STRICT LIABILITY (The rule in Rylands v Fletcher)

It is a general principle in tort that the Defendant will be liable only if it can

be shown that he was at fault and hence resulting in damage to the

Plaintiff.

However, in certain circumstances it has been held that the Defendant will

be liable even if there is no fault on his part. This is what is known as the

principle of strict liability.

The Plaintiff needs only to prove that the tort occurred and that the

defendant was responsible. The law imputes strict liability in situations it

considers inherently dangerous. It discourages reckless behaviour and

needless loss by requiring potential defendants to take every possible

precaution.

Rylands v Fletcher [1868]

The Defendant owned and operated a mill on their land and needed to

construct a water reservoir for the storage of water for use in the mill. They

employed an independent contractor to build the reservoir on the land they

occupied. Underneath this land, there were some old disused mineshafts.

The old coal shafts were improperly filled with debris, and the
contractor chose to continue work rather than properly blocking them up.

The Defendant were not aware of the existence of the shafts or of the

fact that they were connected to the Plaintiff’s mine underground. The

contractors built the reservoir on top of the mine shafts and when the

reservoir was filled with water, the water bursts into the shafts and flooded

the Plaintiff’s mines to an extent that they could not access them.

It was held that ‘the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands

and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes,

must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is primafacie

answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its

escape".

Following the principle established in Rylands v Fletcher, it can be stated

that if a person brings on his land and keeps some dangerous thing and

such thing is likely to cause damage, if it escapes, then such a person will

be held accountable for the damage caused.

The person from whose property escaped will be liable even when he has

not been negligent in keeping the substance in his premises. He is held

because the substance kept on his premises is hazardous and dangerous.

Conditions of application
1. Dangerous substances: Defendant will be held liable if a

dangerous substance escapes from his premises. ‘Dangerous

substance’ in this context means that the substance is likely to do mischief

if it escapes from the premises of the defendant. Things such as

explosives, electricity, toxic gases etc can be said to be dangerous. In the

Rylands v Fletcher case the dangerous thing was the water which had

been collected in the reservoir.

2. The thing must escape from the Defendant’s land to some other land

beyond Defendant’s control. Read v J. Lyons & Co. Ltd [1947]

The Plaintiff was working at the Defendant’s factory where she has been

employed. On 31st August 1942 there was an explosion that killed one, and

injured the Plaintiff and others. After she sustained injuries out of an

explosion of the factory, she filed a case on the basis of the rule of Rylands

v Fletcher arguing that the Defendant had carried out the

manufacture of high explosives knowing that they were dangerous

things. She did not file a claim in negligence.

Issue: Whether, the manufacturers of high explosive shells are under a

‘strict liability’ to prevent such shells from exploding and causing harm to

persons on the premises, as well as to persons outside the premises.

no escape from the Defendant’s premises to another plan over /beyond the

Defendant’s control. It was stated that the strict liability is conditioned by

two elements:

[i] the condition of escape

[ii] the condition of non-natural use.

The dangerous thing that escapes does not always have to be

the thing which was accumulated, but there must be a causal link. E.g

Escape of something naturally occurring on the premises through non-

natural use of land.

Miles v Forest Rock Granite Co (Leicestershire) Ltd (1918)

The defendant had brought some explosives onto his land and used them

to blast rocks which had already been naturally occurring on his land. As a

result of this blasting, some of the rock fragments flew onto nearby land

below, more specifically on the nearby highway, where they hit and injured

the claimant. The claimant brought an action under the rule in Rylands v

Fletcher, which had established strict liability for damage done as a result

of an escape of a thing from one’s land which was brought onto the land by

the defendant and which could be expected to cause such damage.

Ryland v Flecther which related to damage done by things not naturally

occurring on the defendant’s premises, whereas in this case the damage

was done by rocks which had been naturally occurring and which the

defendant had not brought onto his premises.

Held: The court held that there was strict liability here as per Rylands v

Flecther, since there had been an escape of a sorts, namely the blast.

While the rocks were not brought onto the land, the defendant had brought

the explosives onto his land which caused the rocks to fly out through the

blasting. A non-natural use of the land could in effect extend the rule

to damage done by naturally occurring objects. Essentially, once the

escape rule is satisfied then almost everything on the Defendant’s land can

be deemed likely to cause mischief or to be a dangerous thing

depending on the circumstances e.g. fire, gas, explosions, oil, or people.

AG v Corke [1933]

The Defendant allowed a group of people on to his land so that they could

live there in caravans. They engaged in a number of antisocial activities

outside the Defendant’s land. It was held that the Plaintiff was entitled to an

injunction to prevent those people from engaging in activities that was

occupied by caravan dwellers was liable in public nuisance and under the

rule in Rylands v Fletcher and was restrained by injunction.

Bennett J rejected the submission of the defendant’s counsel that: ‘The

defendant cannot be made responsible for acts done by the caravan

dwellers off the defendant’s property.’

3. Non-natural use of land In the Rylands v Fletcher case, the water

collected for use in the mills constituted non-natural use of the land.

Collecting water for domestic use constitutes natural use but collecting

water to use in mills constitutes non-natural use.

For the use to be non-natural, it must be some special use bringing with it

increased danger toothers, and must not merely be the ordinary use of land

or such as is proper for the general benefit of the community. Rickards v

Lothian [1913]

The claimant ran a business from the second floor of a building. The

defendant owned the building and leased different parts to other business

tenants. An unknown person had blocked all the sinks in the lavatory on the

fourth floor and turned on all the taps in order to cause a flood. This
damaged the claimant’s stock and the claimant brought an action based on

the principle set out in Rylands v Fletcher

Held: The defendants were not liable. The act which caused the damage

was a wrongful act by a third-party and there was no non-natural use of

land. 1. water supplied to a building is a natural use of the land. The rule of

Rylands v Fletcher requires a special use of the land.

2. Rylands v Fletcher liability will not be found where the damage was

caused by a wrongful and malicious act of a third party: Sochacki v Sas

[1947]

The defendant was a lodger in the claimant’s house. He lit an open fire in

his room and then went out. Unfortunately, a spark jumped from the fire

and set the room alight. The fire spread to the rest of the house and the

claimant brought an action against the defendant based on liability arising

under Rylands v Fletcher.

Held: The defendant was not liable. Whilst the fire was likely to do mischief

if it escaped, the use of an open fire in the claimant’s fireplace was not

considered a non-natural use of land. The harm that is caused to the

Plaintiff must one which is foreseeable: Cambridge Water v Eastern

Counties Leather plc

of which over spilled onto the floor of its factory. Over a period of time the

chemical that had been spilled percolated into the ground all the way into

the Plaintiff’s borehole several miles away and the water became polluted.

The contamination was not contemplated because it was

believed that because the chemical was highly volatile it would

simply evaporate into the air.

Held: Defendant were not liable because the harm was not foreseeable.

‘Eastern Counties Leather were not liable as the damage was too remote. It

was not reasonably foreseeable that the spillages would result in the

closing of the borehole.

The foreseeability of the type of damage is a pre-requisite of liability in

actions of nuisance and claims based on the rule in Rylands v Fletcher in

the same way as it applies to claims based in negligence.’

Defences:

1. A public body may be allowed by the statute to provide certain amenities

such as water, oil, gas, electricity etc. The statute may exempt the public

body from any inability arising out of an escape of the thing that has

collected into its property.

have caused the injury and in such a case, if the thing escapes and causes

injury the plaintiff would be held to have consented in this.

3. The P may also contribute to his own damage in which case he would be

liable to the extent of such contribution: Dunn v. Birmingham Canal Co

(1872)

The plaintiff worked a mine under the canal of the defendant and had good

reason to know that they would thereby cause the water from the canal to

escape into this mine, it was held that they could not sue in Rylands v.

Fletcher when the water actually escapes and damage their mine.

Cockburn C. J. said; The plaintiff saw the danger, and may be said to have

courted it.

4. Plaintiff is at fault: Where the plaintiff is at fault the defendant will not be

held liable for the harm or damaged that is suffered by the Plaintiff:

Ponting v Noakes (1849)

The claimant’s horse died after it had reached over the defendant’s fence

and ate some leaves from a Yew tree. The defendant was not liable under

Rylands v Fletcher as the Yew tree was entirely in the confines of the

defendant’s land and there had therefore been no escape.

not be held liable: Rickards v Lothian [1913]:

The claimant ran a business from the second floor of a building. The

defendant owned the building and leased different parts to other business

tenants. An unknown person had blocked all the sinks in the lavatory on the

fourth floor and turned on all the taps in order to cause a flood. This

damaged the claimant’s stock and the claimant brought an action based on

the principle set out in Rylands v Fletcher.

Held: The defendants were not liable. The act which caused the damage

was a wrongful act by a third party and there was no non-natural use of

land.

6. Where the escape is as a result of act of God, the D will not be liable.

Nichols v Marsland (1876)

The defendant diverted a natural stream on his land to create ornamental

lakes. Exceptionally heavy rain caused the artificial lakes and waterways to

be flooded and damage adjoining land. The defendant was held not liable

under Rylands v Fletcher as the cause of the flood was an act of God