BL 4
BL 4
A BSTRACT
Federated learning (FL) is a distributed machine learning approach that protects user data privacy
by training models locally on clients and aggregating them on a parameter server. While effective at
preserving privacy, FL systems face limitations such as single points of failure, lack of incentives,
and inadequate security. To address these challenges, blockchain technology is integrated into FL
systems to provide stronger security, fairness, and scalability. However, blockchain-empowered FL
(BC-FL) systems introduce additional demands on network, computing, and storage resources. This
survey provides a comprehensive review of recent research on BC-FL systems, analyzing the benefits
and challenges associated with blockchain integration. We explore why blockchain is applicable
to FL, how it can be implemented, and the challenges and existing solutions for its integration.
Additionally, we offer insights on future research directions for the BC-FL system.
Keywords Blockchain-empowered federated learning · distributed artificial intelligence · security and privacy
1 Introduction
Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies drive the Fourth Industrial Revolution, with user data being essential for
training diverse Machine Learning (ML) models [1]. Training high-quality ML models often involves a centralized
approach, necessitating internal storage of user data. This raises privacy concerns [2, 3, 4] and highlights the need for
stringent privacy protections [5]. In recent years, regions such as the European Union [6, 7], the United States [8],
and Singapore [5] have enacted relevant laws and regulations to govern the use of personal data, enhancing privacy
protection but potentially hindering the utilization of high-quality data.
Federated Learning (FL) is a privacy-preserving distributed machine learning paradigm that balances user data protec-
tion and effective utilization [9, 10, 11]. FL involves training local models on user devices and aggregating these local
models into a global model on a server without requiring users to upload their data, addressing the aforementioned
privacy concerns. Initially applied to training Gboard [12], FL has proven successful. Its potential extends beyond this,
as it can also address the issue of data silos. Data silos refer to the isolated or dispersed nature of data, making access
to this data extremely challenging [13]. One cause of data silos is the reluctance of organizations to share data due to
privacy or competitive concerns. For instance, due to privacy protection, hospitals may be unwilling to share patient
data [14]. In summary, the judicious use of FL can break down data barriers, leading to its widespread application in
healthcare [15, 16], finance [17, 18], industry [19, 20] and so on.
While privacy protection and data utilization benefits have popularized FL across industry and academia, they also
introduce specific challenges. First, there is a lack of trust among nodes within the FL system [21, 22]. Nodes may
worry that their training contributions will be intentionally tampered with or miscalculated, damaging their reputation
and deserved rewards. Second, FL systems are vulnerable to attacks from malicious nodes [23, 24]. Malicious
users may intentionally provide incorrect information to prevent model convergence and disrupt model training, while
malicious servers can recover users’ training data from the uploaded models. Third, FL is prone to single point of
failure issues [25]. In traditional FL architectures, the central server is responsible for aggregating and updating global
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Worker Worker
Blockchain
Integrate Server
Security Distributed
attributes architecture
Figure 1: Main scope of this survey. We begin by exploring the characteristics of blockchain and investigate its en-
hancement of Federated Learning systems. Next, we discuss the additional challenges introduced by using blockchain
in FL systems and review existing solutions. Finally, we outline future research directions for Blockchain-empowered
Federated Learning systems.
model parameters. If the central server is attacked or fails, the entire system’s operation is severely affected, leading
to interruptions in the training process, data loss, and irrecoverable model states.
Blockchain is essentially a distributed ledger, and its successful application in cryptocurrencies demonstrates its poten-
tial to build trust, security, and transparency [26, 27, 28]. Consequently, numerous studies have integrated blockchain
with FL systems to enhance functionality, creating blockchain-empowered FL (BC-FL) systems. Analyzing existing
BC-FL literature, we find that blockchain’s enhancement of different aspects of FL originates from its distinct prop-
erties. First, blockchain’s transparency and immutability can alleviate the lack of trust among nodes within the FL
system. By recording data requiring consensus in the FL system on the blockchain, these data cannot be tampered
with by malicious nodes, enhancing trust relationships. Second, through cross-validation of blockchain nodes and
Ś
other mechanisms, the resistance of the FL system to malicious nodes is improved. Finally, blockchain can replace
ś
the centralized server to avoid single
ŝ point of failure issues. By
Ŝ
designing a reasonable consensus mechanism, suit-
able clients can be selected to undertake model aggregation tasks ŝ in each communication round. With the advent of
blockchain 2.0, users can develop smart contractsŞrunning ş onŚ the
Şblockchain, endowing BC-FL with greater scalability
for automatically running various algorithms [29].
Ŝ ş
ŝ Ş
The introduction of blockchain has further driven the Ş
Ŝ ś development of FL, but blockchain is not a panacea for FL.
Our research indicates that blockchain integration poses challenges related to runtime efficiency and storage capacity.
First, the consensus mechanism of blockchain Ş adds communication and computation overhead to the BC-FL system.
Second, due to the distributed storage nature of Ş
Ŝ blockchain, full nodes need to back up the entire blockchain data.
Additionally, the introduction of blockchain can also bring additional security issues, such as Sybil attacks [30].
ŝ
Currently, several surveys on BC-FL systems have been published. Some focus on the integration of BC-FL with
other fields, such as the Internet of Things, drones, and healthcare. These studies emphasize the specific applications
of BC-FL systems rather than their commonalities. Other surveys investigate BC-FL systems in general. Qu et al.
conducted a detailed study on the performance of decentralization, attack resistance, and incentive mechanisms in
2
Ŝ Ş
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Data ID
Horizontal
federated Federated learning Worker
learning classification Cross-device
federated
Feature Label
Server learning
Data ID
Vertical
federated
learning By data By device
Feature Label
Data ID Cross-silo
Federated Worker Server federated
transfer learning
learning
Feature Label
2 Background
2.1 Federated Learning
FL is a privacy-preserving distributed machine learning paradigm proposed by Google [9]. This paradigm involves
a network of multiple participants (clients) alongside a central server. The clients are tasked with developing local
models, which are then consolidated by the server into a unified, global model [31, 32, 33]. This structure allows
participants considerable autonomy, enabling them to contribute to the FL framework without disclosing their data to
any FL node. Participation in FL training remains at the discretion of the users. Fig. 3 visually represents the standard
FL training methodology. The task initiator selects an FL server to publish the training task. Subsequently, clients
related to the training task join the FL training, and the server initializes the global model. In each communication
round, the server selects clients to participate in that round of training and distributes the global model to these clients.
The clients then use their local datasets to train the global model, resulting in local models, which they send back to the
server. The server aggregates these local models into a new global model according to certain rules. The FL process
stops when the training termination condition is met; otherwise, training continues.
FL generally has two classification methods, as depicted in Fig. 2. Based on the sample ID and feature distribution
of local datasets, FL systems can be divided into Horizontal FL (HFL), Vertical FL (VFL), and Federated Transfer
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Ś:Initialization
Task publisher ś:Worker selection
ŝ Ŝ:Model distribution
ŝ:Local training
Worker1 Ş ş Ś Ş:Global model aggregation
Ŝ ş:Termination condition evaluation
ŝ Ş
Ş
Ŝ ś
Worker2
Global
Ş Server gradient
Ŝ Ş
Learning (FTL). In HFL, users have different sample IDs but identical data features. In VFL, users have identical
sample IDs but different data features. In FTL, both the sample IDs and data features differ. Generally, current
research on BC-FL is predominantly based on HFL, with only a few studies on VFL [34, 35] and FTL [36]. Despite
the datasets’ different characteristics, blockchain’s role does not fundamentally differ.
Moreover, based on the different types of user devices involved in training, FL can be divided into cross-device FL
and cross-silo FL. Cross-device FL involves an extensive array of mobile and IoT devices, potentially numbering up to
1010 , often with poor device performance and network conditions [37, 38]. In cross-silo FL systems, the participating
clients are typically professional computing nodes maintained by specialized institutions, and the number of clients is
generally fewer than 100 [39, 40].
2.2 Blockchain
Blockchain is a distributed ledger system designed to securely, transparently, and immutably record data in a decen-
tralized manner [41, 42]. It is resilient to the presence of some malicious nodes and is resistant to control by any single
entity [43, 44]. A blockchain is essentially composed of interconnected blocks arranged sequentially in a chronological
chain. This structure is illustrated in the Fig. 4. Each block includes a header and a body. The block header typically
contains metadata such as the block number, timestamp, and the hash of the previous blocks. The specific parameters
stored in the header can vary depending on the blockchain system. The block body stores specific information, like
transactions.
Blockchain can be classified into two main types based on node participation restrictions: permissionless blockchain
and permissioned blockchain. The permissionless blockchain allows unrestricted node participation in the system’s
operations, exemplified by Bitcoin and Ethereum. These blockchains operate without the need for approvals or autho-
rizations from central authorities. In contrast, the permissioned blockchain is managed by a specific organization, and
only authorized nodes can access the system. It is suitable for data privacy and security applications, such as financial
and government information management.
The autonomous operation of blockchains in the absence of central oversight relies on consensus mechanisms. These
algorithms define the state of the blockchain and are vital for its functionality. Broadly, consensus mechanisms are
categorized into proof-based and committee-based systems [26]. Proof-based systems prioritize nodes based on spe-
cific resource possession; for instance, Proof of Work (PoW) and Proof of Stake (PoS) are notable examples [45]. In
PoW, nodes compete to solve complex puzzles, with computational prowess conferring a higher accounting priority.
PoS, on the other hand, employs an encrypted random selection algorithm to appoint a leader for block creation, with
a node’s selection likelihood tied to its token holdings. Proof-based consensus mechanisms are predominantly uti-
lized in permissionless blockchains due to their robust defence against malicious nodes. Conversely, committee-based
mechanisms utilize a voting process where consensus on a new block’s addition is reached through a predetermined
number of affirmative votes. Protocols such as Raft [46] and PBFT [47] exemplify committee-based mechanisms.
Committee-based mechanisms generally offer higher throughput than proof-based mechanisms and are often used in
permissioned blockchains. However, they can be communication-intensive, posing challenges in large-scale networks.
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3.1 Decentralization
FL traditionally relies on a central parameter server, where clients must continuously communicate with a single FL
server. This centralized structure poses significant risks, such as single points of failure and potential malicious server
behaviour. Furthermore, node reputation information is solely managed by the server, which is not ideal for developing
an open FL ecosystem. Blockchain’s decentralization is a core feature that fundamentally addresses these issues and
provides a new architectural approach to FL systems. Decentralization can enhance the security, transparency, and
reliability of FL systems, with these benefits manifesting in various facets of blockchain’s advantages for FL.
Our review of existing literature identifies several factors influencing the decentralization of BC-FL, including system
architecture, consensus mechanisms, and smart contracts. The system architecture determines which nodes maintain
the blockchain, while the consensus mechanism dictates which nodes have the right to manage the system. Smart
contracts can automate various algorithms within the BC-FL system, offering greater scalability. Table 1 compiles
representative BC-FL systems, detailing their use of smart contracts, architecture, consensus mechanisms, and exper-
imental platforms.
Architecture. BC-FL systems can be categorized by their degree of decentralization: complete and partial. In the
completely decentralized BC-FL, all nodes are eligible to participate in the consensus process of the blockchain. Fig.
5(a) shows its general system architecture. This approach demands high computational and storage capacities from
all nodes. Conversely, partially decentralized BC-FL involves only a subset of nodes running the blockchain, while
others focus solely on FL training. Fig. 5(b) shows its general system architecture. The selected nodes that operate the
blockchain system are known as super nodes and typically have stronger computing power and better communication
conditions. This approach sacrifices some transparency for increased efficiency.
Consensus Mechanism. A considerable portion of the work adopts common blockchain consensus mechanisms
such as PoW and PBFT. PoW involves blockchain nodes competing to solve a mathematical problem, with the first
solver aggregating models and training information into a new block. Other nodes then verify the block’s correctness,
and upon majority approval, it is added to the blockchain. In PBFT, a set of consensus nodes is chosen within the
BC-FL system, from which a leader node aggregates the model and generates a new block. Other nodes in the set
verify the leader’s block. Some work has specifically developed consensus mechanisms for BC-FL, such as Proof of
Reputation [55]. These custom consensus mechanisms are usually designed to enhance FL functionality or mitigate
the disadvantages of blockchain, which will be elaborated on in the subsequent sections.
Smart Contracts. Smart contracts significantly enhance the scalability of BC-FL systems. For instance, model
aggregation can be executed via smart contracts, increasing transparency. Additionally, smart contracts can deploy
algorithms for detecting and handling malicious nodes, thereby improving system efficiency. They can also manage
node reputation evaluations and incentive algorithms, further enhancing system transparency.
Next, we will examine some representative architectures of completely decentralized BC-FL systems.
In [63], Xu et al. proposed a BC-FL framework named Blockchain Empowered Secure and Incentive Federated
Learning (BESIFL). BESIFL enables any node in the network to initiate FL training requirements. Upon receipt of
a requirement, BESIFL selects computing nodes with high computation reputation scores to form a computing pool
and assigns them the task of model training. Meanwhile, BESIFL chooses verification nodes with high verification
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reputation scores to form a verification pool and assigns them the task of model aggregation and verification using pre-
defined procedures specified by the smart contract. Li et al. also proposed a completely decentralized BF-FL system,
where each client acts as both a FL trainer and a blockchain miner [72]. After training their local models, clients
initiate blockchain transaction requests and broadcast their models by attaching them to the transaction information.
Each client aggregates the global model locally after receiving local models from all other clients and starts mining.
The winning miner broadcasts a block containing global model information, which is verified by other clients and then
written into the blockchain. However, this system assumes that all clients possess equal computational power, which
may not be realistic in practice. In addition to the two aforementioned decentralized methods, Qu et al. designed a
novel approach that utilizes a rotation mechanism with randomness to select committee members for participating in
blockchain consensus [73]. This proposed blockchain consensus mechanism greatly reduces additional consumption
generated by the blockchain consensus process compared to the PoW mechanism. Committee members are only
responsible for aggregating and validating the global model and do not participate in training. The global model
is generated by committee members and stored in the blockchain after verification. While the rotation mechanism
ensures the mobility of committee members, it can ensure some level of system security. However, this consensus
mechanism is only applicable in situations where the number of malicious nodes is small.
The BC-FL systems described below follow the partial decentralization architecture. Feng et al. proposed a BC-FL
system for UAVs that maintains the blockchain system only in entities with high computing and storage capabilities,
such as base stations and roadside nodes [50]. This approach enables transparent and automated model aggregation
operations through the use of smart contracts, which replace the traditional parameter server. To address the challenge
of online and offline state changes among BC-FL participants, the authors set the maximum waiting time and the
required number of local models for each learning round. If any of these conditions are met, the model update contract
is triggered, ensuring timely updates while accommodating BC-FL participant availability. In [53], Liu et al. proposed
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New block
Miner
Blockchain
Model Client
Client Client Miner
Block
Client
Miner
Client
Local Training
Miner Miner Ŝ Ŝ
Block Header
ŝ train ś
Index Š Š
Timestamp
Ş ŝ Ś
Previous Hash
ious H
ŝ Ŝ Ŝ
Difficulty train ś
ş
Block Body Š Š
Ś
ŝ Ŝ Ŝ
Block N train ś
Blockchain Š Š
ŝ
Block Header Block Header Block Header
Index Index Index
Timestamp Timestamp Timestamp
0 Previous Hash
ious H Previous
ious Hash
Figure 6: Overall structure and workflow of the blockchain-empowered federated learning system.
a framework for training vehicle intrusion model. The blockchain is maintained by roadside units and stores and shares
the global models for the BC-FL system. After receiving the global model, the vehicle uses the data collected by itself
to train the model and upload it to the connected roadside unit nodes. The consensus mechanism in place combines
PoW and PoA, with the roadside node that has achieved the highest accuracy being written into the block to encourage
the training of high-precision models.
Workflow of BC-FL Systems. The overall workflow of the BC-FL system is illustrated in Fig. 6. Different BC-FL
systems may be adjusted according to specific circumstances. The steps are explained as follows:
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Step 1. Initialization: Each client initializes the environment based on prior negotiation, including model parameter,
and training parameter. The blockchain can assist clients in negotiation by storing initialization parameters on the
chain and using smart contracts.
Step 2: Local model training. Each client trains the global model using their local dataset.
Step 3: Local model upload. Clients upload training-related data and local models to the blockchain system. To
alleviate storage pressure on the blockchain, clients may upload only model-related information rather than the entire
model, as detailed in Section 4.3.
Step 4: Transaction broadcast. Upon receiving the transaction, blockchain nodes broadcast it within the system for
cross-validation. The nodes inspect the transaction content (e.g., model) based on pre-defined rules. If no issues are
found, the transaction is added to the local transaction pool.
Step 5: Block generation. Blockchain nodes select the node with the right to generate blocks for the current round
based on the consensus protocol. This node aggregates the local models to generate the global model, compiles
relevant model and training information, and creates a block.
Step 6: Block Broadcast. The blockchain system broadcasts the newly generated block. Upon receiving it, validation
nodes verify the block according to specific rules. If the majority of nodes validate the block, it is added to their locally
maintained blockchain, achieving consensus across the network.
Step 7: Global Model Download. Clients download the latest global model from the blockchain system.
Step 8: End condition judgment. Based on pre-negotiated rules, the FL process evaluates whether it has reached the
end condition. If not, the process returns to Step 2 to continue training.
FL is a collaborative approach to training a shared model that requires the participation of multiple clients with local
data. However, clients may have varying motivations and behaviors, such as seeking rewards for their assistance,
hoping to obtain a trained model, or attempting to benefit from the global model without contributing to the training
process. In some cases, clients may even have malicious intentions, seeking to undermine the effectiveness of FL due
to conflicts of interest in reality or other factors. Compared to traditional distributed learning methods, FL prioritizes
user data privacy, which means that the parameter server has limited access to information about the local environment
of each client. Therefore, it is essential for the FL task publisher to implement a reputation management mechanism
that can assist in managing, rewarding, or punishing FL clients based on their contributions and behavior.
Several studies have proposed the use of some reputation management mechanisms in a centralized way on the pa-
rameter server [74, 51]. While this approach can serve as a foundation for client management, reward and punishment
schemes, its lack of transparency remains a concern. Data owners who contribute to the training process may worry
about potential inaccuracies in the parameter server’s reputation calculations, while those seeking to obtain a trained
model may be concerned that the parameter server could intentionally manipulate reputations to undermine FL models.
Given the importance of attracting high-quality data owners to ensure optimal FL model performance, the transparent
reputation management mechanism is particularly well-suited for FL systems. Additionally, a trustworthy parameter
server aims to calculate reputation in a transparent manner to discourage malicious nodes. To address these con-
cerns, the BC-FL system leverages blockchain technology to ensure the transparency and credibility of the reputation
management mechanism.
After conducting our analysis, we have identified two crucial functions that blockchain can perform within the reputa-
tion management mechanism.
1. The blockchain acts as a reliable third-party ledger in the BC-FL system to document crucial information
regarding each node’s reputation, including but not limited to its reputation value [51, 75, 76] and various
calculation bases [77, 53, 57].
2. In the BC-FL system, the reputation computation process can be deployed on the blockchain through a spe-
cialized reputation calculation smart contract [77, 78, 57]. This approach serves to ensure both transparency
and automation throughout the entire computation process, thereby guaranteeing dependable and consistent
outcomes.
The reputation management mechanism based on blockchain in BC-FL is illustrated in Fig. 7. Our study of recent
research papers on client reputation calculation methods has revealed that the multiweight subjective logic calculation
method is a popular choice for enhancing the trustworthiness and reliability of BC-FL systems. To elucidate the
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ůŽĐŬĐŚĂŝŶ
dƌƵƐƚĞĚĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚůĞĚŐĞƌ ^ŵĂƌƚĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚ
ůŽĐŬĐŚĂŝŶͲĞŵƉŽǁĞƌĞĚƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵ
dƌƵƐƚĞĚƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶƉƌĞƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ dƌƵƐƚĞĚƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶĐĂůĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
hƐĂŐĞŽĨƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵ
Figure 7: Reputation management mechanisms based on blockchain. Blockchain is commonly utilized as a reliable
distributed ledger or transparent smart contract platform for reputation management mechanisms. This allows the
system to store clients’ reputation value and the reputation calculation basis on the blockchain, or use smart contracts
to compute the reputation in a transparent way. The primary function of reputation management mechanisms is to
facilitate node selection, model aggregation, and incentivization.
operation of the reputation management mechanism in BC-FL systems, we will present a concise overview of the
multi-weight subjective logic calculation method.
This method aims to assess the reputation value of a client by considering three crucial attributes: positive evaluation,
negative evaluation, and uncertain evaluation. For example, in [75, 79, 77], Kang et al. demonstrated how multi-
weight subjective logic can be used to accurately calculate reputation values. In their proposed BC-FL systems, the
task publisher, denoted as T Pi , calculates the reputation of each client through two main components. The first part
involves direct reputation calculation, where T Pi evaluates BC-FL clients based on three attributes: belief, disbelief,
and uncertainty, corresponding to positive evaluation, negative evaluation, and uncertain evaluation, respectively. To
facilitate comprehension, we simplify the formula as follows:
dir ai
bi→j = (1 − ui ) ai +bi
bi
ddir
i→j = (1 − ui ) ai +bi , (1)
udir = 1 − q
i→j i→j
The variables ai and bi represent the positive and negative evaluations of client Cj by T Pi respectively. Variables bdir
i→j ,
ddir
i→j , and u dir
i→j correspond to the previously mentioned belief, disbelief, and uncertainty. Variable qi→j denotes the
probability of successful delivery of data packets sent by Cj to T Pi . The direct reputation DIRi→j is then expressed
as:
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Chen [80] X X - - - - X -
Gao [81] X - - X X - X X
Guo [51] X - - - - - X -
Haddaji[76] X - X X - - X -
He [74] X - - - - - X -
Kang [77] X - - X - - X -
Liu [53] X - - X - - X X
Qi [57] X X - X X X - X
Qiu [78] X - X X X X - -
Rahman [82] X - - X - - X -
Xu [62] X - - X X X X X
Zhao [83] X - - X - - X X
Wang [66] X - X X - X - -
Lin [84] X - X X - - X -
Fu [85] X - - X - - - X
Wahrstatter [71] X - - X X - - X
Combining direct and indirect reputations results in the final value of belief bfi→j
inal
, disbelief dfi→j
inal
and uncertainty
f inal
ui→j of the Cj , as defined as:
bdir
i→j u
rec
+brec udir
bfi→j
inal
= udir +u
i→j
rec −urec udir
i→j i→j
ddir rec
+drec udir
i→j u
dfi→j
inal
= udir i→j
rec −urec udir , (4)
i→j +u i→j
rec dir
u u
ufi→jinal
i→j
= udir +urec −u rec udir
i→j i→j
where brec , drec , and urec are the belief, disbelief and uncertainty of the indirect reputation mentioned above. Then,
we compute the final reputation REPi→j of Cj in:
REPi→j = bfi→j
inal
+ αufi→j
inal
. (5)
Various papers adopt distinct approaches in calculating the reputation of BC-FL clients. Some calculate reputation
values solely on the basis of local model test accuracy, while others take into account evaluations from other clients
or factor in the interaction effect between clients and the blockchain system. Moreover, researchers have leveraged
clients’ reputations in various ways. For instance, some deploy reputation as a criterion for selecting participating
clients, whereas others utilize it to ascertain the weight assigned to global model aggregation. Additionally, there are
those who offer incentives and penalties to clients based on their respective reputations.
We present a comprehensive analysis of BC-FL systems that utilize blockchain technology to establish transparent
reputation management mechanisms. Table 2 summarizes the key attributes of these systems.
The attributes “Aggregation”, “Other Workers”, and “Blockchain” represent the basis for evaluating the reputation of
clients. A checkmark in the corresponding box signifies that the BC-FL system takes the attribute into consideration
when calculating the client’s reputation. “aggregation” represents the contribution of a client’s local model towards
the global model during aggregation, including evaluating the accuracy of the local model. “other workers” relates
to the interaction between clients, specifically through peer evaluation among training clients. “Blockchain” encom-
passes the effect of a client’s participation in blockchain maintenance activities, such as successful block generation.
The attributes “Usage 1” and “Usage 2” illustrate two potential roles that blockchain may play in the node reputation
mechanism, as previously mentioned. “Usage 1” describes blockchain’s involvement in the BC-FL system’s repu-
tation management mechanism as a transparent and open ledger. “Usage 2” involves the use of smart contracts to
automatically and transparently calculate a client’s reputation. In addition, we examine how reputation is utilized in
BC-FL systems by exploring the attributes of “Model aggregation”, “Node Selection”, and “Reward or Punishment“.
“Model aggregation” involves weighting a local model based on the client’s reputation value when aggregating the
global model. “Node selection” indicates that the FL client selection process in each round will consider its reputation
value. “Reward or punishment” signifies the use of reputation value as the basis for rewarding or punishing the client.
In addition to the reputation calculation methods discussed earlier, several other approaches have been proposed in
the literature. In [57], Qi et al. proposed a novel reputation evaluation mechanism for multi-model aggregators in FL.
Each model aggregator has its test dataset, and the reputation of each participating client is calculated separately by
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each aggregator. The winning aggregator is selected based on a set of rules, and the winning aggregator updates the
client’s reputation value to the blockchain. The model aggregators calculate the client’s reputation in two steps. In the
first step, each model aggregator uses a fair-value game [86] to test the quality of the local model with its test dataset.
When the result of a formula containing model test accuracy reaches a certain threshold, the corresponding reputation
update is activated. In the second step, the model aggregator synthesizes the results given by other aggregators on the
network to obtain the indirect reputation value of the node. Finally, the reputation evaluation value of the modified
model aggregator for the node in this round is obtained from the results of the first and second steps. This approach
ensures fairness in reputation evaluation across different aggregators and improves the accuracy of the final reputation
value.
In [81], Gao et al. designed a time-decaying subjective logic model (SLM) algorithm to measure the client’s reputation
and a lightweight approach based on gradient similarity to measure client contribution. The final task publisher
determines the client’s reward share by multiplying the contribution and reputation metrics. They used reputation
metrics to measure client reliability and select clients with high reputations to ensure high system stability, which
enables their proposed system to work stably in unreliable environments.
In FL systems, clients not only need to contribute local data but also consume significant amounts of computing re-
sources and network bandwidth [87, 88]. Without tangible incentives, it may be difficult to attract enough clients to
participate in the FL systems. Therefore, introducing an incentive mechanism in FL systems is critical. The intro-
duction of incentives can help incentivize clients to join the FL systems and contribute their valuable data. Adequate
participation is crucial for FL to train accurate models with good generalization. Additionally, incorporating incen-
tives can increase clients’ engagement and motivation, leading to contributing better data and participation in more
training epochs [89]. Furthermore, the incentive mechanism can help achieve fairness in FL systems by rewarding
clients based on their data quality and computing power.
A transparent and open incentive mechanism is crucial for attracting clients to participate in federated learning. As
it involves vital interests, each client hopes to supervise the calculation of rewards. The BC-FL system utilizes the
blockchain to provide a transparent and open incentive mechanism. The blockchain is a decentralized ledger that is
maintained on each participating node, requiring the joint efforts of blockchain nodes instead of a centralized organi-
zation. This architecture ensures transparency and openness and facilitates tracking and auditing of data necessary for
calculating incentives, thereby establishing clients’ trust in the incentive results. Furthermore, the incentive algorithm
can be written as a smart contract and deployed on the blockchain for automatic incentive calculation and distribution,
further strengthening clients’ trust in the incentive results. The transparent and open incentive mechanism provided
by the blockchain can help to attract more clients to participate in the FL process, contributing high-quality data and
computing resources. Consequently, it promotes the accuracy and generalization of the trained model and enhances
the efficiency of the BC-FL system.
We focus on BC-FL systems that provide transparent and open incentive mechanisms based on the blockchain. We
believe that understanding this incentive mechanism requires consideration of three aspects: incentive basis, incentives,
and incentive algorithms. The settings of these aspects should be tailored to the specific FL tasks. Table 3 outlines
several prominent BC-FL systems developed in recent years.
The incentive basis refers to the criteria that the system uses to reward clients, which may include factors such as
node reputation, data quality and quantity, and learning behavior. For instance, Qu et al. rewarded the clients based
on the amount of data they contributed [93], but this approach may not accurately reflect the overall contribution of a
client to the global model. Factors such as data quality and participation frequency can also significantly impact the
effectiveness of the training process. In contrast, Li et al. focused solely on model accuracy as the basis for awarding
nodes, as it is verifiable and reflects their contribution [91]. Meanwhile, Gao et al. argued that rewards should be
based on both model accuracy and node reputation, as this incentivizes continued contributions to the global model
[81]. In addition, to compensate the data owner, Zhang et al. considered the energy consumption of the data owner
during training and incorporated this factor into the calculation of rewards [98].
Incentives refer to the rewards that clients receive in a system, and they can take various forms such as economic
items, tokens, and reputation. Economic items provide monetary benefits to data owners, such as cryptocurrencies
like Bitcoin or Ethereum. Tokens, on the other hand, are generated by the BC-FL system and can be used to purchase
services within the system, including trained models or tasks for model training. The circulation of tokens promotes a
self-sustaining ecosystem within the system that encourages participants to contribute and collaborate. In [90, 81, 96],
researchers have utilized tokens within their proposed BC-FL systems as rewards Liu et al. used Ethereum as a
reward for training, providing real-world economic incentives [11]. In addition to cryptocurrency rewards, Abdel et
11
Cai et al.
al. proposed a BC-FL system for the Industrial Internet of Things that offers clients maintenance services or discounts
on products from manufacturers as incentives [48].
The incentive algorithm determines the specific implementation method of the incentive mechanism. Generally, the
algorithm involves quantifying each incentive basis and inputting it as a variable into the reward function, which yields
the corresponding reward value. For instance, xu et al. devised a rewarding formula that takes model accuracy and
training time into account [62]. The reward csi of the i-th client in the proposed solution is calculated as:
Pn j
j=1 [α × (acci − aggAcc
j−1
) + timeE1−α
j j]
i −timeSi
csi = , (6)
n
where n denotes the number of training rounds in which the i-th client participated, accji denotes the model accuracy
of client i in round j, and aggAccj−1 represents the global model accuracy in round j − 1. Additionally, timeEij
and timesji indicate the end time and start time of the jth round for client i. Furthermore, the introduction of variable
α allows for adjustment according to different FL tasks. If the task is more sensitive to time, the value of α can be
reduced, while if the task is more sensitive to accuracy, the value of α can be increased.
The BC-FL system achieves the establishment of a trustworthy relationship in the system through blockchain tech-
nology. As a distributed database, blockchain aligns with the distributed nature of FL. With certain consensus mecha-
nisms, the blockchain can still maintain the consistency and correctness of the system even in the presence of malicious
clients. Therefore, the robustness of blockchain against malicious nodes makes it well-suited for an environment where
malicious nodes could exist in the FL system. Furthermore, due to the robustness of the blockchain, the BC-FL system
allows for the storage of vulnerable data in the blockchain, enhancing the security of the entire system. The security
issues in the BC-FL system is illustrated in Fig. 8.
To explicate the specific security properties of blockchain necessary for implementation in a BC-FL system, we con-
ducted an extensive study of representative BC-FL systems from recent years. The results of this research are presented
in Table 4.
Transparency: Transparency is one of the key features of the blockchain. All the information stored on the blockchain
is accessible to full nodes, while light nodes can query certain information by sending requests to the full nodes. In the
BC-FL system, transparency refers to the transparent operation of algorithms and the disclosure of data. This includes
but is not limited to, the parameter aggregation operation, the reputation of each node, and the reward operation of the
system. The transparent nature of blockchain is derived from the distributed maintenance of the blockchain across all
nodes in the network, with each node maintaining a local copy of the blockchain ledger.
Auditability: Auditability is a significant feature of blockchain systems, enabling the tracing and analysis of data using
specialized algorithms. In the BC-FL system, auditability becomes particularly valuable when specific circumstances
12
Cai et al.
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Figure 8: Security provided by blockchain for the BC-FL system. By employing appropriate techniques, blockchain
can impart its security features (e.g. immutability and traceability) to the FL system. Moreover, in a partially trusted
FL environment, blockchain can act as a reliable entity to foster trust relationships. Furthermore, deploying security-
enhancing algorithms on the blockchain via smart contracts can further enhance the security of the BC-FL system.
arise, such as ineffective model training or the need to review client operations. The recorded data on the blockchain
- including local gradients - can be extracted for detailed analysis. By analyzing previously recorded information on
the blockchain, such as local gradients, nodes can be penalized for producing undesirable outcomes.
Anti-malicious nodes: In blockchain systems, malicious nodes can take on various forms, including those that propa-
gate false blocks or launch attacks against the system. Byzantine robust consensus algorithms can be used to mitigate
these types of malicious behavior. In the BC-FL system, malicious nodes are those that can undermine the effective-
ness of the system, such as through poisoning attacks or privacy violations. To address these issues, specific consensus
algorithms can be designed to thwart malicious activity, or security techniques can be incorporated into the system via
smart contracts. Anti-malicious nodes and auditability both play a role in dealing with malicious nodes, but the former
aims to prevent the impact of malicious nodes in real time, while the latter focuses on identifying the source of the
attack after the fact.
Traceability: The blockchain system inherently preserves all state changes since its genesis block. When tracing back
to a previous state, the system can be readily restored to a specific point in history. In the BC-FL system, traceability
refers to the ability to restore a previously trained model or parameters saved by the current work in case of severe
damage or loss due to central server failure.
Immutability: The immutable nature of the blockchain can be attributed to the sound design that underlies its con-
sensus algorithm. Each full node in a blockchain network maintains a local copy of the ledger, which ensures that
malicious nodes are unable to dictate terms to other nodes unless they comply with the consensus algorithm. Any
attempts to tamper with the local copy by modifying incorrect blockchains will result in the creation of new blocks
that cannot be recognized by other honest nodes. Therefore, as long as the majority of computing power is held by
honest nodes, the blockchain remains immutable. In the BC-FL system, critical information such as client reputation
and model hash values can be securely stored on the blockchain to ensure the accuracy of this data.
Anti-single point of failure: The term "single point of failure" refers to a scenario where a sole parameter server
becomes the bottleneck for FL security, rendering the entire system inoperable if it fails due to an attack or power
outage, among other reasons. To tackle this problem, the BC-FL system replaces the role of the parameter server with
blockchain technology. As discussed in Section 3, the issue of single point of a failure is elaborated upon.
To provide a comprehensive understanding of the utilization of blockchain technology in enhancing the security of the
BC-FL system, we will discuss prominent literature in this field.
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Cai et al.
Awan [101] - X X - X -
Cheng [102] - - X - - -
Feng [103] - - X - X -
Jia [104] - X - - X -
Li [91] - X X X - X
Liu [105] - - X - - -
Lu [106] - - - - - X
Miao [107] X - X X - X
Mothukuri [108] - X - - X -
Sun [109] - X X - X -
Xu [62] X - - - X X
Zhang [98] X - - - X -
Zhang [64] - - - X X X
Huang [110] - - - - X -
Ouyang [67] - X X - X X
Lin [84] - - X - - X
Aloqaily [69] - - X - - -
Mu [70] - - X - - X
Fu [85] X - - - X X
He [100] - X X - X X
Xu [111] - - X X X -
In [101], Sana et al. regarded the blockchain as an immutable, decentralized, and reliable entity, which they incorpo-
rate into their proposed BC-FL framework called blockchain-based privacy-preserving federated learning (BC-based
PPFL). The utilization of blockchain provides auditability, thereby enhancing the resilience of BC-based PPFL against
malicious clients. Specifically, the assumption of semi-honest clients in the universal FL system is further elevated
to the assumption of malicious clients. To augment the credibility and dependability of the FL system, Qi et al. in-
troduced the adoption of smart contracts to handle FL tasks [57]. These smart contracts encompass various functions
such as task initiation, member selection, federated learning execution, reputation evaluation, reward distribution, and
query processing. In [83], Zhao et al. combined Multi-Krum with reputation mechanisms as well as aggregation
mechanisms to rule out malicious gradients and penalize malicious clients. In [48], Qi et al. proposed a smart contract
called Hunter Contract (HC) to prevent malicious clients. HC acts as a hunter by randomly selecting a client and
verifying whether the gradient uploaded by that client causes a decline in the global model accuracy. If the reduction
surpasses a predefined threshold, the client is classified as malicious.
In a blockchain system, individual nodes follow the consensus mechanism to ensure the consistency, validity, and
accuracy of the data. In a BC-FL system, the data or training results of the FL process are stored on the blockchain,
and the blockchain’s consensus mechanism can be used to verify the content of the FL. Consequently, some researchers
have improved the security of FL by adjusting the blockchain’s consensus mechanism.
In [91], Li et al. proposed a Byzantine-resistant consensus mechanism named Proof of Accuracy, which serves to
identify models of poor quality. This consensus algorithm takes into consideration not only the exclusion of local
models that are deemed too poor for aggregation into the global model but also the potential for a local model with
a high loss value to aid the global model in escaping local optimal solutions. To fulfil this requirement, the consen-
sus algorithm employs two critical thresholds: the accuracy oscillation threshold (AOT) and the accuracy deviation
threshold (ADT). The AOT determines the maximum acceptable accuracy reduction permitted by the accepted model,
while the ADT determines the maximum absolute difference in accuracy among different client models. These two
thresholds are subject to dynamic adjustments as the algorithm progresses. In [78], Qiu et al. increased the security of
the BC-FL system through the introduction of a novel consensus protocol called Proof of Learning (PoL). In contrast
to PoW, PoL requires nodes to compete for the privilege of accounting rights through calculation by training a FL
model, where the node with the smallest loss value adds a new block as the winner. Other clients aggregate the win-
ner’s local model based on the reputation value against the winning node after verifying the authenticity of the newly
added block. Ouyang et al. utilized smart contracts to authenticate participating nodes and prevent malicious nodes
from participating [67].
As mentioned earlier, certain security technologies from the field of information security have been considered for
use in the BC-FL system to enhance their security. While not directly related to the security of the BC-FL system,
smart contracts can serve as a platform for running certain algorithms. Hence, we will provide a brief overview of this
topic. To safeguard client privacy, the utilization of homomorphic encryption and differential privacy algorithms [5] is
14
Cai et al.
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Figure 9: Efficiency challenges and related solutions in the BC-FL systems. The efficiency of blockchain is susceptible
to factors such as network and computing overhead. Consequently, BC-FL systems potentially lead to a decrease in
overall efficiency. In response to thus challenges, multiple strategies are contributed to mitigate the reduction in
system efficiency. These methods include but not limited to, efficient consensus mechanisms, reinforcement learning,
and optimized blockchain topologies.
common, and researchers have developed advanced algorithms building upon these fundamental techniques. We have
organized this material in Section 4.2.
The processing capacity of blockchain systems is inherently limited. For instance, Bitcoin can only handle seven
transactions per second [112]. In contrast, modern centralized payment systems can process thousands of transactions
per second [113]. Fig. 9 illustrates the efficiency challenges faced by blockchain in BC-FL systems. Unlike central-
ized systems, blockchain systems necessitate additional steps such as verification, communication, and network-wide
consensus to maintain normal operations, which reduces the efficiency when integrating blockchain with FL systems.
Current BC-FL systems address these efficiency issues through various methods, including efficient consensus mech-
anisms, reinforcement learning (RL), and optimized blockchain topologies. A summary of the pertinent literature is
provided in Table 5.
15
Cai et al.
Cao [114] Blockchain topology DAG blockchain MNIST Accuracy, loss, iteration delay
Consensus algorithm, Two-layer blockchain, Raft,
Cheng [102] - Latency reduction
blockchain topology PBFT
Consensus algorithm,
Feng [103] Two-layer blockchain, sharding MNIST Accuracy, time cost
blockchain topology
Energy consumption, latency, total
Hieu [115] RL DRL -
payment
committee consensus
Li [116] Consensus algorithm FEMNIST accuracy, communication overhead
mechanism
Accuracy, time cost, agent reward,
Lu [54] RL, blockchain DAG blockchain, DRL -
cumulative cost
DarkCOVID, Running latency, block verification
Nguyen [55] Consensus algorithm Proof of reputation
ChestCOVID latency, Accuracy, Loss
Accuracy, agent reward, latency,
Nguyen [56] RL DRL, A2C SVHN, Fashion-MNIST
Loss
Qi [58] Consensus algorithm Modified PBFT Diabetes Breast Cancer Accuracy, time cost, gas cost
Qu [94] Consensus algorithm Proof of federalism CIFAR-10 Accuracy
Consensus algorithm, Two-layer blockchain, proof of Latency, communication overhead,
Xu [97] MNIST
blockchain topology credit, efficient BFT data throughput
Zhao [65] RL Federated DDQL - Agent reward, latency
Accuracy, energy consumption,
Wang [110] Blockchain topology Two-layer blockchain TSP, FMNIST
learning utility
Consensus algorithm, Blockchain sharding, Accuracy, training Latency, testing
Yuan [68] MNIST, Penn Treebank
blockchain topology DAG-based mainchain perplexity
Blockchain sharding, MNIST, KMNIST, Accuracy, agent reward, reputation
Lin [84] Blockchain topology, RL
DRL-based sharding FMNIST, CIFAR-10 of nodes
communicates with a minimum of half the nodes within the BC-FL system for confirmation, leading to redundant
validations among these nodes. To tackle this challenge, they designed a streamlined consensus mechanism known
as Proof of Reputation (PoR). Within the POR algorithm, every blockchain node is permitted to validate with just
a single other node during the consensus process, resulting in a significant reduction in validation delays. In [94],
Qu et al. introduces a Proof-of-Federalism (PoF) consensus algorithm, which builds upon the foundation of PoW.
PoF leverages the training of FL tasks as a viable alternative to the challenge of discovering a fitting nonce in PoW,
effectively sidestepping the computational resources typically expended during the consensus calculation process.
Before each training round commences, intelligent contracts sift through unfavorable local model parameters and
cherry-pick local models that lend themselves well to global aggregation. During cross validation, each node singles
out the most optimal set of global models. Upon reaching a predetermined time threshold, the participant who boasts
the highest number of selected global models emerges as the victorious contender.
In [97], Xu et al. proposed a lightweight blockchain network for FL systems called micro-chain to address the issues of
low transaction throughput and poor scalability. Participants in FL are divided into multiple small-scale micro chains,
each of which is unified through an advanced inter-chain network using Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus protocols.
Within each micro-chain, block consistency is achieved using the Proof of Credit (PoC) algorithm, where committee
members are responsible for generating new blocks. Then, a new committee is randomly selected at the end of each
dynasty round. Ledger consensus is achieved using the Vote-based Chain Finality (VCF) protocol, where committee
member nodes vote to select the preferred branch in case of network forks. In [116], Li et al. introduced an innovative
committee consensus mechanism aimed at significantly reducing the required consensus computation. The proposed
mechanism selects multiple clients as committee nodes in each training round, utilizing the data on these committee
nodes as the validation set. The final scores for each trained client are then determined by taking the median of the
scores of these clients. These scores are subsequently used to perform global model aggregation by selecting a specific
number of clients with the highest scores.
16
Cai et al.
that encourages the agent to find ways to reduce the system delay effectively. Finally, RL training is performed using
a specific algorithm. The agent learns how to optimize resource allocation within the BC-FL system under different
environmental scenarios through continuous interaction with the environment.
In [115], Hieu et al. used the deep reinforcement learning method [120] to control the data and energy used for training
and block generation in the device. By judiciously allocating resources, they were able to mitigate the system delay and
enhance overall system efficiency. In [54], Lu et al. used the Deep Q-learning (DQL) [120] method to facilitate client
selection for the FL process. They formulated a joint optimization plan by considering the client’s available wireless
transmission rate, client computing power (CPU frequency), and the current selection status of clients as the state of the
DQL method. The reward function is designed as a weighted sum of the loss function of each node, the computation
time, and the communication time. This approach leads to a high level of model accuracy while maintaining a low
global system cost. The proposed algorithm design shows promising results in performance evaluation, indicating its
potential in real-world applications.
In [65], Zhao et al. proposed a BC-FL system for vehicle networks. The proposed system allows autonomous vehicles
(AVs) to offload part of their computing tasks to edge servers (ESs), effectively reducing local computation latency,
communication latency, and blockchain consensus latency. To achieve this, the authors employed a federated duel
deep Q-learning (DDQL) algorithm [121] and deployed it to each AV to enable them to take action according to the
changing external environment. The state space of the proposed DDQL includes wireless channel conditions, data set
quality, and packet error rate, where AVs select offload strategy, wireless channel, and CPU-cycle frequency based on
the DDQL algorithm.
In [56], Nguyen et al. applied the DRL method based on a parameterized advantage actor-critic (A2C) algorithm
[122] to a multi-server edge computing scenario to reduce the overall system latency. Their proposed hybrid discrete-
continuous action DRL algorithm takes into account various factors such as data size, channel state, broadband state,
computation state, and hash power to determine whether an edge node should perform computation offloading. In
case of offloading, the agent needs to decide on the corresponding channel selection, power allocation and other trans-
mission necessary parameters. In case of non-offloading, the agent needs to decide on the necessary parameters for
training such as the hash power allocation for local computation. Unlike existing purely discrete or purely continu-
ous action DRL algorithms, the authors proposed a hybrid model where resource allocation is continuous, while the
offloading decision is discrete, leading to improved training performance.
17
Cai et al.
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Figure 10: Security challenges and related solutions in the BC-FL systems. Malicious nodes pose a threat to the
blockchain within the BC-FL system through two distinct avenues: privacy leakage and consensus mechanisms.
The former capitalizes on the blockchain’s data transparency to breach access to model information stored within
it, whereas the latter employs attacks via the straightforward consensus mechanism inherent in the BC-FL system. In
response to these challenges, contemporary solutions are predominantly centered around the development of diverse
privacy protection algorithms and the implementation of exceptionally secure consensus mechanisms.
short period of time, the lower-layer blockchain needs to reach a consensus while only considering the problems of
equipment failure and omission. To this end, the Raft protocol is employed, which is more efficient despite lacking
Byzantine fault tolerance. The upper-layer blockchain connects various lower-layer blockchains and is designed to
prevent malicious nodes and resolve Byzantine faults. Thus, the PBFT algorithm is employed, which can effectively
resist Byzantine attacks but requires a longer time frame for consensus. The upper-layer blockchain’s nodes are super
nodes with robust computing power selected from the lower-layer blockchain. Hence, they are relatively small in
number but possess significant computing capabilities, enhancing the PBFT protocol’s consensus speed.
Integrating blockchain into FL systems holds the potential to significantly bolster system security. However, the
successful execution of such integration in BC-FL systems hinges greatly upon the scrupulous deliberation of system
designers and the implementation of effective combination strategies. Inadequate integration of blockchain may give
rise to supplementary predicaments. The security challenges and related solutions in the BC-FL systems are evidenced
in Fig. 10.
As shown in Fig. 10, the transparent nature of blockchain data raises concerns about storing sensitive information,
potentially leading to violations of privacy. Additionally, extant attack methods targeting blockchain systems, such as
Sybil attacks [126], have the capability to compromise the security of the BC-FL system. An examination of recent
BC-FL systems has unveiled several instances wherein Sybil attacks and breaches of privacy remain plausible.
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Cai et al.
verification process to obfuscate local updates, thereby enhancing privacy. Additionally, in [49], Fang et al. outlined
a secure and verifiable local update aggregation scheme, replacing differential privacy technology with the Shamir
Secret Sharing technique[132] to ensure the correctness of confidential sharing.
Multiple studies also employed differential privacy to protect the privacy of FL clients [92, 55, 74]. In [92], Ma et al.
delved into a differential privacy solution for the BC-FL system, where noise is added to the local data features
to uphold local privacy and pseudo-noise sequences are adopted to identify inactive clients. Similarly, in [133],
Abadi et al. incorporated tailored noise into the data prior to sharing, effectively obscuring the actual data values
while maintaining usability even after noise integration. Within BC-FL systems integrating differential privacy, it is
customary for clients to introduce noise to the model prior to uploading the local model, thereby ensuring privacy
protection. In [83], Zhao et al. employed differential privacy to safeguard the privacy of individual clients by applying
it to the extracted data features of each client. Additionally, Qu’s work [94] presented an enhanced differential privacy
algorithm built upon generative adversarial networks, offering a means of preserving the privacy of local models.
Secure Multi-Party Computing (SMPC) stands out as another promising avenue for ensuring privacy of BC-FL sys-
tems [101, 134]. SMPC represents a versatile cryptographic tool that empowers distributed parties to collaboratively
compute diverse functions while withholding their confidential inputs and outputs [135]. Within the BC-FL system in-
corporating SMPC, every client employs the SMPC protocol to join forces and aggregate the global model. SMPC can
be instantiated as a smart contract on the blockchain, with these contracts delineating computation rules and guarantee-
ing proper protocol execution. In [101], Awan et al. designed a meticulously algorithm that leverages homomorphic
encryption and proxy re-encryption grounded in the Paillier encryption algorithm. This technique involves encrypting
each local model, thereby preventing the model aggregator from accessing individual models. Nevertheless, upon
aggregating the encrypted local models, the aggregator can obtain an unencrypted global model, thus preserving the
confidentiality of each client’s data.
Several studies explored alternative approaches to address the privacy concerns within the BC-FL system [49, 136,
137]. For instance, in [136], Wei et al. introduced a chameleon hash scheme with a modifiable trapdoor (CHCT)
as a countermeasure to potential privacy leaks on the blockchain, effectively creating an adaptable blockchain struc-
ture. The CHCT employs trapdoors to generate hash collisions, resulting in identical hash values. When sensitive or
erroneous data is identified on the blockchain, clients can utilize CHCT to amend the relevant data. However, strict
adherence to a well-defined set of procedures is imperative when modifying the blockchain to safeguard its reputation
as a trusted third-party entity. In [49], Fang et al. employed a privacy-preserving strategy to store the gradient’s com-
mitment on the blockchain and mapped it to an elliptic curve point. Simultaneously, the gradient is obscured using a
Pseudorandom generator-based mask, which can subsequently be removed to restore the accurate global gradient once
all local gradients are incorporated. Similarly, [137], Guo et al. presented a blockchain-based obfuscation transmis-
sion mechanism, shielding the local models of FL edge nodes from external scrutiny by potential attack devices. The
blockchain is initially divided into distinct branches starting from the genesis block, each corresponding to a training
device. A hash key block on each branch stores the hash key function published by the server.
Sybil attacks have garnered extensive attention within the blockchain field, owing to their potential to compromise the
integrity and security of blockchains [126]. Thus attacks involve an assailant generating numerous false identities or
nodes within the network, affording them the means to manipulate the system’s dynamics [138]. Established methods
like Proof of Work (PoW) and Proof of Stake (PoS) have demonstrated some degree of resilience against Sybil attacks
[139, 140]. Within the context of the BC-FL system, certain endeavors have adopted lightweight consensus protocols
or rapid information transmission methods to bolster system speed, inadvertently rendering them susceptible to Sybil
attacks [54, 103, 141]. For instance, in [54], the Raft protocol is harnessed to expedite consensus within the underlying
blockchain. However, this approach exposes a vulnerability where an attacker could subvert the leader election process
through the creation of fabricated identities. This disruption might impede the proper selection of legitimate leaders
or lead the system astray from its intended behavior. In another instance, Feng et al. employed a localized model
update chain facilitated by inter-device communication for efficient blockchain information transfer [103]. While
inter-device communication offers improved network performance and reduced communication costs, it also presents
a vulnerability to Sybil attacks [141]. In the realm of inter-device communication, attackers exploit the creation
of multiple spurious identities or devices to gain a foothold in the network, inundating it with counterfeit traffic or
acquiring sensitive information.
Another group of research tried to employ various consensus mechanisms to counter Sybil attacks [99, 142, 49, 141].
For instance, in [99], Zhang et al. utilize a validator committee selection scheme akin to the Algorand consensus
algorithm [142], utilizing verifiable random numbers to thwart Sybil attacks. In [49], Fang et al. designed a secure
aggregation protocol that directly applies the Algorand consensus algorithm to fend off Sybil and tampering attacks.
19
Cai et al.
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The storage requirements for blockchain systems are inherently cumbersome, as each full node is required to maintain
a complete backup of the entire system. This leads to a linear increase in the total storage size with the number of
full nodes. In FL, clients transmit their local models to a central server and download the global model. The server
is responsible for storing both the local and global models and various FL-related data and parameters, thereby be-
coming the node with the highest storage demand in the FL system. When enhancing the FL system with blockchain,
the BC-FL system must inevitably store diverse information on the blockchain, resulting in significant storage over-
head. Furthermore, most blockchain platforms currently impose limitations on transaction or block size. For instance,
Bitcoin has a block size limit of 1MB, and while Ethereum does not have a theoretical block size limit, its gas limit
effectively restricts the size of transactions [143]. If the BC-FL system requires direct storage of large volumes of data
within blocks, such as model parameters, this could surpass the blockchain system’s storage capabilities.
As illustrated in Fig. 11, the storage challenges of the BC-FL system are primarily twofold:
Constrained storage capacity: the limited block size makes storing some data that takes up storage space difficult.
Redundant storage demands: a large amount of training-related data is stored in the blockchain, which brings
unnecessary information redundancy and terrible storage challenges to the entire BC-FL system.
As depicted in Fig. 11, the current landscape presents two prevailing strategies to tackle the storage challenges in BC-
FL systems. The first approach entails chunking the FL models or data into distinct segments, which are then stored
on the blockchain with constrained block size [144]. This methodology necessitates prior negotiation of a serialization
plan among nodes. Subsequently, each split data’s size is logged as supplementary information within the transaction
block. Gradual storage of the data on the BC-FL system is accomplished through the initiation of transactions. How-
ever, we assert that such techniques possess restricted applicability and are suitable solely for systems characterized
by a few supernodes, each endowed with robust storage capabilities capable of managing storage redundancy.
The second solution involves utilizing distributed storage technology to house the model, while retaining only the
acquisition method on the blockchain [60, 83, 129, 145, 146]. For example, the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS)
employs content addressing for file storage and retrieval, allowing users to access files using the hash value associated
with the file [50]. In this methodology, solely the hash of the respective model finds its place on the blockchain.
Additionally, Xu et al. incorporated a model producer within the system to provide download links to other nodes
[91]. The blockchain then retains the model hashes and corresponding download links solely as part of this innovative
approach. These approaches address the intricate interplay between blockchain and FL requirements, paving the way
for more efficient and effective storage management within BC-FL systems.
20
Cai et al.
lenges. Yet, despite its pragmatic significance, the current body of research in this field remains inadequate. Having
meticulously scrutinized the latest studies, we distill a collection of potential future research directions, presented
herein for consideration.
The majority of current research endeavors have centered around the integration of blockchain into HFL systems.
An imperative exists to delve into the synergies between blockchain and VFL, as well as federated transfer learning.
VFL presents distinct data processing and training methodologies in comparison to HFL [147]. Prior to commencing
training, VFL necessitates privacy-preserving set intersection, and the regular encryption and exchange of interim
training outcomes. This raises the inquiry of whether blockchain can effectively tackle the unique challenges posed
by VFL and federated transfer learning. Further exploration is warranted to ascertain the potential of blockchain in
addressing these specialized concerns within the realm of VFL and federated transfer learning.
In FL systems, particularly in cross-device FL, clients typically exhibit constrained communication and computa-
tional capacities. Introducing blockchain on each client might further burden the communication and computational
resources of edge devices. The majority of blockchains in BC-FL systems maintain a rather general-purpose nature,
with only a handful being meticulously customized for these systems. The forthcoming challenge lies in the advance-
ment of consensus algorithms, topology structures, communication methodologies, and other enhancements aimed at
enhancing the compatibility of blockchain systems with the FL framework.
The integration of smart contracts has substantially elevated the adaptability and scalability of BC-FL systems. A
promising avenue for future exploration involves the formulation of supplementary algorithms tailored for deployment
on personalized smart contracts, aiming to enhance the efficiency, security, and flexibility of BC-FL systems [148].
It is important to highlight that a multitude of ongoing investigations are centered around attacks and defenses in the
realm of smart contract security [149, 150]. Thus, while the utilization of smart contracts within BC-FL systems holds
promise, a prudent approach necessitates meticulous scrutiny of potential vulnerabilities, mandating their mitigation
through rigorous and comprehensive research endeavors.
6 Conclusion
Blockchain-empowered Federated Learning (BC-FL) has emerged as a promising realm of distributed machine learn-
ing in recent years. This all-encompassing review delves into the potential advantages and challenges associated with
the integration of blockchain into FL. The survey highlighted numerous domains where blockchain can be harnessed
to enhance security, avert single points of failure, and establish reputation and incentive mechanisms. We elucidated
how blockchain can surmount the primary challenges encountered by FL. By considering that the amalgamation of
blockchain also presents several challenges that necessitate resolution, we succinctly outlined the efficiency, storage,
and security challenges that arise in BC-FL systems, and provided a comprehensive survey of prevailing solutions.
This survey furnishes a thorough and insightful analysis of the role of blockchain in the FL system. We hold the belief
that this work will expedite the exploration and advancement of related research endeavors, thus bestowing a valuable
resource upon scholars and practitioners in this field.
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