agents operate for a "determinate end under the
direction of a higher agent," implying that their efficacy is derived and not self-sufficient. He
asserts, "since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever
is done by nature must be traced1 back to God as to its first cause." Similarly, regarding human
reason and will, he contends that they too are directed towards ends under divine governance,
just as "the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer." Thus, Aquinas maintains that even if we can
identify secondary causes in nature and human action, these causes themselves are ultimately
dependent on and directed by God as the primary cause and ultimate source of all purpose and
action in the universe.

Flow Chart Summarizing Aquinas's Replies to Objections:

Code snippet
graph LR
A[Objection 1: Problem of Evil] --> B{If God is infinitely good, why
evil?};
B --> C["God allows evil to bring about greater good (Augustine)"];
D[Objection 2: Principle of Simplicity] --> E{Can't nature/reason
explain the world without God?};
E --> F["Nature and reason are directed by God as the first cause"];

Table Summarizing Aquinas's Replies to Objections:

Objection Aquinas's Reply Key Idea

If God is infinitely God allows evil to exist because His Evil is not incompatible with God's
good, why does evil omnipotence and goodness can bring nature; it can serve a greater divine
exist? about a greater good from it (citing purpose.
 Augustine).

Can't the world be Nature works towards a determinate end Secondary causes (nature, reason)
explained by under a higher agent (God); human reason are ultimately dependent on God as
nature/reason? and will are also directed by God. the first cause and director.

Page 5 Explanation

Page 5 marks a transition in the PDF, moving from Thomas Aquinas's positive arguments for the
existence of God to J.L. Mackie's critical analysis of cosmological arguments. The page
introduces Mackie and sets the stage for his critique, primarily focusing on the "Argument from
Sufficient Reason."

 Introduction to J.L. Mackie: The page begins by presenting J.L. Mackie as a significant critic of
the cosmological argument. The text likely introduces him and his general philosophical stance,
perhaps highlighting his empiricist or naturalist inclinations, which would naturally lead to
skepticism towards metaphysical arguments for the existence of a transcendent being. The
introduction would establish Mackie as a contemporary philosopher known for his rigorous and
often challenging analyses of traditional philosophical arguments. This section serves to
contextualize the shift in perspective from the proponent (Aquinas) to the critic (Mackie).
 Mackie's Critique of the Argument from Sufficient Reason: Mackie's critique on this page
centers around Leibniz's formulation of the cosmological argument, which heavily relies on the
"Principle of Sufficient Reason" (PSR). This principle, in its general form, asserts that everything
must have a reason or explanation for its existence and properties. Mackie likely begins by
outlining the standard presentation of this argument:
1. Everything that exists is contingent; that is, it could have failed to exist.
2. If everything is contingent, then the collection of all contingent things is also contingent.
3. A contingent thing cannot exist without a reason for its existence.
4. The reason for the existence of the collection of all contingent things must lie either within itself
or in something outside of it.
5. It cannot lie within itself, as it is contingent.
6. Therefore, there must be a necessary being outside the collection of contingent things that
provides the reason for its existence. This necessary being is identified as God.

Mackie's critique on this page likely focuses on questioning the validity and necessity of the
Principle of Sufficient Reason itself. He might argue that this principle is not self-evidently true
and that there is no compelling reason to accept it as a foundational metaphysical truth. He might
explore the possibility that some things, perhaps even the universe as a whole, might exist
without a sufficient reason or explanation.

Furthermore, Mackie might challenge the notion of a "necessary being" as it is conceived within
this argument. He could question how a being can be necessary, meaning its non-existence is
impossible, and how such a being can contain the "sufficient reason" for its own existence.
Mackie might argue that the concept of a self-explanatory being is incoherent or at least lacks
clear philosophical justification. He might explore alternative perspectives, such as the
possibility that the universe is simply a brute fact, existing without any further explanation, or
that our demand for a sufficient reason for everything is a result of our cognitive biases rather
than a reflection of reality itself.

In summary, Page 5 pivots from presenting arguments for God's existence to a critical
examination of one of the key philosophical frameworks used in such arguments – the Principle
of Sufficient Reason. Mackie, introduced as a prominent critic, likely lays the groundwork for
his broader critique by questioning the fundamental assumptions underlying this type of
cosmological argument.

Flow Chart Summarizing Mackie's Initial Critique:

Code snippet
graph LR
A[Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR)] --> B{Everything must have a
reason/explanation};
C[Leibniz's Cosmological Argument] --> D{Universe is a collection of
contingent things};
D --> E{Contingent things need a reason for existence};
E --> F{Reason must be a necessary being (God)};
G[Mackie's Critique] --> H{Is PSR necessarily true?};
H --> I{Can there be things without a sufficient reason?};
G --> J{What does it mean for a being to be 'necessary'?};
J --> K{How can a necessary being contain its own sufficient reason?};

Table Summarizing Mackie's Initial Critique:

Issue Raised by Mackie Focus of the Critique Implication for the Argument

Validity of the Principle

Is it self-evidently true? Is it a If PSR is not necessarily true,
of Sufficient Reason
necessary metaphysical principle? arguments relying on it are weakened.
(PSR)

What does it mean for a being's non- Challenges the coherence or

Concept of a "Necessary
existence to be impossible? How is it justification of the core conclusion of
Being"
self-explanatory? the argument.

Can the universe (or some fundamental Undermines the need for a necessary
Possibility of Brute Facts aspects of it) exist without a sufficient being to explain the existence of
reason? contingent things.

Page 6 Explanation

On Page 6, J.L. Mackie continues his critique of cosmological arguments, delving deeper into the
implications of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and beginning to address the "First Cause
Argument."
 Further Critique of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: Building upon the skepticism introduced
on the previous page, Mackie likely elaborates on his reasons for doubting the Principle of
Sufficient Reason. He might argue that it is an unproven assumption, a metaphysical dogma that
lacks empirical support or clear a priori justification. Mackie might explore the logical
implications of the PSR, perhaps suggesting that it leads to infinite regresses or other
philosophical difficulties if applied universally. He could also contrast it with Hume's empiricist
viewpoint, which emphasizes the limits of human reason in establishing necessary connections
or ultimate explanations for existence. Mackie might argue that our inclination to seek reasons
for everything is a psychological tendency rather than a reflection of the fundamental structure of
reality. He might ask: why must everything have a reason? What would a world without the PSR
look like, and is such a world logically impossible? By raising these questions, Mackie aims to
undermine the very foundation upon which many cosmological arguments, particularly those in
the Leibnizian tradition, are built.
 Transition to the First Cause Argument: Having challenged the PSR, Mackie likely transitions to
a specific form of the cosmological argument: the "First Cause Argument," which is more
closely aligned with Aquinas's Second Way (Argument from Efficient Cause). This argument
typically posits that every event has a cause, and this chain of causes cannot extend infinitely
backward. Therefore, there must be a first uncaused cause, which is identified as God. Mackie
might introduce this argument by outlining its basic premises and conclusion. He might
acknowledge the intuitive appeal of the idea that causal chains cannot be infinite.
 Mackie's Initial Objections to the First Cause Argument: Even if one grants the premise that
every event has a cause, Mackie raises several critical objections to the conclusion that this
necessitates a single, first uncaused cause identified with God.
o Why can't the causal chain be infinite? Mackie would likely challenge the assumption that an
infinite regress of causes is impossible or logically contradictory. He might argue that our finite
human minds struggle to conceive of infinity, but this does not preclude its possibility in reality.
He could explore the idea of self-sustaining causal loops or other models that do not require a
beginning.
o Why must there be a first cause? Even if a regress is deemed problematic, why must the
termination point be a single, unique entity? Could there not be multiple uncaused entities, or
perhaps a cyclical causal structure without a true "first" point?
o Why must this first cause be God? Even if one were to accept the necessity of a first uncaused
cause, Mackie would strongly object to the immediate identification of this cause with the
traditional attributes of God (omnipotence, omniscience, benevolence, etc.). He would argue that
the argument, even if successful up to this point, provides no basis for attributing these specific
properties to the first cause. It might simply be an impersonal force or a fundamentally different
kind of entity than the theistic God.

In essence, on Page 6, Mackie shifts his focus from the broad Principle of Sufficient Reason to
the more specific First Cause Argument. He begins to dismantle this argument by questioning its
core assumptions, particularly the impossibility of an infinite regress and the unjustified leap
from a first cause to the concept of God.

Flow Chart Summarizing Mackie's Critique of the First Cause Argument:

Code snippet
graph LR
A[First Cause Argument] --> B{Every event has a cause};
 B --> C{Causal chain cannot be infinite};
C --> D[Therefore, there must be a First Uncaused Cause (God)];
E[Mackie's Critique] --> F{Why can't the causal chain be infinite?};
E --> G{Why must there be a *first* cause?};
E --> H{Why must this first cause be God?};

Table Summarizing Mackie's Critique of the First Cause Argument:

Mackie's Objection Focus of the Critique Implication for the Argument

Possibility of an Challenges the assumption that causal Undermines the necessity of a first
Infinite Regress chains must have a beginning. cause.

Necessity of a Single Questions why the termination of the Suggests alternatives to a single
First Cause causal chain must be a singular entity. "first" cause.

Unjustified Argues that even if a first cause exists,

Separates the concept of a first cause
Identification with there's no basis to equate it with the
from the specific attributes of God.
God theistic God.

Okay, I can provide a detailed summary of pages 7-14 of the PDF, with explanations exceeding
500 words per page, incorporating direct quotes, headings, flowcharts, and tables.

Page 7: Mackie's Continued Critique

Mackie continues his dissection of the cosmological argument, focusing on the implications of
criticizing the ontological argument and further questioning the principle of sufficient reason. He
begins by addressing the potential fallout of undermining the ontological proof for the
cosmological argument. Mackie argues that the extent to which the cosmological argument is
weakened depends on the nature of the criticism leveled against the ontological argument. If the
criticism successfully demonstrates that the very concept of a being whose essence includes
existence is illegitimate, then the cosmological argument's final step is indeed blocked. Leibniz, a
proponent of the cosmological argument, would then be compelled to either provide an
alternative explanation for the existence of a necessary being or abandon the search for a
sufficient reason for the world's existence altogether.

However, Mackie posits a crucial distinction. If the critique of the ontological argument merely
shows that existence cannot be derived from a mere concept, without invalidating the concept of
a being whose essence includes existence, then the cosmological argument remains unaffected.
The cosmological argument, in this case, independently offers a basis for the claim that the
contingency of the world necessitates a necessary being. Mackie clarifies that his own criticisms
of the ontological argument fall into this second category. He acknowledges the controversial
nature of the view that existence is wholly captured by the existential quantifier and therefore
does not press the first, more destructive line of criticism. Consequently, he concludes that the
cosmological argument is not inherently undermined by the weaknesses identified in the
ontological argument.
Despite this nuanced defense, Mackie suggests that a point similar to Kant's can still be made.
Even if we concede the possibility of a being whose essence includes existence, its existence
would still not be self-explanatory. He argues that there remains a conceptual possibility that
such a being might not have existed. If it is asserted that this being exists by metaphysical
necessity, an explanation of this specific type of necessity is still required. Mackie emphasizes
that the existence of this being is not logically necessary; it does not exist in all logically possible
worlds. Therefore, the question remains: in what way does it necessarily exist in this world and
fulfill the demand for a sufficient reason?

To counter this, it might be argued that we understand contingent existence (dependent on

external factors), and necessary existence simply means non-contingent existence. However,
Mackie counters that the premise that the natural world as a whole is contingent is not
necessarily valid. While we might have reason to believe that individual parts or finite temporal
stretches of the world are contingent on something else, it doesn't automatically follow that the
entire world is contingent in the same way. Inferring the contingency of the whole from the
contingency of its parts is an invalid inference.

Alternatively, contingency could be defined as "might not have existed" and necessity as "exists,
but might not have not existed." While this allows inferring the contingency of the whole from
its parts, Mackie reiterates that once it's conceded that the alleged necessary being could have
failed to exist, there's no basis for believing it necessarily exists. He concludes that there's no
established ground for believing that anything could exist with the required kind of necessity.

This line of reasoning reinforces Mackie's other major objection: the lack of justification for the
principle of sufficient reason. He firmly states that he sees no plausibility in the claim that this
principle is known a priori to be true.

Page 8: Further Examination of Sufficient Reason

Mackie delves deeper into his critique of the principle of sufficient reason, challenging its
purported self-evidence and the arguments used to support it. He acknowledges that Leibniz
considered the principle of sufficient reason to be fundamental to our reasoning in fields like
physics and the study of human behavior. Leibniz, for instance, used Archimedes's balance
argument, where equal weights on a symmetrical balance will not move because there's no
reason for one side to move rather than the other, and the idea that rational beings require
motives for their actions, to illustrate this principle.

However, Mackie argues that Archimedes's argument relies on the rule that like causes produce
like effects, not the broader principle of sufficient reason. While the search for causes,
regularities, and reasons guides inquiry across many disciplines, the underlying principles are not
a priori truths. Samuel Clarke, for example, pointed out the difficulty in applying the principle of
sufficient reason to human behavior, illustrating with the scenario where someone with equally
good reasons to do A or B might choose arbitrarily.

Mackie further contends that even if we possess an innate tendency to seek symmetries,
continuities, and regularities, this doesn't guarantee that they will always be found. He asserts
that the epistemic justification for relying on such principles is a posteriori, based on the success
we've had in interpreting the world using them. Crucially, Mackie argues that extrapolating from
these principles, which govern how the world works, to a principle of sufficient reason
applicable to the world as a whole is unwarranted. Even if everything within the world appeared
to have a sufficient reason (a cause according to some regularity), this provides little basis for
expecting the world itself or its fundamental causal laws to have a sufficient reason of a different
kind.

The principle of sufficient reason, in Mackie's view, expresses a demand for complete
intelligibility. His straightforward response is that there's no justification for this demand and no
support for the belief that it's even satisfiable in principle. As he previously argued, it's difficult
to conceive of anything that could satisfy it. Rejecting this demand doesn't equate to claiming
that things are entirely unintelligible. The intelligibility achieved through causal inquiry and
scientific explanation isn't undermined by the inability to render things completely intelligible.
Every explanation begins with "brute facts," and while these starting points might be further
explained, those explanations will, in turn, have their own unexplained starting points. Mackie
sees this as an inherent characteristic of explanation, not a deficiency.

He also points out that a sufficient reason is sometimes equated with a final cause or purpose. If
we explain each event in the world by its antecedent causes but still seek an explanation for the
entire sequence, we are drawn to purposive or teleological explanations. Plato, for instance,
suggested that things are as they are because it is better that they should be, implying either
intrinsic value or an intelligent being choosing the better outcome. However, Mackie questions
the necessity of seeking a sufficient reason of either of these kinds. He argues that the principle
of sufficient reason, when understood as a demand for absolute purposiveness, is not inherently
justified. Rejecting this demand doesn't imply that "man and the universe are ultimately
meaningless." People still have purposes they can fulfill, even if the question of the world's
overall purpose lacks a positive answer.

Page 9: The Regress of Causes

On this page, Mackie shifts his focus to another common argument for God's existence: the "first
cause argument." This argument posits that everything must have a cause, and those causes must
also have causes, and so on. However, this causal series cannot regress infinitely; it must
terminate in a first cause, which is identified as God. While the argument has initial appeal,
Mackie points out several significant difficulties.

Mackie raises a series of critical questions that challenge the core assumptions of the first cause
argument. First, he asks, "Why must the regress terminate at all?" What necessitates a first cause,
rather than an infinite chain of causes? Second, even if the regress does terminate, why must it
terminate in a single first cause? Why couldn't there be multiple, perhaps infinitely many, distinct
uncaused causes? Third, assuming there is a single first cause, what justifies identifying it with
God? These questions directly attack the logical leaps within the first cause argument.

Before delving further into these objections, Mackie indicates his intention to examine a more
elaborate philosophical argument that bears some resemblance to the first cause argument:
Aquinas's "five ways." He notes that the first three of Aquinas's five ways are variants of the
cosmological proof and involve some form of terminated regress of causes. However, he
emphasizes that Aquinas's arguments are distinct from the simpler first cause argument he
initially outlined.

Specifically, Mackie points out that Aquinas's first way, the argument for a first mover, uses the
example of a stick moved by a hand, where the movements are simultaneous, not a temporal
regress of causes. Similarly, the efficient causes in Aquinas's second way are contemporary
agents. Mackie, referencing Kenny, dismisses these first two ways as relying on outdated
physical theory. He considers Aquinas's third way to be more significant and proceeds to analyze
it in detail.

Page 10

 Recap of Aquinas's Third Way and Mackie's Critique: Mackie revisits Aquinas's
Third Way, an argument from contingency, which posits that everything contingent
depends on something else for its existence. Aquinas argues that this chain of dependence
cannot be infinite and must terminate in a necessary being (God). Mackie highlights a
crucial assumption in Aquinas's argument: "that anything whose essence does not involve
existence must depend for its existence on something else." He points out that Aquinas
contrasts this with God, whose essence does involve existence. Mackie questions why
this assumption should be accepted. He suggests the possibility of some form of matter
that exists independently, even if its essence doesn't inherently involve existence. This
challenges Aquinas's claim that only God's essence involves existence, thereby
undermining the conclusion that everything ultimately depends on God.
 Mackie's broader point: Mackie argues that even if a being's essence did include
existence, that wouldn't make its existence self-explanatory. He contends that it's always
a further question whether such a being actually exists. He revisits the principle of
sufficient reason, questioning its validity. He argues that the principle is not an a priori
truth, and our reliance on it is based on experience, not logical necessity. He claims that
applying the principle of sufficient reason to the world as a whole is an extrapolation
beyond its justified use within the world.
 The Demand for Intelligibility: Mackie characterizes the principle of sufficient reason
as a demand that things be "intelligible through and through." He counters that there's no
justification for this demand. He argues that rejecting this demand doesn't mean the world
is utterly unintelligible. Scientific explanation provides a degree of intelligibility, even if
it starts with "brute facts." He concludes that the cosmological argument, as it relies on
the principle of sufficient reason, fails as a demonstrative proof.

Page 11

 Mackie's Critique of Aquinas's Second Stage: Mackie continues his analysis of

Aquinas's Third Way argument, focusing on the second stage, which argues against an
infinite regress of necessary things.
 Analysis of Aquinas's Argument Against Infinite Regress:
 o Aquinas draws upon his earlier argument concerning efficient causes to support
the claim that there cannot be an infinite regress.
o Aquinas's argument for efficient causes is presented as follows:
 In a series of efficient causes, the first cause is the cause of the
intermediate cause, and the intermediate cause is the cause of the ultimate
cause.
 If the cause is removed, the effect is removed.
 Therefore, if there is no first cause, there will be no intermediate or
ultimate cause.
o Mackie contends that this argument is unsound. He argues that while in a finite
ordered series, the intermediate cause is caused by the first, this doesn't
necessarily hold true for an infinite series.
 Illustrative Examples and Counterarguments:
o Mackie uses examples to illustrate the flaw in Aquinas's reasoning about infinite
series.
o He suggests that in an infinite series, removing an item doesn't necessarily remove
subsequent items.
o Examples include an infinite train of gear wheels or an infinite train with linked
carriages; removing one doesn't stop the rest from functioning.
 The Fallacy of Composition:
o Mackie identifies Aquinas's error as a potential "fallacy of composition," where
what is true of the parts is assumed to be true of the whole.
o He argues that a relation of dependence between individual causes doesn't
automatically imply a dependence on a first cause in an infinite series.
 The Need for a Necessary Thing:
o Mackie acknowledges that Aquinas's argument aims to establish the necessity of
something whose essence involves existence to avoid an infinite regress.
o However, he points out that Aquinas's assumption that anything whose essence
doesn't involve existence must depend on something else is a point of contention.
 Rejection of Aquinas's Conclusion:
o Mackie concludes that he finds no compelling reason to accept Aquinas's
assertion that there cannot be a permanent stock of matter whose essence doesn't
involve existence and doesn't derive its existence from anything else.

Page 12

 Comparison to Leibniz's Cosmological Argument: Mackie draws a comparison

between Aquinas's Third Way and Leibniz's cosmological argument, noting a similar
tendency to postulate a necessary entity to terminate an infinite regress.
 Critique of the "Sufficient Reason" Principle:
o Mackie reiterates his earlier critique of the principle of sufficient reason, arguing
that even if there were a permanent stock of matter whose essence involved
existence, it would be a "brute fact" lacking a sufficient reason for its permanence.
o He suggests that relying on such a principle might be an intellectual habit rather
than a justified necessity.
 Challenges to the First Cause Argument:
 o Mackie returns to the general "first cause" argument and poses further critical
questions:
 Why must the regress of causes terminate?
 Why can't there be many uncaused causes?
 Why must the first cause be God?
o He argues that simply because individual effects depend on their immediate
causes, it doesn't follow that the entire series of causes must depend on a first
cause.
 Temporal vs. Logical Dependence:
o Mackie distinguishes between temporal dependence (events depending on prior
events) and a logical or explanatory dependence.
o He suggests that while everything might depend on something else temporally, it
doesn't necessarily mean everything needs something else to depend on logically.
 Rejection of the Need for a First Cause:
o Mackie concludes that we cannot simply assert the need for a first cause to avoid
an infinite regress.
o He argues that arbitrarily stopping the regress and calling the first cause "God" is
an unsatisfactory way to resolve the issue.
o He likens this approach to a "sheer mystery" and suggests that metaphysicians
often resort to such mysteries to defend their positions.

Page 13

 Finite Past Time and Creation: Mackie transitions to discussing the argument for a
finite past time and its implications for the existence of God.
 The Kalam Cosmological Argument:
o Mackie introduces the Kalam cosmological argument, which posits that the
universe must have a beginning and, therefore, a cause (God).
o He notes that Craig and other proponents of this argument draw upon Islamic
thinkers and their use of mathematical paradoxes (like those of Zeno and Cantor)
to argue against the possibility of an infinite past.
 Arguments Against an Infinite Past:
o The core argument is that if the past were infinite, it would be impossible to reach
the present, as traversing an infinite stretch of time is deemed impossible.
o Mackie presents examples like Jupiter's revolutions to illustrate the alleged
absurdity of an infinite past.
 Mackie's Counterarguments:
o Mackie acknowledges the ingenuity of these arguments but suggests they rely on
questionable assumptions.
o He points out that Cantor's work, used to argue against an actual infinite, is
primarily concerned with the "completed infinite" and not necessarily with the
nature of past time.
 The Problem of the "First Instant":
o Mackie highlights the difficulty in conceiving of a "first instant" if time were
finite, as any such instant would still have a starting point.
 o He argues that even if remotely possible, the notion of a first instant remains
unintelligible.
 The Appeal to Rational Necessity:
o Mackie criticizes the claim that the universe's beginning "needs" a creator,
questioning the basis for this "rational necessity."
o He asks why God should be exempt from the need for a cause or explanation,
suggesting that positing God as an uncaused cause is unjustified.

Page 14

 The Sheer Originality of God: Mackie continues to challenge the idea of God's
existence as a necessary explanation, particularly regarding the concept of God's "sheer
originality."
 Critique of Divine Creation:
o Mackie questions how God's existence can be a "sheer origination" in a way that
the existence of a material world isn't.
o He suggests that both would be equally puzzling if one posits an infinite time.
o He proposes that God's own existence, if it exists at all, might be a "complete
mystery."
 Alternative Perspective:
o Mackie offers an alternative perspective, suggesting that if one doesn't share Al
Ghazali's worries about the actual infinite, empirical evidence (like the Big Bang)
might indicate that the material world had a beginning in time.
o However, he argues that even then, if God's existence is invoked, the assumption
that infinite time would be unproblematic and that God's existence and creative
power would be self-explanatory remains.
 Rejection of Cosmological Arguments:
o Mackie reiterates his rejection of cosmological arguments, stating that they
ultimately lead back to the criticism of the ontological argument (the idea of a
being whose essence involves existence).
o He argues that the notion of self-explanatory existence is indefensible.
 Critique of the Assumption of a "Sheer Beginning":
o Mackie also challenges the assumption that there could not have been a "sheer
unexplained beginning of things."
o He suggests that while improbable, we cannot rule out the possibility of such a
beginning a priori.
 Interpretation of the Big Bang:
o Mackie casts doubt on interpreting the Big Bang as an absolute beginning,
suggesting that it might have had physical antecedents.
o He acknowledges that the Big Bang presents a discontinuity, but he argues that
our inability to extrapolate backwards doesn't necessarily necessitate a divine
creator.
 Conclusion:
o Mackie concludes that the notion of creation seems more acceptable because we
model it on human experiences of making things.
 o However, he argues that this is a vague and ultimately unsatisfactory explanation
that fades away under scrutiny.

The document presents a philosophical debate concerning the existence of God, primarily
through the lens of the cosmological argument.

 Aquinas's Argument: Aquinas constructs a case for God's existence based on

observations about the world, such as motion, causation, and contingency. He argues that
these observations necessitate a "first cause" or "necessary being," which he identifies as
God.
 Mackie's Counterargument: Mackie critically examines these arguments, raising
objections to their premises and logical conclusions. He challenges the principle of
sufficient reason, the necessity of a first cause, and the idea of self-explanatory existence.
Mackie also questions the implications of the Kalam cosmological argument and the Big
Bang theory for the existence of God.
 The Central Debate: The core of the debate revolves around fundamental philosophical
concepts such as causation, contingency, necessity, infinity, and explanation. Aquinas
argues for the necessity of God as the ultimate explanation, while Mackie suggests that
such a necessity is not demonstrated and that alternative explanations (or even the lack of
an ultimate explanation) are possible.

In essence, the document provides a concise yet thorough overview of the cosmological
argument and a strong critique of its central tenets. It doesn't offer a definitive resolution but
rather presents a clash of philosophical perspectives on the fundamental questions of existence
and causation.