Antrano has standing to bring the dispute concerning Remisia’s deprivation of
nationality of its citizens before the Court.
The Republic of Antrano has a standing in this case as [A] the court has jurisdiction [B] there
is a dispute between Antrano and Remisia and [C] Antrano has a standing in the case.
[A] Whether the court has Jurisdiction in the case of Resmisa and Antrano
Under the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (Article 14) 1 and the
Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons (Article 34) 2, any dispute between contracting
or party states regarding the interpretation or application of the respective conventions, which
cannot be resolved through other means, is to be submitted to the International Court of
Justice. In both cases, the request for ICJ involvement can be initiated by any one of the
parties involved in the dispute.
Article 363 of the International Court of Justice Statute outlines the jurisdiction of the
Court. It covers cases referred to it by parties, matters specified in the UN Charter, and those
outlined in treaties and conventions in force. States parties to the Statute can declare their
recognition of the Court's jurisdiction in certain legal disputes, including treaty interpretation,
questions of international law, the existence of facts constituting a breach of international
obligation, and the nature of reparation for such breaches. Declarations can be unconditional,
reciprocal, or for a specified time, deposited with the UN Secretary-General and transmitted
to relevant parties and the Court's Registrar.
The Applicant is a State as required by Article 34, paragraph 1 4, of the Statute and, as
a Member of the United Nations, is ipso facto a party to the Statute, pursuant to Article 35,
paragraph 1,5 thereof. As we saw in this case since the parties are both state and signatories to
the aforementioned treaties thus the court has jurisdiction in this case. Moreover, the question
of what may have motivated a State such as The Gambia to commence proceedings was not
held to be relevant for establishing the jurisdiction of the Court. As the Court held in Border
and Transborder Armed Actions6 (Nicaragua v. Honduras), “the Court’s judgment is a legal
pronouncement, and it cannot concern itself with the political motivation which may lead a
State at a particular time, or in particular circumstances, to choose judicial settlement”
1
Article 14, https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-reduction-statelessness
2
Article 34, https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-relating-status-stateless-
persons
3
Article 36, https://www.icj-cij.org/statute
4
Article 34, https://www.icj-cij.org/statute
5
Article 35, https://www.icj-cij.org/statute
6
Nicaragua v. Honduras, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 91, para. 52
[B] Whether there is a dispute among Antrano and Remisa
The term dispute in general sense can be defined as a disagreement between two or
more parties regarding a particular topic. Dispute being the rudimentary essential of a court
case has been defined by the International Court of Justice in many cases.
A dispute is “a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of
interests” between parties Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions 7. In order for a dispute to
exist, “[i]t must be shown that the claim of one party is positively opposed by the other”
(South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa8).
The two sides must hold clearly opposite views concerning the question of the
performance or non- performance of certain international obligations (Obligations concerning
Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament 9.
We can clearly see that in this case there is a dispute as there was a disagreement
between the parties on the nationality laws of Remisia and the president of Antrano had
criticized the same10 and under the presidentship of Antrano in the UNSC the resolution
which was considered to be against Remisia was passed.11
[C]Whether Antrano has the Standing before the International Court of Justice in the current
matter.
As per the convention of status of stateless people 1954 and the convention on
reduction of statelessness, Article 1412 “any dispute among the contracting states” and Article
34“any disputes between the parties to the convention” respectively gives a wider sense to the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice as per the interpretation given by the court in
the case of Myanmar vs Gambia13 of these terms.
As we saw the opinion of the court in the Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the International
Court of Justice elucidated the legal relationship forged among States parties within the
7
Judgment No. 2, 1924, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p. 11
8
Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 328
9
Marshall Islands v. India, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2016 (I), p. 270, para. 34
10
Compromis para 37
11
Compromis, para 49
12
Article 14, https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-reduction-statelessness
13
Myanmar vs Gambia, https://www.icj-cij.org/case/178
Genocide Convention. The essence of the Court's explanation lies in the understanding that
within such a convention, the participating States do not pursue individual interests. Rather,
they collectively share a common interest in the realization of the elevated purposes that form
the very essence of the convention (I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23)14
A parallel can be drawn among the convention on genocide and the convention on the
status of stateless persons and the convention on reduction of statelessness as both these
convention are against the international wrongs which affects the world as when the person
becomes stateless all the nations suffer a loss as a certain person cannot be identified as a
national anymore and thus affecting his/her international rights and obligation against the
other states grossly.
When we talk about the cases that ICJ has adjudged like the cases of (Questions
relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite 15,also Barcelona Traction, Light and
Power Company, Limited (New Application: 1962)16 In these cases, the court has adjudged he
obligations under the relevant conventions, such as the Convention against Torture and the
Genocide Convention, are obligations erga omnes partes, indicating that each State party has
17
a vested interest in ensuring compliance. In the case of Belgium v. Senegal , the
International Court of Justice determined that all States parties to the Convention against
Torture share a common interest in adherence to the relevant obligations. The ICJ concluded
that there was no requirement for Belgium, as the applicant, to demonstrate a "special
interest" in Senegal's compliance.
The Court clarifies that, for the institution of proceedings, a State does not need to
prove that victims of an alleged breach of obligations under the Genocide Convention are its
nationals. While diplomatic protection may be exercised by a victim's State of nationality in
cases of internationally wrongful acts causing injury, the entitlement to invoke responsibility
under the Genocide Convention is distinct from the right to exercise diplomatic protection
and is not limited to the State of nationality of the alleged victims. The Court emphasizes that
this entitlement is derived from the common interest of all States parties in compliance with
obligations and is applicable irrespective of the nationality of the victims. The observation is
made that victims of genocide are often nationals of the State allegedly in breach of its
obligations erga omnes partes.
14
I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23 https://www.refworld.org/cases,ICJ,4023a7644.html
15
Belgium v. Senegal, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), p. 449, para. 68
16
Belgium v. Spain, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 32, para. 33)
17
Belgium v. Senegal, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), p. 449, para. 68