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 Preface vii

In Parts Three and Four, the core of the book, we describe how to plan and
carry out an evaluation study. Part Three is concerned with the planning stage:
learning about the program, conversing with stakeholders to learn purposes and
consider future uses of the study, and identifying and finalizing evaluation
questions to guide the study. Part Three teaches the reader how to develop an eval-
uation plan and a management plan, including timelines and budgets for conduct-
ing the study. In Part Four, we discuss the methodological choices and decisions
evaluators make: selecting and developing designs; sampling, data collection, and
analysis strategies; interpreting results; and communicating results to others. The
chapters in each of these sections are sequential, representing the order in which
decisions are made or actions are taken in the evaluation study. We make use of
extensive graphics, lists, and examples to illustrate practice to the reader.

This Revision
Each chapter has been revised by considering the most current books, articles, and
reports. Many new references and contemporary examples have been added.
Thus, readers are introduced to current controversies about randomized control
groups and appropriate designs for outcome evaluations, current discussions of
political influences on evaluation policies and practices, research on participative
approaches, discussions of cultural competency and capacity building in organiza-
tions, and new models of evaluation use and views on interpreting and dissemi-
nating results.
We are unabashedly eclectic in our approach to evaluation. We use many
different approaches and methods––whatever is appropriate for the setting––and
encourage you to do the same. We don’t advocate one approach, but instruct you
in many. You will learn about different approaches or theories in Part Two and
different methods of collecting data in Parts Three and Four.
To facilitate learning, we have continued with much the same pedagogical
structure that we have used in past editions. Each chapter presents information on
current and foundational issues in a practical, accessible manner. Tables and
figures are used frequently to summarize or illustrate key points. Each chapter
begins with Orienting Questions to introduce the reader to some of the issues that
will be covered in the chapter and concludes with a list of the Major Concepts and
Theories reviewed in the chapter, Discussion Questions, Application Exercises,
and a list of Suggested Readings on the topics discussed.
Rather than using the case study method from previous editions, we thought
it was time to introduce readers to some real evaluations. Fortunately, while
Blaine Worthen was editor of American Journal of Evaluation, Jody Fitzpatrick wrote
a column in which she interviewed evaluators about a single evaluation they had
conducted. These interviews are now widely used in teaching about evaluation.
We have incorporated them into this new edition by recommending the ones that
illustrate the themes introduced in each chapter. Readers and instructors can
choose either to purchase the book, Evaluation in Action (Fitzpatrick, Christie, &
Mark, 2009), as a case companion to this text or to access many of the interviews
viii Preface

through their original publication in the American Journal of Evaluation. At the end
of each chapter, we describe one to three relevant interviews, citing the chapter in
the book and the original source in the journal.
We hope this book will inspire you to think in a new way about issues—in a
questioning, exploring, evaluative way—and about programs, policy, and organi-
zational change. For those readers who are already evaluators, this book will pro-
vide you with new perspectives and tools for your practice. For those who are new
to evaluation, this book will make you a more informed consumer of or participant
in evaluation studies or, perhaps, guide you to undertake your own evaluation.

Acknowledgments
We would like to thank our colleagues in evaluation for continuing to make this
such an exciting and dynamic field! Our work in each revision of our text has
reminded us of the progress being made in evaluation and the wonderful insights
of our colleagues about evaluation theory and practice. We would also like to
thank Sophia Le, our research assistant, who has worked tirelessly, creatively, and
diligently to bring this manuscript to fruition. We all are grateful to our families
for the interest and pride they have shown in our work and the patience and love
they have demonstrated as we have taken the time to devote to it.
Contents

PART ONE • Introduction to Evaluation 1

1 Evaluation’s Basic Purpose, Uses,

and Conceptual Distinctions 3

Informal versus Formal Evaluation 5

A Brief Definition of Evaluation and Other Key Terms 6
Differences in Evaluation and Research 9
The Purposes of Evaluation 13
Roles and Activities of Professional Evaluators 16
Uses and Objects of Evaluation 18
Some Basic Types of Evaluation 20
Evaluation’s Importance—and Its Limitations 32

2 Origins and Current Trends in Modern

Program Evaluation 38

The History and Influence of Evaluation in Society 38

1990–The Present: History and Current Trends 49

3 Political, Interpersonal, and Ethical Issues

in Evaluation 64

Evaluation and Its Political Context 65

Maintaining Ethical Standards: Considerations,
Issues, and Responsibilities for Evaluators 78

ix
x Contents

PART TWO • Alternative Approaches to Program Evaluation 109

4 Alternative Views of Evaluation 111

Diverse Conceptions of Program Evaluation 113

Origins of Alternative Views of Evaluation 114
Classifications of Evaluation Theories or
Approaches 120

5 First Approaches: Expertise and Consumer-Oriented

Approaches 126

The Expertise-Oriented Approach 127

The Consumer-Oriented Evaluation Approach 143

6 Program-Oriented Evaluation Approaches 153

The Objectives-Oriented Evaluation Approach 154

Logic Models and Theory-Based Evaluation Approaches 159
How Program-Oriented Evaluation Approaches Have Been
Used 164
Strengths and Limitations of Program-Oriented Evaluation
Approaches 166
Goal-Free Evaluation 168

7 Decision-Oriented Evaluation Approaches 172

Developers of Decision-Oriented Evaluation Approaches

and Their Contributions 173
The Decision-Oriented Approaches 173
How the Decision-Oriented Evaluation Approaches
Have Been Used 184
Strengths and Limitations of Decision-Oriented Evaluation
Approaches 184
 Contents xi

8 Participant-Oriented Evaluation Approaches 189

Evolution of Participatory Approaches 190

Developers of Participant-Oriented Evaluation
Approaches and Their Contributions 191
Participatory Evaluation Today: Two Streams and Many Approaches 199
Some Specific Contemporary Approaches 205
How Participant-Oriented Evaluation Approaches Have Been Used 220
Strengths and Limitations of Participant-Oriented
Evaluation Approaches 223

9 Other Current Considerations: Cultural Competence

and Capacity Building 231

The Role of Culture and Context in Evaluation Practice

and Developing Cultural Competence 232
Evaluation’s Roles in Organizations: Evaluation Capacity
Building and Mainstreaming Evaluation 235

10 A Comparative Analysis of Approaches 243

A Summary and Comparative Analysis of Evaluation Approaches 243

Cautions About the Alternative Evaluation Approaches 244
Contributions of the Alternative Evaluation Approaches 248
Comparative Analysis of Characteristics of Alternative
Evaluation Approaches 249
Eclectic Uses of the Alternative Evaluation Approaches 251

PART THREE • Practical Guidelines for Planning Evaluations 257

11 Clarifying the Evaluation Request

and Responsibilities 259

Understanding the Reasons for Initiating the Evaluation 260

Conditions Under Which Evaluation Studies Are Inappropriate 265
xii Contents

Determining When an Evaluation Is Appropriate:

Evaluability Assessment 268
Using an Internal or External Evaluator 271
Hiring an Evaluator 277
How Different Evaluation Approaches Clarify the Evaluation Request
and Responsibilities 281

12 Setting Boundaries and Analyzing

the Evaluation Context 286

Identifying Stakeholders and Intended Audiences for

an Evaluation 287
Describing What Is to Be Evaluated: Setting the Boundaries 290
Analyzing the Resources and Capabilities That Can Be Committed
to the Evaluation 304
Analyzing the Political Context for the Evaluation 307
Variations Caused by the Evaluation Approach Used 309
Determining Whether to Proceed with the Evaluation 310

13 Identifying and Selecting the Evaluation Questions

and Criteria 314

Identifying Useful Sources for Evaluation Questions:

The Divergent Phase 315
Selecting the Questions, Criteria, and Issues to Be Addressed: The
Convergent Phase 328
Specifying the Evaluation Criteria and Standards 332
Remaining Flexible during the Evaluation: Allowing New Questions,
Criteria, and Standards to Emerge 336

14 Planning How to Conduct the Evaluation 340

Developing the Evaluation Plan 342

Specifying How the Evaluation Will Be Conducted:
The Management Plan 358
 Contents xiii

Establishing Evaluation Agreements and Contracts 367

Planning and Conducting the Metaevaluation 368

PART FOUR • Practical Guidelines for Conducting

and Using Evaluations 379

15 Collecting Evaluative Information: Design, Sampling,

and Cost Choices 381

Using Mixed Methods 383

Designs for Collecting Descriptive and Causal Information 387
Sampling 407
Cost Analysis 411

16 Collecting Evaluative Information: Data Sources

and Methods, Analysis, and Interpretation 418

Common Sources and Methods for Collecting Information 419

Planning and Organizing the Collection of Information 443
Analysis of Data and Interpretation of Findings 444

17 Reporting Evaluation Results: Maximizing

Use and Understanding 453

Purposes of Evaluation Reporting and Reports 454

Different Ways of Reporting 455
Important Factors in Planning Evaluation Reporting 456
Key Components of a Written Report 469
Suggestions for Effective Oral Reporting 476
A Checklist for Good Evaluation Reports 479
How Evaluation Information Is Used 479
xiv Contents

18 The Future of Evaluation 490

The Future of Evaluation 490

Predictions Concerning the Profession of Evaluation 491
Predictions Concerning the Practice of Evaluation 493
A Vision for Evaluation 496
Conclusion 497

Appendix A The Program Evaluation Standards

and Guiding Principles for Evaluators 499

References 505

Author Index 526

Subject Index 530

Part I
Introduction
to Evaluation

This initial section of our text provides the background necessary for the begin-
ning student to understand the chapters that follow. In it, we attempt to accom-
plish three things: to explore the concept of evaluation and its various meanings,
to review the history of program evaluation and its development as a discipline,
and to introduce the reader to some of the factors that influence the practice of
evaluation. We also acquaint the reader with some of the current controversies
and trends in the field.
In Chapter 1, we discuss the basic purposes of evaluation and the varying
roles evaluators play. We define evaluation specifically, and we introduce the
reader to several different concepts and distinctions that are important to evalua-
tion. In Chapter 2, we summarize the origins of today’s evaluation tenets and prac-
tices and the historical evolution of evaluation as a growing force in improving our
society’s public, nonprofit, and corporate programs. In Chapter 3, we discuss the
political, ethical, and interpersonal factors that underlie any evaluation and em-
phasize its distinction from research.
Our intent in Part One is to provide the reader with information essential to
understanding not only the content of the sections that follow but also the wealth
of material that exists in the literature on program evaluation. Although the con-
tent in the remainder of this book is intended to apply primarily to the evaluation
of programs, most of it also applies to the evaluation of policies, products, and
processes used in those areas and, indeed, to any object of an evaluation. In Part
Two we will introduce you to different approaches to evaluation to enlarge your
understanding of the diversity of choices that evaluators and stakeholders make
in undertaking evaluation.

1
This page intentionally left blank
 1
Evaluation’s Basic Purpose,
Uses, and Conceptual
Distinctions

Orienting Questions
1. What is evaluation? Why is it important?
2. What is the difference between formal and informal evaluation?
3. What are some purposes of evaluation? What roles can the evaluator play?
4. What are the major differences between formative and summative evaluations?
5. What questions might an evaluator address in a needs assessment, a process
evaluation, and an outcome evaluation?
6. What are the advantages and disadvantages of an internal evaluator? An external
evaluator?

T he challenges confronting our society in the twenty-first century are enormous.

Few of them are really new. In the United States and many other countries, the
public and nonprofit sectors are grappling with complex issues: educating children
for the new century; reducing functional illiteracy; strengthening families; train-
ing people to enter or return to the workforce; training employees who currently
work in an organization; combating disease and mental illness; fighting discrimi-
nation; and reducing crime, drug abuse, and child and spouse abuse. More
recently, pursuing and balancing environmental and economic goals and working
to ensure peace and economic growth in developing countries have become prominent
concerns. As this book is written, the United States and many countries around

3
4 Part I • Introduction to Evaluation

the world are facing challenging economic problems that touch every aspect of so-
ciety. The policies and programs created to address these problems will require
evaluation to determine which solutions to pursue and which programs and poli-
cies are working and which are not. Each new decade seems to add to the list of
challenges, as society and the problems it confronts become increasingly complex.
As society’s concern over these pervasive and perplexing problems has
intensified, so have its efforts to resolve them. Collectively, local, regional, national,
and international agencies have initiated many programs aimed at eliminating
these problems or their underlying causes. In some cases, specific programs judged
to have been ineffective have been “mothballed” or sunk outright, often to be
replaced by a new program designed to attack the problem in a different—and,
hopefully, more effective—manner.
In more recent years, scarce resources and budget deficits have posed still
more challenges as administrators and program managers have had to struggle to
keep their most promising programs afloat. Increasingly, policymakers and man-
agers have been faced with tough choices, being forced to cancel some programs
or program components to provide sufficient funds to start new programs, to con-
tinue others, or simply to keep within current budgetary limits.
To make such choices intelligently, policy makers need good information
about the relative effectiveness of programs. Which programs are working well?
Which are failing? What are the programs’ relative costs and benefits? Similarly,
each program manager needs to know how well different parts of programs are
working. What can be done to improve those parts of the program that are not
working as well as they should? Have all aspects of the program been thought
through carefully at the planning stage, or is more planning needed? What is the
theory or logic model for the program’s effectiveness? What adaptations would
make the program more effective?
Answering such questions is the major task of program evaluation. The ma-
jor task of this book is to introduce you to evaluation and the vital role it plays in
virtually every sector of modern society. However, before we can hope to convince
you that good evaluation is an essential part of good programs, we must help you
understand at least the basic concepts in each of the following areas:

• How we—and others—define evaluation

• How formal and informal evaluation differ
• The basic purposes—and various uses—of formal evaluation
• The distinction between basic types of evaluation
• The distinction between internal and external evaluators
• Evaluation’s importance and its limitations

Covering all of those areas thoroughly could fill a whole book, not just one
chapter of an introductory text. In this chapter, we provide only brief coverage of
each of these topics to orient you to concepts and distinctions necessary to under-
stand the content of later chapters.
 Chapter 1 • Evaluation’s Basic Purpose, Uses, and Conceptual Distinctions 5

Informal versus Formal Evaluation

Evaluation is not a new concept. In fact, people have been evaluating, or examin-
ing and judging things, since the beginning of human history. Neanderthals prac-
ticed it when determining which types of saplings made the best spears, as did Persian
patriarchs in selecting the most suitable suitors for their daughters, and English
yeomen who abandoned their own crossbows in favor of the Welsh longbow. They
had observed that the longbow could send an arrow through the stoutest armor
and was capable of launching three arrows while the crossbow sent only one. Al-
though no formal evaluation reports on bow comparisons have been unearthed in
English archives, it is clear that the English evaluated the longbow’s value for their
purposes, deciding that its use would strengthen them in their struggles with the
French. So the English armies relinquished their crossbows, perfected and improved
on the Welsh longbow, and proved invincible during most of the Hundred Years’ War.
By contrast, French archers experimented briefly with the longbow, then went
back to the crossbow—and continued to lose battles. Such are the perils of poor
evaluation! Unfortunately, the faulty judgment that led the French to persist in us-
ing an inferior weapon represents an informal evaluation pattern that has been re-
peated too often throughout history.
As human beings, we evaluate every day. Practitioners, managers, and
policymakers make judgments about students, clients, personnel, programs, and
policies. These judgments lead to choices and decisions. They are a natural part of
life. A school principal observes a teacher working in the classroom and forms
some judgments about that teacher’s effectiveness. A program officer of a founda-
tion visits a substance abuse program and forms a judgment about the program’s
quality and effectiveness. A policymaker hears a speech about a new method for de-
livering health care to uninsured children and draws some conclusions about whether
that method would work in his state. Such judgments are made every day in our work.
These judgments, however, are based on informal, or unsystematic, evaluations.
Informal evaluations can result in faulty or wise judgments. But, they are
characterized by an absence of breadth and depth because they lack systematic
procedures and formally collected evidence. As humans, we are limited in making
judgments both by the lack of opportunity to observe many different settings,
clients, or students and by our own past experience, which both informs and bi-
ases our judgments. Informal evaluation does not occur in a vacuum. Experience,
instinct, generalization, and reasoning can all influence the outcome of informal
evaluations, and any or all of these may be the basis for sound, or faulty, judg-
ments. Did we see the teacher on a good day or a bad one? How did our past ex-
perience with similar students, course content, and methods influence our
judgment? When we conduct informal evaluations, we are less cognizant of these
limitations. However, when formal evaluations are not possible, informal evalua-
tion carried out by knowledgeable, experienced, and fair people can be very use-
ful indeed. It would be unrealistic to think any individual, group, or organization
could formally evaluate everything it does. Often informal evaluation is the only
6 Part I • Introduction to Evaluation

practical approach. (In choosing an entrée from a dinner menu, only the most
compulsive individual would conduct exit interviews with restaurant patrons to
gather data to guide that choice.)
Informal and formal evaluation, however, form a continuum. Schwandt
(2001a) acknowledges the importance and value of everyday judgments and argues
that evaluation is not simply about methods and rules. He sees the evaluator as
helping practitioners to “cultivate critical intelligence.” Evaluation, he notes, forms
a middle ground “between overreliance on and over-application of method, general
principles, and rules to making sense of ordinary life on one hand, and advocating
trust in personal inspiration and sheer intuition on the other” (p. 86). Mark,
Henry, and Julnes (2000) echo this concept when they describe evaluation as a
form of assisted sense-making. Evaluation, they observe, “has been developed to
assist and extend natural human abilities to observe, understand, and make judgments
about policies, programs, and other objects in evaluation” (p. 179).
Evaluation, then, is a basic form of human behavior. Sometimes it is thorough,
structured, and formal. More often it is impressionistic and private. Our focus is on
the more formal, structured, and public evaluation. We want to inform readers of
various approaches and methods for developing criteria and collecting information
about alternatives. For those readers who aspire to become professional evaluators,
we will be introducing you to the approaches and methods used in these formal
studies. For all readers, practitioners and evaluators, we hope to cultivate that
critical intelligence, to make you cognizant of the factors influencing your more
informal judgments and decisions.

A Brief Definition of Evaluation

and Other Key Terms
In the previous section, the perceptive reader will have noticed that the term
“evaluation” has been used rather broadly without definition beyond what was
implicit in context. But the rest of this chapter could be rather confusing if we did
not stop briefly to define the term more precisely. Intuitively, it may not seem dif-
ficult to define evaluation. For example, one typical dictionary definition of eval-
uation is “to determine or fix the value of: to examine and judge.” Seems quite
straightforward, doesn’t it? Yet among professional evaluators, there is no uni-
formly agreed-upon definition of precisely what the term “evaluation” means. In
fact, in considering the role of language in evaluation, Michael Scriven, one of the
founders of evaluation, for an essay on the use of language in evaluation recently
noted there are nearly 60 different terms for evaluation that apply to one context
or another. These include adjudge, appraise, analyze, assess, critique, examine,
grade, inspect, judge, rate, rank, review, score, study, test, and so on (cited in
Patton, 2000, p. 7). While all these terms may appear confusing, Scriven notes
that the variety of uses of the term evaluation “reflects not only the immense im-
portance of the process of evaluation in practical life, but the explosion of a new
area of study” (cited in Patton, 2000, p. 7). This chapter will introduce the reader
 Chapter 1 • Evaluation’s Basic Purpose, Uses, and Conceptual Distinctions 7

to the array of variations in application, but, at this point, we will focus on one
definition that encompasses many others.
Early in the development of the field, Scriven (1967) defined evaluation as
judging the worth or merit of something. Many recent definitions encompass this
original definition of the term (Mark, Henry, & Julnes, 2000; Schwandt, 2008;
Scriven, 1991a; Stake, 2000a; Stufflebeam, 2001b). We concur that evaluation is de-
termining the worth or merit of an evaluation object (whatever is evaluated). More
broadly, we define evaluation as the identification, clarification, and application of
defensible criteria to determine an evaluation object’s value (worth or merit) in rela-
tion to those criteria. Note that this definition requires identifying and clarifying de-
fensible criteria. Often, in practice, our judgments of evaluation objects differ because
we have failed to identify and clarify the means that we, as individuals, use to judge
an object. One educator may value a reading curriculum because of the love it instills
for reading; another may disparage the program because it does not move the child
along as rapidly as other curricula in helping the student to recognize and interpret
letters, words, or meaning. These educators differ in the value they assign to the cur-
ricula because their criteria differ. One important role of an evaluator is to help stake-
holders articulate their criteria and to stimulate dialogue about them. Our definition,
then, emphasizes using those criteria to judge the merit or worth of the product.
Evaluation uses inquiry and judgment methods, including: (1) determining
the criteria and standards for judging quality and deciding whether those stan-
dards should be relative or absolute, (2) collecting relevant information, and
(3) applying the standards to determine value, quality, utility, effectiveness, or sig-
nificance. It leads to recommendations intended to optimize the evaluation object
in relation to its intended purpose(s) or to help stakeholders determine whether
the evaluation object is worthy of adoption, continuation, or expansion.

Programs, Policies, and Products

In the United States, we often use the term “program evaluation.” In Europe and
some other countries, however, evaluators often use the term “policy evaluation.”
This book is concerned with the evaluation of programs, policies, and products. We
are not, however, concerned with evaluating personnel or the performance of indi-
vidual people or employees. That is a different area, one more concerned with man-
agement and personnel.1 (See Joint Committee. [1988]) But, at this point, it would
be useful to briefly discuss what we mean by programs, policies, and products.
“Program” is a term that can be defined in many ways. In its simplest sense, a pro-
gram is a “standing arrangement that provides for a . . . service” (Cronbach et al., 1980,
p. 14). The Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation (1994) defined
program simply as “activities that are provided on a continuing basis” (p. 3). In their

1
The Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation has developed some standards for
personnel evaluation that may be of interest to readers involved in evaluating the performance of teach-
ers or other employees working in educational settings. These can be found at http://www.eval.org/
evaluationdocuments/perseval.html.
8 Part I • Introduction to Evaluation

new edition of the Standards (2010) the Joint Committee noted that a program is
much more than a set of activities. They write:
Defined completely, a program is
• A set of planned systematic activities
• Using managed resources
• To achieve specified goals
• Related to specific needs
• Of specific, identified, participating human individuals or groups
• In specific contexts
• Resulting in documentable outputs, outcomes and impacts
• Following assumed (explicit or implicit) systems of beliefs (diagnostic, causal, in-
tervention, and implementation theories about how the program works)
• With specific, investigable costs and benefits. (Joint Committee, 2010, in press)
Note that their newer definition emphasizes programs achieving goals related
to particular needs and the fact that programs are based on certain theories or as-
sumptions. We will talk more about this later when we discuss program theory. We
will simply summarize by saying that a program is an ongoing, planned intervention
that seeks to achieve some particular outcome(s), in response to some perceived ed-
ucational, social, or commercial problem. It typically includes a complex of people,
organization, management, and resources to deliver the intervention or services.
In contrast, the word “policy” generally refers to a broader act of a public orga-
nization or a branch of government. Organizations have policies—policies about re-
cruiting and hiring employees, policies about compensation, policies concerning
interactions with media and the clients or customers served by the organization. But,
government bodies—legislatures, departments, executives, and others—also pass or
develop policies. It might be a law or a regulation. Evaluators often conduct studies to
judge the effectiveness of those policies just as they conduct studies to evaluate pro-
grams. Sometimes, the line between a program and a policy is quite blurred. Like a
program, a policy is designed to achieve some outcome or change, but, unlike a pro-
gram, a policy does not provide a service or activity. Instead, it provides guidelines,
regulations, or the like to achieve a change. Those who study public policy define policy
even more broadly: “public policy is the sum of government activities, whether acting
directly or through agents, as it has an influence on the life of citizens” (Peters, 1999,
p. 4). Policy analysts study the effectiveness of public policies just as evaluators study
the effectiveness of government programs. Sometimes, their work overlaps. What one
person calls a policy, another might call a program. In practice, in the United States,
policy analysts tend to be trained in political science and economics, and evaluators
tend to be trained in psychology, sociology, education, and public administration. As
the field of evaluation expands and clients want more information on government
programs, evaluators study the effectiveness of programs and policies.
Finally, a “product” is a more concrete entity than either a policy or a pro-
gram. It may be a textbook such as the one you are reading. It may be a piece of
software. Scriven defines a product very broadly to refer to the output of some-
thing. Thus, a product could be a student or a person who received training, the
 Chapter 1 • Evaluation’s Basic Purpose, Uses, and Conceptual Distinctions 9

work of a student, or a curricula which is “the product of a research and development

effort” (1991a, p. 280).

Stakeholders
Another term used frequently in evaluation is “stakeholders.” Stakeholders are
various individuals and groups who have a direct interest in and may be affected
by the program being evaluated or the evaluation’s results. In the Encyclopedia of
Evaluation, Greene (2005) identifies four types of stakeholders:
(a) People who have authority over the program including funders, policy makers,
advisory boards;
(b) People who have direct responsibility for the program including program devel-
opers, administrators, managers, and staff delivering the program;
(c) People who are the intended beneficiaries of the program, their families, and their
communities; and
(d) People who are damaged or disadvantaged by the program (those who lose fund-
ing or are not served because of the program). (pp. 397–398)
Scriven (2007) has grouped stakeholders into groups based on how they are impacted
by the program, and he includes more groups, often political groups, than does
Greene. Thus, “upstream impactees” refer to taxpayers, political supporters, funders,
and those who make policies that affect the program. “Midstream impactees,” also
called primary stakeholders by Alkin (1991), are program managers and staff. “Down-
stream impactees” are those who receive the services or products of the program.
All of these groups hold a stake in the future direction of that program even
though they are sometimes unaware of their stake. Evaluators typically involve at
least some stakeholders in the planning and conduct of the evaluation. Their par-
ticipation can help the evaluator to better understand the program and the infor-
mation needs of those who will use it.

Differences in Evaluation and Research

It is important to distinguish between evaluation and research, because these dif-
ferences help us to understand the distinctive nature of evaluation. While some
methods of evaluation emerged from social science research traditions, there are
important distinctions between evaluation and research. One of those distinctions
is purpose. Research and evaluation seek different ends. The primary purpose of
research is to add to knowledge in a field, to contribute to the growth of theory.
A good research study is intended to advance knowledge. While the results of an
evaluation study may contribute to knowledge development (Mark, Henry, &
Julnes, 2000), that is a secondary concern in evaluation. Evaluation’s primary pur-
pose is to provide useful information to those who hold a stake in whatever is be-
ing evaluated (stakeholders), often helping them to make a judgment or decision.
10 Part I • Introduction to Evaluation

Research seeks conclusions; evaluation leads to judgments. Valuing is the sine

qua non of evaluation. A touchstone for discriminating between an evaluator and
a researcher is to ask whether the inquiry being conducted would be regarded as
a failure if it produced no data on the value of the thing being studied. A researcher
answering strictly as a researcher will probably say no.
These differing purposes have implications for the approaches one takes.
Research is the quest for laws and the development of theory—statements of re-
lationships among two or more variables. Thus, the purpose of research is typically
to explore and establish causal relationships. Evaluation, instead, seeks to exam-
ine and describe a particular thing and, ultimately, to consider its value. Some-
times, describing that thing involves examining causal relationships; often, it does
not. Whether the evaluation focuses on a causal issue depends on the information
needs of the stakeholders.
This highlights another difference in evaluation and research—who sets the
agenda. In research, the hypotheses to be investigated are chosen by the researcher
based on the researcher’s assessment of the appropriate next steps in developing
theory in the discipline or field of knowledge. In evaluation, the questions to be
answered are not those of the evaluator, but rather come from many sources,
including those of significant stakeholders. An evaluator might suggest questions,
but would never determine the focus of the study without consultation with
stakeholders. Such actions, in fact, would be unethical in evaluation. Unlike re-
search, good evaluation always involves the inclusion of stakeholders—often a
wide variety of stakeholders—in the planning and conduct of the evaluation for
many reasons: to ensure that the evaluation addresses the needs of stakeholders,
to improve the validity of results, and to enhance use.
Another difference between evaluation and research concerns generalizabil-
ity of results. Given evaluation’s purpose of making judgments about a particular
thing, good evaluation is quite specific to the context in which the evaluation
object rests. Stakeholders are making judgments about a particular evaluation object,
a program or a policy, and are not as concerned with generalizing to other settings
as researchers would be. In fact, the evaluator should be concerned with the par-
ticulars of that setting, with noting them and attending to the factors that are rel-
evant to program success or failure in that setting. (Note that the setting or context
may be a large, national program with many sites, or a small program in one school.)
In contrast, because the purpose of research is to add to general knowledge, the
methods are often designed to maximize generalizability to many different settings.
As suggested previously, another difference between research and evaluation
concerns the intended use of their results. Later in the book, we will discuss the
many different types of use that may occur in evaluation, but, ultimately, evalua-
tion is intended to have some relatively immediate impact. That impact may be on
immediate decisions, on decisions in the not-too-distant future, or on perspectives
that one or more stakeholder groups or stakeholders have about the object of the
evaluation or evaluation itself. Whatever the impact, the evaluation is designed to
be used. Good research may or may not be used right away. In fact, research that
adds in important ways to some theory may not be immediately noticed, and
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
company of the Nineteenth contrived to scramble up the rocks and
to hold its own on the summit until reinforced, when the men
charged with the bayonet, drove back the enemy and captured three
guns. The French then retired into the fortress of Palais and
proceeded to strengthen the defences; while Hodgson, to his infinite
mortification, was obliged to lie idle for a fortnight, being unable to
land his heavy artillery owing to continual gales. At length on the
2nd of May ground was broken, and on the 13th the entrenchments
were carried by storm. The French thereupon retired into the citadel,
which after a most gallant defence was compelled on the 7th of June
to surrender. The losses of the British throughout the whole of the
operations were about seven hundred killed and wounded. Thus
Belleisle was secured as a place of refreshment for the fleet while
engaged in the weary work of blockading the French coast.

Feb.

Any hopes that might have been built on the value of this
expedition as a help to Ferdinand were very speedily dissipated.
Ferdinand himself had sought, while it was yet mid-winter, to make
good the losses of the past campaign by a bold stroke for the
recapture of Hesse. Moving out of his winter-quarters on the 11th of
February he distributed his army into three columns. The left or
eastern column, under Spörcke, was designed to march to the Werra
and Unstrut, and to join with a detachment of Prussians in an attack
upon the Saxons in that quarter; the main or central army, under
Ferdinand himself, was to march to the Eder; and the right or
westward column, which was composed of the troops cantoned in
Westphalia under the Hereditary Prince, was to advance on Fritzlar,
while a separate corps was detached to attempt the capture of
Marburg.

March 20.
March 21.
March.
 Spörcke for his part did his work well and gained a brilliant little
victory at Langensalza; but the rest of the scheme went to wreck.
Broglie on learning of Ferdinand's movements left a garrison in
Cassel and retreated first to Hersfeld, behind the Eder, and finally to
the Main. But meanwhile the Hereditary Prince had been delayed for
two invaluable days by unexpected resistance at Fritzlar; and
Ferdinand, though he had driven the enemy for the moment from
Hesse, had left Cassel, Ziegenhain, and Marburg, invested indeed
but untaken, behind him. He dared not linger to master these places
one after another, for the whole country was laid waste, and the
strain of hauling all supplies from the Weser was intolerable. The
road from Beverungen to the central column of the army was paved
with dead horses, the corpses tracing the whole line of the advance.
He was therefore obliged to hasten on to a district where supplies
were still obtainable, trusting that good fortune would throw the
strong places into his hands before it was too late. But it was not to
be. Broglie quickly concentrated his troops on the Main, summoned
twelve thousand men from the Lower Rhine and advanced
northward to Giessen; whereupon Ferdinand, who had penetrated as
far south as the Ohm, was compelled to fall back to the Eder. On the
following day the Hereditary Prince was attacked by superior
numbers at Grünberg and compelled to retreat with loss of two
thousand prisoners; and this misfortune neutralised all the
advantages so far gained by the enterprise. Ferdinand, therefore,
raised the siege of Cassel and fell back with all speed by forced
marches; for Broglie had now eighty thousand troops against his
own twenty thousand. Arrived at his old position to north of the
Diemel he dispersed his troops once more into winter-quarters. His
stroke had failed; and the operations are interesting chiefly as
exemplifying the futility, in those days of slow communication, of an
advance into an enemy's country, unless at least one fortress were
first captured as a place of arms. It is easier to understand the
reason for the laborious sieges of Marlborough and Wellington when
it is observed that Ferdinand, though he drove the French before
him from end to end of Hesse in a few weeks, was obliged to
abandon the whole of it and to retreat because he had left Cassel
uncaptured in his rear.
The Allies had suffered so terribly from hardship and exposure
during this winter's expedition that it was two months before they
were again fit to take the field;[377] and the French, partly from the
same cause, partly owing to the magnitude of their preparations,
needed little less time than they. The Court of Versailles had, in fact,
resolved to make a gigantic effort and to close the war forthwith by
employment of an overwhelming force. The army of the Rhine was
raised to one hundred thousand men, under the Prince of Soubise,
and that of the Main to sixty thousand men under Broglie. Soubise
was to advance from the Rhine against Ferdinand early in May; thus
forcing the Prince either to abandon Westphalia, together with
Münster and Lippstadt, in order to gain time for recuperation of his
army, or to march with his troops, still weakened and exhausted by
the winter's campaign, to fight him. His task in fact was simply to
keep Ferdinand's army in motion until Broglie's troops were
refreshed, and ready to advance either into Hanover or to Hameln
on the Weser. When Broglie thus occupied the attention of
Ferdinand, Soubise would find himself with a free hand in a free
field. The weak point of the plan was that the two French armies
were to act independently, and that the stronger of them was
entrusted to Soubise, an incompetent commander but a favourite
with Madame de Pompadour. But in any case the outlook for
Ferdinand was formidable, since at the very most he could muster
but ninety-three thousand men against one hundred and sixty
thousand of the French.

April.
May 14.

Soubise duly arrived at Frankfort on the 13th of April and

summoned Broglie to discuss matters with him. Then, instead of
taking the field early in May, he remained motionless behind the
Rhine on various pretexts until the beginning of June. Further, he
determined, contrary to the advice given to him at Versailles, to
pursue operations to the south of the Lippe, and between that river
and the Ruhr, in order to effect a junction with Broglie. The motives
that may have dictated this resolution are unknown; but it was
conjectured that he shrank from engaging so formidable an
adversary as Ferdinand without a colleague to share the risk and
responsibility. Meanwhile Ferdinand, selecting the least exhausted of
his troops, sent a corps under the Hereditary Prince to Nottuln, a
little to the west of Münster, to watch Soubise, and by great
exertions contrived within ten weeks to render both his army and his
transport fit to take the field. Soubise's army was known to be
encumbered by a vast train of baggage; one troop of Horse Guards,
for instance, with a strength of one hundred and forty men,
travelling with no fewer than twelve hundred horses attached to it.
So all the forage about Münster was destroyed, the inhabitants and
their herds being provided for by the King's commissaries, and every
step was taken to embarrass the French in their advance to the east.

June.
July 1-2.
July 3.
July 4.
July 6.

At length on the 13th of June Soubise crossed the Rhine at

Wesel, and arrived ten days later at Unna, a few miles to eastward
of Dortmund, where he entrenched himself, with his front to the
east. Ferdinand thereupon concentrated his army on the 19th at
Paderborn, leaving twenty thousand men under Spörcke on the
Diemel to watch Broglie, and a smaller corps of observation before
Göttingen. On the 20th he marched westward, and on the 28th
encamped over against Soubise, where he was joined by the corps
of the Hereditary Prince. Finding that the French position was too
formidable to be attacked, he determined on a bold stroke, made a
forced march of thirty hours round Soubise's left flank by Camen,
and appeared suddenly at Dortmund full in his rear and across his
line of communication. The movement left Soubise free to unite with
Broglie; but this was rather an advantage than otherwise to
Ferdinand, since the two commanders being on bad terms might
neutralise each other, whereas each of them independently was at
the head of a stronger army than Ferdinand's. On the 4th of July
Ferdinand advanced against the rear of Soubise's camp; whereupon
the French General at once moved on, always with the Allies close at
his heels, to Soest, where Broglie came to concert with him the
junction of the two armies.

July 10.
July.

Broglie himself had on the 29th of June advanced to the Diemel

and obliged Spörcke to abandon Warburg and to retreat, not without
loss of part of his artillery. He had then turned westward upon
Paderborn, which he had occupied, and thence to Soest, where his
army joined that of Soubise on the 10th of July. The joint strength of
the two armies at Soest, after deducting the detachments made
from both of them, was just about one hundred thousand men.
Ferdinand's force, after the arrival of Spörcke, who had made his
way to him from the Diemel with all haste, amounted to no more
than sixty thousand men. Even with such odds against him, however,
Ferdinand stood firm, refusing to cross to the north bank of the
Lippe and abandon Lippstadt, as the French commanders had
hoped. He was determined that they should fight him for Lippstadt;
and they, knowing their adversary, were not too eager to hazard the
venture.
After sundry small changes and shiftings of position between
the 7th and 11th of July Ferdinand made the following dispositions.
General von Spörcke with about eight thousand men was left on the
north bank of the Lippe at Hersfeld, to watch Prince Xavier of
Saxony, who lay with a corps in the vicinity of Paderborn. The main
army was encamped on the south bank of the Lippe, with its left
resting on the river; from whence the left wing extended to the
village of Kirchdünckern on the Ase, a brook impassable except by
bridges. Vellinghausen, Ferdinand's headquarters, lay midway
between the Ase and the Lippe at the foot of a declivity called the
Dünckerberg. From the Lippe to Vellinghausen the ground was
occupied by Wutgenau's corps, of seven battalions and five
squadrons, all of them German troops. From Vellinghausen to
Kirchdünckern the heights were held by Granby's corps, consisting of
two battalions of British grenadiers, the Fifth, Twelfth, Twenty-fourth
and Thirty-seventh Foot under Brigadier Sandford, Keith's and
Campbell's Highlanders, six foreign battalions, the Greys, Seventh
and Eleventh Dragoons in one brigade under General Harvey, and
eight foreign squadrons, together with a regiment of Hanoverian
artillery. From the Ase the position was prolonged to the right along
a similar line of heights by the villages of Sud Dünckern and
Wambeln to the rear of Werle at Budberg, the whole of the front
being covered by a marshy brook called the Salzbach. From the Ase
to Wambeln the ground was occupied by Anhalt's corps of ten
German battalions and the First, Sixth, and Tenth British Dragoons;
to the right of Anhalt stood Conway's corps, of three battalions of
British Guards with their grenadiers massed into a fourth battalion,
Townsend's brigade of the Eighth, Twentieth, Twenty-fifth, and
Fiftieth Foot, and the First, Third, and Seventh Dragoon Guards; to
the right of Conway stood Howard's corps, consisting of Cavendish's
brigade of the Eleventh, Twenty-fifth, Twenty-third, and Fifty-first
Foot, two German battalions, the British light batteries and two
brigades of Hessian artillery; and finally the extreme right from
Wambeln to Hilbeck was held by the Hereditary Prince's corps of
twenty-five battalions and twenty-four squadrons of Germans. The
Salzbach was an obstacle well-nigh insuperable, the only passage by
which the French could cross it being by the village of Scheidingen,
opposite to Conway's corps, where an old redoubt, dating from the
days of Turenne, still remained to bar the way. The weak point of
the position was its right flank which, though more or less protected
by marshy ground, lay practically in the air, and could have been
turned with little difficulty.

July 15.
 The plan of the French commanders, though it took no
advantage of this defect, was not ill conceived. Broglie was to attack
the corps of Wutgenau and Granby, but particularly that of Granby
between the Lippe and the Ase, with his whole force; while Soubise
kept the rest of the Allies distracted by an attack on Scheidingen, at
the same time sending a cloud of light troops round the right flank
of the Allies to Hamm, five miles in their rear, so as to create
confusion and embarrass their retreat. The attack was fixed for the
13th but was deferred for two days; and it was not until the evening
of the 15th that Ferdinand was apprised of the advance of the
French in force against his left. For some reason Wutgenau's corps
had been encamped a thousand yards in rear of its position in the
line of battle; and although it had received orders at noon, in
consequence of suspicious movements by the French, to strike tents
and march forward, yet this order had been cancelled. Thus Broglie's
attack came upon it as a complete surprise. Granby's corps had only
just time to seize its arms and turn out, leaving the tents standing;
the Highlanders indeed hardly emerging from their tents before the
French guns opened fire on them. Yet there was no confusion, and
Granby's dispositions were so good that he was able to hold his own
till Wutgenau's troops came up. The two corps then made a fine
defence until darkness put an end to the combat; but none the less
the French had succeeded in taking Nordel, a village on Granby's
right front, and had made good their footing in Vellinghausen.
Meanwhile Soubise had not yet moved forward against
Scheidingen. The time fixed by the Marshals for their decisive attack
has been, in fact, the early hours of the 16th, so that Broglie's
advance had been premature. He excused himself by saying that he
had intended only to drive in the outposts of the Allies, but that he
had been encouraged by his unexpected success to bring forward
more troops to hold the ground that he had gained, and that he had
accordingly appealed to Soubise to hasten his movements likewise.
Had Broglie really pushed his attack home he would probably have
succeeded, for the Allies were too weak to stop him and were,
moreover, short of ammunition. But the Marshal was too timid a man
to take responsibility on his own shoulders; so instead of making a
bold attempt to carry the Dünckerberg, which if successful must
have forced Ferdinand to retreat, he stopped short at Vellinghausen,
leaving the Allies in their position unmoved.

July 16.

The night passed uneasily in the Allied camp. Between the Lippe
and the Ase skirmishing never ceased. The road to Hamm was full of
waggons going and returning with loads of ammunition; Anhalt's
corps, together with all the British of Howard's corps, was streaming
across the Ase to reinforce Granby; and Conway's and the Hereditary
Prince's were extending themselves leftward to cover the ground
thus left vacant. For Ferdinand knew Broglie to be his most
dangerous antagonist, and was determined to stop him at all costs
by fresh troops. Broglie, on his side, was equally busy replacing the
battalions that had already been engaged; and the dawn was no
sooner come than his columns deployed and attacked in earnest.
The ground was so much broken up by hedges and ditches that in
many places the troops engaged, though no more than one hundred
and fifty yards apart, were unable to see each other, and fired
furiously, not without destructive effect, at every puff of smoke that
betrayed an enemy's presence. From four until eight o'clock this
fusillade continued, neither side gaining or losing an inch of ground,
until at last it slackened from the sheer exhaustion of the men, after
more than twelve hours of intermittent action.
Meanwhile Broglie looked anxiously for Soubise's demonstration
against the Allied centre and right, but he looked in vain. Soubise,
though he did indeed bring forward troops against Scheidingen,
made but a faint attack, often renewed with unchangeable
feebleness and as often repulsed. Then after half an hour's respite,
the fire opened again on the Allied left. Spörcke had detached six
battalions to Wutgenau from Hersfeld; and the arrival of fresh troops
infused new life into the engagement. Broglie too showed symptoms
of reviving energy, for two French batteries were observed in motion
towards a height opposite the Dünckerberg, from which they might
have made havoc of Granby's corps. Ferdinand ordered that the
height should be carried at all costs; and Maxwell's grenadiers,
Keith's and Campbell's Highlanders and four foreign battalions
advanced forthwith to storm it. The French were so much exhausted
that they appear hardly to have awaited the attack. They broke and
fled precipitately, abandoning their dead, their wounded, and several
guns. Maxwell's grenadiers alone made four battalions prisoners;
and Broglie, disheartened by his failure and by the apathy of
Soubise, gave the word to retreat. The ground was too much broken
for the action of cavalry; so he was able to draw off his troops with
little loss indeed, but not without shame and disgrace.

July.

Thus ended the battle of Vellinghausen, one of the feeblest ever

fought by the French army. The losses were not great on either side
for the numbers engaged. Those of the French were reckoned at
from five to six thousand men, besides eight colours and nineteen
guns; those of the Allies did not reach the figure of sixteen hundred
men, of whom over nine-tenths belonged to the corps to the north
of the Ase. The brunt of the fighting fell of course on Granby's
troops; but the casualties of the British with him little exceeded four
hundred men, while those of the British in other parts of the field did
not amount to fifty. The victory was in fact trifling except for its
moral effects; but these were sufficient. The French were humbled
at the failure of a hundred thousand men against fifty thousand; and
Broglie and Soubise, who had left the camp with embraces, returned
to it sworn enemies, each bitterly reproaching the other for the loss
of the battle. Lastly, Broglie, who possessed some military talent and
had hitherto been anxious to bring his enemy to action, came to the
conclusion that a general engagement with Ferdinand was a thing
henceforth not to be courted but to be shunned.

July 27.
August.
 Aug. 16.
Aug. 22.
Aug. 28.

The remainder of the campaign is reckoned to be the finest

example of Ferdinand's skill as a general; but it is impossible in this
place to sketch it in more than the faintest outline. After the action,
Soubise made up Broglie's army to forty thousand men, and
therewith the two commanders separated; Broglie marching on
Paderborn for operations against Hanover and Hesse, while Soubise
made for Wesel to threaten Westphalia. The Hereditary Prince was
detached to follow Soubise and to harass his rear-guard, while
Ferdinand marched some thirty miles eastward to Büren, to be ready
to move into Hesse and threaten Broglie's communications with
Frankfort. At the same time Granby's corps was sent forward to
Stadtberg, to drive back a French corps under Stainville, which
covered Hesse at the line of the Diemel. At Büren Ferdinand
remained, with his eye always on Lippstadt, until the 10th of August;
when, Stainville having been forced back to Cassel and Soubise to
the Rhine, both at a safe distance from the precious fortress on the
Lippe, he marched away to keep watch over Broglie's army. That
officer had used his time to advance to Höxter, aiming at the capture
of Hameln and the mastery of the line of the Weser, and had
detached a corps under Prince Xavier of Saxony into the Principality
of Göttingen. Ferdinand by swift marches brought his army to
northward of Broglie's at Reilenkirchen, thus heading him back from
Hameln; while a separate corps, which he had sent across the
Weser, attacked the French detachments about Göttingen. The
Hereditary Prince, finding nothing to fear from Soubise, also
returned from the Rhine to threaten Broglie from the south. The
Marshal thereupon crossed the Weser; and Ferdinand, for all his
unwillingness to move to the east bank of the river, perforce
followed him; carefully avoiding an engagement, however, lest
Soubise should seize the opportunity to march on Lippstadt. Soubise,
finding himself unwatched, moved eastward again towards Hanover;
whereupon the Hereditary Prince flew back to look after him, and
Ferdinand retiring with the rest of the army to the Diemel, advanced
against Broglie's communications with Marburg and Frankfort. This
movement brought Broglie back hurriedly to Cassel; whereupon
Ferdinand retired quietly to Geismar on the Diemel, having
accomplished his object of occupying Broglie's attention for weeks
and of rendering his movements absolutely purposeless, without the
risk of an action.

Sept. 20.

It was a whole fortnight before Broglie ventured to return to the

east side of the Weser, having meanwhile reinforced Stainville's army
for the protection of Hesse, and furnished him with most careful
instructions for his guidance. No sooner was the Marshal's back
turned, than Ferdinand made a sudden dash upon Stainville just to
south of the Diemel, and though he failed to inflict any great
damage on him, forced him to retire to Cassel and brought Broglie
back in all haste from Hanover. Meanwhile the lethargic Soubise had
made a diversion towards the sea, had actually taken Emden, and
was threatening Bremen. The Hereditary Prince was as usual
despatched to hunt him back to the Rhine; and Ferdinand's
communications with Holland were restored.

October 10.

There still remained some weeks, however, before the campaign

could be closed; and Broglie, despite all Ferdinand's activity, was
strong enough to detach a corps under Prince Xavier into Brunswick,
which captured Wolfenbüttel and bade fair to capture Brunswick
itself. The loss of these two fortresses would have been serious,
since the French could have turned them into bases of operations for
the next campaign, when Ferdinand would have found it impossible
to attend both to Brunswick and to Lippstadt. He therefore hastened
northward at once from the Diemel to save his brother's capital;
whereupon Prince Xavier, though Ferdinand had travelled no further
than Hameln on his way, at once withdrew from before Brunswick
and evacuated Wolfenbüttel. Much relieved at the news of this
deliverance, Ferdinand halted at Hameln until November, when
Soubise went into winter-quarters. He then made a final effort to
drive Broglie from the eastern bank of the Weser, but succeeded
only in thrusting him back for a short distance from his northernmost
post at Einbeck. Broglie then went into winter-quarters along the
Leine from Göttingen to Nordheim, and the Allies followed his
example; their chain of posts running from Münster along the line of
the Lippe and Diemel, and eastward through the Sollinger Forest to
Ferdinand's headquarters at Hildesheim.
So ended this most arduous campaign, in which, though
overmatched by two to one, Ferdinand had won a victory on the
battlefield and lost little or no territory. The exertion demanded from
his troops by incessant and severe marches told heavily upon their
efficiency, and the more so since many of the men had been already
much weakened by the winter's campaign in Hesse. The waste of
the army was in fact appalling, amounting to no fewer than five-and-
twenty thousand out of ninety-five thousand men. Of these some
few had been killed in action, considerably more had deserted, still
more had been invalided, and fully one-half had died of hardship and
disease. It was only at such a price that Ferdinand could make one
army do the work of two; and the task would have been beyond
even his ability had not one of the commanders matched against
him been utterly incompetent, and the other hampered by constant
interference from Versailles. The extreme laxity of discipline among
the French also helped him not a little, and served to heighten the
moral superiority of his own troops. But, making all such allowance
in his favour, the campaign remains memorable in the annals of war
for the consummate skill with which Ferdinand kept two armies,
jointly of double his strength, continually in motion for six months,
without permitting them to reap the slightest advantage from their
operations.
 CHAPTER XI

1761.
1762.
Jan. 4.

Before the campaign closed in Germany, the great Minister who had
revealed to England for the first time the plenitude of her strength in
arms, and had turned that strength to such mighty enterprises, was
fallen from power. The accession of the new King had brought with it
a steady increase in the ascendency of John, Earl of Bute, long a
trusted member of his household and now his chief adviser and
friend. Blameless in private life and by no means lacking in culture or
accomplishments, Bute was both in council and debate a man of
distressing mediocrity. Possessing neither sense of the ridiculous nor
knowledge of his own limitations, and exalted by mere accident to a
position of great influence, he interpreted the caprice of fortune as
the reward of merit and aimed at once at the highest office. He was,
in fact, one of the many men who, finding it no great exertion to
climb up the winding stairs of a cathedral tower, press on, ducking,
stooping, and crawling to the top, to find when they reach it that
they dare not look down. Being weak as well as ambitious he was
compelled to fall back on intrigue in default of ability to help him
upward, and having succeeded in displacing Lord Holderness as
Secretary of State in March 1761, he turned next to the ousting of
Pitt himself. The opportunity soon came. The French Court, weary of
the war, approached Pitt with proposals for peace. Resolved, as he
said, that no Peace of Utrecht should again sully the annals of
England, Pitt not only made large demands for the benefit of Britain,
but insisted that even a separate peace between Britain and France
should not deter King George from giving aid to the King of Prussia.
Curiously enough the negotiation was broken off owing precisely to
one of the most disgraceful concessions made at the Peace of
Utrecht. The Bourbon King of Spain, Charles the Third, who had
succeeded to the throne in 1759, cultivated the friendship of the
Bourbon King of France; and the result was a secret treaty of
alliance between them, which presently became famous as the
Family Compact. Pitt no sooner obtained an inkling of this agreement
than he put an end to negotiations with France, and advocated
immediate declaration of war against Spain. As shall presently be
seen, he made his preparations, which were effective enough; but
above all he desired to strike at Spain while she was still unready for
war. The Cabinet, however, was alarmed at so bold a measure, being
too blind to see that in such a case aggression is the truest
precaution. Many of the ministry had only with difficulty been
persuaded to second Pitt in the lofty language which he had held
towards France; and Bute, who abhorred all interference with affairs
on the Continent, was a leader among the dissentients. Lord Temple
alone stood by his great chief, so Pitt, unable to prevail, resigned,
and his solitary supporter with him. All power passed into the hands
of Bute; and within three months Spain, having gained the time that
she needed for her military preparations, assumed so offensive a
tone that Bute, as Pitt had predicted, was to his huge vexation
obliged to declare war against her himself. Such is the fashion in
which politicians make difficulties for generals.

1761.
June.

Fortunately the designs of Pitt for the new year against both
France and Spain were fully matured, and the means of executing
them were ready to hand. In June 1761 two new regiments[378] had
been either raised or formed out of existing independent companies,
and thirteen more had been added in August and October,[379] thus
bringing the number of regiments of the Line up to one hundred and
fifteen. The total number of men voted by Parliament for 1762 was
little short of one hundred and fifty thousand men, making with the
German mercenaries a total of two hundred and fifteen thousand
men in British pay. There were thus men in abundance for any
enterprise; and the sphere of operations had been marked out by
Pitt. The conquest of Canada having been completed by the end of
1760, there was no object in leaving a large number of troops
unemployed in America; and as early as in January 1761 Pitt had
written to Amherst that some of them would be required in the
autumn for the conquest of Dominica, St. Lucia, and Martinique.
Amherst was therefore instructed to send two thousand men
forthwith to Guadeloupe; to concert with the Governor the means of
taking the two first of the islands mentioned; and to despatch six
thousand more men rather later in the year for the capture of
Martinique.[380] Accordingly in the first days of June 1761 transports
from America began to drop singly into Guadeloupe, the fleet having
been dispersed by a storm. By the 3rd of June four ships had
arrived, together with Lord Rollo, who had been appointed by
Amherst to take the command; and on the following day the whole
of these, together with one ship more from Guadeloupe itself, made
sail under escort of Sir J. Douglas's squadron to beat back against
the trade-wind to Dominica.[381] By noon of the 6th they had arrived
before Roseau, where the inhabitants were summoned to surrender.
The French replied by manning their batteries and other defences,
which included four separate lines of entrenchments, ranged one
above another. Rollo landed his men and entered the town; when
reflecting that the enemy might be reinforced in the night he
resolved, though it was already late, to storm the entrenchments
forthwith. He attacked accordingly, and drove out the French in
confusion with trifling loss to himself. The French commander and
his second being both taken prisoners, no further resistance was
made; and on the following day Dominica swore allegiance to King
George.
Therewith the operations in the West Indies for the time ceased,
though the preparations continued always; but, notwithstanding all
possible secrecy, the French in Martinique got wind of the intended
attack on that island, and took measures for their defence. Their
force was not wholly contemptible in so mountainous a country, for
it included twelve hundred regular troops, seven thousand local
militia, and four thousand hired privateersmen.[382] The
neighbouring English islands did what they could to help the mother
country. Antigua sent negroes and part of her old garrison, the
Thirty-eighth Foot, which had never left her since Queen Anne's day;
and Barbados raised five hundred negroes and as many white men,
which were the more acceptable since that island was, as usual, the
rendezvous for the expedition.[383] The first troops to arrive in
Carlisle Bay were a detachment from Belleisle,[384] where, as well as
in America, regiments had been lying idle; and on Christmas Eve
appeared the main army from America under command of General
Monckton. This was made up of eleven different regiments,[385]
besides a few companies of American rangers. In all, the force
entrusted to Monckton must have amounted to fully eight thousand
men.

1762.
January.
Jan. 24.

On the 5th of January the transports weighed anchor and sailed

away to leeward, under escort of Admiral Rodney's fleet, past the
Pitons of St. Lucia, past the port of Castries and the bay which
Rodney was twenty years later to make famous, and on the 7th
anchored in St. Ann's Bay, just round the southern extremity of
Martinique, on the western side. Two brigades were then landed in
the Anse d'Arlet, a bay farther up the western coast, from which
they marched to the south of the bay that forms the harbour of Fort
Royal, but, finding the road impracticable for transport of cannon,
were re-embarked. On the 16th the entire army was landed without
loss of a man at Case Navire, a little to the north of Negro Point.
This Point forms the northern headland of the harbour, and had at
its foot a road leading due east over the mountains to the capital
town of Fort Royal,[386] some three miles away. The way was
blocked by deep gullies and ravines; while the French had erected
redoubts at every point of vantage, as well as batteries on a hill
beyond, named Morne Tortenson. Monckton was thus compelled to
erect batteries to silence the French guns before he could advance
farther. By the 24th this work was complete, and at daybreak a
general attack was made under the fire of the batteries upon the
French defences on Morne Tortenson, a party being at the same
time detached to turn the enemy's right flank. The turning
movement was completely successful; and the redoubts by the sea,
on the enemy's left, having been carried, the troops stormed post
after post, until at nine o'clock they were in possession not only of
the detached redoubts but of the entire position of Morne Tortenson,
with its guns and entrenchments. The French retired in great
confusion, some to Fort Royal and some to Morne Grenier, a still
higher hill to the north of Morne Tortenson. Simultaneously two
brigades under Brigadiers Haviland and Walsh attacked other French
posts to the north of Morne Tortenson and, after great difficulty
owing to the steepness of the ground, succeeded in driving them
also back to Morne Grenier. The losses of the British in this action
amounted to thirty-three officers and three hundred and fifty men
killed and wounded.

Jan. 25.

On the following day Monckton, being now within range, began

to throw up batteries against the citadel of Fort Royal, but finding
himself much annoyed by the French batteries on Morne Grenier to
his left, decided that these must first be silenced. Fortunately the
enemy saved him from further trouble by taking the offensive. On
the afternoon of the 27th they suddenly debouched in three columns
from Morne Grenier upon Haviland's brigade and the Light Infantry
of the army, on Monckton's left, and with unexpected temerity
ventured to attack. Unhappily for them, one column exposed its
flank to the Highlanders and was almost instantly routed. The two
remaining columns thereupon gave way, and the whole fled back to
Morne Grenier with the British in eager chase. Such was the
impetuosity of the pursuers that they plunged down into the
intervening ravine after the French, and swarming up Morne Grenier
"by every path, road, and passage where men could run, walk, or
creep,"[387] hunted the fugitives headlong before them. Night came
on, but the British officers would not stop until they had cleared
every Frenchman off the hill and captured all the works and cannon.
Monckton at once sent off more troops to support the pursuers, and
by one o'clock in the morning of the 28th Morne Grenier was
securely occupied, at a cost of little more than one hundred British
killed and wounded. The batteries on Morne Tortenson were then
completed, new batteries were constructed within four hundred
yards of the citadel, and on the 3rd of February Fort Royal
surrendered. Nine days more sufficed to reduce the rest of the
Island, and by the 12th of February Monckton's work was done.[388]

Feb. 26-
March 3.
June.

He at once shipped off detachments to St. Lucia, Grenada, and

St. Vincent, which islands fell without resistance, and had made his
arrangements for the capture of Tobago also, when he received
orders requiring the presence of his troops elsewhere. War had been
declared against Spain; Lord Albemarle had been appointed to
command an expedition against Havanna; and Amherst had been
directed not only to embark four thousand men from America to join
him, but to collect eight thousand more for an attack on Louisiana.
[389] The stroke meditated by Pitt three months before was now
about to fall. In February 1762 Albemarle's troops embarked; and on
the 5th of March he sailed with four regiments only,[390] under
convoy of Admiral Sir George Pocock, to pick up the remainder of his
forces in the West Indies. On the 20th of April he arrived at
Barbados, and on the 25th at Fort Royal, Martinique, where he took
over from Monckton what he termed "the remains of a very fine
army," much reduced by sickness, which brought his force to a
strength of twelve thousand men of all ranks.[391] Thence continuing
his voyage he came on the 6th of June into sight of Havanna. Twelve
sail of the line were detached to the mouth of the harbour to block
in the Spanish fleet, and on the following day the troops were
landed safely a little to the northward of the city. On the 8th the
army advanced westward, brushing away a force of militia that stood
in its path, and on the same day arrived before the principal
defences of Havanna.

July.

The entrance to the harbour of Havanna lies through a channel

about two hundred yards wide, which was defended by two forts at
its mouth, Fort Moro on the northern shore, and Fort Puntal opposite
to it, the town also being situated on the southern shore. On the
north side the ground rises rather abruptly from the harbour into a
ridge known as the Cavannos, at the end of which stands Fort Moro,
abutting on the open sea. A detached redoubt on these heights was
carried without difficulty on the 11th of June, and, Fort Moro being
found after reconnaissance to be surrounded with impenetrable
brushwood, the construction of a battery was begun under cover of
the trees. The work progressed slowly, for the soil was thin, while
the Spanish ships in the harbour caused the besiegers no slight
annoyance; so on the 13th a part of the British force was landed at
Chorera, on the other side of the harbour. It was not until July that
the British batteries could open a really effective fire, but by the
15th, with the help of the fleet, the enemy's guns were for the time
silenced; and since trenches were impossible in ground so rocky,
approaches to Fort Moro were made of gabions and cotton-bales.
Still the work made little progress, for the climate had begun to tell
on the troops, and little more than half of the men were fit for duty.
Meanwhile the garrison of Fort Moro continued to defend itself with
the greatest obstinacy, due in part to its confidence in the strength
of the fort. The ditch at the point of attack was seventy feet deep
from the edge of the counterscarp, except in one place, where a
narrow ridge of rock made it possible to reach the wall of the fort
without scaling-ladders. The only way to surmount such an obstacle
was to sink a shaft and blow the counterscarp into the ditch, but
powder was already running short; and Albemarle grew extremely
anxious over the issue of his operations.

July 30.

At length on the 27th Colonel Burton arrived from America with

three thousand men of the Forty-sixth, Fifty-eighth, Gorham's
rangers and Provincial troops, having lost five hundred men captured
by the French on the voyage. Three days later the mine under the
counterscarp was sprung with success, and Fort Moro was carried by
storm with trifling loss, the Spaniards offering but little resistance.
New batteries were then pushed forward along the shore at the foot
of the Cavannos in order to play on the town. On the 10th of August
these opened fire and on the same evening silenced Fort Puntal. The
Spaniards then proposed a capitulation; and Albemarle, in
consideration of their defence, granted them the honours of war,
being in truth devoutly thankful to obtain possession of Havanna on
any terms. His army was melting away rapidly from disease; there
was indeed one brigade of four battalions which could not muster
twenty men fit for duty. Albemarle hastened to ship it back to
America; but Amherst could spare no more troops to replace these,
having already reduced his garrison to a strength of less than four
thousand men.[392] Albemarle hoped that rest and better quarters
might restore the health of the army after the work of the siege was
done; but on the contrary sickness increased. The losses actually
caused by the enemy's fire during the siege were rather less than a
thousand men killed and wounded, yet by the 18th of October the
British had buried over five thousand men dead from sickness alone.
[393] Nor did the transfer of the troops from Cuba to America serve
to abate the plague among them; for the hapless brigade first
shipped off by Albemarle lost three hundred and sixty men within a
month after its return. Yet at any rate Cuba was taken, and Cuba in
those days was reckoned a prize little less rich than India.
 June 27.
Sept. 18.

The virtual destruction of the army before Havanna put all ideas
of an attack on Louisiana out of the question; and the French seized
the opportunity offered by the removal of so many troops from
Canada to send a small squadron and fifteen hundred troops against
Newfoundland. The British garrison being only one hundred strong
could offer no resistance, and the island was accordingly
surrendered. Amherst, however, sent his brother with a sufficient
force to recover it; and the French after a short defence capitulated
as prisoners of war. As Amherst's losses did not exceed fifty men,
and the captured French garrison numbered six hundred, the enemy
gained little by this brief occupation of Newfoundland.
 Walker & Boutall del. To face page 544.
GUADELOUPE, 1759. MARTINIQUE, 1762.
HAVANNA, 1762. BELLEISLE, 1761.

Aug. 1.
Sept. 24.
Sept. 25.
Oct. 4.
Oct. 5.

But in India also there were troops lying idle since the fall of
Pondicherry, which could be employed against Spain. In June
Admiral Cornish received secret orders for an expedition, which he
communicated to the authorities at Calcutta; and on the 1st of
August the fleet sailed away to eastward with a force of one
thousand Europeans, half of them of Draper's regiment, and two
thousand Sepoys, under General Draper. On the 24th of September,
after much delay owing to stormy weather and the extremely
defective condition of Cornish's ships, the expedition entered the bay
of Manila and anchored off Fort Cavita. Draper decided not to waste
time in reducing the fort, so landed his troops unopposed on the
following day through a heavy surf, about a mile and a half from the
walls of the city. On the 26th he seized a detached fort which had
been abandoned by the Spaniards within two hundred yards of the
glacis, and began to construct a battery, while the ships sailed up to
draw the fire of the town upon themselves. On the 30th a storeship
arrived with entrenching tools, but was driven ashore on the very
same evening by a gale, and there lay hard and fast. By singular
good fortune, however, she had taken the ground at a point where
she served exactly to screen the rear of Draper's camp from the
Spanish cannon, while her stores were landed with greater speed
and safety than would have been possible had she remained afloat;
for the gale continued for several days and forbade the passage of
boats through the surf. Four days later the battery and the ships
opened a furious fire, which in four hours silenced the enemy's guns,
and by the next day had made a practicable breach. That night the
Spaniards made a sally upon the British position with a thousand
Indians, who, despite their ferocity and daring, were driven back
with heavy loss; and at dawn of the 6th Draper's regiment and a
party of sailors attacked the breach and carried the fortifications with
little difficulty. Thereupon Manila, with the island of Luzon and its
dependencies, surrendered to the British, paying four million dollars
for ransom of the town and of the property contained therein. Thus
fell Manila within ten days of the arrival of the British; but the siege
though short was attended by much difficulty and hardship. Regular
approaches were impracticable owing to the incessant rain; while the
surf made the landing of troops and stores a matter of extreme
labour and peril. Had not the defences of the town been for the
most part feeble and the spirit of the garrison feebler still, the
capture of the Philippines would have been no such simple matter.
The story of Manila is, however, interesting as a comment on
Wentworth's proceedings at Carthagena, justifying to the full
Vernon's predilection for a direct assault at the earliest possible
moment in all operations against the Spaniard.

Aug. 26.

Yet another expedition brought the British face to face with their
new enemy on more familiar ground than Luzon. The Spaniards, on
the pretext of Portuguese friendship with England, in April invaded
Portugal, overran the country as far as the Douro from the north,
and threw another force against Almeida from the east. The injured
kingdom appealed to England for help; and in May orders were sent
to Belleisle for the despatch of four regiments of infantry,[394]
together with the detachment of the Sixteenth Light Dragoons, to
Portugal. Two more regiments were added from Ireland,[395]
bringing the total up to about seven thousand men; and
simultaneously a number of British officers were sent to take up
commands in the Portuguese army. Unfortunately there was some
trouble over the selection of a commander; and though the two
regiments from Ireland were actually in the Tagus by the first week
in May, it was not until June that the rest of the troops arrived, with
the Count of Lippe-Bückeburg, the famous artillerist, as Commander-
in-Chief of the Allied forces, and Lord Loudoun in command of the
British. The operations that followed were so trifling and of so short
duration that they are unworthy of detailed mention. The Spaniards
captured Almeida early in August; and Bückeburg was obliged to
stand on the defensive and cover Lisbon at the line of the Tagus.
Two brilliant little affairs, however, served to lift an officer, who so far
was little known, into a prominence which was one day to be
disastrous to himself and to England. This was Brigadier-General
John Burgoyne, Colonel of the Sixteenth Light Dragoons, who with
four hundred troopers of his regiment surprised the town of Valencia
de Alcantara after a forced march of forty-five miles, annihilated a
regiment of Spanish infantry and captured several prisoners. Not
content with this, he a month later surprised the camp of another
party of Spaniards at Villa Velha, on the south bank of the Tagus,
dispersed it with considerable loss and captured six guns, at a cost
of but one man killed and ten wounded. Such affairs, which in
Ferdinand's army were so common as seldom to be noticed, made
Burgoyne and the Sixteenth[396] the heroes of this short campaign;
but though the regiment has lived the rest of its life according to this
beginning, Burgoyne's career will end for us twenty years hence at
Saratoga.
From these scattered enterprises against Spain I return to
Ferdinand's last campaign against the old enemy in Germany. We left
the contending parties in their winter-quarters, the French army of
the Rhine cantoned along the river from Cleve to Cologne; the army
of the Main extending from Altenkirchen, a little to north of Treves,
north-eastward to Cassel and from Cassel south-eastward to
Langensalza; and the Allies, facing almost due south, stretched from
Münster to Halberstadt. The whole situation was, however, changed
in various respects. The French had resolved to throw their principal
strength into the army of the Main, which was accordingly raised to
eighty thousand men under the command of Soubise and Marshal
d'Estrées; Broglie having been recalled to France. The army of the
Rhine was reduced proportionately to thirty thousand men under the
Prince of Condé. The total numbers of the French, though less than
in previous years, still remained far superior to Ferdinand's; but, on
the other hand, owing to the change of ministry in England and the
reopening of negotiations by Bute, the Court of Versailles was
content to hold the ground already gained without attempt at further
conquest. Soubise and d'Estrées were therefore instructed to cling
fast to Cassel and Göttingen, to spare the district between the Rhine
and the Lahn with a view to winter-quarters, and to destroy the
forage between the Eder and the Diemel so as to prevent Ferdinand
from manœuvring on their flanks and rear.
Ferdinand on his side, though still outmatched by the armies
opposed to him, was relatively stronger in numbers than in any
previous year, having a nominal total of ninety-five thousand men
ready for the field. Winter-quarters were little disturbed during the
early months of 1762, the country having been so much devastated
that neither side could move, from lack of forage, until the green
corn was already grown high. Towards the end of May both armies
began to concentrate; and Ferdinand, though much delayed by the
negligence of the British Ministry in recruiting the British regiments
to their right strength, determined to be first in the field.

June 18.
June 22.

Having detached a strong corps under the Hereditary Prince to

watch the movements of Condé, he concentrated at Brakel, a little to
the east of Paderborn, and advanced to the Diemel, where he
posted the main army about Corbeke, with Granby's corps to
westward of it at Warburg. Hearing at the same time that the French
had left a corps under Prince Xavier on the east of the Weser to
invade Hanover, he detached General Lückner with a small force
across the river to keep an eye on him, sending also parties to seize
the Castle of Zappaburg, some few miles to south-east, to secure
communications with Lückner, and to occupy the passes leading
from the south of the Diemel into Hesse. Meanwhile, on the 22nd of
June, Soubise and d'Estrées moved northward from Cassel with the
main body of the army as far as Gröbenstein, fixed their
headquarters at Wilhelmsthal and halted. The design of this
movement is unintelligible unless, as is conjectured by one writer,
[397] they wished simply to amuse themselves at the castle of
Wilhelmsthal; but in any case they neglected all necessary
precautions. Their right flank rested on the large forest known as the
Reinhardswald, and might have been rendered absolutely secure by
the occupation of the Zappaburg, which commanded every road
through that forest; yet they had suffered this important post to fall
into Ferdinand's hands. Again, the occupation of the passes to the
south of the Diemel would have secured their front; but here also
they had allowed the Allies to be before them. None the less there
they remained, careless of all consequences, at Wilhelmsthal; while
to tempt an active enemy still farther, they stationed a corps under
M. de Castries before their right front at Carlsdorff, in absolute
isolation from their main body. Ferdinand saw his opportunity, and
though he could bring but fifty thousand men against their seventy
thousand, resolved to strike at once.

June 23.

On the 23rd he recalled Lückner from across the Weser to

Gottesbühren, a little to the north of the Zappaburg; and on hearing
of his safe arrival at eight o'clock of the same evening, ordered the
whole army to be under arms at midnight. For Lückner's corps was
but one of the toils which he was preparing to draw around the
unsuspecting French; and the places for the rest had already been
chosen. Spörcke, with twelve battalions of Hanoverians and several
squadrons, was to advance from the left of the main body, turn a
little to the eastward upon Humme after crossing the Diemel, and,
marching from thence southward, was to fall upon the right flank
and rear of Castries' corps at Hombrechsen. Lückner, with six
battalions and seven squadrons, was to march south-west from
Gottesbühren through the Zappaburg to Udenhausen, and form up
to the left of Spörcke on Castries' right rear. Colonel Riedesel was to
push forward from the Zappaburg with a body of irregulars to
Hohenkirch, on the south and left of Lückner. Meanwhile Ferdinand
was to advance with the main body in five columns between
Liebenau and Sielen, upon the front of the French principal army,
while Granby should move south upon Zierenberg and fall upon its
left flank. Supposing that every corps fulfilled its duty exactly in
respect of time and place, there was good hope that the entire force
of the French might be destroyed.

June 24.

Riedesel and Lückner were punctually in their appointed places

at seven o'clock on the morning of the 24th. Spörcke's two columns,
on emerging from the Reinhardswald at five o'clock, found only two
vedettes before them on the heights of Hombrechsen, and ascended
those heights unopposed. Then, however, not seeing Castries' corps,
which, as it chanced, was hidden from them by a wood, they turned
to their left instead of to their right, and advanced unconsciously
towards the front of the French main army. The startled vedettes
galloped back to give the alarm; and Castries hurriedly calling his
men to arms prepared to retreat. Pushing forward his cavalry right
and left to screen his movements from Spörcke and from Riedesel,
Castries quickly set his infantry in order for march; and having
contrived to hold Spörcke at bay for an hour, began his retreat upon
Wilhelmsthal and Cassel. Lückner came up as he had been bidden at
Udenhausen, but meeting part of Spörcke's corps on its march in the
wrong direction was fired upon by it; and in the confusion Castries
was able to make his escape. Riedesel being weak in numbers could
not stop him, though he fell furiously with his hussars upon the rear-
guard and cut one regiment of French infantry to pieces; but except
for this loss Castries retired with little damage. Thus, as so often
happens, failed the most important detail of Ferdinand's elaborate
combinations.
Meanwhile the French main army, startled out of its sleep by the
sound of the guns about Hombrechsen, was in absolute confusion.
Fortunately for the Marshals, the unlucky mistake as to Lückner's
corps which had saved Castries, saved them also, since it checked
Spörcke's advance against their right. Breaking up their camp with
amazing rapidity, they formed upon the heights and hastened their
baggage away towards Cassel. Lückner, awake to the miscarriage of
the turning movement on the French right, now begged
Kielmansegge, who commanded the left column of Spörcke's corps,
to hasten with him to Hohenkirchen, from whence a cross way to
westward would enable them to bar every road between
Wilhelmsthal and Cassel. But Kielmansegge persisted in attacking
the right flank of the French main body, despite the fact that it was
covered by a brook running through a swampy valley; and before he
could effect his passage over this obstacle, the opportunity for
cutting off the French retreat was lost.
Meanwhile the troops under Ferdinand in the centre advanced
against the French front, though very slowly. Spörcke's right column
formed up on their left, but being out of its right place hampered the
advance of the rest and caused lamentable delay. The French main
army, having cleared its baggage out of the way, was falling back in
several columns towards Wilhelmsthal, when the appearance of
Granby on their left showed them the full extent of their peril. The
flower of the French infantry was then collected under M. de
Stainville and thrown out on the left to cover the retreat of the main
body at any cost; and now the action began in earnest. Taking up a
strong position in a wood Stainville prepared to do his utmost.
Granby's infantry consisted of three battalions of British Guards, the
British grenadiers in three battalions, and the Fifth and Eighth Foot,
—some of the finest troops in the British Army—but the fight was
long and stubborn. Stainville appears at first to have taken the
offensive and to have fallen upon the head of Granby's columns
before the whole of his troops had come up, but to have been
gradually forced back as more and more of the British battalions
advanced into action. French and English came to close quarters,
guns were taken and retaken, and for a time two British cannon
remained in the hands of the French. Granby, however, seems to
have got the upper hand at last, to have surrounded the wood on
two sides and to have made his dispositions for surrounding it on all
sides, when Ferdinand's troops at last came up on Stainville's rear
and put an end to the conflict. The gallant Frenchman's corps was
nearly annihilated; fifteen hundred men were killed and wounded,
nearly three thousand surrendered to the Fifth Foot alone,[398] and
two battalions only made good their escape. The Allied army
advanced a little to the south of Wilhelmsthal; and so the action
came to an end.
The losses of the Allies were small, reaching but seven hundred
men killed and wounded, of which four hundred and fifty belonged
to Granby's corps. The result of the action was in fact a great
disappointment, due partly to the mistakes of Spörcke and
Kielmansegge, partly to the extreme slowness of Ferdinand's
advance in the centre. The main body of the Allies indeed seems to
have taken five hours to move from Gröbenstein to Wilhelmsthal, a
distance of little more than four miles; and the fact would appear to
indicate considerable clumsiness on the part of some officer or
officers in the handling of their men. Still the fact remained that forty
thousand men had attacked seventy thousand and driven them back
in confusion; and the French were not a little shamefaced and
discouraged over their defeat.

July 1.
July 24.
Aug. 30.

On the night of the action Soubise and d'Estrées fell back across
the Fulda and took up a position between Cassel and Lutternberg.
Ferdinand therefore ordered Granby's corps to a position near Cassel
and sent forward a detachment to clear the enemy from the north
bank of the Eder; whereupon the French evacuated Fritzlar and
retiring across the Fulda took post upon its eastern bank. Both
armies remained in this position until the 1st of July, Ferdinand
trying always to force the French back, but obliged to act with
caution, since Prince Xavier's Saxons had joined the French at
Lutternberg and might at any time give trouble on the eastern side
of the Weser. Finally on the 24th he boldly attacked the French right
at Lutternberg and completely defeated it.[399] The French
thereupon fell back to Melsungen on the Fulda, while Ferdinand took
up a position opposite to them on the western bank of the river and
threatened their communications with Frankfort. The Marshals then
summoned Condé from the Rhine, but Ferdinand continued to press
their communications so hard that at length they evacuated
Göttingen and retreated by Hersfeld and Fulda to Vilbel, a little to
the north of Frankfort; Ferdinand marching parallel with them on
their western flank to the Nidda, in the hope, which was
disappointed, of preventing their junction with Condé. So far he had
done well, for he had for the present driven the French armies from
Hesse.

Sept. 7.
Sept. 15.

Meanwhile Condé, obedient to orders, had marched towards

Frankfort, joining Soubise a little to the south of Friedberg on the
30th of August. The Hereditary Prince, who had followed him closely
all the way from the Rhine, attacked him on the same day,
apparently in ignorance of the presence of Soubise's army, and was
repulsed with considerable loss. For the next few days the two
armies remained inactive, Ferdinand between the Nidder and Nidda
with his headquarters at Staden, facing south-west, and the French
opposite to him between Friedburg and Butzbach. Such a position,
while forces were so unequal, could not continue long; and on the
7th of September the French moved northward by Giessen towards
the Eder. Ferdinand, divining that their design was to cut him off
from Cassel, which it was his own intention to besiege, at once
hurried northward to stop them. It was a race between the two
armies. The French travelled due north by Giessen and Marburg,
crossing the Lahn above the latter town. Ferdinand made for
Homberg on the north bank of the Ohm, and turning north-
westward from thence marched on by Kirchhain and Wetter, where
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