Bridge at The Edge
Bridge at The Edge
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Brogeland, Boye
Bridge at the edge [electronic resource] / Boye Brogeland and David
Bird.
Electronic monograph.
Issued also in print format.
ISBN 978-1-55494-174-2 (PDF).--ISBN 978-1-55494-433-0 (HTML)
In bringing these deals back to life, we are indebted to those who chronicle our
great game. Foremost in our minds is Jon Sveindal, who described many of them in
his splendid bridge column for the Oslo newspaper, Aftenposten. Many thanks to
him! For several years now, the excellent website Bridge Base Online has broadcast
— free of charge to users — the world’s finest championships. Nikos Sarantakos
maintains the records of these broadcasts on his excellent VuGraph Project website:
http://www.sarantakos.com/bridge/vugraph.html
We retrieved the details of many deals from this source and thank Nikos warmly.
We acknowledge also the annual world championship books, edited by Brian
Senior and a prerequisite of any bridge lover’s library. Finally, our thanks go to
Christian Vennerød, who wrote some emotive articles in English on Norway’s win
in the 2008 European Championship.
David Bird and Boye Brogeland
Photo credits:
Photo insert
Photos 1 and 2 by Agnès Fabre.
Photo 3 by Agnès Fabre.
Photo 4 by Christian Vennerød.
Photo 5 by Brent Manley.
Photo 6 by Christian Vennerød.
Foreword
One of the privileges open to a bridge writer is the chance to co-author a book with
a world-class player — to delve inside their bridge mind and perhaps discover a
secret or two on how they have achieved so much success. I have been fortunate
to do this with some of the world’s best players and it has always been a rewarding
experience.
Boye Brogeland is an exceptionally bold and adventurous player, following his
instinct and taking risks that few others would contemplate. Most unusually, he
is very happy to publicize his failures as well as his successes. During the 2010
European Championship he and Svendsen bid to a small slam, missing the ace
and king of trumps. I emailed him, ‘Can you explain the bidding on that spade
slam against Germany? Obviously we won’t use the deal in the book, but I’d like
to understand what the bids meant.’ Boye responded, ‘Of course you must put it
into the book! It was a very interesting bidding problem.’ You will find the deal
on page 214.
This book contains some 190 deals played by Boye at championship level.
They illustrate the thrilling highs and depressing lows of top-level championship
bridge. Boye and I have done our very best to convey the buzz and excitement of
playing ‘bridge at the edge’. Have we succeeded in this task? Only you can say.
David Bird
September, 2011
Contents
Introduction9
Boye Brogeland’s Partners 11
1 Through the Back of the Cards 13
2 Slam Bidding Mechanics 25
3 Rescue Operations 39
4 There’s No Justice! 51
5 Interesting Bidding Treatments 63
6 Find the Lady 71
7 Winning the Great Race 77
8 Opening Leads — Inspired and Uninspired 87
9 Slam Adventures 103
10 Delayed Heart Attack 117
11 Technical Mastery 121
12 Three Slams in Shanghai 135
13 Defend with Your Life 141
14 Toil and Trouble 151
15 Battles Around the Trump Suit 163
16 Enter the Illusionist 171
17 Extracting the Maximum Penalty 189
18 Extending the Use of Transfer Bids 195
19 Train Off the Rails! 207
20 In the Fast Lane 223
21 Back-to-Back Grand Slams in Pau 241
Introduction
What is it that gets your juices flowing playing bridge? Is it a neatly timed
elimination and throw-in, a perfectly executed double squeeze, or thirteen rounds
of relays to get to the optimal spot? Maybe it’s wielding the axe on your opponents
and collecting a big number? All that stuff gets me excited too, but I find it even
more thrilling to make a bid, a lead or a play — successful or not — that no
textbook will ever recommend.
‘Avoid big penalties’ is a common maxim, especially playing IMPs or rubber
bridge. Sensible as it may seem, I will go out of my way to help partner to find
the right lead; I open light third in hand, I overcall on decent four-card suits, and I
double Stayman or a transfer bid with any suit — long or short — that screams for
the lead. If this means I look stupid from time to time when my opponents catch
me speeding, so be it. In the long run I believe it is the right approach.
‘Never underlead an ace against a trump contract’ is another adage that bridge
players are familiar with. Well, going against the mainstream can be extremely
effective. No declarer expects it, and faced with a king-jack choice in dummy
at Trick 1 he is almost certainly doomed. As long as you (and your partner) can
stomach finding the occasional stiff king in dummy, underleading an ace is far less
dangerous than most people think.
‘Don’t risk your contract trying to make an overtrick’ is sound advice for IMPs
and rubber bridge, but don’t bank on it. There are situations when the likelihood
of an overtrick is so high that you should play for it even though you risk going
down in a cold contract. Math is a better guidance than the rule of thumb you were
once taught. You have to bear in mind, though, that you have to explain to your
teammates when you call out minus 100 at the comparison.
My most memorable ‘minus 100’ happened in the final of the Bermuda Bowl in
Paris in 2001. I was declarer in a 3NT contract that had nine top winners after the
lead. Rather than securing the contract and keeping my partner and teammates at
ease, I tried for an overtrick since only a really unlucky lie of the cards would put
me in any danger. Rose Meltzer and Kyle Larsen were happy to be given the chance
to collect the next five tricks. Down one. And USA went on to win a close final.
In Shanghai in 2007 it was déjà vu. Norway was in the Bermuda Bowl final
against the USA. I was declaring 3NT on the last board of a segment and had nine
top tricks. I cashed eight of them and was left with the ace-queen of spades and a
couple of diamonds in dummy. Based on my opponents’ discards I was pretty sure
that the king of spades was onside. Should I play it safe to avoid a possible disaster
like six years ago, or should I follow my instincts?
Introduction | 9
My adrenalin was pumping. I asked myself how it would feel to lose the final
by one IMP, knowing that an overtrick on this very hand could have made the
difference. To me, that would be the worst case scenario, so I couldn’t chicken out.
I took the finesse.
Zia Mahmood, who has been my idol ever since I read his Bols Tip, ‘Roll Over
Houdini’, won the king of spades and literally stood up to cash a winner. Now I
was down to a guess — which two cards Michael Rosenberg had left. I was lucky:
I got it right, I made the contract and we went on to win Norway’s first Bermuda
Bowl.
Don’t play it safe. Play at the edge.
Boye Brogeland
How does a skilled declarer read the lie of the cards? He gathers evidence from a
variety of sources: bids made by the opponents, bids not made by the opponents,
the opening lead and defensive signals. He may also draw inferences from the
chosen line of defense. Sometimes he will place a particular card or cards with
one defender because the contract cannot be made unless that is the case. This
assumption may lead him to conclude that the other defender holds some other
vital missing card.
In this chapter we will look at some deals where Boye managed to read the
cards successfully. We start with a deal where declarer has to find the J to make
his contract.
Playing with his wife-to-be, Tonje, Boye ended in 3NT. When West led ace and
another club, East won with the K and cleared the club suit, her partner throwing
a diamond. All now depended on declarer scoring four spade tricks, to go alongside
four hearts and one club. Since East had started with six clubs to West’s two, the
initial odds suggested that West would hold more spades than East. In that case
a finesse against the J would be necessary if the card did not fall on the first two
rounds.
Before playing spades, it is natural to seek some clues by cashing four rounds of
hearts. The suit breaks 3-3 and let us suppose that West discards another diamond
while East throws a club. How should declarer read the spade suit?
If East’s hand is something like
7 2 10 8 3 A 5 K J 8 5 4 3
she can afford to discard a club, while still keeping enough clubs to beat the
contract. Would anyone actually discard this way when they had the useless 5 to
pitch? If you judge it unlikely, you should read East for the hand that she actually
held and therefore play for the drop on the third round of spades.
What happened at the table, then? Er, well… when East cleared the club suit
she had the chance to give a suit preference signal. Rather than indicate the A
clearly, with a low club, she actually attempted a deception by signaling an entry
in spades. This caused West to discard a spade on the last round of hearts, so
Boye was never actually faced with the spade guess. However, he did reassure the
Erik Sælensminde’s double showed some values, around 5 points or more. How
would you tackle 5 when West makes the rather strange lead of the 9?
Even if trumps break 3-3, which is less likely than normal after West’s preempt,
you will still need to avoid three losers in the red suits. Boye won the first trick
with the K. West presumably held seven spades, so the 9 lead was suspicious. It
suggested that he was void in one of the minor suits and was trying to put East on
lead to deliver a ruff. Boye saw that there was no point in trying to ruff a diamond
in dummy. Even if the ruff passed by without accident, he would have no entry
back to his hand. A club to the ace would surely be ruffed by West.
Boye continued by playing three rounds of trumps. The suit broke 3-3, he was
pleased to see, and East won the third round with the queen. Boye won the low
club return with the ace, West throwing a spade. The only chance of making the
contract was an eventual squeeze and his next move was a low diamond towards
the dummy. West does best to rise with the 10 and play a spade, killing the entry
to dummy before declarer can make use of it. He chose to play low instead and East
won dummy’s 9 with the J. These cards remained:
At this stage East could break the squeeze by returning a diamond. He preferred a
‘safe’ K and that was curtains for the defense. Boye ruffed, played his remaining
trumps and crossed to dummy with the A. On this trick East had no good discard
available from Q85 and the Q. He threw a diamond and Boye then scored three
diamond tricks for the contract.
The key to the next deal was reading the lie of the trump suit. Would you have
reached the same conclusion that Boye did?
Three rounds of diamonds forced Boye to ruff. He played a trump to the king and a
second trump to the ten, queen and ace. West returned his remaining trump, won
in the South hand, and this was the position:
How should declarer play the clubs? He can afford to lose two tricks in the suit
but he does need to establish two winners, so that he can discard a heart loser from
dummy.
Suppose you play a club to the jack. East will win with the queen and return
the J. If you win in the dummy and continue with the K, West will win with the
A and his remaining 95 will restrict you to only one club trick.
Perhaps it is better, as the cards lie, to play a club to the eight? Let’s see. East
wins with the Q and returns a heart to dummy’s ace. West wins your K with
the A, leaving your club holding blocked, and plays another heart to remove the
entry to the South hand. One down!
Only one play is good enough and Boye found it — a club to the king. When
he continued with the 8, East’s Q was expended on thin air. The heart switch
was won with dummy’s ace and the J then cleared a trick for declarer’s 10 while
the K remained as an entry.
How did Boye read the club position? Nothing was known of the heart
situation but he thought that East would have ventured 3 on the second round
with something like:
10 7 J 10 8 5 A K Q 6 4 A 6
Boye’s 2NT rebid was artificial and game-forcing and he ended in 4. West led the
10 to East’s queen and declarer won with the ace. When he led his singleton club,
West rose with the A and crossed to partner’s K to receive a heart ruff.
It did not escape Boye’s attention that this ruff was taken with the 9. He ruffed
West’s club return and had to decide how to play the trump suit. Four trumps were
still out and many players would have crossed to the A to run the Q, hoping to
find East with Kx. This could be the case only if West had chosen to ruff with the
9 from a trump holding of 9-7-4, 9-7-2 or 9-4-2. It was possible, yes, particularly
in a world championship semi-final. Still, how many defenders would falsecard in
this way?
Boye decided it was more likely that West had begun with K9 and had been
forced to ruff with the 9. Instead of crossing to dummy for a trump finesse, he
played the A from his hand. Wonderful sight! The K fell from West and he made
the contract.
Show this hand to some of the players at your club and they may disagree with
declarer’s line. ‘West could easily be falsecarding,’ they will tell you. ‘I would take
the percentage line of crossing to dummy for a trump finesse.’
Our advice is that you will do far better in the long run to assume that a
defender is not falsecarding. Another piece of evidence on this particular deal is
that good players do not particularly like leading doubletons. They are more likely
to choose such a lead when they hold the ace or king of trumps; they may then
gain the lead with this card and have a second chance of scoring a ruff in the suit
that was led.
N
W E
S
Q 10 6
KJ8
A862
K54
Andrew Robson led the A, Rita Shugart signaling discouragement with the 10.
How would you plan the play when West switches to a trump?
When you have decided, take a look at the whole deal:
AK5
7
K Q 10 9 7 4
863
9 7 3 J842
A Q 5 3 2 N 10 9 6 4
5 3 W E J
S
A 10 9 QJ72
Q 10 6
KJ8
A862
K54
The early play has been: A, East discouraging, and a trump switch.
How would you play when West leads the 7 to East’s Q?
Your first task is to determine how the clubs lie. When an unbid suit is led
after the defenders have found a fit, you might normally suspect that the lead is a
singleton. Boye discounted this possibility because East would surely have bid 4
if he held a 5-5 hand. It was unlikely that West had led from K107 in an unbid
suit, so Boye more or less placed West with 74. How could the contract be made
in that case?
Playing for a 3-3 diamond break is not a promising line because East’s shape
would then be 1-5-3-4 and the 4-1 trump break would be troublesome. Suppose
you win with the A, draw trumps in three rounds and cross to a diamond honor
to lead a club towards the jack. East will rise with the Q and with only one entry
left to your hand, you will not be able to establish and enjoy the thirteenth club.
West leads the Q against your diamond game. How will you tackle the play when
East overtakes with the K and switches to the Q?
Boye won with the A and drew trumps with the ace and king. After ruffing
dummy’s last spade and taking a successful finesse of the J, he played the AK,
discarding a club. When he led the 2, East produced the last heart. What would
you do on this trick?
If East had started with 5-4-2-2 shape and QJ, the contract could be made
by ruffing the fourth round of hearts and exiting with a club; East would have to
concede a ruff-and-sluff after winning with the J. Could the clubs lie like that,
though? The red-suit distribution was known from the fall of the cards. The
defenders’ spade bidding and West’s double of 5 made it a near certainty that
East had started with 6-4-2-1 shape. Boye therefore discarded another club on the
N
W E
S
Q 10 7 6
AKJ96
A
A43
West’s first two leads had already revealed good values in spades and diamonds,
so it was quite possible that East held the K. Before relying on a favorable club
position, Boye tried to build a spade trick. He won the diamond switch and led the
Q, covered by the K and ruffed in the dummy.
The AK brought the news of a 2-2 break and Boye now had to read the lie of
the spade suit. If East had begun with J43, a ruff of the 7 would bring down the
J and establish the 10 as the game-going trick. If instead, East had started with
843, Boye would need to lead the 10 to pin the 8. Which should it be?
Boye reasoned that in the dangerous case where East held the K, West might
need the J to make up his opening bid of 1. With only 10 points, he might not
have been willing to open when vulnerable against non-vulnerable. Boye therefore
continued with the 10.
If West had covered with the J, declarer would ruff in the dummy; East’s 8
would be pinned and the 7 would be good. West defended more strongly, playing
low on the 10. Reading the position, Boye threw a club from dummy. He could
then ruff his last spade in dummy for a tenth trick.
One of the most important skills in bridge is slam bidding. What methods do you
need to achieve accuracy in this area? A complex relay system, perhaps? A host
of conventions, each targeted at a particular situation? Not at all. As we will see
in this chapter, it is possible to bid a great majority of slams accurately using only
cuebids, Roman Keycard Blackwood (RKCB) and a small number of other gadgets.
Asking for the trump queen Here it was South who bid RKCB. When
A bid in the cheapest non- partner showed the missing key card (the
trump suit asks for the trump K) he bid 5 to ask for the Q. North’s
queen: 6 showed the trump queen and the K.
Mouiel could not be sure of a parking spot
sign-off: no trump queen
for all his heart losers and signed off in 6,
new suit: trump Q + side king Norway gaining 11 IMPs. You can see how
5NT: trump Q and no king. valuable it was for North to bid RKCB rather
than South.
The key bid was Boye’s 4 response to the takeout double. (At the other table
North bid just 3 and South’s 3NT ended the auction.) If South has a minimum
double of 3, he will hold four cards in spades. With five-card spade support and
two useful kings, the North hand is therefore worth a positive move.
Erik Sælensminde asked for keycards.
5NT confirmed that all keycards were held 5NT asking for kings
and asked for specific kings. When Boye Following a RKCB 4NT with
showed the K, Erik could count eleven 5NT asks partner to identify
tricks. Since two extra tricks in either black a side-suit king. Six of the
suit would bring the total to thirteen, he bid trump suit will deny any.
the grand slam in notrump rather than spades. Otherwise he will bid the suit
(Suppose West held J9xx. You would still of his king (the cheaper king
make 7NT if clubs were 3-3.) When the spade if he holds two).
suit broke 3-2, 7NT was easily made.
Boye’s 5 response showed two keycards and the Q. Erik could now visualize a
grand slam if South held the K. He continued with 5NT, asking for specific side-
suit kings and was happy to hear the 6 response. Six spade tricks, three top clubs
and the red aces would add up to eleven. A diamond ruff or two, not to mention
extra club tricks, would surely carry the total to thirteen. He bid 7, as did Katz
and Jacobs at the other table, and the contract was easily made.
Suppose Boye’s response to the 5NT enquiry had been 6, showing that he
held the K but not the K. North would then be nowhere near to counting
thirteen tricks; he would have signed off in 6. How about a 6 response? The K
would not be quite as useful as the K because the prospect of extra tricks would
be slightly less in that suit. It would still be a good bet to bid the grand slam. Two
diamond ruffs, or one ruff and a seventh spade, would again bring the total to
thirteen.
How should South react to North’s splinter bid of 4? Some players would mutter
to themselves: ‘My K is wasted opposite the splinter bid and that leaves me with a
virtual 7-count. I have poor trumps too, so I am going to sign off in 4.’
Redoubling a cuebid
When you cuebid, alert opponents may take advantage by doubling to suggest a
good opening lead. This is not a one-way gain for them since you or your partner
will then have the chance to redouble. The meaning of such an action depends on
which player redoubles. Look at this deal first:
Since a rebid of 2 from North would be natural and forcing (a reverse), 3 becomes
available as a mini-splinter. In other words, it shows a raise to 3 that includes at
most one card in diamonds.
Pick-a-slam 5NT
On the next deal heavy bidding from the opponents left Boye short of space to
investigate the best slam.
Boye and Erik frequently upgrade a good 14-point hand to a 15-17 point 1NT
opening. The North hand merited such treatment, with its strong five-card suit,
two aces and two tens. Erik’s 3 was a natural slam try and Boye signed off in 3NT.
When Erik persisted with 4, showing a second suit, Boye was willing to play at
the slam level. Uncertain which minor would make the better trump suit, he bid a
Exclusion Blackwood
How can you ask for keycards when you have a void in your hand? The answer
is to use Exclusion Blackwood. By bidding a suit at the five-level (instead of 4NT)
you show a void and ask partner for keycards not including the ace of your void
suit. Boye and Erik used that method here:
Diamonds were agreed as trumps and Erik’s leap to 5 carried the message: ‘I have
a heart void. How many keycards do you hold outside hearts?’ If Boye had shown
one keycard (5NT, showing the A), a further keycard enquiry of 6 would have
allowed Erik to locate a possible K in the North hand and bid the grand slam. As
it was, Boye denied the A and the bidding came to a halt in 6.
One good measure of a bridge player is how he or she reacts when things go wrong.
Perhaps the auction goes adrift and the final contract is a dubious one. Maybe the
trump suit or a key side suit breaks badly. In this chapter we will see how a skilful
declarer can sometimes manage to survive such hostile circumstances.
We start with an early memory from Boye’s bridge career, a 6NT contract that
led to a pretty end position:
West led the 10, won in the South hand. When Boye played the A and K, the
4-1 break came to light. How would you have attempted to rescue the situation?
3 Rescue Operations | 39
Boye finessed the Q successfully and cashed three more heart tricks, West
throwing a club. These cards were left:
5
—
Q9
Q84
10 K98
— N —
J 8 W E —
S
AJ9 532
AJ2
—
—
K 10 7
A club to the queen at this stage, followed by a second spade finesse, would produce
only eleven tricks. Instead, Boye led the K. West won with the A and could not
safely play a diamond or a club. When he chose to exit with the 10, Boye won
with the J and played the A to squeeze West in the minor suits.
Sometimes a contract seems impregnable until you draw the first round of
trumps. An opponent shows out and you then have to make fresh plans. That was
the case on this spade game:
Juliano Barbosa was able to lead a heart, despite East’s three-bid, and a useful
dummy hit the table. Unless trumps broke 4-0, a heart could be thrown on the
3 Rescue Operations | 41
Would you bid 3 or 3 on Boye’s cards? North would have re-opened with a
double with his red-suit lengths reversed, so it seems very much a guess. West led
his singleton club to East’s A and back came the Q. Fortunately for Boye, West
did not find the best discard on this — he threw the 4 instead of a spade. How
would you continue the play from this point?
Boye ruffed in the dummy and led the K to East’s ace, unblocking the 9 from
his hand. The heart return went to West’s jack and dummy’s queen. Prospects were
still poor but Boye soldiered on with ace and another diamond, West winning the
queen with the king. These cards remained:
A Q 10 8 4
86
—
—
K J 9 6 3 75
— N —
6 4 W E —
S
— J 10 8 6 3
2
10 7
J 10
97
West exited with a low spade and Boye had to calculate which card to play from
dummy. He needed six out of the last seven tricks and had no side-suit entry to
the South hand to draw West’s trumps. With a trump trick to be lost, he calculated
that he would have to score two trumps, one heart, and three spade tricks! ‘Ten of
spades, please, partner.’
Dummy’s 10 won the trick. Boye reached his hand with a spade ruff and
played his last trump, throwing a spade from dummy. When he turned to his
heart winners, West could discard on the 10 but then had to ruff the second
heart (otherwise Boye would reach dummy with the 8 and score the A for his
ninth trick). On lead with only the KJ9 remaining, West had to lead a spade into
dummy’s AQ and the contract was made.
Before we move to the next deal, think back to the moment when Boye
unblocked the 9 from his hand. Had he retained the 109 as his last two hearts,
West could have discarded spades on the hearts. Declarer would be unable to
reach the A and the defenders would score a club and West’s last trump to beat
the contract!
The second 3 contract comes from the world’s top individual event — a type
of tournament where the contestants change partners every few boards. How
would you have tackled this one?
West led the 3 and Boye captured East’s 9 with the K. What would you have
done next?
Boye could be fairly sure from the bidding that West’s distribution was
2-5-2-4. (The spade lead could not be a singleton or East would have opened 1.)
The percentage play in trumps, looking at the suit in isolation, was to cross to the
ace and finesse the jack. Even if he managed to pick up the trump suit, however,
there would still be a danger of losing two spades, two clubs and one heart (because
there would be no entry to dummy to take the heart finesse).
Boye decided to take the second-best line in trumps, playing the king and
ace. If West’s doubleton trump included the queen, he would not only pick up the
trump suit but also end in dummy to finesse the Q. Sadly, the Q did not fall and
prospects looked bleak. Would you have seen any chance to rescue the situation?
Unwilling to give up, Boye called for the 8. East, who could have scuttled the
contract by covering with the 10, played low. Boye did the same and dummy’s 8
won the trick! Since he was still in dummy, he was able to take a successful heart
finesse. The contract was his.
Perhaps you are unimpressed by this and are muttering to yourself that any
respectable East player would have seen the need to cover the 8. Oh yes? East
was Italy’s multiple world champion, Norberto Bocchi!
Prospects did look good initially on our next deal, a borderline club slam. A
closer look revealed that there was more than one way to rescue the slam contract.
3 Rescue Operations | 43
N-S Vul. J43 2002 Norwegian Championship
Dealer East 10 9 6 4 Heimdal - Bergen
KQ4
KQ9
9 2 Q 10 8 6
J 5 3 N Q87
J 8 7 5 3 W E A962
S
876 10 5
AK75
AK2
10
AJ432
Boye won the Q lead with the K and crossed to the 10 to take the ‘marked
finesse’ in diamonds. Not so marked on this occasion — East had opened on only
10 points and the finesse lost to the king. East won the spade continuation with the
ace and cleared the spade suit. How would you play from this point?
Boye cashed one more round of diamonds, to see if the 10 would fall. To
play another round of diamonds, hoping for a 3-3 break, would result in defeat.
Instead, Boye switched back to the club suit. This was the position with one club
still to be played:
—
J764
9
—
— 10 6
10 9 5 2 N A
— W E 10 8
S
8 —
—
K8
J4
K
Boye led the K, throwing dummy’s 4, and East was squeezed in three suits. To
retain his diamond guard, he had to discard a spade winner. No guess was now
required. Boye played the 8 to the bare A and discarded the 4 when East
3 Rescue Operations | 45
cashed his remaining spade. East had to exit with a diamond and the J and K
scored the last two tricks for declarer.
Moving on, we look at a deal where bad red-suit breaks put 3NT at risk.
Boye won the spade lead with the king and played a diamond to the jack. East won
with the ace and returned a spade, West winning with the ace and clearing the suit.
On the third round of spades, both East and South discarded a club. How would
you have continued the play from this point?
Boye crossed to his K and ran the 10 into the safe East hand. If East had
won, everything would have been easy. No, this was the Vanderbilt and East
withheld the Q. When the 9 was run next, West threw a spade and East again
held up the queen, hoping to restrict declarer to three heart tricks.
Thwarted in the heart suit, Boye played the Q next. The suit failed to divide
3-3, East discarding a club, and these cards remained:
—
AJ7
—
10 4
8 7 —
— N Q5
10 W E —
S
K9 Q76
—
K
43
AJ
At the other table, the USA North passed and Tor Helness opened 1 on the East
cards. Lew Stansby (South) came to rest in 2, just making for +110. A large
number of IMPs were available if Boye could somehow make nine tricks in his
unlikely looking notrump game.
Alan Sontag led the 3 to partner’s ace and Peter Weichsel returned the 8 to
West’s Q. There was little point in clearing the heart suit and West switched to the
10, won by East with his Q. How would you have tried to give yourself a chance
in 3NT when East returns the 8 to dummy’s bare ace?
3 Rescue Operations | 47
Boye crossed to the A and cashed the K, stripping East of his safe exit card
in that suit. He then led the J to East’s K. Weichsel, sitting East, had to find the
best return in this end position:
—
—
J9
KJ76
— —
10 N —
10 6 5 4 W E Q83
S
10 Q83
97
—
AK72
—
A club into dummy’s KJ did not look very inviting, so Weichsel returned a low
diamond. Boye ran this successfully to dummy’s J and discarded his remaining
low diamond on the K. His hand was then high — two spades and two diamonds
— and the game was made.
Did you spot how the defense could have done better? In the six-card end
position shown, East must exit with the Q rather than a low diamond. Declarer
can win with the A, cash two spades and cross to the J to score the K. He
would then have to surrender the last trick to East’s Q for one down.
Boye faced two problems on the next deal. The trump suit was somewhat
inadequate and the defenders were threatening to score a club ruff. No genie in a
bottle was available for assistance, so he had to rescue the situation himself.
How would you play the spade game when West leads the 4?
Let’s see first what happened at the other table, after the same lead. Declarer
won with the Q and finessed the Q, losing to the K. West ruffed the 10
return and underled the A to put East on lead for a second club ruff. That was
one down.
Boye won the club lead in the dummy and led a heart, breaking the link
between the two defenders. East rose with the K and gave his partner a club
ruff. West then tried to cash the A but Boye ruffed in his hand. A trump to the
queen now would result in a second ruff, but Boye played a trump to the ace. He
then returned to his hand with the K to lead a second round of trumps. This line
would succeed whether West had started with K84 or J84. As the cards lay, the
jack, queen and king appeared on the second round of trumps. Boye ruffed the
heart return with the 9 and crossed to the A to draw East’s last trump. Dummy
was then high.
Boye reached a fairly awful slam on the deal below. West breathed some life
into the contract with a helpful opening lead but there was still some work to do.
How would you have played it?
3 Rescue Operations | 49
The Icelandic West led the A and down went the dummy. On any other lead
prospects would have been dismal indeed. How would you take advantage of this
favorable start when West switches to the 5 at Trick 2?
There was no reason whatsoever to think that West would switch away from
the K. Boye rose with the A and drew two rounds of trumps with the ace and
queen, West showing out on the second round. He cashed the Q, crossed to
dummy with a third round of trumps and discarded a club on the K.
Do you see the ending that Boye had in mind? Only one defender guarded
the fourth round of hearts; only one defender held a guard against South’s Q. If
West held the J and East held the K, neither defender would be able to retain a
diamond guard when the remaining trumps were run.
Boye returned to his hand with the A and played two more rounds of trumps.
These cards were still to be played:
—
5
K6
—
— —
J N —
J 10 W E Q7
S
— K
4
—
4
Q
This is the classic matrix of the double squeeze. When the 4 was led, West had
to release the 10 to retain his heart guard. The 5 was thrown from dummy and
East was caught in a similar dilemma. Whether he threw the K or a diamond,
declarer would have his twelfth trick.
‘You played it well,’ said Zia. ‘But next time, please, another king for your 2
bid!’
In this chapter we will look at some championship deals where good play or good
bidding was not rewarded on the scorecard. While this may seem unfair at the
time, many people regard bridge as containing the perfect balance between skill
and luck.
On the first deal Erik Sælensminde was in 3NT and had to calculate the best
play to bring in dummy’s long diamond suit.
Rose Meltzer led the 5, Sælensminde winning with the J. When a diamond was
played to dummy’s king, West followed with the 2 and East with the 10. What
play should you make on the next round of diamonds?
Perhaps you think that it is obvious to continue with the Q, pinning East’s
J. In a typical club game you might well be right. In a world final, however, you
can expect East to falsecard an honor from J10x. Indeed, if he fails to do so you
4 There’s No Justice! | 51
would have no guess in the suit; your only chance would be to lead a low card on
the second round and this would bring down West’s bare A.
Suppose East plays the 10 and you continue with a low diamond on the
second round; you will make the contract when East began with J102 or J105
(two combinations). If instead you continue with the Q, you will succeed only
when East holds J10 (one combination). Sælensminde duly continued with a low
diamond — the percentage play. No justice on this occasion! East’s J won the
trick and the game went three down.
The diamond situation is an example of the Principle of Restricted Choice.
If West holds A5 or A2, she has no choice with her play; she must contribute
the low card on the first round. From a holding of A52, she can choose which
spotcard to play. Restricted Choice states that it is more likely that a card was
played because its owner had no choice than that the card was chosen from equals.
When you have two possible trump suits available — one a 5-4 fit, the other
a 4-4 fit — it is not always easy to decide which to choose. How would you and
your partner have bid these hands?
Boye’s 2 was a standard transfer bid, showing at least five hearts, and East’s double
showed something good in diamonds. Erik’s transfer break to 3 showed a useful
heart fit and a strong four-card suit in clubs. West preempted in diamonds and
Boye then bid a small slam in clubs.
Do you see what an excellent contract 6 is? Even if the club finesse loses, you
can discard your spade loser on the fifth round of hearts and make the slam. No
fewer than 14 pairs in this event bid the small slam in hearts instead, a contract that
West led the 10 and Zia did not like the look of dummy. East scored the two top
honors in the suit and switched to the 3. Zia perked up a bit at this reprieve.
He won with the A and played a club to the king. East ducked the first round
of clubs and won the second. He then exited with the 9, won in the dummy as
West showed out.
Zia’s next move was to lead dummy’s 8, which East does best to duck.
Declarer would still arrive at eight tricks, since East would have to give him a third
heart trick at the end. East decided to win with the K. Zia won the club return,
discarding the J. He then unblocked the A and crossed to the K to enjoy
three more heart tricks. That was +150 and a matchpoint score of 114 out of 130,
contributing to an eventual win in the event.
Suppose the Q and K had been swapped on that last deal. The bidding would
have been just the same but the defenders would have scored seven diamonds, one
heart and one club. Four down!
Boye found a great defensive play on the next deal. The opponents had stayed
low, however, so only overtricks were at stake.
4 There’s No Justice! | 53
Both Vul. Q 7 2010 Vanderbilt
Dealer West K Q 10 9 Reno, Nevada
KJ752
94
J 9 5 4 2 K863
— N 8765
Q 8 4 3 W E 6
S
J865 KQ73
A 10
AJ432
A 10 9
A 10 2
North’s 2 was Drury, showing a good heart raise, and East’s double was lead-
directing. Playing third and fifth leads, Boye led the 6 to the queen and ace.
Helgemo drew trumps in four rounds and led the 9. What are your thoughts
now, sitting West?
If West plays low, declarer will run the 9 successfully. He continues with the
A and 10, overtaking with dummy’s jack, and can then throw two black-suit
losers on the remaining diamonds for +680. Boye had no difficulty in reading
the diamond position. He covered the 9 with the Q! Declarer had to win with
dummy’s K or the defenders would cash two club tricks. The diamonds were
now blocked and Helgemo made only three diamond tricks instead of five, scoring
+620.
You might fondly hope to pick up a couple of IMPs with a smart defense like
that but at the other table Boye’s team mates, Fantoni and Nunes, reached 6 after
North had opened the bidding. Claudio Nunes sneaked through the 9, early in
the play, and scored up his slam with five hearts, five diamonds and the two black
aces.
It’s time for a bidding problem and we will give you this hand held by Tony
Forrester, sitting North in the 2002 Life Master Pairs:
A K 10 8 6 6 5 4 3 6 A 8 5
Your second-round double is for takeout and partner responds with a cuebid of 4.
What will you bid now?
Forrester placed Boye with great diamonds. The opponents’ bidding, along
with the 4 bid, meant that Boye would hold at most one heart and maybe a void.
Forrester bid 6, on his singleton diamond, with every expectation that this would
be a good contract. The next player doubled and this was the full layout:
East’s Lightner double requested an unusual lead, often in dummy’s first-bid suit.
It was not difficult for West to find the spade lead. East ruffed and cashed the
A successfully. That was one down and poor reward for North-South’s splendid
bidding sequence. Boye and Tony finished third in the event and were left wishing
that they had not bid this hand so well!
4 There’s No Justice! | 55
One good diamond slam deserves another and this time it was Boye’s opponents
who reached the top spot.
Jan-Petter Svendsen thought his 4 bid was forcing. (He could not play safe by
bidding the opponents’ suit because West’s major suit had not been disclosed.)
Helness took the view that 4 was invitational. It was lucky indeed for the European
team to win the board after such an auction.
Look back at the full diagram. In another match there was no swing on the
board; both tables went five down in 6NT!
How often will you hold a 7-6-0-0 hand? The chance of picking up such a
shape is around 18,000-to-1 against. The fact that this book contains three such
hands held by Boye and Erik Sælensminde at championship level, plus a fourth
held by their opponents, tells you that they play a huge amount of bridge. How
would you have bid the South cards here?
Erik’s 5NT showed two places to play. He would have bid 6 with a major two-
suiter, so Boye could infer that he held diamonds and a major. Boye bid 6, with
nothing to lose, and was not surprised to hear the correction to 6. How would
you play this contract when West leads the K?
With diamonds breaking 3-2 and the K onside, perhaps you think that there
is little to the play. (After ruffing the club lead, you can simply play a low trump
4 There’s No Justice! | 57
towards dummy’s queen.) Erik did not play this way. He ruffed the club lead in
his hand, cashed the A and ruffed a diamond with the 8, all following. He then
ran the Q. West won with the K and returned the J. East chose not to ruff this
card because he knew that his J4 could not be caught. Erik had to lose a trump
trick and he was one down.
Why did Erik play this way? West had opened with a non-vulnerable preempt,
so East was favorite to hold the K. By running the Q through East, declarer would
make the slam when East held K, KJ, Kx, KJx, Kxx, KJxx or Kxxx. That
is fifteen combinations. He would succeed also when the Q lost to the K but the
J fell on the second round (unless West could give East a diamond ruff). Leading
low to the Q instead would win against a similar number of combinations, mostly
with West holding the K. West was less likely to hold the K, however, so it is
not an even comparison. In addition to that, Erik would have made the contract
some of the time when diamonds broke 4-1. When the preemptor held a singleton
diamond, for example, he would not have been able to ruff effectively in front of
the dummy. Declarer could establish the diamond suit by ruffing with the 8 and
then run the Q.
So, Erik took the best line and, as a result, went off in a slam that his
grandmother would have made easily. Mind you, she would probably have bid 6
instead of 5NT!
In the Danish town of Odense in 2000 a special bridge match was held to
celebrate the 75th anniversary of contract bridge. The match was between Denmark
and the ‘Rest of the World’. Boye was declarer on this slam hand:
QJ
—
7
8
9 7 K52
K N 10
— W E —
S
J —
A 10 6
—
—
9
On dummy’s last diamond Boye threw the 6 and West the 9. (If he discarded the
K instead, he would be thrown in with a trump). Expecting that he had squeezed
West down to a bare K, Boye played a spade to his ace. Would this deal travel
round the world’s bridge magazines? No. To Boye’s great disappointment it was
only a humble 7 that appeared from West. Another grandmother-proof contract
had bitten the dust.
When the last round of the 2010 Copenhagen Invitational started, Erik
Sælensminde and Boye were lying second, facing Poland’s fourth-placed Jassem
and Martens. The prize money went down to third place and the Norwegian pair
could afford to lose this match by 17 IMPs, but not 18, to come in the money. Boye
will take up the story:
4 There’s No Justice! | 59
We had a terrible start to the 10-board match and were down 35 IMPs
halfway through. I was desperate to create a swing when I picked up these
cards for Board 6:
973
92
10 7 6 4 2
J 10 4
We were non-vulnerable; the Poles were vulnerable. What would you have
done to pick up some much-needed IMPs?
Hoping that the opponents had a vulnerable game, I decided to
redouble — showing 10+ points and normally looking for blood! Martens
passed, my partner did the same, and Jassem bid 2. What now?
I could hope that my redouble had done the trick. I didn’t see them
ending up in 2, though, so I followed up my initial redouble with a double
for penalties! I hoped West would bid 2 and it would go two passes to
me, so I could finally put a green Pass card on the table. Martens bid
2, asking partner to choose a black suit, and Jassem bid 2. I couldn’t
do much else than pass for now — forcing — and it looked like we were
heading for trouble.
Martens passed, and Erik, probably disappointed that I couldn’t
double 2, bid 3. I passed, and Martens did the same. We had escaped!
This was the layout:
Erik went two down in 3, losing 100, which looked like a great result as
our opponents were cold for a vulnerable spade game.
Did large wads of Danish kroner end up in our suitcases as a result?
Sadly, no. Three of the eight E/W pairs had soared into 6, going down
because of the 5-2 diamond split. We picked up only 5 IMPs on the board
and were overtaken by the Poles in the final rankings. No glory, no prize
money, but a thrilling ride it sure was!
4 There’s No Justice! | 61
5
Interesting Bidding
Treatments
In this chapter we will look at various bidding treatments that have served Boye
handsomely over the years. One real-life example of a particular method faring
well may not be enough to convince you to use it, we realize. Still, you may find
something that catches your eye.
Judging the South cards to be too strong for a 15-17 point 1NT, Erik Sælensminde
opened 1. Boye’s 3 response carried the message: ‘We may be able to make
game in spades if you have a particularly good fit for my diamond singleton.’
Erik’s diamond holding then allowed him to bid game — despite the unpromising
holding in hearts, the suit bid by East.
At the other table, South did open 1NT, followed by two passes. Terje Aa bid
2 on the East cards, promising six cards in one of the majors. South was reluctant
to bid 2 immediately and must have been disappointed when 2 was passed out
and made with two overtricks!
Players refine their systems over the years. When partner opens 1, these are
the fit-showing responses that Boye now favors:
2 natural
2 shortage in a minor, invitational, 2NT asks for shortage
2NT Jacoby, game-forcing
3 game-try, usually balanced
3 shortage in spades, invitational
3 preemptive
3, 4, 4 void-showing
As you see, you can discover that partner has a side-suit void, rather than a singleton.
Traditional splinter responses do not allow this distinction.
What should Boye bid on the second round? In a bidding competition you might
take a scientific route, cuebidding 4 to show a diamond control but no club
control. On this particular deal you would then stop in 4 and pick up 10 points
for your scholarly efforts. At the table, life is different. It was likely that North held
a club control. Even if that were not the case, a helpful opening lead might allow
the slam to make. Boye therefore bid Roman Keycard Blackwood. When he heard
of one ace opposite, he bid the slam. When West missed the club lead, choosing a
trump, Boye made the contract easily.
The responses to 1 are similar to those after a 1 opening: 3 shows the
shortage in a minor and 3 is invitational; 4/4/4 show a void.
Erik Sælensminde’s Jacoby 2NT showed at least four-card heart support and was
game-forcing. Boye’s 3 was natural and showed an unbalanced, non-minimum
hand. 3 asked for shortage and 3NT shows 2-5-2-4 shape (or possibly 2-6-2-3).
On a hand that was at the bottom end of non-minimum, Boye could have bid 4
over 3, so 3NT was another all-so-important indication of playing strength. Erik’s
4 was a cuebid and 4 a sign-off. With a stronger hand, Boye could have bid 4
instead — a ‘last train’ slam try, not saying anything about a diamond control.
North continued with 5, which carried the message ‘I am still interested in a
slam but I do not have a spade control.’ Boye would have signed off without a spade
control in his hand. His actual 5 showed a spade control but said nothing about
his diamond holding.
That is how the Jacoby 2NT should be used — as a springboard for the
exchange of information. How would you play the slam when West leads the J?
So, three-level bids in a new suit show three-card support and four cards in the suit
bid. Four-level bids show four-card support and a shortage. If responder bids 3
at his third turn, this shows only game-try values.
The 2NT relay bid made life easy on this slam deal from the Norway-Turkey
match in the 2008 European Championship:
Espen Lindqvist bid 2NT to discover more about Boye’s hand. The 3 response
was good news, indicating four clubs and a singleton diamond. He bid 3 to set
spades as trumps (3 would have been only a game-try, remember) and continued
with 4NT. Over the one-ace response he continued with 5 to ask about the queen
of trumps. Without this card, Boye would have signed off in 5, which would
become the final contract. Holding the trump queen, but no king in the side suits,
Boye jumped to 6.
As you see, the key to the hand was East’s singleton diamond opposite West’s
three spot cards. Suppose East’s minors had been swapped and he had bid 3 over
the 2NT relay. The bidding would then have stopped in game — high enough
when there might well be three losers in diamonds.
When Boye showed short hearts, Erik Sælensminde knew that 3NT would not be
the right game. With the perfect fit in hearts, ace opposite the singleton, a slam
might be possible if partner was strong. Erik therefore rebid 4. Boye had no wish
to play in a slam and signed off in his lowest playable suit, the bidding coming to
a halt in 5.
Boye won the K opening lead and drew trumps. When he played the K, West
followed with the Q. What should declarer do on the next round of diamonds?
Looking at the diamond suit in isolation, the Principle of Restricted Choice states
that a singleton Q or J is twice as likely as a holding of QJ. By finessing the
10 on the second round, whenever the queen or jack appears from West, you
will pick up the diamond suit two times out of three. There is a secondary issue
here, however. If you play the A on the second round and find that West began
with QJ, you will definitely make the contract; you can discard two spades from
dummy on the diamonds and ruff a spade for your eleventh trick. If instead you
finesse the 10 and West shows out, you will still need to guess the spade suit
correctly. You cannot afford to lose two spade tricks in that case, as you fight your
way back to dummy for a second diamond finesse. Suppose the spade honors are
split and you finesse the J, losing to East’s Q. He will force your last trump with
a heart and West will cash some hearts when he rises with the A.
It was a close decision and Boye decided to follow Restricted Choice, finessing
the 10 to West’s J. West duly switched to a spade, putting declarer to a guess.
With little to guide him, Boye made the happy choice to call for dummy’s J. This
forced the A and the club game was made.
With the K protected from the opening lead, 6 was safe. What would have
happened if North had played the contract instead? Any self-respecting East would
have underled the A. The only chance, isn’t it?!
Many a contract depends on locating a missing queen and there are few areas of
the game where experts have a greater edge over non-experts. In this chapter we
will look at several deals where success depended on reading which defender held
a vital queen.
The time-honored method for deciding such matters is to gain as much
information as possible on the lie of the other suits. Boye followed this well-beaten
track on our first deal:
Erik Sælensminde’s Jacoby 2NT showed a game-forcing raise in spades and Boye’s
4 rebid indicated a singleton or void club. Erik used Roman Keycard Blackwood
to discover that South held one keycard (the K), also the Q and the K. How
would you play the slam when West leads the 3?
Look at the bidding first. What sort of hand would you expect South to hold for
his 5 bid?
I was not sure if Restricted Choice applied to West’s play of the J. East
also had two cards that he could follow with if he held four diamonds (the
10 and 8). Isn’t that kind of Restricted Choice too when he played the 8
instead of the 10? I think you would have to ask a math professor, and I
am still not sure you would get the right answer!
I recalled that Lauria had jumped to 4 — was that not a bit more
likely with xxxx-xxxx-10xxx-x rather than xxxx-xxxx-xxx-Qx? On the other
hand he would be more tempted to sacrifice in 6 with the first hand since
6 more or less has to be gin. The game of bridge is truly fascinating.
I did get a feeling, though, when Versace switched to the 10 quite
quickly, that he had the queen of clubs. And looking at dummy (unless
I need to guess clubs), the only way to beat the contract is to find Lauria
with a club void. So I played more with my gut feeling than a sure knowledge
of the odds.
Several years before, in the European junior championships, Boye had faced a
curiously similar guess for the Q:
Boye’s 3 rebid, facing the Jacoby 2NT, was natural and showed a non-minimum
hand. Øyvind Saur’s 3 then indicated a singleton. Two cuebids, followed by
Roman Keycard Blackwood, led to a final contract of 6.
West’s Q won the first trick and Boye ruffed the second diamond with the ace.
All depended on the club guess and it was therefore essential to gather as much
distributional information as possible. Boye crossed to a trump, ruffed another
diamond, returned to dummy with a second round of trumps and ruffed dummy’s
last diamond. Noting that diamonds had broken 4-4, and trumps 1-3, he crossed
to the A and drew East’s last trump. West, meanwhile, had discarded two spades.
How did the clubs lie? West had shown up with five red cards to East’s seven,
which tilted the odds slightly in favor of him holding three clubs rather than two.
No sort of count was available on the spade suit but Boye reasoned that West might
well have found a spade overcall if he held six spades. If he held only five spades,
as suggested by the lack of an overcall, this would give him 5-1-4-3 shape!
Boye played a club to the king and then finessed West for the Q. That was
twelve tricks and a big swing for Norway when the German South went down in
the same contract, playing for the drop in clubs.
We will end with a 3NT deal from a matchpoint event. There was a two-way
guess for the Q and the considerations were quite different from those prevailing
at IMPs. We will present only two hands initially, so you can decide how to play the
contract yourself. Boye will then describe his thoughts at the time:
N
W E
S
KQ3
A52
K 10 8 6 4
92
West leads the 8, overtaken with the 9. I duck the first round of hearts
and East continues with the K. I can assume the hearts are 6-2 after
the jump overcall. In any case, it would be risky to hold up again because
a club switch would be awkward. I win with the A, West following with the
7, and must now consider how to play the diamond suit. What would your
thoughts have been? (Remember that it is matchpoint scoring.)
At IMPs there would be no problem whatsoever. West has no heart
left to play. Cashing the A and running the J into the safe West hand
would guarantee you at least ten tricks, even if West won with the Q. At
pairs, I don’t think this is the best line at all. When West holds the Q, you
can score +660 instead of +630 by finessing against West and scoring
five diamond tricks. In that case the extra 30 points will be worth a full
half of a top. The whole field will surely be in 3NT, so your score on the
board depends almost 100% on whether you guess the position of the Q
correctly.
I mark time by playing a spade to the jack and a spade back to the
king, to check if East has a singleton spade. (East and West would then
hold seven major-suit cards each and there would be no reason to finesse
West for the Q.) When East follows with the 2 and 4, it is clear that
he holds at least two more cards in the majors than West. That makes
West favorite to hold the Q and I am going to play for that chance.
Should I cash the K on the first round, in case East holds a singleton
Q? No, because this would prevent me from scoring five diamond tricks
when East holds a singleton 7, 5, 3 or 2 in the suit, which is four times
as likely. The right play is to run the 10 at Trick 3, underplaying with
A J 10 6
43
AJ9
A864
9 8 7 5 42
8 7 N K Q J 10 9 6
7 5 3 2 W E Q
S
K 10 7 QJ53
KQ3
A52
K 10 8 6 4
92
West did hold more diamonds than East, as I had expected. Unfortunately,
East held the singleton Q and proceeded to cash four more heart tricks.
For minus 200 on the board we scored only 2 matchpoints out of 154.
Although the bidding must have been similar at many tables, the other
declarers obviously felt they should finesse into the safe hand. What a
bunch of cowards!
The most important contract in bridge is 3NT. It is the most enticing game to bid,
with its target of only nine tricks; it is also the game that is bid most frequently. In
this chapter we will see some of the key techniques that you can use to ‘win the
3NT race’ — in other words, to score nine tricks before the defenders score five.
We will launch proceedings with a fairly gentle deal, where Boye was partnering
his wife Tonje.
West leads the 3 to East’s jack and your queen. What is your plan?
Four spade tricks will give you the contract and you would like to lead towards
the J on the first round. If East holds the Q, you will then score the tricks you
need against a 4-2 break either way round. How should you cross to dummy for
the first spade lead?
Only 21 points between the hands, yes, but all four tens were to play a role. West
led a heart to partner’s ace and back came a heart to West’s king. How would you
tackle the contract when West plays a third heart to dummy’s J, East throwing a
club?
West had responded 1 and shown up with five hearts. If his distribution
was 5-5-1-2, East would be 5-5 in the minors and would have opened 1. It was
therefore likely that West’s shape was 5-5-2-1. Boye played a diamond to his king
and ran the 10 to East’s Q. When East returned a low diamond, Boye rose with
the Q and the J fell from West.
With seven top tricks available at this stage Boye led the J from his hand,
covered by the Q and A. The trick count was up to eight and East was now ripe
for an endplay. Boye cashed dummy’s Q, throwing a spade from his hand, and
crossed to the K. These cards remained:
When the 10 was played, East was in trouble. Sensing his fate, he discarded the
8. Boye then threw him in with a diamond to lead into dummy’s AJ tenace.
Meckwell would be proud of him!
The next deal illustrates two techniques that arise frequently at notrump.
If North held four spades and was looking for a 4-4 fit in that suit, he would have
continued with an artificial 3 on the second round. His jump to 3NT did not
therefore promise four spades, as it would in many systems. What is your plan
when West leads the 3 to East’s ten and your queen?
Suppose you develop the clubs first, cashing the K and finessing the J. East
will win with the Q and clear the diamond suit. When you play on spades to seek
How will you play the notrump game when West leads the 3, East playing the 9?
Boye saw that if the defenders persisted with hearts, giving him two tricks in
the suit, one spade trick would take him past the finishing line. Since he intended
Boye arrived in 3NT (his previous bid of 2NT was game-forcing) and West led the
3 to East’s K, which was allowed to win. The 10 was covered by the J and
Per-Ola Cullin’s 2 was a forcing-to-game relay. The 2NT response showed 8-10
ZZ-points, where A=3, K=2 and Q=1, with at least ten cards in spades and one
other suit. The 3 continuation was a further relay and 3 named diamonds
as the second suit. (We will understand if you do not leap to adopt this method
immediately…)
With this information available to him, Børre Lund made the brilliant lead of
the K. The Swedish declarer won with the A, no doubt expecting the lead to be
from the KQ, and played a spade to the ten. Lund won this trick and continued
with the 10 to give the defenders four heart tricks. 3NT was two down and that
was 13 IMPs to Norway.
On the next deal, Boye arrived in 3NT and found that he had er… only three
top tricks available. He will tell you the story of what happened.
I now lead a low spade from dummy. If East holds the K, as I expect, I will
have time to test the spade break before choosing a discard on the K.
(If spades are 4-2, I will throw the 9; if spades are 5-1, I will throw a spade
and then have to guess the position of the 10.)
Hristov, the Bulgarian East, rises with the K and I have my nine
tricks. If East had played low, a better defense, only three spade tricks
would be available and I would have to guess the diamonds. By Restricted
Choice, single J or 10 is more likely than J10, so I would probably have
made the contract anyway.
We will end the chapter with a couple of deals featuring defense against 3NT. The
first is from Boye’s days as a junior:
With the spades sitting so well, the ugly 3NT contract had every prospect of
succeeding. A heart lead would have given declarer a ninth trick. South’s bidding
— passing on the first round, then leaping to 3NT — had shown good hearts. Boye
was therefore inclined to look elsewhere. He led the 5 and Øyvind Saur won with
the K. A return of the 10 would have assisted declarer and Saur was careful to
play back the 6. Boye’s Q was allowed to win and a third diamond went to East’s
10. When Saur found the only safe return, a spade, declarer had to surrender. He
won with the K, cashed the A and took dummy’s spade winners for one down.
Declarer can make the contract by winning the second round of diamonds with
the A, blocking the suit from the defenders’ point of view. He then runs all his
spades and exits with a club, forcing the defenders to give him a ninth trick.
On the next deal Boye was South with Geir Helgemo East. Take Geir’s cards
and decide how you would have defended Boye’s 3NT contract.
North’s rebid of 2NT was forcing and South’s 3 showed an undisclosed minor
of at least five cards. (North could have asked which minor his partner held by
bidding 3.) You are East, defending 3NT, and partner leads the 6 to dummy’s
K. You allow this card to hold, let’s say, and declarer calls for the Q. Will you
cover with the K or not? Consider the matter before reading further.
QJ854
A K 10
Q3
KQJ
A K 10 7 6 9
8 5 2 N Q764
J W E K976
S
9863 A 10 7 2
32
J93
A 10 8 5 4 2
54
West led the 6, you will recall, and Geir Helgemo (East) allowed dummy’s K to
win. Declarer called for the Q and Helgemo made one of his rare miscalculations
when he covered with the K. Boye played low and the J appeared from West.
East continued with a low club, won in the dummy. Boye then finessed the 8
successfully and scored five diamond tricks in addition to two hearts and two
clubs. Game made!
If East holds back his K, declarer will make only three diamond tricks instead
of five and will go down. Should East have found this defense? There are some
possible hands for South, containing AJxxx, where failure to cover will allow the
contract to be made. Against that, South might have held AJ10xx, where a cover
allows four diamond tricks (after a duck) and a hold-up would restrict declarer to
three diamond tricks. The play went exactly the same way at the other table and it
was a flat board in +600.
Does anything else strike you about the deal? When East does cover and sees
the J fall from his partner, how should he react to the situation? If he reads the
J as a singleton, as well he may, declarer will have nine tricks on a club return.
Amazingly, the contract can still be beaten by a diamond return! Declarer finesses
the 8 but cannot safely cash all his diamond tricks. On the last diamond he
would have to find one more discard from dummy’s QJ8 AK — QJ. None of
dummy’s seven cards can be spared!
There is no obvious opening lead, it has to be said. What would your choice be?
(See page 88.)
With only two spades in his hand, Øyvind Saur’s double was a bit risky. Nor can
he have been overjoyed when Boye passed the double for penalties. Look at the
West hand now. Can you see a good opening lead?
Boye led the 2! Underleading an ace is always dangerous. If you enjoy such
thrills and are happy to put up with the odd disappointment, you should consider
it when two or more conditions in this checklist apply: (1) dummy is strong, (2)
dummy is balanced, (3) you don’t have a side entry and (4) a passive lead looks
wrong. Here, South had opened with a non-vulnerable 3 and was unlikely to
hold the K. If that card was in the dummy, declarer would surely misguess when
dummy held the KJ or he held the J. Even without the J, many declarers will
not waste dummy’s king at Trick 1.
Back to the deal in question! Declarer called for the 9 and Saur won with the
10. The K return was won in the dummy and declarer played two top trumps,
discovering the 4-1 break. His luck turned for the better when he ran the 10,
forcing East’s A. Declarer ruffed the Q return, played the Q and was now at the
crossroads. Had he switched back to spades, he would have been able to discard a
heart loser on the fourth spade before West was able to ruff. Not expecting West to
hold three spades after East’s double of 3, declarer preferred to concede a trick to
West’s J. When Boye continued blithely with the 4, declarer called for dummy’s
J and lost two further tricks in the suit, going one down. Breathing freely once
more, the Norwegian pair entered +100 in their scorecards.
How many IMPs did this virtuoso defense gain? At the other table, the
Norwegian North attempted 3NT and went four down, so Turkey gained 3 IMPs
on the board. It would have been far more, of course, if 3 doubled had been
allowed to make.
Back to Question
North-South were playing Precision Club, so the 1 opening did not originally
promise diamonds. When North subsequently cuebid spades to agree clubs, Espen
Erichsen placed him with length in both diamonds and clubs. There was also
Boye’s double to consider. The preemptive 3 overcall had not suggested a hand
rich in defense, so the subsequent double was likely to be Lightner. Everything
pointed to East being void in diamonds.
Erichsen led the 9, a suit-preference card that requested a spade return.
Boye ruffed with the 2, West was relieved to see, and returned the 2. This was
another suit-preference card, telling partner that he held another trump for ruffing
purposes. Winning with the K, Erichsen led another diamond and East’s ruff put
the club game one down.
It may seem that such pyrotechnics were unnecessary, since on a passive
defense East-West have a chance to score one trick in each side suit. Suppose West
leads a low spade to East’s ace and a low heart is returned. Declarer plays low from
his hand, preserving the Q, and wins with the A. He then draws trumps and
plays the A, finding a potential loser in that suit. No matter! Declarer plays the
K and runs all his trumps. If West reduces to K J9, he will be thrown in with
a heart to lead into declarer’s diamond tenace. West can attempt to side-step the
endplay by discarding the K, hoping that East has the Q. Not today! Declarer
will score a second heart trick and make the contract.
Back to Question
South’s bid of 2 was based on the assumption that North would hold four hearts
for his negative double. North was alarmed to hear the 4 bid and the bizarre
auction eventually came to a halt in 6 doubled. At the other table the Norwegians
had made 5 with an overtrick, when the A opening lead allowed declarer to ruff
and later discard his spade loser. Norwegian supporters feared that the same lead
here might allow the doubled slam to be made.
Boye looked back at the auction and immediately discounted a lead of the A.
North had announced good spades with his jump to 3NT and South might easily
be void in the suit. How about leading the A? It was somewhat less dangerous
than the other black ace but might still cost in various ways. Boye’s eventual choice
was the 4, spurning the lead of either ace. He could hardly believe it when Erik
Sælensminde produced the A! A spade return put the slam one down and that
was 11 IMPs to Norway.
Back to Question
North’s 4 was a cuebid, agreeing hearts as trumps. What lead would you
choose? (See page 92.)
The opponents are vulnerable, you are not. Choose a lead against South’s
contract of 4. (See page 93.)
North’s 3 is Puppet (Five-card) Stayman and the 3 response shows at least one
four-card major. North’s 3 shows a four-card spade suit, which allows the strong
hand (South) to play the contract when a spade fit comes to light. Mind you, this
may not be such a clever idea if you manage to find the same opening lead that
Boye did. What is your choice? (See page 94.)
Prospects of beating the contract looked poor after North’s cuebid of 4. It seemed
to Boye that the best chance was to underlead the A. Partner might hold Kx,
allowing two diamond tricks and a ruff to be taken. The same effect might be
possible if partner held Qx, with the K in dummy.
Boye led the 7 and Weinstein called for dummy’s J. On lead with the Q,
Erik Sælensminde returned a trump. Declarer won in the dummy and ruffed a
diamond with the 8. He then cashed the A and led a low club from his hand.
Boye won with the 7 and returned a second round of trumps to dummy’s Q.
One club could be discarded on the K but declarer still had two inescapable club
losers and that was one down.
At the other table, after a similar auction, Fred Gitelman led a club against
the same contract. East won and returned a trump, but Geo Tislevoll was able to
unblock the A, ruff a club and discard a club on the K. When a diamond to the
king was allowed to win, later in the play, he actually made an overtrick.
Perhaps you chose to lead a trump. What would happen then? Declarer wins
in the dummy and realizes that he will not be allowed to ruff a club. He reaches
his hand with the A and leads a diamond towards dummy, hoping to establish
his tenth trick in that suit. You play low smoothly in the West seat and… declarer
misguesses, playing the J from dummy. Partner wins with the Q and, feeling
inspired, switches to a low club. You produce the hoped-for K, draw dummy’s
last trump and beat the contract. Brilliant!
Back to Question
Erik Sælensminde reckoned that he needed to give Boye at least one ruff to stand
a chance of defeating the spade game. Although he was longer in diamonds than
in clubs, it was more likely that partner held a singleton club than a void diamond
(particularly as North had opened 1 and might well hold some length there).
Erik led the A and continued with the 8, his highest club to indicate an
entry in the higher of the other two side suits. (The A is visible in the dummy, yes,
but that is no reason for failing to give a clear signal.) Boye ruffed the second club
and returned the 2 to West’s ace. A second club ruff then defeated the contract.
As you see, it would not be good enough to lead the A, expecting that a
suit preference signal from partner would direct your continuation. Even if he
persuaded you to switch to ace and another club, only one ruff would then be
possible.
Back to Question
The spade game appears to be cast-iron, since declarer cannot lose more than one
spade and at most two hearts. Can you imagine how it was defeated? It doesn’t
look as if a club lead will do the job. East can ruff, it is true, but West has no entry
to deliver a second ruff. When declarer gains the lead he will cross to the A, pick
up the remaining trumps with a finesse and discard two hearts from dummy on the
diamond suit. That will give him an overtrick, in fact.
Boye made the deceptive lead of the J! Martin Andresen won with the A and
returned a low heart. Not blessed with psychic powers, declarer played low on this
trick. Boye won with the Q, surprising all present, and could see (after South’s
2NT opening) that East must be void in clubs. A club ruff was followed by a heart
ruff and another club ruff. The defenders had taken the first five tricks. It would
have been rubbing salt into the wound if the fourth round of hearts had promoted a
further trump trick for the defenders. No, declarer ruffed with the queen and drew
the two outstanding trumps with the ace.
A lead of the jack from Q-J doubleton might misfire if dummy held the king
and partner had the ace. That was unlikely on this deal after South’s 2NT opening.
Some players are reluctant to lead from queen-jack doubleton because they expect
to score a trick if declarer holds A-K-10 and drops an honor on the first round.
He may guess correctly, however, reasoning that if you held a singleton honor you
might have led it.
Back to Question
Your partner’s double of 3 tells you that he holds a spade honor and suggests the
lead of a spade. Will you lead a spade or try something else? (See page 96.)
1NT was semi-forcing and the 2 rebid was either natural or (as here) strong and
artificial. 2 showed 8+ points and was forcing to game. 2 promised at least
three hearts and 16+ points. What lead would you choose? (See page 97.)
What lead will give you the best chance of beating South’s 3NT? (See page 98.)
Although clubs had not been bid naturally (North’s 2 rebid, in combination with
his 2 follow-up, was artificial and showed 16+ points), Erik Sælensminde could
see no future in a club lead. Even if the suit could be established, his own hand was
so weak that he was unlikely to gain the lead thereafter. Partner was the one with
the likely entries, so he tried to find Boye’s best suit by leading the Q.
Steve Garner won with the king and ran the 10, which held. When a second
diamond was played to the jack, Boye won and persisted with hearts. Since East
holds the A doubleton, declarer could make the contract at double-dummy by
setting up two club tricks (to go with three hearts, three diamonds and one spade).
At the table he naturally preferred to win with the J and play on spades. A spade
to the queen lost to the king and Boye cleared the heart suit. A subsequent finesse
of the 10 also failed and Boye scored two heart tricks to put the contract two
down.
At the other table (after bidding of 1 - 1NT; 2 - 3; 3 - 3NT) Zia made a
speculative double in the East seat, based on the limited auction and the position
of his spade honors. Tor Helness promptly redoubled in the South seat and, after
a spade lead, made an easy nine tricks. That was a novel way to pick up 800 and
Norway scored 14 IMPs.
In the interests of journalistic integrity (not a phrase that you hear very often
nowadays), it is only fair to report that Boye had made a similar lead-directing
double of 3NT only two deals before. Steve Garner had redoubled and collected
ten top tricks — a novel way to pick up 1400!
Back to Question
Björn Fallenius tried his luck with the 6. With her spade stopper still intact, Rita
Shugart needed only to set up some club tricks and negotiate the blockage in the
diamond suit. She won with the A and played dummy’s AK. She then reached
her hand with the Q and played her remaining two diamond winners. When
she turned to the club suit, leading the Q from her hand, the defenders were
powerless. If East ducked the first two rounds of clubs, declarer would have eight
tricks before her and dummy’s K would be the ninth. Roy Welland in fact won
the first club, switching to a spade, and the game was made.
Look back to the opening lead now. South surely had a spade stopper, so there
was no future in leading spades from the top. If West begins with a low spade, East
will return a spade when he wins with the A and the game will go down. The
most likely distribution of the spades around the table is 5-2-2-4. North is likely to
be relatively short in spades for his double; East might have raised to 2 if he held
three-card spade support plus the high card that will be necessary for 3NT to be
beaten. A low spade lead would concede the contract if declarer had eight running
tricks and a spade trick brought this to nine. This is an unlikely outcome compared
with the chance that a low spade will beat the contract.
What were the prospects for the defense after a heart lead? Not only would
East need to hold something good in hearts, he would also need a high card in
one of the minors to prevent declarer running for home. Another point is that
North was likely to hold good hearts after his negative double of 1. All in all, it
does seem that a low spade will give the defenders the best chance of beating the
contract.
Back to Question
What will you lead against the doubled club game? (See page 100.)
The opponents are vulnerable and you are not. What will you lead against the
doubled heart game? (See page 101.)
South’s 2 shows hearts and a minor suit. Your partner’s double is for penalties.
What lead will you make? (See page 102.)
A heart lead was unlikely to be productive after East’s raise to the four-level. Erik
Sælensminde led the Q, hoping to claim whatever tricks the defenders were due
in that suit. Boye won with the A and returned the 2, knocking out declarer’s
K.
When Michal Kwiecen played the ace of trumps, both defenders followed but
the king did not drop. He then turned to the diamond suit. If the defender with the
trump king had to follow to three diamonds, dummy’s last spade could be thrown
on the fourth round of diamonds. The Card Gods did not have this outcome in
mind. Boye ruffed the third diamond and the defenders claimed a second spade
trick to put the doubled game one down.
The game would have been easily made without a spade lead, it is true, but
did you spot a chance that declarer missed? Suppose he drops the K under East’s
A. As the cards lie, he will then be able to use the 10 as an entry to dummy; he
can pick up East’s K and make the contract. Whether this is a better line than
the one that declarer chose is a close judgment. If everyone is expected to play
double-dummy on the deal, then the spotlight might turn in Boye’s direction. He
can prevent declarer’s brilliant unblock of the K by declining to play his A on
the first trick!
Back to Question
A total of 380 pairs entered the 2003 European mixed pairs and 52 made it through
to the final, including Boye and his partner Tonje Aasand (later to become his wife).
South rather overstated her values with the double of 3, which is usually played as
a game try, and ended in 4 doubled by Boye in the East seat.
What did you decide to lead from the West hand? No one can blame you if
you lay down a top diamond. One diamond trick, one club and two hearts will put
the contract one down doubled and +200 will score well. Tonje liked the odds that
Boye would hold the J, after his raise, and led the 2!
Her bravery was rewarded when Boye’s 10 won the first trick. Boye returned
the 4, ruffed by West. Declarer ruffed the next diamond — low to the J — but
could not avoid the subsequent loss of two trump tricks and one club. That was
two down for a penalty of 500, giving the Norwegian pair 42 matchpoints out of a
possible 50. They eventually finished in 15th place.
Back to Question
South’s 2 showed hearts and a minor suit. What sort of hand does partner hold for
his penalty double of the resultant 4? He is likely to hold either three trump tricks
and one outside winner or perhaps two trump tricks and two outside winners. The
best opening lead is therefore a trump. Partner can win and then cash his outside
winner(s) before declarer has a chance to take any discards. It is possible also that
a trump lead will prevent declarer from scoring some ruffs in the dummy.
Espen Lindqvist led the J instead. As you see, a diamond or club lead would
have been fatal, allowing declarer to discard his two spade losers and then establish
the clubs with a ruff. The spade lead did not suffer this fate because it hit partner’s
ace. Indeed, it put the contract two down! Boye won the dummy’s K with the A
and drew three rounds of trumps, switching to a club. Declarer could discard three
clubs on the AKQ but this still left him with a club loser.
If Espen had led a trump, as we recommend, the contract would have gone
only one down. After drawing three rounds of trumps, Boye would have to take
his A (setting up the KQ for a fourth club discard) to prevent declarer from
discarding his spades.
‘Shouldn’t you lead a trump, partner?’
‘We needed the 300!’
Back to Question
Boye’s 2NT response showed positive values and a balanced hand. His subsequent
4 was a cuebid passing these messages: (1) I have a heart fit and I’m interested in a
slam, (2) I hold the A or K, (3) I do not hold the A, K, A or K; otherwise I
would have cuebid in one of the black suits instead. What a wealth of information
from just one bid!
Leif-Erik Stabell made a similar cuebid in spades and Boye then bid 5. What
could this possibly mean? Since he had already denied the A and K, he could
only be showing the Q. South could place his partner with the K in addition, to
make up the original 2NT response, and therefore leapt to a small slam.
How would you react on the North cards over the surprising leap to 5?
A cautious performer (not that Boye has ever been called that) might think that
there could be two top spade losers. Boye reasoned that his partner had suggested
4-7 shape in the minor suits and the odds were high that he did not hold two spade
losers. This was reason enough to raise to 6 and many players would have found
that bid. Boye went the extra mile and cuebid 5 in the search for a grand slam! If
his partner were then to cuebid 5, showing a void spade, it was possible that seven
clubs, five hearts and the diamond ace would allow 7 to be made.
Erik Sælensminde decided to open 2NT. This was not so much because he feared
1 being passed out, more that it would be difficult to express his hand after any
response to 1. Boye held a great hand for two-below transfers. A response of 3
would have been a standard transfer to 3, showing at least five spades. His actual
response of 4 was a slam try based on a spade suit of at least six cards. Partner
could then show interest in a slam by bidding 4. Since Erik held only a singleton
Q, he signed off in 4.
Espen Lindqvist’s 2, on a passed hand, showed 8-11 points and three-card spade
support. Boye’s 3 was a splinter bid and 3NT showed slam interest. After two
cuebids, Boye’s 5NT carried the pick-a-slam meaning, just in case North had a good
diamond suit. Our question for you on this deal is: after a lead of the Q would
you expect the slam to succeed or not?
Boye won with the A, cashed the K and ruffed a diamond with the 8. He
then led a trump, the 10 appearing from East. At double-dummy the slam can be
made by rising with the A on this trick. You can then lead your last diamond and
West cannot ruff effectively because he would have to use his K to beat dummy’s
6. This happens to work only because East’s 10 is from J10 rather than from
K10, also because East holds the outstanding 10 (which could easily lie with
West after his Q lead).
Boye played with the odds when he finessed the Q on the first round of
trumps, hoping that East had started with K10. The finesse lost to West’s K
and all now depended on the return that Simon de Wijs made. A trump return
would prevent declarer from ruffing his last diamond and kill the slam. With the
tournament director making his presence known, de Wijs extracted a trump from
his hand. The tournament director consulted his watch, yet again. De Wijs pushed
the trump back into his hand and switched to a heart! Boye won with dummy’s A,
crossed to his hand and ruffed his last diamond successfully. He was then able to
draw trumps and the slam was made. Norway gained 11 IMPs instead of losing 11
IMPs and had some insurance against a possible slow-play fine!
AQ74
AJ82
Q3
AK9
3
K65
AKJ7
Q 10 5 4 3
Boye, who was partnering Justin Hackett in the individual segment of the event,
will take up the narrative:
I was worth a slam after partner’s 3 and my 5NT was pick-a-slam, asking
partner to choose a minor suit. West’s lead against the diamond slam
was the K. How would you play?
Your instinct, as mine, is probably to pull the opponents’ trumps and
then take the double hook in clubs. With a 3-2 trump break and divided
club honors that plan is as good as any, but what if trumps are 4-1? In
that case you can’t afford to pull trumps immediately, as you need to ruff
a spade in dummy as well as tackling the club suit.
7
A 10 8 2
KQJ8
A Q 10 6
K Q 6 5 4 2 J 10 9 3
7 4 N J963
10 7 5 2 W E 6
S
K J982
A8
KQ5
A943
7543
The early play in 6 was a spade lead to the ace and a club to the king and
ace, the KQ then revealing the 4-1 trump break.
After this start I crossed to my hand with the K, ruffed the spade
loser and cashed the J. Returning to hand with the Q, I drew West’s
last trump and pitched a club from dummy. Eric Rodwell, sitting East, had
to throw one club and his last spade — otherwise I would score my twelfth
trick in either hearts or clubs. With four cards left, this was the situation:
—
A 10
—
Q 10
Q 6 5 4 —
— N J9
— W E —
S
— J9
—
5
—
754
We will end the chapter with two truly spectacular deals. On the first one, the
Icelandic South player picks up an all-black hand:
Ljosbra Baldursdottir passed on the first round, licking her lips at the prospects of
partner re-opening with a double. It was not to be. South rebid 4 to show a big
two-suiter. North announced her strength with a cuebid and South’s 5NT then
asked partner to ‘pick a slam’. What would you have bid on the North cards?
6NT would not be a clever move. North appreciated the need to play the hand
with a trump suit and opted for 6. Saur led his singleton diamond to the 10 and
J, Stefan Johannson ruffing in his hand. When declarer continued with ace, king
and another trump, Boye was endplayed! A heart or diamond return into dummy’s
tenace would give declarer four spade discards, saving him the spade guess. Boye
chose to return a spade, a defense that would have succeeded if West held Q10x.
With declarer’s actual spade holding, he was again saved the spade guess and the
slam was made.
An opening bid of 2 would not be right on the North cards. You can expect heavy
intervention and it is essential to mention your suits as soon as possible. Boye
opened with a simple 1 and the opponents did indeed enter the auction. At his
second turn he showed a giant hand with his 3 bid. At this stage Forrester was
unimpressed with the contribution that his hand might make as the dummy. He
indicated this by doubling East’s 4 bid.
Boye was not finished, of course. One possibility was to leap to 6 at his next
turn, but this would not pass the message that a grand slam was possible. Boye
chose the amazing bid of 6. This was clearly a grand slam try and had to be
based on a red two-suiter. Forrester not only read the message, he realized that
his four-card diamond support would allow declarer to establish the heart suit.
He completed a glittering auction with a leap to 7, which was easily made. How
often do you see the trump suit for a grand slam named for the first time at the
seven-level?
Sometimes you pick up a hand that looks nothing special initially. As the bidding
progresses, you begin to realize that your cards have real potential. Competing in
the 1996 European Under-26 Championship (an event that Norway eventually
won), Boye picked up these cards in the South seat:
J K 7 5 4 3 2 K 3 10 7 6 5
East opened 1, showing at least four clubs. With only his side vulnerable, Boye
decided to pass. West responded 2, an inverted raise that showed club support
and good values. How would you react to the situation when East rebids 2,
showing a shortage in hearts?
West led the 2 and dummy went down with two useful cards but disappointing
trumps. East won with the K and returned his singleton trump. West defended
strongly now, winning with the J and continuing with the A and Q. This
sacrificed a trump trick, yes, but it prevented declarer from ruffing two clubs in the
dummy. Boye lost two trumps, the A and four club tricks for a penalty of 1100.
At the other table his teammates picked up +460 in 3NT.
Some twelve years later, in the 2008 European Championships in Pau, Norway
faced the Czech Republic. With only the opponents vulnerable, Boye picked up
this South hand:
West opened 1, Espen Lindqvist passed and East responded 1. Would you find
a bid on that hand?
Boye is always on the lookout for lead-directing overcalls but here the heart suit
was not particularly good. If the opponents stopped low, he would have another
chance later. He passed.
West rebid 2 and East bid 2, an artificial game-try. Are you tempted to bid
on Boye’s hand now?
West could still hold hearts over him, so it was no less dangerous to bid than
before. Boye passed again and this was the situation at his next turn:
The final chance to bid on the South cards had arrived. What would your decision
have been?
Perhaps you are surprised even to see a ‘?’ in the South column. How could it
be right to pass twice and then put your head on the block with a bid of 3? It’s true
that West cannot now hold four hearts and he has declined the game invitation, but
surely any possible gain from bidding is outweighed by the chance of conceding a
big penalty?
Some players may talk with the angels. Boye sometime feels that he has a
good dialogue with the cards. On one occasion (don’t laugh, it’s true…) the jack
of diamonds actually winked at him. At such moments the rational mind has to
take second place. Boye dug halfway into his bidding box and extracted the cards
for a 3 bid.
Memories of Cardiff 1996 came flooding back when West doubled. What
would Geir Helgemo have to say when scores were compared and Boye had to
announce minus 500 or worse on their card?
This was the complete deal:
West began with the AK, East following twice. How would you play the contract?
Boye ruffed the second club and paused to consider the lie of the trump suit.
West had denied four hearts with his 3 rebid and had then doubled 3. It seemed
that he would hold Qxx. Boye finessed the 10 successfully and cashed the A.
When he led dummy’s 9, East covered with the jack and the queen was finessed
successfully. The K drew the defenders’ last two trumps and it was time for some
work on the diamond suit.
How did the diamonds lie? East was marked with 5-3-3-2 shape and had so
far shown up with only 5 points in the black suits. To justify his game-try on the
second round he should hold at least AJx. If West held the remaining Qxx, this
would give him another value to justify his penalty double of the final contract. The
9 was the critical card. If West held Q94, nothing could be done — unless West
had a brainstorm and forgot to insert the 9 on the first round, allowing dummy’s
6 to be played. What if East held AJ9? Ah, then declarer would be in business!
Boye led the 8 from his hand and was rewarded by the sight of West playing
low. East won with the 9 and returned the 5. Nothing could be gained by
finessing the 6 at this stage and Boye won with the 10. When he played his last
two trumps, the Czech East player had to make a final discard from K85 AJ. His
choice was a spade and Boye continued with ace and another spade, forcing East to
concede a trick to dummy’s K.
What was the effect of all this? Nine tricks, a fine 730 in the plus column and
(more importantly) all memories of Cardiff were extinguished!
Boye and his partner were experimenting with Precision Club in those days and the
2 opening showed around 11-15 points with short diamonds. 2NT was a relay
bid and 3NT showed a maximum with 4-4-1-4 shape. Terje Aa found the only lead
to trouble the heart game, a low trump. How would you play the contract when the
defenders persist with two further rounds of trumps?
Boye unblocked a trump honor from his hand on the second round and won
the third round in the dummy. He then led a low diamond, to rectify the count for
a possible squeeze ending. East won with the K and switched to a club, declarer
—
—
A86
7
— 10
— N —
10 9 W E —
S
10 9 J86
6
—
—
KQ5
At that time, Boye and Erik treated North’s 3 as forcing. Two cuebids followed
and Erik then bid RKCB, hearing of two keycards and the trump queen. 5NT asked
for kings and 6 showed the K. Now 6, the only available bid below six of the
trump suit, was Last Train for the grand slam. Boye does not like to accept second
prize on such deals and decided to bid the grand slam.
How would you play 7 when West leads the 8 to your 9?
Declarer called for the Q, discarding the 7 from his hand, and West had to
concede the thirteenth trick. Any overbidding could now be forgiven.
On the next deal the Chinese opponents attempted to make life difficult with
an unusual opening bid. The end effect was to push Boye into a playable game that
might otherwise not have been bid.
Fu Zhong’s 2 showed both major suits. When Boye overcalled 2 and Jack Zhao
raised to 3, Erik Sælensminde entered with a competitive double. This showed
both minor suits and a tolerance for spades (usually a doubleton). Boye could
place his partner with at most one heart, after the East-West bidding, and ended
the auction with a leap to 5.
East won the heart lead and shifted to a spade. Boye rose with the A and
finessed the Q successfully. He cashed the A, throwing a spade, and continued
with a spade to the king. Heart ruff, diamond ruff, heart ruff and another diamond
ruff left these cards still to be played:
—
—
J9
J6
— Q
K N 10
— W E —
S
K75 84
J5
—
—
AQ
West leads a low spade to the ace and East persists with another spade. How would
you play the contract?
Boye ruffed the second spade and played the ace of trumps, West discarding
a spade. If declarer had followed with the 4 from dummy, he would have gone
down. As a matter of good technique, Boye unblocked dummy’s 7. This would
give him the option of a further trump entry to his hand with the 6.
Boye continued with three rounds of clubs, throwing two hearts from dummy.
After a heart to the king and ace, East returned the J. Boye ruffed this with
dummy’s 8, again preserving the 4. One more heart ruff would establish the
Declarer won the Q lead, cashed the other top diamond and ruffed a diamond in
the dummy. A trump to the jack lost to West’s queen and West switched to the 7,
drawing East’s jack and declarer’s ace. Take South’s remaining cards now. What
will you do next?
Let’s see first how the USA declarer went down. He continued with a second
round of trumps and West rose with the ace, persisting with a second round of
spades. Declarer won with dummy’s king, drew the last trump and finessed the J.
The finesse lost and East cashed the setting trick in spades.
Foreseeing this ‘road to ruin’, Boye finessed the J immediately after winning
the first spade trick. The finesse lost but East could not play another spade from
You have an unavoidable trump loser, as the cards lie, and a seemingly certain
further loser in spades. Can you see any way that you might make twelve tricks for
a good pairs score?
Boye assessed it as a deal where you should try to make as many trump tricks
as possible. Since he wanted to ruff three diamonds in his hand, he preserved the
entries to dummy by winning the club lead with the ace. A diamond to the ace
was followed by a diamond ruff, a club to the king and another diamond ruff. A
trump to the ace allowed him to ruff dummy’s last diamond, everyone following.
Little could be lost by this sort of play; if a defender happened to overruff the fourth
diamond, this would often be at the expense of a natural trump trick.
A club ruff in dummy was followed by a second round of trumps. All followed
to the AK, leaving only two tricks to be played:
In a way, the two original losers (one spade and one trump) were still intact. Boye
led the 6 and ruffed successfully with dummy’s 9. At Trick 13 West had to ruff
partner’s Q with the Q. Twelve tricks! Even if West’s last side-suit card had been
a spade, instead of a club, dummy’s 9 would have been promoted as a twelfth
trick.
Well, that’s amazing. You wait an age for a matchpoint deal and then two
arrive in a row. Take Boye’s cards here and test yourself on this one:
How would you play this heart game when West leads the Q?
It is Boye’s turn to tell you what happened at the table:
I start with one loser in each suit, and in trumps I could even get two
losers if it’s a 4-1 break. The task is to get rid of one of the losers and
987
K 10 9 7 4 3
6
KJ7
Q J 10 6 3 54
Q 6 N J52
A K W E 10 9 8 4 2
S
A 10 9 6 832
AK2
A8
QJ753
Q54
When I look at the detailed scoresheet later, I see that some declarers
were favored with a top-diamond lead from West. It was easy for them
to set up a diamond trick with a ruffing finesse and then discard a spade
from the dummy. At the nine tables where West found the more awkward
lead of a spade, only four of the declarers managed to make the game.
They had to earn their money rather than just put it in their pocket!
We will next see a deal where decisions were to be made in both the bidding and
the play. Boye will describe the action:
Should I pass 3NT or go to 4, playing in the 5-3 fit? Many players reckon
that it is better to play in 3NT in the long run. The main reason why I
decided to bid 4 was that the Japanese West had seemed keen to bid,
both over 1NT and 2. So I assumed he had a long diamond suit, which
might be cashing against 3NT.
Quite right! Lefty starts with AK against the spade game and East
discards a heart. How do you play when West continues with the J?
You need five spade tricks to have any hope of winning this contract.
Rather than ruffing, I pitch a losing club from dummy at Trick 3. West
switches to the 5, which goes to East’s queen and your king. What now?
East’s ready discard of a heart tells me that hearts are likely to be
5-1. Five spades, three hearts and the A leaves me one trick short. My
only chance is to find East with the KQ in addition to his heart guard. I
will then be able to squeeze him in hearts and clubs. I cash my A and pull
trumps to reach this ending, with the lead in dummy:
When I play the 6, East shrugs his shoulders. He has to give up one of
the suits and I have a neat 620!
On the next deal Boye was partnering Rita Shugart of the USA. This was the layout:
How would you have played this contract when West leads the K?
With one sixteen-board set to be played in the final of the 2007 Bermuda Bowl,
contested in Shanghai, Norway led the USA by the considerable margin of 284-
207. Only a wild set of boards would give the Americans any chance at all of
closing the deficit. This was the third board:
Zia upgraded his hand into the 2 range. His 4 Stayman response showed four
cards in both majors and Rosenberg bid 4 to transfer into spades. Roman Keycard
Blackwood discovered that Zia held all four aces but not the queen of trumps.
Rosenberg offered 6 as an alternative contract but Zia went back to 6.
Boye was on lead, after East’s conventional opening. Since the opponents figured
to hold two long and strong suits, he had to look for quick tricks in the other suits.
His opening lead was the A, on which Erik played the 9. This was a reverse-
attitude discouraging signal. Knowing that there were no further tricks available
in diamonds, Boye switched to the 3. Sweet news arrived on this trick. Declarer
called despairingly for dummy’s K and Erik won with the A! Any fears of a
catastrophic final set that would snatch victory from Norway’s grasp could now
surely be put aside.
This was the auction at the other table:
Steve Garner’s 1 response showed hearts and 2 was fourth-suit forcing. On the
fifth round of bidding, both players cuebid a singleton opposite a known suit in
Winning the Bermuda Bowl in 2007 was a dream coming true. Ever since
I was a kid, I wanted to become a world champion at something. I always
admired the best athletes in any sport, boxing and football being my
favorites, but I soon understood that I wouldn’t become a Muhammad
Ali or a Diego Maradona. In bridge, though, I felt I could compete at the
highest level, given some experience. I would hate to be forty and look back
at what could have been, so in my twenties I dedicated a lot of time to
become as good a bridge player as I could.
We played pretty well in the final, and going into the last segment the
USA needed a spectacular finish to beat us. They got off to a good start
while we had some shaky moments, but after beating a slam and banking a
couple of other good results, I knew we couldn’t lose. Leaving the table to
With Zia Mahmood after their win in the Icelandair Open Pairs, 2003.
Boye becomes a World Grand Master by winning the Bermuda Bowl in
Shanghai, 2007 (L-R Tor Helness, Boye, Geir Helgemo).
At the age of fourteen, Boye played his first competitive bridge at a local club in
Moi, a small town in the south of Norway with a population of 1500. His partner
then was Knut Erik Ljung, not only the best player at the club but also Boye’s
mathematics teacher at school (his multiplication exercises were the highlight of
the week.) Boye believes that the five years he played with his early mentor, from
1987 to 1992, were the most important of his bridge career.
The fondly remembered defensive deal below was played around 1990. Boye
will describe the action.
I led the 6 and Ljung took the first two tricks with the Q and K. He
switched to the 8 and declarer won with the ace. Declarer played three
rounds of diamonds, and I pitched a spade as Ljung won with the jack. The
2 return went to the nine and ten, and I cashed three rounds of clubs,
getting to this situation before the last club:
When I led the 7, Ljung discarded the J. Can you believe it now? Declarer
was caught in a defensive criss-cross squeeze! Whichever spotcard he
decided to throw, we would score the remaining three tricks. When he let
go of a heart, I cashed the K and Ljung got the last two tricks with the
A and the J. The contract was down four. I slept well that night.
Another happy moment from Boye’s formative years at the bridge table was the
defense against this spade game, from his first win in a big pairs event.
Boye led the K and Kåre Kristiansen overtook with the A to return another heart,
drawing South’s 10 and Boye’s Q. It was clear to Boye in the West seat that no
In the 1998 Norwegian Club Championship, Boye won the Rica Prize for the best
defended deal of the event. He was sitting West on this deal:
—
A65
97
8
J 7 —
K J 9 7 N 842
— W E J
S
— 96
A98
Q 10 3
—
—
Suppose you were sitting West here. How would you continue the defense?
You can see what would happen on a low heart return. Declarer would win
with the 10 and throw West back on lead with ace and another spade. The
enforced heart exit would be run to the queen and declarer would have his contract.
A spade return is better for the defense but declarer still has a chance to make
the contract if he scores his spades and endplays West with a heart honor. Only one
card is guaranteed to defeat the contract and Boye found it: the K! Declarer won
with the A and continued with the Q and 10. Boye scored the J9, putting the
contract one down, and then had to lead into the spade tenace.
Take Boye’s East cards here and see if you can match his defense:
Tony Forrester’s negative double implies hearts and you show your three cards in
hearts with a support double. South arrives in 3 and Forrester leads the K. At
Trick 2 he switches to the 3 and you win with the A.
How would you continue the defense from the East seat? When you have
made up your mind, you can take a look at the full deal:
KQ4
10 9 5
Q8765
A7
9 8 6 10 7
Q J 7 3 2 N A86
K W E A 10 4
S
J 10 8 4 K9652
AJ532
K4
J932
Q3
If partner’s K opening lead was from a doubleton, you can play the A and give him
a diamond ruff. That will be four tricks for the defense but it is likely that declarer
can then discard any club losers on the surplus diamond winners in dummy. If he
holds the K, he will make the contract.
Boye paused to calculate West’s diamond holding. Would he really have made
a speculative lead from Kx when he could have led one of the two suits that the
partnership had bid? Surely he must hold a singleton K!
Once this inference had been taken, the next step was to lead the 10 at Trick
3, retaining the A. Forrester ruffed and switched to the J, setting up Boye’s
Erik Sælensminde led the Q against the heart game. Declarer won with the A
and then played ace and another trump. Suppose you were sitting West. How
would you continue the defense?
With only two tricks available to the defenders in the red suits, and none in
clubs, Erik could see the need for a spade switch. He switched to the 10 and Boye
won with the bare ace. All now depended on East’s next move. What would your
decision have been?
If West had led from a doubleton diamond, his remaining card could be the 10,
7 or 3. At pairs it would be dangerous to return a low diamond, underleading
the KJ, because if declarer won with the 10 he would score a valuable overtrick.
At teams, any chance to beat the contract should be grabbed. The only way to beat
the contract was to find partner with exactly Q10 and Boye duly returned a low
diamond. He was rewarded by the appearance of partner’s 10 and a spade ruff
then defeated the game.
(At double-dummy, declarer can make the contract — even with an overtrick
— by finessing the J at Trick 2. This would be way against the odds compared
with the line that he actually chose.)
Boye led the 2, Kyle Larsen winning East’s 9 with the J. A finesse of the J
proved successful and declarer then ran the J to Boye’s queen. Suppose you had
been sitting West. What would you have done next?
You can expect declarer to have seven tricks in the minor suits. If he can add
one spade and one heart to the total, he will reach the tape before you. Continuing
clubs would have been too slow; declarer would win with the ace, run the 8 and
set up a spade trick. Boye realized that three spade tricks would be needed to
accompany his two tricks in hearts. The 9 might have a role to play later, so he
switched to the 5.
Larsen played low from dummy, Erik Sælensminde winning with the J. Back
came the 3 to West’s 9 and dummy’s queen. Running the 8 to West’s A would
not help declarer now, since he would lose five tricks in the majors. He therefore
led the 8 to his K, hoping that East held the A. Not today, my friend. Boye
won with the A and led a third round of spades through dummy’s K. The game
was then two down, which was worth an 8 IMP swing in conjunction with the
+130 from the other table.
The next deal features defense against an elimination end position. Take the
West cards and see how well you would have fared.
Boye led the K, East signaling count with the 3, and declarer followed with the
9. Maarten Schollaardt won the low diamond continuation, crossed to the trump
ace and ruffed dummy’s last diamond. He then drew the outstanding trumps,
cashed the AK and ruffed a club in his hand. Would you have seen the danger
when declarer next led a heart towards dummy’s jack?
Suppose you play the 9 on the first round. You will have to win the next
round of hearts and, with only minor-suit cards in your hand, concede a ruff-
and-sluff. Declarer will discard dummy’s last heart, ruff in his hand and claim the
contract.
When declarer led the 3, Boye rose with the A. The only chance of beating
the contract now was to find partner with the KQ. He exited with his remaining
heart and partner scored two more heart tricks, for one down.
Doubled contracts have a character all of their own. It’s as if a thundercloud has
descended and is hovering a few feet above the table. In this chapter we will see
several instructive contracts with one aspect in common — they were all doubled.
By the time the chapter closes, we may have picked up a lesson or two on when a
penalty double is appropriate.
The first deal comes from the final round of a national championship for club
teams.
Both Vul. 63 2002 Norwegian Championship
Dealer West K6 Sundvolden
KQJ2
98762
K J 9 8 2 Q7
9 4 N 872
10 W E A9875
S
K J 10 4 3 AQ5
A 10 5 4
A Q J 10 5 3
643
—
You may choose your own adjective for Boye’s 4 bid. It was a somewhat ambitious
shot, it is true, and he was lucky that dummy had nothing wasted in clubs.
West led the 10, won by East’s A. A trump return would have worked
well, leaving declarer with three spade losers in addition to the trick already lost in
Erik Sælensminde opened a strong 1NT, adding a point or two for his chunky club
suit. It was not attractive to defend with such a long suit in his hand, so he jumped
to 3NT on the second round. Alfredo Versace doubled but on any lead there were
nine top tricks. +550 to Norway.
At the other table East opened the bidding:
Nunes and Fantoni did well to reach 3NT but Helness was not willing to surrender.
He bid 4 over Fantoni’s 3NT, looking for the best available trump suit. Helgemo
did not want to guess which major to bid, so he marked time with 4, happy to
play there undoubled if there was no further bidding. When this was doubled, he
redoubled for rescue. Helness ended in 4 doubled and North led the K. What
outcome would you expect?
Helness ruffed the club lead and crossed to the A to lead a trump. When
the K won he led the Q from his hand. South won with the A and led a club,
forcing declarer to ruff again. A second spade went to North’s K and he had to
find a return from 6 6 J104 Q8. Six of his seven cards would have been good
enough to defeat the contract but Nunes chose the seventh, the 6. The contract
was made and Norway gained 15 IMPs — not enough to win the match, as it
turned out.
We will take a breather from doubled contracts at both tables. On this deal
Boye and his partner were doubled in two different games:
East’s double was not music to West’s ears. Since he could hardly bid at the five-
level on his drab hand, he had to pass. He led the 2 and cannot have found much
cheer from the dummy that went down. East won with the 10 and continued
with the A. Boye ruffed in the South hand, noting that he would have to restrict
his losers to the three missing aces. When he led a club to the queen, East won
West led a heart to East’s J and East continued with the K. Lindqvist ruffed with
the 8, West following suit, and led the K to West’s A. How would you attempt
to give yourself a chance when West returns the 7?
East holds eight red cards and must therefore guard at least one black suit, if
not both. There cannot therefore be a genuine black-suit squeeze on West. The
Q threat card is positioned under East’s guard in the suit and cannot be of any use
with regard to a possible double squeeze. In short, Lindqvist realized that he would
After an exciting auction, South ends in 5 doubled. West, your partner, leads the
A and declarer ruffs with dummy’s 3. What is your plan for the defense when
declarer’s next move is to call for dummy’s 8?
When you have decided what to do, look at the complete diagram:
Alex Dubinin played low, perhaps thinking that declarer would run the 8 to some
bare honor in the West hand. The contract could no longer be beaten! Boye won
with the K and ruffed a diamond in dummy. A heart to the king allowed him to
ruff his last diamond, exhausting the table’s trumps.
Boye reached his hand with the K and led the Q to East’s A. With no
diamonds left, East switched to the Q. Declarer won with the A and led a
second round of clubs. The poor East player had only black cards in his hand. He
could not prevent declarer from reaching his hand in clubs and drawing the last
two trumps with his 107. That was eleven tricks and +650 to go with the +600
for 5 at the other table — a swing of 15 IMPs.
To beat the contract, East had to win with the trump ace and play another
trump. Declarer would no longer be able to ruff all his diamond losers.
Boye passed on the first round of bidding, to discover how strong the opponents’
hands were. When they dropped the bidding in 2 it was clear that North, Rita
Shugart, would hold at least 8 points. (Boye had 9 points and East-West would
surely have tried for game if they held 24 points or more.) Hoping that his partner’s
points would plug a few of the gaps in his hand, Boye bid 4. East doubled this,
on the strength of his two aces facing a strong 1NT. As you see, East-West in fact
had a spade game available their way, due to the double fit.
Both Wests in this match led the K against 4 doubled. At Boye’s table East
signaled encouragement with the 7 and West played another diamond. Curtains
for the defense! Boye ruffed in his hand, crossed to the K and returned to his
hand with another diamond ruff. He drew a second round of trumps with the
ace, East showing out, and played the K and A, West’s queen appearing. Away
went a spade on the third round of clubs and West had to ruff with his trump trick.
Declarer lost one spade, one heart and one diamond, making the contract.
At the other table Ishmael Del’Monte sat West with George Mittelman East.
They were playing the excellent signaling method known as ‘ace for attitude, king
for count’. In other words, they would signal their attitude if partner led an ace
(or a queen) but show their count after a king lead. When Del’Monte led the
K, Mittelman gave a reverse count signal of the 2, showing an even number of
diamonds. Since declarer was known to hold a huge number of hearts, the odds
were high that East held four diamonds to declarer’s one. Del’Monte therefore
switched to the K. This time East signaled an odd number of spades, with a
Boye led the 4, Sabine Auken winning with the 10. When the 5 was returned,
Hamman put in the 10 and Boye won with the J. This is the first part of the
problem. What would you return from the West hand?
It is not safe to play another spade, since there is a danger that declarer will
set up dummy’s spade suit. Boye decided to return the K and all followed to this
trick, South winning with the ace. Hamman’s next move was to lead the Q from
his hand. Boye won with the K, East showing an odd number of diamonds, and
now faced a serious problem. What should he do next?
When you have made your decision, take a look at the full diagram:
The early play was: spade lead to East’s ten and a trump return to the ten and jack.
Boye returned the king of trumps to the ace and declarer then threw him on lead
with the Q to his K. Suppose West exits with a diamond. Declarer will win with
the 10 and throw a club from dummy on the A. He will then ditch dummy’s
last club on the fourth round of diamonds, a loser-on-loser play. West will be
endplayed without escape. A spade will allow dummy’s suit to be set up. A club,
high or low, will let declarer score his K and ruff the other two club losers.
Boye found the only exit to prevent the contract from being made. On lead
with the K, he played ace and another club. This allowed declarer to make his K
but he was left with three losers (two diamonds and a club) and only two trumps
in dummy with which to ruff them. One down!
We will close the chapter with a deal where Boye made two bold moves during
the bidding:
As you look at Boye’s bid of 3, you are maybe regretting the purchase of a book by
two authors, at least one of whom is completely mad. Hang on a minute and listen
to the reasoning behind the bid. West has neither overcalled in a major nor made a
takeout double, despite being white against red and obviously holding fair values.
It follows that he should hold some length in clubs. You’re not convinced? Well,
it was many years ago; Boye might not find such an overcall nowadays.
The main point of the deal lies in Boye’s double of 4. This could hardly be
based on high-card values and was therefore lead-directing. Erik Sælensminde
led the A, Boye throwing a heart, and continued with a suit-preference 2. Boye
ruffed and returned a club, the defenders eventually claiming two trump tricks, two
clubs and the two red aces for a penalty of 800. The time to try such a double is
when the opponents’ auction is limited and you have some reason to think that the
indicated lead will defeat the contract. When their bidding is less limited, you may
run into a redouble and a smirking opponent eventually saying ‘Now, what does
that come to?’ Not a pleasant experience!
In this chapter we will see some deals where declarer had to operate with an
inadequate trump suit. In particular, we will look at how the ruff-and-sluff can be
a valuable weapon for the defenders when seeking to wrest trump control.
The USA’s Rose Meltzer reached game on a 4-3 spade fit on this deal:
North’s 2 response showed 8-11 points and three-card heart support. How would
you play the heart game when West leads the 2 to your bare A?
Boye played the two top spades and led a third round of the suit. West could
not benefit by ruffing and discarded the 7. After ruffing the spade in dummy,
Boye played the K and discarded a diamond. A club ruff in the South hand was
Boye won the K lead and played three top diamonds to discard the 9. After a
trump to the ten and king, West forced the South hand by playing the Q. With
no quick entry to the dummy, Boye cashed the AK. When the Q fell from West,
he played the J. West could not ruff and the contract was made.
Did you spot the defenders’ missed chance? Instead of playing the Q, West
needed to play a fourth diamond, weakening dummy’s trumps. Suppose declarer
ruffs with dummy’s 6. East discards a club, leaving this position:
When the 7 is led, East rises with the A and plays a heart. If declarer ducks this
to West, he will have no entry to dummy to finesse the 9. Suppose instead that
he ruffs with the 9. Whether he plays the Q next or runs the clubs, he will lose
trump control and go one down.
Let’s see one more deal that illustrates the defensive power of the ruff-and-sluff.
The play was interesting from both sides of the table.
6
43
—
74
— J 10
10 N 65
8 W E —
S
10 6 5 J
A8
AJ
—
A
How would you continue the defense from the West seat?
Suppose you play a club. Declarer will win with the ace and draw one more
round of trumps with the ace. He will then give himself a double chance of success
by playing the A. He will make the contract when spades are 3-3 or when they
break 4-2 but the defender with the doubleton spade does not hold the last trump.
(This is how Boye made the contract at the other table, after West had followed
a different defense.) To avoid this outcome, Tor Helness led a fifth round of
diamonds! This conceded a ruff-and-sluff, yes, but see the effect of it. Zia ruffed in
dummy with the 3, overruffed by the 5 and J. Declarer could no longer make
the contract against a 4-2 spade break. He had to draw the outstanding trumps and
rely on spades being 3-3. That was one down.
On the next deal Erik Sælensminde played the macho man by opening a one-
bid on an aceless 9-count. He ended in 4 on a deal where declarer at the other
table went down in 2. Hardly a promising situation, you might think…
It was not a contract that the VuGraph commentators had suggested when the deal
first flashed onto the screen. The lie of the cards was benign, however. Declarer
would certainly lose two trump tricks and a diamond. To beat the contract, the
defenders would have to force the South hand continually in the diamond suit.
Cezary Balicki found the necessary opening attack — the A followed by
another diamond. Erik ruffed in his hand and led the 5 to dummy’s J. He then
called for dummy’s J. Adam Zmudzinski needed to rise with the A and force
declarer with his last diamond. Since West had a trump entry and more diamonds
to play, declarer would then have lost trump control. The J actually ran to West’s
Q. West could force the South hand with a diamond but Sælensminde then
crossed to the A and led a trump towards the king. When East took his A he had
no diamonds left. Declarer was able to draw the last trumps and take an eventual
club finesse for the contract.
At the other table the Polish South opened 2 (showing a two-suiter) and
this was passed out. When Tor Helness chose the seemingly uninspired lead of
the K, Lloyd’s of London would have insured the contract. According to the
championship bulletin, declarer decided to score as many trump tricks as possible,
making use of dummy’s J9. He was subsequently ‘affected by the heat of the
room’, the account continues, and failed to cash the Q, ending with only seven
tricks. A weird board indeed.
The Italian maestros, Benito Garozzo and Giorgio Belladonna, occasionally
surprised the kibitzers by drawing trumps only at the very end of the play.
Sometimes the aim was to discover the likely lie of the trump suit; sometimes they
West led the 8, Boye winning with the A and leading a club. West rose with
the K and played another heart to South’s king. A club to the ten and East’s ace
was followed by a third round of hearts, West discarding a diamond and dummy
ruffing. All followed to the AK and Boye drew one round of trumps with the ace.
Dummy’s Q then allowed him to pitch his last diamond.
These cards remained in play:
9
—
J4
5
Q 10 8 —
— N J 10 6
— W E 9
S
J —
KJ76
—
—
—
No bridge player can say that his game is complete until he has mastered the art of
deception. Some players would actually prefer to bring home a dubious contract
by this route than by a clean-cut technical play. Does this mean that there is a hint
of the masochist in them? It’s not for us to say.
On the first deal Boye cast a magical cloak over his threatening club holding.
From the West defender’s point of view, declarer’s KQ became invisible.
North’s 3 showed a sound raise in hearts and East’s 3 was intended as lead-
directing. West duly led the 6 and Boye won with dummy’s ace, sure from East’s
diamond bid that he would hold the king. There are four top losers. How would
you try to give yourself a chance?
Suppose you play a club to one of your honors at Trick 2. West will surely see
the risk that you hold the other missing club honor and are about to discard one
West’s 2 showed a good diamond raise and North’s 3 showed a good spade raise.
After this pleasing symmetry in the auction, Boye had to find a lead against South’s
3. Any ideas?
North had opened 1 and shown most of the points held by the partnership.
It was therefore a near certainty that he would hold the K. Boye chose the Q as
his opening shot and, sure enough, dummy went down with the K.
Placing the A with East, Ian Thompson played low from dummy on the
first trick. At double-dummy the contract can now be beaten by force: A, club
ruffed with the J, diamond underlead to West’s king and a fourth club to promote
the bare K. The club position was not clear, however, and Boye switched to a
heart. Thompson won in the dummy and called for the 9, East rising with the
A. Declarer won the heart return with the Q and paused to assess the position.
K742
Q 10 8 3 5
AJ96
Boye won deceptively with the J and then led the 6. Placing his partner with
the 9, West followed with the 3. Boye called for dummy’s 4 and then had four
club tricks. One to show the grandchildren!
Boye tried a rather unusual deception on the next deal. He will describe events
as he saw them at the time.
West leads the K and it sure looks like ten tricks. There are no squeeze
opportunities and no chance of ruffing out the Q in the West hand.
Should I concede one down?
Deceptive plays are not restricted to the play of the hand. Let’s see a deceptive
move from Boye during the auction.
Espen Lindqvist’s 2 showed a sound raise to at least 3. East’s double meant that
he did not want a diamond lead from partner, thereby implying that he had another
suit that he would like to be led. What should Boye bid now in the South seat?
With a near minimum and the long suit headed only by the queen, some
players would sign off in 3. If your intention is to play in 3NT when partner
holds a heart stopper, you could show your good spades with a rebid of 2. Partner
75
A96
98
9
K 6 10 9
J 7 N K Q 10 8
A Q 10 7 W E 43
S
— —
AJ
542
KJ
6
When the last club was played, West could beat the contract if he ditched another
diamond. This was hard to judge and he chose instead to throw his penultimate
heart. Boye was quick to take advantage of this slip. He cashed dummy’s A,
removing West’s safe exit card in that suit, and continued with a spade to his ace.
Seeing that he would be endplayed with a spade if he followed with the 6 on this
trick, West unblocked K under South’s A. This would have saved him if East had
held the J. As it was, Boye faced the J and claimed his game.
A bidding deception of a different type paid off handsomely on the next deal,
from the final of the 2005 European mixed teams in Tenerife. Both sides were
vulnerable and the bidding started like this:
A 10 2 K 10 8 4 A 7 2 8 3 2
Of course I was worth a raise to 4. The trouble with such a bid was that
East or West would surely bid 4 over it. The decision whether to continue
to 5 would not then be so obvious. I decided to hide the value of my hand
by passing Tonje’s 3. I was confident that this would not be passed out
because lefty’s 3 bid had already indicated the values to play in 3.
Boye passed Tonje’s 3 overcall, confident that Ulla-Britt Goldberg would compete
with 3. This vision in his crystal ball duly materialized and after two passes he
bid 4. It was an unexpected bonus when this was doubled by Lars Goldberg in
the pass-out seat. Tonje guessed the hearts correctly but not the diamonds, ending
with a doubled overtrick and a score of +990. At the other table the bidding was
a brief 1 - 2, with South not venturing an overcall. Espen Erichsen was allowed
I guess you are considering 2, 3 or 4. Against a world class pair such
as Fallenius and Fredin, the 2009 European Pairs winners, I didn’t think a
diamond pre-empt would do much damage. Even if it did and they missed
a 4-4 fit in hearts, it could be the wrong thing to do with the hearts
breaking badly.
With a passed partner you have more leeway to do extraordinary
things in the bidding. Bridge, like poker, is a positional game, and I thought
this was the time and place for a bluff. A cheap one too: 1NT!
Peter Fredin, a well-known bridge illusionist himself, doubled. Partner
passed (a good sign as he probably didn’t have five hearts), Fallenius
passed and I was back in the hot seat. What now?
I am pretty sure you are thinking: ‘2, what else?’ and probably it is
the right bid. But when I have a winning hand I like to suck’em in. So I tried
2, hoping that someone would double. Fredin was right there with the
axe, obligingly, and after two passes it was my bid again.
I know I am going to bid 2 but I don’t want to do it too fast or too
slowly, which would have been unethical. I try to find the perfect tempo
to put 2 on the bidding tray. My heart is pounding — will I really be able
to buy this in 2 doubled when the opponents have at least a nine-card
heart fit?
Fredin whacks me again, and everybody seems to be happy when it is
passed out. I certainly am! This was the full layout:
Fredin leads the 6. I win with dummy’s ace, cash the AK and eventually
set up a club trick for plus 180.
Hands like this are match winners. For one thing you collect 12 IMPs
when your teammates score the obvious 420 in 4. Much more important
is the momentum you gain. With 19 boards left to play in the match, your
opponents feel gutted and hustled. After this start they will not be able
to play anything remotely close to their A-game — trust me, I’ve been
there. Bridge at the top level is more than anything a game of psychology.
Out-and-out psychic bids are somewhat rare nowadays but it has become part of
the modern game to respond to partner’s opening bid on very weak hands. You pay
out occasionally when partner has a strong hand and will not let the bidding drop
until you have climbed too high. Many more times, you will make life difficult for
your opponents. Let’s see an example of this tactic:
With the vulnerability in his favor, Boye ventured a 1 response. More players
would follow this tactic today than was the custom back in 1997, when this deal
was played. South had nothing to say over this but he re-opened with a double
when West’s 2 rebid ran back to him. North bid 2 and Boye felt that one more
effort was required to prevent the opponents from bidding the game that seemed
to be available to them. He bid 2NT, indicating that he wanted to compete in one
of the minor suits.
South doubled to show a good hand, and North doubled Øyvind Saur’s 3,
which had shown tolerance for clubs if East’s 2NT was based on long clubs. Boye
corrected to 3 and the opponents’ bidding eventually drew to a halt in 3. Four
tricks in each black suit, plus the two red aces, gave declarer an easy overtrick. It
is not always easy to overcome such tactics, as you see.
When you have a notrump contract in mind, it is an old ploy to open a weak
minor suit. In Victor Mollo’s splendid series, Bridge in the Menagerie, the Hideous
Hog was a master of such deception: ‘You play the weakest minor, of course?’ was
often heard when Hog cut Hog.
Boye had no doubt which was his weaker minor on this deal:
I have to admit that I like preparing for notrump when I have a balanced
hand with a weak minor suit. When it goes all pass, I look pretty stupid,
but after reaching every other contract it can be hard for the opponents
to find the right lead. Over a jump to 2NT (18-19) we use transfers, so 3
from partner showed 4-4 in the majors.
West had no problems finding a diamond lead, starting with the K.
East followed with the 6 and I played the 2, trying to discourage another
diamond from West. (As declarer you should use the same signals as the
opponents. If you want them to continue the suit, encourage; if you prefer
that they switch suit, discourage.)
After a few seconds, West switched to the 4. East played the 6
and I won my ace. This didn’t look promising. Even five club tricks would
only make a total of eight. There was a small chance of a stepping-stone
squeeze in diamonds and spades if I had five club tricks and ran them, but
I decided to go for a more cunning play. At Trick 3 I led the 4 from my
hand!
West put in the J, and East, shaking his head, won with the Q and
returned the 6. With diamonds 5-2, as every card and every grimace by
the opponents suggested, I was back in the ballgame. What now?
Thinking about Vacant Spaces, with the diamonds 5-2, I could have
played righty for Jxxx and let the club ride. But the 6 didn’t look like
K
Q 10 8
—
—
— 10 9
J 6 3 2 N A7
— W E —
S
— —
—
K95
—
9
West had started with two spades, two clubs and five diamonds, so he
must have four hearts. That leaves East with five spades, two hearts,
two diamonds and four clubs. Cashing dummy’s fourth spade would give
the opponents five tricks (two diamonds plus one in each of the other
suits), so I played a heart to the king. Leaving the last club uncashed too,
I continued with a heart to the ten and ace. East’s spade return gave the
last two tricks to the dummy and plus 600 gave us 38 out of 38 match
points.’
Espen Lindqvist led a third-and-fifth 4 and declarer ducked this to Boye’s K.
With the spades under control there was no hurry to dislodge dummy’s A. Boye
returned the J, declarer winning with the ace. What are your plans for the defense,
sitting East, when declarer plays the 8 to West’s 7 and dummy’s 10? These were
Boye’s thoughts:
My instinct tells me to win deceptively with the A and return a club, but
at the last second, I chicken out. I do not feel we have complete control of
the trumps (although declarer would certainly have cleared trumps unless
Espen has a trick in that suit). I convince myself that declarer will go
down if I do not give him a trick. I think he will finesse in diamonds, or that
partner even may have two trump tricks. Therefore I win with the J just
as my grandmother would have done. I return a club. But declarer has no
option in diamonds; there is no finesse. He simply pulls trumps and bangs
down the two top diamonds to take nine red tricks and the ace of clubs.
I am furious with myself! When I play in the zone, I have such false cards
on the fingertips. I had all the information and only needed some guts to
produce the magic. How could I miss this opportunity? It is nauseating!
If I had won with the A and played a club, I can guarantee that declarer
would try to cash the good spades to discard his low diamonds. Placing
Espen with the J, he would have no reason to fear a ruff from him.
Boye led the 3, playing third-and-fifth leads, and dummy’s Q won. When Lew
Stansby led a diamond at Trick 2, East played the 2 to show an odd number of
cards and declarer finessed the queen. Seeing that declarer would score an easy
three diamond tricks if he won, Boye tried the effect of holding up the K.
Stansby continued with the Q, covered by the K and A. His next move
was to lead dummy’s J, hoping to pin an original 108 with West. Not today.
Boye won with the K and led a heart to dummy’s bare ace, freeing a trick for his
K and leaving dummy’s diamond holding blocked. Declarer continued with jack
and another club, throwing Boye on lead.
Boye paused for thought. If East held the J, it was possible that declarer had
the K. Erik had discouraged on the first round of hearts, so Boye placed declarer
with the J. In that case he had 10 points outside spades and was likely to hold
only the Q (because he had rejected the 2NT game try). Boye switched to ace and
another spade, allowing the defenders to score four tricks in the suit. This was the
position as Erik led his last spade:
Declarer was caught in a defensive squeeze. If he discarded the A, Boye would
score a trick in each red suit. When he chose to throw the 9, Boye discarded the
10 and claimed the last two tricks in hearts. +300!
The next deal was played in Tenerife, an island that became famous when a
well-known English bridge writer and his wife chose it for their honeymoon, way
back in 1975.
They say that ‘anything goes’ in the third seat at favorable vulnerability. Quite so,
and Boye was there with a 1 opening. There was no resultant good fortune in
Sensing a big spade fit for East/West, Zia attempted to cloud the issue with a psychic
rebid of 1NT. West raised to 2 and this ran back to Zia. Since a club game was
still possible he jumped to 4, causing a few puzzled looks around the table. There
was no further bidding and West led the K.
Zia ruffed the spade lead and played the A, dropping the Q from East. It
did not escape his attention that the 8 was now an entry to dummy. He played
the J, which won, followed by the 8 to dummy’s K. West had signaled his
count in hearts and East won the second round. A low diamond would have put
Zia to a guess but East returned a spade, ruffed in the South hand. Zia crossed to
You like Boye’s 6? Ever since playing three-handed bridge with his grandparents
he has loved to ‘bid what I think I can make’. West led the K and, after some
thought, switched to a heart. How would you play the slam?
The only serious technical chance is to finesse the Q. However, Boye was
absolutely certain that West did not hold the K. If that were the case, he would
surely have attempted to cash another top spade or (if he rated the South player as
a very wild bidder) played his partner for the A. Following his judgment, Boye
rose with the A and immediately called for the Q!
Believing that South held only one heart, East followed with the 7. After such
a majestic coup in hearts it would have been unjust if there was a trump trick to be
lost. No, the trumps broke 2-2 and Boye made the slam.
Perhaps you are unimpressed and think that no East player at your club would
be fooled by such a ruse. It’s not the right reaction. Sam Inge Høyland is a strong
player — a Norwegian international. Instead you should tuck away the important
message that you must follow your instinct at this game. If you truly believe that
the cards lie in a particular way, do not follow a line of play that would then lead
to defeat.
Once in a while you double the opponents in an unfortunate spot and there is no
escape for them. Your task is only half done. It is essential in such circumstances
to assume the role of a Victorian hanging judge — inflicting the maximum sentence
on your poor victims. In this chapter we will see some examples of such merciless
behavior.
On the first deal, South chose an unlucky moment to enter with the Unusual
Notrump. He was made to pay the maximum price.
Since North had declined to choose his better minor, it was quite likely that he held
two cards in each suit. Aiming to prevent any club ruffs in dummy, Øvind Saur
made the accurate lead of the 10. Declarer won with the jack and led his singleton
heart. West went in with the ace and Boye followed with the J, a suit preference
signal for spades.
Erik Sælensminde, sitting South, had an unwelcome decision to make on this deal.
Should he sit for the double of 4, hoping that partner held four tricks in defense,
or should he look for a sacrifice somewhere? He chose the latter option, bidding
4NT to show two places to play, and eventually ended in 5 doubled.
Muller led his singleton heart, won in the dummy, and Erik played the K to
East’s A. The next trick came as something of a surprise. East led the 8 and this
drew the 4, 7 and 5! There could be only one reason for West leaving East on
lead: he wanted a heart ruff. De Wijs duly led the 4 to the next trick. West ruffed
with the J and returned the Q, giving the defenders three club tricks for an 800
penalty.
At the other table the first seven bids were the same but Bas Drijver then
decided to defend against 4 doubled. North cashed the A and switched to the
When Erik Sælensminde led the 7, Fulvio Fantoni played low from dummy and
Boye won with the 10. What should East do next?
Boye could be fairly sure from the opening bid that Erik held the KQ. He
switched to the 3, West playing the Q and dummy winning with the A. Declarer
played a low heart towards his hand and Erik won with the K, continuing with a
third round of hearts. Boye ruffed, cashed the A and continued with a low club.
When Fantoni chose to ruff with the 8, Erik overruffed with the 9 and cashed
the AK. A third round of diamonds gave Fantoni another decision on how high
he should ruff. This time he assigned dummy’s A to the task.
Declarer had scored two tricks and it seemed he would score two more. It did
not turn out that way. Fantoni led dummy’s J and Boye ruffed with the J, South
discarding his last diamond. East was on lead in this position:
Boye led the K and Fantoni was faced with yet another decision in the trump
suit! He now had to guess whether West’s remaining trump was the 7 or the 5.
He chose to ruff with the 10, playing West for the 7, and then had to lose two
further trump tricks to Boye’s K7. He was 1100 down at the one-level.
Perhaps you are expecting the final deal of this chapter to feature a penalty
even bigger than 1100. You will have to wait and see. It certainly features a fine
defense by Odin Svendsen.
7
10 8 7 6
—
K654
— QJ
A Q 5 4 2 N KJ3
K 9 W E —
S
J7 A 10 9 8
10 9 4
9
10 8 7 4 2
—
Declarer led the 8, covered by the 9, and ruffed with dummy’s last trump (the
7). If Svendsen overruffs in the East seat, declarer will be able to ruff the second
round of hearts and set up three diamond tricks while maintaining trump control.
He will escape for two down and a penalty of just 500. (This was the penalty
conceded in the same contract at the other table, where Thomas Charlsen took a
better view by running the J at Trick 3.)
Svendsen made no such mistake! He discarded a club on the trick. When
declarer led a heart from the table, Svendsen rose with the K and drew two rounds
of trumps. A heart continuation forced South’s last trump and he lost the remaining
tricks, going five down for a penalty of 1400. That was 14 IMPs to Norway.
The use of transfer bids increases year on year. In this chapter we will look at five
different areas of bidding where transfer bids may be new to you.
Transfer responses to 1
Almost everyone uses transfer bids opposite 1NT, bidding 2 with hearts and 2
with spades. A similar scheme works well opposite 1. A response of 1 shows
four or more hearts; 1 shows four or more spades.
After a start of 1 - 1, the opener rebids 1 on most hands with three-card
heart support. When the responder is weak and holds only four hearts, he can pass
or sign off in 1NT. When he is stronger, with only four hearts, he can bid a new suit
(including 2) or make a higher bid in notrumps. When the responder holds five
or more hearts an eight-card fit has been found. He can sign off in 2 or invite a
game with 3. A further option is a mini-splinter (including 3), showing at least
game-try values.
Odin Svendsen’s 1 response showed hearts and East’s double indicated a good
holding in diamonds. Boye’s 2 rebid denied three-card heart support and showed
at least six clubs. With a minimum 3-2-3-5 hand he would have passed instead (or
perhaps rebid 1NT if he held a diamond stopper).
North continued with 2, a game force. Since Boye had already denied three
hearts, he could bid 2, keeping the bidding low on his minimal hand. 2 and
The 1 response is not available when you hold diamonds, of course, so you would
respond 1 instead. This response also covers balanced hands that contain no
major suit and are not strong enough for the medium-range 1NT response.
Again, 1 is used as a catch-all for those hands that do not fit into the other
categories.
Erik Sælensminde used the spade-showing double on this deal:
West’s continuation to 3 robbed North of the opportunity to use this bid himself.
He might have passed a similar message with a competitive double, again giving
South the opportunity to bid 3NT. His actual choice was 4, which was as high as
you want to be in that denomination.
A double and 1NT hold their usual meanings, with the negative double strongly
suggesting at least four hearts. In addition, East can use these two switch bids:
All other bids are natural and show a hand that is not prepared to stop in 2
opposite a minimum switch bid.
Similarly, when an opening bid of 1 or 1 is overcalled with 1, the two-level
responses in the remaining suits are switched. For example, after a 1 opening
overcalled with 1, 2 would show diamonds and 2 would show clubs.
Switch bids apply only after a black-suit overcall. This is the situation when
the overcall is in clubs:
There is no change to the negative double. In addition, East can use these two
switch bids:
The same scheme applies when an opening bid of 1 or 1 is overcalled with 2.
There will be two bids in new suits available at the two-level. The suits shown by
these two bids will be switched.
When the responder has extra values, he will bid again at his second turn:
West East
A Q 9 6 5 8
J 5 N K Q 10 9 6 2
A 10 7 2 W E Q93
S
Q3 KJ7
East is too strong to pass 2 and makes a game-try, which West is happy to accept.
West East
8 7 AK632
A K 6 4 Q8
A 10 8 5 3 Q62
Q 2 973
East shows his spade suit, which does not elicit a fit, and is then able to show some
diamond support. West sees no reason to bid further and a sensible contract is
reached.
Let’s see an exciting competitive deal that includes a switch bid:
Odin Svendsen’s 2 response was a switch bid showing at least five hearts. Paul
Chemla doubled, to show spades, and Alain Levy eventually ended in 6 doubled,
a sacrifice over the making 6.
Svendsen led the K, winning the first trick, and continued with the 9.
Declarer does best to cover this with the J, bolstering the value of dummy’s
You can see the main advantage of such responses. They allow you to show a
modest hand with a long suit. When the opener’s hand is nothing special, he will
honor the transfer and the bidding can stop in two of your suit. A second benefit
is that the opening hand, usually with the greater strength, will play the contract.
This method worked well on the following deal:
West led the K and Espen Lindqvist ended with nine tricks.
Some players achieve similar results by playing a 2 response as non-forcing
over a double. Yes, but that makes life more difficult when you hold a strong hand
with clubs. By launching club hands with a 1NT transfer, you can deal well with
both weak and strong hands.
Most bidding conventions involve giving up something to make way for the
bids that are to be used in an artificial way. Here you are acquiring several new
bids and the sacrifice to be made is the surrender of the natural 1NT response over
a double. This is quite a useful bid, it has to be admitted. Nevertheless, the use
of transfers over a double is becoming increasingly popular. Remember too that
you are getting several useful transfer bids by giving up just one natural response.
After a start of 1 - dbl, the responses are similar:
Again you have the chance to differentiate between a garbage raise to the two-level
and a sounder raise.
There are three suit bids between the overcall and a raise of the overcall. These are
their traditional meanings:
When you use ‘transfers opposite an overcall’, you jumble these three bids with no
loss whatsoever:
2 transfer to spades
2 transfer to clubs
3 showing a strong diamond raise
So, the bid that would be a transfer to partner’s suit shows a strong raise of that suit.
3 is still available for the weaker raise.
Great method, isn’t it? If you have a moderate hand with a spade suit, you can
bid 2. Partner will rebid 2 on most hands and you can stop there. If you happen
to hold a stronger hand, you will have the opportunity to bid again.
Whatever the opening bid and the overcall, there will always be three suit bids
available and you can re-order these from the traditional meanings to give you two
transfer bids and a cuebid strong raise. Look at this, much higher, situation:
The three available suit bids will now have these meanings:
It is unlikely that you would want to correct the contract from 4 to 5, it is true.
A much more likely scenario is that you want to make a fit-bid raise to 5, inviting
a slam:
West East
J 9 2 8
K 6 2 N A Q J 10 8 7
W
A Q J 8 2 E K43
S
J3 A 10 7
One cooked-up sample hand proves nothing, you are right, but you get the idea.
It makes no difference what meanings you would normally have assigned to the
three available suit bids in a particular situation. You will benefit by changing their
order, thereby switching two of the three bids into transfers.
They say that mistakes can be just as instructive as excellent play. Yes indeed, and
in this chapter we will take a close look at some unsuccessful plays and defenses
made by Boye, his teammates and their opponents. Sometimes there was a good
reason for the ‘wrong’ play; sometimes it was an out-and-out mistake from which
we may all be able to benefit.
The first deal features defense:
Boye led the Q, drawing the 10, 4 and 3. Aiming to prevent a diamond
ruff if that suit was 5-2-3-3 around the table, he switched to his singleton trump.
Dummy followed low and declarer won East’s king with the ace.
The defenders did not enjoy what happened next! Declarer crossed to dummy’s
6 and discarded his 7 on the A. He lost three diamond tricks subsequently but
the contract was his.
As you will have noticed, the contract goes down if Erik plays the 5 on the
first round of trumps, retaining his K to deal with dummy’s lowly 6.
West led the Q again but at this table declarer covered with dummy’s king. East
won with the ace and returned a second diamond to West’s jack. Continuing
diamonds will result in two overruffs by East and three down. No, West diagnosed
a spade switch. Declarer won with dummy’s A, discarding his club loser, and then
picked up the trumps with a finesse. Declarer’s remaining 98 were good so it was
5 doubled and made!
Boye is a firm believer in following his judgment rather than playing safe. This
policy pays off handsomely in the long run but it cost him a packet when defending
on this deal:
Erik Sælensminde led the K and continued with a second spade, ruffed in the
dummy. When Mike Passell led dummy’s singleton heart, Boye rose with the A
and switched to a trump, won in the dummy. Now came the key moment. Declarer
called for the 2. What would your reaction have been in the East seat?
It may seem obvious to rise with the A, ensuring the defeat of the contract.
However, Boye could not believe that declarer held a singleton K. Surely he
would have led a club instead of a heart at Trick 3 in that case? If West held K8
he would be able to win this trick and return a second round of trumps, putting the
A word or two on the bidding first: at this time Boye and Erik used 3 as a relay,
asking for further information. When the Stayman response was 2, the opener
responded according to this scheme:
3 four-card diamonds
3 four-card clubs
3 five spades
3NT 4-3-3-3 shape
So, Boye discovered that North was 4-3-3-3, set diamonds as trumps and heard a
club cuebid, denying a heart or spade control. He then bid the slam, hoping that a
heart trick would be the only loser.
A K Q 10 8 6 2 K 6 3 K 8 A
My spinal reflex is to bid 5. But that is the bid I would have chosen with
none of the side-suit honors. After all, we are white against red, and the
Israeli player certainly expects to come close to his bid. I might also jump
to 6, but that would be a wild guess. On a sunny day, I might find Espen
with an ace, or even two, but that is pure speculation. The aces are just
as likely with West and then I risk a double. Coming from Norway I am more
accustomed to grey weather than an abundance of sunrays.
I find what I consider a middle of the road solution: I double. Espen
knows too that opener has a truck-load of clubs and at least nine tricks
in his own hand. I believe I have made something close to a takeout double,
and that Espen will bid with a decent suit. Over 5 or 5 I plan to follow
up with 5, showing a very good hand. Brilliant reasoning, I say to myself
as I place the red bidding card on the tray. Everyone passes, and I have to
find an opening lead. You get to try first, while I think.
53
AQ874
10 7 5 3
93
A K Q 10 8 6 2
K63 N
K8 W E
S
A
Partner plays the 8. Decide your next move before reading further.
This is embarrassing. If declarer has nine clubs and two hearts, I have
no idea whether to find the undertrick in spades or diamonds. Switching
to the A would cost if declarer is 0-2-2-9; he would be able to ruff his
hearts good and enter dummy with the 9. A diamond exit may be wrong
in several ways. I would love to take a step back in time and lead what any
normal person would, a high spade. Then I would not be in this agonizing
predicament.
Why did Espen pass? If he takes my double as takeout, his pass
implies no five-card suit. If he has 4-4-4-1 shape my top spade will be
ruffed. He may also be 4-3-5-1 with the A as his only value, thinking it
is safer to take a penalty rather than bid at the five-level. I continue to
explore every angle I can imagine. I turn. I pant. I puff. I suffer. After a
few more excruciating minutes, I hardly know whether I am in Jerusalem,
Mecca or Pau.
But stop. Is not this championship supposed to be mine? Have I
not led the A because it had a divine significance? I will not be led into
temptation just because everybody else will say they would have led a
spade. No, my faith is still pure and strong. Solemnly, I lead the K. This
was the full deal:
Minus 750! Indeed, it could have been minus 950 if declarer had cashed
his diamonds before crossing to the 9. The result is even more galling
after the good view to double rather than bid the failing 5.
One of Boye’s worst bridge memories arose at the 1994 European Junior
Championship. He was partnering Geir Helgemo, a big name even then, and had
a black moment when playing this spade grand slam against Austria (who were in
last place by a big margin).
The bidding need not concern us. Boye arrived in 7 and West led the Q. How
would you play the contract?
All bridge players have moments like this, tucked away in the back of their
memories. The fear of losing a close match, or of making some ghastly mistake, is
one of the ingredients of the game that makes it so exciting.
What would your reaction be if you and your partner bid to a small slam in a
major event, missing the ace and king of trumps? Some players would look for a
way to blame the disaster on partner’s bidding. Others would grit their teeth and
never mention the hand again. That’s not the way! Once the event is over, you
should discuss the deal with your partner and see — without any recrimination —
how the hand should have been bid. You will then stand a good chance of avoiding
a similar misfortune in the future.
Let’s take an in-depth look at one such bidding disaster and how an expert pair
react to it. In the 2010 European Championship, playing against Germany, Boye
and Odin Svendsen bid a slam missing the ace and king of trumps. This was the
deal:
Two trump tricks were lost and that was 13 IMPs away. We mentioned the
Norwegians’ treatment of the Jacoby 2NT in Chapter 5. The 2NT bid announced a
game-forcing raise in spades and 3 showed a non-minimum unbalanced opening
bid. South’s honors were all pulling hard, so that was a reasonable if optimistic
description. Boye could have bid 3 next, asking partner if he held a side-suit
singleton. Since he was well-stocked in both hearts and clubs, there was no direct
benefit to be gained from that option. He preferred to bid 3NT, showing a balanced
hand (often of around 14-15 points) with values in both of partner’s possible
singleton suits.
With a promising hand Svendsen would have made a cuebid now. His actual
bid of 4 showed that he was at the bottom end of the non-minimum range. This
space-consuming response was not what Boye had been hoping for. What should
he do next? RKCB would give some assurance about the trump position but the
likely two-keycard response would say nothing about the vital K. If a keycard was
missing, it was essential that partner held the K. Boye decided to cuebid 5 and
partner’s 5 confirmed that he held the K.
Boye takes over the story now:
Over 5, I should probably have tried a ‘last train’ 5. But would partner
bid 6 with Axxxx-xx-Kxxx-Ax or KJxxx-xx-Kxxx-Ax? So I put him out of
that agony, as I always like to when I think I know the right thing to do, by
You see how valuable such a discussion can be, after you and your partner have
reached an awful contract.
Have you ever seen a freely bid slam go five down undoubled? ‘It wouldn’t
happen at our local club,’ you reply. ‘None of our members bid that badly.’ Not
at your local club, let’s agree with you, but perhaps it could happen in a Bermuda
Bowl final!
Boye’s 2 was forcing to game unless followed by 3, so the bidding was more or
less pre-ordained up to 3. Boye was a bit too strong to sign off in 3NT next, so 3
looks the right move. The train is still on the track at this stage, but… what does
How should Espen Lindqvist interpret Boye’s 5 RKCB response? On the face of
it, this showed two keycards (the A and K) and the Q. Since Lindqvist held
—
42
7
QJ
Q 10 K
5 3 N J986
— W E —
S
K —
J
A K Q 10
—
—
The last diamond was led, joined on the table by the K, J and Q. How should
declarer read the cards? East would not throw the K from K10, since declarer
might hold the Q. So West was known to hold the 10. There was no apparent
clue as to the location of the K. If East held that card, hearts would break 3-3; if
West held the K, East would hold four hearts and the odds would favor a heart
finesse.
Lindqvist played the hearts from the top. The J did not fall and that was
a 16 IMP loss compared with the 7 that was bid and made at the other table.
Playing with diamonds as trumps, of course, declarer could establish a thirteenth
trick in hearts by ruffing. It seems that Lindqvist took the right line of play on the
information available. If East held the K he would make the contract 100% of the
time; if West held the K he would make it 33% of the time (when the J lay with
the doubleton holding). That was around a 67% line of play. A heart finesse would
succeed 50% of the time when East held the K and 67% of the time when West
held the K, a total chance of only 58%.
How would you play 4 on a low heart lead? These were Boye’s thoughts:
3NT looks a better contract — this could be a bad one. Should I have
rebid 3 instead of 3? No point worrying about that now. I win with the
K, call for the 2 (in case East has a stiff queen or ten) and put in the
9. This forces West’s A!
It is incredible how emotions can change during a hand. Suddenly I feel
like a million dollars. I am going to make this contract and win my first big
pairs event after so many near misses — many of them roller-coasters
where I had been leading going into the last session.
I win the heart continuation and play the 9 to dummy’s 10. This
wins and I picture myself making twelve tricks with East holding Q10x and
West Kx or Kxx. When I play the 8 from dummy, East contributes the
10 and I play the J. Unfortunately West pitches a heart. But I still feel
close to a million dollars, since I should be able to ditch my heart loser.
I cash the K and play the J, overtaking with dummy’s Q. Oh no,
East starts thinking and must be out of diamonds. How unlucky! East
will ruff the Q and cross to West’s A for him to cash the setting trick
in hearts. Meanwhile, a bundle of pairs will be making 3NT.
What lesson can be drawn from this? When you encounter an unlucky break, or a
defender finds the one play that you were dreading, somehow you must try to keep
calm and think with a clear head about the rest of the play. It is all too easy for us
to give such advice and very much harder to follow it — even for top international
players.
Did the sad story have a happy ending? We will now see. Boye and Erik
avoided any further misadventure and rated themselves still with a chance of
winning when the last board of the event was placed on the table. Sitting South,
with both sides vulnerable, Boye picked up:
West passed, Erik opened 1 (playing five-card majors) and the next player
passed. What do you bid?
If you start with 1, it could get awkward when partner bids 2 or 3.
So I think it is right to respond 2. This is game-forcing in our methods
unless you continue with 3. Not surprisingly, partner bids 2. What
now?
It is tempting to hope for a misfit and bid a non-forcing 3. It is a big
risk, though. If partner has 4-5 or 4-6 shape in the majors, we may miss
No game is good, as you see. Erik held the precious K, but 3NT would fail
even if the clubs broke 3-2. Playing in hearts, even 3 is too high. However,
Erik recovered from the shock of being left in a partscore and managed to
make nine tricks. We scored 33.5 out of 38 matchpoints and won the Von
Zedtwitz Life Master Pairs, just 6 matchpoints ahead of Italy’s Norberto
Bocchi and Guido Ferraro. A wonderful moment!
We are close to the end of the book and it is time to have some fun! Let’s enjoy
some deals where Boye and his partner took a risk or two and, as a consequence,
large numbers of IMPs or matchpoints changed hands.
The first deal features an electrifying 3NT bid:
After Ishmael Del’Monte’s heart raise, Boye could visualize eight top tricks. A
diamond lead would set up the K for a ninth trick, so why not bid 3NT?
East doubled and Boye bravely stuck his ground. The Q lead was allowed to
win and West continued with the J, covered by the king and ace. East switched to
the J and Boye’s K won the trick. That was two doubled overtricks and a score of
+1150 for North-South — good going, even for regular occupants of the fast lane.
The play in 4 is interesting. A minor-suit lead would defeat the contract, but
how would you tackle the play if the Q is led?
Unusually, West’s 2 was natural rather than a transfer. North doubled for takeout
and Boye made an adventurous leap to 3NT. West, who had an unexpected opening
lead in diamonds up his sleeve, ventured a double.
Let’s think about the play in 3NT for a moment. A heart lead will give the
contract no chance because declarer cannot set up the spades before the defenders
are able to claim three heart tricks to go with their AK. What would happen on
West’s intended diamond lead, though?
The answer is that declarer can make the contract provided he rises with the
A on the first trick. This prevents East from winning with the Q and switching
to hearts; at the same time it also blocks the diamond suit. Declarer can set up the
spades, losing two spades and two diamonds at most.
It was probably a new experience for Tor Helness to watch his opponents
rocketing into slam with him having a 2NT opening!
For lead purposes I decided to bid my stronger rather than my lower-
ranked four-card suit after the double, and I was pleased to see partner
jump to 4, which promised a diamond void with spade support. Pumped
up by my strong trump holding and the J, I used Keycard Blackwood.
Erik’s 5 response told me that only one keycard was missing (the A is
We will continue with a bidding problem. Listen to the auction and see whether
you would find a bid on this South hand:
K 10 4 K 9 4 10 7 J 7 6 4 3
Only the opponents are vulnerable. East passes, you pass and West opens 1. The
bidding continues:
They have stopped in 2. Do you feel called upon to make a contribution?
Boye held the South cards and reasoned that the opponents’ lack of ambition
marked his partner with around 10 points or so. He had not found a bid over 1,
white against red, and was therefore likely to have some length in clubs. Surprising
as some would find it, on such a moderate suit, Boye protected with 3. This was
the full deal:
How would you play the contract when West leads ace and another heart?
Boye won with the K and saw that he would need an endplay to avoid losing
a spade trick. His first move was to lead a diamond, preparing to eliminate that
suit. West rose with the ace and returned the Q to dummy’s king. Ace and
another trump put West on lead and he exited with the J, ruffed by declarer.
These cards remained:
A97
J
—
10 5
J 8 3 Q652
— N Q6
9 6 3 W E —
S
— —
K 10 4
9
—
76
Boye threw East on lead with a heart, forcing him to open the spades or concede a
ruff-and-sluff. East did the best that he could, returning the Q, but Boye played
for split honors. He won with the K and finessed dummy’s 9 successfully. That
was nine tricks and the contract.
Boye saw red when he picked up the South cards on the next deal — six hearts
and seven diamonds!
The first two bids were the same at the other table but South then opened his
account with a negative double. This would be fine with something like 4-5 in the
red suits, but negative doubles do not tend to work well with more shapely hands
— there is so little chance that partner will respond in one of your suits. Boye
preferred to bid his suits directly and showed the six-card major first. When the
bidding returned to him, the opponents were in 5. Boye then showed his second
suit, bidding 5. This ran back to East, who persisted with 6. If declarer makes
the most of his cards, he can escape for two down in this contract. Boye was not
willing to let it play, however, and competed with 6. West’s double brought an
eventful auction to a close.
How would you play 6 doubled when West leads the 3?
West had shown good values with his cuebid raise and Boye placed him with
the A. He called for dummy’s K, an essential first move, and East showed out.
A finesse of the Q proved successful and Boye continued with the A and a third
heart, ruffing in the dummy. He could then draw trumps and claim the slam.
Thanks to dummy’s mighty 5, the contract would have made even if West had
started with a doubleton heart!
Look at this bidding problem next. Only the opponents are vulnerable and
they start with a multi 2 (usually based on a weak-two in one of the majors).
Partner passes and your right-hand opponent makes a 2NT relay response. What
would you bid on Boye’s hand in the fourth seat?
A 9 8 7 6 4 10 8 K 9 8 A K
As you see, a diamond lead was indeed needed to beat a contract of 4. Meanwhile,
Boye landed in 5 doubled. Best defense, which involves removing South’s trump
holding, would pick up an 1100 penalty. West led the Q, Boye winning and
playing another spade. The defenders cashed two heart tricks and switched to
clubs. Boye played the AK, ruffed a spade in dummy, ruffed a club and ruffed
another spade. These cards remained:
—
—
J75
8
— —
Q N 5
6 2 W E A Q 10
S
J —
98
—
K9
—
Have you ever heard of a reverse at the five-level? You have now!
A spade lead would make life easy for declarer, who could then take three heart
ruffs. Seeing little future in spades, West made the stronger lead of a club. East
won with the J and returned the 10. Take the South cards after this start. How
would you play the slam?
Only two heart ruffs were possible now, so declarer’s best chance was to take
either a straight finesse or a ruffing finesse in hearts. Boye made East favorite (on
the bidding) to hold the missing K. He won the trump switch in dummy and
finessed the Q. Breathing freely again when the queen won, he ruffed a heart and
returned to his hand with a spade ruff. All followed when a second heart ruff was
taken, so Boye could claim the contract.
You are itching for another bidding problem? Right, you’re sitting South in the
Cavendish tournament in Las Vegas and only the opponents are vulnerable. This
is your hand:
9 5 2 A 10 4 K 9 7 5 A 6 2
A contract of 4NT doubled on a combined count of 18 points. Life in the fast lane,
indeed! West led a top spade and switched to the K, Boye winning with the A.
Only one player could hold Qxx after West’s strong bidding in the majors, so Boye
continued with a low diamond to dummy’s ace. It was then a simple matter to
score six diamond tricks and two aces.
The outcome was as Boye had predicted — only two down against a vulnerable
game that would easily have been made. On the cross-IMPing used at the Cavendish,
Boye and Espen scored 100 IMPs more than they would have done by going three
down in 5 doubled.
Have you ever seen a deal where East-West are cold for 3NT, on any lead, but
North-South bid unopposed to the same contract? It happened on this deal:
When his partner opened 1, Boye could guess that the opponents had a major-suit
game. He decided to psyche a 2 response, which was forcing to game unless he
rebid 3. East was sufficiently impressed to pass, rather than double, and Espen
Lindqvist’s 2NT rebid showed 12-14 points. This was exactly the continuation
Boye would have chosen. He could now bid a non-forcing 3 with every hope that
it would conclude the auction.
Had Lindqvist passed, 3 would actually have been made, combining nicely
with the 3 made with an overtrick by the Norwegian West at the other table.
He looked favorably at his AK, however, and had visions of a low point-count
notrump game being available. 3NT was indeed made… by the defenders. They
scored five hearts, three diamonds and the A to collect +250 and a swing of 3
IMPs.
One of the most difficult areas of bidding is displaying good judgment at the
five-level. Look at the problem Boye faced, holding these cards:
A 6 A Q J 9 8 7 4 J 10 9 4 —
On the second round Boye made an ‘action double’. He could visualize a cheap
save on the East-West cards. The double asked partner to decide whether to defend
or sacrifice. Erik Sælensminde was not delighted to be asked such a question,
particularly when South announced a strong hand with his redouble. He had
no support for hearts and very little defense against the opponents’ club contract.
Hoping that a heart ruff might come his way, he decided to defend.
Sitting East, you win the 6 lead with the A and South follows with the 10.
How will you defend? Many defenders would return the Q; West would ruff and
a subsequent spade trick would put the contract one down. Although it made no
difference as the cards lay, Boye defended more accurately. He cashed the A at
Trick 2. If West held the K, and a doubleton heart, he would give an encouraging
attitude signal on the spade switch. A spade continuation would then defeat the
contract, even if declarer held Axx and would otherwise have been able to discard
one of dummy’s spade losers. Erik played a discouraging card on the A and ruffed
Boye’s switch back to hearts. East-West scored a nervy +400 for one redoubled
undertrick.
We will present the next deal as a bidding problem. Sitting South, with both
sides vulnerable, you hold this hand:
Partner’s 2NT suggests 12-14 points. What, if anything, will you do next?
The auction had shown that the partnership held a 5-2 fit in each of the majors
— not usually enough to furnish a satisfactory trump suit. Boye reasoned that his
partner would have not have shown his doubleton heart support if he had a double
stopper in clubs. Consequently there was some risk that the clubs would be under-
protected in 3NT.
Boye continued with 4, requesting a choice of games. When partner bid 4
next, Boye raised to 5. Did that end the bidding? No, you will recall that this
chapter is called ‘In the Fast Lane’. Erik Sælensminde raised to 6! This was the
full deal:
9 8 A Q 10 7 4 K J 9 3 7 4
Would you say anything more on that East hand? The North-South auction was
confident and Boye expected the opponents to make 3NT, aided by a long club suit
in the North hand. His answer to the bidding problem was the same as that for the
preceding problem: 4. This passed the message: ‘I am happy to sacrifice in any of
the other three suits. You choose.’
This was the full deal:
West led the Q. Give the East cards back to Boye now and pick up the South
hand. How would you play 4NT?
One idea is to lead the K at Trick 2, intending to lead towards the J later.
As the cards lie, Boye would have had to switch to a diamond after winning with
the A. Bas Drijver tried something different. After winning the spade lead, he
led a low diamond from dummy. Boye went in with the K and returned his
remaining spade, South winning with the A. Hoping to endplay East eventually,
Drijver played six rounds of clubs. When he subsequently played ace and another
diamond, West was able to win the trick and the contract went one down. Twelve
IMPs to Norway had been conjured from thin air! At all the other seven tables of
the Bermuda Bowl and Venice Cup quarter-finals, the contract was 3NT — bid and
made.
Later in the match, vulnerable against not, Boye (West) picked up:
You passed over 1, but perhaps some contribution is expected over 4. What do
you reckon?
The defenders claimed the A and K and Erik returned a spade to Boye’s ace. Two
club tricks brought the penalty to 300.
At the other table Sjoert Brink sat West and overcalled 1NT over 1, showing
four spades and a longer minor in his system. Tor Helness raised to 3 on the
North cards and Bas Drijver (East) bid 4. Take Geir Helgemo’s South cards now.
How would you defend against the spade game?
Geir led a top heart and found the only winning continuation, a second top
heart to force a trump from the dummy. Drijver ruffed in the dummy and led a low
trump, North winning with the K. Declarer won the club switch, ruffed his last
heart in dummy and cashed the A. He could not avoid two further trump losers
and was one down, giving Norway 9 IMPs.
What would happen if declarer led the J after winning the club switch? If
South covers with the Q the contract will be made. Declarer can win with the A,
return to his hand and ruff the last heart. He can then play a club to the ace, draw
another trump and claim ten tricks when diamonds break 2-2. We can be sure that
Helgemo would not have covered the J.
If South has any hand containing three-card spade support, he doubles now. A
direct raise to 2 would promise four-card support. You can see how useful it is
to distinguish between the cases. If North holds only four spades, for example, he
may be able to rebid 2. South starts with a support double when holding three-
card support, however weak or strong he may be. The level of the contract can be
sorted out on a subsequent round.
What’s that to do with life in the fast lane? Well, on the next deal Boye
discovered a previously hidden advantage of the method:
With the vulnerability in his favour, Boye decided that the moment was right for a
psychic 1 response. Simon de Wijs entered with 2 and Erik doubled to show his
three-card spade support. North passed and, trying to look casual about it, Boye
passed too. Declarer scored four black-suit tricks and two trumps to go 500 down.
At the other table East chose to respond 1NT instead. Ulf Tundal passed on
the South cards, West bid 2 and East closed the auction with 2. That went three
down and the innocuous-looking deal produced a 12-IMP swing.
We will end the chapter with an amazing bidding deal — the very last played
in the 2008 NABC Spring Nationals.
West’s 2 was a transfer to 2. Boye and Espen Lindqvist had passed five times
between them. However, the bidding was not yet over…
… 2 3 4
pass 4 pass 4
pass 4NT pass 5
pass 6 (!)
Boye protected with 2 and Espen’s 4 was natural (fortified by the knowledge that
partner was very short in diamonds). After two cuebids Boye bid 4NT, a Last Train
slam invitation. Espen signed off in 5 but Boye could not resist bidding 6. East
won the spade lead and switched to a trump, resolving the guess there. A diamond
ruff then brought the total to twelve. Would Espen have guessed the clubs without
East’s helpful switch? We will never know!
The 2008 European Championships were held in Pau, high in the French Pyrenees.
When the last round started, four teams had a good chance of winning the gold
medal: Bulgaria, Germany, Norway and Russia. In the last 20-board match Norway
faced Denmark, who had every prospect of finishing in the top six themselves,
thereby qualifying for the Bermuda Bowl. This final chapter of the book tells the
tale of Boards 14 and 15, where two grand slams were bid.
Boye won the 8 lead in his hand. There was more than one way to play the slam
but he decided to take the simple line of a heart finesse through the overcaller. He
led a heart at Trick 2, held his breath and finessed the Q. It won! He played
dummy’s A and returned to his hand with another round of trumps, the suit
breaking 2-2. When he led a second round of hearts, the K appeared from West
and he was able to claim the grand slam.
This was the auction at the other table:
Mads Kroejgaard did make the 3NT rebid that Boye had contemplated. When his
partner advanced to 4, he declined the slam invitation with a retreat to 4NT, raised
to 6NT. So, not without a degree of good fortune, Norway gained 11 IMPs.
On the next board Boye picked up this hand:
Once again, the ‘main man’ will give you his thoughts at the time.
As partner denied the Q, he probably has only five spades. With ten
trumps together with me, Espen would have lied about the missing Q
(responding 5) as the card would probably drop. If Espen has another
suit it is probably hearts, where I am short. Maybe he has the AQ? No,
I am not bidding another grand on a heart finesse! This finesse would be
different from the one on the previous board. It now would represent a
50% chance as a best-case scenario, whereas the heart finesse was 50%
as a worst-case scenario on the last board. The difference is huge.
So, I should pass?
Suddenly inspiration strikes me. Wait a minute, there is a great grand
available with clubs as trumps! I can take the diamond finesse, as East’s
double more or less guarantees that he has the king. Then I can ruff my
last diamond and throw my heart loser on the fifth spade! Wow! I can
make 7 even if Espen has only two clubs.
I know that 7 is the right bid in theory. But will it work in practice?
Will Espen pass with two or three or even four small clubs? Can he be sure
that I have a four-card royal flush draw in a suit I only mention at the
seven level? Also, it may not be necessary to bid seven. How likely is it
that the Danes have found 7?
The spade grand slam has no play and goes one down. I cannot understand
how Espen interpreted 7 as anything else than a proposition to play
that contract, but this is neither the time nor the place for a system
discussion. We lose 19 IMPs as Caspersen-Krøjgaard were one of only
three pairs in the championship that managed to bid 7 (and stop there!)
I take a break to collect a glass of water. I pass by Espen and try to
calm him down. This match is still going our way. We have lots of good
Boye and Espen recovered well from this disastrous misadventure, picking up
several useful scores including an 800 with a speculative double of a 2 contract.
Boye will now describe the conclusion of the championship:
A short while ago, Ron Tacchi, who is the official photographer at all major
championships, came into our room to take a number of pictures. He may
of course only be doing his duty, but I take it as a sign that we are at
least participating in the gold finish. Otherwise, he would be occupied with
snapping photos of Bulgarians, Germans or Russians.
After two more good results on the last boards, we rush out of the
TV room in the basement to find out what the final standings are. In the
doorway, I bump into a top bureaucrat of the EBL, Jean-Claude Beineix of
France. I am looking for a sign. He smiles in a friendly way. I am no longer
sure if he said ‘Congratulations’, ‘Well played’ or ‘You did it’, but I realize
that we have won.
Norway had beaten Denmark by 24 VPs to 6 and these were the final leading
scores:
1. Norway 299
2. Russia 287
3. Germany 286
4. Bulgaria 285
This is the moment. In the style of Björn Borg, I run a couple of steps
before I throw myself on the concrete floor of the basement in Palais
Beaumont. My tears are flowing. To win the Bermuda Bowl is of course
incredibly great, but this feels even better. Not only because it may be a
more difficult competition to win, but also because Espen and I managed
to play above ourselves in our first major tournament together.
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Bridge Should
Be Fun!
So says Norway’s Boye Brogeland, and he’s a World Champion. If
he didn’t enjoy the game so much, he wouldn’t play it. And he has
his own ideas about how it should be played. He’d rather lose the
world title by bidding a grand that goes down than be branded a
chicken.
So get ready to follow him through the ups and downs of top-
flight competition, as he encounters the proverbial thrill of victory
and agony of defeat. This book is full of new bidding ideas, critical
decisions, great cardplay, and roller-coaster excitement. It’s never
dull — it’s bridge at the edge!
BOYE BROGELAND (Norway) has won both the World and European Championships,
and is a regular participant in top-level North American tournaments.
DAVID BIRD (Southampton, UK) is the author of more than 100 books on bridge.
His most recent include Defensive Signaling and the award-winning Planning the Play
of a Bridge Hand (with Barbara Seagram).