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Dedicated
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the Heroes of tomorrow
• -
 N

NATION BETRAYED

By SAIDA
PRINTED &; PUBLISHED B Y S. SHAMSUL HASAN AT T H E MUSLIM LEAUGE
PRINTING PRESS, DARYAGUNJ, DELHI.
 PREFACE
The case of Muslim India often goes by
default through Jack of publicity. The so-
called Nationalist Press is controlled by the
Hindu Banias who extend full support to the
Caste Hindu ridden Congress; but misrepresent
or misinterpret the Muslim League decisions or
resolutions. Under these circumstances the
persons who are generally misled are the fore-
igners and those who cannot devote enough time
to understand the intricacies of the political pro-
blems of this sub-continent known as India.
Any attempt to unite India would be as futile
as any one trying to unite the various national-
ties of Europe—and India is as vast as Europe,
and the term Indian is just as elastic as the term
European. A Frenchman is just as much
Eur6pean as a German. In the same way a
Musalman living in this Sub-continent is just as
much an Indian as a Hindu. But the difference
I between a Muslim and Hindu is far more
marked than between a Frenchman and a Ger-
man Just as it is impossible to unite the French
\ with the Germans, in the same way and in fact
still more, it is absolutely impossible to unite
sthe Hindus and the Musalmans.
 Islam and Hinduism are not religions in the
strict sense of the word but are in fact diffe-
rent and distinct social orders as well and those
who think that Muslims and Hindus can ever
evolve a common nationality see a mirage.
This misconception of our Indian notions has gone
far beyond the limits and is the cause of most
of our troubles and will lead India to destruction
if we fail to revise our notions in times. The
Hindus and Muslims belong to two different
religious philosophies, social customs and litera-
ture. They neither intermarry nor interdine
togetner and indeed they belong to two different
civilisations which are based mainly on conflic-
ting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on
life and of life are different. The Hindus and
muslims derive their inspiration from different
sources of history. They have different epics,
different heroes, different episodes. Very often
the hero of one is a foe of the other and
likewise. Their victories and defeats overlap.
To bring together two such nations under a
single state, one as a numerical minority and
the other as a majority, must lead to growing
discontent and final destruction of any fabric that
may be so built up for the Government of
such a state. In support of this I qoute an
extract from a letter of late Lala Rajpat Rai
who was a staunch Hindu Leader of the
Punjab, addressed to Mr. C. R. Das about
twenty years ago "There is one point, which

(ii)
•
 *

m o r e than once has been troubling m e very ^S

much of late and one which I want y o u t o think
carefully and that is the question of Hindu
mohammedan unity. I have devoted most of m y
t i m e during t h e last six months t o the study
of Muslim history and musiim Law. I am
inclined t o think it is neither possible nor
practicable. Although we can unite against t h e / *
British, we cannot do so t o rule Hindustan on
British lines. W e cannot do so t o rule Hindus-
tan on democratic lines."

Such an impossible task the British Mission

wanted t o achieve. But when t h e y f o u n d it
impossible then t o the great horror and amaze-
m e n t of the musiim nation and neutral observers
the representatives of the British nation w e n t
back on their w o r d and promises.
The object of this book is t o narrate the f u l l
story of the cabinet Mission's negotiations in
• India; keeping it f r e e as far as possible, f r o m m y
o w n comments, so that neutral and unprejudi-
ced observers w h o really wish t o examine the
documents and t h e Cabinet Mission's behavicr
may do so and d r a w their own conclusions.
They may realise for themselves that the Cabi-
net Mission's last action was a complete reversal
of their statement of J u n e 16, a volt face f o r
which there is no explanation. Never in the
history of Britain's inglorious rule in this country
have pledges so solemnly given, been so shabbily

(iii)
 1
broken. Their act has been a deliberate
attempt to appease the Congress regardless
of those sections who have exposed the caste-
ridden Bania dominated and Capitalist controlled
organisation.
I shall be failing in my duty if I did not
thank my printers and publishers for their
untiring efforts and co-operation and "Dawn"
for its cartoons,
SAIDA

Delhi
10-10-1946

(iv)
 CONTENTS

1. The stage is set. 1

Secretary of State's statement in
Lords—Mr. Attlee's statement in
Commons—Mr. Jinnah points out
contradictions'—Congress reactions.
2. Mission Arrives 22
Secretary of State's first utterance
—Mission's Parleys—Mr. Jinnah
meets Mission—the Show boy—Cor-
respondence—Simla again—Simla
Correspondence.
3. Cabinet Mission's Statement 96
Lord Pethick-Lawrence's broadcast-
Mission's Press Conference—Lord-
Wavell's broadcast—C. in C's broad-
cast—Mission's second Press Confe-
rence—Mr. Jinnah analyses Press
proposals—Mission's memorandum
on states—Congress Working Com-
mittee resolution—Mission's May
•

26, statement.
V

4. Muslim League acceptance 184

Mr. Jinnah's speech in the Council
League Council resolution—British
Press Comments—Dawn—Congress

A
 #

hesitant—Azad-Wavell Correspon- '

dence. I

5. Interim Government 235

Mission's Interim Plan of June 16,—
Queering the pitch—Shopkeepers
all—Congress rejection of short-
term plan—president's letter—
Congres Working Committee reso-
lution—British press on Congress
tactics—
6. A Nation Betrayed 276
Caretaker Government—Musalmans
indignant—Mr. Jinnah's statements
with correspendence—Mr. Liaquat
AH Khan's statement—Press: A
descent — A.I.C.C. Session — Mr.
Nehru's Press Conference—Mr.
Jinnah's reactions—other Criticisms
7. Cabinet Ministers in Parliament. 355
Lord Pethick-Lawrence's statement
in Lords—Sir S. Cripps Statement
in Commons—Mr. Churchill's state-
ment.
8. A nation's resentment 409
League Council meeting— Mr.
Jinnah's Speech—Council expresses
indignation—-Resolution withdra-
wing acceptance—Direct action
resolution—Mr .Jinnah's Press Con-
ference.

B
\ •
 LORD PETHICKJLAWRANCE
ANNOUNCES
{February 19, 1946)
The House will recall that on September
19 last year, on his return to India after
discussions with the British Government, the
Viceroy made a statement of policy in the
course of which he outlined the positive
steps to be taken immediately after the
Central and Provincial elections to promote
in conjunction with leaders of Indian opinion
the early realization of full self-government
in India. Those steps include:
First, preparatory discussions with
elected representives of British
India and with Indian States in
order to secure the widest measure
of agreement as to the method of
framing a constitution;
Second, the setting up of a constitution-
making body; and
Third, the bringing into being an execu-
tive council having the support
of the main Indian parties.
Elections at the centre were held at the
end of last year and in some of the provinces
they are also over and responsible govern-

1
ments are in the process of formation. In
other provinces polling dates are spread over
the next few weeks. With the approach
of the electoral campaign, the British
Government have been considering the most
fruitful method of giving effect to the pro-
gramme to which I have referred.
In view of the paramount importance
not only to India and to the British Common-
wealth but to the peace of the world of
successful outcome of discussions with leaders
of Indian opinion the British Government
I

have decided with the approval of His

Majesty the King to send out to India a
special mission of Cabinet Ministers (Lord
Pethick-Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and
Mr Albert V. Alexander) to act in associa-
tion with the Viceroy in this matter. This
decision has the full concurence of Lord
Wavell.
I feel sure that the House will give its
support and goodwill to the Ministers and
the Viceroy in carrying out a task in which
the future of 400,000,000 people and crucial
issues both for India and the world will be
at stake.
During the absence of these ministers,
the Prime Minister will himself assume
responsibility for Admiralty business and
the Lord President (Mr. Herbert Morrison)
will be in charge of the Board of Trade.

\
 So far as the India and Burma offices are
concerned, the Parliamentary Under-Secre-
tary of State (Major Arthur Henderson) will
be in charge daring my o^n absence, but
he will be able to rely upon the personal
advice of the Prime Minister whenever it
is required and he will refer important issues
to him, particularly those affecting Burma
where the Government will not, like the
Viceroy, be in personal touch with myself.
i

MR. ATTLEE'S STATEMENT IN

HOUSE OF COMMONS
(March 15, 1946)
I find from our friends in this House who
had been out to India and returned, from
letters received from Indians and from
Englishmen in India of all points of view,
complete agreement on the fact that India
is today in a state of great tension and that
this is indeed a critical moment. I am quite
sure that everyone in this House realizes the
difficulty of this task which the members of
the Mission have undertaken in conjunction
with the Viceroy and that no one will desire
to say anything whatever that will make that
task more difficult.
I t is time emphatically for a very definite
and clear action. I do not intend to make
a long speech. 1 do not think it would be

3
wise to do so and in particular it would be
most unhelpful to review the past. It is so
easy to go back over the past, and in accor-
dance with one's predilections to apportion
blame for past failures in long-drawn-out
discussions on this extraordinarily difficult
problem—the problem of development of
India into a completely self-governing nation.
In the long period of the past, it is so easy
to point out and say that at this stage or
that stage opportunities were missed by
faults on one side or other.
I have had very close connection with
this problem for nearly 20 years and I say
there have been faults on both sides, but
this time, we should look to the future rather
than harp back to the past. Thus I would
say it is no good applying the formula of the
past to the present position. The tempera-
ture of 1946 is not the temperature of 1920,
1930 or even 1942. The slogans of earlier
days are discarded. Sometimes, words that
seemed at that time to Indians to express
the height of their aspirations are now set
side and other words and ideas thrust
forward.
Nothing increases the pace and mo
ment of public opinion more than a great
war. Everyone who had anything to do
with this question in the early days between
the warknows what effect the war of 1914-18

4
 #

had on Indian aspirations and ideas. The

tide t h a t runs comparatively slowly in peace
becomes vastly accelerated in wartime, and
especially directly afterwards, because that
tide is to some extent banked up during war.
I am quite certain that at the present time
the tide of nationalism is running very fast
in India and indeed all over Asia.
One alwavs has to remember that India
is affected by what happens elsewhere in
Asia. I remember when I was on the Simon
Commission what effect the challenge that
had been thrown out by Japan at that time
had had on the Asiatic people and the tide of
nationalism t h a t at one time seemed to be
canalized among a comparatively small
portion of the people of India, mainly a few
of the educated clashes, has tended to spread
wider and wider.
I remember that in the Simon Commis-
sion report although there were great diffe-
rences in expression of the nationalistic
sentiment between what were called extrem-
ist and moderate and although in many
instances there might be such stress of com-
munal claims as may seem almost to exclude
the conception of nationalism, we found that
among Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Marhat-
tas, politicians or civil servants—among all of
them—that conception of nationalism had
i

5
\
been growing stronger and stronger an
today I think that the national idea has
spread right through, not the least perhaps
among some of those soldiers who had done
such wonderful service in the war.
I would like today, therefore, not to
stress so much the differences between the
Indians, but let us all realize that whatever
the difficulties and divisions may be there is
this underlying demand among all the Indian
people.
There will be matters undoubtedly on
which it is necessary to refer back for Cabinet
decision, but in our fluid position at the
present time when we desire to get the
utmost co-operation and goodwill between
all leaders of Indian opinion it would be
unwise to try and tie down those who are
going out too rigidly.
The obvious reasons for sending out the
Cabinet Ministers is that you send out
persons of responsibility who are able to take
decisions. Of course, there must be an
area in which there may have to be a
reference back.
I t is worth remembering that twice in
25 years India has played a great part in
the defeat of tyranny. Therefore, is it any
wonder that today she claims—a nation of
four hundred million people that twice sent

6
 /

her sons to die for freedom —that she should

herself have freedom to decide her own
destiny ? (Cheers).
My colleagues are going to India with
the intention of using their utmost end
eavours to help her to attain that freedom
as speedily and fully as possible. What
form of government is to replace the present
regime is for India to decide, but our d
is to help her to set up forthwith a machinery
for making that decision.
There you have met with the initial
difficulty of getting that machinery set up,
but' we are resolved that a machinery shall be
T
set up and w e seek the utmost co-operation
of all Indian leaders to do so.
\

India herself must choose as to what

will be her future situation and her position
in the world. Unity may come through the
United Nations or through the Common-
wealth, but no great nation can stand alone
by herself without sharing what is happening
in the world.
I hope that India may elect to remain
within the British Commonwealth. I am
certain t h a t she will find great advantage
in doing so, but if she does she must do it of
her own free will, for the British Common-
wealth and Empire is not bound together by
chains of external compulsion. It is a free

7
association of free people. If on the other
hand she elects for independence—and in
our view she has a right to do so--it will be
for us to help make the transition as smooth
and easy as possible.
I am well aware that when I speak of
India I speak of a country containing
congeries of races, religions and languages
and I know well the difficulties thereby
reated but these difficulties can only be
overcome by Indians.
We are mindful of the rights of the
minorities and the minorities should be able
to live free from fear. On the other hand,
we cannot allow a minority to place their
veto on the advance of a majority. We
cannot dictate how these difficulties shall
be overcome. Our first duty is to get a
machinery set up and that is the main
purpose of the Ministerial Mission and the
Viceroy.
We want to see set up an interim govern-
ment—one of the purposes of the Bill which
has been discussed today—to give the
Viceroy greater freedom in order t h a t in the
period which is to elapse while a constitution
is being worked out, you may have a
government enjoying the greatest possible
support in India. I would not like to fetter
the Viceroy's decision in any way in regard
to the choice of portfolios.

8
 In many Indian States, great advance
has been made and there is a most interest-
ing experiment in Travancore. Of course,
feelings in India with regard to nationalism
and unity of India cannot be confined by
boundaries that separate the States from
the provinces.
I am hoping that statesmen of Britain
and of Princelv India will be able to work
out a solution of the problem of bringing
together in one great polity the various cons-
tituent parts, and there again we must see
that Indian States find their due place. I
do not believe for .a moment that the Indian
Princes would desire to be a bar in the
forward march of India.
This is a matter which Indians will settle
themselves. I am very well aware of the
minority problem in India. I think all
Indian leaders are realizing more and more
the need for getting a settlement of these
minority problems if India is to have a
smooth passage in future years and I believe
that due provision will be made for them in
the constitution.
The Mission will certainly not neglect
this point. But you cannot make Indians
responsible for governing themselves and
at the same time retain over here the
responsibility for treatment of minorities and
powers of intervention on their behalf.
 We are mindful too of the position of
the services and of the men who have done
reat service to India. India should be
sensible of the responsibility she has to those
who have served her.
Any interim government which takes over
the assets of the Government will also take
over the liabilities. That again is a point
to be dealt with later on. I t does not
concern the immediate setting up of the
Instrument of Decision.
With regard to the treaty, we are not
going to hang out for anything for our own
advantage which would be to the disadvan-
tage of India.
Let me stress again the crucial nature of
the task before us. This problem is of vital
importance not only to India and the
British Commonwealth and Empire but to
the world.
In the mass of Asia, and Asia ravaged
by war, we have here the one country t h a t
has been seeking to apply the principles of
democracy. I have always felt myself that
political India might be the light of Asia.
I t is a most unfortunate circumstance
that just at the time when we have to deal
with these great political issues there should
be grave economic difficulties. In particular,
we have very grave anxiety over India's
food supply.

10
 The House knows that the British
Government are deeply concerned in this
problem and the Minister of Food is now in
the United States with the Indian Delega-
tion. We shall do our utmost to help India.
I do not think I should refer to the
social and economic difficulties except to
say that I believe that these difficulties can
onty be solved by Indians themselves
because they are so closely bound up with
the whole Indians way of life and outlook.
Whatever we can do to assist we shall do.
My colleagues are going out to India
resolved to succeed and I am sure everyone
will wish them godspeed.
a 55
ATTLEE DOES THE ROPE-WALK
Qaid~e~Azam Jinnah points out contradictions

Mr. M. A. J I N N A H , President of the

All India Muslim League, issued the
following statement to the Press at New
Delhi pointing out the Contradictions.
a I regret thart Mr. Attlee, though in a

guarded and qualified manner, has done the

rope walking when he says "on the other
hand we cannot allow a minority to place
a veto on the advance of a majority" and
yet he has fallen into the trap of the false
propaganda that has been carried on for
some time. There is no question of veto or

11
holding up the progress or advance of the
majority.
The issue is, to give it a simile, says tbe
spider to the fly: 'Walk into my parlour' and
if the fly refuses, it is said that the veto is
being exercised and the fly is intransigent
However, I note, that the Prime Minister
in the same breath says: 'We are mindful
of the rights of the minorities and the mino-
rities should be able to live free from fear.'
I want to reiterate that the Muslims of India
are not a minority, but a nation and self-
determination is there birthright. If the
Cabinet Mission comes with an open mind,
there is hope of their realizing the true
situation. If the expression that the Cabi-
net Mission is going in a positive mood
means—"We are resolved that a machinery
shall be set u p " by way of single constitution-
making body or a Constituent Assembly
then it is futile for him to say in the next
breath "we seek utmost co-operation of all
Indian leaders to do so."
*

Having said that "the House realizes the

difficulty of the task which members of the
Mission have undertaken in conjunction
with the Viceroy and that no one will desire
to say anything that will make their task
difficult", he himself has indulged in various
expressions which are contradictory and
and are calculated to create misunderstanding.

12

i
 In one place, he again says: " B u t in
our fluid position at the present time, when
we desire to get utmost co-operation and
goodwill between all leaders of Indian
opinion, it would be unwise to try and tie
down those who are going out too rigidly."
And I am glad he has realized....when he
says, "You cannot make Indians responsible
for governing themselves at the same time
retaining over here (in England), the respon-
sibilitv for treatment of minorities and
powers of intervention on their behalf."
It seems t h a t he was speaking to a large
audience with many voices but so far as we
are concerned our position remains detinite
that we stand for a division of India and the
establishment of Pakistan and that Pakistan
is the onlv solution of India's constitutional
problem. I t will lead to happiness, prosperity
and security to the two sovereign states and
all the inhabitants of this sub-Continent."
Congress React! cms
The speech of Mr. Attlee, the British
Prime Minister in the House of Commons on
Friday was welcomed by the Congress Presi-
dent Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, in an inter-
view to the Associated Press of India.
Maulana Azad said, " I consider that the
speech of the British Prime Minister on the
whole has helped to create the desirable

13
 -

atmosphere which we want to maintain

during the stay of the Cabinet delegation in
India. It has thrown light on certain basic
problems and I believe its spirit will generally
be appreciated in the country. The real
problem to be tackled now does not concern
theoretical principles but actual practice and
from this future results will naturally flow.
Nehru Welcomes Speech
a
So far as we are concerned, naturally
we expect to meet the Cabinet Mis?ion, but
we have made no programme of any kind
except that we may have to come up ) »

declared Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru on

Saturday, when asked by correspondents
what plans the Congress Working Committee
has drawn up for talks with the Three-Minis-
ter Cabinet Delegation. He welcomed the
change in tone and approach in Mr. Attlee's
speech.
Elucidating his Culcutta interview that
Congress has already conceded 95 per cent
Pakistan Nehru said:
"There should be a federal union of
willing units with full autonomy to the
federation units and with minimum list of
common subjects for the federation—a list
with as few subjects as possible. Obviously,
the principal subject will be Defence, Com-
munication, Foreign Affairs and Currency.

14
I

For the rest, there would be an optional list

of common subjects which a unity may or
may not accept. So if a federating unit
want the minimum list, it gives it 95 per
cent independence plus of course a big share
in the five per cent. That is what the Con-
gress has said constructively.
"Ultimately you have to choose between
two things: It seems quite clear t h a t while
you may admit that you will not compel
any area to come in it follows equally
strongly that you cannot compel anybody
to go out."
Mr. Sarat Chandra Bose: " I am glad
that Mr. Attlee did not harp on the usual
and oft-repeated difficulties in the way of
Britian conceding freedom to India, but that
he expressed his determination to solve
India's problem in the way India wanted to
solve it. I hope the Cabinet Mission will
convert Mr. Attlee's Words into action and
that they will not permit any section of
Indians to impede India's march to freedom.
Commenting on tbe Prime Minister's
speech the daily Dawn of March 17, in its
editorial wrote as follows:—
MR. ATTLEE IN LABOUR
Prime Minister Clement Attlee does not
appear to have heard of the ancient story

15
which tells of two men and a donkey who
wanted to suit their action to the comments
of every passer-by in order to please every-
body, and ended in getting bewildered them-
selves, without pleasing any body. His
speech in course of the India debate in
Parliament on Friday was a desperate bid to
offer some sop to every shade of opinion,
in India and other countries interested in
the Indian problem where Britain has lately
been the object of much sniping. The result
is a series of contradictions and conflicting
utterances held together by a string of high
sounding, even cheap slogans and catch
phrases, giving an impression of confused
thinking and a total lack of policy.
The Qaid-e-Azam has pointed out some
of the glaring inconsistencies in the speech,
in a statement issued on Saturday, and brief
though that statement is it has a tone of quiet
confidence which is in noticeable contrast to
Premier Attlee's laboured outburst. The
one thing which clearly emerges out of the
situation is that while the Muslim nation in
*

India knows its own mind and what it wants,

the present British Government do not seem
to know what they want to do in India except
that they have some vague notions cf the
Major aspects of Indian problem in general.
Mr. Attlee is mindful of the "rights of
the minorities and the minorities should be
16

>
able to live free from fear." Ignoring for
the moment the misuse of the word "minority,'
in the context of Muslims, how does Mr.
Attlee propose to ensure that minorities can,
in fact, live free from fear in the India of
the future? Although the Cabinet Mission is
said to be coming out in a "positive mood,"
one looks in vain for a positive indication of
any solution of this problem, whose existence
and validity is so clearly recognised in the
speech itself. Instead, there are a few essen-
tially negative assertions that (1) "We
cannot dictate how these difficulties shall be
overcome," (2) " ...you cannot retain
over here responsibility for treatment of
minorities and powers of intervention on their
behalf," and (3) " I believe that due provi-
sion will be made for them in the constitu-
tion.
Mr. Attlee hopes that "India would
elect to remain in the British Commonwealth
by her own free will," but she can also
"elect for independence." An admirable
sentiment which all sections of Indians
welcome, but how is this to be translated
into positive action? Mr. Attlee answers:
"Our first duty is to get a machinery of
decision set up, and t h a t is the main purpose
of the Ministerial Mission and the Viceoy."
But here again, Mr. Attlee does not know
how this is to be done, for he is well aware
17

/
of the fact that Muslims have said they will
not come into a single constitution-making
machinery for the whole sub-continent. He
therefore does some more fencing: "There
you have met with the initial difficulty of
getting that machinery set up, but we are
resolved t h a t a machinery shall be set up,
and seek the utmost co-operation of a
Indian leaders to do so." Once more,
coming up against the inconsistency between
the "resolve" to set up a constitution-mak^
ing machinery and expecting the co-operation
of all Indian leaders for this purpose, Mr.
Attiee just leaves it at that.
Elsewhere, Mr. Attiee expresses anxiety
that no one should "say anything that will
make their (the Cabinet Mission's) task more
difficult" and considers it "unwise to try and
tie down those who are going out too rigidly,"
because of the need for "co-operation and
goodwill between all leaders of Indian opin-
ion." And than in the same breath, he makes
the categorical assertion that "We cannot
allow a minority to place their veto on the
advance of a majority." Does not this state-
ment make the Mission's task more difficult?
Does it not tie them down risidlv? Does
t not mak','5 it infinitely difficult for leader;
important sections of Indian opinion t<
extend their co-operation and goodwill? And
above all, does it not prejudge the very issu<

18
 \

which the three Cabinet Ministers are suppo-

sed to be coming out to settle?
Either Mr. Attlee and the British Govern-
ment are honest when they talk of the neces-
sity for a constitution which will provide,
that sections of people whom, the former
calls "minorities can live "free from fear"
or they are dishonest about it. If they are
honest, they cannot expect or intend to force
these sections of people to accept a constitu-
tion, by whomsoever made, and howsoever
made, which does not in their view ensure
freedom from fear, and they cannot let the
majority have it their own way just because
they happen to be a majority. If they are
dishonest, it is altogether a different matter
and if the Cabinet Mission are coming out to
put any such dishonest intentions into prac-
tice, they will find the Muslims also in a very
"positive mood."
We refrain purposely from dealing further
with this aspect of Mr. Attlee's speech, because
we feel that the speech is so charged with
contradictions and half-baked expressions
of purpose or lack of purpose that further
clarification of the point, following the
arrival of the Cabinet Mission, should be
awaited before such expressions are taken
inevitably at their face value. The Qaid-e-
Azam has effectively dealt with Mr. Attlee'e
use of the word " v e t o " in this connexion,

19
and it is indeed surprising that the Prime
Minister of Britain should have slavishly
imitated the deliberately mischievous lang-
uage of Congress propagandists. Any novice
in the Inns of Court would have told Mr.
Attlee that when one party makes a certain
proposal to another party who holds no
manner of authority over the former, and
the latter considers that proposal unaccepta-
ble and says so, it is not exercising a "veto."
The boot indeed is on the other leg, for Bri-
tain holds authority over India, can enforce
decisions on Indian political elements, and
if she tries to compel the Muslims to accept
a constitution which they regard as inconsis-
tent with their freedom, it will be a case of
Britain vetoing the Muslim's demand for
freedom.
Only one thing remains t^ be said. The
Muslims of India are a nation, not a minority.
They have declared so in the elections just
held. Muslims want to have a homeland
of their own, and on this issue also they have
expressed their will in the elections. If Bri-
tain vetoes these demands, professing still
to render lip-services to the principles of
democracy, she will forfeit the right to be
regarded as a better exemplar of the freedom
of mankind than were the Nazis of Germany
or are others elsewhere, with whose ideology
that of the so-called Democracies are at the

20
present time in the process of increasing conflict
While, therefore, we would rather not pre-
judge the Cabinet Mission's labour, it is
necessary to remind His Majesty's Govern
ment that if their intention is to betray th <~>

?>
Muslim nation, whom they call a "minority
the Mission will come to inaugurate in India
not an era of peace and independen ?e, b u t
a tion which may make this country
<;
the light of Asia" in a very different sense
to what was in Mr. Attlee's mind when he
used that expression

I
 *

MISSION ARRIVES
On 23rd of March when Muslim India celebrated
'Pakistan Day* the Cabinet Mission landed in Karachi
to greet the foreign visitors a huge aerial landmark in
the form of a map of Pakistan was erected at the Idgah
Maidan.
Secretary of State's rst utte*fiancein India
"As mv colleagues and I set foot on the
soil of India, we bring to the people of
this country on behalf of the British
Government and of the British people a
message of cordial friendship and goodwill.
We are convinced t h a t India is on the
threshold of a very great future when in
the exercise of her freedom she will stand
for the preservation of civilisation in the
East and bring her great influence to
bear in the counsels of the nations.
" W e have come but with one purpose in
view. It is, m conjunction with Lord
Wavel, to discuss with the leaders of India
r
and her elected representatives how best to
speed the fulfilment of your aspirations, to
take full control of your own affaira and
thus enable us to complete the transfer of
responsibility with pride and honour to

22
oursel The British Government d the
British people desire without reservation to
consummate the promises and pledg that
have been made and we can assure yc that
in our negotiation we sh ot seek to
provide for anything that is incompatible in
any way to the sorvereign dignity of India.
"We have, then, with all our Indian
associates, the common objective for the
achievement of which all our energies will
be devoted in the coming weeks. The
precise road towards the final structure of
India's independence is not yet clear, but let
the vision of it inspire us all in our renewed
efforts to find the path of co-operation. I
am confident we shall face our task together
in faith and with determination to succeed.''
4
Sir Stafford Cripps identified himself
with the observations of Lord Pethick-Law-
rence, and said that a fuller statement will
be made at Delhi at the Press conference to-
morrow.
Sir Stafford Cripps then replied to a
barrage of questions. He said it was not
true that a draft treaty of alliance between
Britiain and India was already discussed bet-
ween Indian leaders and the British Govern-
ment. "We have just come and we have
come with an open mind. We are here to
investigate and enquire all about t h a t . "

23
 , Asked about their views on Pakistan,
Sir Stafford Cripps again emphasised that
they had come with an open mind: "We
have not come with any set views. We are
here to investigate and enquire about."
Questioned if the Cripps' proposals formed
the basis of the present negotiations, Sir
Stafford Cripps said: "We are not going
backward. We are going forward."
As regards the possible duration of their
stay, Sir Stafford Cripps remarked: "We
have not decided about it. We ourselves
do not know, but we shall return only when
opf work is over."
P Sir Stafford Cripps said that they had
ot come to adjudicate between rival claims
n India but to find out the means for the
S I

ransfer of power to Indian hands.

Sir Stafford Cripps expressing satisfaction
at the reception given to the statement on
India of Mr. C. R. Attlee, British Prime
Minister, said that it had the support of all
the sections of British Parliament and people.
They would prefer not to say anything
more at present, concluded Sir Stafford
Cripps.
Questioned about a Press report that the
Cabinet Mission would seek India's support
against Soviet threat and would seek alliance

24
\
with India for security measures by Britiain
in North-west India, Sir Stafford Ciipps said
that the report was absurd. /

Winding up the Press conference. Lord

Pethick-Lawrence and Sir Stafford Cripps
emphasised once again their determination
to succeed. I C

T
Mr. A. V . Alexander told the Associated
Press of India that though he had a com-
fortable journey, he felt rather tired to see
pressmen.
Mr. Alexender's party included Mr. F. W.
Mottershead and Miss Booker.
Lord Pethick-Lawrence was accompanied
by Sir William Croft, Deputy Under-Secretary
of State, Mr. F. F. Turnbull, Private
Secretary, Mr. A. H. Joyce, Publicity Adviser,
Col. Fraser and Mr. E. W. R. Lumby.
Sir Stafford's party included Major Wyatt,
Major Short and Mr. G. B. Blaker. Mr. T. L.
Crosthwait, a special officer attached to the
Mission, met the Mission at the airport.
The party drove to Government'House
where they spent the night before continuing
their onward Journey to Delhi the next
morning
The entire route from the airport to
Government House was lined with armed
R I A F pickets and policemen. '

25
 MISSION'S PARLEY
Immediately after their arrival in Delhi the
Cabinet Mission announced their programme
of negotiations with the party leaders.
•

The first to meet the Mission were the

Provincial Chief Ministers and the leaders of
opposition in those provinces. While all on
the one hand the powerful Hindu Press
concentrated its propaganda to mislead the
Mission. Every effort was made to prove that
the Caste Hindu Congress was the only
national orginisation of India. The Promoters
of 1942 Resolution and the revolutionaries
were seen petitioning and making appeals
to the representatives of the imperialist
power to save their sacred 'Mata' from
vivisection. On the other hand the Muslim
_

Nation oppressed by the Hindu Capitalist

and crushed by the British Imperialist, and
with no advanced propaganda machinary a t
its disposal had complete faith in the right-
eousness of its cause, and statesmenship
of its seasoned leader the Qaid-e-Azam.
They were thus confident that the propa-
gandist would have no chance to prevail
upon the judgement and honesty of the
Mission and on the contrary the Mission
would see through this clamour for Bania Raj
backed and financed by the Hindu Black
marketeers.

26
Qaid~e~Azam Meets Mission
On the 3rH of April 1946 Qaid-e-Azam
M. A. Jinnah met the Mission. The fict
that the meeting lasted for three hours showed
the importance of the talk and the serious-
ness of the problem.
The Show Boy
Parleys on behalf of the Congress were
made with the Mission in the name of Abul
Kalam Azad, the show boy of the Congress.
But the chief adviser, Mr. Gandhi—who
takes pride in not being a four anna member
of the Congress was always there to play
the part. The part he played known to
all, was never a constructive one. While
he was the Master poor Azad was merely
'His Master's voice.'
After about a month's talk with the
leaders of India the Members of the Mission
left on the 19th April by air for an Easter
week-end trip to Kashmir, leaving the Indian
leaders to talk the matter amongst them-
selves in the meantime. Each side expressed
willingness to confer provided the other side
came to the conference with prior concession
wholly unlikey to be made. The Congress
wanted an agreement wherein they could
secure some sort a of a Central Government
without any commitment for complete

27

*
independence for the Muslim areas of
India. The Muslim League on the other
hand insisted that such commitments must
be made before they negotiate. One Muslim
League Leader said:- "How can we negotiate
away our independence. If we surrender our
independence we have nothing left to nego-
tiate". That was the position on the
Members return from Kashmir on the 23rd
April. Soon after their return, the Cabinet
Mission started working on the basis of a
formula which would bring the Leaders of
the League and the congress closer and at
last to confer together around a table.
Delhi with its soaring temperature was not
considerd a fit place for a cool discussion-
a Hill station was suggested and the choice
fell on Simla.
The following correspondence passed between
the Mission on on3 side and Congress and League
other, before a basis for talks was agreed.
!

Letter Prom Lord Pethick Lawrence to Montana Abid

*

Kalam Azad and Mr. Jinnah Dated 27th April 1946.

The Cabinet Mission and His Excellency
the Viceroy have carefully reviewed the
opinion expressed to them by the various
representatives they have interviewed and
have come to the conclusion that they should
make one further attempt to obtain agree-
28
ment between the Muslim League and the
Congress. -. •• '
realise that it would be useless to
ask the two Parties to meet unless they were
able to place before them a basis of
negotiation which could lead to such an
agreement.
r

I am therefore asked to invite the Muslim

League to send four negotiators to meet the
Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy together
with a similar number from the Congress
Working Committee with a view: to discussing
the possibility of agreement upon a scheme
based upon the following fundamental prin-
ciples:
The future constitutional structure of
British India to be as follows:—
A Union Government dealing with the
following subject:
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communica-
tions. There will be two groups of Provinces,
the one of the predominantly Hindu Provin-
ces and the other of the predominantly Mus-
lim t^ovinces, dealing with all other subjects
which the provinces in the respective groups
desire to be dealt with in common. The
Provincial Governments will deal with all
other subjects and will have all three siduary
Sovereign rights.

29
 I t is contemplated that the Indian States
will take their appropriate place in this
structure on terms to be negotiated with
them.
1 would point out that we do not think
it either necessary or desirable further to
elaborate these principles as all other matters
could be dealt with in the course of the
negotiations.
*

If the Muslim League and Congress are

prepared to enter into negotiations on this
basis, you will perhaps be so good as to let
me know the names of the four people
appointed to negotiate on their behalf. As
soon as I receive these I will let you know
the locus of the negotiations which will in all
probability be in Simla, where the climate
will be more temperate.
Letter from the President of the Congress to Lord
Pethick-Lawrence, dated 28th April, 1946.
i

I thank you for your letter of April 27th.

I have consulted my colleagues of the
Congress Working Committee in regard to
the suggestion made by you and they desire
me to inform you that they have always been
willing to discuss fully any matters con-
cerning the future of India with represen-
tatives of the Muslim League or any other

30
 organisation. I must point out, however,
1
t h a t the "fundamental principles ' which you
mention require amplification and elucidation
in order to avoid any misunderstanding.
As you are aware, we have envisaged a
Federal Union of autonomous units. Such
a Federal Union must of necessity deal with
certain essential subjects of which defence
and its allied subjects are the most impox-
tant. I t must be organic and must have
both an executive and legislative machinery
as well as the finance relating to these
subjects and the power to raise revenues
for these purposes in its own right.
Without these functions and powers it
would be weak and disjointed and defence
and progress in general would suffer. Thus
among the common subjects in addition to
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communica-
tions, there should be Currency, Customs,
Tariffs and such other subjects as may be
found on closer scrutiny to be intimately
allied to them.
Your reference to two groups of Provinces,
one of the predominantly Hindu Pro-
vinces and the other of the predominantly
Muslim Provinces, is not clear. The only
predominantly Muslim Provinces are the
i North-West Frontier Province, Sind and
Baluchistan. Bengal and Punjab have a

31
 -

bare Musi majority W consid it

wrong to form groups of Provinces und
the Federal Union and m g
or communal basis.
It a appe rs that ^ ch
to a Pr the matt ?r oi joining or not
joining a group It by r,o means certain
that Province as constituted would like
join any particular group, In any event it
would be wholly wrong to compel a Province
to function against its own wish. While we
agree to the Provinces having full powers
in regard to all remaining subjects as well
as the residuary powers, we have also stated
that it should be open to any Province to
\
exercise its option to have more common
v
subjects with the Federal Union. Any
sub-federation within the Federal Union
would weaken the Federal Centre and would
be otherwise wrong. We do not, therefore,
favour any such development.
Regarding the Indian States we should
like to make it clear that we consider it
essential that they should be parts of the
Federal Union in regard to the common
subjects mentioned above. The manner of
their coming into the Union can be con-
sidered fully latter.
You have referred to certain "funda-
mental principles" but there is no mention
of the basic issue before us, that is, Indian

32
Independence, and the consequent with-
drawal of the British army from India. i t is
only on this basis that we can discuss the
future of India, or any interim arrangment.
While we are ready to cary on negotia-
tions with any party as to the future of India,
we must state our convictions that reality
will be absent from any negotiations whilst
an outside ruling power still exists in India.
I have asked three of my colleagues of
the Congress Working Committee, namely,
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Vallabh-
bhai Patel and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan
to accompany me in any negotiations t h a t
may take place as a result of your suggestion.
Letter from the President of the Muslim League to
Lord Pethick-Lawrence, dated 29th April, 1946.
I thank you for your letter of the 27th
April, which I placed before my Working
Committee yesterday morning.
My colleagues and I fully appreciate
the further attempt t h a t the Cabinet
Mission and His Excellency the Viceroy
are making to bring about an agreement
between the Muslim League and the
Congress by proposing a meeting of the
representatives of the two organisations for
the purpose of negotiating an agreement.
They however, desire me to invite your
attention to the position taken up by the

33
Muslim League since the passing of the
Lahore Resolution in 1940 and, thereafter,
successively endorsed by the All India
Muslim League Sessions and again by the
Conventio islators
as recently as
copy enclosed.
The Working Committee desire to point
out that many important matters, both of
principle and detail, in your brief letter,
require elucidation and clarification, which
in their opinion, can be achieved at the
meeting proposed by you.
Therefore, without prejudice or commit-
ment, the Working Committee, in their
anxiety to assist in finding an agreed
solution of the Indian constitutional problem,
have authorised me to nominate three
representatives on behalf of the Muslim i

League to participate in the negotiations.

The following are the four name:—1. Mr.
Jinnah: 2. Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan:
3. Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, and 4.
Sardar Abdur Rab Nishter.
Enclosure to Mr. JinnaKs Letter to Lord Pethick-
f
Lawrence, dated 29th April, 1946.
Resolution, passed by the All-India Muslim League
Legislators' Convention on A p r i l 1946:
Whereas in this vast sub-continent of
India a hundred million Muslims are the

34
 ^

adherents of a Faith which regulates every

department of their life (educational, social
economic and political), whose code is not
confined merely to spiritual doctrines and
tenets or rituals and cermonies and which
stands in sharp contrast to the exclusive
nature of Hindu Dharma and Philosophy
which has fostered and maintained for thous-
ands of years a rigid Caste System resultin
in the degradation of 60 million human
beings to the position of untouchables,
creation of unnatural barriers between man
and man and super-imposition of social and
economic inequalities on a large body of the
people of this country, and which threatens to
reduce Muslims, Christians and other mino-
rities to the status of irredeemable helots,
socially and economically:
Whereas, the Hindu Caste System is a
direct negation of nationalism, equality,
democracy and all the noble ideals that
Islam stands for;
Whereas, different historical backgrounds,
traditions, cultures and social and economic
orders of the Hindus and Muslims have made
impossible the evolution of a single Indian
nation inspired by common aspirations and
ideals and whereas after centuries they still
reman two distinct major nations.
Whereas, soon after the introducation by
the British of the policy of setting up politi-

35
cal institutions in India on the lines of
Western democracies based on majority rule
which meant that the majority of one-nation
or society could impose its will on the
majority of the other nation or society in
spite of their opposition as was amply
demonstrated during the two and a half
years' regime of Congress Government in
the Hindu majority Provinces under t,hft

Muslims were subjected to untold harass -

ment and oppression as a result of which
thev were convinced of the futility and
• -

ineffectiveness of the so-called safeguards -

provided in the Constitution and in the

Instrument of Instructions to the Governors
and were driven to the irresistible conclusion
that in a United Indian Federation, if estab-
lished, the Muslims even in majority Pro-
vinces would meet with no better fate and
their rights and interests could never be
adequately protected against the perpetual
Hindu majority at the Centre;
Whereas, the Muslims are convinced that
with a view to save Muslim India from the
domination of the Hindus and in order to
afford them full scope to develop themselves
according to their genius, it is necessary to
constitute a sovereign independent State
comprising Bengal and Assam in the North-
East zone and the Punjab, North-West
36
i
 \

Frontier Province. Sind and Baluchistan in

the North-West zone.
This Convention of the Muslim League
Legislators of India, Central and Provincial
after careful consideration hereby declares
t h a t the Muslim Nation will never submit
to any constitution for a United India and
will never participate in any single cons-
titution-making machinery bet up for the
purpose, and that any formula devised by
the British Government for transferring
power from the British to the peoples of
India, which does not conform to the
following just and equitable principles
calculated to maintain internal peace and
tranquillity in the country, will not contri-
bute to the solution of the Indian problem:
1. That the zone comprising Bengal and
Assam in the North-East and the Punjab,
orth-West Frontier Province. Sind and
Baluchistan in the North-West of India,
namely Pakistan zones, where the Muslims
are in a dominant majority, be constituted
into a sovereign independent State and that
unequivocal understanding be given to
implement the establishment of Pakistan
without delay;
2. That two separate constitution-
making bodies be set up by the peoples of
akistan and Hindustan for the purpose of
raming their respective consitutions;

37
 \

3. That the minorities in Pakistan and

Hindustan be provided with safeguards on
the lines of the All-India Muslim League
Resolution passed on the 23rd March 1940,
at Lahore;
That the acceptance of the Muslim
League demand of Pakistan and its imple-
mentation without delay are the sine qua
non for the Muslim League co-operation and
participation in the formation of an Interim
Government at the Centre.
This Convention further emphatically
declares that any attempt to impose a
constitution on a United India basis or to
force any interim arrangement at the Centre
contrary to the Muslim League demand will
leave the Muslims no alternative but to
resist such imposition by all possible means
for their survival and national existence.
Letter from Lord Pet hick- Lawrence to the President
of the Congrzss , dated 29th April, 1946.
Thank you for your letter of 28th April.
The Cabinet Delegation are very glad to
know that the Congress agree to enter the
joint discussion with representatives of the
Muslim League and ourselves.
We have taken note of the views you
have expressed on behalf of the Working
Committee of Congress. These appear to
deal with matters which can be discussed at

38
 N

the Conference, for we have never con-

templated that acceptance by Congress and
the Muslim League of our invitation would
imply as a preliminary condition full appro-
val by them of the terms set out in my
letter. These terms are our proposed basis
for a settlement, and what we, have asked
the Congress Working Committee to do is to
agree to send its representatives to meet
ourselves and representatives oi the Muslim
League in order to discuss it.
Assuming that the Muslim League, whose
reply we expect to receive in the course of
the afternoon, also accept our invitation, we
propose that these discussions should be
held at Simla, and intend to move there our
selves on Wednesday next. We hope that
you will be able to arrange for the Congress
representatives to be in Simla in time to
open the discussions on the morning of
Thursday, May 2.
Litter from Lord Pethich-Lawrence to the President
of the Muslim League, dated 29th April, 1946.
Thank you for your letter of the 29th
April. The Cabinet Delegation are very
glad to know that the Muslim League agree
to enter he joint discussion with the re-
presentatives of the Congress and ourselves.
I am glad to say I have received a latter
from the President of the Congress to say

39
that they are also willing to participate in
t h e proposed discussions and have nomina-
ted Maulana Azad, Pandit Nehru, Sardar
Vellebhbhai Patel and Khan Abdul Ghaffar
Khan as their representatives.
We have taken note of the resolution of
the Muslim League to which you draw our
attention. We have never contemplated
that acceptance by the Muslim League and
the Congress of our invitation would imply
as a preliminary condition full approval by
them of the terms set out in my letler.
These terms are our proposed basis for a set-
tlement and what we have asked the Muslim
League Working Committee to do is to agree
to send its representatives to meet ourselves
and representatives of the Congress in order
to discuss it.
We propose that these discussions should
be held at Simla and intend to move there
ourselves on Wednesday next. We hope
that you will be able to arrange for the
Muslim League representatives to be in
Simla in time to open the discussions on the
morning of Thursday, May 2.
AGENDA
1. GROUPS OF PROVINCES—
(a) Composition.
(b) Method of deciding Group subjects.
40
 (c) Character of Group organisation
2. UNION—
(a) Union subjects.
(b) Character of Union Constitution
(c) Finance.
3. CONSTITUTION-MAKING
MACHINERY-
(a) Composition.
(b) Functions.
(i) in respect of Union;
(li) in respect of Groups;
(Hi) in respect of Provinces.
Before proceeding to Simla the following
basis of talks proposed by the Cabinet
mission was accepted by the Muslim League
and the Congress.
Both the Congress and the Muslim League
selected their four representatives to repre-
sent their respective points of view. Even
in the selection of their spokesmen the
Congress did not hesitate in choosing two
Muslim show-boys neither of whom could
either understand the language or the
intricacies of the constitutional problems.
*

The two show-boys Abul Kalam Azad

and Ghaffar Khan of the Frontier could not
have contributed much by their dumbfolded
silence at the conference. Naturally the
two Hindu representatives must have done

41
the talking and the Muslim show-boys only
the nodding.
Inspite of the fact that the four represen-
tatives of the Muslim League were fully
authorised to speak on behalf of the Muslim
Nation yet the President of the League
considering the responsibility too much and
for t h a t reason had also asked his Working
Committee to be present at Simla to he
and s;uide them in the deliberations of the
talks. Thus when the President of the
Muslim League submitted the minimum
demands of the Muslim Nation to the Cabi-
net Mission and a copy of it to the President
of the Congress, it was done with the
approval of the Working Committee. On
the other hand to the great astonishment
of every one and especially the Foriegn press
representatives, the Congress Working Com-
mittee was no where on the scene to contri-
bute anything officially on behalf of the
Congress organisation. So much so t h a t
the League demands were rejected by the
Congress President only on the advice of
the Mahatma who is not even a four Annas
member of the Congress!
The appointment of the two muslim
show-boys by the Congress was merely done
to annoy and insult the national orginisation
of the Mussalmaus—the All India Muslim

42

^
League because the League had always
declared such people as quislings and
traitors to the nation. The Congress expec-
ted that the League might refuse to sit with
such traitors, but to the great disappoint-
ment of the Congress the Muslim League was
not prevented from taking part in the con-
ference and facing the issues squarely and
boldly.
Seventy-six-years old secretary of State,
Lord Pethick Lawarance, opened the Tripar-
tite Conference with a brief address, exactly
at 10 a. m. on Sunday, May 5 in the
Viceroygical Lodge, Simla.
This was followed by a brief speech by
the Congress President. Then there was a
general discussion the atmosphere was most
cordial and the proceeding were 'most busi-
7
ness-like'. But as the days w ent by the
general trend of the talks became one of
pessimism. The gulf between the League
and the Congress remained as wide as ever.
Persons in close touch with Congress circles
gave the impression that the Congress atti-
tude was instransigent as ever and the corres-
pondence published later proved it.
In the Muslim League camp where the
usual calm prevailed but the atmosphere
elsewhere was extremely jittery, and the
majority of journalists who were in Simlr-

43
were also visibly affected by this psychologi-
cal malady. I t was only the fourth day of
the talks that there started a general talk of
packing up for the return journey.
The Cabinet Mission during the confe-
rence was in ch se touch and communica-
tion with His Majesty's Government.
May 8th proved a crucial day in the Cong-
ress Camp mutual discussions amongst Cong-
ress leaders were reported to have been by
no means without hint of accrimony. Ele-
ments inclined to be less intransigent were
however, overawed by the Patel Group.
For the fate of Bhulabhai Desai who was
cruelly hunted out of politics because of his
supposed conciliatory attitude towards the
Muslim League, had been an unpleasant
reminder of what those favouring an honour-
able compromise could expect.
Sunday proved the fateful day. In the
evening a Press Communique was issued by
the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy. I t
declared that the conference had broken
down.
SIMLA CONFERENCE CORRESPONDANCE
Letter from, the President of Congress to Lord
Pethick-Law rence, dated May 6, 1946:
My colleagues and I followed with care
the proceedings of the conference yesterday
and tried to understand what our con-

44

\
 /

versations were leading up to. I confess to

feeling somewhat mystified and disturbed at
the vagueness of our talks and some of the
assumptions underlying them. While we
would Jike to associate ourselves with every
effort to explore ways and means of finding
a ba is for agrrement, we must not decie\e
ourselves, the Cabinet Mission or the
representatives of the Muslim League into
the belief t h a t the way the conference h^s
so far proceeded furnishes hope of success.
Our general approach to the questions before
us was stated briefly in my letter to you of
April 28. We find that this approach has
been largely in gored and a contrary method
has been followed. We realize that some as-
sumptions have to be made in the early
stages as otherwise there can be no progress.
But assumptions which ignore or run con-
trary to fundamental issues are likely to
lead to misunderstandings during the later
stages.
In my letter of April 28, I stated t h a t
the basic issue before us was t h a t of Indian
independence and the consequent with-
drawal of the British Army from India, for
there can be no independence so long as
there is a foreign army on Indian soil. We
stand for the independence of the whole of
India now and not in the distant or near
future. Other matters are subsidiary to this

45
and can be fitly discussed and decided by
the Constituent Assembly.
Indo'British Relations
At the conference yesterday I referred to
this again and we were glad to find that
you and your colleagues, as well as the other
members of the conference, accepted Indian
independence as the basis of our talks. I t
was stated by you that the Constituent
Assembly would finally decide about the
nexus or other relationship that might be
established between a free India and England
While this is perfectly true, it does not affect
the position now and that is the acceptance
of Indian independence now.
If that is so, then certain consequences
inevitably follow. We felt yesterday that
there was no appreciation of these consequ-
ences. A Constituent Assembly is not going
to decide the question of independence that
question must be and, we talk it, has been
decided now. That Assembly will represent
the will of the free Indian nation and give
effect to it. I t is not going to be bound by
any previous arrangements. ID has ^to be
preceded by a Provisional Government which
must function, as far as posible, as a govern-
ment of free India, and which should under-
take to make all arrangements for the transi-
nal period

46
Provincial Grouping
In our discussions yesterday reported ref
rences were made to "groups" of Provinces
functioning together, and it was even sugges-
ted that such a group would have an execu-
tive and ligislative machinery. This method
of grouping has not so far been discussed by
us but still our talks seemed to presume all
this. I should like to make it ver'y clear
that we are entirely opposed to any executive
or legislative machinery for a group of Pro-
inees or units of the Federation. That will
'

mean a sub-federation, if not something

*mere, and we have already told you that we
do not accept this. It would result in crea-
ting three lavers of executive and legislative
bodies, an arrangement which will be cum-
brous, static and disjointed, leading to
continuous friction. We are not aware of
any such arrangement in any country. \
We are emphatically of opinion that it is
not open to the conference to entertain any
suggestions for a division of India. If this
is to come, it should come through the Consti-
tuent Assembly free from any influence of
the president governing power.
*

No Parity
Another point we wish to make clear is
that we do not accept the proposal for parity
as between groups in regard to the executive

47
or legislature. We realize that everything
possible should be done to remove fears and
suspicions from the mind of every group and
country. But the way to do this is not by
unreal methods which go against the basic
principles of democracy on which we hope
to build up our constitution.
Letter from Lord Pethick-Lawrence to the President
of the Muslim League and the Congress, dated May 8,
1946.

My colleagues and I have been thinking

over the best method of laying before the
conference what in our judgment seems the
most likely basis of agreement as shown by
the deliberations so far.
We have come to the conclusion that it
will be for the convenience of the parties if we
/commit this to writting and send then confi-
dential copies before the conference meets
again.
We hope to be in a position to let you
have this in the course of the morning. But
as this will give you too short a time to
study it adequately before the proposed
resumption of the conference at 3 o'clock
this afternoon. I feel sure that you will
agree that the meeting be postponed until
the same hour (3o'clock) tomorrow,afternoon.

48
Thursday, May 9, and I hope that you will
concur in this change of time which, we are
convinced, is in the interests of all parties.
Letter from the Private Secretary to Lord Pethick
Lawrence to the Presidents of the Congress and tl
Muslim League, dated May 8 1946:
With reference to the Secretary of State's
letter to you this morning, the Cabinet
Delegation wish me to send to you the
enclosed document which is the paper to
which the Secretary of State referred. The
Delegation propose that this paper should be
discussed at the next meeting to be held on
Thursday afternoon at 3 p. m. if that is
agreeable to the Congress-Muslim League
delegates.
PROPOSALS FOR JOINT DISCUSSION
{Enclosure with letter of May 8)
Suggested points for agreement between
the representatives of the Congress and
Muslim League:
(1) There shall be an All-India Union
Government and Legislature dealing with
Foreign Affairs, Defence, Communications,
Fundamental Rights and having the necss-
sary powers to obtain for itself the finances
it requires for these subjects.
(2) All the remaining powers shall vest
in the provinces.
49
 (3) Groups of Provinces may be formed
and such groups may determine the Pro-
vincial subjects which they desire to take in
common.
(4) The groups may set up their own
executives and legislatures.
(5) The Legislature of the Union shall
be composed of equal proportions from the
Muslim-majority Provinces and from the
Hindu-majority Provinces whether or not
these or any of them have formed them-
selves into groups; together with representa-
tives ef the States.
(6) The Government of the Union shall
be constitute in the same proportion as the
Legislature.
(7) The constitutions of the Union and
the groups (if any) shall contain a provision
whereby any Province can by a majority
vote of its Legislative Assembly call for a
reconsideration of the terms of the cons-
titution after in initial period of 10 years
and at 10 yearly intervals thereafter.
For the purpose, of such reconsideration
a body shall be constituted on the same
basis as the original Constituent Assembly
and with the same provisions as to voting
and shall have power to armed the cons-
titution in any way decided upon.

50
 (8) The constitution-making machinery
o arrive at a constitution on the above
asie shall be as follows:
I

(a) Representatives (shall be elected

from each Provincial Assembly
in proportion to the strength of
the various parties in the assembly
on the basis of 1 /10th of their
numbers.
•

(b) Representatives shall be invited

from the States on the basis of
their population in proportion to
the representation from British
India.
(c) The Constituent Assembly so
formed shall meet at the earliest
date possible in New Delhi.
(d) After its preliminary meeting at
which the general order of business
will be settled, it will divide into
three sections, one section re-
presenting the * Hindu-majority
Provinces, one section representing
* the Muslim-majority Provinces
and one representing the States.
(e) The first two sections will then meet
separately to decide the Provincial
constitutions for their group and,
they wish, a group constitutions.

51
 •

(f) When these have been settled it

will be open to any Province to
decide to opt out of its original
group and into the other group or
to remain outside any group. i

(g) Thereafter the three bodies will

meet together to settle the cons-
titution for the Union on the
lines agreed in paragraphs 1—7
above.
(h) No major point in the Union
constitution which affects the
communal issue shall be deemed
to be passed by the Assembly
unless a majority of both the two
major communities vote in its
favour.
(9) The Viceroy shall forthwith call
together the aboye constitution-making
machinery which shall be governed by the
provision stated in paragraph 8 above.
LEAGUE OBJECTS TO NEW SUGGESTED
POINTS
Latter from the President of the Muslim League
to Lord Pet hick-Lawrence, dated May 8, 1946:
I have now received the letter of your
Private Secretary, dated May 8, 1946, and
the enclosed document to which you had
referred in your earlier letter of May 8, 1946

52
 *

^ »

I t is proposed by you that this "paper' be

discussed at the next meeting of the con-
ference to be held on Thursday afternoon at
3 p. m if this is agreeable to the Muslim
League Delegation.
I

T
Your proposal embodied in } our letter
;
of April 27, 1946, runs as follows:
< <

A Union Government dealing with

the following subjects—Foreign
Affairs, Defence and Communica-
tions. There will be two groups
of Provinces, the one of the
predominantly Hindu Provinces
and the other of the predominantly
Muslim Provinces, dealing with all
other subjects which the Provinces
in the respective groups desire to
be dealt with in common. The
Provincial Governments will deal
with all residuary sovereign rights.
» *

This matter was to be discussed at Simla

and we agreed to attend the Conference on
Sunday, May 5, 1946, on the terms of my
letter, dated April 28, 1946.
You were good enough to explain your
formula and than after hours of discussion on
May 5 and 6, the Congress finally and defina-
tely turned down the proposed Union confined

53
\
 to three ts even with power to
'contribution for financing the Union.
Next, your formula clearly envisaged an
reement precedent between the Congress
and tb Muslim League with regard to th
groupin of Muslim d H Pro
and the formation of two Federation f thr
grouped Provinces and it followed t h a t th
must be two constitution-making machiner
It was that basis that some kind of Un
ggested in your form fined onlv
to th bjects and our approval was
ght in order to put into this skeleton
blood and flesh Th propo w also
lly turned down by the Cong
d the meeting had to be adjourned for the
Missio to d er th e m as to what
steps they may take in the matter.
And now the new enclosed document ha s
been sent to us with a view that th£t
pape
should be discussed at the i xt meeting to
• 4

be held on Thursday after Don at 3 p.m."

The heading of the paper is "Suggested
Points for agreement Between the Rep
tives of the Congress and the Muslim Leag
By whom are they sugg it not made
clear.
Departure from Formula
* I
We are of the opinion that the new £
o ted points for agreement fund

54
 9

tal departure from the original formula

embodied in your letter of April 27, which
was rejected by the Congress.
To mention some of the important points
we are now asked to agree that there should
be one All India Union Government in terms
of paragraphs 1—7 of this paper, which adds
OT e more subject to be vested in the Union
Government, i.e.,. "Fundamental Rights"
and it is not made clear whether the Union
Government and Legislature will have power
or not to obtain for itself the finances by
means of taxation.
In the new "suggestion" the question of
grouping of Provinces is left exactly as the
Congress spokesmen desired in the course of
di-cussi ms that have taken place hitherto
and is totally different from your original
formula.
That there should be a single constitution-
making body, we can never agree to; nor can
we agree to the method of formation of cons-
titution-making machineries suggested in the
aper.
There are many other objection ab'e
features contained in the suggestions which
we have not dealt with as we are only dealing
with the main points arising out of this
paper. In these circumstances, we think, no
useful purpose will be served to discuss this

55
/

paper as it is a complete departure from your

original formula, unless after what we have
said above vou still desire us to discuss it in
the conference itself tomorrow.
INDIA SECRETARYS REPLY TO JINNAH
LeUer from Lord Pethick-Lawrence to President of
the Muslim League, dated May 9, 1946:
I have to acknowledge your letter of
yesterday which I have shown to my colleag-
ues. In it you raise a number of issues to
which I propose to reply in order.
.(1) You claim that the Congress
"finally and definitely turned down the
proposed Union confined only to three
subjects even with power to levy contribu-
tion for financing the Union." This state-
ment is not in accord with my recollection of
what took place in the conference room. I t
is true that the Congress representatives
expressed their view that the limitation was
too narrow and argued further that even so
limited it necessarily included certain an-
cillary matters. Up to a point you recogniz-
ed that there was some force in the argum3nt
because you agreed, as I understood, that
some power to obtain the necessary finance
must be given. There was no final decision
on this matter (or of course on any other).
(2) Next you claim, if I understand you
aright, that our reference to the formation

56
of groups is at variance with the formula in
our invitation. I am afraid I cannot accept
this view. It is of course a slightly amplified
from because it specifies the manner in which
the Provinces can, decide as to jqjning any
particular group. This amplified from is put
forward by us as a reasonable compromise
between the views of the Muslim League and
those originally expressed by the Congress
against grouping at all.
(3) You further take exception to the
machinery that we suggest should be set up
for making the constitution. I would point
out to you, however, that you yourself in
explaining how your two constitution-making
bodies would work agreed on Tuesday
last in the conference that they would have
to join together in the end to decide the
constitution of the Union and you took no
exception to their having a preliminary
session in common to decide procedure.
What we are proposing is in fact precisely
the same thing expressed in different words.
I am, therefore, quite at a loss to understand
what you have in mind when you use the
words "this proposal was also categorically
turned down by the Congress."
(4) In your next suceeding paragraph
you ask who it is that makes the suggestions
t h a t are contained in the document I sent
you. The answer is the Cabinet Mission and

57
His Excellency the Viceroy who make them (

in our endeavour to bridge the gap between

the viewpoints of the Congress and the
Muslim League.
(5) You next take exception to our
departing from the original formula in ray
invitation. I would remind you that in
accepting my original invitation neither the
Muslim League nor the Congress bound it-
self to accept in full the original formula,
and in ray reply of April 29, I wrote these
words:
"We have never contemplated that
acceptance by the Muslim League
and the Congress of our invitation
would imply as a preliminary condi-
tion full approval by them of the
terms set out in my letter. These
terras are our proposed basis for a
settlement and what we have asked
the Muslim League Working Com-
mittee to do is to agree to send its
representatives to meet ourselves
and representatives of the Congress
in order to discuss it."
Indeed this is the only sensible attitude
because the object of all our discussions is
to explore every conceivable possibility of
reaching agreement.
(6) "Fundamental Rights" were included
by us in our suggestions for addition to the

58
list of Union subjects because it seemed to
us that it would be of benefit both to the
large communities and to the small minoirties
for them to be put in and accordingly to be
worthy of consideratian in our conference.
As to finance it will, of course, be quite open
to discuss in the conference the precise
significance of the inclusion of this word in
its context.
(7) Your two following paragraphs are
mainly a recapitulation of your previous
arguments and have been already dealt with
above.
From your last paragraph I understand
that though you do not consider in the
circumstances that any good purpose would
be served by the attendance of the Muslim
League delegation at the conference fixed for
this afternoon, you are willing to come if we
express a desire that you should do so. My
colleagues and I wish to obtain the views of
both parties on the document submitted
and, therefore, would be glad to see you at
the conference.
CONGRESS OBJECTS TO SUB-FEDERATION
Letter from the President of the Congress to Lord
Prthick-Lawrence, dated May 9, 1946:
My colleagues and I have given the most
careful consideration to the memorandum
tent by you yesterday suggesting various

59

f
points of agreement. On April 28, I sent
you a letter in which I explained briefly the
Congress viewpoint in regard to certain "fun-
damental principles "mentioned in your letter
of April 27. After the first day of the con-
ference, on Msy 6, I wrote to you again to
avoid any possible misunderstanding regar-
ding the issues being discussed in the confe-
rence.
I now find from your memorandum that
some of your suggestions are entirely opposed
to our views and to the views repeatedly
declared by the Congress. We are thus
placed in a difficult position. I t has been
and is our desire to explore every avenue for
a settlement and a change-our in India bv
consent, and for this purpose we are prepared
to go far. But there are obvious limits
beyond which we cannot go if we are con-
vinced t h a t this would be injurious to the
people of India and to India's progress as a
free nation.
In my previous letters I have laid stress
on the necessity of having a strong and
organic Federal Union. I have also stated
that we do not approve of sub-federations
or groupiug of Provinces in the manner
suggested, and are wholly opposed to parit}'
in executives or legislatures as between
wholly unequal groups. We do not wish to

60

#
come in the way of Provinces or other units
oo-opeiating' together, if they so choose, but
this must be entirely optional.
Minority Rights
The proposals you have put forward are
meant, we persume, to limit the free dis-
cretion of the Constituent Assembly. We do
not see how this can be done. We are at
present concerned with one important aspect t

of a large problem. Any decision on this

aspect taken now might well conflict with
the decisions we, or the Constituent Assem-
bly, might want to take on other aspects.
The only reasonable course appears to us is
to have a Constituent Assembly with perfect
freedom to draw up its constitution, with
certain reservations to protect the rights of
minorities. Thus we may agree that any
major communal issue must be settled by
consent of the parties concerned, or, where
such consent is not obtained, by arbitration.
J

From the proposals you have sent us

D.E.F.G.) it would appear that two or
three separate constitutions might emerge
for separate groups, joined together by a
flimsy common super-structure left to the
mercy of the three disjointed groups.
i

There is "also complusion in the early

stages for a Province to join a particular

61
group whether it wants to or not. Thus why
should the Frontier Province, which is clearly
a Congress Province, be compiled to join
any group hostile to the Congress ?
We realize that in dealing with human
b ings, as individuals or group*, many con-
siderations have to be borne in mind besides
logi • und reason. But logic and reason
cannot be ignored altogether, and unreason
and injustice are dangerous companions at
and time and, more especially, when we aie
building for the future of hundreds of
millions of human beings.
New Suggestions
I shall now deal with some of the points
in your memorandum and make some sugges-
tions in regard to them.
No I: - W e note that you have provided
for the Union to have necessary powers to
obtain for itself the finance it requires for
the subj- cts it deals with. We think it
should be clearly stated that the Fe
Union must have power to raise revenues
in its ow^n right. Further that currency ^nd
customs must in any event be included in
the Union subjects, as well as such ether
subjects as on closer rerutiny may be found
to be intimately allied to them. One other
subject is an essential and inevitable Union
subject and that is planning. Planning can
 •

only be done effectively at the Centre, though

the Provinces or units will giv^ effect to it
in their respective areas.
The Union must also have power to take
remedial action in cases of breakdown of the
constitution and in grave public emergencies.
Nos. 5 and 6. —We are entirely opposed
to the proposed parity, both in the executive
and legislature, as between wholly unequal
groups. This is unfair and will lead to
trouble. Such a provision contains in itself
the seed of conflict and the destruction of
free growth. If there is no agreement on
this or any similar matter, we are prepared
to leave it to arbitration.
No. 7.—We are prepared to accept the
suggestion that provision be made for a
reconsideration of the constitution after ten
f

years. Indeed the constitution will neces-

sarily provide the machinery for its revision
at any time.
The second clause lays down that recon-
sideration should be done by a body cons-
tituted on the same basis as the Constituent
Assembly. This present provision is intended
to meet an emergency. We expect that the
constitution for India will be based on adult
suffrage. Ten years hence India is not
likely to be satisfied with anything less than
adult suffrage to express its mind on all
grave issues.
63
 \

No. 8-A.—We would suggest that the

just and proper method of elections, fair to
all parties, is the method of proportional
representation by single jtransferable vote.
I t might be remembered that the present
basis of election for the Provincial Assemblies
is strongly weighted in favour of the
minorities.
The proportion of 1 /10th appears to be
too small and will limit the numbers of the
Constituent Assembly too much. Probably
the number would not exceed 200. In the
/

vitally important tasks the Assembly will

have to face, it should have larger numbers.
We suggest that at least one-fifth of the total
membership of the Provincial Assemblies
should be elected for the Constituent As-
sembly.
No. 8-B. This clause is vague and
requires elucidation. But for the present
we are not going into further details. *

No. 8-D.E.F.G.—I have already referred

to these clauses. We think that both the
formation of these groups and the procedure
suggested are wrong and undesirable. We
do not wish to rule out the formation of the
groups if the Provinces so desire. But this
subject must be left open for decision by the
Constituent Assembly. The drafting and
settling of the constitution should begin

64
\

with the Federal Union. This should contain

common and uniform provisions for the Pro-
vinces and other units. The Provinces may
then add to these.
No. 8-H.—In the circumstances existing
today we are prepared to accept some such
clause. In case of disagreement the matter
should be referred to arbitration.
I have pointed out above some of the
obvious defects, as we see them, in the
proposals contained in your memorandum.
If these are remedied, as suggested by us,
we might be in a position to recommend
their acceptance by the Congress. But as
drafted in the memorandum sent to us. I
regret that we are unable to accept them.
On the whole, therefore, if the suggestions
are intended to have a binding effect,. with
all the will in the world to have an agreement
with the League, we must repudiate most of
them. Let us not run into any evil greater
than the one all of us three parties should
seek to avoid.
If an agreement honourable to both the
parties and favourable to the growth of free
and united India cannot be achieved, we
would suggest that an Interim Provisional
Government responsible to the elected
members of the Central Assembly be formed
at once and the matters in dispute concern-

65

\
 f.
*

ing the Constituent Assembly between the

Congress and the League be referred to an
independent tribunal.
Conference Adjourned
After a proposal by Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru thai
an Umpire should be appointed to settle matters of
difference between the parties the Conference, understand-
ing that there was a likelihood • / agreement on an umpire
between the parties, was adjourned and the following
correspondence passed betwien the parties.

SELECTION OF AN UMPIRE
Letter from Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru to the President
of the Muslim League, dated May lb, 1946:
In accordance with our decision yesterday
at the conference, my colleagues have given
a good deal of thought to the choice of a
suitable umpire. We have felt that it would
probably be desirable to exclude Englishmen
Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. The field is
*

thus limited. Nevertheless, we have drawn

up a considerable list from which a choice can
be made. I presume that you have also, in
consultation with your executive, prepared a
list of possible umpires. Would you like
these two lists to be considered by us, that is,
by you and me? If so, we can fix up a
meeting for the purpose. After we have met,
our recommendations can be considered by
the eight of us, that is, the four representa-
tives of the Congress and the four represen-
66
\
 tatives of the Muslim League, and a final
choice can be made, which we can place
before the Conference when it meets tomorrow.
PROPOSAL FOR SECOND MEETING
Letter from the President of the Muslim League to
Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru; dated May JO, 1946:
I received your letter of May 10 at 6 p.m.
At yesterday's meeting between you and
me at the Viceregal Lodge we discussed
several points besides the fixing of an umpire.
After a short discussion, we came to the con-
clusion that we will further examine your
proposal made by you at the Conference
yesterday, with all its implications after your
and my consulting our respective colleagues.
I shall be glad to meet you to consider
the various aspects of your proposal any time
that may suit you tomorrow morning after
10 O'clock.
?
NEHRU'S REPLY TO JINNAH
f

Letter from Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru to the President

'of the Muslim League, dated May 11, 1946:
Your letter of May 10 reached ine at 10
last nigljt.
During 'the talk we had at Viceregal
Lodge you referred to various matters
besides the choice of an umpire and I
gave you my reactions in regard to them.
But I was under the impression that the
proposal to have an umpire had been agreed

67
/

\
to and our next business was to suggest
names. Indeed it was when some such
agreement was reached in the conference
that we had our talk. My colleagues have
proceeded on this basis and prepared a list
of suitable names. The conference will
expect us to tell them this afternoon the
name of the umpire we fix upon, or at any
rate to place before them suggestions in this
behalf.
The chief implication in having an umpire
is to agree to accept his final decision. We
agree to this. We suggest that we might
start with this and report accordingly to the
conference.
As suggested by you, I shall come over
to your place of residence at about 10-30
this morning.
Letter from the President of the Muslim League to
Mr* Jawaharlal Nehru, dated May 11, 1946:
I am in receipt of your letter of May 11.
During the talk we had at the Viceregal
Lodge, which lasted for about 15 or 20
minutes, I pointed out various aspects and
implications of your proposal and we had a
discussion for a little while, but no agreement
was arrived at between you and me on my
point except that at your suggestion that
you consult your colleagues and I should do
likewise we adjourned to meet again the
next day to further discuss the matter.
-
i
|
*

68
 - I I I
'

I shall be glad to meet you at 10-30 this

morning for a further talk.

Memorandum by the President of the Muslim

League embodying minimum demands by way of an
offer, in accordance with thd Conference decision,
dated May, 12, 1946. (Copies sent to the Cabinet
Delegation and the Congress).
_

1. The six Muslim Provinces (Punjab,

N W.F.P., Baluchistan, Sind, Bengal and
Assam) shall be grouped together as one
*

group and will deal with all other subjects

and matters except Foreign Affairs, Defence
and Communications necessarv for Defence,
which may be dealt with by the Constitution-
making bodies the two groups of Provinces
Muslim Provinces (hereinafter named Pakis-
tan Group) and Hindu Provinces—sitting
together.
2. There shall be a separate Constitution-
making body for the six Muslim Provinces
named above, which will frame Constitutions
for the Group d th Provin in the
Group and will determine the list of subjects
that shall be Provincial and Central (of the
MI Federation) with residuary so-
Pakistan
gn powers vesting in the Provinces.
. Th 3 method of election of the re-
presentati res to the Constitution-making
body will be such as would secure proper

69
 /

representation to the various communities in

proportion to their population in each
Province of the Pakistan Group.
4. After the Constitutions of the Pakis-
tan Federal Government and the Provinces
are finally framed by the Constitution-
making body, it will be open to any Province
of the Group to decide to opt out of its
Group, provided the wishes of the people of
that Province are ascertained by a referen-
dum to opt out or not. '..•'•
5. I t must be open to discussion in the
joint Constitution-making body as to whether
the Union will have a Legislature or not.
The method of providing the Union with *
finance should also be left for decision of the
joint meeting of the two Constitution-making
bodies but in no event shall it be by means
/ of taxation.
6. There should be parity of representa-
tion between the two Groups of Provinces in
the Union Executive and the Legislature, if
any.
7. No major point in the Union Cons-
titution which affects the communal issue
•

shall be deemed to be passed in the joint

Constitution-making body, unless the majo-
rity of the members of the Constitution-
making body of the Hind,u Provinces and
the majority of the members of the Cons-
-

70
\

titution-making body of Pakistan Group,

present and voting, are separately in its
favour.
8. No decision, legislative, executive or
administrative, shall be taken by the Union
in regard to any matter of controversial
nature, except »y a majority of three-
fourths.
9. In Group and Provincial Constitutions
fundamental rights and safeguards con-
cerning religion, culture and other matters
affecting the different communities will be
provided for.
10. The Constitution of the Union shall
contain a provision whereby any province
can by a majority vote of its Legislative
Assembly, call for reconsideration of the
terms of the Constitution, and will have the
liberty to secede from the Union at any
time after an initial period of ten years.
These are the principles of our offer for
a peaceful and amicable settlement and this
offer stands in its entirety and all matters
mentioned herein are independent.
CONGRESS PROPOSALS FOR CONSTITUENT
ASSEMBLY
Points suggested on behalf of the Congress as a basis
for agreement, dated May 12, 1946:
1. The Constituent Assembly to be formed
as follows:

71
 Representatives shall be elected by
each provincial Assembly by pro-
portional representation (single
transferable vote). The number
so elected should be one fifth of the
number of members of the Assem-
*

bly and they may be members of

the Assembly or others.
-

(ii) Representatives from the States on

the basis of their population in
proportion to the representation
from British India. How these
ives are to be chosen is
to be considered later.
-

2. The Constituent Assembly shall draw

up a constitution for the Federal Union.
This shall consist of an All-India Federal
Government and Legislature dealing with
Foreign Affairs, Defence, Communications,
Fundamental Rights, Currency, Customs and
Planning, as well as such other subjects as
on closer scrutiny, may be found to be inti-
mately allied to them. The Federal Union
will have necessary powers to obtain for
itself the finances it requires for these sub-
jects and the power to raise revenues in its
own right. The Union must also have
power to take remedial action in cases of
breakdown of the constitution and in grave
public emergencies.

72
 *

3. All the remaining powers shall vest in

the Provinces of Units.
4. Groups of Provinces may be formed
and such groups may determine the Provin-
cial subjects which they desire to take in
common.
5. After the Constituent Assembly has
decided Union the constitut ion for the All - India
Federal Union as laid downin paragraph 2 ab
ove, the representatives of the Provinces may
form groups to decide the Provincial consti-
tutions for their group and, if they wish, a
group constitution.
6. No major point in the All-India Federal
Constitution which aifects the communal
issue shall be deemed to be passed by the
Constituent Assembly unless a majority of
the members of the commnnity or communi-
ties concerned present in Assembly and vot-
ing are separately in its favour. Provided
that in case there is no agreement on any
such issue, it will be referred to arbitration.
In case of doubt as to whether any point is
a major communal issue, the Speaker will
decide, or, if so desired, it may be referred
to the Federal Court.
7. In the event of a dispute arising in the
process of constitution-making, the specific
issue shall be referred to arbitration

73
 8. The constitution should provide machi-
nery for its revision at any time subject to
such checks as may be devised. If so desired,
it may be specifically stated that this whole
constitution may be reconsidered after ten
years.
CONGRESS STAAJD EXPLAINED
Note by the Congress on the principles to be agreed
upon as suggested on behalf of the Muslim League, dated
May 12, 1946:
The approach of the Muslim League is so
different from that of the Congress in regard
to these matters that it is a little difficult to
deal with each point separately without
reference to the rest. The picture as envis-
aged by the Congress is briefly given in a
separate note. From consideration of this
note and the Muslim League's proposals the
difficulties and the possible agreement will
become obvious. I
*

The Muslim League's proposals are dealt

with below briefly:
(1) We suggest that the proper procedure
is for one Constitution-making body of Cons-
tituent Assembly to meet for the whole of
India and later for groups to be formed if so I

desired by the Provinces concerned. The

matter should be left to the Provinces and
if they wish to function as a groups they are *

• i

74
I
 at liberty to do so and to frame their own
constitution for the purpose.
In any event Assam has obviously no
place in the group mentioned, and the North-
West Frontier Province, as the elections
show, is not in favour of this proposal.
(2) We have agreed to residuary powers,
apart from the Central subjects, vesting in
the Provinces. They can make such use of
them as they like and, as has been stated
above, function as a group What the
ultimate nature of such a group may be
cannot be determined at this stage and
should be left to the representatives of the
Provinces concerned.
(3) We have suggested that the most m

suitable method of election would be by

single transferable vote. This would give
proper representation to the various com-
munities in proportion to their present re-
presentation in the legislatures. If the
population proportion is taken, we have no
particular objection, but this would lead to
»

difficulties in all the Provinces where there

is weigh tage in favour of certain com-
munities. The principle approved of would
necessarily apply to all the Provinces.
(4) There is no necessity for opting out
of a Province from its group as the previous
consent of the Provinces is necessary for
joining the group.

) • 75
'
t
 •

(5) We consider it essential that the ' • #.

Federal Union should have legislature. We

also consider it essential that the Union
should have power to raise its own revenue.
(6 and 7) We are entirely opposed to
parity of representation as between groups
of Provinces in the Union executive or
legislature. We think that the provision to
the effect that no major communal issue
in the Union constitution shall be deemed
1

to be passed by the Constituent

unless a majority of the members
community or communities concerned present
and voting in the Constituent Assembly are
separately in its favour, is a sufficient and
ample safeguard of all minorities. We
have suggested something wider and in-
cluding all communities than has been
proposed elsewhere. This may give rise to
some difficulties in regard to small com-
munities, but all such difficulties can be got
over by reference to arbitration. We are
prepared to consider the method of giving
effect to this principle so as to make it more
feasible. I

(8) This proposal is so sweeping in its

nature that no Government or Legislature
can function a t all. Once we have safe-
guarded major communal issues other
matters, whether controversial or not, require

76
 no safeguard. This will simply mean safe-
guarding vested interests of all kinds and
preventing progress, or indeed any movement
in any direction. We therefore entirely
disapprove of it.
\ •
*

(9) We are entirely agreeable to the

inclusion of Fundamental Rights and safe-
guards concerning religion, culture and like
matters in the constitution. We suggest
that the proper place for this is the All-India
Federal Union constitution. There shou'd •

be uniformity in regard to these Funda-

mental Rights all our India. I

(10) The constitution of the Union will

. inevitably contain provisions for its re-
vision. I t may also contain a provision for
its full reconsideration at the end of ten
years. The matter will be open then for a
complete reconsideration. Though it is
'
implied, we would avoid reference to seces-
sion as we do not wish to encourage this
idea. ( i

MISSION'S MEMORANDUM ON STATES'

FUTURE POSITION
• ,

V
1. Prior to the recent statement of the
British Minister in the House of Commons
an assurance was given to the Princes that
that there was no intention on the part of
I

;#

. . . .
77 >
*' f
1
 I

r*4 : V
•

the Crown to initiate any change in their

relationship with the Crown or the rights
guaranteed be their treaties and engagements
\
without their consent. It was at the same
time stated that the Princes, consent to any
changes which might emerge as a result of
negotiation would not unreasonably be with-
held. The Chamber of Princes has since
J 4

confirmed that the Indian States fully share

the general desire in the country for the
immediate attainment by India of her full
stature. H.M.G. have now declared that if
the Succession Government or Governments I

in British India desire independence, no ob-

stacle would be placed in their way. The
effect of these announcement is that all those
concerned with the future of India wish her
• i

to attain a position of independence within

or without the British Commonwealth.
The Delegation have come here to assist in
resolving the difficulties which stand in the
way of India fulfilling this wish.
2. During the interim period, which must
elapse before the coming into operation of a
new constitutional structure under which
British India will be independent or fully
self-govering, paramountcy will remain in
operation. But the British Government
could not and will not in any circumstance
transfer paramountcy to an Indian Govern-
ment.
78
 3 In the meaawhile. the Ind States
position to play an important part
in the formulation of the new titutional
structure for Ind and H.M.G. have b i

formed by the Ind States that they

d in their own interest d in the
terests of India as a wh both to make
th ntribution to the framing of the
structure, and to take their due ce in it
when it is completed. In order to facilitate
this they will doubtless strengthen their
position by doing ything possible to
ensure that their administ form
to the highest standard. Where adequate
standards cannot be achieved within the ex-
isting resources of the State they will no
doubt arrange in suitable cases to form or
join administrative units large enough to
enable them to be fitted into the constitu-
tional structure. It will also strengthen the
position of States during this formative
period if the various Governments which
have not already done so, take active steps
to place themselves in close and constant
touch with public opinion in their State by
means of representatives institutions.

Economic Arrangements.
4. During the interim period it will be
neccessary for the States to conduct nego-
tiations with British India in regard to the

79
 t

future regulation of matters of common

concern, especially in the economic and
financial field. Such negotiation, which will
be necessary whether the States desire to
participate in the new Indian constitutional
structure or not, will occupy a considerable
period of time, a r d since some of these nego-
tiations may well be incomplete when the
new structure comes into beincr, it will, in
order to avoid administrative difficulties, be
necessary to arrive at an understanding
between the States and those likely to
control the Succession Government or
Governments that for a period of time the
then existing arrangements as to these
matters of common concern should continue
until the new agreements are completed.
In this matter, the British Government and
the Crown Representative will lend such
assistance as they can should it be so
desired.
5. When a new fully self-governing or
independent Government or Governments
come into being in British India, H.M.G.'s
influence with these Governments will not
be such as to enable them to carry out the
obligations of paramountcy. Moreover, they
cannot contemplate that British troops
would be retained in India for this purpose.
Thus, as a logical sequence and in view of
the desires expressed to them on behalf of

80
«
 '

the Indian States His Majesty's Government

will cease to exercise the powers of para-
niountcy. This means that the rights of
the States which flow from their relotionship
to the Crown will no longer exist and that
all the rights surrendered by the Paramount
Power will return to the States. Political
arrangements between the States on the one
side and the British Crown and British India
on the other will thus be brought to an end.
The void will to be filled either by the States
entering into a federal relationship with the
Successor Goverment or Governments in
British India, or failing -this, entering into
particular political arrangements with it or
them.
AN ERROR
An explanatory note issued a few hours
after Memorandum said:
The Cabinet Delegation desire to make
it clear that the Memorandum on States'
Treaties and Paramountcy was drawn up
before the Mission began its discussions with
party leaders and represented the substance
of what they communicated to the represen-
tatives of the States at their first interviews
with the Mission. This is the explanation of
the use of the words "Succession Govern-
ment or Governments of British India," an
expression which would not of coarse have

81
 /

been used after the issue if the Delegation's

recent statement.
The note at the head of the document
was inserted in error.
The daily Dawn in its issue of the 22nd May, 1948
analysed the Correspondence between the Qaid-e*
Azam and the Secretary of State as follows.
An analysis of th pondence which
passed between the President of th Mu s mi
Lea d the Secretary of State shows how
rely Mr. Jinnah d th Leag dele
gates at Simla strove for an agreement | a n d
w h a t ! concessions they were prepared to
make in th tv to arrive at an
amicable understanding with the Congress.
The careful student of the published cor-
respondence will be struck, at the very out-
set, by the extermely conciliatory and co-
operative tone in which the first letter from
the President of the Muslim League to Lord
Pethick-Lawrence, dated 29th April, 1946,
was couched (No. 3). This in itself was in
marked contrast to the parallel letter from
the Congress President to the Mission (No.
2), which raised a formidable number of is-
sues and which had, therefore, the effect of
queering the pitch of the Conference even,
before it had assembled. Mr. Jinnah, on the
other hand, expressed his and the League

82
 Working Committee's full appreciation of
"the further attempt that the Cabinet
Mission and His Execellency the Viceroy are
making to bring about an agreement between
the Muslim League and the Congress by
proposing a meeting of the representatives
of the two organisations for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement". He also assured
the Secretary of State of che League's
"anxiety to assist in findingo an agreed solu-
55
tion of the Tndian constitutional problem
We refer to these passages in that letter as
evidence of the conciliatory and helpful
attitude with which Mr. Jinn ah and his
colleagues went to Simla, and as a result of
which they later made concession after con-
cession. The League certainly did not accept
the invitation wholly without reserve and
Mr. Jin nan stressed the fact that certain
points did require elucidation and clarifica-
tion, but be was content to levae all that to
the Conference itself.
The course which the discussions took a t
Simla during its sessions on the 5th and 6th
of May, did not provoke Mr. Jinnah to
volunteer another leter to the Mission in
the manner of the Congress President (No.
dated 6the May). I t ,was only after the
Congress President's letter had induced the
Cabinet Mission to depart materially from
the original basis indicated by itself, and

83

•
after receipt of the Mission's fresh proposals
described as "suggested points for agree-
ment". (No. 11). that Mr. Jinnah wrote his
second letter to the Secretary of State, dated
8th May (No. 12). In this letter he pointed
out the discrepancies between the Cabinet
Mission's skeleton formula embodied in the
Secretary of State's letter of 27th April, and
explained that in view of the sudden depar-
ture made with regard to, the basic princi-
ples and also in view of the Congress attitude,
7
no useful purpose w ould be served by dis-
cussing the fresh proposals.
In spite of this, however, and although
the new suggestions by the Mission contained
"many other objectionable features", Mr.
Jinnah still expressed himself willing to
continue to participate in the Conference if
"you still desire us to discuss it in the
Conference itself" One has only to study
these fresh proposals of the Mission in order
to discover how completely at variance these
were with the original basis on which the
League had been invited to join the Con-
ference. If there had been the slightest "in-
transigence" on the part of the League, it
could have with full justification immediately
and finally walked out of the Conference.
But Mr. Jinnah kept the door open.
Before we proceed further it is necessary
to deal with Lord Pethick-Lawrence's reply,

84
 *

dated 9th May (No. 13) to the letter of Mr.

Jinnah mentioned above. This is a carious
document and shows the Secretary of State
in an unfavourable light. Accused of havin
resiled from the original position and for-
mulated fresh suggestions very muoh in line
with what the Congress wanted, Lord
Pethick-Lawrence appears to have got tied
up into several knots, and this letter was
Lord Pethick-Lawrence's pathetic attempt
to wiggle out of them. He questions the
correctness of Mr. Jinnah's statement that
Congress had "finally and definitely turned
down the proposed Union confined only to
three subjects even with power to levy con-
tribution for defending the LTnion Hand
•>">

says: 'This statement is not in accord with

my recollection of what took place in the
Conference room 5>
To prove that the
Secretary of State's "recolh ction" was very
much at fault, it is only necessary to quote
what the Congress finally and on the very
last day reiterated as its minimum demand.
In its communication, dated 12th May,
it said: "The Federal Union shall deal with
Foreign Affairs, Defence, Communications*
Fundamental rights, Currency, Customs, and
Planning, as well as such other subjects as,
on closer scrutiny, may be found to be in-
timately allied to them. The Federal Union
will have necessary powers to obtain for it-

85
 *

self the finances it requires for these subjects

and the power to raise revenues in its own
ri^ht." If this was the Congress stand on
12th May, surely in the Conference room on
5th and 6th May, Congress could not have
done anything else than "turn down the
proposed Union confined only to three sub-
jects". Either Lord Pethick-Lawrence's
memory ill served him when he drafted his
letter to Mr. Jinnah on 9th May, or he was
deliberately constituting himself into counsel
for defence on behalf of the Congress, in
order to placate the Congress leaders. Neither
assumption does any credit to him, and there
is unfortunately no third one.
i

Most of this particular letter of the

Sscretary of State, is written in the same
vein, and no useful purpose would be served
by further analysing it, axcept to say that in
trying to controvert the points made by Mr.
Jinnah in his letter of the previous day,
Lord Pethick-Lawrence gets involved in an
epistolary fencing bout. In concluding this
letter, however, he requests Mr. Jinnah to
attend the next session of the Conference,
and this the letter did.
The brief interlude of the Jinnah-Nehru
correspondence and meeting which followed
thereafter appears in retrospect to have been
basbd on a misunderstanding. The only
86
point worth noting in this connexion is the
quickness with which Mr. Nehru jumped to
the conclusion that Mr. Jinnah had agreed to
the appointment of an umpire and only
names remained to be discussed, while the
fact was that Mr. Jinnah had merely expres-
sed the desire that "we will further examine
your proposal made at the Conference, with
all its implications, after your and my con-
sulting our respective colleagues". No
agreement appears to have been reached on
the principle of reference to an umpire, and
the Nehru-Jinnah meetings produced no
result. This restored the status quo for
which the unpleasant name is '"deadlock";
and finally on 12th May, the Muslim League
delegation embodied their "minimnm de-
mands", and forwarded them to the Cabinet
Mission and the Congress as "our offer for a
peaceful and amicable settlement". This
is the most important of all the documents
which emanated from the Muslim League at
Simla and one has onlv to read this to be
4/

convinced of the extent and nature of con-

cessions which the Muslim League made.
The League agreed to the principle of a
Union Centre having charge of Foreign Af-
fairs, Defence, and "Communications nece-
ssary for defence", the details of that Centre
being left to the constitution-making bodies
of the two groups of provinces "sitting toge-
 *

ther". The League agreed to allow any

province in a group " t o decide to opt out
of its group" after a referendum of the peo-
ple of the province. The League even with-
drew its objection to a Legislature for the
Union Centre. The League agreed to leave
to the joint meeting of the two constitution-
making bodies to decide how to provide the
Union with finance, with the reservation
that "in no event shall it be by the means of
taxation".
I t is not necessary in the present context
to deal with the other points in this final
League memorandum, because all that we
are concerned with at the moment is to show
how the Muslim League considerablv modi-
fied its original stand in order to make an
agreement possible. I t gave up its opposi-
tion to no Centre at all and agreed t h a t the
Pakistan group of provinces would voluntari-
ly transfer some of its sovereignty to a
Union—of course with the right of cessation
after 10 years. Having first accepted the
ideal of only an "agency Centre" the League
moved farther on and agreed to a Legislature.
I t gave up its opposition to the idea of
allowing any province in the Pakistan group
to go out of Pakistan, and agreed t h a t a
province might opt out provided the majority
of the people in it so desired. The League
did not insist on a plebiscite of Muslims only

• 88
V
 *

as had been its stand all, but agreed to

abide by the verdict of the people as a
whole. It also agreed to give the Union
Centre financial powers, short of taxation.
I t is now for the honest student of affairs
to contrast the attitude of the Muslim Lea-
gue at Simla to that of the Congress, which
had made no concession at all, and to decide
which showed greater anxiety for a compro-
mise and gave practical evidence of it by
yielding point after point for the sake of an
understanding. Many of the supporters of
the League, we know, consider that the Lea-
gue yielded too much. If so, statesmanship
and patriotism prompted the League Dele-
gation and the nation's verdict, we are sure,
will vindicate their action.
The Congress position too was analysed by
the Daily Dawn as follows.
In the introduction to the statement
issued by the Cabinet Mission the following
paragraph occurs: "There was full ex-
change of views and both parties were
prepared to make considerable concessions
in order to try and reach a settlement but
it ultimately proved impossible to close the
remainder of the gap between the parties
and so no agreement could be concluded".
In the light of the correspondence which
passed between the Cabinet Mission and the

89
Viceroy, and representatives of the Congress
a n d ' the Muslim League, during the Simla
Conference, the words which we have put in
italics can only be regarded as a polite fiction
designed not to hurt the feelings of the
Congress. A careful perusal of relevant
letters addressed by the Congress President
to the Secretary of State will show that the
Congress did not modify its attitude in the
slightest degree from that which it had
taken up before its representatives pro-
ceeded to Simla, and that until the last it
stood out for its full pound of flesh.
Following several sessions of the Congress
Working Committee in Delhi, the Congress
President announced on April 15 what was
widely publicised in the Congress Press as
the socalled "Azad formula". I t was pointed
out at that time that it contained nothing
new and indicated no departure from the
previous Congress stand vis-a-vis the Muslim
demand. That, however, is not the present
issue, and we refer to it merely for purposes
of a comparison between the Congress stand
as summed up in that formula, and the
Congress position as it was finally stated
after many long hours of discussion at Simla,
in the communication addressed on behalf of
the Congress to the Cabinet Mission, on
12th May, 1946 (No. 20 of the correspon-
dence).

90
 ^^_^^_ ^^^^^^^^^^_ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^_ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^_ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^_ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^_ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^_ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^_ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^_

The "Azad formula" visualised (1) Full

autonomy to the provinces with residuary
powers, (2) tw o lists of Central subjects, one
compulsory and one optional. The full
implication of this formula was explained by
the Congress President in his letter to Lord
Pethick Lawrence, dated 28th April, 1946
(No. 2). The Congress stand as explained
in this letter can be summarised as follows:
(1) A Federal Union of autonomous units,
(2) the Federal Union to deal with Defence,
Foreign Affairs, Communications, Currency,
Customs, Tariffs, "and such other subjects
as may be found on close scrutiny to be
intimately allied to them", (3) the Union to
have both an Executive and Legislative
machinery as well as the finance relating to
these subjects and the power to raise re-
venues for this purpose in its own right",
(4) no groups of provinces to be formed.
After the Conference at Simla had met
and the Congress representatives had bad
the benefit of listening to the views of the
League representatives, the Congress position
remained exactly what it was before. In
his letter to Lord Pethick-Lawrence, dated
6th May, 1946 (No. 8), the Congress Presi-
dent once again reiterated the same old
demands, as the following quotations will
show: (1) "We are entirely opposed to any
Executive or Unions of the Federation",

91
(2) " We are emphatically of opinion that it
is not open to the Conference to entertain
any suggestions for a division of India",
(3) "We do not accept the proposal for
parity as between groups in regard to the
Executive or Legislature", (4) "the Con-
stituent Assembly is not going to be
bound by any previous arrangements", (5)
the Constituent Assembly ''has to be prece-
ded by a provisional Government which
must function as far as possible as a Govern-
ment of free India and which should under-
take to make all arrangements for the
transitional period."
On receipt of this letter, the Cabinet
Mission formulated a fresh set of proposals
and forwarded them to the Presidents of the
Muslim League and the Congress. In reply
to this the Congress President wrote again to
the Secretary of State on the 9th May, in
a strain which showed that the Congress con-
tinued to remain adament. This letter
(1) reiterated the demand for " a strong organic
Federal Union", (2) rejected the idea of '
groupings of provinces, (3) re-emphasised its
opposition " t o parity in Executives and
Legislatures", (4) insisted on setting up " a
Constituent Assembly with perfect freedom
to draw up its constitution", subject to any
major communal issue being settled by con-
sent of the parties concerned, or by arbi-

92
tration, (5) restated its demand that the
Federal Union should have powers to raise
revenues in its own right and control over
Currency, Customs, and Planning, (6) put
in an additional demand that the Union
"should have power to take remedial action
in cases of breakdown of the constitution
and in graye public emergencies",—thus
seeking to endow the Union with all the
powers which the present Central Govern-
ment and the British Parliament together
possess and exercise.
Finally, on the 12th* May, the Congress
representatives submitted 8 points as their
final say on the subject. The main points
were: An All-India Federal Government
and Legislature, dealing Foreign Affairs,
Defence, Communications, Fundamental
Rights, Currency, Customs and Planning,
"as well as such other subjects as, on closer
scrutiny, may be found to be intimately
allied to them"; the Federal Union to have
powers to obtain for itself the finance it
requires for these subjects and the power
to raise revenues in its own right; the Union
to have power to take remedial action in
cases of breakdown of the constitution and
in grave public emergencies; the remaining
powers (if any were left?) to vest in the pro-
vinces or units. Having thus effectively
ensured that a strong Central Government

93
/
 /

wonld be brought into being, with all the

powers t h a t any Federation could aspire to
possess, the Congress, in this note, agreed
t h a t "groups of provinces may be formed
and such groups may determine the provin-
cial subjects which chey desire to take in
common".
Although Congress ostensibly sent its
representatives to Simla to confer with
spokesmen of the Muslim League, and the
Cabinet Mission, its leaders went determined
not deviate bv the fraction of an inch
from the intransigent attitude which they
had adopted towards the Muslim demand.
Every time the head of the Congress delega-
tion wrote to the Cabinet Mission, he reite-
rated the same demands in the same lansrua-
ge, and he maintained this stand until the
very end. It is quite clear, therefore, that
the Congress had no intention of settling its
< differences with the Muslim League on a
reasonable and honourable basis, and that
its acceptance of the Cabinet Mission's
invitation to participate in the Tripartite
Conference was not actuated be any sincere
desire to come to terms with the Muslims.
In other words, Congress went to Simla
determined to have its own demands accep-
ted in toto, or to break up the Conference.
I t made no concessions whatsoever, and,
failing to presuade or browbeat the represen-

94

\
tatives of the Muslim League to accept their
dictation, the Congress delegates succeeded
in causing the Conference's breakdown.
Thus, on the Congress and the Congress alone
rests the entire responsibility for the failure
a t Simla.
On the other hand, the Muslim League
showed that far from being "intransigent"
it was genuinely imbued with the desire to
reach a settlement, and all the concessions
made at Simla, came from Mr. Jinnah and
the League delegation.

95
 CABINET MISSION'S STATEMENT
Dated 16th May 1946.
The following is the text of the statement issued
by the Cabinet Mission and H.E. the Viceroy:"
9

1. On March 15 last, just before the

despatch of the Cabinet Delegation to India,
Mr. Attlee, the British Prime Minister, used
these words:—
"My colleagues are going to India with
the intention of using their utmost endeav-
ours to help her to attain her freedom as
speedily and fully as possible. What form
of government is to replace the present
regime is for India to decide; but our deshe
is to help her to set up forthwith the machi-
nery for making that decision.
" I hope that India and her people may
elect to remain within the British Com-
monwealth. I am certain that they will
find great advantages in doing so.
But if she d o elect, it must be by
her own fr will. The British Common-
alth and Empire is not bound together by
chains of external compul It free
association of free peopl If, on the oth

96
hand, she elects for independence, in our
view she has a right to do so. I t will be
for us to help to make the transition as
smooth and easy as possible."
2. Charged in these historic words we
the Cabinet Ministers and the Viceroy—have
done our utmo&t to assist the two main
political parties to reach agreement upon the
fundamental issue of the unity of division
of India. After prolonged discussions in
New Delhi we succeeded in bringing the
Congress and the Muslim League together in
conference at Simla. There was a full ex-
change of views and both parties were pre-
pared to make considerable concessions in
order to try and reach a settlement but it
ultimately proved impossible to close the
remainder of the gap between the parties
and so no agreement could be concluded.
Since no agreement has been reached we feel
that it is our duty to put forward what we
consider are the best arrangements possible
to ensure a speedy setting up of the new
constitution. This statement is made with
the full approval of His Majesty's Govern-
ment in the United Kingdom.
3. We have accordingly decided that
immediate arrangements should be made
whereby Indians may decide the future
constitution of India and an Interim Govern-

97
ment may be set up at once to carry on the
administration of British India until such
time as a new Constitution can be brought
into being. We have endeavoured to be
just to the smaller as well as to the larger
sections of the people, and to recommend a
solution which will lead to a practicable way
of governing the India of the future, and will
give a sound basis for defence and a good
opportunity for progress in, the social, poli-
tical and economic field.
4. I t is not intended in this statement
to review the voluminous evidence that has
been submitted to the Mission: but it is
right that we should state that it has shown
an almost universal desire, outside the sup-
porters of the Muslim League, for the unity
of India.
5. This consideration did not, however,
deter us from examining closely and im-
partially the possibility of a partition of
I n d i a ; since we were greatly impressed by
the very genuine and acute anxiety of the
Muslims lest they should find themselves
subjected to a perpetual Hindu majority
rule.
This feeling has become so strong and
widespread amongst the Muslims that it
cannot be allayed by mere paper safeguards.
If there is to be internal peace in India it
i

, 98
must be secured by measnres which will
assure to the Muslims a control in all matters
vital to their culture, religion, and economic
or other interests.
6. We therefore examined in the first
instance the question of a separate and fully
independent sovereign State of Pakistan as
claimed by the Muslim League. Such a
Pakistan would comprise two areas: one in
the north-west consisting of the provinces of
the Punjab, Sind, Noith-West Frontier and
British Baluchistan ; the other in the north-
east consisting of the provinces of Bengal
and Assam. The League were prepared to
consider adjustment of boundaries at a
later stage, but insisted that the principle of
Pakistan should first be acknowledged. The
argument for a separate State of Pakistan
was based, first, upon the right of the
Muslim majority to decide their method of
government according to their wishes, and
secondly, upon the necessity to include
substantial areas in which Muslims are in
a minority, in order to make Pakistan
administratively and economically work-
able.
The size of the non-Muslim minorities in
a Pakistan comprising the whole of the six
Provinces enumerated above would be very
considerable as the following figures show:
' i .

99

•
 4

NORTH-WESTERN AREA
Non-
Muslim Muslim
Punjab ... 16,217,242 12,201,577
N.W.F.P. ... 2,788,797 249,270
Sind ... 3,208,325 1,326,683
Br. Baluchistan 438,930 62,701

22,653,294 13,840,231

62.07% 37.93%
NORTH-EASTERN AREA
Bengal ... 33,005,434 27,301,091
Assam ... 3,442,479 6,762,254

36,4*7,913 34,063,345

51.69% 48.31% '

The Muslim minorities in the remainder
of British India number some 20 million
disperesed amongst a total population of
188 million.
These figures show that the setting up of
a separate sovereign State of Pakistan, on
the lines claimed by the Muslim League,
would not solve the communal minority
problem: nor can we see any justification
for including within a sovereign Pakistan

100

*
 I

those districts of the Punjab and of Bengal

and Asmara in which the population is pre-
dominantly non-Muslim. Every argument
that can be used in favour of Pakistan can
equally, in our view, be used in favour of
the exclusion of the non-Muslim areas from
Pakistan. This point would particularly
affect the position of the Sikhs.
7. We therefore considered whether a
smaller sovereign Pakistan confined to the
Muslim majority areas alone might be a
possible basis of compromise. Such a Pakis-
tan is regarded by the Muslim League as
quite impracticable because it would entail
the exclusion from Pakistan of (a) the whole
of the Ambala and Jullunder Divisions in
the Punjab ; (b) the whole of Assam except
the district of Sylhet; and (c) a large part of
Western Bengal, including Culcutta, in which
city the Muslims form 23.6% of the popula-
tion. We ourselves are also convinced t h a t
any solution which involves a radical parti-
tion of the Punjab and Bengal, as this would
do, would be contrary to the wishes and in-
terests of a very large proportion of the in-
habitants of these Provinces. Bengal and
the Punjab each has its own common langu-
age and a long history and tradition. More-
over, any division of the Punjab would of
necessity divide the Sikhs leaving substantial
bodies of Sikhs on both sides of the boundary.

101

r
We have therefore been forced to the con-
clusion that neither a larger nor a smaller
sovereign State of Pakistan would provide
an acceptable solution for the communal
problem. I

8. Apart from the great force of the

foregoing agreement there are weighty admi-
nistrative, economic and military considera-
tions. The whole of the transportation and
postal and telegraph systems of India have
been established on the basis of a united
India. To disintegrate them would gravely
injure both parts of India. To case for a
united defence is even stronger. The Indian
armed forces have been built up as a whole
for the defence of India as a whole, and to
break them in two would inflict a deadly blow
on the long traditions and high degree of
efficiency of the Indian Army and would
entail the gravest dangers. The Indian Navy
and the Indian Air Force would become
much less effective. The two sections of the
suggested Pakistan contain the two most
vulnerable frontiers in India and for a succ-
essful befence in depth the area of Pakistan
would be insufficient.
9. A further consideration of importance
is the greater difficulty which the Indian
States would find in associating themselves
with a divided British India.

102
 10. Finally there is the geographical
fact that the two halves of the proposed
Pakistan State are separated by some seven
hundred miles and the communications
between them both in wsir cinci peace would
be dependent on the goodwill of Hindustan.
11. We are therefore unable to advise
the British Government that the power
which at present resides in British hands
should be handed over to two entirely sepa-
rate sovereign States.
12 This decision does not however blind
us to the very real Muslim apprehensions
that their culture and political and
social life might become submerged in a
purely unitary India in which the Hindus,
with their greatly superior numbers, must
be a dominating element. To meet this the
Congress have put forward a scheme under
which Provinces would have full autonomy
subject only to a minimum of Central subjects,
such as Foreign Affairs, Defence and Comm-
unications. ,
Under this scheme Provinces, if they
wished to take part in economic and admi-
nistrative planning on a large scale, could
cede to the Centre optional subjects in addi-
tion to the compulsory ones mentioned
above.

103
 13. Such a scheme would, in our view,
present considerable constitutional disad-
vantages and anomalies. It would be very
difficult to work a Central Executive and
Legislature in which some Ministers, who
dealt with Compulsory subjects, were respon-
sible to the whole of India while other Minis-
ters, who dealt with Optional subjects, would
be responsible only to those Provinces which
bad elected to act together in respect of such
subjects. This difficulty would be accentua-
ted in the Central Legislature, where it
would be necessary to exclude certain mem-
bers from speaking and voting when subjects
with which their Provinces were not con-
cerned were under discussion. /

Apart from the difficulty of working such

a scheme, we do not consider that it would
be fair to deny to other Provinces, which
did not desire to take the optional subjects
at the Centre, the right to form themselves
into a group for a similar purpose. This
would indeed be no more than the exercise
of their autonomous powers in a particular
way.
\

14. Before putting forward our recom-

mendation we turn to deal with relationship
of Indian States to British India. I t is quite
clear that with the attainment of indepen-
dence by British India, whether inside or

104
 \

outside the British Commonwealth, the rela-

tionship which, has hitherto existed between
the Rulers of the States and the British
Crown will no longer be possible. Paramo-
untcy can neither be retained by the British
Crown nor transferred to the new Govern-
ment. This fact has been fully recognized
by those whom we interviewed from the
States. They have at the same time assured
us that the States are ready and willing to
co-operate in the new development of India.
The precise from which their co-operation
will take must be a matter for negotiation
during the building up of the new constitu-
tional structure, and it by no means follows
that it will be identical for all the States.
We have not therefore dealt with the States
in the same detail as the Provinces of British
India in the paragraphs which follow.
15. We now indicate the nature of a
solution which, in our view would be just
to the essential claims of all parties, and
would at the same time be most likely to
brin^ about a stable and practicable from
of constitution for All-India.
We recommend that the constitution
should take the following basic from:—
(1) There should be a union of India,
embracing both British India and
the States, which should deal with

105

\
 the following subjects: Foreign
Affairs, Defence and Communica-
tions; and should have the powers
necessay to raise the finances requ-
ired for the above subjects.
(2) The Union should have an Execu-
tive and a Legislature constituted
from the British Indian and States
representatives. Any question
raising a major communal issue
in the Legislature should require
for its decision a majority of the
v
representatives present and voting
7
of each of the tw o major commu-
nities as well as a majority of all
the members present and voting.
(3) All subjects other than the Union
subjects and all residuary powers
should vest in the Provinces.
W The States will retain all subjects
and powers other than those ceded
to the Union.
(5) Provinces should be free to form
Groups with executives and
legislatures, and each Group could
determine the Provincial subjects to
be taken in common.
(6) The constitutions of the Union
and of the Groups should contain

106
 7
a provision whereb} any Province
cuuld, by a majority vote of its
Legislative Assembly, call for a
reconsideration of the terms of the
constitution after an initial period
of 10 years and at 10 yearly inter-
vals thereafter.
16. Tt is not our object to lay out the
details of a constitution on the above lines,
but to set in motion the machinery whereby
a constitution can be settled by Indians for
Indians. _

It has been necessary, however, for us to

make this recommendation as to the broad
basis of the future constitution because it
became clear to us in the course of our
-

negotiations that not until that had been

done was there any hope of getting the two
major communities to join in the setting up
of the constitution-making machinery.
17. We now indicate the constitution-
making machinery which we propose should
be brought into being forthwith in order to
enable a new constitution to be worked out.
18. In forming an Assembly to decide
a new constitutional structure the first pro-
blem is to obtain as broad-based and accu-
rate a representation of the whole population
as is possible. The most satisfactory method

107
4
i
obviously would be by election based on
adult franchise; but any a t t e m p t to intro-
duce such a step now would lead to a wholly
unacceptable delay in the formulation of the
new constitution. The only practicable
alternative is to utilize the recently elected
Provincial Legislative Assemblies as the
electing bodies. There are, however, two
factors in their composition which make this
difficult. First, the numerical strengths of
the Provincial Legislative Assemblies do not
bear the same proportion to the total popu-
lation in each province. Thus Assam with
a population of 10 millions has a Legislative
Assembly of 108 members, while Bengal,
with a population six times as large, has an
Assembly of only 250. Secondly, owing to
the weightage given to minorities by the
Communal Award, the strengths of the seve-
ral communities in each Provincial Legis-
lative Assembly are not in proportion to
their numbers in the province. Thus the
number of seats reserved for Muslims in the
Bengal Legislative Assembly is only 48 per
cent of the total, although they form 55 per
cent of the provincial population. After a
most careful consideration of the various
methods by which these inequalities might
be corrected, we have come to the conclusion
t h a t the fairest and most practicable
would be—

108
 (a) to allot to each province a total num-
ber of seats proportional to its population,
roughly in the ratio of one to a million, as
the nearest substitute for representation by
adult suffrage:
(b) to divide this provincial allocation of
seats betweeu the main communities in each
province in proportion to their population:
(c) to provide . t h a t the representatives
allotted to each community in a province
shall be elected by the members of that
community in its Legislative Assembly.
We think that for these purposes it is
sufficient to recognize only three main com-
munities in India: General, Muslim and
Sikh, the "General" community including all
persons who are not Muslims or Sikhs.^ As
the smaller minorities would, upon the popu-
lation basis, have little or no representation
since they would lose the weight age which
assuies them seats in the Provincial Legis-
latures, we have made arrangements (set
out below) to give them a full representation
upon all matters of special interest to the
minorities.
19 (1) We theiefore propose t h a t there
shall be elected by each Provincial Legis-
lative Assembly the following numbers of re-
presentatives, each part of the Legislature
\

109
*
(General, Muslim or Sikh) electing its own
representatives by the method of propor-
tional representation with the single transfer-
able vote:
TABLE OF REPRESENTATION
Section A
Province General Muslim Total
Madras 45 4 49
Bombay 19 2 21
United Providces 47 8 55
Bihar 31 5 36
Central Provinces 16 1 17
Orissa 9 0 9

Total 167 > 20 187

Section B
Province General Muslim Sikh Total
Punjab 8 16 4 28
N.W.F.P. 0 3 0 3 i

Sind 1 3 0 4

Total 9 22 4 35

110

*.
 Section C
Province General Muslim Total
Bengal 27 33 60
Assam 7 3 10

Total 34 36 70

Total for British India 292

Maximum for Indian States 93

Total 385

Note.—In order to represent the Chief

Commissioners' Provinces there will be ad-
\

ded to Section A the Member representing

Delhi in the Central Legislative Assembly,
the Member representing Ajmer-Merwara in
the Central Legislative Assembly and a re-
f
presentative to be elected by the Coorg
Legislative Council.
To Section B will be added a represeta-
tive of British Baluchistan.
(2) I t is the intention that the States
should be given in the final Constituent
Assembly appropriate representation which
would not, on the basis of the calculations
adopted for British India, exceed 93, but

111
the method of selection will have to be deter-
mined by consultation. The States would
in the preliminary stage be represented by a
Negotiating Committee. *

(3) The representatives thus chosen shall

meet at New Delhi as soon as possible.
(4) A preliminary meeting will be held
at which the general order of business will
be decided, a Chairman and other officers
elected, and an Advisory Committee (see
paragraph 20 below) on the rights of citizens,
minorities, and tribal and excluded areas set
up. Thereafter the provincial representatives
will divide up into the three sections shown
under A,B, and C. in the Table of Represen-
tation in sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph.
(5) These sections shall proceed to
settle the Provincial Constitutions for the
Provinces included in each section, and shall
also decide whether any Group Constitution
shall be set up for those provinces and, if so,
with what provincial subjects the Group
should deal. Provinces shall have the power
to opt out of the Groups in accordance with
the provisions of sub-clause (8) below,
(6) The representatives of the Sections
and the Indian States shall reassemble for
the purpose of settling the Union Constitu-
tion.
I

112
 (7) In the Union Constituent Assembly
resolutions varying the provisions of para-
graph 15 above or raising any major comm-
unal issue shall require a majority of the
representatives present and voting of each
of the two najor communities.
%

The Chairman of the Assembly shall

decide which (if any) of the resolutions raise
major communal issues and shall, if so requested
by a majority of the representatives of either
of the major communities, consult the Federal
Court before giving his decision.
(8) As soon as the new constitutional
arrangements have come into operation, it
shall be open to any Province to elect to
come out of any Group in which it has been
placed. Such a decision shall be taken by
the new legislature of the Province after .the
first general election under the new cons-
titution.
i•
20. The Advisory Committee on the
rights of citizens, minorities and tribal and
excluded areas should contain full repre-
sentation of the interests affected, and their
function will be to report to the Union Cons-
tituent Assembly upon the list of Funda-
mental Rights, the clauses for the protection
of minorities, and a scheme for the adminis-
tration of the tribal and excluded areas, and
to advise whether these rights should be in-

113
corporated in the Provincial, Group or Union
constitution.
21. His Excellency the Viceioy will
forthwith request the Provincial Legislatures
to- proceed with the election of their repre-
sentatives and the States to set up a Nego-
tiating Committee. I t is ' hoped that the
process of constitution making can proceed
as rapidly as the complexities of the task
permit so that the interim period may be as
short as possible.
22. I t will be necessary to negotiate a
treaty between the Union Constituent As-
sembly and the United Kingdom to provide
for certain matters arising out of the trans-
fer of power.
.;
23. While the constitution-making pro-
eds. the administration of India has to be
arried on. We attach the greatest impor
tance therefore to the setting up at once of
an interim Goverment having the support of
the major political parties. I t is essential
during the interim period t h a t there should
be the maximum of co-operation in carrying
through the difficult tasks that face the
Government of India. Besides the heavy
task of day-to-day administration, there is
the grave danger of famine to be countered,
there are decisions to be taken in many
matters of post war development which will

114
 1

hav< a far-reaching effect on India's future ;

and there are important international con-
ferences in which India has to be lepresented.
For all these pin poses a government having
popular support is necessary. The Viceroy
has already started discussions to this end,
and hop<s soon to foirn an Interim Govem-
nment in which all the portfolio-, including
t h a t of,War Member, will be held by Indian
leaders having the full confidence of the
people. The British Government, recongnizing
the significance of the changes in the Govern-
ment of India, will give the fullest measure
of co-operation to the Government so formed
in the accomplishment of its tasks of ad-
ministration and in bringing about as rapid
and smooth a transition as posible.
24. To the leaders and people of India
who now have the opportunity of complete
independence we would finally say this. We
and our Government and countrymen hoped
that it would be possiblo for the Indian
people themselves to agree up on the method
of framing the new constitution under which
they will live. Despite the labours which we
have shared with the Indian parties, and the
exercise of much patience and goodwill by
all, this has not been possible. We there-
fore now lay before you proposals which,
after listening to all sides and after much
earnest thought, we trust, will enable you

115
 i

< ' i • • • • " : { '

* •

to attain your independence in the shortest

time and with the least danger of internal
disturbance and conflict. These proposals
may not, of course, completely satisfy all
parties, but you will recognize with us that
at this supreme moment in Indian history
statesmanship demands mutual accommoda-
tion.
/

We ask you to consider the alternative to

acceptance of these proposals. After all the
effort which we and the Indian parties have
made together for agreement, we must states
that in our view there is small hope of peace-
ful settlement by agreement of the Indian
parties alone. The alternative would there-
fore be a grave danger of violence, chaos, and
even civil war. The result aiid duration of
such a disturbance cannot be fort seen; but
it is certain that it w ould be a terrible disas-
ter for many millions of men, women and
childern. This is a possiblitity which must
be regarded with equal abhorrence by the
Indian people, our own country men, and
the world as a whole.
We therefore lay these proposals before
you in the profund hope that they will be
accepted and' operated by you in the spirit
of accommodation had goodwill in which
they are offered. We appeal to all who have
the future good of India a t heart to extend

116
 »

their vision beyond their own community or

interest to the interests of the whole four
hundred millions of the Indian people.
We hope t h a t the new independent India
may choose to be a member of the British
Commonwealth. We hope in any event that
you will remain in close and friendly as-
sociation with our people. But these are
matters for vour own free choiee. What-
ever that choice may be we look forward
with you to your ever increasing prosperity
among the great nations of the world, and
to a future even more glorious than your
past.
LORD PETHICK-LAWRENCE'S BROADCAST
I

Dated 16th May, 1946.

''The words which I shall speak to you
are concerned with the future of a great
people—the people of India. There is a
passionate desire in the hearts of Indians
expressed by the leaders of all their political
parties for independence. His Majesty's
Government and the British people as a
whole are fnlly ready to accord this indepen-
dence whether within or without the British
Commonwealth and hope that out of it will
spring a lasting and friendly association
between our two peeples on a footing of
complete equality."

117
 *

"Nearly two months ago I, as Secretary

of State for India, and my two Cabinet
colleagues, Sir Stafford Cripps and Mr,
Alexander, were sent out by His Majesty's
Government to India to assist (he Vicero}'
in setting up in India the machinery by
which Indians can devise their own constitu-
tion.
"We were at once confronted with a
major obstacle. The two principal parties
the Muslim League, who won the great
majority of the Muslim seats in the recent
elections, and the Congress who won the
majoritiy of all the others—were opposed
_tp* one another as to the kind of machinery
to be stt up. The Muslim League claimed
t h a t British India should be divided into
two completely separate sovereign States,
and refused to take part in constitution-
making unless this claim was conceded in
advance. Congress insisted on one single
nited India.
"During our stay in India we have tried
by every means to secure such an accommo-
dation between the parties as would enable
constitution making to proceed. Recently
we were.able to bring them togerher at Simla in
a conference with ourselves, but though both
sides were prepared to make substantial
concessions, it was not found possible to reach

118

*
 complete, agreement. We have therefore
been compelled ourselves to seek ior a
solution which by securing the main objects
of both parties will enable the constitution-
making machinery to be brought into imme-
diate operation.
"While we recognize the reality of the
fear of the Muslim League that in a purely
unitary India their community with its o*n
culture and way of life might become submer-
ged in a majority Hindu rule, we do not accept
the setting up of a separate Muslim sovereign
State as a solution of the communal problem.
Pakistan, as the Muslim League would call
their State, would not consist solely of Mus-
lims: it would contain a substantial minority
of other communities which would average
over 40 per cent and in certain wide areas
would even constitute a majority, as for
instance in the city of Calcutta where the
Muslim form less than one third of the popu-
lation. Moreover the complete separation of
Pakistan from the rest of India would in our
view gravely endanger the defence of the
! / \ whole country by splitting the army into two
\* »and by preventing that defence in depth
which is essential in modern war. We there-
fore do not suggest the adoption of this
proposal.
•'Our own recommendations contem- *

plate a constitution of three tiers, at the top

t 119
of which would be the Union of India with
an executive and legislature empowered to
deal with the essential subjects of external
affairs, defence and communications and the
finance necessary for these services. At the
bottom would be the provinces which would
have, apart from the subjects I have just
named complete autonomy. But we contem-
plate further that provinces will wish to unite
together in groups to carry out, in common,
services covering a wider area than t h a t of a
single province, and these groups may have
if they wi^.h, legislatures and executives
which in that event will be intermediate
between those of the provinces and those
of the Union.
a
On this basis, which makes it possible
for the Muslims to secure the advantag
Pakistan without incurring the dangers in-
herent in the division of India, we invite
Indians of all parties to take part in framing
a constitntion. The Viceroy will accordingly
summon to New Delhi representatives of
r
British India who w ill be elected by the
members of the provincial legislatures in such
a way that as nearly as possible for each one
million of the population there will be one
representative, and that the proportion bet-
ween the representatives of the main com-
munities will be on the same basis.

120
 J -

• "After a preliminary meeting in common

these representatives of the province will
divide themselves up into three sections the
composition of which is laid down and which,
if the provinces ultimately agree, will become
the three Groups. These sections will decide
upon provincial and Group matters. Sub-
sequently they will reunite to decide upon
the constitution for the Union. After the
first elections under the new constitution,
provinces will be free to opt out of the Group
into which they have been provisionally
placed. We appreciate t h a t this machinery
does not of itself give any effective repre-
sentation to other than the principle mino-
rities and we are therefore providing for a
special committee to be set up, in which the
minorities will play a full part. The busi-
ness of this Committee will be to formulate
fundamental and minority rights and to re-
commend their inclusion in the constitution
a t the appropriate level.
"So far I have said nothing about the
Indian States which comprise a third , of the
area of India and contain about one quarter
of the whole population. These States at
present are each separately governed and
have individual relationship with the British
Crown. There is general recognition that
when British India attains independence the
position of these States cannot remain un-

121
 •

'

affected, and it is anticipated that they will

wish to take part in the constitution making
process and be represented in the all-India
Union. I t does not however lie within our
province to decide these matters in advance
as they will have to be the subject of nego-
tiation with the States before action can be
taken.
- -

"During the making of the constitution,

the administration must be carrif d on and
t

we attach therefore the greatest importance

to the setting up at once of an interim
\

I
Government having the support of the major
political parties. The Viceroy has already
started discussions to this end and he hopes
to bring them shortly to a successful issue.
"During the interim period the British
Government, recognizing the significance of
the changes in the Government of India will
give the fullest measure of co-operation to
the Government so formed in the accomplish-
ment of its tasks of administration and in
bringing about as rapid and smooth a transi-
tion as possible.
"The essence of statecraft is to envisage
the probable course of future events but no
statesmen can be wise enough to frame a
constitution which will adequately meet all
the requirements of an unknown future. We
may be confident, therefore, that the Indians,
'• /

122

\
on whom falls the responsibility of creating
the initial constitution, will give it a reaso-
nable flexibility and wiil make provision for
it to be revised and amended as required
from time to time.
"In this short talk you will not expect me
to go into further details regarding our pro-
posals, which yo'i can read in the statement
which has been released for publication this
evening. But in conclusion I will repeat
and emphasize what to me is the funda-
mental issue. The future of India and how
that future is inaugurated are matters of
vital importance not only to India herself but
to the whole world. If a great new Sovereign
State can come into being in a spirit of
mutual goodwill, both within and without
India, that of itself will be an outstanding
contribution to world stability.
"The Government and people of Britian
are not only willing, they are anxious to play
their full part in achieving their result. But
the constitution for India has to be framed
by Indians and worked by Indians when they
have brought it into being. We appreciate
to the full the difficulties which confront
them in embarking on this task. We have
done, and we will continue to do, all that
lies in our power to help them to overcome
these difficulties. But the reponsibility and
i

123
 I

the opportunity is theirs and in their ful-

filment of it we wish them godspeed."
CABINET MISSION'S PRESS CONFERENCE
Dated 16th May 1946.
Sir S. Cripps Explains
"You have heard two broadcasts on the
statement and vou have the document before
you. This evening the members of the Mission
wanted an opportunity to meet you to give
you a few words of explanation and tomorrow
we shall be m e e 11 n g you again to answer
questions which you may have to put. I
will make a lew remarks about the statement
while we are waiting for the Secretary of
State to come from the broadcasting studio.
The first thing I want to point out is
what the statement does not purport to do.
Let me remind you that this is not merely
the Mission's statement, that is the statement
of the four signatories: but it is the statement
of His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom. Now the statement does not
purport to set out a new constitution for
India. I t is of no use asking us 'how do you
propose to do this or that V The Answer
will be we don't propose to do anything as
regards decision upon a constitution; that is
not for us to decide.
W h a t we have had to do is to lay down
one or two broad principles of how the cons-

124
titution might be constructed and recommend
those as foundations to the Indian people.
You will notice we use the word recommend
with regard to the ultimate constitutional
forms with which we deal.
"You may quite fairly ask, 'but why do
you recommend anything: why not leave it
to the Indians?' The answer is t h a t we are
most anxious to get all Indians into some
constitution-making machinery as quickly
as possible and the block at present is in
this matter- We are therefore, by this
means, trying to remove the block so that
the constitution-making may start and
progress freely and rapidly. We hope very
earnestly that that will be the effect.
"Now that it has been finally and ab-
solutely decided that India is to have the
complete independence she desires, whether
within or without the British Commonwealth
as she chooses, we are anxious that she shall
have it as soon as possible and the soonest
is when there is a new constitutional struc-
ture decided upon by the Indian people.
" B u t of course we cannot just stand by
and wait till t h a t time -comes. I t is bound
to take some time to reach thai point of
completion of the new constitutional struc-
ture.

125

'
 I *

''So as you know, the Viceroy, in whose

province Government-making primarily lies,
has alreadv started his talks with a view to
the immediate setting up of a reprasentative
Indian Government. We hope that, with
the other issue out of the wav, on the basis
of our statement, he will be able very
rapidly to get that Ntw Government re-
presentative of the main parties set up and
in operation.
"This matter of the Interim Government
is of the supreme importance because of the
enormous tasks facing India at the moment.
I t is these great tasks, and perhaps the grea-
test of them is to deal with the food situation,
that makes it absolutely essential that we
should between us arrange a smooth and
efficient transition.
"Nothing could be more fatal to the
Indian people today in the face of dangers of
famine, than a breakdown of administration
and communication any where in India, and
that is why we stress a? we do the vital need
for co-operation between all parties and
communities, including the British, in this
time of transition.
"So much then for the vitally important
point of the Interim Government. Some of
you may wonder how soon this means that

126
\
 the British will sever th governmental
with Ind I hop that in y
event we shall m th closest friend
when Indian freedom mes Well we
certainly c m ' t ay hat Who can foretell
how quickly constitutions 3an be hammered
out? O thing is h tvever absolutely
certain, and this is the quicker you star } t h e
quicker you d and the sooner we shall
be able to withdraw, handing over the power
to the new Governments of the Union, pro-
vinces and, if it is decided, of the groups.
"This brings me to what has been decided
rather than recommended. I t has been
'/ decided to make a start with the corstitu-
/ tion-making right away. This does not mean
a decision as to what the constitution shall
finally be: that is for dicision by the represen-
tatives of the Indian people. What it does
mean is that the deadlook which has preven-
ted a start on the process of constitution-
making is to be removed once and for all.
"The form in which we propose that the
constitution-making bodies should be assem-
bled is important for this reason. I t permits
of arriving at constitutions in the recommen-
ded form. I t goes a little further then that
in one respect. As we believe and hope that the
two parties will come into this constitution-
making on the basis of our recommendations,

127
 V

it would not be fair to either of them if the

fundamental basis which we recommend
could be easily departed from. So we stipu-
late that a departure from t h a t basis, which
is laid down in paragraph 15of the statement
should only be made if a majority of both
communities agree to it. That I think is
eminently f iir to both parties. I t does not
mean that no departure can be made from
the recommendations, but it does mean t h a t
the special provisions I have mentioned will
apply to such resolutions in the constituent
assembly of the Union. That is one special
provision as to particular majorities. The
only other is in relation to matters raising
any major communal issue, when a similar
rule will apply. All the rest is left to the
free play of discussion and vote.
"The question, I am sure, will occur to
all of you and that is why we have named
the three sections of Provinces into which the
assembly will break up to formulate the
provincial group constitutions.
"There was a very good reason for this.
First of all, of course, somehow or ether those
groups had to be formed before they could
proceed to their business. There were two
ways of dealing with that matter. Either
let the present provincial Governments opt
themselves into groups or-after seeing the

128
 titutions produced, let the new G
ments afcer the whole titution making
plete, opt themselves out if they wish
W h chosen the |nd alternative for
tv\ reasons. First beca jse it follows the
ggest Cong put forward as regards
e pro d a single fe leration. They
gested that the provinces should come
in at the beginning but could opt out if they
did not like the constitution when they had
seen it. We think that this principle should
apply to the groups. Second, the present
gislatures are not trul i presentative of
the l w hole! population because of the effect
of the Communal Award v. ith its weightag

"We have tried to get a scheme as near

as possible to the full adult suffrage, which
would be fairest but which would take pro-
bably two years to work out—and no one
believes that we could wait t h a t length of
time before starting on constitution-making.
So we discard the present legislatures as
decisive for the option and say let it be exer-
cised when the first new elections have taken
place, when no doubt there will be a much
fuller franchise and when, if necessary, the
precise issue can be raised at the election.
So the three sections will formulate the
provincial and group constitutions and when
that is done they work together with the

129
States representatives to make the Union
constitution. That is the final phase.
State's Future •

a
N a word bout the States Th
statement in paragraph 14 makes the posi-
tion quite clear that paramountcy cannot be
tinned ft th 5, new constitution com
into c perati< can it be handed over to
anyon 3 else. It is not necessary for me to
state, I am sure, 1 hat a contract or arrange
ment of tlrs kind cannot be handed over to
a third party without the consent of the
States. They will therefore become wholly
independent but they have expressed their
wish to negotiate their way into the Union
and that is a matter we leave to negotiation
between the States and the British Indian
parties.
"There is one other important provision
which I would like to stress as it is some-
what novel in constitution-making. \
We
were met by the difficulty of how we could
deal fairly with the smaller minorities, the
tribal and the excluded areas. In any cons-
titution-making body it would be quite
impossible to give them a weigh tage which
would secure for them any effective influence
without gravely upsetting the balance bet-
ween the major parties. To ive them a
tiny representation would be useless to them.

130
 f

So we decided that minorities would be

dealt with really in a double way. •The
major minorities, such as the Hindus in
Muslim provinces, and the Muslims in Hin-
du provinces, the Sikhs in the Punjab and
the Depressed Classes, who had considerable
representation in a number of provinces
would be dealt with by proportional repre
sentation in the main construction of th
constitution-making bodies.
" B u t in order to give these minorities,
like the Indian Christians and the Anglo-
Indians and also the tribal representatives,
a better opportunity of influencing minority
provisions, we have made provisions for the
setting up by the constitution-making body
r
of an influential advisory commission w hich
will take the initiative in the preparation of
the list of fundamental rights, the minority
protection clauses and the proposals for the
administration of tribal and excluded areas.
This commission will make its recommenda-
tions to the constitution-making body and
will also suggest at which stage or stages in
the constitution these provisions should be
inserted, that is whether in the Union,
Group or provincial constitutions or in any
two or more of them.
"Now that, I think, gives you some pic-
ture of the main points with which we have
dealt in our statement.

131
 _

"There is only one other point t h a t I

want to stress before leaving the matter with
you until tomorrow morning.
"You will realize I am sure, how terribly
important is this moment of decision for the
Indian people.
i

"We are all agreed that we want a speedy

conclusion of these m a t t e r s ; so far we have
not been able all to agree upon how it should
be brought about. We have done in this
statement what we believe to be best, after
two months of discussion and verv hard
•

work; and in the light of all we have heard

and studied. This is our firm opinion and we
do not, of course, intend to start all the nego-
tiations over again. We intend to get on with
the job on the lines we have laid down. We
ask the Indian people to give this statement
calm and careful consideration I believe t h a t
the happiness of their future depends upon
what they now do.
"If failing their own agreement, they will
accept this method that we put forward of
getting on with the marking of a new cons-
titution for India, we can between us make
it a smooth trancition and a rapid one, but
if the plan is not accepted no one can say
how great will be the disturbance, or how
acute and long the suffering t h a t will be seli-
inrlicted on the Indian people.

132
Security Reiterated
"We are convinced that this statement
offers an honourable and peaceful method to
all parties and if they accept it we will do all
t h a t lies in our power to help forward the
constitution-making so as to arrive at the
speediest possible settlement.
"Let no one doubt for one moment our
intentions. We have not come to India and
stayed here so long and worked so hard
except to carry out what has long been the
policy of the British Labour party, and t h a t
is to transfer power to the Indian people as
quickly, as smoothly, and as co-operatively
as the difficulties of the process permit
"We hope from the bottom of our hearts
t h a t the Indian people will accept the state-
ment in the spirit of co-operation in which it
has been drawn up, and that within a week
or two the process of constitution-making
may begin and the Interim Government may
be formed." •

LORD WAVELL'S BROADCAST

Dated 17th May 1946.
" I speak to the people of India at the
most critical hour of India's history. The
statement of the Cabinet Delegation contain-
ing their recommendations, has now been
[before you for 24 hours. I t is a blue-print
(for freedom, an outline of which your repre-

133
sentatives have to fill in the details and
construct the building.
"You will have studied the statement,
most of you, and may perhaps already have
formed your opinion on it. If you think that
it shows a path to reach the summit at which
you have baen aiming for so long, the inde-
pendence of India. I am sure you will be
eager to take it. If you should have formed
the view I—hope you have not—that there is
no passage that way, I hope that you will
study again the route indicated to you, and
see whether the dinicuties in the path—and
we know they are formidable—cannot be
surmounted by skill and patience and
boldness.
I can assure you of this, that very much
hard work, very much earnest study, very
much anxious thought, and all the goodwill
and sincerity at our command have gone to
the making of the recommendations. We
would much have preferred that the Indian
leaders should have themselves reached agree-
ment on the course to be followed and we
have done our best to persuade t h e m ; but it
has not been found passible in spite of con-
cessions on both sides which at one time
promised results.
"These proposals put before you are
obviously not those t h a t any one of the

134
 parties would have chosen if left to itself;
but I do believe t h a t they offer a reasonable
and workable basis on which to found India's
future constitution. They preserve the essen-
tial unity of India which is threatened by
the dispute between the two major com-
munities; and in especial they remove the
Idanger of the disruption of that great fellow-
ship, the Indian Army, to which India already
lowes so much and on whose strength, unity
land efficiency h( r future security will depend.
[They offer t o the Muslim community the
[right to direct their own essential interests
Itheir religion, their education, their culture,
their economic and other concerns in their
t>wn way and to their own best advantage.
"To another great community, the Sikhs
they preserve the unity of their homeland,
the Punjab, in which they have played, and
can still play, so important and influential
a part.
^ "They provide in the Special Committee
which forms a feature of the constitution
making machinery, the best chance for the
smaller minorities to make their needs known
and to secure protection for their interests.
They seek t o arrange a means for t h e
Indian States, great and small, to enter by
negotiation into the polity of a united India.
They offer to India the prospect of peace—a

HUHl3
5 HHHH
peace from p a r t y strife, the peace she needed
for all the constructive work there is to do.
And they give you the opportunity of com-
plete independences so soon as the Consti-
tuent Assembly has completed its labours.
e
*I would like to emphasize the construc-
tive work to be done. If you can agree to
accept the proposals in the statement as a
reasonable basis on which to work out your
constitution, then we are able at once to
concentrate all the best efforts and abilities
in India on the short-teim problems t h a t are
so urgent. You know them well—the imme-
diate danger of famine to be countered, and
measures taken to provide more food for
everyone in future years, the health of India
to be remedied; great schemes of wider
education to be initiated, roads to be built
and improved; and much else to be done to
raise the standard of living of the co^u^on
man. There are also great schemes in hands
to control India's water supplies, to extend
irrigation, tc provide power, to prevent
floods; there are factories to be built and new
industries to be started; while in the outside
world India has to take her place in interna-
tional bodies, in which her representatives
have already established a considerable
reputation.
" I t is therefore my earnest desire t h a t
in these critical times ahead, in the interim

136 -

"
 built, the Government of India should be in
the hands of the ablest of India's leaders,
mean recognized as such by the Indian
people, whom they will trust to further
their interests and bring them to their goal.
"As said in the statement, I am charged
with the responsibility to form such a Govern-
ment as soon as possible, to direct the affairs
of British India in the interim period. There
will be no doubt in the minds of anyone, I
hope, how great a step forward this will be
on India's road to self-government. I t will
be a purely Indian government except for its
head, the Governer-General, and will include,
if I can get the men I want, recognized
leaders of the main Indian parties, whose
influence, ability and desire to serve India
are unquestioned.
"Such a Government must have a
profound influence and power not only in
India, but also in the outside world. Some
of the best ability in India, which has hit-
herto been spent in opposition, can be har-
nessed to constructive work. These men can
be the architects of the new India.
"No constitution and no form of govern-
ment can work satisfactorily without good-
will: with goodwill and determination to
succeed even an apparently illogical arrange-
ment can be made to work. In the complex
situation t h a t faces us there are four main

137
*

parties: the British: the two main parties in

British India, Hindus and Muslims, and the
Indian States. From all of them very con-
siderable change of their present outlook will
be required as a contribution to the gene-
ral good, if this great expreriment is to
succeed. To make concessions in ideas and
principles is a hard thing d ot iy
palatable It quires me greatnes f
mind to recognize the necessity, much great
of spirit to make the concession, I
t h a t this will not be found wanting in
India, as I think you will admit t h a t it h
ot been found wantin British people
i the offer.
I wond wheth yo thatth
the greatest and most mementous experiment
governmen in the whole hist Drv of the
w a ew constitution to c trol the
destiny of 400,000,000 people, A grave
responsibility indeed on all c f s ho are
privileged to assist in making i
Lastly, I must emphasize the
of the choice befo yo It th eho
b t peaceful construction or the disord
or strife, between perat or d
ity,bw/ ordered progress or consf
I am sure yon will not hesitate in your ch
for co operation.
''May I end with some words wM< 7v\ch were
*

quoted' by one great m to other at a

138
r

crisis of the late war, and may well be

applied to India at this crisis:
"Thou too, sail on, 0 Ship of State,
Sail on. 0 Union, strong and g r e a t ;
Humanity with all its fears.
With all the hopes of future years
Is hanging breath-iess on thy fate •?•»

OLN-C'S BROADCAST IN HINDUSTANI TO

MILITARY FORCES
{March 17,1946.)
As you have heard from the Viceroy, the
British Government have pub forward a
scheme to enable Indians to make their own
constitution and set up an independent
Indian Government.' As you all know, too,
members of the British Government and the
Viceroy have for some time past been dis-
cussing ttith the leaders of the Muslim
League and of the Congress. J Thev have been
trying to decide what kind of Government
shall be set up in India. Their objects is to
make good the promise of the British Govern-
ment t h a t in future India shall be governed
entirely by her own people, free from all
control by Britain, and free to remain within
the British Commonwealth or to go outside
if she likes.
In spite of every attempt to find a form
of Government which would be acceptable to

139
the Congress and the Muslim League, no
agreement has been reached.
The Muslim League considers t h a t there
must be two independent and separate
Governments in India, Pakistan for the
*

Muslims and Hindustan for the Hindus. The

Congress thinks t h a t India must not be
divided and t h a t there should be one Central
Government with the provinces controlling
their own affairs to the greatest possible
extent.
This, very briefly is the position taken up
by the two main political parties.
\

It was hoped t h a t between the two points

of view some compromise acceptable to both
parties-might be found. This has, however,
not been found possible although both parties
have, for the sake of goodwill, modified their
views to a considerable extent.
The British Government, therefore, having
failed to get the two principal political parties
to agree, has decided t h a t it is their duty to
the people of India to lay down what shall
be done in order to give India her indepen-
dence as soon as possible in an orderly and
peaceful manner, so t h a t the mass of the
people may be put to the least inconvenience
and disturbance.
*

140
 In making thrse arrangements, the
British Government has tried to ensure
justice and freedom for the .smaller as well
as for the 1 irge sections of the people of
India.
The British Government realizes that the
Muslims have a real fear that they may be
forced to live for always under a Hindu
Government and that any new form of
Government must be such as to make this
fear groundless for all time. m

With this in view, the possibility of sett-

ing up a completely separate and indepen-
dent Muslim state of Pakistan has been most
carefully considered from every point of
view and without any partiality at all.
As a result of this examination the British
Government has been forced to conclude
that the setting up of completely indepen-
dent States not linked together in any way
would not result in a settlement of the
differences between Hindu and Muslim.
The setting up of two or more indepen-
dent Governments would also, in their opinion
result in great loss and danger to India in
the future.
They, therefore, cannot agree to divide
India into separate States, though they do
think that some way must be found for the

141
predominantly Muslim areas to govern them-
selves if they wish to do so and to live their
own lives. This is also recognized by the
Hindus and the Congress Party.
The British Government, therefore, have
approved neither the settiug up of completely
separate states, nor the retention of all
power at the Centre. They consider t h a t
although the different areas should have a
a large measure of independence if the peopl
desire it, the responsibility for the Army,
. Navy and Air Force and for the defence of
the whole of India in war must rest with one
authority for the whole of India.
Apart from this they have accepted the
principle t h a t each province or group of
provinces may have full powers to manage
its own affairs as desired by its own people
without interference from the Centre.
These proposals are meant to ensure that
all creeds and classes shall have their say in
how they are to be governed and also to
prevent any one section of the people being
forced to live under the iule of any other
section, without being sure that they will
have the right to live their lives in their own
way without fear or persecution.
The details of this new system of Govern-
ment for. India must be worked out by the

142

I
people of India themselves. I t is not the
task of the British Government to do this.
To carry on the administration of the
country while a new system of Government
is worked out, the Viceroy proposes to form
an interim Government comoos* d of himself
A-

and of leaders of Indian political opinion

who have the confidence of the people.
Post of War Member
In this temporary Government, the post
of War Member which is at present held by
the Commander-in-Chief (that is myself), will
be held by a civilian who will be an Indian.
I shall continue to be responsible for the
command and welfare of trie Army, Navy
and Air Force but all political matters will be
in the hands of the new War Member under
whom I shall serve just as the commanders
in Britain serve under civilian ministers.
While this temporary Government carries
on the daily business of governing the country
it is proposed that there should be set up
three assemblies composed of representatives
of all parties and creeds and classes, and
elected by the Provincial Legislatures.
It will be the task of these three assem-
blies together with representative from the
Indian States to decide how India will be
governed in the future.

143
 The British Government hopes that in
this way peace and security will come to
India undt-r the rule of her own leaders and
*

that she will become great and prosperous as

she deserves.
While these discissions and meetings are
going on it is the duty of the Navy, Army
and Air Force to continue to serve the
9

Government and to carry out its orders.

As I have said, this temporary Govern-
ment will be an Indian Government composed
of members chosen from the leaders of the
main political parties in the country who have
full confidence of the people.
There is no doubt that today there is
danger of strife and disorder in the country.
Whether you are in the Army, the Navy or
p
the Air Forc , you all know the good that
comes from discipline and toleration. You
have also learned to live together, Hindu,
Muslim, Sikh and Christian, in the service of
your counlry without quarrelling or jealousy.
You have learned each to respect the
other and to work side by side for one
object—the good of your country.
In this you have set an example to all
India.
I trust you, as I have always trusted you,
to go on setting this example and to do your
duty, as you have always done it in war and
peace.

144 .• •
 I for my part shall do the s-ame. So long
as I am here you mav r«-lv on me to sate-
guard your interest in the future as in the
past.
CABINET MISSION'S PRESS CONFERENCE
\

Dated 17th May 1946

I t is a recommendation, as to certain
bases of the constitution, and a decision to
summon Ii dian representatives to make
their own constitution, and therefore quite
clearly there is no question of enforcing an
award. In these circumstances, the question
of use of British troops does not ari?e at all.
:

The Secretary of State said that the

constitution recommended bv the Mission
could not be modified in favour of one party
to the disadvantages of another.
The question of the right of the Provin-
ces vis-a-vis the proposed Union was one of
about 100 questions which Lord Pethick-
Lawrence answered.
Asked if the provinces with the right to
opt out of the groups will have the right to
secede from the Indian Union, say within
two years, Lord Pethick-Lawrence replied :
"They will not have the right to opt out in a
period of two years. What they will have
the right to do is to ask for a revision of the
constitution at the end of 10 years."

145
*
 Q: Supposing Assam, which has a
Congress Ministry, decided not to come
into Group C with Bengal, which has a
Muslim League Ministry. Would Assam be
allowed to join any other Group ?
-

A: The right to opt out comes later

for this reason that the whole picture
should be understood before the option is
exercised. <
Q: Can a province, if it opts out of one
section, go into another section ?
Lord Pethi<k-Lawrence replied that if
the right was given to a province to opt into
another section and that other section did
not want to receive it, a rather awkward
situation would arise. The answer to the
question was not laid down in the statement
but it would be open to the Constituent
Assembly to deal with it at the appropriate
time.
Q: If any province does not wish to
join the Group in which it has been put, can
it stay out ?
A: The provinces automatically come
into the Sections " A " , " B " and " C " which
are set out in the statement. Initially they
are in the particular sections to which they
are allocated in the statement and that
particular section will decide whether a
group shall be formed and what should be

146
the constitution. The right to opt out of
the, group formed by that section arises after
the constitution has been framed and the
first election to the legislature has taken
pla.ce. I t does not arise before that.
Q: There is a provision whereby any
province could, by a majority vote of its
Legislative Assembly, call for a recon-
sideration of the terms of the constitution
after an initial period of 10 years. Is
there included in the words "call for a
reconsideration of the terms of the cons-
titution" any right to have secession
considered ? *

A: If you revise the constitution,

quite clearly the whole basis of the consti-
tution can be considered again. Any
province can ask for a revision of the
constitution. And so far as I can see,
when that revision is undertaken, all
questions in the constitution are open to
re-discussion.
Q: If the provinces in Section " B " ,
which formed a Muslim majority area, deci-
ded to form a group but would not come
into the Union, what would be the position ?
i

A: I t would be a breack of the con-

dition under which all these people met to-
gether for the purpose of making the
constitution and, therefore, the constitution-
•

147

i
 '

making machinery would break down if it

was persisted in. That is contrary to the
understanding on which these people came
together. If they are coming together on
an understanding, presumably honourably
accepting the major premise, and if
they were to refuse that later on, it
will be, a breach of the understanding
and we do not contemplate such a
thing.
*

Q: Could the provinces in Section " B "

at the end of 10 yeais decide to be a separate
sovereign State ?
A: If the constitution is being revised,
of course, all proposals? for its revision will
be open to discussion. Whether they
would be carried through is quite another
question.
Q: Supposing a ^roup decides not to
come into the Union Constit uent Assembly,
what would be the position as far as that
group is concerned ?
A: This is a purely hypothetical ques-
tion. You cannot forejudge exactly what
would be done in the event of people not
co-operating, but there is every intention to
procceed with the constitution-making machi-
nery as it is set out in the statement.

148
 What will happen if one ^ • p e r s o n
or any person or groups of people
in some way tried to throw spanners in
the works I am not prepared at this stage
precisely to say, but the intention is to get
on with the job.
Q: Can the provincial Assemblies elect
i people from outside their membership ?
A: Yes, That is not excluded under the
terms of the statement.
Q: Does the 10-year period set for
revision of the constitution mean that the
Union constitution is inviolable for 10
years ?
A: What does it mean is that the Con-
stituent Assembly will lay down provisions
for the revision of the constitution. This
iis in accordance with what is taking place in
a great many other cases in the world. There
must be some provision for revision. Precise-
ly what the conditions of revision are is a
matter for the Constituent Assembly to
decide. I do not think I can go further into
that.
Q: Will it be open to the Constituent
Assembly to endow the Union with all
powers of taxation including Customs,
income-tax and other taxes?

149

' -
 Lord Pe thick -Lawrence replied that the
statement left it open to the Constituent
Assembly to interpret the words relating to
finance, subject to the condition t h a t any
resolution raising a major communal issue
should require a majority of the representa-
tives present and voting of each of the two
major communites subject to that and sub-
ject to alterations in tne basic formula, a
bare majority in the Constituent Assembly
could carry a proposal.
Lord Pethick-Lawrence said that the
question including currency in the Central
list could be discussed, if necessary, in the
constitution-making body.
Replying to a number of questions on
Indian States, the Secretary of State reitera-
ted the fact the paramountcy would conti-
nue in the interim period. He stated that
the Mission bad already rec 4ved indications
from most of the principal States and repre-
sentatives of large bodies of other States
that they had no desire to impede the pro-
gress of India towirds sef-government and
independence and t h a t they wanted to co-
operate in it.
As regards the position of the India
Office during the interim period, Lord
Pethick-Lawrence said t h a t for months now
the India Office had been proceeding on the

150
assumption that the time would come when
great changes would be made in India and
the whole position of the India Office would
be altered. Its vast administrative machine
would, however, be at the disposal of the
new constitution in India.
Q: If the constitution-making body
decides that as a preliminary to proceeding
with its work British troops should be with-
drawn, will they be withdrawn?
A: I think that is a misunderstanding
of the situation. Some one must be respon-
sible for law and order in a country. In
the provinces the Governments are really
responsible for law and order, but the
ultimate responsibility rests with the Gover-
nment of India. We are anxious to transfer
t h a t at the earliest possible moment, but we
must transfer it to a properly constituted
Government. When t h a t time comes, we
will make the transfer.
Q: What will be the next stage of
activity of the Cabinet Delegation?
A: The fir-st thing is to ' get this plan
accepted by the two main communities and
I hope that will be carried through as soon
as possible.
Q: What will be the percentage of
Muslims in the interim Government ?

151
 A: The question of the interim Govern-
ment is not for us to decide; it is primarily a
question for the Viceroy,
Q: During the interim period, will
the Viceroy's veto be exercised as at present?
A: That is a question for the Viceroy
and he is now negotiating with the parties.
Lord Pethick-Lawrence said that the
division into three main communities—
General, Muslim and Sikh—had not been
T
made in consultation with anj party. "This
statemennt is our own and does not represent
necessarily the opinion of anybody in India.
But it is put out after we have discussed all
these matters with different Indians and it is
/
our attempt to reach the most likely method
which will be accepted by the different
parties."
Q: Has Congress agreed to this?
A: We have not put this out on the
basis that anybody has agreed to anything.
I t is our statement and stands on its own
feet.
There were a number of questions on
Mr. Churchill's speech in the House of
Commons.
Q: Is Mr. Churchill correct in suggesting
that the "shifting of the onus of deciding
i
152
the future constitution from Indians to
HMG is an unfortunate step going beyond
the understood purpose and mandate of the
Mission"?
A: There has been no shifting of the
onus of deciding the constitution. If we
could have arranged by agreement between
the parties in India the basis of a constitu-
tion on which they could come together in a
constitution making body, nothing would
have pleased us better; in default of that we
thought it desireable to make certain recom-
mendations as to the basis on which they
could come together and the Viceroy is pre-
pared to summon a constitution-making
body on that basis. We believe that is in
accord with the wish not only of Indians but
the majority of our own people a t home.
Q: What legislative steps will be
required for setting up the interim Govern-
ment, the creation of the new constitution
and abrogation of the King's tittle of Empe-
ror of India?
A: So far as the first two are concerned,
no legislative steps are necessary at all.
So far as the ultimate step is concerned,
that is, a matter of constitutional law and
I cannot answer offhand. So far as
know, speaking without consideration, I am

153
I
I
\

not at all sure A at a precise statute will be

required for it, but I should not like that to
be taken as final. There will naturally have
to be a debate in Parliament and some
legislative step will have to be taken with
the consent of His Majesty the King. But
I do not conternplete an difficulty about all
that, The present statement to the Press,
said: The first impression of the statement
of Lord Pethick-Lawrence on my mind is
t h a t the Cabinet Ministers have tried thfir
best to accommodate and please Indians
but I doubt if their efforts have been a
complete success.
j

*'It is now for, us to take steps to save

the people from the miseries of a violent
revolution.
" B u t we must wiat and see what kind of
interim Government is going to be set up.
The statements .are good when you read
them, but to put them into practice is the
important duty of national leaders and the
nation. I t is one of the most difficult tasks
and can only be performed by a group of
selffless individuals who have always the
freedom of their people a t heart. Whatever
the outcome of all these negotiations, one
thing is clear, namely, t h a t no earthly power
can obstruct the independence of India in
these revolutionary days."

154
 QAID~E~AZAM ANALYSIS OFTHE PROPOSALS
Congress press hailed the award in a most
provocative manner w i t h banner head lines as "Pakistan
buried". On the other side the great statesman of
India, Mohammed Ali Jinnah analysed the statement
in a dignified manner. The following statement was
issued by him from Simla.

" I have now before me the 'Statement of

the British Cabinet Delegation and His Exce-
llency the Viceroy, dated the 15th May,
1946, issued at Delhi. Before I deal with
it, I should like to.give a background of the
discussions that took pleace at Simla from
the 5th of May onwards till the Conference
was declared concluded and its breakdown
announced in the official communique dated
May 12, 1946. We meet in the Conference
on May 5 to consider the formula embodied
in the letter o^ the Secretary of State for
India, dated April 27, 1946 inviting the
League representatives. The formula was as
follows:—
"A Union Government is to deal with the
following subjects—Foreign Affairs, Defence
and Communitations.
"There will be two groups of provinces,
one of the predominantly Hindu Provinces
and the other of the predominantly Muslim
provinces, dealing with all other subjects
which the provinces in the respective groups

155

*
 *

desire to be dealt with in common. The

provincial Governments will deal with all
other subjects and leave all the residuary
powers and sovereign rights."
The Muslim League's position was that:
Firstly, the zones comprising Bengal and
Assam in the north-east, and the Punjab,
N W F P , Sind and Baluchistan in the north-
west of India, constitute Pakistan zones
and should be constituted as a sovereign
independent State, and that an unequvocal
undertaking be given to implement the
establishment of Pakistan without delav.
Secondly, that separate constitution-
making bodies be set up by the peoples of
Pakistan and Hindustan for the purpose of
framing their respective constitutions.
Thirdly, that minorities in PaKistan and
Hindustan be provided with safeguards on
the lines of the Lahore Resolution.
Fourthly, that the acceptance of the
League demand and its implementation with-
out delay were a sine quo non for the League
co-operation and participation in the forma-
tion of an interim Government at the Centre.
Fifthly, it gave a warning to the British
Government against any attempt to impose
a Federal Constitution on a united India basis
of foreing any interim arrangement at the
Centre, contrary to tho League demand; and

156
t h a t Muslim India would resist if any at-
tempt to impose it were made.
Beside, such an attempt would be the gros-
sest breach of faith of the declaration of His
Majesty's Government made in August, 1940,
with the approval of the British Parliament
and subsequent pronouncements by the
Secretary of State for India and other res-
ponsible British statesmen from time to time
reaffirming the August Declaration.

Mission's Invitation
We accepted the invitation to attend the
Conference without prejudice, without any
commitment and without accepting the
fundamental principles underlying this short
formula of the Mission on the assurance
given by the Secretary of State for India in
his letter, dated April 29, 1946, wherein he
said:, 'We have never contemplated that
acceptance by the Muslim League and the
Congress of our invitation would imply as a
preliminary condition full approval by them
of the terms set out in my letter. These
terms a r e : ''Our proposed basis for a settle-
ment and what we have asked the Congress
Working Committee to do is to agree to
send its representatives to meet ourselves
and representatives of the Muslim League
in order to discuss it."

157
 The Congress position in reply to t h e
invitation, was stated in their letter of April
28, 1946, that a strong federal government
at the Centre, with present provinces as
federating units, be established and they laid
down t h a t Foreign Affairs, Defence, Currency,
Customs, Tariffs and 'such o t h t r subjects as
may be found on closer scrutiny to be
intimately allied to them,' should vest in the
Central Federal Government.
They negatived the idea of grouping of
provinces. They also agreed to participate
in the Conference to discuss the formula of
the Cabinet Delegation.
After days of discussion no appreciable
progress was made. Finally, I v\ as asked to
give our minimum terms in writing. Conse-
quently, we embodied certain fundamental
principles of our terms in writing as an offer
to the Congress in the earnest" desire for a
peaceful and amicable settlement and for the
speedy attainment of freedom and indepen-
dence of the peoples of India. It was
communicated to the Congress on May 12,
and a copy of it was sent to the Cabinet
Mission at the same time.
League Offer *

The following were the terms of the offer.

(I) "The six Muslim provinces (Punjab,
N.W.F.P., Baluchistan, Sind, Bengal and

158
Assam) shall be grouped together as one
group and will deal with all other subjects
and matters, except Foreign Affairs Defence
and Communications necessary for Defence,
which may be dealt with by the consititution-
making bodies of the two groups of pro-
vinces—Muslim provinces (hereinafter named
Pakistan group) and Hindu provinces—sitting
together.
2) "There shall be a separate constitu-
tion-making body for the six Muslim pro-
vinces named above, which will frame cons-
titutions for the group and the provinces in
the group and will determine tne list of sub-
jects t h a t shall be Provincial and Central
(of the Pakistan federation) with residuary
sovereign powers vesting in the provinces.
4
(3) *The method of election of the re-
presentatives to the constitution-making
body will be such as would secure proper
representation to the various communities in
proportion to their population in each pro-
vince of the Pakistan group.
(4) "After the constitutions of the Pakis-
tan Federal Government and the provinces
are finally framed by the constitution making
body, it will be open to any province of the
group to decide to opt out of its group,
provided the wishes of the people of that
province are ascertained by a referendum to
opt out or not.

159
 (5) " I t must be open to discussion in the
joint constitution-making body as to whether
the Union will have a legislature or not. The
method of providing the Union with linance
should also be left for decision of the joint
meeting of the two constitution-making
bodies, but in no event shall it be by means
of taxation.
(6) "There should be parity of representa-
tion between the two groups of provinces in
t h e Union Executive and the Legislature,
if any.
(7) "No major point in the Union cons-
titution which affects the communal issue
shall be deemed to be passed in the joint
constitution-making body, unless the majority
of the members of the constitution-making
body of the Hindu Provinces and the majo-
rity of the members of the Constitution-
making body of the Pakistan Group, present
and voting, are separately in its favour.
(8) "No decision, legislative, executive or
administrative, shall be taken by the Union
in regard to any matter of controversial
nature, except by a majority of three-fourths.
(9) "In Group and Provincial constitu-
tions fundamental rights and safeguards
concerning religion, culture and other matters
affecting the differeat communities will be
provided for.

160
\
 (10) "The constitution of the Union shall
contain a provision whereby any province
can, by a majority vote of its Legislative
Assembly, call for re-consideration of the
terms of the constitution, and will have the
liberty to secede from the Union at any time
after an initial period of 10 years."
#

The Crux
The crux of our offer, as it will appear
from its text, was inter alia t h a t the six
Muslim provinces should be grouped together
as Pakistan Group and the remaining as
Hindustan Group and on the basis of
two federations we were willing to consider
the Union of Confederation strictly con-
fined to three subjects only namely, Foreign
Affairs, Defence and Communications neces-
sary tor defence which the two sovereign
federations would voluntarily delegate to
Confederation. All the remaining subjects
and the residue were to remain vested in
the two federations and the provinces res-
pectively. This was intended to provide
for a transitional period , as after an initial
period of 10 years we were free to secede
from the Union. But unfortunately this
most conciliatory and reasonable offer was
in all its fundamentals not accepted by
Congress, as will appear from their reply to
our offer.
*

161
 On the contrary their initial suggestions
were the same as regards the subjects to be
vested in the Centre as they had been before
the Congress entered the conference and
they made one more drastic suggestion for
our acceptance t h a t the Centre "must also
have power to take remedial action in cases
of breakdown of the constitution and in^
grave public emergencies." This was stated
in their reply dated May 12 1946, which was
communicated to us.
At this stage the conference brokedown
ond we were informed that the British
Cabinet Delegation would issue their state-
ment which is now before the public.
To begin with the statement is cryptic
with several lacunas as the operative part of
it is comprised of a few short paragraphs to
which I shall refer later.
I regret that the Mission should have
negatived the Muslim demand for the es-
tablishment of a complete sovereigh State of
Pakistan which we still hold is the only
solution of the constitutional problem of India
and which alone can secure stable govern-
ments and lead to the happiness and welfare
not only of the two major communities, b u t
of all the peoples of this sub-continent.
I t is all the more regrettable that the
Mission should have thought fit to advance

162
common place and exploded arguments again-
st Pakistan and resorted to special pleadings
couched in a deplorable language which is
calculated to hurt the feelings of Muslim
India.
Placate Congress
It seems that this was done by the
Mission simply to appease and placate the
Congress, because when they came to face
the realities they themselves have made the
following pronouncement embodied in para-
graph 5 of the statement which says: "This
consideration did not, however, deter us from
examining closely and impartially the pos-
sibility of a partition of India, since we were
greatly impressed by the very genuine and
acute anxiety of the Muslims lest they
should riind themselves subjected to a perpe-
tual Hindu majority rule.
"This feeling has become so strong and
widespread amongst the Muslims that it
cannot be allayed by mere paper safeguards.
If there is to be internal peace in India it
must be secured by measures which will
assure to the Muslims a control in all matters
vital to their culture, religion and economic
or other interests."
And again in paragraph 12: "This
decision does not however blind us to the
I

very real Muslim apprehensions that their

163
 culture and political and social life might
become submerged in a purely unitary India,
in which the Hindus with their greatly supe-
perior numbers must be a dominating
element."
And now what recommendations have
they made perceptibly secureing the object in
view and in the light of the very clear and
emphatic conclusion they arrived at in
paragraph 12 of this statement?
I shall now deal with some of the impor-
tant points in • the operative part of the
Statement:
(1) They have divided Pakistan into
two, what they call Section B (for the north-
western zone) and Section C (for the north-
eastern zone).
(2) Instead of two constitution-making
bodies, only one constitution-making body is
devised, that for sections A B and C.
7

(3) They lay down that "there should

be a Union of India embracing both British
India and the States which should deal with
the following subjects: Foreign affairs, De-
fence and Communication; and should have
the powers necessary to raise the finances
required for the above subjects". There is
no indication at all that the Communications
would be restricted to what is necessary for
defence Nor is there any indication as to how
this Union will be empowered to raise
*

164

•
 \

/ »

finances required for these three subjects,

while our view was that finance should be
raised only by contribution and not by
taxation.
(4) It is laid down that "the Union
should have an executive and a legislature
constitued from British India and States
representatives. Any question raising a
major communal issue in the legislature
should require for its decision a majority of
the representatives present and voting of
each of the two major communities as well
as a majority of all the members present and
f>
voting.
Concessions Ignored
While our view was :
(a) That there should be no legislature
for the Union but the question
should be left to the constituent
assembly to decide;
(b) That their should be parity of
representation between the Pakis-
tan Group and the Hindustan Group
in the Union executive and legisla-
ture if any; and
(c) That no decision legislative, execu-
tive or administrative should be
taken by the Union in regard to
any matter of a controversial
nature, except v by a majority of

165
 three-fourths. All these three
terms of our offer have been
omitted from the statement,
Indeed there is one safeguard for the
conduct of business in the Union legislature
that "any question raising a major communal
issue in the legislature should require for its
decision a majority of the representatives
present and voting of each of the two major
communities as well as a majority of all the
members present and voting." Even this is
vague and ineffective. To begin with, who
will decide and how as to what is a major
communal issue and as to what is a minor com-
I

munal issue and what is a purely non-comm-

unal issue?
(5) Our proposal that the Pakistan
group should have a right to secede, from the
Union after an initial period of ten years,
although the Congress had no serious objection
to it, has been omitted and now we are only
limited to a restruction of the terms of
the Union constitution after an initial period
of ten years.
(6) Coming to the constitution-making
machinery, here again a representative of'
of British Baluchistan is included in Section
B but how he will be elected is not indicated.
(7) With regard to the constitution
making body for the purpose of framing
the proposed Union constitution it will have

166
 and overwhelming Hindu majority as in a
House of 292 for British India the Muslim
strength will be 79 and if the number allotted
to Indian States, i.e. 93, is taken into account,
it is quite obvious that the Muslim propor-
tion will be further reduced as the bulk of
the State representatives would be Hindus.
I This Assembly m constituted will elect the
Chairman and other Officers and, it seems,1
%

also the members of the advisory committee

referred in paragraph 20 of the statement
by a majority, and the same rule will apply
also to other normal business. But I note
that there is only one saving clause which
that runs as follows:
" I n the Union constituent assembly reso-
lutions varying the provisions of paragraph
15 above or raising any major communal
issue shall require a majority of representa-
tives present and voting of each of the two
major communities*" '-
-

Chairman's Powers
The chairman of the Assembly shall
decide which (if any) of the resolutions raise
major communal issues and shall, if so re-
quested by a majority of the representatives
of either of the major communities, consult
the Federal Court before giving his decision."
I t follows therefore t h a t it will be the
chairman alone who will decide. He will

167
 %

not be bound by the opinion of the Federal

Court. Nor need anybody know what t h a t
opinion is as the chairman is mere directed
to consult the Federal Court.
(8) With regard to the provinces opting out
of their Group, it is left to the new legislature
of the provinces after the first general elec-
tion uuder the new constitution to decide
instead of a referendum of the people as was
suggested by us.
(9) As a for paragraph 20 which runs as
a follows:
"The Advisory committee on the rights of
citizens, minorities and tribal and . excluded
areas would contain full representation of
the interests affected, and their function will
be to report to the Union constitution as-
sembly upon the list of fundamental rights,
the clauses for the protection of minorities,
and a scheme for the administration of the
tribal and excluded areas, and to advise
whether these rights should be incorporated in
?>
the Provincial Group or Union constitution
No Anticipation
This raises a very serious question indeed,
for if it is left to the Union constituent as-
sembly to decide these matters by a majority
vote whether any of the recommendations
of the Advisorv Committee should be incor-

168

\ "
 porated in the Union Constitution, then it
will open a door to more subjects being
vested in the Union Government. This will
destory the very basic principle that the
Union is to be strictly confined to three
subjects.
These are some of the main points which
I have tried to put before the public after
studying this important document. I do not
wish to anticipate the decision of the Work-
ing Committee and the Council of the All-
\
India Muslim League which are going to
me°t shortly at Delhi. They will finally
take such decisions as they may think proper
after careful consideration of the pros and
cons and a thorough and dispassionate ex-
amination of the statement of the British
_ _ ^

Cabinet Delegation and His Exellency the

Viceroy.
CABINET MISSION'S MEMORANDUM
CONCERNING STATES
Dated May 23, 1946.
* Prior to the recent statement of the
British Prime Minister in the House of Com-
mons, an assurance was given to the Princes
that there was no intention on the part of the
Crown to initiate any change in their re- t

lationship with the Crown or the rights gua-

ranteed by their treaties and engagements

169
without their consent. ^ I t was at the same
time stated that the Princes' consent to any
changes which might emerge as a result of
negotiations would not unreasonably be
withheld. The Chamber of Princes has since
confirmed that the Indian States fully share
the general desire in the country for the im-
mediate attainment by India of her full
stature. HMG have now declard that if the
succession Government or Governments in
British India desire independence, no obsta-
cle would be placed in their way. The
effect of these announcements is that all those
concerned with the future of India wish her
to attain a position of independence within
or without the British Commonwealth. The
Delegation have come here to assist in resolv-
ing the difficulties which stand in the way of
India fulfilling this wish.
During the interim peroid, which must
elapse before the coming into operation of
a new constitutional structure under which
British India will be independent or fullv
self-governing, paramountcy will remain
operation. But the British Government
could not and will not in any circumstances
transfer paramountcy to an Indian Govern-
ment.
Meanwhile the Indian States are in a
position to play an important part in the

170
formulation of the new constitutional struc-
ture for India, and HMG have been informed
by the Indian States that they desire, in
their own interests and in the interests of
India as a whole, both to make their con-
tribution to the framing of the structure, and
to take their due place in it when it is com-
pleted. In order to facilitate this they will
doubtless strengthen their position by doing
everything possible to ensure that their
administrations conform to the highest
standard. Where adequate standard cannot
be achieved within the existing resources
of the State they will no doubt arrange in
suitable cases to form or join administrative
units large enough to enable them to be fitted
into the constitutional structure. I t will
also strengthen the position of States durin
this formulative period if the varions Govern-
ments which -have not already done so take
active steps to place themselves in close and
constant touch with public opinion in their
States by means of representative institu-
tions. i

During the interim period it will be

necessary for the States to conduct negotia-
tions with British India in regard to the
future regulation of matters of common
concern, especially in the economic and
financial field. Such negotiations, which will
be necessary whether, the States desire to

171
 4

participate in the new Indian constitutional

structure or not, will occupy a considerable
period of time, and since some of these nego-
tiations may well be incomplete when the
new structure comes into being, it will, in
order to avoid administrative difficulties, be
necessary to arrive at an understanding
between the States and those likely to control
the succession Government or Governments
that for a period of time the then existing
arrangements as to these matters of common
concern should continue until the new agre-
ements are completed. In this matter, the
British Government and the Crown Repre-
sentative wfll lend such assistance as they
can, should it be so desired.
When a new fully self-governing of in-
dependent Government or Governments come
into being in British India, HMG's influence
with these Governments will not be such as
to enable them to carry out the obligations
of paramountcy. Moreover, they cannot con-
template, that British troops would be re-
tained in India for this purpose. Thus, as a
logical sequence and in view of the desires
expressed to them on behalf of the Indian
States, His Majesty's Governmeut will cease
to exercise the powers of paramountcy. This
means that the rights of the states which flow
from their relationship with the Crown will
no longer exit and that all the rights sur-

172

/
 x

rendered by the States to the paramount

power will return to the States. Political
arrangements between the States on the one
side and the British Crown and British India
on the other will thus to brought to an end.
The void will have to be filled either by the
State | sentering into a federal relationship
with the succession Government or Govern-
ments in British India, or failing this,
entering into particular political arrangements
with it or them.
CONGRESS WORKING COMMITTEE
RESOLUTION
Congress Working Committee after long delibera-
tion issued the following vague resolution on the 24th
May 1946.
T>
he Working Committee has given
careful consideration to the statement dated
May 16, 1946. issued by the Delegation of
the British Cabinet and the Viceroy on behalf
of »the British Government as well as the
correspondence relating to it that has passed
between the Congress President and the
members of the Delegation. They have
examined it with every desire to find a way
for a peaceful and co-operative transfer of
power and the establishment of a free and
independent India. Such an India must
necessarily have a strong Central authority

173
capable of representing the nation with
power and dignity in the counsels of world. * *

In considering the statement, the Working

Committee have kept in view the picture of
the future, in so far as this was available to
them from the proposals made for the for-
mation of a Provisional Government and the
clarification given by members of the Dele-
gation. This picture is still incomplete and
vague. I t is only on the basis of the full
picture that they can judge and come to a
decision as to how far this is in conformity
with the objectives they aim at.
Congress Objectives
These objectives are: Independence for
India, a strong, though limited, Central
authority, full autonomy for the provinces,
the establishment of a democratic structure
at the Centre and in the units, the guarantee
of the fundamental r? hts of each individual
that he may have full and equal opportu-
nities of growth, and further that each com-
munity should h ive opportunity to live the
life of its choice within the larger framework.
The Committee regret to find a divergence
between these objectives and the various
proposals that have been made on behalf
of the British Government, and, in particular,
there is no vital change envisaged during the

174

V
 terim period when the Provisional G
ment 11 function pite of the
given paragraph 23 of the statement If
the i pend f India is aimed at. then
the functioning of the Provisional Govern-
ment must approximate closely in fact, even
though not in law, to t h a t independence, and
all obstructions and hind to it should
be removed. . The continued presence of a
foreign army of occupation is a negation of
independence.
The statement issued by the Cabinet
Delegation and the Viceroy contains certain
recommendations and suggests a procedure
for the building up of a Constituent Assemblv
which is sovereign in so far as the framing
of the constitution is concerned. The Com-
mittee do not agree with some of these re-
commendations. In their view it will be
open to the Constituent Assembly itself at
y stag to ke ch es and variations
with the proviso that in regard to certain
major communal matters a majority d
of both the maj communities ill be
necessary.
The proced ire for the election of the
Constituent Assembly is based on repre-
sentation in the ratio of one to a million, but
the application of this principle appears to
have been overlooked in the case of Furopean

175
 f

members of Assemblies, particularly in Assam

and Bengal. Therefore, the Committee
expect that this oversight will be corrected.
I

Unrepresentative Character
The Constituent Assembly is meant to be
a fully elected body, chosen by the elected
members of the provincial legislatures. In
Baluchistan, there is no elected Assembly or
any other kind of Chamber! which might eject
a representative for the Constituent Assembly
_ I t would be improper for any kind of
nominated individual to speak for the whole
province of Baluchistan which he really does
not represent in any way.
In Coorg, the Legislative Council con-
tains some nominated members as well as
Europeans elected from a special consti-
tuency of less than a hundred electors. Only
the elected members from the general cons-
tituencies should participate in the election.
The statement of the Cabinet Delegation
affirms the basic principle of provincial
autonomy and residuary powers vesting in
the provinces. I t is further said that pro-
vinces should be free to form groups. Sub-
sequently, however, it is recommended that
provincial representatives will divide up into
sections which shall proceed to settle the
provincial constitutions for the provinces in

176
 each section and shall also decide whether
any group constitution shall be set up for
those provinces. ,
Contradictory Provisions
There is a marked discrepancy in these
tw*o separate provisions, and it would appear
t h a t a measure of compulsion is introduced
which clearly infringes the basic principle of
provincial autonomy. In order to retain the
recommendatory character of the statement,
and in order to make the clauses consistent
with each other, the Committee read para-
graph 15 to mean that, in the first instance,
the respective provinces shall make their
choice whether or not to belong to the section
in which they are placed. Thus the Cons-
tituent Assemblv must be considered as a
sovereign body with final authority for the
purpose of drawing up a constitution and
giving effect to it.
\

The Indian States

The provision in the statement in regard
to the Indian States is vague and much has
been left for future decision. The Working
Committee would, however, like to make it
clear that the Constituent Assembly cannot
be formed of entirely disparate elements and
the manner of appointing State representa-
tives for the Constituent Assembly must
>

177
approximate, in so far as is possiable, to the
method adopted in the provinces.
The Committee are gravely concerned to
learn that even at this present moment some
State Governments are attempting to crush
the spirit of their people with the help of the
armed forces. These recent developments^ in
the States are of great significance in the pre-
sent and for the future of India as they
indicate that there is no real change of policy
on the part of some of the State Governm-
ents and of those who exercise paramountcy.
Need For New Basis
A Provisional National Government must
have a new basis and must be a precursor of
the full independence that will emerge from
the Constituent Assembly. I t must func-
tion in recognition of that fact, though chan-
ges in law need not be made at this stage.
The Govern or-General may continue as the
head of that Government during the interim
period, but the Government should function
as a Cabinet responsible to the Central Legis-
lature. The status, powers and composition
of the. Provisional Government should be
fullv defined in order to enable the Commit-
tee to come to a decision. Major comm'unal
issues shall be decided in the manner referred
to above in order to remove any possible fear
or suspicion from the minds of a minority.

178 /
 The Working Committee consider t h a t
the connected problems involved in the estab-
lishment of a Provisional Government and a
Constituent Assembly should be viewed
together so t h a t they may appear as parts of
the same picture, and there may be co-ordi-
nation between the two, as well as an
acceptance of the independence t h a t is now
recognized as India's right and due.
0

I t is only with the conviction t h a t they

are engaged in building up a free, great and
independent India that the Working Commi-
ttee can approach this task and invite the
co-operation of all the people of India. In
the absence of a full picture the Committee
are unable to give a final opinion a t this
stage. -
CABINET MISSION'S STATEMENT
Dated May 26, 19-46.
(In order to clarify the points raised by the President
of the All India Muslim League in his statement dated
May 22, and the resolution of the Congress Working
Committee passed on May 24, the Cabinet Mission
issued the following statement.)
The Delegation have considered the
statement of the President of the Muslim
League dated May 22 and the resolution
dated May 24 of the Working Committee of
the Congress.

179
 I

The position is that since the Indian

leaders after prolonged discussion, failed to
arrive at an agreement, the Delegation put
forward their recommendations as the
nearest approach to reconciling the views of
the two main parties. The scheme stands as
a whole and can only succeed if it is accepted <
and worked in a spirit of co-operation.
The Delegation wish also to refer briefly
to a few points that have been raised in the
statement and resolution.
The authority and the functions of the
Constituent Assembly, and the procedure
which it is intended to follow are clear from
the Cabinet Delegation's Statement. Once
the Constituent Assembly is formed and
working on this basis, there is no intention
of interfering with its disci etion or question-
ing its labours.
His Majesty's Government will recom-
mend to Parliament such action as may be .
necessary for the cession of sovereignty to
the Indian people, subject only to two
matters which are mentioned in the State-
ment and which we believe, are not contro-
versial, namely, adequate provision for the
protection of the minorities (Paragraph 20
of the Statement) and willingness to conclude
a treaty with His Majesty's Government to
*

180
 cover matters arising out of the transfer of
power (Paragraph 22 of the Statement.)
I t is a consequence of the. system of
election t h a t a few Europeans can be elected
to the Constituent Assembly. Whether the
right so given will be exercised is a matter
for them to decide.
The representative of Baluchistan will
be elected in a joint meeting of the Shahi
Jirga and the non-official members of the
Quetta Municipality.
In Coorg the whole Legislative Council
will have the right to vote, but the official
members will receive instructions not to take
part in the election.
The interpretation put by the Congress
resolution on Paragraph 15 of the Statement
to the effect that the provinces can in the
first instance make the choice whether or not
to belong to the section in which they are
nlaced does not accord with the delegation's
intentions. The reasons for the grouping of
the provinces are well known and this is an
essential feature of the scheme and can onlv
be modified by agreement between the
parties.
The right to opt out of the groups after
tbe constitution-making has been completed

I t
181
 •

will be exercised by the people themselves,

since at the first election under the new pro-
vincial constitution, this question of opting
out will obviously be a major issue and all
those entitled to vote under the new fran-
chise will be able to take their share in a
truly democratic decision.
The question of how the States repre-
sentatives should be appointed to the
Constituent Assembly is clearly one which
must be discussed with the States. I t is
not a matter for decision by the Delegation.
I t is agreed that the Interim Govern-
ment will have a new basis. That basis is
*

that all portfolios, including that of tue war

member, will be held by Indians, and that
the members will be selectad in consultation
with the Indian political parties. These are
very significant changes in the Government
of India and a long step towards indepen-
dence. H.M.G. will recognise the effect of
these changes, will attach the fullest weight
to them, and will give to the Indian Govern-
ment the greatest possible freedom in the
exercise of the day-to-day administration of
India.
As the Congress statement recognises,
present constitution must continue^ during
the interim period; and the Interim Govern-

182

*
ment cannot, therefore, be made legally res-
ponsible to the Central Legislature. There
is, however, nothing to prevent the members
of the Government, individually or by common
consent, from resigning, if they fail to pass
an important measure through the Legisla-
ture, or if a vote of no-confidence is passed
against them.
There is, of course, no intention of re-
taining British troops in India against the
wish of an independent India under the new
constitution; but during the interim period,
which it is hoped will be short, the British
Parliament has, under the present constitu-
tion, the ultimate responsibility for the
security of India and it is necessary, there-
fore, that British troops should remain*

183
 I

LEAGUE ACCEP TANCE

Simla talk were over the Cabinet Mission made
known its awards. The Qaid-e-Azam had already
commented on the award : the Congress too passed
a vague resolution. Now in order to give a chance
to the Muslim Nation to give its verdict a meeting
of the Muslim National Parliament i.e. the 'All India Mus-
5
lim League Council was called for the 5th and 6th of
June, 1946. Although the Cabinet i.e. the Muslim League
Working Committee met before the 5th of June but
it refrained from passing any rosolution and thought
it advisable to leave the important issue to the
National Parliament.
Addressing the Council Meeting the Qaid-e-Azam
addressed as follows.

QAID-E-AZAM'S SPEECH AT THE

COUNCIL
Mr. Jinnah, opening the meeting of the
Council of the Muslim League in New Delhi
spoke for 45 minutes.
He condemned the Cabinet Mission's
treatment of the Pakistan demand and
declared: "That is one of the greatest blun-
ders they have made."
"Let me tell you that Muslim India will
not rest content until we have established

184
 \

full, complete and sovereign Pakistan (loud

cheers and cries of "Pakistan le-ke-rahenge.")
I repel with all the emphasis I can command
the arguments, the reasons and the way in
which the Mission have mutilated facts for
no other purpose except to please and
appease the Congress. In fact, the founda-
tion and the basis of Pakistan are there in
their own statement. (Hear, hear.)
"The Congress Press and Hindus," he
added, "felt jubilant at this'sugar coated pill'
but soon found there was so little sugar that
it was a pill minus sugar." (Laughter.)
Mr. Jinnah dealt with the food situation,
the position in South Africa, Palestine,
Indonesia and Kashmir.
As regards Kashmir, he referred to the
conflicting information available, and said
he would hold his views till he received a,
report from representatives of the Kashmir
Muslim Conference who had gone to the State
for the purpose. But, Mr. Jinnah uttered a
word of caution, and said to the Maharaja
of Kashmir, the Prime Minister and officials
to see that they did not drag in, hurt or
injure any innocent Muslim and he urged
that the most scrupulous care be taken in
this matter; otherwise they would compel
Mussalmans to jump into the fray.

185
Momentous Decisions
Mr. Jinnah, whose arrival was greeted with
prolonged and vociferous cheers began his
address by saying that the Council had been
summoned "on an occasion which is a very
serious one indeed." "You have got to
decide momentous issues now facing you,"
he said.
Mr. Jinnah referred to the negotiations
in Delhi, the progress and the final break-
down of the Tripartite Conference at Simla,
the publication of the British Cabinet
Mission's scheme and the correspondence that
took place between the three parties and his
comment on the Mission's proposals.
"You have got all the material before you
and the decisions you have to take on
«

Wednesday or on Thursday are going to be

of far-reaching importance and consequence.
"No doubt," he went on, "the Working
Committee could have followed the normal
procedure on the analogy of a Cabinet. I t
could have, if it had chosen to do so, come
to a decision and formulated a resolution of
its own after the two day's discussions it had
had and it could have presented its decision
to the Council for confirmation. But the
Working Committee thought that this was

186 <

r
 '

an exceptional position of grave importance I

and, therefore, that was not the course for

it to adopt.
Committee's View
"If we had taken any decision and placed
it before yoa and if you disapproved of it, /

there would have been no other coruse open

to us except to resign and we thought that
we should not create such a situation when
the Council is meeting and when there is no
urgency and no necessity for such a course.
"Members of the Working Committee have
^ —

discussed the pros and cons for hours and

we thought we should not anticipate your
verdict or your decision and, therefore, we
have adopted this course that the Council,
having regard to the gravity of the situation,
should take the responsibility for whatever
decision you arrive at.
" I want, therefore, every member to feel
that he is free and he is not tied down or
fettered by any step that we have taken
which prevents him in any way for expessing
his opinions or taking his final decision,
whatever it may be. I t is now up to you
as the parliament of the Muslim Nation to
take your decision."
Referring to the demand for Pakistan Mr.
Jinnah said: "Let me tell you that Muslim
India will not rest content until we have
187
 I

established full, complete and sovereign

Pakistan. (Loud cheers.) And I repel with
all the emphasis that I can command the
arguments and the reasons and the way in
which the Mission has mutilated the facts
for no other purpose except to please and
appease the Congress. (Cries of shame,
shame'.)
" I n fact the foundation and the basis of
Pakistan are there in their own scheme.
(Hear, hear,)
Greatest Blunder
"That was one of the greatest blunders
t h a t they have made, and the result has been
this. The Congress Press and the Hindus,
when they, heard these phrases and had this
sugar-coated pill (Laughter) that Pakistan
was rejected, there was' jubilation and,
naturally, amongst the Muslims there was
tbe x strongest condemnation and resentment.
But it was a sugar-coated pill and there was
so little sugar that within a short time t h e :
Congress Press felt it was a pill minus sugar".
(Laughter.)
Mr. Jinn ah went on to refer to his recent
remarks at a Muslim reception at Simla and
the interpretation put on those remarks.
These grave issues, he said, were not to be
decided by a word here or a phrase there or
by mere sentiment or slogans.

188
 •

I t had been reported that he said, "We

cannot keep quarrelling all the time." The
obtuse mentality of a section of the Press at
once jumped to the conclusion, "Mr. Jinnah
has come to his senses."
" I am glad I have come to my senses,"
Mr. Jinnah went on, " b u t I wish they will
also come to their senses. (Laughter,) Surely
it requires two parties for a quarrel but in
this case there are three and even four
parties, leaving smaller minorities.
Muslim Suffering
"When I say we cannot keep quarrelling
all the time, am I not addressing everv one
of them, including ourselves? 1 know and I
repeat this, that the "* Mussalmans have
suffered, and suffered to an extent that I
shudder to think of?
"Six years ago the position of the Mu-
salmans was such," continued Mr. Jinnah
" t h a t they would have been wiped off. In
everv walk of life the Musalmans have suf-
fered and are suffering now. I want to say,
put an end to this suffering and for us there is
no other goal except the establishment of
Pakistan. (Cheers). May be, obstacles will be
put in our way but nothing is going to make
us flinch or falter in any way or budge by a
hairs's breadth from doing everything in our

189

!
power to reach our goal and establish
T>
Pakistan.
Mr. Jinnah added: " I repeat from this
platform that delay is not good either for the
British Government or the Hindus. If they
love freedom, if they love the independence
of India, if they want to be free, then the
sooner they realise the better that the quick-
est way is to agree to Pakistan. Either you
agree or we shall have it in spite of you.
(Hear, hear.)
" W h a t methods they would adopt and
what instruments they would use would
depend upon the time and circumstances.
After touching the South African, lndo-
nisian and Libyian question he proceeded
with the food problem in India. Mr. Jinnah
made a reference to riots in provinces where
the Congress was in power and reiterated
t h a t there was only one remedy and that
was the establishment of Pakistan. When
Pakistan was established. Hindus would
think differently. At present, unfortunately,
the Hindu had a wind in his head that
wherever a Congress Ministry was established,
a Hindu Raj was established.
"There is no remedy for a disease of this
kind. Where a man is under a delusion, the
only place for him is a lunatic asylum. With

190
 *

this delusion, the Hindu is arrogant, tyran-

nical and oppressive. But I think all this
will sober down. If it does not, then we
shall have to do something to make it sober
down, (hear, hear).
"These instances show that they are
driving one more nail into their own coffin.
The more they do this, the more will they
55
regret
LEAGUE COUNCIL RESOLUTION
After two days of heated discussion the Council of
the All India Muslim League passed the following
resolution accepting the Mission's plan.
"This meeting of the Council of the All
India Muslim League, after having carefully
considered the statement issued by the
Cabinet Mission and His Excellency the
Viceroy on the 16th of May 1946, and other
relevant statements and decuments officially
issued in connection therewith; and after
having examined the proposals set forth in
the said statement in all their bearings and
implications, places on record the following
views for the guidance of the nation and
direction to the Working Committee.
a
Thatthe references made and the
conclusions recorded in paragraphs 6,7,8,9,10
and 1L of the Statement concerning the
Muslim demands for the establishment of

191
 I
I

fall sovereign Pakistan as the only solution of

the Indian constitutional problem, are un-
waranted, unjustified and unconvincing, and
should not therefore .have found place in a
State Document issued on behalf and with
the authority of the British Government,
These paragraphs are coached in such a
language and contain such mutilation of
established facts t h a t the Cabinet Mission
have clearly been prompted to include them
in their Statement solely with the object of
appeasing the Hindus in utter disregard of '
Muslim sentiments. Furthermore, the con-
tents of the aforesaid paragraphs are in
conflict and inconsistent with the admissions
made by the Mission themselves in paragraphs
5 and 12 of their Statement, which are to
the following effect:
First, the Mission "were greatly impressed
by the very genuine and acute anxiety of the
Muslims lest they should find themselves
subjected to perpetual Hindu majority rule." *
Secondly, "this feeling has become so
strong and widespread amongst the Muslims
that it cannot be allayed by mere paper
safeguards."
Thirdly, "if there is to be internal peace <
in India it must be secured by measures
which will assure to the Muslims a control in

192
 all matters vital to their culture, religion,
economic or other interests," and
f - '

Fourthly, "very real Muslim' apprehen

sions exist that their culture and political
and social life might become submerged in
a purely unitary India in which Hindus with
their greatly superior numbers, must be a
dominating element." '• •
In order that there may be no manner
of doubts in any quarter the Council of the
All India Muslim League reiterates that the
attainment of the goal of complete sovereign
Pakistan still remains the unalterable ob-
jective of the Muslims of India, for the
achievement of which they will, if necessary,
employ every means in their power and con-
sider no sacrifice or suffering too great.
*•' That, notwithstanding the affront offered
to Muslim sentiments by the choice of injudi
cious words in the preamble of the Statement
of the Cabinet Mission, the Muslim League,
having regard to the grave issues involved, and
prompted by its earnest desire for a peaceful
solution, if possible, of the Indian constitu-
tional problem, and inasmuch as the basis
and tfye foundation oi Pakistan are inherent
in the Mission's Plan, by virtue of the com-
pulsory grouping of the six Muslim provinces
in Sections B and C, is willing to co-operate
with the constitution-making machinery

193

•
 T
proposed in the scheme outlined b} the
Mission, in the hope that it would ultimately
result in the establishment of complete sover-
eign Pakistan and in the consummation of
the goal of Independence for the major
nations, Muslims and Hindus and all the
other people inhabiting this vast sub-
continent.
I t is for these reasons that the Muslim
League is accepting the scheme and will join
in Constitution-making body, and it will keep
in view the opportunity and the right of
secession of provinces or gioups from the
Union which have been provided in the
Mission's Plan, by implication. The ultimate
attitude of the Muslim League will depend
on the final outcome of the labours of the
i

Constitution-making body, a^d on the final

shape of the Constitutions which may emerge
from the deliberations of that body jointly
and separately in its three sections.
The Muslim League also reserves the
right to modify and revise the policy and
attitude set forth in this resolution, at any
time during the progress of deliberations of
the Constitution-making body, or the Cons-
tituent Assembly, or thereafter, if the course
of the events so repuire, bearining mind the
fundamental principles and ideals herein-
before adumbrated to which the Muslim
League is irrevocably committed.

194
 r

That, with regard to arrangements for

the proposed interim Government at the
Centre, this Council authorises its President
0

t o negotiate with His Excellency the Viceroy

and to take such decisions and actions as
he seems fit and proper.
British Press
*

1
V
The 'Daily Telegraph^ , London, commenting on t/u
League's acceptance of the Cabinet Mission's plan wrote
as follows]
"The Muslim League with Mr. Jinnah a t
its head have saved the country from the
prospect of immediate chaos; that is a states-
manlike decision.
" I t would be wroog to suppose that it is
abandonment of the Muslim demand for
Pakistan. What is recognised is that within
the Mission's proposaJs there is substance of
Pakistan with a provision for alteration of
the constitution after ten years.
" I n t h a t period it will be for the Hindus
as the dominant community so to work the
new constitution as to remove Muslim doubts
of equality of treatment. Only by wise
restraint will that be possible
The Manchester Guardian:—"Mr. Jinnah
who held out so long for a fully sovereign
Muslim State has shown true statemanship in
taking the substance of Pakistan. I t was
/

195
 r

clearly his last chance of getting so much.

He himself is presumably willing to enter
the provincial national Government. I t has
thus proved possible to allay the fears of the
Muslim without disrupting India.
"The decision of the National Congress,
the other major party is expected soon. I t
will show whether it has also been possible
to preserve sufficient Indian unity and trans-
fer sufficient power at once to satisfy the im-
patient Congress leaders. Let them reflect
that there may be some virtue in the British
method of progress by compromise."
The influential London Times writes :
"The sense of realism shown on Thursday
by Mr. Jinnah and his colleagues of the
Muslim League in accepting the plan of the
Cabinet Mission augurs well for the future
alike of the Muslim community and of In-
dia.
The Liberal News Chronicle says:
"This display of common sense by Muslims
has transformed the scene and removed by
far the gravest obstacle to a solution of .
what has long been a seemingly intractable
problem."
*

"Scrutcator" the well-known 'Sunday

Times' commentator summing up the Cabinet

196
Mission's negotiations according to a Globe
message from London on Monday says:
" I f Indian self-Government is to work,
the first need is for something like a coalition
spirit between Hindu and Muslim leaders.
This cannot develop rapidly while Congress
goes on claiming that all India speaks
through its mouth and pretending not to see
that Mohammadon India speaks through the
Muslim League. /

a
The League, on the other hand, has
made a considerable advance by admitting
T
the case for an Indian L nion with a central
body for defence, etc. On the British side
the indispensable quality is patience.
'•Much has already been shown, not least
by the Viceroy, who on this side would be a
tower of strength to any Government. »

Clearly he has not exhausted it and if he

wins through his will indeed be a famous
example, though not without precedent in
in our history of civil laurels being added to
military."
Speaking about the Cabinet Mission, the
a
writer continues: The measure of success
crowning their efforts seems not inconsider-
able. They have formulated for the first time a
constitution complete in outline for the whole
peninsula and secured its acceptance in
(

principle by Hindus and Muslims alike.

1 I

197
l
,
 "This is much and in European country
would be decisive. In India, no doubt, it is
less so, as the episode, on the insistence on
a Congress Muslim may illustrate. No
demand for one was made until matter was
on the point of going through, when it was
made bv Gandhi."
His motive, he said, was to assert the
Congress was not a communal body and so
to assuage communal feeling. But that it
would inevitably have just the opposite effect
must have been obvious to far less acute
minds. Can it have been entirely hidden
from his ?
;

DAWN
Commenting on the resolution passed by the League
Council, Daily Dawn In its editorial of 8th June wrote
as follows:!
In India's decisive hour the elected
representatives of the Muslim nation have
taken a decision which will, if the same
spirit of sincerity is shown by Hindu leader-
ship, make the strife of yesterday flower
into friendly collaboration of tomorrow.
The manner in which the decision has been
taken ensures for it the broadest basis
of popular support and vindicates the
Muslim League's position as a democratic
national organisation.
o And above all towers
\

198
 the personality of Qaid-e-Azam Jinnah who
has, at the cross-roads of Indian destiny, let
his hundred million followers to the correct
turning. If further roadblocks loom ahead
and impede the sub-continent's progress to-
wards the goal of freedom, it will not be the
Muslim League from whose ranks the obs-
tructionists will arise.
The resolution adopted by the League
Council on Thursday is a masterly document
which symthesises the still unalterable
Muslim goal of complete sovereign Pakistan
with the policy of co-operation with the other
parties concerned for the purpose of evolving
the immediate pattern of progress. The
grain is isolated from the chaff in the Cabi-
net Mission's Statement and the anti-Pakistan
window-dressing in its six disjointed, ill-
argued paragraphs are dismissed as mere
window-dressing. What the unanalytical
minds of impulsive Akhand Hindusthanists
avidly pounced on as "rejection of Pakis-
i
t a n " — a term not used by the Mission them-
selves—is found on dispassionate analysis to
be no more than a thin veneer which clothes
substance of a very different kind. The
Mission is rightly condemned for attempting
to create illusions for the verbal appeasement
of the Hindus, forgetful that Muslims also
have sentiments. But "having regard to
the grave issues involved" and "prompted by

199

/
 r

the earnest desire for a peaceful settlement

n
if possibl these in pr are gnored
Reason, patriotism and good will dictate the
verdict , and mere sentimental discontent is
st side. World opin v misguided
by tendinous propaganda, will perhaps now
realise how grossly it had misjudged the
Muslim League and its leader.
Whil the Leag e Coui esolution
a
rnabi usly says that th Leag IS
accepting the scheme and will join the Con-
stitution-making body", it is necessary t h a t
the full implication of thisthi decision should
be derstood by all quit arly Th
following points g from the text of the
resolution therefore need emph First
and foremost th Mi in paragraph
and 12 of their 'Statement, from which the
resolution quotes extensively, have recognized
the justice of the basic Muslim demands that
they should not be subjected to perpetual
Hindu majority rule, t h a t mere paper safegu-
ards | are not enough for them, t h a t specific
statutory measures must secure for them
control in all matters vital to them, and t h a t
they must not be ub merged m a purely
unitary Hindu-dominated India. Therefore
the perati parts f the Mission's scheme
are interpreted in this light and it is assumed
t h a t any attempt to fill in the scheme's
outli in any ma aner which may militate

200

\
 gainst the spirit of paragraphs 5 and 12 of
the Statement will be deemed contrary to
that spirit.
Secondly, the basis and foundation of
Pakistan inherent in the compulsory group-
ing of the six Muslim provinces into Sections
B and C, will be capable of fuller develop-
ment in course of time, culminating if nece-
ssary in the exercise of that right of secession
which the Congress itself conceded in its
memorandum to the Mission dated May 12,
1946, and which is also implied in the ten-
yearly revision clause in the scheme itself.
I t is on this foundation that the Muslim
League will seek to build from within, and
in a spirit of amity and understanding with
the other parties concerned, until its goal of
complete sovereign Pakistan is attained,
without any one else being the worse for it.
Thirdly, this "acceptance" m not irrevo-
cable, and final judgment will depend on the
manner in which the Constitution-making
bodies of the Sections and the joint Constitu-
ent Assembly function. Checks and balances
are provided in the scheme, but much will
depend on the spirit in which the majority
proceeds to decision on details, and the
League's co-operation can be fruitful of re-
sults satisfactory to all elements and condu-
cive to speedy progress only if the majority

201

\
 ceases to be constantly conscious of its ma jo.
rity. Should the League's spirit of compro-
mise be not reciprocated or should attempts
be made to shape the future in a spirit cont-
tary to that of the vital paragraphs 5 and 12
of the Cabinet Mission's Statement, the
League may be compelled to "modify or
revise the policy and attitude set forth in
the resolution." I t was imperative that <

this proviso should be explicity inserted

because the Mission's scheme is but the
barest of an outline and unconditional com-
mitment to accept whatever details might be
worked into it by a body dominated numeri-
cally by Hindus, would have been a leap
in the dark.
Nevertheless, trust can beget trnst and
if only the Congress will now emulate the
League's spirit of sincerity, co-operation and
compromise, and accept the scheme without
mental reservations and secret intentions of
seeking to twist and distort it to their own
pattern of Akhand Hindustan, the black
clouds of bitterness and animosity can disap-
pear overnight and the glorious new dawn
of araity rise on the morrow. Before this
week is ended the Congress will take its own
decision. Whether it will still seek "clarifi-
cation and interpretation" of certain aspects
of the scheme in order to rob it of all that
is attractive from the Muslim point of view

202

I
remains to be seen. Mr. Gandhi's latest
utterance from Mussoorie encourages hope
that the sniping phase is over. The world
now awaits his and the Congress's next step.
Let us hope that the League's lead and ges-
ture of friendliness will not be lose on them,
and that thev will not strain at the enat of
" p a r i t y " in the Interim Executive after hav-
ing wisely swallowed the North-Western and
the North-Eastern Groups of Pakistan.
CONGRESS HESITANT
Contrary to the hopes of the country Cong-
ress was hesitant to accept the proposals. The
League Council gave its verdict on the 7th of
April. There was enthusiasm all over the
the country. Congress Leaders in general and
Mr. Gandni in particular had already wel-
comed the Mission's long term proposals.
On the ninth of June, Congress Working
Committee assembled to dicide the fate of the
Mission's plan. For two days the Congress
Working Committee was in session, and yet
it was unable to arrive at a decision on the
Cabinet Mission's "Blueprint for Indian
freedom" to use the language of one of the
top leaders of the Congress itself. It was
Muslim League and not the Congress which
was expected to reject the British pro-
posals and very rightly too. At the crucial
moment, however, the leaders of the Muslim

203

N
Nation rose to the occasion and it was their
intransigent. Qaid-e-Azam who made all the
concessions and gave the lead by accepting
the proposals. Congress acceptance of the
plan was now expected to be more or less
a matter of formality, fur none had praised
it and its authors more unequivocally and
enthusiastically than Mr. Ganahi.
Writing in the 'Hai ijan under the Cap-
tion. "An Analysis" Mr. Gandhi expressed
himself as follows:—
"After four days of searching examination
of the State paper issued by the Cabinet
Mission and the Viceroy, on behalf of the
British Government, my conviction abides
t h a t it is the best document, the British
Government could have produced in the
circumstances.
" I t reflects our weakness, if we would be
ood enough to see it. The Congress and
the Muslim League did not, and could not
agree. We would grievously err if a t this
time, we foolishly satisfy ourselves t h a t the
differences are a British creation.
"The Mission have not come all the way
from England to exploit them. They have
come to devise the easiest and quickest
method of ending British rule. We must be

204
.

brave enough to belive the declaration until

the contrary is proved. Bravery thrives
upon the deceit of the deceiver.
"My compliment, however, does not
mean that what is best from the British
standpoint is also best or even good from the
Indian, Their best may possibly be harm-
ful. My meaning will, I hope, be clear from
what follows.
"The authors of the document have en-
deavoured to say fully what they mean.
They have gathered from their talks the
minimum tbey thought would bring parties
for framing India's charter of freedom. Their
one purpose is to end British rule as early
as may be possible. They would do so, if
they could, by their effort, leave a united
India not torn asunder by internecine quarrel
bordering on civil war: They would leave in
any case.
Patience and Skill I

"Since in Simla the two parties, though

the Mission succeeded in bringing them to-
gether at the conference table—with what
partience and skill they could do so they
alone could tell—could not come to an agree-
ment, they descended to the plains of India
and devised a worthy document for the pur-
pose of setting up the Constituent Assembly

205
 •

which should frame India's charter of inde-

dependence free of any British control or
influence.
" I t is an appeal and an advice. I t has
no compulsion in it. Thus the Provincial
Assemblies may or may not elect the dele-
gates. The delegates, having been elected,
may or may not join the Constituent Asssem-
blv.
"The Assembly having met may lay down
a procedure different from the one laid down
in the statement. Whatever is binding on
any person or party arises out of necessity of
the situation. The separate voting is binding
on both the major parties, only because it is
necessary for the existence of the Assembly.
"At the time of writing I took up the
statement, re-read it clause by clause and
came to the conclusion that there was nothing
in it binding in law. Honour and necessity
alone are the two binding forces. What is
binding is that part of it which commits the
British Government.
" I suppose the four members of the Bri-
t i s l Mission took the precaution of receiving
full approval of the British Government and
the two Houses of Parliament. The Mission
are entited to warm congratulations for the
first step in the act of renunciation which the

206
statement is. Since other steps are necessary
for full renunciation, T have called this one
a promissory note.
The Assumption
"Though the response to be made by
India is to be voluntary, the authors have
naturally assumed that the Indian parties
are well organized and responsible bodies
capable of doing voluntary acts as tully as,
if not more fully than compulsory acts.
"Therefore when Lord Pethick-Lawrence
said to a Press correspondent 'If they do
come together on that basis, it will mean that
they will have accepted that basis, but they
can still change it, if by a majority of each
party, tbey desire to do so', he was right in
the sense that those who became delegates,
well knowing the contents of the statement,
were expected by the authors to abide by the
basis unless it was duly altered by the major
parties. When two or more rival parties
meet together they do so under ^ome under-
standing.
"A self-chosen umpire (in the absence of
one chosen by the parties the authors cons-
titute themselves one) fancies t h a t the parties
will come together, only if be presents them
with a proposal containing a certain mini-
mum and he makes his proposal leaving them

207

\
free to add to, to subtract from or altogether
change it by joint agreement.
What About Units?
"This is perfect so far. But what about
the units? Are the Sikhs, for whom the
Punjab is the only home in India, to consider
themselves against their will as part of the
section which takes in Sind, Baluchistan and
the Frontier Province ? Or is the Frontier
Province also against its will to belong to the
Punjab called " B " in the statement, or
Assam to " C " although it is a predominantly
non-Muslim province ?
"In my opinion the voluntary character
of the statement demands that the liberty
of individual units should be unimpaired.
Any member of the sections is free to join it.
The freedom to opt out is an additional
sefeguard. t

" I t can never be a substitute for the free-

dom retained in Para. 15 which reads: Pro-
vinces should be free to form groups with
executives and legislatures and each group
could determine the provincial subjects to
be taken in common.'
" I t is clear that this freedom was not
taken away by the authors by Para 19 which
'proposes' (does not order) what should be
done. It pre-supposes that the chairman

208
of the Constituent Assembly at its first
meeting will ask the delegates of the pro-
vinces whether they would accept the group
principle and if they will accept the assign-
ment given to their province. This freedom
inherent in every province and that given
by Para. 15 (5) will remain intact.
No Cause for Perturbation
"There appears to me to be no other way
of avoiding the apparent conflict between
the two paragraphs as also the charge of
compulsion which would immediately alter
the noble character of the document.
" I would, therefore, ask all those who
are perturbed by the group proposal and
the arbitrary assignment, that, if my inter-
pretation is valid there is not the slightest
cause for perturbation,
"There are other things in the document
which would puzzle any hasty reader who
forgets that it is simply an appeal and an
advice to the nation showing how to achieve
independence in the shortest time possible.
The reason is clear. In the new world that
is to emerge out of the present chaos, India
in bondage will cease to be "the brightest
jewel" in the British Crown.
" I t will become the blackest spot in
t h a t crown, so black that it will be fit only

209

*
 for the dustbin. Let me ask the reader t o
hope and pray with me that the British
Crown has a better use for Britian and the I

world. The brightest jewel is an abrogation.

"When the promissory note is fully hono-
ured the British Crown will have a unique
jewel as of right following from due perfor-
in an e e of duty. «

"There are other matters outside the

statement which are required to back the
promissory note. But I must defer t h a t
examination to the next issue of Harijan".
But to the surprise of every one the Cong-
ress Working Committee adopted dilatory
tactics. Tried to coerce the Viceroy and the
Mission. The correspondence passed between
the Viceroy and the Congress President and
later the Working Committee's resolution
speak for themselves and needs no comment
from me here !

AZAD-WAVELL CORRESPONDENCE t

Lztier from Maulana Azad to the Viceroy, dated May

25, 1946.
\
Your Excellency will remember that the
demand of the Congress from the very beg-
inning of the present discussions regarding
the Interim Government has been that there
must be a legal and constitutional cbang in <J

210 /

*
 *

order to give it the status of a truly national

Government. The Working Committee has
felt that this is necessary in the interests of
a peaceful settlement of the Indian problem.
Without such status the Interim Government
would not be in a position to infuse in the
Indian people a consciousness of freedom
which is today essential.
• .

Both Lord Pethick-Lawrence and you

»

have however pointed out the difficulties in

the way of offering such constitutional change
while at the same time assuring us that the
Interim Government would have in fact, if
not in law, the status of a trulv national
Government. The Working Committee feel
that after the British Government's declara-
tion that the Constituent Assembly will be
the final authority for framing the constitu-
tion any constitution framed by it will be
binding the recognition of Indian indepen-
dence is imminent.
I t is invitable that the Interim Govern-
ment which is to function during the period of
the Constituent Assembly must reflect this
recognition. In my last conversation with
you you stated that it was your intention
to function as a constitutional head of the
Government and that in practice the Interim
Government would have the same powers as
that of a Cabinet in the Dominions. This is,

211
 \

however, a matter which is so important

that it would not be fair either to you or to
the Congress Working Committee to let it
rest upon what transpired in informal con-
versations. Even without any change in the
law there could be some formal understanding
by which the Congress Working Committee
may be assured that the Interim Government
would in practice function like Dominion
Cabinet.
Responsibility To Legislature
The question of the responsibility of the
Interim Government to the Central Assembly
may also be treated in the same way. The
existing lew permits an executive indepen-
dent of the Central Legislature but a con-
vention could be created bv which its tenure
of office^would depend on its enjoyment of
such confidence.
The other details regarding the composi-
tion and magnitude of the Interim Cabinet
which came up in my discussions with you
would all depend upon the satisfactory so-
lution of the two basic questions enumerated
above. If the questions of status and res-
ponsibility of the Interim Government are
satisfactorily solved I hope we would be
able to decide other questions without
delay.
212
 Reply from the Viceroy to the Congress President,
dated May 30, 1946.
My Dear Man Ian a Sahib,
1 have received your latter of May 25, on
the Interim Government. We have dis
cussed this matter on several occasions and
I recognize the importance that you and your
party attach to a satisfactory definition of
the powers of the Interim Government and
appreciate your reasons for asking for such
definition. My difficulty is that the most
liberal intentions m a y b e almost unrecogniz-
able when they have to be expressed in a
formal document. v
I am quite clear that I did not state to
you that the Interim Government would
have the same powers as a Dominion Cabinet.
The whole constitutional position is entirely
different. I said that I was sure that His
Majesty's Government would treat the new
Interim Government with the same close
consultation and consideration as a Dominion
Government.
His Majesty's Government have already
said that they will give to the Indian Gov-
ernment the greatest possible freedom in the
exercise of the day-to-day administration of
the country; and I need hardly assure you
that it is my intention faithfully to carry out
this undertaking.

213

r
 I am quite clear that the spirit in which
the Government is worked will be of much
greater importance than any formal docu-
ment and guarantee. I have no doubt
that if you are prepared to trust me, we
shall be able to co-operate in a manner which
will give India a sense of freedom from
external control and will prepare for com-
plete freedom as soon as the new constitution
is made.
I sincerely hope that the Congress will
accept these assurinces, and will have no
further hesitation in joining to co-operate in
the immense problems which confront us.
In the matter of time-table you will be
aware t h a t the -All-India Muslim League
Council is meeting on June 5, at which
understand decisive conclusions are to be
reached. I suggest, therefore, that if you
summon your Working Committee to re-
assemble in Delhi on Friday the 7th, it may
be possible for final decisions to be made by
7
all parties on all outstanding questions earl}
in the following week.
Nehru Invited
Letter from the Viceroy to Mr. Nehru, dated June
12, 1946:—
Dear Mr. Nehru.
I am anxious to have an opportunity of
consulting you together with Mr. Jinnah as

214
to how best I can fill the various posts in
the Interim Government, could you come to
see me for this purpose at 5 p.m. today?
I t is not my intention to discuss any
question of principle such as "parity" or
otherwise, but to concentrate upon what I
know to be our common objective. That is
to get the best possible Interim Government
drawn from the two major parties and some
of the minorities, and to approach this deci-
sion by a consideration of what the portfolios
should be and how each one can best be
filled.
I am sending a similar letter to Mr. Jinn ah.
Invitation Accepted.
Reply from Mr. Nehru to the Viceroy, dated June
1946
Dear Lord Wavell,
I am sorry for the slight delay in answer
ing your letter of today's date. Your invit
tion to me to see you today at 5 p.m. in order
to confer with you and Mr. Jinnah about
the Interim Government placed me in a
somewhat difficult position. I would
gladly g meet you at any time, but our official
spokesman in regard to such matters is natu-
rally our President Maulana Azad. He can
sppak and confer authoritatively, which I
cannot do. I t is, therefore, proper that he
should be in charge on behalf of any autho-
rilative conversations that might take

215
But since you have asked me to come I
shall do so. I hope, however, that you will
appreciate my position and that 1 can only
talk without authority which vests in our
President and the Working Committee.
Parity Not Acceptable
Letter from Maulana Azad, to the Viceroy, dvted June
J3, 1946.—
-

Dear Lord Wavell,

Thank you for your letter of June 12,
which I have just received, inquiring after
my health. I have now more or less recovered.
Mr. Nehru has reported to my Committee
and me, the gist of the conversations between
your Excellency and him. My Committee
regret that they are unable to accept your <

suggestions for the formation of the pro-

visional national government. These ten-
tative suggestions emphasize the principle of
"parity" -to which we have been an<J are
entirely opposed.
T I the composition of the Cabinet sugg

ted by you there is "parity" between the

Hindus, including the Scheduled Castes d
the Muslim Lea 5 e. That is the number of
Caste Hindus ii ctually less than the nomi- /

of the Muslim League. The position thus

worse than it w is in June 1945. at Sim]
whe cording to your declaration then

216
there was to be 'parity' between the Caste
Hindus and Muslims, leaving additional seats
for the Scheduled Caste Hindus. The Mus-
lim seats tben were not reserved for the
League only but could include non- League
Muslims. The present proposal thus puts
the Hindus in a very unfair position and at
the same time eliminates the non-League
Muslims. My Committee are not prepared
to accept any such proposals. Indeed as we
have stated repeatedly we are opposed to
"parity" in any shape or form.
In addition to this parity we are told that
there should be a convention requiring that
major communal issues should be decided by
separate group voting. While we have accepv-
ted this principle for long-term arrangements
we did so as an effective substitute for other
safeguards. In your present proposal, how
ever, both "parity" and this convention are
suggested. This would make the working of
the provisional Government almost impossible
and deadlock a certainty.
Cabinet of 15 Demanded
As I have often pointed out to you we
are strongly of the opinion that the Pro-
visional Government should consist of 15
members. This is necessary to carry out the
administration of the country efficiently,
as well as to give adequate representation to
I

217
fc

the smaller minorities. We are anxious that

the various minorities should have scope in
such a Gevernment. The work before the
Provisional Government is likely to be much
heavier and more exacting
In your proposals Communications include
railways, transport, posts, telegraphs and air.
I t is difficult for us to conceive how all these
can be joined together in one portfolio. This
would be highly undesirable at any time with
industrial troubles, and the possibility of
railway strikes this arrangement would be
wholly wrong. We think also that planning
is an essential department for the Centre.
We think, therefore, that the Provisional
Government must consist of 15 members.
The suggested division of portfolios
appears to us to be undesirable and 'unfair.
My Committee would also like to point
out that a Coalition Government in order to
be successful must have some common out-
look and programme for the time being. The
manner of approach in forming such a
government has been such as to leave this
out of consideration and my Committee do
not feel any confidence that such a coalition
can function successfully.
It was our intention to write to you about
certain other matters also, but for reasons

218
 /

known to you our letter has been delayed.

I shall write to yon about the other matters ,
later. My purpose in writing to you now is
to convey to you without any delay our
reactions on the tentative proposals that you
put forward today.
Defects In Statement
Letter from Maulana Azad to the Viceroy, datei
June 14, 1946:
Dear Lord W&vell,
In my letter to you sent yesterday 1
promised to send you another letter. I am
now doing so.
On May 24, the Congress Working Com-
mittee passed a resolution which I conveyed
to you. In a resolution we gave our reaction
to the statement dated May 16, 1946, which
the British Cabinet Delegation and you issued
on behalf of the British Government. We
pointed out what were in your opinion some
of the ommissions and defects in that state-
ment and we also gave our interpretation of
its provisions. In a subsequent statement
issued by you and the Cabinet Delegation
our viewpoint was not accepted.
You know and we have repeatedly em-
phasized this t h a t our immediate objective
has been and is the independence of India.
We have to judge everything by this stan-
dard. We suggested that even though no

219
 /

legal change might be made at this stage,

independence in practice might be recognized.
This has not been agreed to.
In your letter, dated May 30, 1946, add-
ressed to me you explained what in your
view the status and powers of the Interim
Government would be. This too foils short
of what we aim at. Yet the friendly tone of
your letter and our desire to find some way
out led us to accept your assurance in the
matters. We came to the conclusion also
that, unsatisfactory as were many of the
provisions of your statement of May 16, we
would try to work them according to our
own interpretation and with a view to
achieving our objective.
Grouping Opposed
You are no doubt aware of the strong
feeling of resentment which exists among
arge sections of the people against some of
the proposals in the statement, notably the
idea of grouping. The Frontier Province and
Assam have expressed themselves with con-
siderable force against any compulsory group-
ing. The Sikhs have felt hurt and isolated
y these proposals and are considerably
gitated. Being a minority in the Punjab,
hey become still more helpless, as far as
umbers go, in Section " B " . We apprecia-
ed all these objections especially as we our-

220

i
 »

selves shared them. Nevertheless we hoped

t h a t according to our interpretation of the
clauses relating to grouping, which we still
hold is the correct interpretation, for any
other interpretation would endanger the
basic principle of provincial autonomy, we
might be able to get over some of the obvious
difficulties.
Two Obstacles
But two insuperable obstacles remained
and we had hoped that you would be able to
remove them. One of these related to the
part the European members of the Provincial
Assemblies might play in the election to the
Constituent Assembly. We have no objec-
tion to Englishmen or Europeans as such,
but we do have a strong objection to persons,
who are foreigners and n on-nationals and
who claim to belong to the ruling race,
participating in, and influencing the elections
to the Constituent Assembly.
The Cabinet Delegation's statement lays
down clearly that the future constitution of
India has to be decided by Indians. The
basic principle of the statement of May 16
was the election of a member of the Cons-
tituent Assembly to represent one million
inhabitants. On this basis, the representa-
tives of 146,000 Muslims in Oiissa and
180,000 Hindus and 58,000 Sikhs in the

221
North-West Frontier Province have not been
given the right to elect any member to the
Constituent Assembly. The European popu-
lation of Bengal and Assam numbers only
21,000, but their representatives can return
to the Constituent Assembly bv their own
vote seven out of 34 members, thus appro-
priating to themselves the right to represent
seven millions. They are returned to the
provincial assemblies by a separate electorate
of their own and have been given fantastic
weightage. This representation of Europeans
in the Constituent Assembly will be at the
cost of non-Muslims, that is, mainly Hindus,
who are already in a minority in Bengal.
To make a minority suffer in this way is
surely utterly wrong.
No Vote For Europeans
Apart from the question of principle,
it is a matter of the utmost importance in
practice and may well affect the future both
of Bengal of Assam. The Congress Working
Committee attach the greatest importance to
this. We would like to add that even if the
Europeans themselves do not stand for
election, but merelv vote, the results will be
equally bad.
The Cabinet Delegation have informed us
that beyond promising to use persuaeive
powers they could not hold out any assurance

222
to us that these European members would
not exercise the right which, we are advised,
they do not possess under the statement of
May 16. But if the Delegation hold other-
wise, as evidently they do, we cannot con-
template a legal fight for their exclusion at
the threshold of the Constituent Aesembly.
Therefore, a clear announcement is neccessary
that they will not take part as voters or can-
didates in the election to the Constituent
Assembly. We cannot depend on grace or
good-will where rights are concerned.

Dangerous Innovation
Equally important, in our view, is the
question of "parity" in the proposed pro-
visional national Government. I have al-
ready written to you on this subject. This
"parity," or by whatever other name it may
by called, has been opposed by us through-
out and we consider it a dangerous innova-
tion which, instead of working for harmony,
will be a source of continuons conflict and
trouble. I t may well poison our future as
other separatist steps in the past have pois-
oned our public life.
We are told that this is a temporary pro-
vision and need not be treated as a precedens
but no such assurance can prevent an evil step
from having evil consequences. We are con-

223
\
that even the immediate rusults of any such
provision will be harmful.
If the position about the European vote
and "parity" remains, my committee are
reluctantly compelled to iaform you that
they will not be able to assist you in the
difficult task ahead.
The talk we had with you today has not
made any substantial difference to the funda-
mental position. We have noted that accor-
ding to your new suggestions, the proposed
woman member might be replaced by a
Hindu, thus increasing the Hindu members,
including Scheduled Caste representatives,
to six. We would be sorry not to have a
woman member, but apart from this, the
new proposal maintains the old Simla (1945)
formula of parity butween Cast Hindus and
Muslims with this important qualification
that now Muslims are supposed to mean
members of the Muslim League. We are
unable to agree to this proposal and we are
still convinced that the Provisional Govern-
ment must consist of 15 members and that
there should be no kind of parity in their
selection.
Viceroy Admits Failure
Letter from the Viceroy to the Congress President
dated June 15, 1946:

224
My dear Maulana Sahib,
I have received your letter of June 14.
I will reply to it in detail in the course of
today.
Meanwhile I must assume from the last
paragraph of your letter that my attempt to
negotiate an agreement between the two
major parties on the composition of Interim
Government has failed.
The Cabinet Delegation and I have, there-
fore, decided to issue to-morrow a statement
on the action we propose to take, and we will
let you have a copy of this before publication.
Compulsory Grouping
Letter from the Viceroy to the Congress President
datzd June 15, 1946:
My dear Maulana Sahib,
I have received your letter of June 14.
You deal with matters on which we have
already had much discussion.
We are doing everything possible to
further the independence of India. As we
have already pointed out, however, there
must first be a new constitution drawn up
y the people of India.
The delegation and I are aware of your
objections to the principle of grouping. I
would however point out that the statement

225
of May 16 does not make grouping com- \

pulsory. It leaves the decision to the elected

representatives of the provinces concerned
sitting together in sections.

The only provision which is made is

t h a t the representatives of certain pro-
vinces should meet in sections so that V,.

they can decide whether or not they wish to

form groups. Even when this has been done
the individual provinces are still to have the
liberty y to opt out of the group if they so
decide.
I recognize the difficulty about the Euro-
peans who through no fault of their own find
themselves in a difficult position. I still
hope that a satisfactory solution of the pro-
blem will be found.
Party Position
Our discussions in regard to the Interim
Government have been on the basis of politi-
cal parties and not communities. I under-
stand that this is regarded as preferable now,
as it was at the first Simla Conference.
In the proposed Interim Government of
myself and 13 others there will be six Cong-
ressmen and five Muslim Leaguers. I do not
see how this can be called parity. Nor is
there parity between Hindus and Muslims,

226
 there being six Hindus to five Muslims.
Even at this last moment, I still hope
that the Congress will now accept the state-
ment and consent to join the interim Govern-
ment.
(Sd.) Wavell.
Changed Situation
Letter from Montana Azad to the Viceroy, dated June
16, 1946:—
Dear Lord Wavell,
1 have received your two letters of June
15. I note what you say about grouping.
We abide by our interpretation of it.
As regards Europeans we are clear that
even on a legal interpretation of the state-
ment of May 16, apart, from other considera-
tions they have not the right to participate
in the elections to the Constituent Assembly.
1 am glad you expect a satisfactory solution
of the problem.
We have endeavoured in our letter and
in the course of our talks to state clearly
what our position is in regard to any kind of
parity. You will remember that parity was
mentioned and considered at the first Simla
conference. The parity was exactly the same
as is now suggested by you, that is, parity
between Caste Hindus and Muslims. Owing

227

/
 to the stress of war and other conditions then
existing we were prepared to accept this only
for the occasion. I t was not to be used as a
precedent. Moreover, this was subject to the
inclusion of at least one Nationalist Muslim.
Now conditions have entirely changed and
we have to consider the question in another
context, that is approaching independence
and Constituent Assembly.
As we have written to you in this context
and in the present circumstances we consider
this kind of parity unfair and likely to lead
to difficulties. The whole scheme proposed
by you in the statement of May 16 is based
on the absence of weightage. And yet, in
the proposed Provisional Government, there
/

is this weightage, in addition to other far-

reaching communal safeguards.
We have tried our utmost to arrive at a
satisfactory settlement and we shall not
despair of it. But such a settlement, in order
to be enduring, must be based on strong
foundations. So far as the statement of <

May 16 is concerned, our main difficulty, as

we wrote to you, was the European vote.
This difficulty, also goes.
The second and remaining difficulty re-
lates to the proposals for the Provisional
Government which have to be considered to-
gether with the statement. The two cannot

228
be separated. These proposals have thus far
been unacceptable to us, but if a satisfactory
settlement in regard to them is arrived at,
we would be in a position to shoulder the
burden.
Interim Proposals
Letter from the Viceroy to the. Congress President,
dated June 16, 1946:
Dear Maulana Sahib,
I send herewith a copy of the statement
which has indicated in the letter I sent you
yesterday, will be released at 4 p.m. this
evening.
As the statement shows, the Cabinet
Ministers and I are fully aware of the difficul-
ties that have prevented an agreement on
the composition of the Interim Government.
We are unwilling to abandon our hope of a
working partnership between the two major
parties and representatives of the minorities.
Appeal To Congress
We have, therefore, done our best to
arrive at a practicable arrangement taking
into consideration the various conflicting
claims and the need for obtaining a Govern-
ment of capable and representative ad-
ministrators. We hope that the parties will
now take their share in the administration
of the country on the basis set out in our

229
 (

new statement. We are sure we can rely on

you and your Working Committee to look to
the wider issues and to the urgent needs of
the country as a country a whole, and to
consider this proposal in a spirit of accom-
modation.
(Enclosed)—statement by the Cabinet Delegation and
the Viceroy, dated June 16, 1946:—
No Decision Yet
Letter from the Congress President to the Viceroy,
dated June 18, 1946:—
Dear Lord Wavell,
I promised to wrtie to you this evening in
case my committee had come to any decisions.
The committee met this afternoon and sat
for many hours. In the absence of our
colleague, Khan Abdul GhafFar Khan, who is
due to arrive tomorrow morning, we decided
to adjourn till tomorrow. I am, therefore,
not in a position this evening to convey to
you any decision. I shall communicate with
you as soon a3 my committee arrives at any
conclusion.
Request to Azad
Letter from the Viceroy to the Congress President,
dated J urn 20, 1946:—
Dear Maul ana Sahib,
You will, I am sure, appreciate that the
members of the Cabinet Mission have a great

230
deal of urgent work awaiting them in Eng-
land and are not in a position to prolong
their stay in this country indefinitely. I
would, therefore, ask your Working Com-
mittee to let us have a final answer as soon
as possible to the proposals made in our
statement of June 16.
I understand that you have summoned
back the members of the committee who had
left Delhi and in these circumstances we
would ask you to let us have your answer
not later than Sunday, June 23.
New Difficulty
Reply from the Congress President to the Viceroy,
dated June 21, 1946:
Dear Lord Wavell,
I have your Excellency's letter of June
20, 1946.
I appreciate your anxiety to come to an
early decision regarding the formation of an
Interim Government and I can assure you
that my Working Committee fully share your
anxiety. A new difficulty, in addition to
the old ones, has, however, been created
the publication in the press of the alleged
contents of Mr. Jinnah's letter to you in
which he raises objection to the Congress
nominations in the Interim Cabinet. I t will
be of great assistance to the Working Com-

231
mittee in coming to a decision if they could
have copies of these alleged letters and your
reply thereto as they deal with vital matters
which we have to consider.
No Precedent
Letter from the Viceroy to ihi Congress President
dated Jane 22, 1946:
My Dear Maulana Sahib,
I understand from Press reports that
there l i s l a l strong feeling in Congress circles
that the party should insist on their right to
include a Muslim of their own choice among
the representatives of the Congress in the
Interim Government.
For reasons, of which you are already
aware, it is not possible for the Cabinet Mis-
sion or myself to accept this, request, but I
draw your attention to paragraph 5 of the
statement of June 16 which reads as follows:
"The above composition of the Interim
Government is in no way to be taken as a
precedent for the solution of any other
communal question. I t is an expedient put
forward to solve the present difficulty only^
and to obtain the best available coalition
Government." , .
In the light of this assurance that no pre-
cedent is established we appeal to the Cong-
ress not to press, their demands, but to take

232 «
part in the strong Interim Government which
the country so u fcly needs.
Interim Plan Rejected
. Letter from the Congress President to the Viceroy,
dated June 24, 1946:
Dear Lord Wavell,
I have just received the telephone me-
ssage sent on your behalf asking me to com-
municate immediately the decision of the
Working Committee in regard to the provi-
sional Government. The decision was in fact
taken yesterday but we felt that it would be
better if we wrote to you fully on all aspects
of the proposals made by you and the
Cabinet Delegation. The Working Com-
mittee have been sitting almost continuously
and will be meet ting at 2 p.m. again today.
After full consideration and deliberation they
have been reluctantly obliged to decide
against the acceptance of the Interim Govern
ment proposals as framed by you. A detailed
and reasoned reply will follow later.
(Sd.) Abul Kalam Azad.
Letter from Maulana Abul Kalam Azad to the
Viceroy, dated June 25, 1946:—
The Congress President in this letter
gave a detailed reply expressing the inability
of the Congress Working Committee to assist
the Viceroy in forming a provisional Govern-

233
ment as proposed in the statement of J u
16. 1946. The letter, however pted the
proposals of the statement of May 16 1946
for the formation and ssful working
of the Constituent Assembly after recording
the interpretation of the Cong Working
Committee to certain provisions of this state
ment.

234
 *

INTERIM GOVERNMENT
In the absence of an agreement between the
Congress and the Muslim League, regarding the
composition of the Interim Government, the Cabinet
Mission after consulting the Prime Minister Mr.
Attlee and the British Cabinet made the following
announcement:—

BRITISH CABINETS PLAN FOR INTERIM

GOVERNMENT
The following statement was issued by thz Cabinet
Delegation and the Viceroy on June 16 at 4 p. m.
1. His Excellency the Viceroy, in con-
sultation with the members of the Cabinet
Mission, has for some time been exploring
the possibilities of forming a coalition Gover-
nment drawn from the two major parties
and certain of the minorities. The discussions
have revealed the difficulties which exist for
the two major parties in arriving at any
agreed basis for the formation of such a
Government.
2. The Viceroy and the Cabinet Mission
appreciate these difficulties and the efforts
which the two parties have made to meet
them. They consider however that no
useful purpose can be served by further

235
 i

prolonging these dioussions. It is indeed

urgently nece3sary that a strong and represen-
tative Interim Government should be set up
to conduct the very heavy and important
business that has to be carried through.
3. The Viceroy is therefore issuing in-
vitation to the following to serve as mem-
bers of the Interim Government on the basis
that the constitution-making will proceed in
accordance with the Statement of May 16:
Sardar Baldev Singh, Sir N. P.
Eagineer, Mr. Jagjivan Ram, Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru, Mr. M. A. Jinnah,
Nawabzada Liaquafc Ali Khan, Mr. H. K.
Mahtab, Dr. John Mathai, Nawab Mohd.
Ismail Khan, Khwaja Sir Nizamuddin,
Sardar Abdur Rab Nisbtar, Mr. C. Raja-
opalachari, Dr. Rajendra Prasad and
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel.
If any of those invited is unable for
personal reasons to accept, the Viceroy will
after consultation, invite some other person
in his place.
I

4. The Viceroy will arrange the distri-

bution of portfolios in consultation with the
leaders of the two major parties.
5. The above composition of the Inte-
rim Government is in no way to be taken as
a precedent for the solution of any other

236

•
 ' . I \

communal question. I t is an expedient put

forward to solve the present difficulty only,
and to obtain the best available coalition
Government. t

6. The Viceroy and the Cabinet Mission

believe t h a t Indians of all communities
desire to arrive at a speedy settlement of
this matter so that the process of consti-
tution making can go forward and that the
Government of India may be carried on as
efficiently as possible in the meantime.
\

. They therefore hope that all parties

especially the two major parties will accept
this proposal so as to overcome the present
obstacles, and will co-operate for the success-
ful carrying
• o
on of the Interim Government.
Should this proposal be accepted the Viceroy
will aim at inaugurating the New Govern-
ment about the 26th June.
i.
8. In the event of the two major
parties or either of them proving unwilling to
join in the setting up of a coalition Govern-
ment on the above lines, it is the intention of
7

the Viceroy to proceed with the formation of

an Interim Government which will be as
representative as possible of those willing to
accept the Statement of May 16th.
9. The Viceroy is also directing the
Governors of the Provinces to summon the

237
Provincial Legislative Assemblies forthwith
to proceed with the elections necessary for
the setting up of the constitution-making
machinery as put forward in the Statement
of j May 16th.
The following letter was sent to the
Presidents of the Indian Natioi al Congress
and the All-India Muslim L* ague by the
Viceroy today.

As the Statement shows, the Cabinet

Ministers and I are fully aware of the diffi-
culties that have prevented an agreement on
the composition of the Interim Government.
We are unwilling to abandon our hope of a
working partnership between the two major
parties and representatives of the minorities.
We have therefore done our best to arrive at
a practice ble arrangement taking into consi-
deration the various conflicting claims, and
the need for obtaining a Government of
capable and representative administrators.
We hope that the parties will now take their
share in the administration of the country
on the basis set out in our new Statement.
We are sure we can rely on you and your
Working Committee to look to the wider
issues and to the urgent needs of the country
as a whole, and to consider this proposal in
in a spirit of a accomodation.

238
 QUEERING THE PITCH
On the 17th of June the Daily Dawn Commented
on the formation of an Interim Government as follows :\
The Cabinet Missiob, it would seem, have
pulled a last one this time on the more
conciliatory of the political elements, in their
anxiety to placate the Congress. In their
second "award," made exactly a month after
their first one, they announce that fourteen
individual leaders have been invited to join
the interim Government, but the selection
has really been made on the basis of Lea
Congress and the minorities. Under this ]ast
category the most glaring instance of pro-
Congress wangling is the inclusion of Mr
Jagjivan Ram, allegedly as a representative
of the Scheduled Castes.
The Mission's solicitude for th m
munity is of very recent growth, since it was
known t h a t they did not originally propose
to include any Scheduled Castes member in
the Interim Government of 12. I t takes no
special circumspection to realise that this
sudden concern for the "depressed Hindu" is
an afterthought and arises not from any
genuine desire for his welfare but from
anxiety to find a backdoor method of brin
ing an additional Congressman in. The
person selected is a Congress M.L-A. of Bihar
who is not evidently eminent enough to have

239

'
been considered suitable by the Congress it-
self for a place in the Ministry. Scheduled
Castes in the Congress represent their own
community just as much or as little as the
"nationalist" Muslims among Congress camp
followers represent Muslims. The Poona
Pact is responsible for this cruel anomaly,
and if the Cabinet Mission were sincere in
their ostensible intention of giving the
Scheduled Castes a share of power in the
in terim Government they should have looked
for a capable individual in the Scheduled
Castes Federation. By selecting this gentle-
man they have betrayed this much wronged
community, although they may have been
won encomiums from Congress quarters.
The manner in which the Mission has been
t

reacting to bullying tactics bodes no good for

the success of their labours, nor does it in-
crease their individual and collective repu-
tation or prestige as men of conviction. I t
becomes increasingly difficult to judge just
where they will stop or how far downhill
they will roll under pressure from those who
believe in the efficiency of pressure tactics.
What guarantee is there even now that this
"final" decision on the interim Government
issue will indeed remain final ? Whp can
reply on the Mission's announcement that
even if one major party does not come in
they will go on with the interim Gover

240

t
 bment—if the recalcitrant party happens to
ne Congress ? In two paragraphs of their
Statement issued yesterday they lay down
that whichever party comes into the interim
Government on the terms offered must accept
the basis that the "constitution-making will
proceed in accordance with the Statement
55
of May 16.
This is welcome but will the Mission
muster courage enough to remain firm even
on this issue ? Ttiey give little evidence of
their capacity to tell Congress where to stop.
We shall not anticipate the decision of
the Muslim League on this new "award" and
we doubt not that the League Working
Committee will once again consider the "pros,
and cons." dispassionately; but the Mission
)?
are rapidly queering their own pitch.
*
SHOPKEEPERS ALL
By now it became abundantly clear that while the
Muslim League showed willingness to compromise for
the peace and independence of the country, the
Congress struck to its bullying tactics and kept on
coercing the Mission and the Viceroy to squeeze more
out of the League. Commenting on such a state of
affairs theftDaily Dawn' on the 18th of June 1946 wrote
as follows :
We said before that the Cabinet Mission
were rapidly queering their own pitch. The
more we reflect the more is that opinion
confirmed. They show two dangerous ten-

241
dencies: to allow themselves to be pushed
about by the Congress, and to take the
Muslim League for granted. On the spirit
of the bully they put a premium, on the
spirit of conciliation a heavy discount. Has
not the Muslim League shown wiHinnness to
compromise ? Therefore the League can be
safely expected to make more concessions.
Has not the League played the game? Then
it can be expected to go on playing it. It is
the other fellow who gives all the headaches ;
therefore the pill must be coated with a '
little more sugar for his palate. So seems
to run the mental process of the three
"changelings in Labour,'' with an equally
indecisive Viceroy thrown in. So we have a
veritable procession of formulas, the third of
!
which now holds the field. The Mission make
one mistake. The Muslim Leaguers are good
sportsmen but they will not self-denyingly
go one playing ball if the other dide does not
observe the rules of the game.
The present proposals for the interim
Government have the savour of the shop
counter about it The customer insists on a
little more to be added to the scale; the man
behind the counter piles on a trifle but keeps
the balance even in a manner which all
clever salesmen know. I t is a case of plus
one against plus one. The two minorities
become four. The taker feel« be has got

242

•
f

something, the giver knows he has not really

given anything away. Needless to say that
the second party in question is not the
Muslim League. The League's share is there,
intact. What irritates the League is this in-
terminable haggling, and this exploiting of the
minorities as pawns in somebody else's game.
And what, after all, has the Congress
gained by this long drawn-out pother ? One
seat for a henchman who comes in under
*

fake colours. Is this either straightforward

or fair - to the much-wronged Scheduled
castes with whose feathers this new entrant
comes sailing into the interim Government?
The Muslim League would welcome, more
than any other party, real representation of
minorities, but this exploitation of them is
disgusting beyond measure. Secondly, the
character of "parity" has been changed from
the political to the worst communal basis.
Instead of League-Congress parity, which
was far more preferable, it is now Muslim
Caste-Hindu parity. The Congress, profess-
ing to be non-communal and patriotic, has
succeeded in importing the least desirable
form of communalism into the interim pic-
ture. If its leaders feel proud of the per-
formance, they are welcome to the satis-
faction of an evil iob well done.
In the next few davs it will be known
how much longer and in what other direc-

243

J
tions the Mission is going to pander to the
Congress and vitiate an atmosphere which
was beginning to clear, or whether they are
going to cry halt. Muslim attitude will be
guided by their conduct, and if the conces-
sions so far made by the League are re-
garded as signs of weakness, proof will per-
force have to be given that it is not rusty
museum pieces t h a t rattle in the Muslim
armoury.
Congress Rejection of short term plan and quali-
fied acceptance of Long-term plan.
CONGRESS PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF JUNE 26
TO THE VICEROY
Ever since the receipt of your statement
of J u n e 16 my Committee have been consider-
ing it from day-to-day and have given long
and anxious thought to your proposals and
to th< invitations vou have issued to indivi-
duals to form the Provisional National
Government. Because of our desire to find
some way out of the present most unsatis-
factory situation, w,e have tried our utmost
to appreciate your approach and viewpoint.
In the course of our conversations we have
already pointed out to you our difficulties.
Unfortunately these difficulties bave been
increased by the recent correspondence.
The Congress as you are aware is a nat-
ional organization including in its fold the

244

v
 members of all religions and communities in
India. For more than half a century it has
laboured for the freedom of India and for
equal rights for all Indians. The link t h a t has
brought all these various groups and commu-
nities together with in the fold of the Cong-
ress is the passionate desire for national in-
dependence, economic advance and so ial equ-
»
ality. I t is from this point of view th it we have
to judge every proposal. We hoped t h a t a
Provisional National Government would be
formed which would give effect in practice
to this Independence. Appreciating some
of your difficulties, we did not press for any
statutory change introducing Independence
immediately but we did expect a de facto
change in the character of the Government
making for independence in action. The
status and powers of the Provisional Govern-
ment were thus important. In our view this
was going to be something entirely different
from the Viceroy's Executive Council. I t was
to represent a new outlook, new methods of
work and new psychological approach by
India to both domestic and external prob-
lems Your letter dated May 30, 1946, gave
us certain assurances a b o u t the status and
powers of the Provisional Government.
These did not go far enough according to
our thinking but we appreciated the friendly
tone of t h a t letter and decided to accept the

245
assurances and not to press this particular
matter any further.
Parity Untenable
The important question of the composi-
tion of the Provisional Government remain-
ed. In this connection, we emphasized that
we could not accept anything in the nature
of parity even as a temporary expedient
and pointed out that the Provisional
Government should consist of fifteen mem-
bers to enable the administration of the
country to be carried on efficiently and the
smaller minorities to be represented in it,
Some mention of names was made and on
our part suggestions were put before you
informally, including the name of a non-
League Muslim.
In your statement of June 16, some of
the names suggested came as a surprise to
us. Several changes had been made from
the provisional list prepared by the Congress.
The manner of preparing your list and pre-
senting it as an accomplished fact seemed to
us to indicate a wrong approach to the prob-
lem. One of the names included had not
been previously mentioned at all and was
that of a person holding an official position
and not known to be associated with any
public activity. We have no personal ob-
jection to him, but we think that the
inclusion of such a name particularly without

246
 any previous reference or consultation, was
undesirable and indicated a wrong approach
to the problem.
Then again a name from our list was
excluded and in his place another of our
colleague was put in but as you have said
that this can be rectified, I need not say
»
more about it.
Extraordinary Decision.
One outstanding feature o( this list w
the non-inclusion of any Nationalist Muslim.
We felt that this was a grave omission. We
wanted to suggest the name of a Muslim to
take the place of one of the Congress
names on the list. We felt that no one
could possibly object to our changing
the name of one of our own men. Indeed,
when I had drawn your attention to the fact
that among the Muslim League nominees was
included the name of a person, who had
actually lost in the recent elections in Fron-
tier Province and whose name we felt had
been placed there for political reasons, you
wrote to me as follows: *I am afraid that I
cannot accept the right of the Congress to
object to names put forward by the Muslim
League, any more then I would accept
similar objections from the other side. The
test must be that of ability.' .But before we
could make our suggestions, 1 received your

247
letter of June 22 which surprised us greatly.
You had written this letter on the basis of
some Press reports. You told us that the
Cabinet Mission and you were not prepared
to accept a request for the inclusion of a
Muslim chosen by the Congress among the
representativee of the Congress in the Interim
Government. \ >

This seemed to us an extraordinary de-

cision. I t was in direct opposition to your
own statement quoted above. I t meant
that the Congress could not freely choose
even its own nominees. The fact that this
was not to be taken as a precedent made
hardly any difference. Even a temporary
departure from such a vital principle could
not be accepted by us at any time or place
and in any circumstances.
Minority Representation
In your letter of June 21, you gave certain
questions framed by Mr. Jinnah in his letter
dated June 19 and your replies to them. We
have not seen Mr. Jinnah's letter. In
Question 3 reference is made to 'representa-
tion of the four minorities, viz., the Schedu-
led Castes, the Sikhs, the Indian Christians
and the Parsees,' and it is asked as to 'who
will fill in vacancies caused in these groups,
and whether in filling up the vacancies the

248
leader of the Muslim League will be consul-
ted and his consent obtained.'

In your answer you say: 'If any vacancy

occurs among the seats at present allotted
to representatives of the minorities, I shall
naturally consult both the main parties be-
fore filling it.' Mr. Jinnah has thus included
the Scheduled Castes among the minorities
and presumably you have agreed with this
view. So far as we are concerned we re-
pudiate this view and consider the Scheduled
Castes as integral parts of Hindu society.
You also, in your letter of June 15, treated
the Scheduled Castes as Hindus.

You pointed out that in your proposal

there was no "parity" either between Hindus
and Muslims or between the Congress and
the Muslim League inasmuch as there were
to be six Hindus belonging to the Congress,
as against five Muslims belonging to the
League. One of the six Hindus belonged to
the Scheduled Castes. We are in any case
not agreeable to the leader of a party, which
claims to represent a community which is a
minority, interfering with the selection of
names either the Scheduled Castes, whose
representation you counted as falling within
the Congress quota, or with the selection of
representatives of the minorities mentioned.

249
Veto Power For The League
In question 4, the Scheduled Castes are
again referred to as a minority and it is
asked whether the proportion of members of
the Government community-wise as provided
in the proposals will be maintained. Your
answer is that the proportion will not be
changed without agreement of the two
major parties. Here again one communal
group functioning admittedly as such is
given a power to veto changes in other
groups with which it has no concern.
We may desire, if opportunity offers
itself, to increase the representation of the
Scheduled Castes, or to give representation,
when it is possible to another minority, for
example, th< Anglo-Indian. All this would
depend on the consent of the Muslim League.
We cannot agree to this. We may add t h a t
your answers restrict the Congress repre-
sentation to Caste Hindus and make it equal
to that of the League.
Finally, you state in answer to Question
5 that "no decision of a major communal »

issue could be taken by the Interim Govern-

ment if the majority of either of the main
parties were opposed to it. You further say
that you had pointed this out to the Cong-
ress President and he had agreed t h a t the
Congress appreciated this point. In this
connection I desire to point out that we had

250 •
 pted this principle for the long-term
arrangement in the Union Legislature and
it could possibly be applied to the provisional \

Government if it was responsible to the

Legislature and was composed of representa
tives on the population basis of major com-
munities. I t could not be applied to the
provisional Government formed on a different
basis altogether. It was pointed out by us
*

my letter of the June 13 t h a t it could

make administration impossible and dead-
locks a. certainty.
Even in the question as framed by Mr.
Jinnah it is stated t h a t "in view of the sub-
stitution of 14 now proposed for the original
12" no major communal issues should be
decided if the majority of the Muslim mem-
bers are opposed to it. Thus this question
arose a f t e r t h e substitution of 14 for 12, after
your statement of June 16. In this statement
no mention was made of this rule. This
very important change has been introduced,
almost casually and certainly without our
consent. This again gives the power of veto
or obstruction to the Muslim League in the
Provisional Government.
We have stated above our objections to
your proposals on June 16 as- well as to our
answers to the questions framed by Mr.
Jinnah. These defects are grave and would
render the working of the provisional Govern-

251
 *

ment difficult and deadlocks a certainty. In

these circumstances your proposals cannot
fulfil the immediate requirements of the
situation or further the cause we hold
dear.
Interim Proposals Rejected
My Committee have, therefore, reluctantly
come to the conclusion that they are unable
to assist you in forming a provisional Govern-
ment as proposed in your statement of
June 16.
With regard to the proposals made in the
statement May 16, relating to the formation
and functioning of the Constitution-making
bodj', the Working Committee of the Cong-
ress passed a resolution on May 24 and
conversations and correspondence have taken
place between your Excellency and the
Cabinet Mission on the one side and myself
and some of my colleagues on the other. In
these we have pointed out what in our
opinion were the defects in the proposals. We
also gave our interpretation to some of the
provisions of the statement. While adhering
to our views, we accept your proposals and
are prepared to work them with a view to
achieve our objective. We would add,
however, that the successful working of the
Constituent Assembly will largely depend on
the formation of a satisfactory Provisional
Government.

252 -
 i

WORKING COMMITTEE'S RESOLUTION

The following is the full text the resolution passed
by the Congress Working Commtttee on Cabinet Mission's
proposals.
1

On May 24, the Working Committee

passed a resolution on the state-
ment dated May 16 issued by the
British Cabinet Delegation and the
Viceroy. In this resolution they
pointed out some defects in the
statement and gave their own inter-
pretation of certain parts of it.
Since then the Committee have been
continuously engaged in giving
earresb consideration to the propo-
sals made on behalf of the British
Government in the statements of
May 16 and June 16 and have con-
sidered the correspondence in regard
to them between the Congress Pre-
sident and the members of the Cabi-
net Delegation and the Viceroy.
The Committee have examined both
these sets of proposals from the
point of view of the Congress objec-
tive of immediate Independence
and the opening out of the avenues
leading to the rapid advance of the
masses ,economically and socially,
so that their material stan-

253
 dards may be raised and poverty,
malnutrition, famine and the lac
of the necessaries of life may be
ended, and all the people of the
country may have the freedom and
o p p o r t u n i t y to grow and develop
according to their genius. These
proposals fall short of these objec-
tives. Yet the Committee consid-
ered them earnestly in all their
aspects because of their desire to
find some way for the peaceful
settlement of India's problem and
the ending of the conflict between
India and England.
The kind of independence Congress has
aimed at is the estblishment of a
united, democratic Indian federa-
tion, with a Central authority,
which would command respect from
the natious of the world, maximum
>

provincial autonomy, and equal

rights for all men and women in
the country. The limitation of the
Central authority as contained in
the proposals, as well as the system
of grouping of provinces, weakened
the whole structure and was unfair
to some provinces such as th s*s

N.-W.F. Province and Assam, and

to some of the minorities, notably
254
 the Sikhs, The Committee disap-
approved of this. They felt how-
ever, that taking the proposals as a
whole, there was sufficient scope for
enlarging and strengthening the Cen-
tral Government and for fullv ensur-
*>'

ing the right of a province to act

according to its choice in regard to
grouping, and to give protection to
such minorities as might otherwise
be placed at a disadvantage. Certain
other objections were also raised on
their behalf, noteably the possibility
of non-nationals taking any part
in the constitution making, It is
clear that it would be a breach of
both the letter and spirit of the
statement of May 16 if any non-
Indian participated in voting or
standing far election to the Cons-
tituent Assembly.
In the proposals for an Interim Govern-
ment contained in the statement of
June 16 the defects related to matters
of vital concern to Congress.
Some of these have been pointed
out in the letter dated June 25 of
the Congress President to the Vice-
roy. The Provisional Government
must have power and authority and
responsibility and should function in
255
 fact, if not in law, as a de facto in-
dependent Government leading to
the full independence to come.
The member- of such a government
can only hold themselves res-
ponsible to the people and not to
any external authority. In the
formation of a provisional or other
Government Congressmen can never
give up the national character of
the Congress, or accept an artifical
and unjust parity, or agree to the
veto of a communal group. The
Committee are unable to accept
the proposals for the formation of
an Interim Government as contained
• *

in the statement of June 16.

The Committee have, however, decided
• f

that the Congress should join the

proposed Constituent Assembly,
with a view to framing the Constitu-
tion of free, united and democratic
India. t

While the Committee have agreed to

Congress participation in the Cons-
tituent Assembly, it is in their
opinion essential that a representa-
tive and responsible provisional
National Government be formed at
the earliest possible date. A con-

256
%
 tinuation of authoritarian and un-
representative Government can only
add to the suffering of famishing
masses and increased discontent. It
will also put in jeopardy the work
of the Constituent Assembly, which
can only function in a fi 3e environ-
ment. *

The Workiug Committee recommend

accordingly to the All-India Cong-
ress Committee, and for the purpose
of considering and ratifying this
recommendation they convene an
emergent meeting of the A.-I.C.O.
in Bombay on July 6 and 7.
I

Commenting upon the Congress desire that the Cons-

tituent Assembly should have sovereign power, the
"Scoteman", according to a Globe Londo ma
said:
"The British Government has made it
clear that it cannot cede sovereignty to the
Indian people until the Constituent Assembly
has completed its labours."
"There is no intention of interfering with
its discreation or questioning its powers, but
before the power can be handed over to the
Indian people, the British Government must
be satisfied that there is an adequate pro-
tection of the Minorities and willingness to

257
 r

conclude the treaty with Britain to cover

matters arising out of the transfer of power.
" I t follows as a matter of course, that
there can be no transfer of full power to the
Interim Government. Obviously such a
transfer would open up at once the Hindu-
Muslim controversy".
On the Congress criticisms of grouping of
the Provinces the paper says: "To concede
the Congress demands would be to ensure
the Muslim League's rejection of the scheme.
The Government insists that preliminary
grouping is an essential feature of their plan
which could be modified only by an agree-
5?
ment with the parties
Dealing with the Congress claim that the
States', representatives should be chosen in
the same way as those of the Provinces, the
paper adds: "To this the British Government
very properly replies that this is a matter to
be discussed with the States.
*

"Indeed, it is understood, that they

(states) desire to co-operate with the rest of
India but they will be exposed to pressure
from Congress politicians who wish to under-
mine the authority of the Princes. I t will
be no easy task for the British Government
to play the part of an honest broker", the
paper concludes.

258
 *

Sommoning up the Indian situation Norman Cliff of

the News Chronicle of London wrote on June 19, as
follows:—
"The old issue which wrecked the 1945
Simla conference has reared its ugly head
again and presented a final obstacle to agree-
ment on the proposed Indian Interim Gov-
ernment. Mr. Gandhi has discovered
(mark the word 'discovered') that in order
to preserve its national character, Congress
must insist as a matter of principle, on
including in its Cabinet quota a Nationalist
Muslim "
Again, earliar on June 13, he wrote;
"Although apparently satisfied by the assu-
rances given regarding the powers of the
Interim Government, Congress leaders, or at
least the majority of them, are jibbing at
conceding the parity with the Mulim League
their spokesmen agreed to during the war-
time negotiations (the first Simla con-
ference)".
While praising the Cabinet Ministers for
their achievement on the long term proposal,
Cliff singles out the Viceroy for the blame on
the failure of the interim arrangement.
On this point, he states: "The Govern-
ment is not being fair to Wave'll. We have
no right to expect from men of military

259

\
training and tradition, who instinctively
eschew politics, the qualities of political
acumen and statecraft that only a front-
rank statesman of long experience could be
presumed to possess.
I

T
"By a series of happ} accidents in the
course of British history, soldier-statesmen
of great ability have sometime been discov-
ered on the spot a t times of momentous crisis.
Wavell, by his wisdom , and integrity, soon
proved his commanding stature in the early
stages of the negotiations and he won the
high respect of all taking part.
"But when the negotiations for forming
and Interim Government were handed over
entirely to him, India's subtlest lecjalistically-
minded politicians—not to mention the in-
calculable Mr. Gandhi—got to work, and it
should cause no surprise that in a short time,
the Cabinet Ministers were called upon to
share the responsibility, and accusations were
made that the Viceroy had been induced to
to give assurances to one side which were
inconsistent with the assurances given to
the other.
!

"Apparently the even stickier problem

or trying to reopen and to conduct nego-
tiations for the Interim Government on a
new basis and with the suspicions of both
parties reinforced, is be left to the Viceroy."

260
 I

This verdict on the Viceroy ends on a

striking note o^* a demand for Wavell's recall.
Concludes Cliff. The imperative necessity
it seems to me, is either to relieve Wavell
of this over-whelming responsibility or to
give him support of some man of outstanding
political ability and of integrity equalling
his own who could share a large part of the
burden and, at the same time, command the
confidence of the Indian parties. Where is
such a man to be found?"

TRUTH ABOUT CONGRESS < 'ACCEPTANCE"

OF LONG-TERM PLAN
>

Commenting on Mr. Nehru's mockeries at a recent

Press Chnference 'Nawai-i-WaqV of Lohore, wrote
editorially:—

Mr. Nehru is a sentimental man, and his

passions always dominate his reason. We,
therefore, have never expected that he
would ever think before he talked, and talk
sense. But his irresponsible utterances at
a Press Conference after his accession to the
Presidential ' Gaddi" of the Congress, came
as a surprise to us. Mr. Nehru explaining the
position of the Congress vis-a-vis the Cons-
stituent Assembly asserted that the Cong-
ress had only agreed to participate in the
Constitution-making body. The Congress,
he said, has not accepted any limitation, the

261
Constituent Assembly shall be completely
sovereign and free to take any decisions it
chose to take. There shall be no grouping,
he believed, and the Centre shall have under
it, in addition to Defence, Foreign Affairs
and Communications, the Department of
Industries, Foreign Trade, Customs and
Tariff. The Union Centre shall also levy
taxes and bring under its control as many
subjects as possible. All these utterances of
Mr. Nehru are childish and a responsible
man can only feel ashamed to own them.
Leaders of the Hindu Congress, amongst
whom Mr. Nehru and the ex-showboy Pre-
sident "Maulana" Azad were the foremost,
had talks with the Cabinet Mission for w eeks
together and proposals such as these have
been under discussion. The Hindu Cong-
ress accepted many of the preliminary pro- /

posals put forth by the Ministers, and sugges-

ted amendments for the rest. When the
Hindu Congress and the Muslim League
failed to reach a settlement, the Cabinet
7
Delegation announced their scheme on May
16. Mr. Gandhi called it a remarkable
document and advised the Hindu Congress
to accept it. Subsequently Mr. Gandhi
modified his opinion, and began enumerating
its principal defects, but at last concluded
that the Hindu Congress should accept the
scheme, notwithstanding the defects. Accor-

262
 I

dingly, the Congress put the seal of accept-

ance en the Plan.
Now Mr. Nehru says that the Hindu
Congress has agreed to nothing more than
to join the Constituent Assembly; the cons-
titution-making body has no proprosals to
form the basis for its procedure, and the
Assembly would take decisions according to
its own sweet will. One wonders how he
could manage to suppose that the Muslims
sitting on the floor of the Constituent Assem-
bly would be a team of nonentities allowing
the Hindu Congressites to do what they
liked. Pandit Nehru's plan is an unveiled
plan of Hindu Raj in India, and for him,
strangely enough, its implementation does
not appear to be difficult. Only entry into
the Constituent Assembly will do. I t will
be the height of folly to imagine that the
Muslims will be going to the Constituent
Assembly only to get themselves stifled by
the noose of Hindu Raj. Had these words
been uttered by Mr. Gandhi or Sardar Patel,
we would have taken it as a challenge for
civil war, but we do not consider it worth-
while to attach any importance to the heroics
of a leader who talks like children at the age
of fifty-five.
The Constituent Assembly is only one
item of the Declaration of May 16, and the

263

* •
British Government has quite unequivocally
made it clear that the scheme can be rejected
or accepted as a whole. There is absolutely
no room for anv amendment unless both the
League and the'Congress demand it jointly.
B u t the Honourable President of the Hindu
Congress declares with the gestures of Musso-
lini that we accept only that part of May 16
declaration which relates to the Constituent
Assembly and has nothing to do with the
rest of it. If the Congress actually adopts
the policy which has been declared by its
irresponsible and "old but-childish" President,
it will directly play in the hands of the British
imperialists, because the inevitable result of
such a policy would be t h a t the Constituent
Assembly will never come into existence, or
if it does it will soon face a deadlock that is
bound to killit. Probably this is just what the
British Imperialist wants. At pn sent he dec-
lares, to prove his sincerity, that we are pre-
pared to transfer power but the Indians are
not united amongst themselves. Then he would
discredit India by saying that we established
a Constituent Assembly in India but the
mutual differences of the Indians throttled
it on the very first day. t

BRITISH PRESS ON CONGRESS TACTICS

Most provincial newspapers gave promi-
nent display on Wednesday to the news

264

I
that the Congress has accapted the British
long-term plan for India, though some
prefer to stress the unfavourable reception
of the Interim plan, says a Reuter report
from London.
Scotsman
The influential Scottish daily "Scotsman"
deplored that when the Viceroy issued an
invitation to prospective Ministers, he indi-
cated t h a t if the. parties failed to agree, he
would, nevertheless, proceed to form a
Government of those willing to accept office,
pointing out that this enabled the Congress
party to avoid assuming responsibility.
"How far the Congress party will go is
not clear," says the "Scotsman", "if their
acceptance of the long-term plan is hedged
about with conditions and reservations
intended to leave a loophole for the exercise
of the Hindu majority's power without regard
to minority rights of Muslims. The whole
scheme will break down because it will not
be accepted by Muslims > '

Glasgow Herald
The independent "Glasgow Herald''
blamed Mr. Gandhi for Congress refusal of
the Interim plan, maintaining t h a t he is
"always an adept at devising an insuperable
objection in the 12th hour"

265
 The "Herald" continued "There would
seem to be no escape from the conclusion
that Mr. Gandhi, who has now no official
standing in the Congress, cannot bring him-
self to support any decision which involves
shouldering by party leaders of governing
responsibility.
"Being himself without any conception
of administration or any interest in Govern-
ment, he is virtually resolved that the Cong-
ress should continue to be an irresponsible
Opposition."
News Chronicle
Writing on Congress rejection of Interim
Government proposal the News Chronicle
said: "They have rejected it not because
of any defect from the national viewpoint but
because they are still determined to put their
own sectional interest first".
I give this comment firstly to indicate
trend of public opinion and secondly to emp-
hasise turn which even extremely pro-Cong-
ress section represented by this paper has
taken.
i

I t seems this last episode in history of

Indian constitutional advancement' has
brought the fact to force as never before that
Hindu and Muslim viewpoint stands and

266 <
 interests are fundamentally opposite and
exclusive.
Congress tactics have only helped to show
futility^ of efforts at bringing two nations
into harmony. And some have begun to
wonder whether Muslim League's personal
plan for partition was not the best plan for
India.
Conviction is growing t h a t people of
such opposite drift cannot be brought to^ei
.v
ther in the best interests of country.
\

"Few of the recognised popular leaders of

INC have come out of the recent test with
honour," said the British Right-Wing weekly
"Time and Tide". " B u t those with least are
Pandit Nehru and his colleagues," cables
Renter from London.
I t adds; "Narrow doctrinaire, and in
many respects plain stupid politically, they
resolutely decline to accept responsibility for
0
anything but the new India of their own
ambitions—the India, the whole conception
of which will be bitterly opposed by sections
of people far too powerful."
"By refusing to enter the Interim Govern-
ment," the article concludes: "they escape
responsibility to retain their privilege of
immoderate criticism and reserve perpetual

267
rights of rejection of everything that does not
correspondent 100 per cent to their own
blueprint for a Congress dominated India".
Commenting-on the Congress r jeciion of the Interim
Government proposals Mr. M N. Roy in a Press state-
ment said:

"The last minute refusal by the Congress

to join the Interim Government is a move
which cannot but mystify all who think in
terms of practicale politics. None can have
any doubt that the Cabinet Mission came
with the determination to placate the Cong-
ress.
For that purpose, they were prepared
to do any think short of by-passing the
Muslim League. Without any scruple what-
soever, they threw Ambedkar overboard, in
ord^r to give the Congress one more seat in
the Tnierim Government. That was a gross
injustice, because Scheduled Cast candidates
sponsored by the Congress could not defeat
Ambedkar's followers except with Caste Hindu
votes.
"After the refusal of the Congress to join
the Interim Government the Viceroy and the
Cabinet Mission ought to have acted accor-
ding to their plighted word and proceeded
to form the Interim Government with the
Muslim League and such other Indian public

268
men as were prepared to accept the State-
ment of May 16. Instead of taking t h a t
straightforward course the Viceroy and the
Cabinet Mission have decided to set up a
Ceretaker Government of officials and to
resume negotiations again after some time.

This action is in flat contardiction of the

intention to transfer power and is besides a
breach of a solemn promise. No words will
be strong enough to condemn the action.
After three months of labour the Cabinet
Mission is returning home after establishing
a Governmet of Bureaucrats instead of a
Provisional National Government as they
planned to do. There cannot be a worse
contrast between promise and fulfilment.

Commenting on the question of parity the

Liberator wrote editorially: When the
Cabinet Mission announced its programme of
a long-term settlement, it added a rider to
the effect that an interim Government re-
presentative of the two main political parties
would shoulder the burden of office and
responsibility. The Mission clearly pointed
out that the constitution of an Interim
Government depended on the acceptance of
the long-term proposals embodied in its
paper issued on the 17th of last month.
Aware of the disadvantages of the plan and its

269
 hostile attitude towards the Muslim League
yet anxious to extract water from a stone,
the Muslim League decided to accept it.
The Muslim League was under the impression,
and is under the impression that it would
enjoy equality of representation with the
Congress; at the Simla Conference held
last year it was freely mentioned in Congress
circles t h a t the Wavell Formula would have
been accepted if it had been modified and
parity between the Congress and the League
I had been provided for in the Interim Govern-
ment. Time works many wonders and with-
in the brief spell of a year, the Congress has
come to the conclusion that it cannot accept
parity with the Muslim League and that the
latter body must be taught a lesson. We
have no desire to take sides in the contro-
versy, but we cannot help feeling that the
Congn ss is adopting a singularly unwise and
unreasonable policy. Why should a national
organisation object to parity? At Simla
Conference No. 2, Congress representatives
at the Conference table were equal in num-
ber to those of the League. According to
impartial observers, the Conference was
concerned with affairs of greater moment
than those with which an Interim Govern-
ment would necessarily be concerned and
one would have thought that if disagreement
should arise, ii would not be on this issue.

270
 High-ranking Congress authorities are
satisfied with the Viceroy's assurance regard-
ing the constitution, powers and scope of
the functions of the Interim Government.
Only they cannot swallow the bitter sweet
of parity. Why is there so much ballyhoo
raised on this issue of parity, and how is it
likely to advance the cause of freedom? We
are told that the present Congress-League
Parity Formula would place the Hindus at
a disadvantage who, in a Council of twelve,
will be represented by five members, and
that this would not be fair to the Hindus.
But Congress, we are told in the same breath,
is a national organisation, an organisation
which is not interested in the colour, the
creed or the community of the individual.
If this be true, then how does is matter to
the Congress whether there are five Hindus
or no Hindu at all in the Viceroy's Executive
Council functioning under the 1919 Act? Did
not Mr. Vallabhai Patel only recently inform
the public that they would be only too pleased
if the British handed over the keys of the
Government to Mr. Jinnah and walked out
of India so that a new era might be born ?
If words have any meaning, then Mr. Valla-
bhai Patel must be taken to have expressed
his confidence in the Muslim League and
suggested that it could rule over the whole
of India. If Mr. Jinnah and his followers

271
can be entrusted with the great responsibil-
ity of ruling the whole of India, and free
India at that, why should they not enjoy
parity of representor ion with the Congress
which aspires to suffer in this world, seeks no
rewards from anv one on this earth and is
wedded to a life of glorious suffering and
peerless sacritice? L >ok at this question
from a more earthly point of view and it
will be realised that parity has more points
in it which require to be considered very
carefully.
Congress, it may be pointed out, has
claimed to represent the nation, but has
drawn its strength from certain groups in the
country. These groups have been divinely
ordaint d or received the Mahatmaic sanction
to assume office and never to be ruled. Other-
wise, how can one explain in Madras, the
presence of five Brahmin Ministers in a
Cabinet of eleven? Judged by all principles
of justice and proportionality, there is no
necessity to have more than a single Brahmin
Minister in the Cabinet. The Non-Brahmins
are there in the Congress in order to work
for the power and prosperity of the governing
caste, and if they are impertinent enough to
breathe a word of protest against the recog-
nised usage and rules of the Congress party,
they will meet their doom J u s t as in the
provinces the governing caste must rule, so
*

272

*
too in the Centre must it obtain a large slice
of the patronage. What, after all, is the
Muslim doing? He is not taking away the
bread from the mouths of the Non-Brahmin
and the Scheduled Castes, but is attempting
to make the governing caste less gluttonous
and grow slimmer so than it might be beauti-
ful. 80 why blame tht> Muslim ? Why not
accept the parity demand and work with
Mr. Jinnah in close harmony? True, he may
be the leaded of the Interim Government, but
what right have we to object when the entire
dominion was off red to him by Mr. Valla-
bhai Patel? If Congress is honest, if it is
patriotic and if it is imbued with the feelings
of friendship and love of freedom, it will in
the words of the Mahatama slightly adapted
to suit the subject, recognise in Mr. Jinnah
the "man of God". If the Cabinet Mission
was recognised by the Mahatama to be "man
of God" why should not Mr. Jinnah also be
recognised as a man of God, and instead of
being worshipped, which is the prerogotive of
Mahatama be allowed to form an Interim
Government on the basis of parity with the
Congress ? 1

On the 19th of June the Daily 'Dawn' writing under

the caption of Parity phoboea wrote:—
In an attempt to back out from the posi-
tion which Congress leadership had accepted

273
 1

mi
on the question of parity," they appear to
have inspired the Hindu Press to indulge in
blatant denials. The Amrita Bazar Patrika
, of Calcutta-Allahabad and the Tribune of
Lahore, among others, have taken to the
trial like packs in full cry. The former has
fallen foul of this newspape?* for having
stated in a recent Political Correspondent's
story, that not only had Congress-League
parity been accepted in the so-called Desai-
Liaquat formula, but that in the first Simla
Conference the Congress had accepted Mus-
lim-Caste Hindu parity which was the basis
of Waveli Plan I:
"Our Muslim League contemporary.
Dawn" says the Patrika, 'mas drawn upon
its imagination to mislead its readers."
Fortunately, imagination of this particular
7
variet} has been so completely monopolised
b y . our Hindu nationalist contemporaries
that there is little left for us to draw upon
even if we want to. We confess rather to
a weakness for facts.
The late Mr. Bhulabhai Desai published
his formula, the basis of which was parity of
representation in the Central Government
between Congress and the Muslim League.
Whether Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan was
really a party to it or not is not germane to
the present issue; but Mr. Desai did claim

274
 • »

its authorship and also declared t h a t Mr.

Gandhi had agreed to the formula. Mr.
Gandhi did not deny it, The Congress as a
body may not have considered and given its
decision on it, because the members of the
Working Committee 'were still mostly in pri-
son, but the consent of Mr. Gandhi was
enough.
*

In the Wavell Plan announced shortly

afterwards the Congress-League parity
of the Desai formula was changed to Caste-
Hindu-Muslim parity. Mr. Gandhi publicly
stated that he did not understand this al-
*

though he could understand parity between

League and Congress. The most important
fact however was—and we repeat the world
"fact"—that in the first Simla Conference
the Congress delegates, after preliminary
objections, did categorically accept parity
between Muslims and Caste Hindus. The
Conference broke down not on this issue but
beciuse Congress insisted on including a
"nationalist" Muslim in the Muslim quota,
and eventually the Viceroy insisted on
including in it a Muslim Unionist. I t is
useless for our contemporary to draw upon
its own fertile imagination and mislead its
readers by pretending that these are not
facts. If it has any genuine doubt on the
subject let it refer to Mr. Gandhi himself and

275
invite him or the Congress President to
deny what we have stated.
-As regards the Tribune which says: " i f
Congress leaders were not prepared to
swallow the rlindu-MusWm parity formula at
the first Simla Conference, how could they
swallow it now?" and again: "The Congress
rightly refused to entertain the communal
parity idea when it was put officially iu the
forefront at Simla"—we regret to have to
say that it is indulging in deliberate false-
hoods. The fact that the Congress did swal-
low the communal parity formula at Simla
in 1945 may be a bitter pill for our Lahore
contemporary, but we are unable to furnish
any sugar-coating for it. We are not the
Cabinet Mission.
When two Parties do not agree and a
third party is called upon to propose a
settlement conceding partially the demands
of both, the only honest course for the par-
ties in question is either to saV yes or no.
That is what was expected both from the
Congress and Muslim League. The Cong-
ress set down impossible conditions for the
modification of a considered decision
arrived at by the Mission and the Viceroy.
And having failed in the negotiations to
secure everything that was desired to suit
the ends of Hindu Raj, the Congress rejected

276
the invitation. "The party that adopts
such tactics brands itself as intransigent".
The Muslim League on the other hand
took one more momentous decision and gave
further evidence of its statesmanship and
spirit of co-operation. It accepted the invita-
tion to participate in shouldering the respon-
sibilities of an Interim Government. Unlike
the Congress the Muslim Leasue made no reser-
vations and set down no impossible condition
for the modification of a considered decision
arrived at by the Mission and the Viceroy
after a failure of agreement between the
parties.
Let us recall paragraph 8 of the Cabinet
Mission Statement of June 16 in which they
declared that. /

"In the event of the two parties or either

of them proving unwilling to join in the
setting up of a eoalition Government on the
above lines, it is the intention of the Vicerov
to proceed with the formation of an Interim
Government which will be as representative
as possible of those willing to accept the
Statement of May 16."
One major party expressed its willingness
to joia thus making it less difficult for the
Viceroy to proceed with the formation of a
new Government, than he would have if
both parties had rejected the Plan.

277
 But at this stage the Congress circles
assiduously set on foot a whispering cimpaign
to the effect that they had made a secret
deal with the Cabinet Ministers and the
Viceroy by which the Cabinet Mission and
the Congress agreed to act according to a
prearranged Plan. This Plan, the the Cong-
ress propagandists maintained, was that the
Congress would reject the Interim Govern-
ment proposals and accept the Long term
Plan with their own mental reservations,
while the Mission and the Viceroy on their
own part, and as a price for the Congress
acceptance of the proposals of May 16, would
go back on tha decision embodied in their
Statement of June 16, as well as on the
categorical assurances given to Mr. Jinnah
subsequently by the Viceroy, and post-
pone indennately the formation of the
Interim Government.
Something we refused to beleive at that
stage made itself apparent later when the
three British Cabinet Ministers atnd Lord
Wavell branded themselves and the Govern-
ment they esent as tterly dish
able by falling into a pit obligingly, opened
out for them by Congress's men of dishonour.
The formation of the Interim Government
was postponed by the Cabinet Mission and
Viceroy and a government of officials was to be
imposed on India. Such a reactionary course

278
had not been envisaged even by the worst
pessmists and although the Hindu Congress
Press had canvassed the idea it was con-
sidered incredible that either the Congress
could suggest or the Mission could accept a
so-called solution however temporary.
Dt ep regret was expressed that merely
to spite the Muslim League the Congress
leaders could lend support to the "monstrous
idea of putting India under complete bureau-
cratic chains there by restoring conditions
that prevailed nearly four, decades ago.
Nor was it expected that the Mission
would take advantage of this impatriotic
attitude of the Congress and hasten.to make
imperialistic capital out of it.
But the unexpected at last did happen
and the British imperialist and Congress
conspiracy gave birth to a caretaker Govern-
ment of Officials. The following Statement
was issued in New Delhi by the Cabinet
Delegation and the Viceroy.

"The Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy

are glad that Constitution-making can now
proceed with the consent of the two major
parties and of the States. They welcome
the statements made to them by the leaders
of the Congress and the Muslim League t h a t

279
it is their intention to try and work in the
Constituent Assembly so as to make it a
speedy and effective means of devising the
new constitutional arrangements under
which India can acheive her independence.
Thev are sure that the members of the Cons-
tituent Assembly who are about to be elected
will work in this spirit.
"The Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy
regret t h a t it has not so far proved possible
to form an Interim Coalition Government,
but they are determined t h a t the effort
should be renewed in accordance with the
terms of paragraph 8 of their Statement of
June 16. *
"Owing, however, to the very heavy
burden which has been cast upon the Viceroy
and the representatives of the parties during
the last three months, it is proposed that the
further negotiations should be adjourned for
a short interval during the time while the
elections for the Constituent Assembly will
be taking place.
T
" I t is hoped that w hen the discussions are
resumed, the leader^ of the two major parties,
who have all expressed their agreement with
the Viceroy and the Cabinet Misson on the
need for the speedy formation of a representa-
tive Interim Government, will do their ut-

280
most to arrive at an accommodation upon the
composition of that Government.
"As the Government of India must be
carried on"until a new Interim Government
can be formed, it is the intention of the
Viceroy to set up a, temporary caretaker
Government of officials.
I t is not possible for the Cabinet Mission
to remain longer in India as they must
return to report to the British Cabinet and
Parliament and also to resume their work
from which thev have been absent for over
%

three months. They therefore propose to

leave India on Saturday next June 29
" I n leaving India the members of the
Cabinet Mission express their cordial thanks
for all the courtesy and consideration which
they have recived as guests in the country
and they most sincerely trust that the steps
which they have initiated will lead to a
speedy realisation of the hopes and wishes 01
the Indian people."
MUSALMANS INDIGNANT
The rejection by the Cabinet Mission of
the offer of forming the Interim Government
by the Muslim League caused extreme resent-
ment to the Mussalmans. It came as a
great shock to them that the Mission went-

281
back on its own words and the musalmans
were now determined not to take this dilibe-
m

rate betrayal lying down. The Cabinet

Mission was in honour bound by their written
committment to form an Interim Govern-
ment by any party that was willing to accept
their proposals as a whole, long-term or
short term.
Musalmans are incapable of any hypocra-
cy and duplicity. They showed throughout
utmost accommodation and reasonableness
for solving the political deadlock. But the
Cabinet Mission in their anxiety to appease
the Congress went out of their way in reject-
ing the offer of friendship by the Muslim
League, This rejection was the cause of
great jubiliation for the Hindu Press and
they were glad that the Muslim League did
not come into power. This is a proof posi-
tive of the fact that when the Congress talk
of transferance of political power to Indian
hands they mean the Congress Raj. And if
the Hindu raj is not established they are
prepared to perpetuate the British raj.

The daily 'Dawn' on the 27th June 1946 com-

mented as follows on the Failure of the Mission:— ,
The Cabinet Mission are to depart from
India next Saturday. Over their labours of
three long months, failure is writ large. In
/

282 .
their statement issued yesterday evening
they vainly attempt to clothe that failure
with the semblance of success. Their State-
ments of May 16 and June 16 are no longer
achievements of which they can be proud.
The long-term Plan set forth in the first, and
solemnly declared as unalterable except by
two party consent, has been allowed to be
badgered out of shape in vital parts of its
anatomy by the shock-tactics of one intransi-
gent party which hns put its own iterpreta-
tions and declared its intention of sticking
to them. This is not acceptance in the sense
that any honest man would understand that
word. But the Cabinet Mission have allow-
ed themselves to be bullied into silence over
so vital an issue. Instead, they have put
their tonerues in their cheeks and expressed
satisfaction " t h a t constitution-making can
now proceed with the consent of the two
major parties and the States". 'They know
t h a t it cannot, and that there is grave
trouble, confusion and choas ahead if the
Congress carries out its announced intention
to convert the Mission's Plan into a plan of
its own which the Muslim League has not
accepted and cannot accept.
The Cabinet Mission have bungled more
gravely and shown even greater cowardice
over their other Plan announced on June 16,
regarding the formation of an Interim Gover-

283
 >

nment. In their yesterday's statement they

resort to palpable contradictions in order to
cover their bungling and their cowardice.
They declare "their determination that the
effort (to form an interim Government)
should be renewed in accordance with the
terms of paragraph 8 of their Statement on
June 16". and in the same breath they indi-
cate that the discussions are to be resumed
with "the leaders of the major parties" inclu-
ding the Congress which has unequivocally
rejected the proposal. It must be assumed
that the members of the Mission are not
half-witted, and therefore these contradic-
tions, this liberty with the English language,
can only be regarded as deliberate.
Every newspaper readers must now know
by heart the language of paragaph 8 of the
June 16 Statement. Therein the Mission
declared that they would proceed with the
formation of an Interim Government whether
both or either of the major parties accepted
the proposal or not. They undertook to go
ahead with both major parties if they agreed,
with one major party if the other did not
agree, or without any of the major parties if
neither agreed. The consent of either the
League or the Congress or of both was not
indispensable for the carrying into effect of
the formation of the Interim Government,
this is clearly implied in "the terms of para-

284
 graph 8". Now the Mission say t h a t after
the elections for the Constituent Assembly are
over thev will "resume discussions" and
they indicate that even the Congress wh
has rejected the Plan, is again likely to be
approached. Has the basis of the Interim
Government Plan been now altered to mean
that there can be no such Government unless
both the major parties agree ?
The most wicked, the most insulting and
the most treacherous to the cause of India,
irrespective of party interests is the further
decision of the Mission to hand over the
Government of India for an indefinite period
to a body of officials. Professing to come
out to India to give her freedom for the
future and representative popular Govern-
ment for the Interim period, the Mission
have in reality set the clock back by 40
years. They have re-established the com-
plete strangle-hold of imperialism on the
Indian administration which existed before
the appointment of non-official Indians to
>

the Viceroy's Executive Council began.

When the Mission came there was at least an
Executive Council composed of a majority of
non official and able Indians who were
eminent in their own way and who had a
certain amount of independence of action
and outlook. When the Mission leave, even
this partially popular character of the Cen-

285

*v
tral Government will have disappeared, and
a set of officials in the permanent employ
of the imperialist will be in complete mono-
poly of power. This is the net result oi the
Cabinet Mission's "sincere desire" to transfer
power te Indian hands even while the future
constitution is being framed! And this is
what the Congress has done to Tndia by
refusing to share power with the Muslim
League and by standing in the way of other
patriotic oarties exercising that power for
the good of India at this most critical time
when the country should be administered by
independent representatives of the people
and not by the imperialist bureaucracy.
This is the sum-total of the Cabinet
Mission's achievement in India of which thev
seem to be proud. The more one reflects,
the more does the conviction grow that it is
not out of altruistic love for India and
Indians, or actuated by the desire to set
India free from British domination, that
three members of the British Cabinet came
out to this country and laboured in the sultry
plains of Delhi—but that they came out to
play the age old British game of strengthen-
ing the British hold on India under the pre-
tence of relaxing it. Words have no meaning
except in the context of deeds, and this dark
deed of handing India over to a set of officials
on the plea of "no agreement between

286
parties" falsifies all the Mission's platitudes
and professions If they had been really
desirous of transferring power they could have
brought into being immediately a Govern-
ment consisting of those who had accepted
their invitation of June 16 and keeping the
other seats in the Executive Council vacant
so that they could be filled later by further
negotiations with the Congress or with others.
• •

This is what they had categorically pledged

themselves to do in paragraph 8 of their
Statement. The Muslim League having
accepted the invitation at least six or seven
seats in the interim Government could have
been immediately filled. Thtse six or seven
Members of the New Government could have
held charge of all the portfolios until others
came in. That might not have been the
complete Government at one start, but it
would have certainly been a Government a
thousand times more representative of and
beneficial to the people than this official
caueis which is being put in power.
Judging by these facts the conclusion is
justifi d t h a t the Mission came out to India
to hold the country more firmly to the
British Empire, and not to help her on the
road to freedom. The suspicion also grows
that the statement of yesterday is the first
step towards a double-cross on the Muslim
League and the Muslim Nation. We still

287
refuse to believe t h a t categorical promises
made by Lord Wavell to Mr. Jinnah will be
broken because the man who has given
these promises and assurances is not only the
Viceroy of India but a Field Marshal in the
British Army, Never yet, as far as we know,
has the King's highest representative in
India broken his solemn word to anybody,
nor can Lord Wavell be unaware of the
sanctitv of a soldier's word. The honour of
Britain, and particularly the personal honour
of the Viceroy who knows what pledges
he has given, are at s t i k e . So is the peace
of India. The next move of the British
Government will decide whether under a
Socialist regime the honour of a nation is to
be turned into dishonour and whether there
must be the shedding of blood in India after
all.

The new developments obliged Qaide Azam M. A.

Jinnah to come out with an exhaustive statement, plac-
ing the whole issue thread bare before the public. The
following is the full text of his statement:

I have considered the letter of the Cong-

ress President addressed to Lord VVavell
dated June 25, the resolution of the Working
Committee of the Congress released to the
Press yesterday: and the statement of the
Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy issued

288
in New Delhi on Wednesday, June 26, but a
copy of which has not yet been furnished to
me.
" I think it is necessary for me to state
shortly as to what occurred during the pro-
gress of the negotiations at various stages
from time to time.
"Prior to the Cabinet Delegation's state-
ment of May 16, and further statement of
May 25, the Viceroy at Simla represented to
me that he would proceed with the formation
of an Interim Government on the basis of
the formula 5 : 5 : 2 , i.e. 5 on behalf of the
Muslim League, 5 on behalf of the Congress,
one Sikh, and one Indian Christian or Ano-o
Indian and that, as regards the portfolios,
the most important of them would be equally
divided between the Congress and the Muslim
League, further details being left open for
discussion.
" With the permission of the Viceroy I was
authorised to state this formula to the
Working Committee at Simla, on the assump-
tion that the long-term Proposals would be
such as would be acceptable to us. There-
after again, on the eve the meeting of the
Working Committee of the Muslim League,
in my interview on June 3, the Viceroy re-
peated the same formula and authorised me
to communicate it to my Working Com-
mittee.

289
 "This was one of the most important
considerations which weighed with them to-
gether with the two statements of the Cabi-
net Delegation dated May 16 and May 25.
The long-term plan and the Interim Govern-
ment formula together formed onp whole and
this formula regarding the Interim Govt, was
an integral part of the whole scheme and as
such the Council of the All-India Muslim
League gave its final decision on that basis
on June 6.
"Thereafter, the Viceroy sent for me on
June 13 and he sugges ed a formula of
5 : 5 : 3. Owing to the agitation set on foot
by the Congress Press and the opposition of
the Congress to the original formula. I had
already given a warning to the Viceroy in a
letter on June 2, that any departure from
:
this formula, d rectly or indirectly, would
lead to serious consequences and would not
secure the co-operation of the Muslim League,
and that I might have to call a meeting of
the Council of the All-India Muslim League
again.
"At my interview with the Viceroy on
June 13, I wfis told by him that he wanted to
change the basis of the original formula and
proceed on the basis of 5 Congress, 5 Muslim
League and 3 others i.e. one Sikh, one Schedul-
ed Caste and one Indian Christian or Anarlo

290
Indian. In spite of the difficulties that I
had pointed out would arise, I informed the
Viceroy that if the Congress were finally to
agree to this new formula 1 would place it
before my Working Committee for their
consideration .
" B u t even this second proposal of the
Viceroy was turned down by the Congress and
His Excellency the Viceroy, informed me by
his letter dated June 15 that he had failed to
negotiate an agreement on the basis which he
had suggested and that the Cabinet Delega-
tion and he had decided to issue their state-
ment on J u n e 16 on the action they proposed
to take.
Accordingly, the Statement of J u n e 16
was issued to the Press and an advance copy
was sent to me. The terms were, we were
categorically informed, final and not
open to any m codification, except t h a t
the names in the statement could not be
regarded as final, until the Viceroy had recei-
ved acceptances from those invited to take
office in the Interim Government.
"On June 19, I wrote to the Viceroy seek-
ing certain clarifications regarding the state-
ment of June 16, to which a reply was recei-
ved from him on June 20 after he had consul-
ted the Cabinet Delegation. The following

291
extracts are from t h a t letter of the Viceroy
in reply to question put to him:
(\) "Until I have received the acceptance
of those invited, to take office in the
Interim Government, the names in
the statement cannot be regarded as
final. No change is proposed to be
made in the statement without the
consent of the two major parties.
(2) "No change in the number of 14
members of the Interim Government
will be made without agreement of
the two major parties.
(3) "If any vacancy occurs among the
seats at present allotted to the re-
presentatives of the minorities. I
shall naturally consult both the main
parties for filling it.
(4) "The proportion of the members by
'communities' will not be changed
without agreement of the two major
parties.
(5) No decision on a major communal
issue could be taken by the Interim
Government if the majority of the
main parties were opposed to it.
I pointed this out to the Congress
President and he agreed that the
Congress appreciated this point.

292
 " I had by my letter of June 19 informed
the Viceroy that in view of the serious
changes which had from time to time been
made to satisfy the Congress, it was not
possible for the Working Committee to arrive
at any decision in the matter of formation of
the Interim Government, so long as the Cong-
ress did not convey their final decision on the
proposals of June 16 to the Viceroy and
until it was communicated to me.
" I t was finally arranged that the Con
ress should give their decision by Sunday
J u n e 23, and the League should give its
decision on the same day or immediately
thereafter. The renlv of the Congress w
however, not forthcoming till late in the
C

evening on June 25, and I was asked to meet

the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy the
same evening. There I was furnished with a
copy of the letter of the President of the
Congress dated June 25.
"According to the arrangement referred
to above, I placed this reply before my
Working Committee immediately and the
same day the Muslim League Working Com-
mittee adopted the following resolution which
was communicated to H.E. the Viceroy the
same night.
The President of the All-India Muslim
League placed before the Working Committee

293
a copy furnisned to him by the Viceroy and
the Cabinet Delegation in the course of their
interview with him this evening, of the letter
of the Congress President addressed to the
Viceroy, conveying the decision of the Cong-
ress with regard to the proposals of the Cabi-
net Delegation and the Viceroy contained in
their statements of May 16 and June 16,
1946.
1. 'According to the understanding that
the Muslim League Working Committee will
give their decision after the Congress has
decided, and as desired by the Viceroy by
the letter of his Private Secretary dated
June 21 addressed of the Honorary Secretary
of the All-India Muslim Leigue, Nawabzada
Liaquat Ali Khan, that the decision of the
Muslim League be communicated immedia-
tely after the reply of the Congress, the
Working Committee of the All-India Muslim
League hereby resolve to agree to join the
Interim Government on the basis of the
statement of the Cabinet Delegation and His
Excellency the Viceroy dated June 16, 1946,
and the clarifications and assuranees given
by the Viceroy after consultation with the
Cabinet Delegation in his letter dated June
20, 1946, addressed to the President of the
Muslim League.
2. 'The Working Committee cannot
accept the contention of the Congress con-

294
tained in the aforesaid letter that the Cong-
ress is entitled to adhere to its interpretation
of some of the provisions in the Statement
of the Cabinet Delegation and His Excellency
the Viceroy dated May 16, 1946, which is
opposed to the interpret ition and explana-
tion embodied in the Statement issued by the
Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy on May
25, 1946,
3. "With regard to the rest of the letter
of the Congress President, the Working Com-
mittee reserve their observation for the
present.
"I regret that the Cabinet Delegation and the
Viceroy should have thought fit to postpone indefinite-
ly the formation of the Interim Government on the
basis of their Statement of June 16 as that Statement
clearly says that the Viceroy aimed at inaugurating
the Interim Government about June 26. It is very
difficult to see what are the mysterious reasons and
causes for this sudden departure.
The Muslim League emphatically dis-
approves of this action on the part of the
Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy, because
all contingenciss including rejection by the
Congress were contemplated by and provided
for in the Statement of June 16 and Clause 8
of the Statement, taken along with the con-
text, is quite clear and the Delegation and
the Viceroy were in honour bound to go
ahead with the formation of the Interim

295

•
Government immediate!v with those who
were willing to come into the Interim Govern-
ment on the basis and principles set out in
their Statement of June 16.
"As regard the resolution of the Congress,
I most emphatically repudiate their bogus
claim that they represent India and their
claim to "national" character. The Cong-
ress are a Hindu organisation and they do
not represent any other community except
the Caste Hindus. They certainly do not re-
present the Muslims and the mere fact that
they have a handful of Muslim henchmen
for the purpose of window-dressing cannot
give the national character which they claim,
nor the right to represent India upon which
they keep on harping.
"This has been established beyond doubt
in the recent elections the results of which
show that the Muslim League carried away
90 per cent of the total of Muslim seats in
the various legislatures, and out of the re-
maining 10 per cent the Congress share does
not amount to more than 4 per cent.
'The Congress, therefore have no right to
represent or speak on behalf of the Muslims
and their refusal to accept the proposals for
the formation of the Interim Government is
based on sinister motives. First, they

296
 I

wanted to break the parity between the Mus-

lims and the Caste Hindus. If was accepted
by them at Simla last year at the Conference
called by the Viceroy in connection with the
Wavell Proposals, and secondly, their insis-
tence on nominating a Congress Muslim is
aimed at striking at the fundamentals of the
League and its Muslim national representa-
tive character and at attempting to estab-
lish a false claim that the Congress represents
the Muslims and-the Muslim League is not
the representative organisation of Muslim
India.
As it is pointed out above, the Congress
claim is not true nor based upon facts and
therefore the Muslim League cannot be a
party directly or indirectly to any course of
action which is calculated to prop up this
bogus claim.
"As regards the safeguard that no deci-
sion on any major communal issue could be
taken if the majority of the main parties
were opposed to it, of which assurance was
given by the Viceroy, this is absolutely neces-
sary to protect the Muslim interests as the
number is now increased from 12 to 14, and
although there is parity between the Caste
Hindus and the Muslims, the Muslims will be
in a minority of little over one-third in the
whole executive.

297

•
 " I gather from the letter of the President
of the Congress that the Viceroy represented
to him that in his proposal there was no
parity either between Hindus and Muslims
or between the Congress and the Muslim
League in as much as there were to be 6
Hindus belonging to the Congress as against
5 Muslims belonging to the Muslim League.
One of the six Hindus belonged to the
Scheduled Caste.
"Whether this version is true or not, it
is contrary to what the Viceroy said in this
letter of June 20 to me whi<m clarifies the
points raised by me and in that he says,
The proportion of members by communities
will not be changed without the agreement
of the two major parties." However, I want
to make it clear that if there is any departure
made in the principle of parity or if the
Congress is allowed to nominate a Muslim
in either case it will be impossible for the
Muslim League to agree to it as t n a t would
strike at the very fundamentals of the
League.
"Notwithstanding the clear Statement of
May 16 and the further statements of the
Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy of May
25, clarifying and finally giving their authori-
tative interpretation, the Congress, both in
the letter of the President and their resolu-
tion adhere to their wrong interpretation

298
that any province or provinces is or are
entitled to opt out initially and that have
a right at any stage to do so.
"This is clear indication that the Cong-
ress is not accepting the long-term proposals
in a sincere and honest spirit of co-operation
and peaceful settlement. If they persist in this
and adopt measures to set at nought what is
described by the statement of the Delegation
of May 25, to constitute the essential future
of the scheme the whole plan will be wrecked
at its very inception.
"As regards the many other statements
and allegation that are made in the letter of
the Congress President, they are merely
intended for propaganda and some of them
are n o t relevant to the immediate issues,
but I have no means of dealing with th^m
as I do not know what actually took place
between the Congress President and the
Viceroy of the Delegation as I have not got
the correspondence t h a t passed between
them on various points to which references
have been made in this letter.
" I n conclusion I would like to emphasise
that if any attempt is made to whittle down
in any way the assurances given to the Mus-
lim League or to change or modify the basis
of the statement of June 16, which has been
accepted by the Muslim League, it will be
regarded bv Muslim India as going back on

299
the part of the Cabinet Delegation and the
Viceroy on their pledged word in writing
and as a breach of faith. The British
Government will in that case forfeit the
confidence of Muslim India and of those
whom they expect to work, on their part,
according to their pledged word
However the Viceroy and the Cabinet Mission
tried to refutd the charge of Mr. Jinnah,—that the
Viceroy and Cabinet Mission had gone back on their
word with regard to the formation of an Interim
Government and the following exchange of correspon-
dence throws light on the subject.
i

Letter from M. A. Jinnah, President, All-India

Muslim League, dated New Delhi, June 19:
(

Dear Lord Wavell, '

I am in receipt of your letter of the June
18, L946, together with an advance copy of
the statement by the Cabinet Delegation and
yourself of the same date.
In my interview with you at Simla prior
to the announcement of the Cabinet Delega-
tion's proposals, you had informed me that
you were going to form the Interim Govern-
ment consisting of 12 members on the basis
of five Muslim League, five Congress, one
Sikh and one Indian Christian or Anglo-
Indian.
As regards the portfolios, you had indica-
ted that the important Ones would the equa-

300
lly divided between the Muslim League and
the Congress but details of actual allotment
were to be left open for discussion. After
the Statement of the Cabinet Delegation and
yourself, dated May 16, 1946, you again on
June 3 at New Delhi gave me to understand
that the formula for the formation of the
Interim Government disclosed to me at
Simla would be followed.

On both the occasions I sought your

permission to communicate this information
to my Working Committee which you kindly
gave. Accordingly I gave a full account of the
talks I had with you and the decision of the
Working Committee in regard to the accep-
tance of the long-term proposals was largely
influenced by the faith which they reposed
in the scheme for the formation of the In-
terim Government disclosed by you to me on
the two occasions.

Further, as I have already pointed out

in my letter to you of June 8, I made
the statement before the Council of the AU-
India Muslim League that that was the formu-
la which, I was assured by you, would be the
basis on which you would proceed to form
your Interim Government, and, therefore,
this formed an integral part of the plan em-
bodied in the Statement of the Delegation.

301
 This was one of the most important con-
siderations which weighed with the Council
of the All-India Muslim League also in arriv-
ing at their decision, although even then
there was a section that was opposed to the
plan being accepted.
•

When the Congress Press started a sinis-

ter agitation against Congress-League parity,
with a view to inform you of the Muslim
League stand, I wrote to you on June 8 t h a t
"any departure from this formula, directly or
indirectly, will lead to serious consequences
and will not secure the co-operation of the
Muslim League."
Subsequently, in my interview with you
on June 13 you informed me that you wanted
to alter the basis and proceed on the formula
of five Congress, five Muslim League, and
three others namely, one Sikh, one Scheduled
Caste, and one Indian Christian. I told you
then if any change was proposed to be made
I would have to place the matter before the
Working Committee and may have to call
another meeting of the Council of the All-
India Muslim League.
I also informed you t h a t when the Cong
ress finally agreed to your new formula I
would then place it before my Working
Committee for them to take such action as
they deem necessary.

302
 After discussion with the Congress repre-
sentatives you wrote to me on J u n e 15 in-
forming me that you bad failed to negotiate
an agreement on the composition of the
Interim Government on the basis of 5 : 5 : 3
and that the Cabinet Delegation and vour
self would issue a statement on J u n e 16 on
the action that you proposed to take and
T
that you would let me have a cop} of it be- »
fore publication.
Accordingly you sent me a copy of the
statement by the Cabinet Delegation and
yourself issued on June 16 with a covering
letter of the sinie date, which I placed
before my Working Committee who after
careful consideration of the matter have
authorised me to state as follows:—
(a) That the Working Committee are
surprised that invitations have been issued
to tive Muslim Leaguers to join the Interim
Government without calling for a list from
the leader of the Muslim League.
(b) That your latest proposal on the basis
of which you now desire to form your Interim
Government shows that you have abandoned
parity between the Congress and the Muslim
League, the two major parties, and have sub-
stituted parity between the Muslim League
and Caste Hindus, and have added a fourth

303
 representative of the minorities, namely, a
Parsi. One of the minority representatives
nominated by you, that is, Mr. Jagjivan
Ram, is a Congressman and has been selec-
ted, it appears, not to give real representa-
tion to the Scheduled Castes, but to give an
additional seat to the Congress in the Interim
Government;
I
(c) That the modifications which have
been made in the original formula for the
Interim Government have adversely affected
the proportion of the Muslims in the Interim
Government as a whole and as against the
Congress as a, single group
(d) That in view of the serious changes
which have, from time to time, been made to
satisfy the Congress, it is not possible for the
Working Committee to arrive at any decision
in the matter of the formation of the In-
terim Government so long as the Congress
does not finally convey its decision on the
proposals to you; and
(e) That the question of distribution of
portfolios should also be finally decided so
that there may be no further hitch created
by the Congress in this regard and the Work-
ing Committee may have a complete picture
before them when they meet to consider the
proposals.

304

I
 Further, I shall be grateful if you will
please make the following points clear with
reference to your letter and statement of
J u n e 16: —
1. Whether the proposals contained in
the statement for the setting of an Interim
Government are now final or whether they
are still open to any further change or modi-
fication at the instance of any of the parties
or persons concerned ;
2. Whether the total number of 14 mem-
bers of the Government as proposed in the
statement would remain unchanged during
the Interim period ;
3. If any person or persons invited as
representatives of the four minorities, Viz.,
the Scheduled Castes, the Sikhs, the Indian
Christians and the Parsis, is, or are, unable
to accept the invitation to join the Interim
Government for personal or other reasons,
how will the vacancy or vacancies thus crea^
ted, be filled by the Viceroy. And whether
in filling up the vacancy or vacancies the
leader of the Muslim League will be consulted
and his consent obtained : w

4. (A) Whether during the Interim

period for which the coalition Government
is being set up the proportion of members of
the Government, community wise, as provi-
ded in the proposals, will be maintained;

305
 (B) Whether the present representation \

given to four minorities- viz, the Scheduled

Casies, the Sikhs, the Indian Christians and
the Parsis will be adhered to without any
change or modification; and
5. In view of the substitution of 14 now
proposed for the original of 12 and the change
made in the original formula, whether there
will be a provision, in order to safeguard
Muslim interests, that the Executive Council
shall not take any decision on any major
communal issue if the majority of the Mus-
lim members are opposed to it.
I trust that you will kindly favour me
with your reply as early as possible.
Yours Sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.
f

Letter to Mr.-M. A. Jinnah, President, All-India

Muslim League, dated the Viceroy's House, New Dethi,
June 20, 1946: 4

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I thank you for your letter of June 19
which I have shown to the Cabinet Mission.
I do not think it is necessary for me to
comment on the first part of your letter. I
am sure you will appreciate that negotiations
designed to secure acceptance by two parties
with conflicing interests may not always end
on the same basis as that on which they

\
306
 t ,

began; and, as you know, I never gave you

any guarantee that they would necessarily be
concluded on any particular basis.
I note the views of the Muslim League
set out in paragraphs (A) to (E) of your
letter.
The intention in the statement of June 16
was that the discussion of portfolios with
leaders of the two main parties should follow
the acceptance by both parties of the
scheme, V

This intention still holds, since until the

names are known, it is difficult to decide on
the distribution of portfolios.
On the points which you desire to be
made clear in connection with the Govern-
ment to be formed under our statement of
June 16, I give you the following reply after
consultation with the Delegation:—
(1) Until I have received acceptance from
those invited to take office in the Interim
Government, the names in the statement
cannot be regarded as final. But no change
in principle will be made in the statement
without the consent of the two major parties.
(2) No change in the number of 14 mem-
bers of the Interim Government will be made
without the agreement of the two major
parties.

307
 (3) If any vacancy occurs among the seats
at present al'oted to representatives of mino-
rities, I shill naturally consult both the main
parties before filling it.
(4) (A) and (B) The proportion of mem-
bers by communities will not be changed
without the agreement of the two major
parties.
(5) No decision on a major communal
issue could be taken by the Interim Gover-
ment if the majority of either of the main
parties were opposed to it. I pointed this
out to the Congress President and he agreed
that the Congress appreciated this point.
(6) If you agree, I will send copies of the
questions in your letter and of paragraphs
four and five of this letter to the President
of the Congress.
Yours Sincerely,
Wavell.
Letter to Mr. M, A. Jinnah, President, All-India
Muslim League, dated the Viceroy's House, New Delhi,
June 28th, 1946.
Dear Mr, Jinnah,
The Cabinet Mission and I feel that there
are certain points in your statement released
yesterday which it would be wrong to leave
unanswered.

308
 You will remember that at an interview
which the Cabinet Mission and I had with
you on the evening of the June 25, before
the meeting of your Working Committee at
which you accepted the proposals in the
statement of June 16, we explained to you
thao as Congress had accepted the statement
of May 16, while refusing to take part in the
Interim Government proposed in the state-
ment of June 16, these had produced a
situation in which paragraph 8 of the state-
ment of June 16 took effect.
t

This paragraph stated that if either of the

two major parties was unwilling to join in
the setting up of a coalition Government on
the lines laid down in that statement, the
Viceroy would proceed with the formation -
of an Interim Government which would be
as representative as possible of those willing
to accept the statement of May 16.
We said that since the Congress and the
Muslim League had now both accepted the
statement of May 16, it was the intention to
form a coalition Government including both
those parties as soon as possible.
In view, however, of the long negotiations
which had already taken place, and since we
all had other work to do, we feel that it would
be better to have a short interval before
J

309
proceeding with further negotiations for the
formation of an Interim Government.
Thus whatever interpretation you may put
on paragraph 8, your Working Committee
can have been in no doubt as to the course
we proposed to adopt.
I confirmed in writing the same evening
what we had told ycu.
Secondly, the assurances which you quote
in your statement related specifically to the
particular Interim Government that would
have been set up if both major parties had
accepted the statement of June 16.
J

. To prevent misunderstanding I propose

to. publish this letter together with your
letter of June 19, the substance of which has
7

already appeared in the Press, and my reply

of June 20.
Yours Sincerelv,
Waveli;
His Excellency the Viceroy's Utter dated June 28,
to Mr. M. A. Jinnah.
I have received vour letter of June 28 and
have shown it to the Cabinet Ministers.
We are quite unable to accept your sug-
gestion that we have gone back on our word.
As I have said in a letter to you earlier today
our course of action was determined by what
%

310
had been laid down in paragraph 8 of the
statement of June 16, and we had made it
plain to you before your Working Committee
meeting on the June 28, that we proposed to
follow this course. , -.

The arrangements for the elections to the

Constituent Assembly have already been put
into operation and we do not propose to post-
pone them.
As the substance of your letter was in-
cluded in the All-India Radio news today I
am publishing this reply.
t

Qaid-e-Azam M. A. Jinnah, in a statement issued

on Saturday June 29, maintained that the Cabinet
Delegation and the Viceroy had gone back on their I

word by postponing the formation of the Interim

Government and developed the fact that only a few
letters torn from the rest of the correspondence that
passed between him and the Delegation and the Vice-
roy had been published. Therefore as a part of his
statement Mr. Jinnah released the rest of the corres-
pondence that passed between him and the Viceroy.
The following is the full text of Mr.
Jinnah's statement.
The Cabinet Delegation and His Excellen-
cy the Viceroy have thought lit to release
only a few letters torn from the rest of the
correspondence that passed between me and
the Delegation and the Viceroy which have a
very important bearing on the present con-
troversy.

311
\
 That the Viceroy did make a clear repre-
sentation to me that hei would proceed to
form his Interim Government on the basis
of the formula 5:5:2 i.e. five representatives
of the Muslim League, five of the Congress,
one Sikh and one Indian Christian or Anglo-
Indian, and that, as regards the portfolios,
the most important portfolios will be equally
divided between the League and the Cong-
ress in distribution thereof, further details
being left open for discussion.
The Viceroy further authorised me to
make that representation to my Working
Committee and the Council of the All-India-
Muslim League, which I did, and, it was on
that basis that, both the Working Commit-
tee and the Council were induced to accept
t the long-term plan and the proposal for the
Interim Government together as a whole?
This formula had a vital bearing and did
r
greatly w< ish w ith the Council of the All-
India Muslim League in coming to their final
decision, which was communicated to the
Viceroy on June 7. Immediately thereafter
sinister agitation was set on foot by the
Congress Press against this formula and I
informed the Viceroy by my letter of June 8,
by way of caution, that, there should be no
departure form this formula. Below is the
full text of this letter which speaks for itself;

312
 ,

Letter from Mr. Jinnah, to H. E. the Viceroy,

dated June 8, 1946.
Dear Lord Wavell,
During the course of our discussions
regarding the Interim Governo>ent at Simla
and thereafter at Delhi ou June after
my arrival and before the meeting of the
Muslim League Working Committee took
place, you were good enough to give me the
assurance that there will be onlv twelve
portfolios, five on behalf of the League, five
Congress, one Sikh and one Christian or
Anglo-Indian, and that, as regards the port-
folios, the most important portfolios will be
equally divided between the League and the
Congress in the distribution thereof, further
details being left open for discussion..
With your previous permission Unformed
the Working Committee of this assurance
and this was one of the most important con-
siderations which weighed with them toge-
ther with the Statement of the Cabinet
Mission.
These two together
© formed one whole and.
as such the Council of the All-India Muslim
i

League has given its final decision on the 6th

of June. I may further inform you that
similarly I had to repeat the assurance to
the Council before they finally give their
approval.
313
 «

>

As you know, the meeting of the All-India

Muslim League Council was held in 'camera',
and there again, the House showed great
opposition to the scheme in the begining.
During the course of discussions at a very
early stage a large body of opposition was
satisfied when I made the statement in
' I
answer to the very pressing question as to
what our position will be with regard to the
Interim Government. , *

But for this assurance we could not have

got the approval of the Council to the
scheme. As requested by you I took as
much care as possible to see that it did not
become public. I *

I am writing this letter to you as I find

that a very sinister agitation has been set on
foot by the Congress Press against your
formula stated above, which was the turning
point in our having secured the decision of
the Council.
•

Any departure from this formula directly

or indirectly, will lead to very serious conse-
quences and will not secure to co-operation
of the Muslim League.
You know further that the Congress may
adopt an offensive attitude by including a
Muslim in their quota, which will be strongly

314 <
 I

resented by the Muslim League and which

will be another very great hurdle before us.
•

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah,
The Viceroy replied by his letter on the
9th June and in this letter he did not takb
exception to the facts stated by mp in my
letter quoted above. Only, according to
him "there was no assurance on this point."
The following is the full text of the Viceroy's
letter :
Letter from, FT. E. the Viceroy to Mr. M. A. Jinnah
dated, June 9, 1946.
Dear Mr. Jinnah, .
Thank you for your letter of yesterday.
You speak of an assurance about the 5: 5: 2
ratio. There was no assurance on this point,
but I told you, as I told the Congress, that
this was what 1 had in mind. It would be
wrong for me to leave you under the impres-
sion that there was any assurance, although
I hope that we may reach agreement on that
basis.
Yours Sincerely,
Wavell.
The fact, however, remains that he did
make this representation to me and autho-
rised me to do likewise to the Working Com-
mittee and the Council of the All-India

315

r
 I

Muslim League, both of which were induced

to come to their decisions upon the faith of
this representation.
The next important date is June 13, when
I was called by the Viceroy, and, suddenly
he presented a ne*v formula for the composi-
tion of the Interim Government i.e. 5: 5: 3.
I have already explained as to what trans-
pired between him and me with regard to
this revised formula. -
But the Viceroy failed to negotiate an
agreement with the Congress on this basis
also and I was informed by his letter of the
15th June that the Cabinet Delegation and
he would issue a statement on June 16 on the
action they proposed to take. I reproduce
below in full the Viceroy's letter of June 15:
Letter from His Excellency the the Viceroy to Mr.
M. A, Jinnah, dated June 15, 1946:
Dear Mr. Jinnah,
I am writing to inform you t h a t after
discussions with the Congress representatives
<

I have failed to negotiate an agreement on

the composition of an Interim Government
on the basis which I suggested to you.
The Cabinet Delegation and myself have,
therefore, decided to issue tomorrow a State-
ment on the action we propose to take; and

316 «

•
 *

we will let you have a copy of this before

publication.
Yours Sincerely
Wavell.
Their final proposals were embodied in
their Statement of 16th June and now they
have gone back on these proposals also by
> . postponing the formation of the Interim
Government indefinitely.
As regards my interview on the evening of
J u n e 25, at 5-30 p.m., when I was suddenly
called by the Cabinet Delegation and the
Viceroy, a fantastic interpretation was sug-
gested on the statement of June 16, in the
course of our talk and I was asked to give
my opinion; and 1 emphatically differed from
them.
I t was agreed that they will communicate
in writing to me finally their views and the
action they proposed to take. The Viceroy
then sent me his letter dated, June 25, which
reached me, as I have already stated, at
midnight after the Resolution of the Working
Committee was passed and released to the
Press. \

If, as it is now sought to make out that,

they had already come to their final decision
as to the course they were going to adopt, why
was the decision not communicated to me by

317

I
 the Viceroy earlier in the day as they had
received the Congress repty before mid-day
on June 25 instead of calling me for discussion
as to the correct interpretation or true con-
•
struction of Paragraph 8 in the Statement
of June 16, and then informing me that the
Cabinet Delegatien and the Viceroy will
communicate with me as to what they pro-
posed to do.
I give below the full text of the Viceroy's
letter of June 25, referied to above, my reply
to this letter, dated June 26 and the Viceroy's
reply to it dated June 27, conveying to me
his intention to form a temporary caretaker
Government till the re-opening of negotiations
"after the elections to the Consituent Assem-
bly have been completed."
Letter from H.E. the Viceroy dated June 25:
Dear Mr. Jinn ah,
You asked for a letter irr continuation of
what the Delegation said to you this evening.
*

We informed you that the Congress had

accepted the Statement of May 16 while re-
fusing to take part in the Interim Government
proposed in the Statement of June 16.
This has produced a situation in which
paragraph 8 of the Statement of June 16.
takes effect. This paragraph said that if•

318
either of the two major parties was unwilling
to join in the setting up of a Coalition
Government on the lines laid down in the
Statement the Viceroy would proceed with
the formation of an Interim Government
"which will be as representative as possible
of those willing to accept the Statement of
May 16."
Since the Congress and the Muslim League
have now both accepted the Statement of
May 16, it is the intention to form a Coalition
Government including both those parties as
soon as possible. In view, however, of the
long negotiations which have already taken
place, and since we all have other work to
do, we feel that it will be better to have
short interval before proceeding with further
negotiations for the formation of an Interim
Government.
This, therefore, is the course of action we
propose to adopt, unless the two main parties
can within the next few days agree upon a
basis on which they can co-operate in a
Coalition Government.
Meanwhile the election and summoning
of a Constituent Assembly as laid down in
the Statement of May 16 are going forward.
Yours Sincerely,
Waveli. .

319

s
 Letter from Mr. M. A. Jinnah to His Excellency the
Viceroy dfited June 26:
Dear Lord Wavell,
I received your letter dated June 25, at
midnight last night after I had sent you the
Resolution of my Working Committee passed
at its meeiing yesterday with a covering
letter of the same date, agreeing to join the
Interim Government on the basis of the
Statement of the Cabinet Delegation and
yourself dated June 16, and the clarifications
and assurances given byyou after consulta-
tion with the Cabinet Delegation in your
letter dated June 20, addressed to me.
I regret that the Congress, while accepting
the statement of May 16, should have rejec-
ted the proposals regarding the setting up of
the Interim Government on the basis of the
statement of June 16, which was the final
decision of the Cabinet Delegation and your-
self in this regard.
May I draw your attention to par raph 8
of the statement of June 16, which clearly
lays down that the acceptance of the state-
ment of May 16, and rejection of the final
proposals embodied in the statement of June
16, cannot change the basis and principles
laid down therein ?
In paragraph 3 of your letter, when you
say that the Viceroy would proceed with the

320
formation of an Interim Government "which
will be as representative as possible of those
willing to accept the Statement of May 1 6 ' ,
the quotation qualifies them to be included
in the Interim Government, but, only on the
basis of, and the principles laid down in,
proposals of June 16.
In these circumstances, as indicated in
the statement of June 16, paragraph 7, that
you aimed at inaugurating the Interim
Government about June 26, I hope, you will
not now delay the matter but go ahead with
the formation of the Interim Government
on the basis of your statement of June 16.
Yours Sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.
Letter from His Excellency the Viceroy dated June 27.
Dear Mr. Jinnah,
T hank you for your letter of yesterday.

I am sorry that my letter did not reach you

till after the meeting of your Working Com-
mittee h?d ended.
As we explained to you during our inter-
view on Tuesday the Cabinet Mission and I
consider that in the light of paragraph 8 of
the Statement of June 16, I am clearly
bound to make an attempt to form a Govern-
ment representative of both the major
parties, since both have accepted the State-
ment of May 16.

321
 I think you will agree that it is essential
to have a short interval before resuming ne-
gotiations, and as we informed you, it is pro-
posed to set up a temporary caretaker
Government of officials. I intend reopening
negotiations after the elections to the Cons-
tituent Assembly have been completed.
Meanwhile the Cabinet Mission will return
home to report.
Yours Sincerely,
Wavell.

As regards my request for the postpone-

ment of the elections to the Constituent
Assembly, my reply to the two letters of the
Viceroy of June 28, has not been included
in the published letters. I therefore think
that I must in fairness release my letter of
June 28, in reply to the Viceroy's letter of
June 27, reproduced above; and also my
reply dated June 28, to the two letters of
the Viceroy of same date released to the
Press yesterday. The following is the text
of the two letters.

Letter from Qaide Azam M. A. Jinnah dated June 28

}
to H.\E. the Viceroy in reply to the latter s dated June 27
*

Dear Lord Wavell.

I amin reciept of your letter of June 27,
1946

322 i
 *

I had already pointed out to j^ou by my

letter of June 26, in reply to yours of June
25, an i also, at the interview on Tuesday
June 25, with you and the Cabinet Delega-
tion that you were in honour bound to pro-
ceed forthwith with the formation of vonr
Interim Government in accordance with the
Statement of June 16, which was final, and
the assurances given to us.
The Cabinet Delegation and yourself issu-
ed an official Statement late in the evening
of June, 26, and as I have already pointed
out in my Statement issued to the Press yes-
terday, by that pronouncement yon have
chosen to go back upon your pledged word
by postponing the formation of the Interim
Goverment.
Now I have received your letter of June
27, and hereby inform you that I cannot
agree with you when you say in your letter
that "it is essential to have a short interval
before resuming negotiations " I repeat that
you should have proceeded in terms of th V/

paragraph 8 of the Statement of June 16,

without delay.
But since you have adopted this course
of action in the official Statement of the
Cabinet Delegation and yourself, which is
neither fair nor just, I strongly urge upon

323
 \

you without prejudice, that the elections to

the Constituent Assembly should also be
postponed as, you know, that according to
all the relevant documents and particularly
the two statements of the Cabinet Delegation
and yourself dated May 16 and 25, the long
term plan and the formation of the Interim
Government formed one whole each cons-
tituting an integral part of the whole scheme.
I t is, therefore, undesirable to proceed
with one part, i.e. elections to the Consti-
tuent Assembly and postpone the other.
Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.
Letter from Mr. M. A. Jinnah to the Viceroy in
reply to his two iettirs of June 28 released to the Press
on Friday:
Dear Lord Wavell,
" I am in receipt of your letter of June
28. The facts are correctly stated in my
statement that was released to the Press
on June 27.
"The explanation that you now give in
your letter under reply of what took place
between me and the Cabinet Delegation and
yourself, does not change in any way the
position. The fact is that you did not com-
municate to me your views officially before
the meeting of the Working Committee. I

324
 requested you to send your views officially to
me and you did so by your letter dated June
25, which reached me at midnight after the
Working Committee had passed their reso-
lution which was released to the Press accor-
ding to the solemn arrangement that we
were to give our reply immediately after the
decision of the Congress. If you wish to
> take the credit that some indication was
given to me of the change on your part in
the course of the interview, where we dis-
cussed so many things, you may do so.
As regards paragraph 2 of your statement
I am surprised when you say that the assu-
rances quoted by me from your letter in my
Statement were given "if both the major
parties had accepted the Statement of June
55
16
No such indication of any condition is
given in your letter of June 20, which I un-
derstand from your Private Secretary has
already been released to the Press together
with some other correspondence. May I
request you to release this letter also ?
•

I have received a second letter from you

dated June 28. May I also request you to
publish the full text of my letter of June 28,
asking you to postpone the Constituent
Assembly elections—and not only substance

325

f
 r

of it which might have appeared in the All

India Radio Broadcast as—you propose to
release your reply to the Press.
Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.
I maintain that the Cabinet Delegation
and the Viceroy have gone back on their
word within ten days of the final proposals
not implementing the Statement of June 16,
and I fully endorse what has been put so
well-"Statesmen should not eat their words."
*

NAWABZADA LIAQUAT ALI KHAN'S

STATEMENT
"The interpretation which has been put
by the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy
on Clause (8) of their statement of June 16?
regarding the formation of the Interim
Government is worthy of a petty-fogging
lawyer and not that of three responsible
Members of His Majesty's Government and
the representative of the Crown in India."
"A careful study of the statement and
the correspondence which took place between
the Muslim League President and the Viceroy
will convince every fair minded person that
the charge which Mr. Jinnah has levelled
against the Delegation and the Viceroy of
going back on their word is fully justified.

326

4
 "There is not the slightest doubt that
these noble and honourable gentlemen have
eaten their words and are guilty of breaking
their solemn pledges, which they had given
to the Muslim League, in order to placate
and appease the Congress.
" I t cannot by very edyfjdng for Great
Britain t h a t its responsible statesmen have
within ten davs treated their solemn dec-
laration and written pledges aa a mere
scrap of paper. It is bound to shake the
faith of the people in the word and pledges
of British statesmen.
"The perusal of the correspondence which
has passed between the Congress and the
Delegation and the Viceroy since the nego-
tiations were started clearly shows that the
Congress has not budged an inch from the
position that it took up from the very begin-
ing and has not shown any spirit of com-
promise on any point.
"Even the acceptance of the long-term
scheme by the Congress with its own inter-
pretation of some of the vital provisions of
the statement of May 16 especially of the
Grouping of the Provinces in which it still
persists, even after the authoritative ex-
planation and interpretation by the Cabinet
Delegation in their statement of May 25, is

327 \
 x

in fact a rejection of the scheme embodied in

the Delegation's statement of Mav 16.
"The Congress by accepting the long-term
plan has, without doubt, accepted the forma-
tion of Sections A. B and C of the Cons-
tituent Assembly on the basis of Muslim re-
presentation as a separate nationality where
Muslims can only be el< cted to tbe Cons-
tituent Assembly by Muslims alone. How
is this compatible with the much advertised
national character of the C mgress ?
"Yet in the Interim Government there is
the bogey that if the Congress does not have
a Muslim of its own choice its national
character will be destroyed. I t clearly shows
that it is a sinister move on the part of the
Congress to humiliate the Muslim League
and disrupt the Musalmans. Further why
does it not claim to nominate the representa-
tives of all the other communities as well in
the Interim Government?
"As against this attitude of the Congress,
the Muslim League has a t every stage of
negotiations shown an attitude of reasonable-
ness and spirit of accommodation.
a
In view of the betrayal of the Muslims
by the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy
I wish to give a timely warning to His
Majesty's Government not to be under the

328 1
delusion that the reasonableness shown by
the Muslim League during these negotiations
is to be taken as a sign of its weakness.
" I t has been our earnest desire through-
•

out to find a peaceful solution of the Indian

problem. We have tried our best to aviod a
struggle but if it is thrust on us we shall face
it with courage and determination.
"If it is only the shedding of blood which
convinces the British Government the Musal-
mans will not hesitate to resort to that course,
if forced into it, to protect their honour and
save themselves from annihilation. We shall
not go to the shambles like tame sheep.
" I ask the Musalmans to be prepared and
ready. We want peace with honour but if
there is to be war we shall accept the
challenge."

I t was the end of June when the Cabinet-

Delegation left New Delhi by air for the
United Kingdom. In a farewell message from
Karachi Lord Pethick-Lawrence told the
correspondents that the Mission was return-
ing with the hope that ere long, India would
realise what she wanted. I t was for Indian
leaders to wrest the opportunity.
Lord Pethick-Lawrence said: "We started
work in India about 14 weeks ago. We hope

329
 we have done something towards helping
India realise her independence.
"We had friendly relations with the Press
in Delhi and we are quite sure—you wish our
Mission to be a success—yon will help in the
days that will come to keep the temperature
down a bit. Let us get on with the job and
let us get on as harmoniously as possible. I
7
thank you and w ish India w ell."
Asked what the next ?t?p was likely to
be with regard to the setting up of a popular
Interim Government Lord Pethick Lawrence
said: " I cannot answer that. I t is certainly
the intention of the Viceroy that the Interim »

should be very short. Beyond that I cannot

say anything." The Secretary of State
refused to repty to further questions.
Commenting on the releass of the whole correspondence
which threw sufficient light on the subject, the daily
'Dawn' in its editorial of July 1st 1946 wrote as
follows:—-
m

Mr. Jin nab has done well to release the

rest of the correspondence that passed bet-
ween him and the Cabinet Mission and the
Viceroy because a few letters released earlier
by the Mission and the Viceroy were likely
to produce a distorted picture of what really
happened. As usual, the Qaid-e-Azam's
statement issued on Saturday evening is
.remarkably free from cant and duplicity and

330

i
 1

the letters exchanged between him and the

Viceroy are a fruitful study in contrast as
they show League's honest desire to reach
an amicable settlement and the Mission's
ill concealed anxiety to appease the Congress.
As Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan says in a
statement, "the perusal of the correspondence
which has passed between the Congress and
the Delegation and the Viceroy since the
negotiations started, clearly shows that the
Congress has not budged an inch from the
position that it took from the very beginn-
ing and has not shown any spirit of com-
promise on any point As against this
attitude of the Congress, the Muslim League
has at every stage of negotiations shown
an attitude of reasonablness and every
spirit of accommodation." Mr. Jinnah's ex-
plict exposition of the League's stand is
couched in a language which admits of no
elastic interpretations. This perspicuously
frank statement is in sharp contrast with
Lord Waveil's constipated reply to the
various points raised by Mr Jinnah in the
course of his letters to the Viceroy.
On the basis of the letters now released
Mr. Jinnah has irrefutably substantiated
the charge that, by their statement oi J u n e
16, the Mission went back on their pledged
word by postponing the formation of an
Interim Government. The correspondence

331
 makes it manifest to the meanest intelligence
t h i t the Viceroy had given a cidar under-
taking to Mr. Jinn ah that the Interim
Government will be formed on the basis of
the formula 5: 5: 2, i.e, five representatives
of the Muslim League five of Congress, one
Sikh and one Indian Christian or Anglo-
Indian. I t was largely on the basis of these
clarifications and assurances that the Muslim
League Working Committee and the Council
agreed to accept the long-term Plan and to
join the Interim Government.
Lord Wavell seems to think that since
the Congress has accepted t i e long-term
Plan, it is incumbent on him to resume
negotiations and " t o make an attempt
to form a Government representative of
both the major parties." If the long-
term a i d the short-term Plans can be so
curiously blended together, why was Mr.
Jinnah's plea for postponing elections to the
Constituent Assembly, on the ground t h a t
m both the Plans are an integral part of the
whole scheme, rejected? Is it statesmanship
or political pettifoggery?
The explanation given by the Cabinet
Delegation and the Viceroy for postponing
the formation of an Interim Government is
no explanation at all; it is a species of legal
chicanery, quibbling with words, t h a t cannot

332
 *

dupe any right-thinking person. Their

latest action is a complete reversal of their
statement of J u n e 16, a volt face for which
there can be no explanation- The whole
scheme of Interim Government has been
overnight turned topsyturvy, a fact which
no amount of equivocation can hide. Never
perhaps in the history of Britain's inglorious
rule in this country have pledges so solemnly
given been so shamelessly broken; never have
words so honourably given been so hastily
gulped; never have assurances so unequi-
vocally given been so completely forgotten.
The Indian Musalmans have lost their faith
in the bona fides of British statesmen as they
have known to their cost t h a t pledged words
have no sanctity, and assurances which
e x i s t ' i n mind' have no meaning for those
wno are in fact morally bound by them. It
does not appear to be a story of bungling and
fumbling but a deliberate attempt to appease
the Congress, regardless of the alienation of
those sections of the Indian population who
have exposed the all-representative preten-
sions of this Bannia dominated, caste-ridden
and capitalist-con-trolled organisation.
If the British Government choose to sow
the wind, they are sure to reap the whirlwind
in course of time. This Chamberlanian
p< licy of appeasement is bound to prove
disastrous, and what followed in the wake of

333 9

•
Munich is sure to happen in this country on
a different pattern. If the Cabinet Dele-
gation have achieved any success, it is for
the die-hard British imperialists (both Tory
and Labour) to be jubilant about, for th^
administrative machinery of India has been
switched back to a period when bureaucracy
ruled this country. The outlook for the
future remains as bleak as ever. Meanwhile
the next move of Britain's Socialist Govern-
ment will be anxiously awaited; and if they
are still honest in their intentions to part
with power, let them not so cavalierly play
with Muslim sentiments in ordt^r to placate
the Congress.
Even neutral observers closely in touch w i t h the
political developments in the country were very much
taken aback the way the Viceroy and the Cabinet
Mission went back on their words.
The 'Statesman' in its editorial on the 28th June
1946 commented as follows:—
We record, with regret, t h a t we consider
the British Cabinet Mission and the Vice-
r

roy's latest move an error. I t is wcdl inten-

tioned. If detached from its chronological
sequence and context it might, to meet the
existing position, be a suitable enough expe-
dient. Ii deed, so viewed, it even shows ad-
vantageous possibilities of a transient sort;
for plainly, Congress-League disagreements
being what they ,still unfortunately are, a

334

L
League-dominated Central Government, in
relation to Congresa-dominated Provincial
Governments might not prove much of a
remedy for India's many present adminis-
trative ills. But it cannot be so detached.
The context exists, plain and recent, for all
to read. On June 16, in paragraph (8) of
their s t a t e m e n t , the Mission and the Vice-
roy declared that, "in the event of the two
major parties, or either of them, proving un-
willing to join the setting up of a coalition
Government on the above lines, it is the in-
tention of the Vicerov to proceed with the
formation of the Interim Government which
will be as representative as possible of those
willing to accept the statement of May 16."
This declaration's direct bearing on the
existing position is unmistakable, unavoid-
able. The Muslim League having on June 6
accepted the proposals made for an i n t e r i m
Government in the May 16 plan, and
having reiterated its acceptance lately, the
Congress by contrast having rejected them,
W3 fail to see any other conclusion than t h a t
the Viceroy stood morally bound at this stage
to form forthwith an Interim Government
consisting largely of members of the Muslim
League. There had been several earlier
authoritative assertions of India's imperative
need, because of the threat of famine and
other grave administrative problems, for

335
 g
I

speedy establishment of a representative

Interim. Government at the Centre. The
language of the passing reference now made,
in Wednesday night's annoucement by Mis-
sion and Viceroy to paragraph (8) of their
June 16 declaration and its clear commit-
ment, seem to us, we are sorry to say,
evasive and disinsenoas.
Politicians may do so, but it is not the
business of statesmen to eat their words; they
should not risk bold sweeping, unequivocal
public undertakings unless they mean them,
and can be relied upon to fulfil them. Parti-
cularly we suggest, it is not British states-
men's business to do so in India, an alien
land still of semi-dependent status. W h e t
was so emphatically considered needful
and proper on June 16 cannot well, within
ten days, have radically transformed its
nature. Good and bad, necessary and un-
necessary, are not thus readily interchange-
able.
Our writings, we think, have shown lively
and wholehearted awareness of the unparal-
leled difficulties confronting the Mission and
the Viceroy throughout, of their exemplary
patience, of the exceptional mental and
physical stresses t h a t they must lately have
borne. Could we believe that what they
have now done has sound moral basis, or

336
 !

even that, in the narrower sense, it was

required because it would be justified by
results, we might commend it. But we view
the long-term x consequences of Wednesday
night's decision with uncertainty and misgi-
ving. Opportunity of solid and imme •*•

diate co-operation, form at any rate one of

India's two main parties, lay within the
Mission's grasp. This has been let slip in
favour of larger objectives later aimed at.
We wish we could see more cause for conn-
dence that these will not, when the time
comes, dissolve between the fingers into
windy nothingness. During the long drawn
out Delhi-Simla negotiations there have alrea-
dy been too many tactical shifts of ground
and changes of front by others. I t grieves
us that a venerable and idealistic Secretary
of State, a line Viceroy and their two eminent
colleagues of Britain's new and good cabinet
should at this last stage have descended—as
we see matters to similar swithery Courses.
Mr. Arthur Moore, the one time editor of the
Statesman expressing his astonishment at the Cabinet
Delegation's announcement, saidj

1
"This won't do. A Government of care-
takers as the answer to self Government
makes nonsense; As well call it a Govern-
ment of undertakers. What can the Mission
be thinking about, and what more important

337

4
business can a Secretary of State for India
have in London than to redeem our promises
to India in India?
i

' ' t

"The Congress has been thinking too

much about its own prestige and too little
about India. Over and over again it has
said it would accept any Indian Government
for the sake of freedom. Now it has the
chance not only of freedom but of unity,
because the Muslim League, realising that
in the atomic age the sovereign State is a
dead conception, has wisely dropped its
claim for a sovereign State and wants a
Pakistan within a feoeral India.
" T h a t is the natural ultimate guarantee
for a race or a religion, namely, to have
somewhere a cultural homeland of its own.
The Congress should rejoice in this accep-
tance of federation, and offer to serve. They
have brilliant men whom the country needs.
I

"The root trouble is still our British un-

willingness to part with power. We magnify
a burden of responsibility that we took upon
ourselves because it paid us well and that
has Jong over-irked our unwilling wards.
Let Mr. Jinn ah be asked to form a purely
Indian Government and to choose his own
•

colleagues. His first thought will be to get

as many Congressmen as he can to co-ope-

338

•
rate with him. Indian rancour is sometimes
fierce, but rarely deep. Jinnah and Jawahar-
lal teamed together would soon recognise
each other's qualities and bless each other's
work.
"The youth of India are tod*y bitterly
disappointed. The hungry sheep look np,
and it is high time that they were led."

The All India Congress Committee on

7th July 1946, by an overwhelming majority
of 204 to 51 votes endorsed and rati Bed the
*

steps, taken by the Congress High Command

during the last three months' constitutional
negotiations with the British Cabinet Missio
and their decision to enter the constituent
Assembly.
The Congress had committed itself to the
Constituent Assembly scheme propsed by the
Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy and had
decided, in the words of the members of the
All-India Congress Committee who partici-
pated in the two-day debate, " t o make it a
fully sovereign body."
While there was no doubt as to the final
result of the voting by the All-India Congress
Committee, Mr. Gandhi's speech calling
upon Congressmen to enter the Constituent
Assembly "make the best of i t " had a decid-
ed influence on the voting."

339
 «

Mr. Gandhi's speech must nahirally have

enabled the vacillating members finally to
cast thier votes in favour of the Congress
High Command.
Maulana Abu I Kalam Azad made a fight-
ing speech in answering criticisms levelled
against the Congress High Comnund by the
opposing speakers. He declared that those
who talked of a struggle talked of it without
realisms what it meant. Thev had to realisa
that a struggle was only a means and not an
end in itself.
"Victory has come to our door-step. Do
not turn it into defeat," he concluded.
•

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, in his conclud-

ing remarks made it clear that the Congress
had not made any commitments whatever,
except that it had decided to enter the Cons-
tituent Assembly which was free to frame a
new constitution for a free and independent
India. If they found that after going into
the Constituent Assembly that it could not
what it had been called upon to do then
they would get out.
Among the opposing speakers on Sunday,
Mrs. Aruna Asaf Ali and Mr. Achut Patwar-
dhan were the best. Mrs. Aruna Asaf Ali told
Mr. Gandhi, "We have listened to you and
obeyed you all these years. Now you must
lisen to us and it is your duty to obev u s . "

340
 ' I

This session of A-ICC decidedly d

monstrated the growing strength of the Lef-
tist wing of the Congress. In pre-war days,
the Congress Socialists were never able to
secure the support of one fifth of the House.
For the first time now they have secured a 20
per cent vote in their favour, although they
might have failed in their objective of reject-
ing the Congress High Command's decision.
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the Congress
President, declared at a Pr< ss Conference in
Bombay on Wednesday July 10 that the
Congress would enter the Constituent Assem-
bly completely unfettered by agreements
free to meet all situations as they arise, an
demanding that Britain "treat us as equals"
in all things pertaining to the achievement
of independence.
"We agreed to go into the Constituent
_

Assembly," Pandit Nehru said. "We agreed

to nothing else. True we agreed to certain
procedures for going into it. But we are
absolutely free to act."
Describing two major considerations as
''proper arrangements for minorities" and the
framing of a treaty between India and
Britain, he said India would not permit Bri-
tain or any other "outsider" to dictate that
treaty and would insist that Britain "treat

341 *
 »

us as equals" and "we will treat them as

equals"
When his attention was drawn to the
forthcoming meeting of the All-India Muslim
League Council at Bombay, Pandit Nohni
said: "Whatever the Congress do«-*s is always
intended to create new situations. We do
not follow other peoples situations.
am glad that the Muslim League has
realised that we have created a new situation.
We propose to create many further new
situations What we shall do if the League
decides to do this or t h a t we will see what
the conditions then are and decide accord-
inglv-"
Dealing with the powers of the proposed
Union Centre, Pandit Nehru said according
to the Cabinet Mission's proposals there were
three or four basic subjects in it—that is
defence, foreign affairs, communications and
the power to raise finances for these. "Ob-
viously, defence and communications have a
large number of industries behind them. So
these industries inevitably come under the
Union Government and they are likely to
grow, Defence is such a wide subject that it
tends to expand its scope and activities more
and more. All that comes under the Union
Government.

342
 "Similarly, external affairs inevitabty
include foreign trade policy. You can not
have a foreign policy if you divorce foreign
trade from it. They include all manner of
things which are ^ot put down there but
which can be brought in."
i

Referring to the question of raising

finances for the Union, Pandit Nehru said
it had to be done by taxation. "If anyone
suggests that some kind of contribution or
doles are going to be given by the provinces or
states it is bunkum. No Central Government
carries on doles. I cannot make a list now
but obviously customs, including tariffs, is
bound to be one."
Pandit Nehru pointed out that the Central
Government must be responsible for foreign
market, loans and such other subjects. I t
must also obviously control currency and
credit.
"Suppose there is trouble between the
provinces or States, or an economic break-
down due to famine conditions, the Centre
comes in again inevitably. However limited
the Centre might be, you cannot help the
Centre having wide powers, because the past
few years have shown t h a t if there were no
Central authority, the conditions would
have been far worse in India. However,
the fact that there has been a Central autho-

343
 . I

rity has not done much good to the country,

because it has been incompetent."
" I t is obvious." he continued, " t h a t with-
t th Cent thority, y cannot deal
ith problems m< mtioned bo 7e. There
ust be some overall p to intevene in
grave crises, breakdown of the administration
or economic breakdown or famine.
"The scope of the Centre," he said, "even
though limited, inevitably gr ^s because it
not exist otherwise Th h some people
might oppose this broadening of the Cen
th >. Constituent Assembly will have to d
5?
cide on the point
Qaid-e-Azam M. A. Jinnah's reactions to the A.I.C.C
resolution d M Neh peech were recorded in
an interview to th id Press of India, on July
!4. 1946 I

I t is for the British Parliament d H

Majesty's Government to make it clear
beyond doubt d rem th impi
that the Congress has accepted the long term
scheme of the Cabinet Deleg which is
sought to be conveyed abroad by the timid
efforts of the Cabinet Delegation and the
Viceroy.
Mr. Jinnah said a It has been clear
from the outset to those who understood
from the letter of the President of the
Congress, of June 25, addressed to the Vice-

344
rov and the resolution of the Congress Work-
ing Committee t i n t followed it next dav re-
jecting the Interim Government proposals
contained in the statement of the Cabinet
Delegation and Viceroy, dated June 16, that
the so-called acceptance by the Congress only
of long-term Plan of May 16, was never in-
tended to honour its terms and obligations
with the desire to carry out the scheme in
the spirit of constructive and friendly co-
operation.
I t ended with covert threat t h a t the sue-
ceesful working of the Constituent Assembly
will depend upon the formation of a satisfac-
tory provisional Interim Government. After
that they themselves had wrecked the final
proposals put for word by the Cabinet Dele
&
*tion and the Viceroy in their statement
of June. 16.
A

''In their resolution they make reserva-

tions and put fantastic interpretations upon
the fundamentals of long-term plan and
finally thev make it clear that they were
only going to prevent other people, whom
they consider undesirable, from getting into
the constituent, Assembly and seek elections
to wreck the long-term plan also.
They are going into the Constituent Ass-
embly as we have now seen, so frankly
and clearly defined by Pandit Jawaharlal

345
 J

Nehru, on his assumption of office as the

President of the Congress 'to achieve their
objective.' \
He has also made it quite clear that they
are not going to honour any of the terms of
the long-term plan and that they are only
entering to put it shortly to use it as platform
for their propaganda in utter disregard of
rights and obligations of those agreeing and
who are in honour bound to futill or abide I

by it
This is simply because they have secured
a brute majority of 292 against 79 Muslims
in the Constituent Assembly.
What Pandit Nehru says while referring to
the correspondence that passed between the
Cabinet Mission and Viceroy and the Congress
and of their final decision of June 25-26 is :
"You will see on what conditions and circum-
stances we agreed to go into the Constituent
Assembly. We have agreed to go into the
Constituent Assembly and we have agreed to
nothing else.
Mr. Jinnah added: "This is complete re-
pudiation of the basic form upon which the
long-term scheme rests and all its fundamen-
tals and terms and obligations and rights of
parties accepting the scheme.
" I understand that there is going to be a
debate in the British Parliament very soon

346
on the report of the Cabinet delegation arid it
is for the British Parliament and His Majes-
ty's Government to make it clear beyond
doubt and remove the impression that the
Congress has accepted the long-term scheme
which is sought to be conveyed abroad bv
*

the timid efforts of the Cabinet Delegation

and the Viceroy, who throughout these nego-
tiations suffered from a fear complex and
constant threats of the Congress as resorting
to civil disobedience, which is now reueated
by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in his present
statement to the Press conference and further
in their undue anxiety to secure success of
their Mission at any cost and the sacrifice of
everybody else.
I n spite of knowing full well the true sit-
uation and the intentions of the Congress,
the Mission have tried to threat the decision
of the Congress as acceptance by the Party,
with real spirit of constructive co-operation
to reform their obligations as honourable
organisation, according to spirit and letter
of the long-term scheme.
We shall have to consider the situation
when the Working Committee and the Coun-
cil of the All India Muslim League will meet
on July 26, 27 and 28 and adopt such action
as we may think proper in the circumstances
that have arisen."
/

347
 Pandit Nehru's speech and the speeches
at tho A-ICC were cHtised throughout Mus-
lim India.
N a w a b M a m d o t challenged the fantastic inter-
pretation put by the Congress and said:
"Pandit Nehru's somersaults are perhaps
f among the greatest tragedies of modern
India. His dynamic personality should have
gone to help his country regain frx-edom. and
v
social justice but instead he has thrown his
weight on the side of tUrm.oil, camouflage
and black-mailing.
" H e has celebrated his presidential elec-
tion by giving a most fantastic interpreta-
tion ot the Cabinet Mission's statement of
May 16. Every one knows it that the Miss-
ion has sought to confine the functions of the
Central Government to three subjects, namely
Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communica-
tions.
"The Muslims have never accepted this
position willingly. They are out for comp-
lete separation and sovereign independent
Pakistan State and it is only for the sake of
a compromise t h a t they have agreed to con-
sider a centre in the context of the Cabinet
Mission's statement.
" I t is obvious that they can never agree
to any interference in other subjects in which
the group units would be completely sover-
eign.

\ 348

• /
 "Industries of all types, heavy or light,
whether allied to defence or not, in fact the
entire economic direction in internal and
external trade, etc . must rest completely
with the group administrations and the
centre would have anv say whatsoever in
these matters.*'
)

"And the Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan took the

view t h a t the Congress position would
make the Constituent Assembly a
sovereign body, adding t h a t "if it is establi-
shed as a sovereign body we would have no
place in* that because we would be one
against four."
"Unless the position is clarified," he con-
tinued, "it would be suicidal for the Muslim
}i
League to enter the Constituent Assembly.
Our only fault has been t h a t we have
< <

been honest about the whole thing. Our

faith has been shaken in the word of the
British. Now we can't tell if they mean
what they say."
He also commented that if the Cabinet
Mission had declared the Constitutent Assem-
bly would be a sovereign body, "we would
not have accepted. We would have demanded
separate Constituent Assemblies, one for our
provinces and one for the Hindu provinces."

349
W h i l e M r . Jamiluddin convenor, Muslim League
Committee of writers said:
The tall chim made by Mr. Nehru in 1936,
that there were only two parties in India—
Congress and the British Government and
others must simply line up—proved a blessing
in disguise in that it spurred the Muslims to
action and led them to build an organiza-
tion at whose doors Mr. Gandhi and Mr.
Nehru had to knock repeatedly. "But Mr.
Nehru like the Bourbons of old has learnt
nothing and forgotten nothing. He persists
in attacking and belittling the Muslim Lea-
gue and throws out the arrogant challenge
that he proposes to create many new situa-
tions and to convene his own Constituent
Assembly sometime later.
"The Muslim have reason to be thankful
to Mr Nehrn for warning them of the real
intentions of the Hindu Congress to which
the Muslim League will give a fitting reply
when the League Council meets in Bombay
towards the end of this month. •

" I t is, indeed, a pity that the Muslim

League's conciliatory, honest and straight-
forward attitude was misconstrued as a sign
of weakness and surrender by both the Cabi-
net Mission and the Congress, and all notions
of political honesty and straight dealing were
thrown to winds.

350
 '•There cannot be a shadow of doubt
now that Congress are out to use the machi-
nery of the Constituent Assembly to create
hundred per cent Akhand Hindustan by
sheer dint of their numerical majority and
the expected British acquiescence, absolutely
regardless of the basic provisions of the
operative part of the Mission's Pian pertain-
ing to the process of constitution-making of
the groups, provinces and the Union.
"Mr. Nehru makes no secret of his deter-
mination not only to kill grouping right
a t the beginning but also to cripple the pro-
vinces by bringing in as many subjects as he
desires under the Union Centre and thus
making it an all-powerful Hindu-dominated
Central Government reducing all non-Caste-
Hindu peoples to serfdom.
"When one major party unequivocally
repudiates the very fundamentals of the
Plan under which it was to meet another
major party to build a constitution acceptable
to both it would be nothing short of suicide
for the other party to join the Constituent
Assembly envisaged in the Plan.
"Unless the British Government unambi-
I

guously state their intentions, the Muslim

League should refuse to enter the Constituent
Assembly and demand the Convention of a
separate Constituent Assembly for the six
351

*
Muslim province with power to conclude a
treaty with the Constituent Assembly of the , -
Hindu provinces regulating mutual relations
and providing for the protection of minorities
in the two states on reciprocal basis"
'Dawn' did not keep silent either, over Pandit
Nehru's provocative utterances and the following
paragraphs are quoted from its editorial on June 12,
1946.
Having admitted his inability to 'peep
1
into the future, Pandit Nehru has not
scrupled to conjure up before his mind the
scene of a Constituent Assembly whose re-
presentatives give their verdict against
grouping. Answering Pressmen's queries in
Bombay, Pandit Nehru vividly visualized the
collapse of B and C Groups and the emer-
gence of an Akhand Hindustan, with all its
glory and grandeur, power and pelf, main-
taining a strong Centre as all the provinces
and Groups would fall into abeyance! Pro-
bably reminded of the days of Abbe Sieyes,
he even thinks that at some future date "we
may have to summon our own proper revo-
lutionary Constituent Assembly". Some of
the Hindu papers are apologetically defend-
ing the tempestuous Pandit, pleading t h a t
constitution-making should preferably pro-
ceed on non-violent lines.
Let Pandit Nehru use—or abuse—his
telescopic faculty in the manner he likes, if

352
 "

wishful thinking is all his mental pabulum.

But his political ramblings could not have
been worth considering if he had not catego-
rically declared that Congress's conception
of Constituent Assembly is not even limited
by the question of * minorities' and the
arrangement for a treaty between India and
England. "The first thing", says he, "is
that we have agreed to go into the Consti-
tuent Assemblv, and we have agreed to no-
thing else. I t is true that in going to the
Constituent i^ssembly, inevitably, we have
agreed to a certain process of going into it
i.e. election of the candidates to the Cons-
tituent Assembly. What we do there, we
are entirely and absolutely free to determine.
We have committed ourselves to no single
matter to anybody." ^(Italics ours). The
end is not yet. Let the Musalmans remain
under any delusion that the Congress has
reached the limits of power-madness
Pandit Nehru is glad to announce that the
Congress proposes "to create many further
new situations." This can justly be called
a sadistic expression of the majority complex;
the determination of Hindu Congress to con-
*

vert India into an Akhand Bharat in which

the non-Hindus will have no place. Well,
one of the 'new situations' created by the
Congress is the imposition of I.C.S. rule on
India after many years of struggle between

353
\
 the bureaucratic and democratic forces. For
their communal virus and hysterical appeals
Pandit Nehru's speeches and statements are
unsurpassable. Even his ardent admirers
must have felt baffled by the irresponsible
manner in which the newlv solemnised
is

Kashtrapati of Congress is behaving towards

problems that do not require for their solu-
tion the genius of a tub-thumper.
There appears to be no reason for conflict
between the Muslim League and Congress a t
a time when the constitution-making machi-
nery has not begun to operate but the fact
is that Congress has darkened the atmosp-
here in which the Constituent Assembly may
have to meet. Item by item, Pandit Nehru
- has repudiated all the piovissions of the
long-term Plan contained in the Cabinet
Mission's Statement of Mav 16. The aid of
legal quibblers is being invoked to confer the
status of sovereigntv on the Constituent
Assembly. Cangress leaders are trying to
strike Frankensteinian terror into the hearts
of all non-Congress and non-Hindu sections
of the population regarding the powers,
functions and scope of the Constituent
Assembly, If the Constituent Assembly realy
becomes a moloch capable of swallowing all
anti-Akhand Hindustan elements, it would
-

be suicidal for Muslims, as the Nawabzada

354

*
says, to participate in the tasks of constitu-
tion-making.
Lord Pethick-Lawrence made the following state-
ment in the House of Lords on June 18 1946.

"As there is so much to tell, I will only

say one thing by way of introduction regard-
ing the problems with which we have to
deal,"
"If yon take all the population of the
United States, and all the population both in
Europe and Asia of the Soviet Union, and all
the people of the Britisn Tsles and all the
white people throughout the British Empire
and add them all together—even then you
do not reach a total as great as that of the
Indians in India."
"Not only that, but that vast subconti-
nent has great diversities of race, religion,
language and culture. No wonder it is then
that Indian statesmen are deeply conscious
of their responsibilities and take divergent
views as to the precise constitutional future
of that country.
"The two great parties in British India,
Congress and the Muslim League, who be-
tween them nearly swept the polls in the
recent provincial elections are acutely divided
on this matter.

355
 " W h i l e the Congress has always stood
for one united India, the claim of the Muslim
League has been for the division of India
into Hindusthan and Pakistan.
"Therefore, while the first task of the
Mission was to convince Indiars of the since-
rity of the British people in offering them
independence within or without the British
Commonwealth, according to their choice
their second task was to bridge the apparent-
ly unbridgeable gap separating the rival
views of the two great Indian parties.
" I think I can claim without fear of
disagreement t h a t as for the first we were
entirely succeseful (Cheers).
"All leaders of Indian opinion now realise
t h a t the British people mean what they say
and will do their part to carry it into effect.
"As to the second, I believe the facts as
disclosed in the voluminous command papers
(white papers) which I hope to make more
clear, speak for themselves.
"We began by geting into direct personal
contact, orally and by correspondence with
the most representative men and women in
India not only of the great Indian parties
and from the States but also of other sec-
tions and minorities in British India. "Their
views profoundly influenced us in forming

356
I
our opinion as to the best way to approach
the problem.
"The main difficulty lay in the fact that
not only were the major parties differing in
their views of the future constitutional struc-
ture of India, but this divergence prevented
them from agreeing on a constitution-making
machinery.
"The Congress wanted a single constitu-
tion-making body while the Muslim League-
wanted two separate constitution-making
bodies—one for Hindustan and one for
Pakistan.
"After considerable discussion with them
separately, we decided to invite them both
to send four representatives each to meet us
together at Simla and consider a proposal
for forming a constitution on three-tier basis.
"This they agreed to do, while reserving
complete freedom of comment and action.
The Simla talks were marked by the very
welcome spirit of accommodation shown by
both parties and although a final agreement
was not reached, the talks ended amicably
and sufficient progress had been made to
justify us in putting out a Statement on May
16, which we believed was sufficiently near to
the views of both parties to be likely of
acceptance.

357
•

<fc
That statement did not purport to lay
down a constitution for India. This was a
matter only for Indians. W h a t we did was
to put forward the three-tier suggestion
and offer it for a basis for constitution-mak-
ing machinery.
a
The three-tier basis is nothing more than
our recommendation to the Indian peoples,
but on the basis of these proposals we were
asking the parties to join in the formation
of a Constituent Assembly. BUG ic was
necessary to stipulate that the provisions
should not be altered without a majority of
the two major communities.
" I n paragraph 18, we gave our reasons
for taking a population basis for the alloca-
tion of seats on the Constituent Assembly
and this method has met with general
approval.
In paragraph 14, we dealt with question
of the Indian States. We had discussions
with the Chancellor of the Chamber of
Princes, the Nawab of . Bhopal, and were
very much impressed with the helpful and
co-operative attitude they adopted through-
out, and to that attitude can be attributed
much of the success of the solution of the
problem of the Indian States.
"Our attitude to the States is expressed
m paragraph 14 of the statement where

358
we record the willingness of them to /

co-operate and also their helpful attitude as

to the winding up of Parliament's para-
mountry relationship,
"This matter was further elaborated in
the memorandum handed by us to the
Chancellor, and "a Negotiating Committee
has been set up to arrange for the partici-
pation of the States in the constitution-
•

making body. I
"The Congress had not at that time given
it an excellent reception, though there were
points in it that were criticised on many
sides. Neither of the major parties could
achieve their whole objects, though it pre-
sented a practicable and flexible compromise
and we hop3 they might both accept it.
"After issuing that statement there
followed another period when all the parties
in India were discussing among themselves
our proposal' and weighing up the pros and
cons in minute detail as it affected their own
principles and the principles of their parti-
cular section*.
.

Tl.
were also bal exchanges be
tween them and ourselves as to the Consti
tuent Assemblv as it will be s in s me of
the earlier letters published d fr the
statement issue 1 by the Mission on May 25

359
*
"On June 6, the All-India Muslim League
Council passed a resolution which, while
critical of the contents of our statement of
m

May 16, particularly on the issue'of Pakistan,

and while reserving opinion on those points,
difinitely accepted the scheme put forward
by the Mission.
This was a great step forward and I
pay tribute to the courage and statesmanship
of Mr. Jinnah that in advance of the Cong-
ress, he-should have advocated in his Council
and carried through that body acceptance of
our proposals, which differed substantially
from the views held until then and vigorous-
ly expressed by his followers.
"The Congress did not at that time try to
come to any final decision but if I may
anticipate events, they, tor, on June 26, in
a resolution and a letter to the Viceroy,
while expressing their views on interpreta-
tion announced their acceptance of the pro-
posals set out in our statement of May 16.
"Thus we have secured in the end the
acceptance of both the major parties in
India to these proposals. Nominations and
elections to the constitution-making b o d v
have accordingly been proceeding in the
present month and, from the news which
reaches me, it would seem that some of the
best human material in India is likely to be
returned to take part in the deliberations..

360
 I

"If my expectations in this respect are

fulfilled a most valuable start has been^made
in the erection of a constitutional structure for
the future of India.
"Before leaving this I would like to say
a few words about some recent reports from
India as to the intentions of the parties in
joining the Constituent Assembly.
' •

"We saw both parties shortly before we

left and they stated to us quite categorically
t h a t it was their intention to go into the.
Assembly with the objective of making it
work. They are, of course, at perfect liberty
to advance their own views as to what should
or should not be the basis of the future con-
stitution.
"That is the purpose of the Constituent
Assembly—to hammer out agreement from
diverse opinions and plans.
Likewise they can put forward their views
as to how the Assembly should conduct its
business but, having regard to the statement
of May 16 and the Constituent Assembly
elected in accordance with it, they cannot
of course, go outside the terms of what has
been agreed to.
That would not be, fair to, the other-
parties who go in and it is on the basis of
that agreed procedure t h a t the British

361
 t

Government has said they will accept the

provisions of the Constituent Assembly.
66
As to the States, they need have no
anxiety since it is for them to decide freely
to c o n e in or not, as they choose. It is for
that purpose that they have set up a Nego-
tiating Committee and I am sure that Com-
mittee will have the wisdom to work out an
accept*ble basis for their co-operation in
the Assembly.
66
It is on a free consensus of the many
diverse elements of the Indian people that
the success of the new constitution will
depend.
" I am confident from what was said to
me in India that all parties appreciate this
fundamental fact,
"Union cannot be by force. I t must be
by agreement and it will be the task of the
Assembly to obtain that agreement.
" I t will be possible for the majority and
minorities alike to prepare to co-operate for
55
the good of the future of all India.
Dealing with the negotiations for the
creation of an Interim Government, Lord
Pethick-Lawrence said:
" I need hardly point out t h a t during this
'Interim period it is most desirable, if possi-
ble to get an Interim Government which is

362
in the nature of a coalition ard in which, at
any rate, the two major paities are both
represented.
"No agreement was reached at Simla on
this point or alter our return to Delhi. A
very strong point with the Cangress was
related to the powers and status of the
Interim Government and the treatment of
it by the Viceroy.
6fc
Th C took Pt to parity
between the two parties and attempts were
made to meet this by forming an Interim
Government on the basis of six Congress re-
presentatives—s—five Caste Hindus and one re-
preventative of the Scheduled C fi
Muslims ar d two oth Mr. Jinn ah might
possibly have a but the Cong ^ere
not satisned wi
"We reache com pi deadlcck and it
seemed the or possible way to ak it
was for the Viceroy, in consultation with th
Mission, to choose a suitable Interim Govern
ment on a basis of six Congress including
from the Depressed Classes fi M
one Sikh two oth one Parsi d one
Indian Christian.
"The Viceroy had unofficial and tentative
lists of names from both sides and these
were largely used in the selection.

363
 "Mr. Jinnah took up the position that he
would await the Congress decision before
giving that of the Muslim League. The
Congress were very much troubled by the
type of parity still remaining between the
Muslim League and the'Caste Hindus and on
the matter concerning minority representa-
tion.
" B u t the Congress despite any difficulties,
might have consented to t h e arrangement,
had there not been, unfortunately, a widely-
published disclosure of certain letters written
by Mr. Jinnah at the moment, the most
important of which contained a sentence
that the Muslim League would never accept
the appointment of any Muslim by the
Viceroy other than a, Muslim Leaguer.
"This became a major issue. The Cong-
ress had suggested that they should be al-
lowed to substitute a Muslim for one of their
number but this had been opposed by the
Viceroy and they might have waited the
suggestion, had it not been that a public
challenge was made at this moment to their
right to do so.
The Congress had always insisted on the
national character of their organisation and
this is fully demonstrated by their nomina-
tion of personnel in the provincial assemblies
—I mean national as opposed to communal
character.
\

364

*
 f

" I t was made clear to Mr. Jinnah that

neither the Viceroy nor the Mission could
accept his claim to a monopoly of Muslim
appointment.
"We felt we could not at this stage accept
much alteration of the Viceroy's plan. In
the Statement of June 16, we had laid down
the course we should pursue in the event of
both or either of the two major parties not
being able to accept a coalition Government
on the basis proposed.
" I f either opposed it, the whole basis of
the coalition fell to the ground. In this
event our Statement of June 16, stated that
the Viceroy would seek to form an Interim
Government which would be as representa-
tive as possible of all those willing to accept
the Statement of May 16.
"When the Congress ultimately came to
their final decision to accept the May 16
Statement while unfortunately rejecting the
Interim Government, they quite clearly
became equally eligible with the Muslim
League for inclusion in such a representative
Government.
"Immediately we received from the Cong-
ress President letter No 31, we saw Mr.
Jinnah and told him the position, giving him
a copy of the letters and informing him that
the scheme of June 16 had fallen to the
ground.

365
 /

"Up to that moment the Muslim League

had arrived at no decision as to their attitude
to the proposals of June 16 and they had
adopted the line that they must await the
Congress decision before they themselves
decided. In view of the Coagress decision,
it was then too late for any decision of the
Muslim League to be effective.
t

"The situation now is that the Viceroy

will proceed to act on paragraph 8 of the
Statement of June 16 after a very short
delay.
"Referring to the present "Caretaker
Government" of officials, Lord Pethick-Law-
rence said: 'No one desired an official
Government but any other solution was
impossible.
"Only those who carried out the in ten-
sive negotiations can realise how exhausted
all the participants were. I t was essential to
have a short interval after the three and half
months of intensive work and so that the
Indian parties could participate in the elec-
tion to the Constituent Assembly.
"The next stage will be for the Viceroy
to resume negotiations at the earliest practi-
cable moment with the two major parties
for the formation of an Interim Government.
"This " will be a difficult task and we hope

366
that the fact that the constitution-making
machinery has been launched will make both
parties realise the absolute necessity of agree-
ing on the question of an Interim Govern-
ment.
"This Government does not purport to be
any permanent structure. I t was purely a
Provisional Government to carry on for the
time being. I t would, therefore, seem appro-
priate for a parity to insist on principles
which would affect the long point of view but
would not affect the induence of the interim
arrangement.
Both parties should be ready to sink their
communal differences and come together
for the good of India in this difficult time
and set up the efficient and representative
Government which was so vital to her future
welfare.
"So far I have concentrated on the major
parties," he continued.
There was also the question of the repre-
sentation of that large proportion of the
population other than the major parties and
whose position was entitled to very serious
consideration.
He had, he said, already referred to
arrangements in the discussion they had had
with the Indian States.

367
 There was the question of the Sikhs. The
difficulty arose from the inescapable facts
of the geographical position of the Sikhs.
Whereas, the Sikhs numbered five millions,
the Muslim numbered 90 millions and the
Sikhs were not a geographical entity.
Full consideration, he said, should be
given to their claim and full consideration
had been given to it as a distinct com-
munity.
The most the Mission could do was as
outlined in the White Paper.
On a population basis they had been
given four out of 22 seats in the Punjab.
The situation could be brought up and con-
sidered by the Advisory Gommittee of
Minorities.
He appealed to the Sikhs to reconsider
their attitude and their decision not to take
part in the work that was now being done.
Th^re were two other claimants for re-
presentation with which he wished to deal.
s

Lord Pethick Lawrence referred to the

Depressed Classes led by Dr. Ambedkar and
said that they would have very full repre-
sentation through the Congress-affiliated
organisation. The Mission had interviewed
the leaders of the Congress organisation and

368
were convinced of their genuine desire to
help the Depressed Classes.
I t was another matter on which the Ad-
visory Committee on minorities might reach
some solution and he hoped that the Com-
mittee would be generous in their allocation
of seats to minorities.
There was also the question of other
minorities including the Christians and the
Anglo-Indians whose representatives would,
they hoped, be safeguarded by the Advisory
Committee.
In the Statement of May 25, the Mission
had singled out adequate provision of pro-
tection for minorities as one of the two
matters on which the British Government
required assurances before it would recom-
mend. Parliament to secede authority.
They profoundly hoped that the matter
would not be allowed to become controver-
sial.
He went on to pay tribute to his Cabinet
colleagues and the Viceroy whose resource,
initiative and wise judgment had been in-
valuable, and without whose help they might
not have got anywhere, he said.
He also paid a tribute to the Indian
statesmen with whom they came into contact.
Although they were dealing with matters

369
that were acutely controversial their personal
relationships always remained very friendly.
And though the Mission at times had felt
a little impatient at delay they had to bear
in mind the tremendous importance of what
to think again, and then still think again,
when they were considering a framework
under which they might have to live for
centuries to come.
He was quite sure that the Lords would
bear in mind the delicate state of the nego-
tiations t h a t were ebing carried on and that
they would refrain from any remark t h a t
might cause harm.
The work which he and his colleagues had
been engaged on for three and a half months
had been no lijzht task and it was fraught
with consequences of the greatest propor-
tions, not only to India and Britain but to
the world.
If they had been able to reach a partial
solution of some of the problems and helped
their Indian friends in any way, he was very
glad to have taken his part in this great
work.
SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS STATEMENT IN THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS. I

Speaking in the House of Commons on

the Cabinet Mission to India, Sir Stafford

370
Cripps said: "The issue of 'one or two
India's had been bitterly contested at the
elections and the two major parties, Cong-
ress and the Muslim League, had each of
them almost swept the board in their respec-
tive constituencies,"
Sir Stafford went on, "to some extent,
perhaps, this outstanding success of the two
major parties simplified the matter, because
the smaller parties had been relegated to
the background by the electorate but, on
the other hand, of course, reinforced both
two major parties in their directly opposed
policies 55

a Tbe House must, I am sure, be fully

conscious of the fact that the circumstances

of the spring of 1946 were vastly different
.*•* - • - V - *•_ A . V A . ^ ^ ^-^

from those ot 1942, or 1939.

"India has shared to the full in the politi-
cal awakening which is evident all over the
world after the war and nowhere perhaps
more than in the Far East.
"Pressures which were sufficiently in
evidence, before the war and during the
war have become greatly accentuated and
what might have been considered a reasona-
ble speed of progress before the war would
now be regarded as dilatory and inadequate.
" I have always personally believed that
our best hope of maintaining the valued

371
 h

friendship and co-operation of the Indian

people was to offer them their full and
untrammelled freedom as to their own future
and to help them to the best of our ability
to achieve their desires as smoothly and
quickly as possible.
"There is no doubt whatever that since,
at any rate, the early months of this year no
other approach than this would have had
any chance of success at all.
"When the Mission first arrived in New
Delhi the atmosphere for a g r ement between
the parties was not propitious.
"We found a highly-charged political
atmosphere resulting from the elections
which were stiil in progress in some of the
Provinces and a deep suspicion that some-
how or other our object would be to delay
and frustrate the hopes of Indian indepen-
dence."
"There was another factor which had an
influence, and t h a t was the weather.
"Summer in New Delhi is not the best
place and time for negotiations, excessive
heat and, latterly, in June dampness make
it difficult for all parties to maintain t h a t
atmosphere of calm and patient deliberation
which is so essential in dealing with such
complex negotiations.

372

/
 "Perhaps the House will permit me in
this association to p ly a very real and sincere
tribute to the noble Lord who presided over
our Mission and whose calm, patient and
determined conduct of the negotiations was
so largely responsible for the results that we
are able to report."
Speaking of the initial month of the nego-
tiations and the formal intei views with all
communities, sections and individuals, Sir
Stafford said : "There was some criticism
of the time we spent upon these interviews
but we were all convinced t h a t they were
well worth while and they certainly enabled
us to appreciate the feelings and desires
vastly differing desires—of the very diverse
population of 400,000,000 people with whose
representatives we were dealing."
Sir Stafford said that before leaving New
Delhi for a four-day holiday in Kashmir the
Mission indicated their hope that the two
principal parties might come together for \

negotiation during their absence.

He added: "Immediately upon our
return, finding t h a t nothing further had
transpired, we set ourselves the task of
bringing together the Muslim League and
the Congress.
"We were determined not to lose any
opportunity of reaching an agreement.

373
 "Apart from the difficulty of arriving a t
a common view as to the form of the Cons-
i

tituent Assembly and the composition of

the Interim Government there was in these
initial stages a wide difference of approach
on the part of the two parties.
"The Congress held strongly that the
question of the Interim Government should
first be settled after which a settlement as
to the Constituent Assembly should follow. #

"The Muslim League on the other hand

were equally firm that they could not discuss
the composition of the Interim Gjvernment
until the long-term question associated with
the setting up of the Constitution -making
machinery had been settled.
" I t was not practicable to obtain a
settlement of both questions simultaneously
and we came to the conclusion that the best
chance of ultimate agreement upon the whole
matter was to deal with the longer-term
question first and thereafter immediately to
tackle the problem of the Interim Govern-
ment. It was on that basis that we pro-
ceeded. *
'
" I t therefore become necessary to work
out with the leaders of all main parties some
basis upon which these parties would be
prepared to meet for discussion of the long-
term problem.

374

\
 "Our difficulty here was t h a t the Muslim
League were committed up to the hilt to an
independent, fully sovereign Pakistan as a
ssparate entity, while the Congress equally
were strongly pledged to a unitary India,
though they had stated that they could not
compel the people of any territorial unit to
remain in an Indian Union against their dec-
lared will.
"The second stage of our negotiations
was, therefore, introduced by a very intense
period of personal interviews and conversa-
tions during which a joint basis was worked
out for discussion, and ultimately both
parties, while making it clear that they were
in no way bound, expressed their willingness
to meet in Simla to discuss the matter."
Sir Stafford Cripps then quoted the basis
of the future constitutional structure of
British India—a Union Government dealing
with Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communi-
cations, tvaro groups of Provinces, one predo-
minantly Hindu and the other predominant-
ly Muslim, dealing with all other subjects
which the Provinces in the respective groups
desired to be dealt with in common; Provin-
cial Governments to deal with all other
subjects and have all residuary sovereign
rights and commented : " I t was upon this
purposely vague formula, worked out in con-

375
 junction with the leaders of the two parties
that we were able to bring together to confer
with us in Simla four representatives each
from the Congress and the Muslim League.
"We were not over-optimistic regarding
the final agreement at that stage but what
we hoped for and, in fact, realised, was a
much closer approach to a solution which
would narrow the gap between the two '
parties and so enable us subsequently to put
forward to them suggestions for bridging
that gap."
Sir Stafford said that towards the end of
the Simla talks the two sides produced
written statements of their rival demands
which, he said, showed that both had moved
very considerably from their initial stand-
*
points.
Sir Stafford continues: " I t was not
possible to get the parties any closer to one
another at Simla and so with their consent,
the meetings were terminated after lasting a
fortnight and the Mission announced that it
would return to New Delhi and put out a
statement of its own views.
"We had, in fact, worked very hard on
the production of a plan while at Simla,
adapting it in the light of the negotiations,
7
and on our return to New Delhi, we w ere

376

*
 I

able to finalise it quickly so that it was

issued on May 16.
" I t is perhaps worth stating that—cont-
rary to the allegations which were made in
some quarters in India—we had not gone
out to India with any cut and dried plan.
We went out with open minds since our
object was not to impose a plan on India *
but to help Indians to agree on a plan
amongst themselves."
He added ; "We did not desire in any
way to interfere with the making of the fu-
ture constitution of India, which was and is
a matter entirely for Indians. On the other
hand, a« we were asking the different com-
munities to join in the forming of a Constitu-
tion-making Body on a certain basis which
we believed to conform to the greatest
possible common measure or agreement
between them, we had to offer each of them
some security that if they came in on that
basis it would not be changed without their
consent."
Therefore, he said, the Cabinet adopted a
basic form for the future constitution.
\

A point to note, he said, was that "this

three-tier system, as it has been christened
is nothing more than our recommendation
t o the Indian people.

377
 But it was on that basis t h a t the Cabinet
Mission was asking the parties to join in the
formation of a Constituent Assembly, it was
necessary to stipulate t h a t the provisions
should not be varied without a majority of
each of the two major communities.
This was designed with, we were sure, the
assent of the Congress to give a degree of
security to the Muslims if they came in on
the basis of our recommendation."
Commenting on the part of the Cabinet
Mission's statement on May 16 giving their
reasons for adopting the population basis for
the elections to the Constituent Assembly,
Sir Stafford said that this method had met
with very general approval.
Of the special procedure for the extra
protection of the minorities Sir Stafford said:
"To this we attach great importance. A
straight population basis for the Constituent
Assembly with election by single transfera-
ble vote inevitably results in the minorities,
to some extent, losing their existing weigh-
tage in the Provincial Legislature.
" I t was wholly impracticable to extend
the population basis to each of minorities
individually because their numbers are so
divided up amongst the different provinces
that it in practice would have resulted in

378 <

0
some of them not gaining any representation
at all.
We therefore, took only three major
* . .

divisions—Muslims, Sikhs and General.

"In the later category the Congress are,
of course, thp vast majority and if—as in
fact they are doing—they provide adequate
opportunities for minority representatives to
get elected, the minorities will gain and not
lose by the arrangement.
"Despite this, we still felt that the mino-
rities should have some special consideration
and we were sure from our negotiations that
both the major parties were anxious to give
them good and fair treatment.
a
We proposed, therefore an advisory
Committee. This provides a way of initiat-
ing recommendations for minority protection
in the constitution in a body which should
consist mainly of minority representatives.
We believe that this method is more likely
to produce sound and just results than an
insignifi atn minority in the Constituent
Assembly which is the most that could, by
any electoral device, have been obtained for
the minorities.
Sir Stafford said that the Cabinet's state-
ment of May 16 gained an excellent recep-
tion in India, adding, "though, of course,
there were points in it that were criticised on

379
many sides. Neither of the two major par-
ties could achieve the whole of their objective
through it, but it presented a practicable and
flexible compromise which we hoped t h a t
both might accept."
Regarding the formation of an Interim
Government, which the Mission regarded as
a matter of great importance, Sir Stafford
said: " W e stated then (May 16) and we
still take the view t h a t a Coalition Govern-
ment having full popular support, was
necessary, and that we were anxious to
settle its composition as soon as possible
so that the two things—the Constitution-
making machinery and the Interim Govern-
ment—could go forward together. Moreover,
it appeared clear that time, as I have point-
ted out, that the Congress was unlikely to
accept the long-term plan until a solution
has also been found for the short-term ques-
1
tion of an Interim Government.'
Sir Stafford said t h a t the letters exchan-
ged during the period of waiting, which was
essential to give the party leader time to
consult, showed a gradual elimination of
some of the difficulties which seemed almost
insuperable to the parties in the first ins-
tance. He emphasised that the points of
disagreement were few and the general degree
of acceptance very great.

380

r
 (

Of the All-India Muslim League's Reso-

lution of June 6, accepting the Scheme p u t
forward by the Mission, Sir Stafford said :
" T h a t was a great step forward and it must
have required no little courage and deter-
mination on Mr. Jinnah's part in the light of
the strong views held and veiy forcibly
expressed by his followers, to support and
carry this resolution through the Muslim
League."
Sir Stafford said that there were two
main points which the Congress were stress-
o to the statement of May 16. "The first
was as to whether Provinces were compelled
to come into sections of the Constituent
Assembly in the first instance, or whether
they could stay out of they wished. We
made it quite clear that it was an es^tntial
feature of the Scheme that the Provinces
should go into the sections, though, if Groups
were subsequently formed, they could after-
wards opt out of those groups."
"Fear was expressed t h a t somehow or
other the new Provincial Constitutions might
be so manoeuvred as to make it impossible
for a Province afterwards to put out. I do
not myself see how such a thing would b
possible but if anything of that kind were to
be attempted it would be a clear breach of
the basic understanding of the scheme."

381
 t

/ Sir Stafford said the essence of the Cons-

[titut ion-making Scheme was that the Pro-
vincial representatives should have the op-
I portunity of meeting together and deliberat-
ling upon the desirability of forming a
["group" and upon the nature and extent of
[the subject to be dealt with by the group.
"If, when the pattern of a group, ulti-
mately emerges, any province wishes to
withdraw from the group because it is not
satisfied, then it is at librety to do so after
the first election under the new constitution
When with, no doubt, a wider elec orate
than at present that matter can be made a
straight election issue.
"The second point which disturbed the
Congress was as to the European vote. The
Congress took the view that as we had laid
down that the Constitution was to be made
\

by Indians for Indians, Europeans had no

locus at all in the matter.
"So far as sitting in the Constituent As-
sembly was concerned, this seemed pretty
clear and while we were in India, the Euro-
pean Party in the Bengal Legislature—which
is an important case in point—expressed
their clear intention neither to nominate nor
to vote for any European.
"Since our departure, they have gone
further and have decided to take no part in

382
the elections at all and the same has been
done, I understand, by the Europeans in
Assam.
" T h a t matter has, therefore, been got
out of the way not by our decision, but by
the sensible and co-operative attitude of the
Europeans themselves, who have through-
out done their best to assist towards the
working out of the new regime in India.
Sir Stafford Cripps continued: "Before
I leave this matter of the Constituent As-
sembly I must mention some of the recent
reports as to the alleged intentions of the
parties in joining the Constituent Assembly.
a
We saw representatives of both the
parties shortly before we left India and they
stated to us quite categorically that it was
their intention to go into the Assembly with
the object of making it work.'
"They are, of course, at liberty to advance
their views as to what should or should not
be the basis of the future constitution—that
is the purpose of the Constituent Assembly,
to hammer out an agreement from diverse
opinions and Plans.
''Likewise they can put forward their business, and
having agreed to the statement of May 16, and the Cons-
tituent Assembly being elected in accordance with that
statement they cannot, of course, go outside the terms
what has been agreed to as that would not be fair to the
come

383
 Dealing with the parity issue, Sir Stafford
continued:
Mr. Jinnah took up the position verbally
that he would await the Congress decision
before giving that of the Muslim League.
"The Congress were very much troubled
the type of parity t h a t still remained
between the Muslim and the Hindus other
than the Scheduled Castes and also bv the
t

inclusion of Sir N . P . Engineer, not because

of his personal qualifications which they
admitted were of the highest, but because
they considered that he was holding an offi-
cial post which they thought gave him an
facial rather than a representative oh
tc
"The major problem, however, was still
that of parity.
aI t might have been that, despite all
difficulties, the Congress would have consen-
ted to this arrangement had not there been
unfortunate and widely publicised disclosure
of certain letters written by Mr. Jinnah at
this precise moment.
The most important of these was t h a t
r
w hich contained the following sentence: "The
Muslim League would never accept the nomi-
nation of any Muslim by you (that was the
Viceroy) other than the Muslim Leaguer."

384
 This at once became a major issue. The
Congress were in fact considering the possibi-
lity of asking for substitution of one of their
Hindus by a Muslim in ord r to get out of
parity difficulty. They might, perhaps, have
waived this suggestion of nominating a Mus-
lim, had it not been that public challenge
was at this moment made to their right to
do so.
"The Congress has, of course, always
insisted upon the non-communal nature of
its organisation, and it has fulty demonstra-
ted this fact by its nomination of personnel
to those Provincial Governments in which it
has a large majority.
" I t was made perfectly clear to Mr. Jinnah
on more then one occasion that neither the
Viceroy nor the Mission would accept his
claim to a monopoly of the Muslim appoint-
ments, though the Muslim League was, cer-
tainly, to be regarded as the major represen-
tative of the Muslim interests."
"Sir Stafford Cripps said that in the state-
ment of June 16, the Cabinet Mission had
laid down a course which it should pursue
in the event of both or either of the two
major parties being unable to accept a coali-
tion Government on the basis there laid
down.

385
 "If either refused, the whole basis of the
proposstd coalition fell to the ground,but
we desired to protect any who had agreed
to co-operate in the plan of May 16 for the
constituent Assembly and so we stated t h a t
in the event of a failure to from a coalition
. on the lines set up, it is the intention of the
Viceroy to proceed with the formation of an
Interim Government which will be as repre-
sentative as possible of those willing to accept
the statemnt of May 16.
U p to June 16 this indicated the Muslim
League only, as neither the Congress nor the
Sikhs had upto that time given any decision,
they decided I am glad to say, to accept the
statement of May 16 while unfortuntely re-
jecting the Interim Government proposed for
reasons I have already stated.
This acceptance of the Statement of May
16 was an act of statesmanship on their part,
as it enabled progress to be made towards
working out a new constitution.
"Immediately we received the letter from
the Congress we saw Mr. Jinnah and told him
the position, giving him a copy of the letter
and informing him that the scheme of J u n e
16 had fallen to the ground since the Congress
had turned it down. This confirmed the
same evening. Up to that moment the Mus-
lim League had arrived at no decision. As I

386
have already pointed out they had adopted
a line t h a t they mint await the Congress
decision before themselves deciding.
"Mr. Jinn ah went straight from his meet-
ing with us to his Working Committee who
had passed a resolution accepting the Scheme
of June 16, presumably, Mr. Jinnah told his
Working Committee what had passed at the
interview, though he does not make this
clear in his letter.
"Mr. Jinnah seemed to think that accep-
tance by the Congress of the Statement of
J u n e 16 had put him into a false position
and that we should have proceeded forthwith
to the formation of an Interim Government
with the Muslim League alone.
" I t is easy to realise the disappointment
of Mr. Jinnah that the Congress had not ac-
cepted what apparently seemed to him an
acceptable arrangement of June 16 for a
coalition Government being set up, while at
the same time, qualifying themselves for
consultation upon the formation of some
other Interim Government by agreeing to
operate the Plan of May 16.
Mr. Jinnah was anxious to enter the
Coalition Government as laid down in the
statement of June 16, but as Paragraph 8 of
that Statement made the setting up of such
a Government dependent upon acceptance by

387
both parties, it was impossible to proceed
upon it as basis when one p a r t y — m d the
major party—had stated its unwillingness to
accept."
Replying here to an interjected inquiry
by Mr. Richard Butler (Conservative) as to
the meaning of Paragraph 8 in the State-
ment of J u n e 16, Sir Stafford Cripps said:
"If either the Congress or the Muslim League
would not consult to come into the coalition
Government, then the scheme for the Coali-
tion Government went because it would no
longer be a coalition and we should have to
find some other Interim Government of those,
who accepted the scheme of May 16."
Sir Stafford continuing said: 'The situa-
tion now is that Viceroy will proceed to act-
under Paragraph 8 of the statement of J u n e
16. There had been quite understandable
criticism of the fact that a purely temporary
official Government has been set up in the
meantime.
I t is admittedly necessary to take some
immediate steps as regards the Viceroy's
Executive as a number of its members had
resigned, some of them having returned to
this country.
"There were only two possible alterna-
tives, either to proceed at once with fresh
negotiations with the two major parties, or

388

•
 Ise to appoint a purely transitional Govern-
ment until such time as further negotiations
could take place.
"For the purpose of such a transitional
Government, the only practical method was
to set up a purely official caretaker Govern-
ment, and as the House knows, that is what
has been done and that Government is now
functioning.
"1 must moke it clear that this is a purely
temporary expedient to tide over time until
a representative Interim Government can be
formed.
"The deciding factor in the choice be-
tween the two alternative was purely a
practical one. No one desired an Official
Government had any other solution been
possible; *

"Only those who have carried through

the intensive negotiations during the summer
months in New Delhi can realise how exhaus-
ted all participants were.
" I t was essential that there should be a
pause after three and a half months of intense
work, and this necessity was further empha-
sised, by the fact that all members of the
Congress Working Committee had to leave
for the All-India Congress Committee meet-
ing at Bombay on July 8 and that all parties
r

389
wished to participate in the elections to the
Constituent Assembly.
" I must here pay a tribute to the amaz-
ing way in which the Viceroy carried the
great load of these negotiations throughout
aJl these months (cheers); during which he
had the task of carrying on all this many
day-to-day duties in the Government of India
as well.
" I t is not surprising t h a t he too was feel-
ing tired and needed a period of comparative
rest. So it was t h a t this purely temporary
expedient was adopted.
"The next stage which will come very shortly will
be for the Viceroy to resume negotiations at the
earliest practicable moment with the two major
parties for the formation of an Interim Government.
"This will admittedly be a difficult task,
but we hope that the fact t h a t the Consti-
tution-making machinery is being now at
last launched, will make both the parties
realise the absoulte necessity for a compro-
mise on the question of the Interim Govern-
ment.
"This Government is no part of any per-
manent structure in India, it is purely a
provisional Government to carry on until
such time as the new constitution comes into
operation and it would, therefore, seem in-
appropriate for either p a r t y to delay its for-

390
matiori by insisting upon principles which
for a purely temporary purpose will have no
influence upon their future position.
"Members of the Mission would wish to
appeal to all those on both sides in India with
whom they developed such truly friendly
relations during their stay in India, to put
aside for this purpose, their keen communal
and party feelings and to come together for
the good of all Indians this difficult time
when an efficient aud representative Govern-
ment is so vital to her future welfare.
"So, far, I have, of necessity, concentra-
ted upon the position of the two major
parties, but although these represent a large
proportion nf the total population of British
India, there are other important elements
which are entitled to fullest consideration.
"First, perhaps, I might deal with that
large section of Indian territory and popu-
lation which comes within Indian States.
"The House will be familliar with our
T
relationship w ith Indian States, described by
the word 'paramountcy.'
"We had a series of very interesting talks
with the representatives of the Princes and
some of the leading States' Ministers as well
as a good deal of correspondence, and we
were most impressed by the co-operative
attitude which they adopted throughout.

391
 "The Chancellor of the Chamber of
Princes, His Highness the Nawab of Bhopal,
was very helpful and will, I am sure, contri-
bute much to a solution of the problems of
Indian States.
"The States are willing and anxious to
co-operate and to bring their own constitu-
tions into such conformitv with those of
British India to make it possible for them
to enter the Federal Union.
"There will of course, have to be close
negotiations between the Negotiating Com-
mittee which the States have set up and the
major British Indian parties, both as to the
representation of the States in the Constitu-
ent Assembly and as to their ultimate posi-
tion in the Union.
"If the same reasonable temper continues
to be shown about these matters as was the
case while we were in India, we may well
hope that accommodation will be arrived at
which will enable all India to come within
the Union set up by the constitution-making
machinery.
" I now pass to the question of Sikhs. It
was a matter of great distress to us that the
Sikhs should feel that they had not received
the treatment which they deserved as an
important section.

392
 "The difficulty arises, not from anyone's
under-estimate of the importance of the
Sikh community, but from the inescapable
geographical facts of the situation.
"What the Sikhs demand is some special
treatment analogous to that given to the
Muslims. The Sikhs, however, are a much
smaller community 5,500,000 against
90,000,000, and are not geographically situa-
ted so that any area as yet desired^—I do
not put it out of possibility that one may be
devised—can be carved out in which they
would find themselves in a majority.
" I t is, however, essential that fullest
consideration should be given to their claims
for they are a distinct and important com-
munity, and this we have done.
" B u t on the population basis, adopted,
they would lose their weightage and cons-
equently have only 4 out of a total of 28
seats in the Punjab, or out of 35 in the
North-Western Section.
"This situation will to some extent, we
hope, be remedied by their full representa-
tion in the Advisory Committee on minorities
set under Paragraph 20 of the Statement of
May 1.
"Over and above that, we have represen-
ted to the two major parties—who were both

393
most receptive—that some special means to
giving the Sikhs a strong voice in the affairs
of the Punjab for the North-Western Section
should be devised.. I feel most hopeful that
if only our Sikh friends maintain single and
undivided view among themselves and are
patient that they will find their position is
generally recognised and t h a t they will be
able with the two main parties to work out
some satisfactory arrangement.
" I now come to the third element outside
the two major parties—the Depressed
Classes.
"The difficulty t h a t arises here h\ that
there are two claimants to represent this
large body of Indians.
"One is identified with the name of Dr.
B. R. Ambedkar, who has fought so streno-
usly for the rights of the Depressed Classes
and the other which works in close associa-
tion with the Congress.
"Dr. Ambedker's Organisation is some-
what more local in its character, bein
mainly centred in Bombay and the Central
Provinces; the Congress-affiliated Organisa-
tion is spread widely over the whole country
"We naturally considered with great care
as to what could be done to obtain represen-
tation for both Organisations in accordance
with their popular support in the country.

394
 "The House will remember t h a t th
5
?ctoral basis for the Repressed Classe •>•>

presentatives is what is known as th \j

Poona Pact, agreed to under pressure by D

c
Amb dkar, which lays down a most compli-
cated system of election, in which there are
primary elections by the Depressed Classes
electors alone, in which four candidates are
chosen from which subsequently in the second
election, one is chosen by the general elec-
torate.
"Whether this is a good or bad system, it
is one to which the parties agreed and which
is in operation and as a result of it, at least
in the Provincial elections, the Congress
made practically a clean sweep of the whole
Depressed Classes constituencies.
" T h a t is a fact and as it was almost uni-
versally agreed that members of the Provin-
cial Legislative Assemblies formed only
possible electorate for the Constituent
Assembly, it was not possible, even had we
desired to do so, to arrange for Dr. Ambed-
kar's Organisation to have any special right
of election to the Constituent Assembly.
" I t had failed in the elections and we
could not artificially restore its position.
The Depressed Classes will, of course, have
their full representation through the Congress
iffiliated Organisation.

395
 "We interviewed leaders of that Organi-
sation and were convinced of their very
genuine and strong desire to support the
case of the Depressed Classes.
"Here again, however, the iVdvisory
Committee on minorities can provide an
opportunity for reasonable representation of
both Organisations and we hope very much
that the majoritv of the Constituent Assem-
bly in setting up that Advisory Committee,
will be generous in the allocation of seats to
all minorities, but particularly to minority
organisations which though they have a
considerable, following in the country, have
little or no representation in the Constituent
Assembly itself.
" I have attempted in what, I fear, is
rather a long review of our negotiations to
cover some of the major points. I hope that
members will not thiuk that because, I have
omitted to mention them, there were not a
mass of other matters to which we gave
most careful attention.
"We met daily including Sundays, and
often two or three times a day, so that we
might consult fully upon every point that
arose and despite the heat and long hours,
I can, I am sure say on behalf of myself and
my colleagues that we were the most cohesive

396
and good tempered team and we certainly
did not shirk any single issue that was
to brought our attention.
"Before coming to a short summing up
of the situation as I now see it, I want to
pay a sincere tribute to all those with whom
we negotiated. It would be invidious to
mention names but I am convinced that
every single person with whom we dealt was
genuinely anxious for a solution of these
most difficult problems.
"They each rightly pressed and pressed
very strongly the particular views of their
community or party, but also they, (one and
all) made very considerable compromises
which were especially difficult in view of the
very pronounced election propaganda-period
which had immediately preceded our vist.
"We are most grateful to them for their
contribution as well as for the very friendly
and helpful way in which they received and
entertained us in their country.
"We were sent to India to try and work
out with Indian parties a way of completing
the structure of Indian independence, which
has long been planned and contemplated.
"Every step that had been taken before
and since the first World War has been in
that direction, but so far it has not been

397
possible to bring to full fruition, the plans
and promises that had been made.
"There is no doubt t h a t at the time of
our arrival in India, there was a universal
and dangerous spirit of frustration and disi-
llusionment. The first great step to clear
away this form of doubt and meditation was
taken when the Prime Minister made his
speech in this House on'March 15 last.
" T h a t speech which was accord d a fri-
endly reception from every quarter of the
House and by aU the British Press has pro-
found effect in India. We quoted some of
the more important passages from it in the
opening paragraph of our statement of May
1, that we tried to build.
" I n this statement of Government policy,
the Prime Minister in one respect and in one
respect only went further then any British
Government had gone before.
" I n the Offer of 1942, India was promised
the position of a Dominion and it was then
expressly stated on instructions from the
Coalition Government that, should India so
desire to do, once she had achieved her in-
dependence, she would be free to go out of
the British Commonwealth of Nations.
"Since 1942 conditions have changed.
" W h a t was then rejected would have been
100 times more certain of rejection in 1946.

398
/

One hope of a peaceful and friendly change

of sovereignty was to offer Indians their
complete and unqualihing independence,
whether within or without the British Com-
monwealth. In that way alone was there a
hope of retaining their friendship and ulti-
mately co-operation.
" I t was largly this change in approach,
announced by the Prime Minister on March
15, that made it possible for our Mission to
make headway towards settlement. With-
out it our visit to India would have been
pointless and fruitless.
"When we left India, there had undoubt-
edly been a change of atmosphere. There
was trust in the sincerity of the British
Government which had formerly been absent
and a desire and willingness for co-operation
in the solution of India's problems.
" T h a t is the first positive gain, and is
something when, we believe, augurs well for
our future relationship with an independent
India, whether she chooses to remain within
or to go without the British Commonwealth.
<<»j
Second, we have negotiated and agree-
ment between the main Indian parties and
acceptable to Indian States, which provides
a machinery for working out new constitu-
tion. It is not our task to make that machi-
nery work. We must now stand aside,

399
 •

always ready and anxious to help if we are

wanted but determined not to interfere.
"No one would be so foolish as to imagine,
that the course of constitution-making will
be a smooth one. The principle parties will
not give up their deeply held convictions at
the moment.
" B u t we have succeed' in doing what,
it has often been suggested was necessary.
We have negotiated means of bringing the
representatives of Indian people together
without our presence—to settle for them-
selves their own exceedingly difficult prob-
lems.
"We believe that given the accommoda-
tion with both sides have shown in agreeing
to the Plan, it will not be impossible to
work out a solution of the many problems
that confort the Constituent Assembly.
"One factor is certainly encouraging and
that is that all parties are trying to get the
very best persons elected to the Constituent
Assembly, including many who are not party
men at all.
"There is every hope that that body,
when elected, will represent the views of
nearly every element of Indian life, including
of course, the minorities, although it is reg-
rettable that the Sikhs have recently with-
drawn their candidates.

400
 *'Unfortunately, we did not succeed in
accomplising the second task which we
regard as of great importance—that of the
setting up of a representative Interim Go-
vernment.
"We did not fail, because of any difficulty
between the Viceroy or the British Govern-
ment and Indians. We have failed, because
so far we have not been able to devise the
composition of a Government acceptable to
both parties. •
" I n the ultimate stages, the issue came
down to very narrow one upon which neither
party was prepared to give way—whether
the Congress could nominate a Muslims as
one of their representatives in the Interim
Government.
" I t would obviously be undesirable to
comment on that situation which is the one
with which the Viceroy will have to deal in
the lortncoming negotiations, nor as 1 am
sure, the House fully realises, would it be
helpful if the members were to canvass one
or the other of contentions put forward. On
both sides convictions are honesty held and
both parties attach great importance to this
issue.
"There can be no doubt in any of our
minds t h a t the course of the Constituent
Assembly will run more smoothly, if repre-

401
sentative Government can be set at the
centre, nor have we any doubt whatever
that the circumstances of India demand the
setting up of such a Government as an
urgent matter.
"Both major parties equally agree that a
Coalition Government is highly desireable
and indeed necessary.
"After a short respite from negotiations,
we hope that both parties may find the way
out of this dilemma, for no one can contem-
plate with any equanimity, the breakdown
of progress to Indian independence, because
of the method of allocating a single seat in
the Interim Government.
"Th^ magnitude of what we are trying to
accomplish cannot be over-estimated. I t is
nothing less than transfer by peaceful means
of sovereignty to over 400,000,000 people
situated in many diverse territories of differ-
ing religions and different races.
"To achieve such an aim would be to
revitalise that faith of the world in peaceful
methods and human reasonableness. Suc-
cess, though not yet by any means certain.
is within the grasp of ourselves and our
Indian friends, and we may hope that in this
realisation, the remaining difficulties may be
overcome.

402
 #

"There is one thing of which I feel certain*

t h a t every person i n this House and this
country will desire their most heartfelt wishes
for success to be conveved to those represen-
tat ives of the Indian people who will shortly
be meeting in the Constituent Assembly.
"May God bless their labours and may
they achieve for India upon a sound and
lasting basis that freedom for which all her
people long."
Sir Stafford
minutes.
Mr. Winston Churchil speaking after Sir
Stafford Ciipps' speech on the Cabinet Mis-
sion's work in India in the House of Com-
mons said: " I take full responsibility for
the offer of 1942 although we received no
co-operation from the Congress Party in
India, which throughout the war. adopted
an attitude of no co-operation although two
million or more Indians fought with us for
freedom.
" I t was a remarkable thing that the
political parties did not sway the views of
Indians and, although we got no assistance
from those parties, we adhered to the stand
we had made." t

Mr. Churchill added he would register his

dissent with severance from the original

403

I
plan, for he considered this short-circuiting
of normal constitutional processes to be not
in accordance with the best wishes of those
concerned with a solution of the Indian
problem.
"Having regard to the elements in India
to which the Home Government mainly
address themselves, it prejudiced, in an
adverse sense, the case of whether the vast
sub continent of India with its population of
400,000,000 should remain, of its own free
will, within the commonwealth of nations.
Government had the power to make this
change. Theirs is the responsibility for
making it.
"Secondly the offer of 1942 was conditional
upon agreement being reached among the
principle forces and parties in the life of India.
Mr. Churchil continuing said: " I am
not making accusations agninst the Govern-
ment. The General Secretary of the Muslim
League has gone so far as to say that unless
the situation is clarified, it would be suicidal
for the League to enter the Constituent
Assemblv.% •

"All this raises the most formidable issue.

Those who have been to India know well
that agreement of the Muslims to the new
system, will affect the whole foundation of
the problem.

404
 a

Mr. Churchil added there was no doubt

the there was a complete lack of agreement
at the present time between the two princi-
pal communities.
Between these two commnnities the gulf
T
was never more wide than it w as at present
Differences were never more acute. The
deadlock was very grave.
Acceptance by the martial races of the
final settlement which we made before we
left India was indispensable to the future
peace.
" I desire to emphasise that all the arrange-
ments to be made by the Constituent Assem-
bly, and in the treaties which may subse-
quently be brought into existence between
Crown and Parliament of Great Britain and
a new sovereign independent Government of
India, must be subject to the fulfilment of
the honourable discharge of our obligations.
" I hope we are in agreement on that".
He could not contemplate the British
troops should be used to crush Muslims in
the interests of caste Hindus. Whatever
might be our responsibilities, whatever might
be the day appointed for us to quit India,
we must not make ourselves agents of a caste
Government or particular sectional Govern-
ment in order to crush by armed force and

405
*
#

modern weapons another community, which

although not so numerous, was numbered by
90 millions.

He added that the opposition was content

that further discussion should stand over till
the autumn when they would have a fuller
knowledge of the situation and of the forces
at work in India than was possible at pre-
sent.

Mr. Hugh Molson (Conservative) said

that the task on dealing with the Indian
problem should be put fairly and squarely
on the shoulders of Indian politicians.
He was glad that Sir Stafford Cripps
made it plan that the present Interim
Government could at any time be replaced
by a Government of Indian politicians and
he hoped that would take place before long.
All he said, felt goodwill towards India.
Winding up the debate, Mr. Albert Alex-
ander, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and
the third member of the Cabinet Mission,
said: '"Mr. Churchill had realy suggested
that we have taken almost a revolutionarv
departure from the offer of 1942 in that we
have not merely offered Dominion Status but
independent status. Who suggests that it is
a departure from 1942 ?" .

40(>

*
 Mr. Churchill: " I do. The offer of 1942
implied the setting up of Dominion Status
first.
Mr. Alexander: That is really splitting
hairs. 1

Mr. Churchill: If you say "take indepen-

dence now", that is what they are going to
take. Don't blind yourselves to the situation.
There will be no hesitation on the part of
those with whom you are dealing.
Mr. Alexander said: "If we approach the
situation today entirely from the viewpoint
of 1942 we would have come back with the
same failure."
Mr. Alexander then referred to points
which, he Siid, Mr. Churchill had raised
about the minorities. The kind of argument
which Mr. Churchill used, he said, was lead-
ing them to think that if they added the
total number of present minorities together
that would make a majority in India and
that there would be a reason for not accept-
ing the Prime Minister's statement that
ultimately the minorities ought not to be
allowed to prevent the progress of the majo-
ties.
" I n fact, if they took-the total figures of
the minorities—Muslims, Depressed Classes,
Indian Christians, Sikhs and Anglo-Indians—
and added them altogether they could make

407

I
 that kind of case, but if they went through
all the minorities and subtracted from them
all the millions in, or behind, the Congress
Party, his experience in the last three months
demonstrated that the majority of the Dep-
'ressed Classes, for example, were behind the
Congress.
Mr. Godfrey Nicholson (Conservative)
intervened to ask whether thev where not
departing from the spirit of the debate which
had been intended today.
Mr. Alexander said that he was most
anxious not to depart from the spirit of
the debate but he did not want to allow
the impression to go out that the question
of the minorities was not a matter of concern
to the Government or the House.
•

Mr. Alexander said that the Congress

secured from the Depressed Classes a very
large number of efficient candidates for rep-
resentation in the Assembly.
Mr. Butler, he said, could raise these
matters in more detail during the October
dabate.
He agreed very much with the tributes
paid to the Indian's voluntary war efforts
and to the 2,000,000 Indians in the great
struggle that they were in with Britain for
freedom and liberty. But the British were

408
 *

not offering this independence and freedom

to India, simply because they had done
Britain a great military service we give it on
the basis of it being our birthright in
this country and the birthright we desire to
see give to men and women in all parts of
the world.
NAWABZADA L1AQUAT ALI KHAN, Secretary,
All-India Muslim League, issued following statement
on Jnly9, 1946
" I t has been decided to convene a meet-
ing of the Council of the All-India Muslim
League at Bombay on the 28th and 29th of
July, 1946.
"Since the Council passed its Resolution
on June 6, accepting the Scheme embodied in
the Statement of the Cabinet Delegation and
the Viceroy of May 16 and May 25, certain
developments have taken place. The Cabinet
Delegation and the Viceroy have gone back
on their word in postponing the formation
of the Interim Government according to
their final proposals embodied in their State-
ment of the 16th June and have broken
their solemn pledges given in writing to the
Muslim League in this connection.
"Further, the Congress has accepted the
long-term plan of the Cabinet Mission only
conditionally with reservations and their

409
own interpretation which is totally opposed
to the authoritative statement made by the
Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy on May
25 clarifying their statement of May 16
particularly with regard to the grouping of
provinces which is the corner stone of the
long-term scheme.
" I n view of the?e serious developments,
it has been considered necessarv t h a t the
1/
I

Council should examine the whole position

and decide as to what course of action should
be adopted by the Muslim League under
changed circumstances."
A meeting of the Working Committee of
the All-India Muslim League will also be held
at Bombay on July 27.
In an interview to the representative of
the Associated Press of America Nawahzada
Liaquat Ali Khan asserted t h a t the British
had "gone back on their word" to the Muslim
League and that the Congress Party's accep-
tance of the Constituent Assembly plan for
drafting a constitution was "conditional"
and t h a t in reality "they have accepted
nothing."
Congrsss leaders took the view at the
recent All-India Congress Committee meet-
ing in Bombay, when acceptance of the
Constituent Assembly plan was ratified, that
provinces might realign themselves accordin

410
to their desires in the beginning, instead of
after a stated period as outlined by the
Cabinet Mission.
Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan took the
view t h a t the Congress position would make
the Constituent Assembly a sovereign body,
%
adding that 'if it is established as a sovereign
body we would have no place in t h a t be-
cause we would be one against four."
"Unless the position is clarified," he
continued, "it would be suicidal for the
Muslim League to enter the Constituent
Assemblv."
Asked what might happen in the event it
wa« decided to continue with the Constituent
Assembly without the Muslim League,
Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan replied.
"Cercainly it will not be a peaceful trans-
fer of power—that I can say. The Musal-
mans will not take it lying down."
Should all acceptance be withdrawn and
nothing further done, he said t h a t "then the
only thing to do is to divide," reverting
back to the demand for the separate Muslim
State—Pa kis tan.
He also asserted that "our only fault has
been that we have been honest about the
whole thing. Our faith has been shaken in

411
the word of the British. N'»w we can't tell
if they mean what they say."
He also commented that if the Cabinet
Mission had declared the Constituent Assem-
bly would be a sovereign body, "we would not
have accepted. We would have demanded
separate Constituent Assemblies, one for our
provinces and one for the Hindu Provinces."
"True to its democratic traditions, the
All-India Muslim League has decided to
convene a meeting of its Council at Bombay
on July 28 and 29 to review the situation
created bv the refusal of the Cabinet Delega-
tion and the Viceroy to go ahead with the
formation of the interim Government with
the help of the Muslim League, and the
wavering attitude of the Congress to the
long-term Plan. The Cabinet Mission and
the Viceroy unblushingly swallowed their
word of honour by postponing the formation
of the interim Government as they failed to
implement their proposals embodied in their
statement of June 16. Emboldened by this
climb down on the part of the Mission and
the Viceroy, the Congress seems to regard
these developments as a personal triumph
and is, in fact, rejoicing over the installation
of a bureaucratic regime because the alterna-
tive would have been an interim Government
formed by the Muslim League.

412
 Since J u n e 6, when the Council passed a
resolution approving of the long-term Plan
and the proposal for the interim Government
circumstances have changed and the Muslim
League has taken the only proper and possi-
ble decision to elicit the opinion of the larger
f
body in order to determine i s course of
action in the light of new factors which have
arisen.
A Government of officials is an inauspi-
cious prelude to the setting up of a Constitu-
ent Assembly and the atmosphere in which
it will begin to grapple with grave issues can
better be imagined than described. In sharp
contrast with the British Labour Party's
resolution congratulating the Cabinet Mission
on its "success" is the view of London's
Socialist weekly Tribune that "the temporary
solution of 'Caretaker' Government will not
allow matters to rest for long. Two large
and powerful political parties, unhampered
by administrative responsibility but with •
their appetite for power whetted by the past
few months' negotiations cannot be expected
to go quietly ahead with the election of the
Constituent Assembly with no thought of
manoeuvring for the next round." Sardar
Patel claims that the Congress had made it
clear to the Cabinet Mission that " t h e
proposed Constituent Assembly will not
prove a success if a responsible, representa-

413
 tive provisional Government at the Centre
is not established soon " Had the Congress
honestly believed that the formation of an
Interim Government was an essential preli-
• minary to the smooth working of the Cons-
tituent Assembly and had it sincerely wished
the termination of alien rule in India, it
could never have reiected the Muslim
League's hand of co-operation so magnani-
mously extended.
What the political correspondent of the
Associated Press 'of India has called 'a new
phase in the history of Congress' is nothing
more than an added proof of the utter
bankruptcy of Congress statesmanship to
give a lead to its own followers, much less
to those outside its fold. Maulana Azad's
heroics, MahatmaV sermon on "Swadeshi
Constitution", Pandit Nehru's 'Quit India'
cry and Congress leftwingers' revolutionary
slogans show a discrepancy of opinion which
• is bound to grow as the Constituent Assemb-
session begins in New Delhi. Much
valuable time was wasted in debating the
question whether the Constituent Assembly
was a Swadeshi product or a British brand,
whether the Congress has preserved or
abandoned its die-hard principles. The
post mortem proved to be futile because the
Congress remains where it was: far fro
clarifying its attitude to the Cabinet Missior

414

»
 lon£-term Plan, it has made confusion worse
confounded. As usual, fulminations against
the Muslim League will only serve to ac-
centuate differences between the two major
political parties on the eve of constitution-
making. Both the members of the Old
Guard and the new struggling leftist mino-
7
ritj have paraded their incapacity to trans-
cend communal ambitions in the larger inter-
ests of India.
As the forum of Muslim conscience, the
Council of the All-India Muslim League will
meet at Bombay towards the end of the
month to consider dispassionately these por-
tentous developments. As before, it will give
a lead to the Muslim nation, and empower its
chosen men to negotiate with other parties
in a spirit of cordiality but never will the
League show any inclination to seek a com-
promise at the expense of its declared policy
(
and sacred principles." 'DAU?N"
The Working Committee of the All India
Muslim League held several meetings before
the Council meeting which was to consider
airesh the attitude of the Muslim League
vis-a-vis the Constituent Assembly, and the
participation of the Muslim League in the
provisional Government at the Centre.
Qaid-e-Azam M. A. Jinnah opened the
3
proceedings o'f the All India Muslim League

i
415
Council with a fighting speech which lasted
150 minutes, during which he elaborately
reviewed the Constitutional negotiations.
QaicUe-Azam Speech on July 27, 1946.
_ >

" I feel the time has come for the Muslim

League— and I have been saying so—that
our motto should be discipline, unity and
trust in the power of our own nation. If
there is not sufficient power, creat that power
If we do t h a t the Mission and the British
Government may be rescued, released and
7
freed from being cowed dow n by the threats
of the Congress that they would launch a
struggle and start non-co-operation. Let us
also say that we will also do that.
Stating that all efforts of the Muslim
League at fairplay, justice, even supplication
and prayers have had no response of any
kind from the Congress, Mr. Jinnah declared:
"The Cabinet Mission have played into the
hands of the Congress. I t has played a game
of its own."
" I tell you the Congress has done the
greatest harm to the peoples of India in
which the caste Hindus are in an over-
whelming majority by its petty-fogging,
higgling attitude during the recent constitu-
tional negotiations. The Congress is full of
spite towards the Muslims.

416
 The Congress has now taken India back
40 years by enabling a completely bureau-
cratic and autocratic Government to be set
up at Delhi.
Mr. Jinnah continued: 'The Congress
thinks that it is going to walk into the Inte-
rim Government and by pass the Muslim
League. I t is welcome to go there. We are
not frightened by that and we know how to
deal with that.
"They are talking through their hats when
they talk of turning the Constituent Assem-
bly, into a sovereign body—the Constituent
Assembly that is being summoned by the
Viceroy appointed by the British Govern-
ment. I t is going to be turned into a
sovereign body by the bravado and the
childish statements of Pandit Jawaharlal
Nehru?"
At the outset Mr. Jinnah said that the
Council had been summoned "to consider
certain issues of grave importance." "You
have to finally decide what course of action
the Muslim League should adopt with regard
to the Constituent Assembly as embodied
in the statements of May 16 and May 25 of
the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy.''
Mr. Jinnah said that the Congress had
accepted the long-term proposals with their

417
own reservation and interpretation, notwith-
standing the authoritative statement that
was made by the Cabinet Mission on May 5.
Quoting extracts from the Congress Pre-
sident's letter of June 25 the Cabinet Mission
and the Congress Working Committte's reso-
lution of June 26, Mr. Jinnah said the Cong-
ress acceptance was conditional.
"Any man of commonsense can come to
one conclusion only, leave alone these great
politicians. It is surprising that the Cabinet
Mission and the Viceroy should consider
this decision as acceptance. Throughout
these negotiations the Cabinet Mission and
the Viceroy were under terror and threats of
the Cougress.
i
The second thing the Council of the Mus-
lim League had to consider was what steps
should be taken by the Muslim League in
view of the attitude adopted by the Cabinet
Delegation and the Viceroy in regard to the
Interim Government. Mr. Jinnah said:
"They have gone back on their plighted word
and abandoned what was announced as their
final proposals embodied in their statement
of June 16."
Mr. Jinnah contended that the Congress
really never accepted the long-term plan. Its
conditional acceptance was communicated to

418
the Cabinet Mission by the Congress Presi-
dent on June 25 and was subsequentiy rati-
fied by the A1CC at its meeting in Bombay
on July 7.
The Cabinet Mission Mr. Jinnah said
like a drowning man ready to catch hold of
straw treated this conditional acceptance of
the Cong as genuine P t i n e e . I Not
only did they try to propagate this view in
this country, but during the debate in the
House of commons and in the House of Lords
both Lord Pethick-Lawrence and Sir Stafford
Cripps created the impression that the Cong-
ress had accepted the long-term proposal.
This impression is not based on facts.
The Congress Working Committee's resolution
was bad enou but Pandit Jawaharlal
Nehru as the elected President, having taken
charge of his office, at a Press conference
mba
Congress to war
rm ear rview
awa ma ;uite ear
ongress was committed nothing and
were not boun arasra
ate
Constituent Assembly not
sovereign body, »?
Mr. Jinnah continued:
"Either we accept it or not accept it. Once
we accept it then the only honourable course

419
 '

open to my party is to treat the Constituent

Assembly really what it is. What is the use
of imagining things and dreaming.
Pandit Nehru had stated that the Cong-
<
^fi/-~ ress was not bound by Paragraph 19 of the
State Paper which regulates grouping and
which also regulates the functions of the Con-
stituent Ass*, mbly. The essential part of the
scheme, from the Muslim League point of
view, is grouping B and C and it is that part
of the scheme which has been unequivocally
repudiated by the Congress which asserts
that provinces in Group B and C are free to
opt out from the very beginning and not as
/is provided until the group constitution and
provincial constitutions are framed and
elections are held under the new provincial
constitutions.
Mr. Jinnah said that because the Cong-
ress had had a "brute majority" in the whole
of the Constituent Assembly it was hoping
to take any decision it liked with its majo-
rity, ignoring, nullifying and repudiating
every term of the scheme and act in a
manner which would not be competent of
the Constituent Assembly and which would
be 'ultra vires' of the functions and of t h a t
body.
The Congress position in a nutshell was,
Mr. Jinnah said: "We are committed to

420
nothing and we are going to the Constituent
Assembly to achieve onr objective and accor-
ding to our sweet will we will do what we
like on the basis of the interpretation which
we have already announced to the world."
This, Mr. Jinnah said had created a new
situation necessitating the summoning of
the League Council.

Mr. Jinnah referred to the Secretary of

State's speech in the Lords debate when he
declared that the Indian parties could not
go outside the terms of what had been agreed
to as that would not be fair to other parties
and said: "Beyond this pious expression
there is no effective check or remedy provi-
ded in the event of the Congress, which hap-
pens to have a brute majority in the Consti-
tuent Assembly, taking any decision which
is "ultra vires" and incompetent of t h a t
Assembly.

The Mission knew it. I t was made clear

to them that the Congress acceptance was
with reservation and with their own interpre-
tation on some of the fundamentals of the
scheme. Both Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan
and mvself had made this clear in our state-
ments. The British Government is in posse-
ssion of these details before the debate took
place.
421
 And ^vet Lord Pathick-Lawrence had
contended himself with the pious expression
of hope. Does this show any sense of res-
ponsibility or understanding on the part of
the Cabinet Mission who spent here three
and half months.
Further Pandit Nehru at a mass meeting
at Delhi on July 23, said that if they cannot
mend the Constituent Assembly they would
end it. When some papers attributed the
Pandit's statements to his emotional and
sentimental feelings. Pandit Jawaharlal
asserted, repeated and reaffirmed t h a t he
had said it deliberately and with a full sense
of his responsibility. He made it clear t h a t
the Congress would pursue t h a t line and, if
necessary kill the Constituent Assembly".
Mr. Jinnah characterised Lord Pethick-
Lawrence's statement in the Lords t h a t he
had faith and hope in the Indian people
doing the right thing as "most unconvincing
optimism" in view of the Congress stand.
" I feel we have exhausted all reasons.
I t is no use looking to any other source for
help or assistance. There is no tribunal to
which we can go. The only tribunal is the
Muslim Nation (cheers).
" I t is no consolation to me t h a t Lord
Pethick-Lawrence and Sir Stafford Cripps

422
 •

have acknowledged t h a t we made very subs-

tantial and vital concessions whereas the
Congress has not budged an inch. I wish T
could honestly pay a tribute to their courage
and statesmanship which they so sadly
lacked in handling these negotiations. Nor
have I seen any sign of the slightest gesture
of goodwill or conciliation or any indication
of co-operation on the part of the Congress.
" I am confident the Muslims of India
are not going to be perturbed, nor are we
going to suffer from any sense of frustration.
I can tell you this without fear of contradic-
tion that of the three parties, the Muslim
League acted throughout the negotiations as
an honourable organisation.
"We negotiated on high principles.
We made concession after concession, not
because we were over-awed. We did so
purely because of our extreme anxiety for an
amicable and peaceful settlement which will
lead, not only the Muslims and the Hindus,
but also other communities inhabiting this
sub-continent to the achievement of freedom.
But the Congress stood there like a mule.
I t has no other consideration except the one,
namely, how to down the Muslim League."
—(shame).
"We worked with clean hands", Mr.
Jinnah went on to say. "The Muslim
League is the only party that has emerged
from these negotiations with honour and
clean hands. The Mission went back on
their words with regard to the Interim Go-
vernment. The Mission today is cowed
down and paralysed. The Congress has
resorted to methods that even an ordinary
individual will be ashamed of.
•

"Have you (Congress) not got the decen-

cy and have you not got any sense of honour
and courage to say that you cannot accept
the proposals because it is opposed to your
fundamental principles and your objectives"
asked Mr. Jinnah.
*

Demanding a categorical reply from the

Viceroy, Mr. Jinnah asserted that on the
night of June 24 the Congress Working
Committee had rejected both the long term
and short term proposal. Earely in the
morning of June 25, the indefatigable Sir
Stafford Crips went and worked up Mr.
Gandhi in the Bhangi Colony. I t seems he
did not cut much ice. He came beck and
*

Lord Pethiek-Lavs rence was put on the scent

of Mr. Vallabbhai Patel, the strong man of
the Congress.
He waylaid Mr. Patel on the road and
took him to his house and thers they concoc-
ted a device. The Congress was persuaded

424
 to accept the long-term proposal even with
their own interpretations and rtservations
and the Mission assured the Congress that
it would abandon the Interim Government
scheme of June 16. It is again like a drown-
ing man catching at a straw. They wanted
some how or other to say that their mission
was not a complete failure.
a
This is exactly what happened. Now
I ask the Viceroy to issue a statement, giving
a categorical explanation on this point. This
is a grave charge against the honour, integri-
ty and character of the members of the Cab-
inet Delegation and the Viceroy.
"All these prove clearly," Mr. Jinoah said,
"beyond a shadow of doubt, that the only
solution of India's problem is Pakistan
(cheers). So long as the Congress and Mr
Gandhi maintain that they represent the
whole of India and so long as the Congress
waste their money to no purpose but to
create disruption among the Muslims and
o men who have no sense of
and morality by bribery, corruption and
jobbery, so long as they deny true facts and
the absolute truth that the Muslim League
is the only authoritative organisation of the
Muslims and so long as they continue in this
vicious circle there can and will be no com-
promise or settlement or freedom."

.
425
 s

Mr. Jinnah maintained that it was a

"bogus claim" of the Congress tbat it repre-
sented the whole of India. In the elections
_

to the Constituent Assembly out of 79 seats

for Muslims, the Congress had secured only
three. The candidate from the United
Provinces stood from three Muslim constitu-
encies in the provincial elections and he was
"kicked out everywhere."
"Mr. Gandhi now speaks as universal
adviser. He says that the Congress repre-
resents the whole of India and t h a t the Cong-
ress is the trustee for the people of India. I t
is an alarming status he wants. We have
enough experience of one trustee that has
been here for 150 years. We do not want
the Congress to become our trustee. We
have now grown up. (laughter). The only
trustee of the Muslims is the Muslim nation.
Mr. Gandhi is the self-appointed trustee of
the Harijans. Does he honestly believe t h a t
the Harijans have confidence in him? The
Harijans are a blot on any civilised commu-
nity. Sixty millions of them who have been
tied down by social and economic tyranny
for centuries have been living in a miserable
condition. What has Mr. Gandhi done to
i them since he assumed charge of the welfare
of the Harijans? The Scheduled Castes are
now offering satyagraha and going to jail.

426
People no not and will not take to this
extreme measure unless there is strong feeling
and strong grievance. The Mission have
betrayed the Harijans in order to appease
the Godess of the Congress.
Mr. Jinn ah proceeded to explain in detail
the negotiations regarding the setting up of
an interim Government and said: " I t is
entirely untrue that I submitted any list on
behalf of the Muslim League. On the cont-
rary, I definitely s lid that I was not prepared
to submit anv list until I knew that there
was an agreed settlement and if there was
no agreed settlement, the Viceroy was bound
to go ahead with one major party that accep-
ted it and that I will submit my list at that
stage.
"The Viceroy had no business to put my
name when I had clearly made it known to
him, in spite of histrying to persuade me,
that I will not accept any office so long as
I am the President of the Muslim League."
"Immediately the Congrssgave its reply."
Mr. Jinnah said, "We gave our reply. .Now
we are told that clause 8 means something
which it does not mean. Here I must say
Sir Stafford Cripps, when he was questioned
in the House of Commons, found it very
difficult to wriggle out of it and he resorted

427
to jugglery of words and misleading the
House. *

" I am sorry to say that Cripps debased

his legal talents and put this dishonest inter-
pretation on this clause. . He overpowered
the venerable and idealistic Secretary of
State.
Mr. Jinnah deplored that too much
prominence had been given to the interview
he had with the Mission on June 25. The
Viceroy received the Congress reply at about
11 or 12 noon t h a t day. I t had not been
stated anywhere that we were time-barred
in accepting the proposal. It was not stated
t h a t the offer had been withdrawn. Of
course they would have been entitled to
withdraw the offer had both the parties not
accepted the offer.
A fantastic and dishonest construction
was put on the clause "by that ingenuous
juggler of words, Cripps" to evade the form
tion of the interim Government, it was only
Mr. Alexander who intervened in the inter-
view and said that the Mission had not arri-
ved at any decision and that they wanted
to know Mr. Jinnah's views.
Mr. Jinnah criticised Lord Pethick-Law-
rence's statement that he (Mr. Jinnah) could
not have 'monopoly of Muslim nomination.'

428
 " I am not a trader," Mr. Jinnah said. " I
am not asking for concessions for oil nor am
I higgling and haggling like a Banya. Is it
not absurd for the Secretary of State for
India to come out with this phraseoloy that
Mr. Jinnah cannot claim monopoly. Are the
Muslims a commodity?''
Mr. Jinnah maintained that right from
the begining he had objected to the inclusion
of 'Quisling Muslims' in the Interim Govern-
ment. The Viceroy himself had, in his
letter ta> the Congress President on June 22,
stated that he would not have any non-
League Muslim. If Mr. Jinnah had that
monopoly then, he asked, did he lose it
after two days. The reason was the Cong-
ress did not accept it.
Mr. Jinnah thought that the Congress had
acted throughout in a petty manner and
their objective was to discredit and humiliate
the Muslim League. If the Congress was
really a national body representing the whole
of India then why should it bestow its
attention only on the Muslims and not on
other communities?
Amplifying his remarks on the part
played by the Cabinet Mission, Mr. Jinnah
said : "The British Government have un-
doubtedly gone back on their words. They

429

»
 T
have pla} ed into the hands of the Congress.
They have tried to propitiate the Goddess of
the Congress and postponed the formation
of the Interim Government. They have
accepted what is no acc» ptance at all on the
part of the Congress of long term proposal.
"Can they conscentiously say from the
way in which they conducted the negotia-
tions here that they are entitled to expect
from Muslim India faith in the Cabinet
Mission or the British Government t h a t has
endorsed this statement.
"When representatives of H.M.G. go back
on their own words within ten days and dis-
honour themselves and the Government they
represent and the nation to whom they
belong what confidence can we have in these
people?

The Council of the All-India Muslim

League concluded after three days of delibe-
rations in which 23 speakers participated.
Almost all speeches were emphatic in their
attack against the Cabinet Mission and the
Congress.
" I think I am putting the sense of the
house correct^ that we should withdraw our
acceptance of the long term proposal as con-
tained in our resolution of J u n e 6, communi-
cated to the Cabinet Mission and the Vice-

430
roy," said Qaid-e-Azam when almost every
speaker had spoken. There were loud and
prolonged cheers. He said, he believed that
all viewpoints had been put forward. He
and the members of the Working Committee
had sat till late at night discussing at length
the draft resolutions, but the final draft was
to be settled at the meeting itself.
Amidst scenes of unparalleled enthusi-
asm the All-India Muslim League Council
made history when without discussion, adop-
ted two resolutions moved by Nawabzada
Liaquat Ali Khan, which Qaid-e-Azam
Jinnah, described as "the most historic act
in our history."
By one resolution, the League Council
reversed its Delhi decision, accepting the
Cabinet Mission's proposals, while by the
other resolution it directed the Working
Committee immediately to prepare a pro-
gramme of direct action with the object of
achieving Pakistan.
The following is the full text of the reso-
lution withdrawing acceptance of the
Cabinet Mission's proposals :
On June 6, the Council of the All-India
Muslim League accepted the scheme embo-
died in the statment of the Cabinet Delega-
tion and the Viceroy, dt ted, May 16, 1946,

431
 f

and explained by them in their statement;

dated, May 25, 1946. The scheme of the
Cabinet Delegation fell far short of the
demand of the Muslim nation for the imme-
diate establishment of an independent and
fully sovereign State of Pakistan, comprising
the six Muslim provinces, but the Council
accepted a Union Centre for ten years strictly
confined to three subjects, viz., Defence,
Foreign Affairs and Communications, since
the scheme laid down certain fundamentals
and safeguards and provided for the group-
ing seperately of the six Muslim provinces in
Section B and C for the purpose of framing
their provincial and group constitutions
unfettered by the Union in any way; and
also with a view to ending the Hindu-Mus-
lim deadlock peacefully and accelerate the
attainment of freedom of the people of
India.

In arriving at this decision, the Council

was also greatly influenced by the statement
of the President which he made with the
authority of the Viceroy that the Interim
Government, which was an integral part of
the Mission's scheme was going to be formed
on the basis of a formula, viz. five Muslim
League, five Congress, one Sikh, one Indian
Christian or Anglo-Indian, and the most
important portfolios to be distributed equally

432
between the two major parties, the Muslim
League and the Congress.
The Council authorised the President to
take such decision and action with regard to
further details of setting up the Interim
Government as he deemed fit and proper.
In that very resolution the Council also re-
served the right to modify and revise this
policy if the course of events so required.
*

The British Government have committed

a breach of faith with Muslim League in that
the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy went
back on the original formula of 5: 5: 2 for
setting up of the Interim Government to
placate the Congress.
The Viceroy, having gone back on the
original formula upon the faith of which th Q

Muslim League Council came to their deci-

sion on June 6, suggested a new basis of
5: 5: 3 after carrying on considerable nego-
tiations with the Congress and having failed
to get the Congress to agree intimated to
the parties on June 15, that he and the
Cabinet Delegation would issue their final
statement with regard to the setting up of
the Interim Government.
Accordingly, on June 16, the President of
the Muslim League received a statement
embodying what was announced to be the
final decision for setting up the interim Go-

433
*

vernment by the Viceroy, making it clear

that if either of the two major parties
refused to accept the statement of J u n e 16,
the Viceroy would proceed to form the
Interim Government with the major party
accepting it and such other representatives
as were willing to join. This was explicitly
laid down in paragraph 8 of the statement
of June 16.

Even, this final decision of the Cabinet

f

Mission of June 16, with regard to the

formation of the Interim Government was
rejected by the Congress, whereas the Muslim
League definitely accepted it—although it
was different from the original formula, i.e.,
5 : 5 : 2—because the Viceroy provided safe-
guards and gave other assurances which are
in his letter dated June 20, 1946.
The Viceroy, however, scrapped the pro-
posal of June 16, and postponed the forma-
tion of the Interim Government on the plea
concocted by the legalistic talents of the
Cabinet Mission putting a most fantastic
and dishonest construction upon Paragraph
8 of the statement to the effect that as both
the major parties, i.e. the Muslim League
and the Congress, had accepted the statement
of May 16, the question of the Interim
Government could only be taken up in con-

434
 *

sultation with the representatives of both the

parties 'de novo.'
Even assuming that this construction was
tenable, for which there is no warrant, the
Congress, by their conditional acceptance with
reservations and interpretations of their own,
as laid down in the letter of the President,
of the Congress of June 25, and the resolu-
tion of the Working Committee of the Cong-
ress passed at Delhi on June 26, repudiating
the very fundamentals of the scheme, had,
in fac^, rejected the statement of May 16.
and, therefore, in no event there wa9 any
justification whatsoever for abandoning the
final proposals of June 16.
As regards the proposals embodied in the
statements of May 16 and 25 of the Cabinet
Delegation and the. Viceroy, the Muslim
League alone of the two major parties,had
accepted it.
The Congress have not accepted it because
their acceptance is conditional and subject
to their own interpretations which is contrary
to the authoritative Statement of the Delega-
tion and the Viceroy issued on May 16 and 25:
The Congress have made clear that they do not
accept any of the terms or the fundamentals
of the scheme but that they have agreed only
to go into the Constituent Assembly and to

435

'
 nothing else: and that the Constituent Assem-
bly is a sovereign bodjr and can take such
decisions as it may think proper in total
disregard of the terms and the basis on which
it is to be set up.
Subsequently they made this further
clear beyond doubt in the speeches that were
made at the meeting of the All-India Cong-
/

ress Committee in Bombay on July 6, by

prominent members of the Congress and in
the statement of Pandit Jawaharlal ISTehru,
President of the Congress, to a Press Confe-
rence on July 10, in Bombay and then again
even after the debate in Parliament in a
public speech by him in Delhi on July 22.
The result is that, pf the two major par-
ties, the Muslim League alone has accepted
.the statement of May 16 and 25, according
to the spirit and letter of the proposals em-
bodied therein and inspite of the attention
of the Secretary of State for India having
been drawn to this situation by the state-
ment of the President of the Muslim League
of July 13 from Hyderabad (Deccan), neither
Sir Stafford Cripps in the House of Commons,
nor Lord Pethick-Lawrence in.the House of
Lords, in the course of the recent dabate
have provided or suggested any means or
machinery to prevent the Constituent i^ssem-
ply from taking decisions which would be
1
436
 >

'ultra vires' and not competent for the Assem-

bly to do.
The reply to the matter that the Secretary
of State gave was mere expression of a points
hope and said " t h a t would not be fair to the
oth r* parties who go in."

Once the Constituent Assembly has been

summoned and met there is no provision or
pawer that could prevent any dicision from
being taken by the Congress with its over-
whelming majority, which would not be com-
petent for the Assembly to take or which
would be 'ultra vires' of it, and however,
repugnant it might be to the letter or spirit
of the schsme. I t would rest entirely with
the majority to take such decisions as thev
may think proper or suit them: and the
Congress has already secured by sheer num-
bers an overwhelming Caste Hindu majority
and they will be in a position to use the
Assembly in the manner in which they have
already declared, that is they will wreck the
basic from of the grouping of provinces, and
extend the scope, powers and subjects of the
Union Centre which is confined strictly to
there specific subjects as laid down in Para-
graph 15 and provided for in Paragraph
19 of the statement of May 16.

437
 The Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy
colh ctively and individually have stated
several time* t h a t the be sic principles were
laid down to enable the major parties to
join the Constituent Assembly and t h a t the
scneme connot succeed unless it is worked in
a spirit of eo operation. The a'titude of the
j
Congress cl arly s-hows t h a t t h conditions
precedent for the successful working
of the constitution-making body do not
exist.
This fact, taken together with the policy
of the British Gevernment of sacrificing the
interests of the Muslim nation and some
other weaker sections of the peoples of India,
particularly the Scheduled Castes, to appease
the Congress and the way in which they have
been going back on their oral and written
solmen pledges and assurances given from
time to time to the Muslims, leave no doubt
t h a t in these circumstances the participation
of the Muslims in the proposed constitution-
making machinery is fraught with danger
and the Council, therefore, hereby with
draws its acceptance of the Cabinet Mission
proposals which was communicated to
the Secretary of State for India by the
President of the Muslim League on J u n e
6. 1946.

43S
 The follow!:,:g :s the full text ci the resolution on
Direct Action:
"Whereas the All-India Muslim League
has todav resolved to reject the pioposals
emb- died in the statement of the Cabinet
Delegation and the Viceroy dated May 16,
194b, due to the Imran«ii£ei ce of the Ooim-
ress on the one hand and the breach of faith
with the Muslim by the British Government
on the other ;
And whereas Muslim India has exhausted
without success all efforts to find a peaceful
solution of the Indian problem by compromise
and constitutional means ; and whereas the
Congress is bent upon setting up a caste
Hindu Raj in India with the connivance of
the British ; and whereas recent events have
8^>own t h a t power politics and not justice
and fair play are deciding factors in Indian
affairs ;
And whereas it has become abundantly
clear t h a t the Muslims of India would not
re°t content with anything less than the
Immediate establishment of an Independent
and full sovereign state of Pakistan and
wouM resist any attempt to impose any
constitution, long-term or short-term, or
netting up of any Interim Government at

439
the centre without the approval and consent
of the Muslim League, the council of the
Alllndia Muslim League is convinced t h a t
i;ow the time has come for the Muslim Nation
to resort to Direct Action to achieve Pakis-
tan and to get rid contemplated future caste
Hindu Domination.
This Council calls upon the Muslim nation
to stand to a man behind their sole repre-
sentative organisation,—the All-India Mus-
lim League and be ready for every sacrifice.
This Council directs the Working Com-
mittee to prepare forthwith a programme of
direct action to carry out the policy initiated
above and to organise the Muslims for the
coming struggle to be launched as and when
necessary.
As a protest against and in taken of their
deep resentment of the attitude of the British
this Council calls upon the Musalmans to
renounce forthwith the titles conferred upon
them by the Alien Govesnment.

QAID-E-AZAM REITERATES EARLIER

DECLARATION
Mr. M. A. Jinnah, addressing a Press
Conference on July 31, said. We have done

440
our best and any further initiative now must
come either from the British Government or
from the Congress."
Mr. Jinnah was reviewing the decisions
of the Council of the Muslim League. He
made it clear in answer to a question that
the decision of the Muslim League to resort
to direct action is not a declaration of war
against anybody. This resolution is nothing
but a statement concerning the steps we
propose to take for our own self-preservation
and self-defence.
9

Mr. Jinnah declined to indicate what the

Muslim League would do in hypothetical
circumstances, remarking that the situation
would be dealt as it arose. He also declined
to indicate the e*act nature of the direct
action which the League proposed to take
nor the steps the League Council of Action
would take in that direction.
Mr. Jinnah reiterated his earlier declara-
tion that the Congress acceptance of the
Cabinet Mission's plan envisaged in the Miss-
ion's statement of May 16 was not real accep-
tance, as it was conditional and therefore
amounted to rejection or at best a counter-
offer.
Mr. Jinnah charged the Congress with
making vigorous preparations for lauching

441
 /

a struggle mere fierce than the 1946 struggle

and said t h a t instructions had gone out t o
Congressmen for this purpose. The help of
the INA personnel was being sought to make
the struggle effective.
While both the British Government and
the Congress were armed in their own way,
one with fire weapons and the other with
threat of mass struggle the Muslim League
felt it was high time* it also forged its own
sanctions and got ready for a struggle to
enforce its demand for Pakistan. .
Mr. Jinnah revealed that he had received
a communication from the Viceroy; but dec-
lined to disclose the nrture of it.
Mr. Jinnah soid: "We maintain that the
Congress has not accepted the scheme in the
Statement of May 16 and it is quire clear
from the letter of the President of the Cong-
ress of June 25 which is incorporated and
endorsed in the resolution of the Working
Committee at Delhi on June 26.
«r
That was confirmed by the AICC on
July 7 and it was aboundantly made clear
by the speeches of the outgoing President
and the incoming President and other fore-
most top-ranking Congress leaders.
"Therefore, we naturally thought t h a t
this is a somewhat serious situation. In the

442
 meantime Pandit Nehru after the conclusion
of the deliberations of the A ICC made it
clear on July 10 that the Congress was com-
mitted to nothing. He said that the Congress
was going into the Constituent Assembly to
turn it into a Sovereign Assembly.
"Now the questien is not as it is some-
times suggested that we are opposed to a
Constituent Assembly. In fact our demand
has been that there should be two Sovereign
Constituent Assemblies and for the obvious
reason that if there is one Sovereign Consti-
tuent Assembly, then it means the majority
of the one nation would, with their overwhel-
ming number of three to one, impose then
decisions upon the majority of the other
nation."
*

Referring to the Long-Term Plan Mr.

Jinnah said: "We were not satisfied with
it, In fact it was far more favourable to the
Congress point of view than our point of
view.
N
"The only question was whether to ac-
cept it or not. We accepted it. I repeat
what I said before that we accepted it with
the full knowledge and understanding with,
out any kind of equivocation.
"Why did we do that? We made a ter-
mendous sacrifice in accepting a limited Pakis-

i
443
*
tan t h a t is minus three subjects, viz., Defence,
Communications and Foreign Affairs.
"We were actuated by the welfare of
every community inhabiting India and we
felt that it will free us in the shortest possible
time from foreign domination and also lead
us all to the attainment and realisation of
our independence. We understood perfectly
r
well what we were doing. That w as one
vital consideration.
"The other consideration was t h a t we
thought even if we have to make a secrifice,
it is worth our while to do so to avoid strife.
bloodshed, stalemates and deadlocks. We
considered that an amicable and peaceful
settlement was worth more ond se we volun-
tarily and willingly delegated there subjects
to the Union Centre.
"There is not the slightest doubt t h a t
after we did this the Cabinet Delegation and
the Viceroy went back on their plighted
T
word w ithin 10 days with regard to their
proposal embodied in their statement of June
16, which was announced to be final. They
put the most fantastic and dishonest inter-
pretation on paragraph 8.
" I see now that they have discovered a
new word, that the Proposals 'lapsed^' Why?
Because 'not that we the Muslim League did

444
not accept the Statement of June 16 in time
but because the Congress accepted the
Statement of May 16 and rejected the state-
ment of J u n e 16.
"Paragraph 8 of J u n e 16 Statement
sets forth or.lv one of the terms. How on
earth can you argue that although the Mus-
lim League accepted the Proposal within the
ii
time limit fixed the Proposals have lapsed.
"The questions is what is the true inter
pretation of Clause eight? I maintain t h a t
the interpretation which the Mission put
on it and still persist in is most fantastic
and dishonest. I am not an tiered or peeved
at all But surely when one party has com-
mitted a breach of faith the other party has
a right to indict it on this grave charge. If
that is anger than I am angrv."
Reiterating that the acceptance of the
Congress of the Long-term Scheme was no
acceptance but a counter-offer Mr. Jinnah
said. " I cannot believe that men of experi-
ence such as the members of the Cabinet
Mission and Viceroy could have possibly
believed t h a t this was an acceptance.
" L e t me tell you why they believed it
Becauge they were trying to catch at a straw
and justify that at any rate to some extent
their Mission succeeded and they have misled
Parliament and the world."

445
 "The Mission had already shaken our
confidence. We thought t h a t they were
overawed and cowed down and coerced by
the threats of the Congress which they held
out throughout the discussions, both inside
and outside."
"The Congress has been and is organising
itself to launch a struggle of mass civil dis-
obedience. Preparations have been going
on in full swing. Indian National Army
men are requisitioned, enrolled, financed
and sent all over the country. Various
other organisations have been set up and
established.
"They are going through the necessary
drills and physical training. In season and
out of season everybody is informed that "if
we are not allowed to achieve our objective
we are preparing ourselves to launch a
struggle which will be a thousand times
worse than the 1942 struggle."
"The Muslim League alone has scrupu-
lously kept itself within the constitutional
orbit and has been following constitutional «

methods, believing in constitutionalism. I t

is, therefore, obvious that we sat at this con-
ference and carried on negotiations which our
hands and feet tied by constitotional method
and constitutionalism.
"We found t h a t thh British Delegation
and the Viceroy and the British Government

446
are under the spell of the sword of Democles
hanging over their head that if the Congress
is not appeased or satisfied it would launch
a struggle which will be a thousand times
worse than 1942.
"The question arises. "Are we the only
party to sit as we sat until now, with our
:
hands and feet tied. '
The British have machine guns and can
interpret what they say as they like. There
is no tribunal to which you can appeal.
They are the judges of what they say and
act,as they like.
"There is the other party, the Congress
armed to the teeth with another kind of wea-
pon which is not to be trifled with we. We,
therefore, are now forced for our self-dtfence
and self-preservation to say good-bye to con-
stitutional methods and we have decided
now as part and parcel of our policy and pro-
gramme to prepare and resort to direct
action as and when the time may come t©
launch it."
Mr. Jinnah said that the Congress had
already put into effect its interpretation of
the State Paper by directing the Congress
P a r t y in the Assam Legislative Assembly to
adopt a resolution on the floor of the House
that they would have nothing to do with
gronping. This was a definite and concrete

447

•
act done by the Assam Assembly under th a

authority of the Congress High Command.

Mr. Jinnah recalled that the Secretary of
£tate Lord Pethick-Lawrence in his broad-
cast on May 16 said that t h e Mission's Pro-
posals made it possible to secure the advan-
tages of Pakistan without incurring the dan-
gers inherent in the division of India and
invited Indians of all parties to take part in
the framing of the Constitution.
The Muslim League also took the view
t h a t minus the three subjects, Groups B and
C constituted Pakistan they agree that the
Union would confine strictly to those three
subjects for ten years but Pandit Nehru had
since then made it clear that the Congress
is not bound to confine itself to those three
subjects only and t h a t it was free to enlarge
the scope and powers of the union centre.
Referring to foreign Press reaction to the
Muslim League's latest resolution Mr. Jinnah
said that he could not expect the British
Press to say t h a t the Mission was guilty of
breach of faith. Naturally the comment was
t h a t the decision the League had taken was
a grave one and so it was.
He thought t h a t there was an incorrect
appreciation of the real situation. When
some papers talked of democracy t\ay forgot
the realities in India. If India was a homo-

448
genous country and the nation then one
could talk of democracy.
But India was a sub-continent comprising
of nationalities which Lord Pethick-Lawrence
admitted during the recent debate.
Mr. Jinnah said: "There are two major
nations here. This is the root cause and
essence of our troubles. When there are
two major nations how can you talk of de-
mocracy which means t h a t one nation majo-
rity will decide everything for the other
nation although it may be unanimous in its
opposition.
"If all the Muslims were to say: We do
not agree to this "even then the majority
decision will be forced on the Muslims as
they are three to one.
"If there is one nation then there is no
trouble a t all. These two nations cannot be
judged by Western Democracy. But they
should each be treated as equals and attem-
ts should be made to solve the difficulties
y acknoweldging that fact. They should
meet each other honestly and sincerely and
try to come to adjustment.
Mr. Jinnah declined to discuss the details
of the proposed direct action. He said: "1
am not prepared to tell you that now."
Asked if the Muslim League would join
hands with other anti-Impetialist forces such

449
 as the Congress Mr. Jinnah said: "The
Congress direct action has not been against
the British. The direct action of the Cong-
ress on the various occasions it launched it
and the last time in 1942, was to coerce and
blackmail the British to bypass the Muslim
League and surrender to the Congress de-
mands. That is exactlv what it is doing
now and t h a t is exactly what the Mission
was Overowed with. Congress has asked the
British to quit. How can it, with self-res-
pect, accept an Interim Government which
is going to be formed under the Act of 1919.
It was willing to do that at Simla provided
the League was kept down."
Questioned if the resolution adopted ruled
out the scope for negotiations, Mr. Jinnah
said: "What are the other nations doing?
Armed to the teeth with atomic bombs, are
they not going on talking and discussing. Are
they not at the same time going on with
preparations. Is not the Government of
India going on today with preparations to
*
put down any party they like? Why do you
want me (the League) alone to sit with
folded hands? I am also going to meet the
situation as and when it arises."
Asked if the proposed direct action would
be violent or non-violent Mr. Jinnah said :
" I am not going to discuss ethics."

450
 Q: Is this decision irrevocable?
Ans: If you are a politician you will
not ask me this question.
To further questions Mr. Jinnah replied:
a
In the direct action we envisage we shall
mclude any one who is willing to join us for
the cause for which we may have to launch
a struggle.
Q: Would you consider the posibility of
making an approach to the Congress?
Ans: I have done my best and the initia-
tive must now come either from the British
Government or from the Congress.
Asked if he had any communication from
the Viceroy relating to the formation of an
Interim Government, Mr. Jinnah said that he
had received a communication but he was
told that it was entirely private. He declin-
ed to discuss the nature of the communica-
tion.

451
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16®
 S O M E I M P O R T A N T POLITICAL BOOKS

I A Nation Betrayed 3y Saida

2 It Shall Never Happen Again

3 Pakistan & Muslim India (English &

Urdu) (Forward by Qaid-e-Azam)

4 Nationalism in Conflict in India

(English) (Forward by Qaid-e-Azam)

5. India's Problem of Her Future Cons-

titution (Urdu & English)
6. Resolutions of the Annual
tJve AM India Muslim League (1924

7 Resolutions of the W o r k i n g C o m m i t t e e
Council and Annual Sessions of the A l l
India Muslim League (1937

8. Qaid-e-Azam's Presidential Addresses

OJfi
ALL I N D I A M U S L I M LEAGUE
Daryaganj, Delhi.