Democracy, elections & political parties

A conceptual overview with

special emphasis on Africa
Berouk Mesfin

ISS Paper 166 • July 2008

Price: R15.00

Introduction to more established ones, are by definition fragile in

the sense that they not formally constituted and are
Few concepts are more central to the modern state and less experienced (Pridham & Lewis 1996:1). Vengroff
at the same time difficult to define than the concepts and Magala (2001:130) have gone ahead to contend
of democracy, elections and political parties. This that new democracies also lack the pre-existence of
paper, based on books, book chapters, journal articles a political culture of democracy the emergence and
and research papers, will nonetheless try to defy the growth of which could, however, become possible as
odds and explain these concepts as clearly as possible a result of institutional modifications independent of
and in the context of Africa. It is organised as follows. economic development.
Section one elaborates on the definitions of elections
and democracy. Section two considers the quality Nonetheless, the founding pillars of any democratic
of elections in Africa as well as the most common political system, whether considered fragile or
perceptions concerning them. Section established, remain undoubtedly
three briefly describes the selection, elections which can simply be taken
categories and operation of the various
electoral systems. Section four examines
The founding pillars as the most critical and visible means
through which all citizens can peacefully
the type and responsibility of the three of any democratic choose or remove their leaders, and
institutions crucial to carry out and secure political system, which are evidently costly affairs (Anglin
the preparation and conduct of elections, 1998:474). In other words, elections are
namely the electoral commission, the whether considered the principal instruments that ‘compel
judiciary and the military. Section five fragile or or encourage the policy-makers to pay
discusses the purposes, relevance and
constraints of international observation,
established, remain attention to citizens’ (Powell 2000:4).
Indeed, the winning political party of the
while section six reviews those of undoubtedly elections, or ruling party, is conceived
domestic observation groups. Section elections as holding temporarily the mandate of
seven surveys the different attempts to the entire citizenry, only in so far as it
define the concept of political party, continues to win elections. Parallely,
identifies its distinguishing characteristics political opposition is held to be legal,
and clarifies its most basic functions, especially those legitimate and even necessary because there will
that generally relate to elections. And, section eight simply be no real test of the competence of the ruling
finally considers the historical background, leadership, party without such opposition in elections.
foundation and inadequacies of Africa’s political
parties. Thus, elections require the existence of a multiparty
system so that citizens make a political decision by
Elections as prerequisites of democracy voting for the competing candidates fielded by various
political parties holding divergent views and presenting
Makinda (1996:557) held that, generally, democracy different alternatives. There is general agreement
can be seen ‘as a way of government firmly rooted among political scientists that one of the essential
in the belief that people in any society should be components in a healthy democracy is the existence
free to determine their own political, economic, of an enduring opposition that critically checks the
social, and cultural systems.’ More commonly, the day-to-day activities of the ruling party (Kiisa 2005;
concept of democracy is used to describe a political Ionescu & de Madariaga 1968). In fact, the ruling
system designed to widen the participation of ordinary parties attempt to run the government so as to defend
citizens in government the powers of which are clearly their record and win public approval, knowing that if
defined and limited. New democracies, as opposed they fail to do so they may lose office. The opposition

Democracy, elections & political parties • page 1 Paper 166 • July 2008
parties point out defects in the ruling parties’ public Furthermore, the United States and European states
policies and make alternative proposals, hoping that only require a simulacrum of democratic adherence
the voters will entrust them with power in a four, five to play down the anti-democratic practices carried
or six years time. ‘The opposition, then, is essentially a out by African governments, and to even reward them
government-in-waiting’ (Kiisa 2005:3). with increased assistance. To make matters worse,
‘many [African] citizens are beginning to perceive
It follows that, in any political system, the democratic that democracy has distinctive shortcomings including
litmus test will be, by default, the peaceful changeover unruly political discourse, a poor record of service
of government power with the opposition winning delivery, and new opportunities for corruption’ (Bratton
elections and constituting a government, and the ruling 2007:5). Adhering to this line of argument developed
party quietly accepting the results and not responding by political scientists closely studying African politics,
with violence and intimidation. This has recently Joseph (1999:11) maintains that, in Africa,
occurred in Zimbabwe where the ruling party accepted
its defeat in the first round of the elections of 28 the prime purpose of elections will remain the
March 2008 with trepidation and almost immediately legitimation of whatever regime that currently
resorted to absurd retribution (Amnesty International holds governmental power … [and] are far from
2008). Otherwise, as Mainwaring (2001:190) puts it, being autonomous operations: they reflect the
‘opportunities for new parties are restricted, not legally, character of the political order and especially
but rather as a result of the low turnover.’ Another the degree of risk incumbents are willing to
form of test may be power-sharing (Budge & Keman tolerate.
1990). Power-sharing arrangement is generally formed
when the ruling party’s confidence and legitimacy According to these political scientists, African elections
are severely weakened even though it remains strong are, in simple terms, window-dressing rituals with
enough to exercise control over the most no real political meaning other than
important institutions. the stuffing of the ballot boxes behind
African elections closed doors. They are just administrative
The creation of a power-sharing are just formalities which have become standard
arrangement has the advantage of administrative signs of good conduct adopted by African
conferring some sort of legitimacy to governments to Western states and
the ruling party without discrediting the formalities which international institutions on which they
opposition. It might reduce the ruling have become are financially and politically dependent
party’s fear of losing everything and fear (Adejumobi 2000:66). Doubts have
of future reprisals while, at the same standard signs even sprung up whether multiparty
time, it might assuage the opposition’s of good conduct systems are altogether appropriate to the
anxiety that the ruling party might have highly divided societies of Africa (Young
somehow rigged the elections. That is
adopted by 1993:301), and cynicism has won the
what occurred in Kenya after the 2007 governments to day with contentions that, in Africa, ‘a
elections, but only after the unexpected Western states flawed election may be preferable to
post-elections turmoil which killed 1 000 no election at all’ (Anglin 1998:474).
of its citizens, drove 300 000 from their More expressively, Chabal (2001:3) has
homes and constituted a considerable setback for its written that multiparty competition has not improved
image as Africa’s show case of democracy and stability. accountability, with the exception of Botswana and
What is grave is that it may still prove to be more most notably the island states of Cape Verde and
deceitful than genuine and may further undermine the Mauritius, and that it has not led to more sustained
already shaky faith of Kenyans in democracy (Chege, economic development.
Mukele & Kabeberi 2007:3; Afrobarometer 2006).
In Africa where most states are undeniably plural
Elections in Africa societies marked by deep cleavages among a diversity
of ethnic groups (Erdmann & Basedau 2007:15),
The conventional wisdom holds that, despite the elections seem to provide the opportunity to legitimise
political overture of the 1990s, there is no place for the political and economic pre-eminence of one group,
democracy in Africa because of one-party dominance, to reward supporters of that group and compel them
restriction of civil liberties, monopolisation of the to adopt greater political conformity, and to reimpose
means of mass communication, marginalisation of a firm hand on challenging elements within or outside
civil society, detrimental economic indicators and that group (Young 1993:305). In other words, they seem
disrupting foreign interference (Diamond 2008:7–9). A to merely represent an artificial exercise the results
brief revisit of the last two variables is necessary. To be of which are instinctively manipulated by a ruling
sure, African states have been continuously suffering party in order to prevent opposition political parties
from inflation and food shortages, inadequate reserves, winning elections despite the fact that citizens might
external imbalances and the burden of debt servicing. courageously vote for change (Monga 1997:51; Bratton

Democracy, elections & political parties • page 2 Paper 166 • July 2008
& Van de Walle 1997:234–235). The cumulative effect called first-past-the-post or winner-takes-all. This
of such a misdemeanour will be, unfortunately, political system is based on territorially demarcated single
uncertainty and the sharpening of ethnic politics which member constituencies, with the candidate or party
will, in turn, inspire the widespread disillusionment of getting the greater number of votes winning in only one
Africa’s citizens who will be forced to rethink that the round even if the proportion of the votes gained does
solution to prevailing problems cannot be found within not constitute a majority (Shively 1999:210). Murithi
the framework of democracy. 2000:3), however, holds that this system constitutes
both a structural inadequacy and an obstacle to
Electoral systems democracy in Africa’s highly ethnicised politics as the
votes cast for the losers are considered wasted in the
Nohlen (1996:20) posits that electoral systems determine sense that they do not serve as effective instruments
‘the rules according to which the voters may express for expressing the voters’ will. The majority system is
their political preferences and according to which it a modification of the plurality system as the candidate
is possible to convert votes into parliamentary seats only wins if he or she receives an absolute majority of
or in government posts.’ Electoral systems are by no the votes cast in the constituency, that is, one more
means uniform and identical, and the selection of one than 50 % of the total votes cast (Bauer 2001:108–109).
type of electoral systems depends on two important An effect of both the plurality system and the majority
variables. On the one hand, the content and design system is that they tend to exaggerate the parliamentary
of competing electoral systems depend on the socio- representation of the largest political party (Rakner &
cultural, historical, geographic, economic and political Svåsand 2007:6).
conditions of a given state. On the other hand, they
just constitute one method determining the nature of The proportional representation system treats the entire
the prevailing political system, including its inclusivity state as one constituency or provides for multimember
towards ‘groups that had previously been constituencies. The purpose of this system
locked in conflict’ (Chege, Mukele & is to ensure that all political parties are
Kabeberi 2007:4), and also the overall guaranteed a place in legislatures. It
shape of the party system, including is perceived as constituting ‘the most
the way political parties organise and Electoral systems adequate system to govern any society
operate internally (Rakner & Svåsand determine the with a high degree of segmentation’ (Boix
2007:6).
rules according to 1999:613), although it may also entrench
political engagement along ethnic lines if
In the established democracies, which the voters it does not take into account the existing
alternative electoral systems result from may express political traditions and the degree of
the choice by political parties which is civic and voter education so crucial
predictably based on each alternative their political to its effectiveness (Murithi 2000:6).
system’s expected effects, both immediate preferences Under the proportional representation
and long-term, on their electoral self- system, there are two variations namely
interests (Benoit 2004:367). In emerging the single transferable vote and the party
democracies, on the contrary, what form list system. The single transferable vote
of electoral system is most appropriate for emphasises the personal rather than
the consolidation of democratic rule is rarely debated the territorial principle and provides for a candidate
among political leaders, electoral administrators and to obtain a quota of votes which is approximately the
civil society elements (Barkan, Densham & Rushton number of votes equal to the total votes cast divided by
2006:926). In fact, particularly in Africa, Rakner and the number of seats to be filled. In the party list system,
Svåsand (2007:6) made it clear that each competing party receives a specific percentage of
seats proportional to the total number of votes gained
unlike more established democratic systems, we (Bauer 2001:109).
observe that while the electoral formula impacts
on the form of representation of parties in the The institutional framework
legislature, other factors, like the importance
of presidential rule, the regional distribution Pastor (1999:75) points out that whether ‘an election is a
of voters, and manipulation of constituency source of peaceful change or a cause of serious instability’
design also impact on party representation and mainly depends on the character, competence and
contribute to the observed dominance of one composition of a number of institutions. Sundhaussen
party. (1998:331), however, cautions that ‘older states have
had centuries to build [and sustain] the institutions that
Electoral systems are broadly grouped into three major suited their political culture, but that new states have
categories with their own variations: the plurality to do this in a hurry.’ All things considered, the most
system, the majority system and the proportional important institution is the electoral commission, which
representation system. The plurality system is variously is the permanently functioning institution charged

Democracy, elections & political parties • page 3 Paper 166 • July 2008
with the task of preparing and conducting elections. have very limited access to updated legal information.
Goodwin-Gill (1994:41) observes that institutions such What’s worse is that the wide majority of the citizenry
as the electoral commission ought to be ‘independent, has very limited access to even such an ineffective
competent and perceived as completely fair by all the judiciary (Ndulo 2008:91). Taking into account all
candidates and parties participating in the [electoral] these shortcomings, African states have enshrined in
process.’ Furthermore, the electoral commission’s their constitutions the principles of independence of
standing will depend on its ability, including resources the judiciary, with southern Africa providing the best
and real legal prerogative, to impartially handle example in this regard (Madhuku 2002:233–234).
election-related complaints and effectively redress Ndulo (2008:81) specifies the two most important
irregularities, thus effectively facilitating the resolution principles of judicial independence as follows
of a Kenya-like electoral dispute which can easily
speed out of control. (a) that judicial power must exist as a power
separate from and independent of, executive
Only in this way, can electoral commission build the and legislative power, and (b) judicial power
confidence of the electorate and political parties alike must repose in the judiciary as a separate organ
which is essential to generate a credible electoral of government, composed of persons different
process. However, in Africa’s nascent and fragile from, and independent of those who compose
democracies, the responsibility for elections is usually the executive and legislature.
conferred to an institution which is not properly
insulated from the political pressure and control of In view of that, the judiciary should operate
political forces, especially the ruling party which has independently from undue pressures of the executive,
a special interest in the outcome of elections (Pastor legislature and political parties. An independent
1999:80). This is particularly true in Kenya where the judiciary should also have financial autonomy to fulfil
Electoral Commission was ‘long ago captured by the its own priorities and sufficient resources to offer the
leadership of Kenya’s ethnically driven political party appropriate salaries and benefits which are needed to
oligarchs’ (Nyamwamu 2008:4). In fact, Nyamwamu attract qualified candidates (Prempeh 2008:106; Ndulo
(2008:4) charges that, during the 2007 Kenyan 2008:87; Madhuku 2002:244). The appointment and
elections, the Electoral Commission removal of judges should be objective and based on
merit in order to enhance transparency and attain
found itself totally impotent to resolve a simple legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry. Prempeh
dispute over the election results even when (2001:270–271) suggested that the main political parties
the Commission’s chairman [Samuel Kivuitu] which are represented in national politics should be
had for days been on national TV asserting that involved in the appointment process. He reiterated
the electoral results were being cooked by his that judges who are selected almost exclusively by the
[own] officials. ruling party are less likely to fearlessly apply the law
in case of breaches by their benefactors in that party.
Similarly, African states have struggled to ensure the All things considered, only an independent judiciary
existence of an independent and effective judiciary. The ‘can effectively review governmental acts and ensure
structure, authority, effectiveness and independence of the constitutional guarantee of human rights’ (Ndulo
the African judiciary were seriously constrained, from 2008:81). It could also, as the Malawian case aptly
the start, by the structural conditions and practices demonstrates it,
inherited from the colonial era (Joireman 2001:576–
577). There has been, thereafter, little public confidence sanction violations of electoral rules …
in the judiciary which, in due course, ‘served as hinder self-serving alterations of the legal and
passive instruments of legitimation for authoritarian institutional framework of the elections and
regimes’ (Prempeh 2001:260). More recently, because preserve space for actors in the political and
of the growing uncertainty about electoral results, civil society to perform a meaningful role in
ruling parties have attempted to perpetuate their the electoral process … diffuse tension, for
control over the judiciary and increase the likelihood of example when electoral results are disputed, by
judicial decisions that favour their self-interests, further providing an arena where the contesting parties
undermining the institution’s effectiveness as well as can fight out their battles through their lawyers
legitimacy in the eyes of many citizens. (Gloppen & Kanyongolo 2004:31).

Thus, African judges have had to operate in an An institution equally important as the electoral
atmosphere in which the pressure of undue influence commission and the judiciary for the successful conduct
from the ruling party is explicit, rendering them of elections and working of democracy is the military.
unwilling to reach decisions which might be seen The military is the institution which has the monopoly
as critical of the ruling party. Furthermore, they over the control and use of the physical instruments
are appointed, transferred or removed at will, work of violence, and enjoys a relatively high degree of
without computers and other adequate stationary, and discipline, single-mindedness and centralisation of

Democracy, elections & political parties • page 4 Paper 166 • July 2008
authority. Also, the military has a wealth of information about ‘every aspect of the organisation and conduct of
which enables it to have the most rationally calculating an election, including the functioning of the national
view towards national problems (Finer 1962:6–13; electoral commission, the registration of voters, the
Kummel & Von Bredow 2000; Janowitz 1977). Civilian course of the campaign, the poll itself, the counting of
supremacy over the military is an essential requirement the ballots, and the compilation of the results’ (Anglin
to the functioning of any democracy. Under such a 1998:487). Abbink (2000:11) asserts that it also involves
system of civilian supremacy, the military is allowed to making an informed judgment regarding whether
develop professionally and obliged to strictly remain ‘elections have been conducive to the establishment
politically neutral. A professional military would carry of democracy.’
out the objectives and policies set out by any legitimate
civilian group that wields state power as is still the case At a minimum, a well-organised team of international
in Senegal (Vengroff & Magala 2001:149). observers can detect organised efforts at fraud in the
balloting and counting process (Garber, McCoy &
But, as Kohn (2001:76) points it out, in fragile Pastor 1991:107; Pastor 1999:129; Van Cranenburgh
democracies, the military has ‘been deeply involved 2000:28), and thus make sure that electoral outcomes
in politics, sometimes preying on society rather than somewhat reflect the views of the voters. What’s more,
protecting it.’ In fact, especially in Africa, the ruling the mere presence of international observers can
party attempts to guarantee a loyal and pliable military provide voters a sense of security and a reassurance
through a biased system of recruitment, reward and regarding the secrecy of the ballot and the efficacy
deprivation in order to ensure its political longetivity of the entire electoral process (Garber, McCoy &
(Bratton & Van de Walle 1997:245; Monga 1999:58). Pastor 1991:107; Garber & Bjornlund 1992:13). At
For instance, during the run-up to the Zimbabwean times, international observers can go further, helping
elections of 28 March 2008, General Constantine mutually suspicious sides to negotiate acceptable terms
Chiwenga, the Commander of the of the electoral game (Pastor 1999:131).
Zimbabwe Defence Forces, outright
declared that his troops ‘will not respect Pastor (1999:131) points out that, to fulfil
any president other than Robert Mugabe’ A well-organised the above functions or expectations,
(UN Integrated Regional Information team of international observers need ‘to have
Networks 2008:1). The danger is that the the stature and credibility or the access
military, recognising this dependence, international to the [particular] country’s leadership
might be tempted to ease out the ruling observers can … [and the] ability to separate the
party after decrying deteriorating socio- technical from the political side of
economic conditions, stacking the detect organised problems.’ Also, they can encourage
courts with its cronies, pretending to efforts at fraud in all sides to accept the election results,
be above the fray and arranging rigged if they are internationally respectable,
elections (Monga 1999:58). Thus, Kohn
the balloting and in order to preserve the credibility and
(2001:279–280) argues in detail that counting process legitimacy of the declared victor in a
polarised contest (Pastor 1999:129).
every effort must be made to limit Pastor (1999:134) goes further and
the military to external defense so argues that international observers can
that it functions as a representative of the whole even mediate the implementation of settlements, thus
society, acting in the best interest of the whole facilitating ‘the political evolution of parties which
nation. Only in the direst of emergencies should [may] lack experience in democratic compromise,’
military forces be used to secure internal order; and, in the process, ‘promoting confidence in the
they must see themselves, and be seen, as the [electoral] process and easing the mutual distrust that
guardians and not the oppressors of the people might otherwise come into full blown conflict’ (Garber,
… Tasking the military with everyday law McCoy & Pastor 1991:107).
enforcement, as opposed to maintaining order as
a last resort, pits the military against the people, Nonetheless, international observation is constrained
with a loss of trust and confidence, eventual by certain factors. In the first place, it is quite difficult for
alienation on both sides, and a diminishing international observers to answer effectively the question
civilian control. whether elections were free and fair, two issues which
cannot be easily distinguished and are rather subject to
International observation controversy (Bauer 2001; Goodwin-Gill 1994; Elklit &
Svensson 2001). For instance, international observers
The prospects for genuine elections can be further described Malawi’s 1994 elections as free and fair,
enhanced by international observation which literally its 1999 elections as substantially free and fair and its
means gathering information, by a group of monitors 2004 general elections as free but not fair (Rakner &
and election experts established by an international Svåsand 2005:16). For that reason, Van Cranenburgh
organisation or foreign non-governmental organisations, (2000:29) asserts that the declarations of international

Democracy, elections & political parties • page 5 Paper 166 • July 2008
observers must be ‘founded on sufficient factual data.’ groups are ‘more cost-effective, more knowledgeable,
Pastor (1999:131) supports this assumption by stating linguistically more mobile, available for longer periods,
that observers need and perhaps more observant of what really matters.’ The
main concerns regarding domestic observation groups,
to evaluate the entire electoral process. which are not always viewed benignly by African
Irregularities of some kind occur, and the governments, are their independence and credibility.
problem is to try to determine a pattern to the To be credible, it is crucial for these groups to remain
irregularities that could have biased the election impartial at all times during the entire electoral process,
in favour of a particular party. despite enduring budgetary constraints, the existence
of a potentially disenabling legal environment and the
The international observers also have to take into account apparent absence of standards to determine the freeness
the potential impact which their declarations can have and fairness of elections. They may, however, ‘typically
on the overall political process and on the attitudes of rely heavily on outside support’ (Anglin 1998:474) and
ordinary citizens (Abbink 2000:11). Indeed, it is usually may thus be tied to the organisation that has funded
tempting for international observers to declare most their operation, with their final reports occasionally
elections free and fair, simply because to do otherwise tailored to the requirements of that particular funding
would be predictably destabilising, and because it source.
would be costly and politically near-impossible to redo
elections from scratch. Lastly, international observers Definition, characteristics and
may not be entirely familiar with the unique history, functions of political parties
socio-cultural outlook, demographic diversity, local
languages, communication infrastructure, resource A prominent writer took political party as ‘a fighting
distribution, institutional development, prevailing organisation in the political sense of the word’ (Michels
political conditions and urgent security 1962:78), while another author defined
concerns of the state in which the it as ‘any political group that presents
particular elections are being held. at elections, and is capable of placing
through elections, candidates for public
Domestic observation Domestic office’ (Sartori 1976:64). Ware (1995:5)
suggested that it is ‘an institution that
Domestic observation groups refer to observation groups seeks influence in a state, often by
those groups which originate within the are more interested attempting to occupy positions in
state where the elections are being held government, and usually consists of
and include independently operated non- in the election more than a single interest in the society
governmental organisations, churches, process itself rather and so to some degree attempts to
human rights bodies, trade unions, aggregate interests.’ Considered to be an
women and student organisations.
than its outcome authority on political parties, Duverger
Geisler (1993:634) believes that their (1962:17) stated that a political party is
most likely objective is ‘to represent the ‘not a community but a collection of
electorate, both in their broad-based communities, a union of small groups
composition as well as in their mandate, dispersed throughout the country.’
and [that] they have a very large constituency.’ They
may be more interested in the election process itself All these definitions offer valuable insights. They
rather than its outcome, and may be engaged in civic all use the concept of political party to designate a
education programs. Indeed, Geisler (1993:634) holds nationally and locally articulated political institution
that ‘their observation and monitoring is a continuum that has the ability to engage in political recruitment,
which covers the entire democratic process of which to contest elections, to win maximum support at these
they are a part, and therefore does not stop after the elections, to control the decision-making positions and
elections.’ They may address substantive political and personnel of a government, and to make concerted
legal issues that go beyond Election Day and stretch efforts to implement a broad range of public policies
from the post-elections period to the run-up to the (LaPalombara & Weiner 1966:29). It should be noted
next elections. They may even recommend specific that, notwithstanding the above-mentioned attempts,
changes in the election law and procedures as they no clear and agreed-on definition has been discovered
are designed in the abstract and also as they operate and won acceptance in academic circles (Bell 1981:3;
in practice. They may also address the composition, Blondel 1978:13). All in all, a political party is a
organisation, responsibilities and performance of political institution that has a number of identifiable
the electoral commission including the efficiency, characteristics.
motivation and integrity of its personnel.
First and foremost, a political party is established by
Anglin (1998:491–492) contends that, when compared like-minded individuals, with a common set of beliefs
to international observation, domestic observation and agreeing on important matters of public policy.

Democracy, elections & political parties • page 6 Paper 166 • July 2008
These individuals are, in a self-conscious manner, and shape the formulation and execution of public
determined to gain and hold power on their own policies (Andrain & Apter 1995:145).
or in coalition with other political parties (Shively
1999:224; LaPalombara & Weiner 1966:6; Budge & Anatomy of African political parties
Keman 1990:10). Furthermore, a political party has a
recognised degree of permanence and continuity, its Historically, political parties in Africa emerged as
expected life span not depending on the life span of nationalist movements the ultimate objective of
its leaders or founders (Bell 1981:3; Monga 1999:49). which was to attain independence from the political,
Bell (1981:3) adds that each political party possesses economic and military domination of European
a ‘distinctive label which distinguishes it from other colonial powers. Hodgkin (1961:93) clearly indicates
political groupings.’ Moreover, a political party is linked that most of these political parties had a rudimentary
in an organised way to a variable number of citizens, form of organisation with the three highest political
and has a stable structure founded on two levels. On bodies being the party leader, a central committee or
the one hand, there is the national level which operates bureau politique and an executive committee, which
in the name of the entire political party and where the were typically complemented by a National Congress
major decisions are made. On the other hand, there is or Conference, different local branches at the bottom
a subordinate local level geographically dispersed but and representatives of mass associations of women,
directly answerable to the national level (LaPalombara workers and the youth. Zolberg (1966:33–35) notes
& Weiner 1966:6). The relationship between the two that they were also endowed with a pyramidal and
levels is by nature diverse and subject to changes in centralised structure having ‘a relatively large head
conditions. in the capital and fairly rudimentary limbs,’ and that
they were created in a very short time span and led by
Having specified the definition and characteristics of a ‘strong personalities with great political acumen and
political party, it is useful to offer some determination.’
generalisations about its diverse functions
in a democratic political system. Indeed, Just after independence, these leaders,
in the course of their competition with The primary representing one particular region or
one another during the electoral process, function of political ethnic group, sought to impose and
political parties perform certain functions justify a largely discredited one-party
without which democracy could hardly parties is to give system which was, nonetheless,
exist. Andrain and Apter (1995:145) voters a choice of ‘accepted and justified as the best
believe that the primary function of solution by the international community
political parties is to ‘give voters a choice candidates who and by academia, since the priority was
of candidates who become legislators become legislators [to protect] the political order against
and executive officials.’ And, as Ball the risk of disorderly mobilisation of
(1981:4) points it out, political parties
and executive grievances’ (Gentili 2005:4). Thus,
provide the electorate some guidance officials political parties lost all importance as
concerning the different programmes democratic institutions and became
and public policies which candidates tools for authoritarian leaders who
commit themselves to pursue. They also articulated the parties’ priorities as well
attempt to interest ordinary citizens on the issues of a as governments’ policies, and later on became only
campaign, and to stimulate them to go out to the polls interested in the inviolability of their monopoly on
and vote, thus practically engaging in the mobilisation power (Morrison 2004:421). This was notably the
of the entire citizenry (Shively, 1999:227). case in Ghana with Nkrumah, in Cote d’Ivoire with
Houphouet-Boigny, in Tunisia with Bourguiba, in
Furthermore, political parties recruit young leaders, Kenya with Kenyatta, in Malawi with Banda, in Zambia
train and give them experience, and gradually move with Kaunda, in Cameroon with Ahidjo, in Guinea
them to positions of greater responsibility (Shively with Sékou Touré, in Tanzania with Nyerere and in
1999:227–229; Andrain & Apter 1995:145). Moreover, Senegal with Senghor. It is, still and more disastrously,
political parties help to articulate different interests, the case in Zimbabwe with Mugabe. It follows that
and, as Andrain and Apter (1995:146) described it, to African states and their citizens were forced to rapidly
‘reconcile the conflicting policy preferences of adverse put up with ‘the development of a single, not plural,
social groups.’ Political parties disseminate political political logic’ (Chabal 2001:10).
ideas, ideologies and programmes. They help members
and citizens alike to interpret political information and Bogaards (2004:192) acknowledges that, since then,
events, organising or participating in political meetings one central feature of African political parties has been
and discussions on a wide range of political, economic the dominance of one political party which has a grip
and social issues (Andrain & Apter 1995:146). Finally, on the majority of legislative seats and intentionally
depending on their electoral success, some political governs alone. Such dominant parties are mostly
parties manage the different branches of government, advantaged because they will have unfettered access

Democracy, elections & political parties • page 7 Paper 166 • July 2008
to and make use of the state resources at their disposal hopes for a new era of democracy, built on some
for party financing and other political purposes. Such of the continent’s oldest traditions of pluralism
purposes include de-legitmising and squeesing out and liberal thought. But increasingly, the aging
the opposition parties as well as undermining their President Wade drew power and resources
potentially constructive engagement, and may directly into his own hands and those of his family.
result in the detrimental duplication of ruling party In the years leading up to Wade’s reelection
and state power. Ottaway (1999:311) draws attention in 2007, journalists, political activists, singers,
to another central feature when she asserts that long- and marabouts (Muslim spiritual leaders) who
standing and emergent political parties are, both overtly criticized Wade or supported the opposition
or covertly, ethnically defined. They tend to solely were subjected to physical intimidation and
represent and protect the interests of their respective violence. Critics charge the election was marred
ethnic groups (Erdmann & Basedau 2007:15–18), by vote-buying, multiple voting, and obstruction
especially when elections are close by. This view of opposition voting.
is echoed by Nyamwamu (2008:3) who raises the
compelling case of Kenya where Ottaway (1999:311) left little doubt about the fact that
African opposition parties are not formed and united
once the electorate has secured their elite in on the basis of distinct public policies, in fact lacking
power through their ethnic votes, their elite the time and experience to prepare distinguishable
discard them, forget them and cut the bridge and realistic programmes. They are also prone to
for the next five years. In the long run, the elite demagoguery and just build on promises to get rid of
have structured and organised the elections to the ruling parties which they regard as enemies, on
become a mere ethnic census. the basis of both ethnicity which remains an important
factor in African electoral politics and the stumbling
Basedau and Stroh (2008:23) further point out that blocks which they face. These opposition parties are,
all African political parties correspondingly display indeed, exposed to manipulation and repression which
weak roots in society and a very low level of differ only in degree not in kind across African states.
institutionalisation. Rakner and Svåsand (2007:14) went Accordingly, they remain disturbingly weak in terms
on to explain that of subordination to unaccountable leaders mainly
interested in ‘grabbing a few crumbs of the national
rather than being developed as organisations, pie,’ insufficient territorial coverage and organisational
parties appear as useful vehicles for ambitious capacity specifically between elections, unsatisfactory
politicians … The consequence of the ideological orientation and programmatic appeal,
personalistic nature of parties is that they chronic factionalism, lack of systematic count of
are not likely to become institutionalised as members who are few in number, poor funding base,
organisations. Instead, the party leaders use the lack of access to media and disunity among themselves
party to mobilise sufficient support from the (Monga 1999:49–50; Simutanyi 2005:2; Patel 2005;
electorate in order to bargain with other party Elisher 2008). All these factors account for the decision
leaders for the dispersion of public goods. by opposition parties to either participate or boycott
elections, for their usually poor showing during these
Nowhere is the trend described in the previous elections and even for their inability to stand the
quotation more apparent than with the numerous test of time. Lindberg (2006:128) is correct when he
opposition parties which have failed, in many respects, ascertains that
to mount a strong and effective challenge to the
dominant political parties in Africa. Indeed, only in the participation by opposition parties in free
a few cases such as Kenya, Senegal and Zambia, and fair elections may seem a given, just as a
opposition parties have won elections and constituted boycott may be expected when a ruling regime
governments. However, based on the experience of sets up an orchestrated façade of elections. But
these same states, it is possible to argue that opposition opposition parties may participate even when
parties display a striking degree of continuity with their elections stand no chance of being free and
predecessors, eventually until retribution catches up fair or legitimate in order to press authoritarian
with them too. Indeed, after they taste the forbidden rulers for further concessions and can also stage
apple of power, they reconstitute the conditions for boycotts in legitimate elections in hopes of
the unfavourable participation of an organized and discrediting a ruling regime when they stand no
concerted opposition in the run-up to elections and then chance of winning.
involve in direct rigging. Diamond (2008:8) provides
the rather disappointing example of Senegal where Conclusion

when longtime opposition leader, Abdoulaye It follows that a number of points are in order. On the
Wade, won the presidency in 2000, ending four one hand, the conceptual assumptions and arguments
decades of Socialist Party rule, there were high presented in this paper are not meant to conceal, by

Democracy, elections & political parties • page 8 Paper 166 • July 2008
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About this paper

This paper develops, in a manageable manner, a conceptual framework in order to adequately define the essentially
contested concepts of democracy, elections and political parties. There is much overlap in these concepts which are
abundantly used in both academic and policy-making circles, and it is undoubtedly essential to make distinctions between
them if a nuanced understanding is to be gained. This paper establishes that democracy denotes mainly a form of political
system in which citizens are effectively able to choose their leaders in competitive elections. Furthermore, this paper
argues that elections, which need to be administered by impartial electoral institutions, watched over by independent
judicial institutions and monitored by qualified observers, should not be conflated with democracy and should only be
seen as its primary prerequisites. It also maintains that, despite falling short of both international and local expectations,
African elections constitute a necessary condition for democracy to thrive. And, this paper defines political party as a
political institution which is sensitive to the demands of particular constituencies, and has the ability to contest several
elections. It also uncovers the nature of African political parties which tend to be mostly ethnic-based, personalised
and non-institutionalised. All in all, this paper puts forward the thesis that, in Africa as elsewhere, a credible democratic
political system requires credible elections which, in turn, require the participation of credible political parties.

About the author

MR. BEROUK MESFIN is currently a Senior Researcher for the Direct Conflict Prevention Programme at the Institute
for Security Studies office based in Addis Ababa. He has worked as a defence analyst at the Ethiopian Ministry of
National Defence, as a consultant on elections, and as political adviser to the US embassy in Ethiopia. He also
worked as a lecturer of Political Science and International Relations at Addis Ababa University, and as a research
associate to the Institute of Development Research and the Institute of Federal Studies.

Funder
This paper was made possible through the generous funding of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.

© 2008, Institute for Security Studies • ISSN: 1026-0404

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Democracy, elections & political parties • page 12 Paper 166 • July 2008