American Political Parties

American Political Parties

Why They Formed, How They Function, and Where

They’re Headed

John Kenneth White

Matthew R. Kerbel

University Pr ess of K ansas

 © 2022 by the University Press of Kansas
All rights reserved

Published by the University Press of Kansas (Lawrence, Kansas 66045), which was
organized by the Kansas Board of Regents and is operated and funded by Emporia
State University, Fort Hays State University, Kansas State University, Pittsburg State
University, the University of Kansas, and Wichita State University.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: White, John Kenneth, 1952–author. | Kerbel, Matthew Robert, 1958–author.
Title: American political parties : why they formed, how they function, and
where they’re headed / John Kenneth White, Matthew R. Kerbel.
Other titles: Party on!
Description: Lawrence : University Press of Kansas, 2022. | Revised edition
of: Party on! : political parties from Hamilton and Jefferson to Trump.
Second edition. New York : Routledge, 2018. | Includes bibliographical
references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021050481
ISBN 9780700633340 (paperback)
ISBN 9780700633357 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Political parties—United States—History. | Two-party
systems—United States. | Political culture—United States.
Classification: LCC JK2261 .W55 2022 | DDC 324.273—dc23/eng/20211122
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021050481

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data is available.

Cover image: Rob Young/Wikimedia Commons

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For our daughters, Jeannette White and Gabrielle Kerbel,
who grew up with this book.
 Contents

Acknowledgments xi
Preface: How We Got Here xiii
Introduction: An Election Like No Other 1
Chapter 1
Hamilton vs. Jefferson: How Political Parties Began 10
Chapter 2
The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of Party Politics 26
Chapter 3
Party Organizations in the Twenty-First Century 44
Chapter 4
Nominating Presidents 62
Chapter 5
Party Brand Loyalty and the American Voter 89
Chapter 6
Parties and Social Media 102
Chapter 7
Campaign Finance and Transitional Political Parties 119
Chapter 8
Elected Officials in an Age of Hyper-Partisanship 138
Chapter 9
Third Parties in the Twenty-First Century 153

Conclusion: Where Are We Going? 174

Notes 190

ix
 Acknowledgments

Writing a book always incurs more than the usual number of obligations. We
are grateful to the University of Kansas Press, particularly David Congdon, for
sharing our vision and guiding this project toward publication. We are also in-
debted to the reviewers, especially Mark Brewer and Samuel Rosenfeld, who
greatly assisted us in making this a better book. We are grateful to the Catholic
University of America and the dean of Arts and Sciences for helping to fund this
work. We are likewise grateful to our students who have asked us incisive ques-
tions and helped to sharpen our thinking about American politics. Once more,
we dedicate this book to our daughters, Jeannette White and Gabrielle Kerbel,
who have followed our work from childhood into adulthood.
This book is completed during a time of intense partisan polarization and
disillusionment with politics. We remain optimistic about the future, although
we know that our democracy is in danger and the events described in this vol-
ume are ones we could have hardly imagined. But our optimism is rooted in the
fact that the history of American political parties is one of constant adaptation
and renewal. Once more, we are at a moment where renewing our parties will,
we believe, ultimately strengthen our democracy.

xi
 Preface: How We Got Here

There is reason to worry that our two hundred-plus-year experiment with de-
mocracy is in danger. On January 6, 2021, insurrectionists invaded the US Capi-
tol, interrupting the official congressional certification of the 2020 electoral vote
and Joe Biden’s victory. Then-president Donald Trump successfully encouraged
protestors to march from the White House to the Capitol and disrupt the sol-
emn proceedings, and unsuccessfully urged his vice president, Mike Pence, to
refuse to certify enough electoral votes to reverse the election outcome. As dem-
onstrators neared the House and Senate chambers, members of Congress were
hustled to secure locations while Capitol police, National Guard, and Wash-
ington, DC, police officers fought the rioters, often in hand-to-hand combat.
For the first time in US history, a sitting president was accused of inciting an
insurrection that, if successful, would have led to a constitutional crisis the likes
of which Americans have never before seen.
The Republican and Democratic Parties were obvious sources of blame for
this discord, especially from those who questioned the election result after their
passions were inflamed by Donald Trump. Deep fissures in our politics are re-
flected in sharp divisions between the political parties. A metaphorical canyon
divided Republicans from Democrats in 2020, with 85 percent of Trump and
Biden supporters each saying the other side did not understand them.1 Foreign
actors, especially Russia, were accused of using social media to enflame these
tensions by planting false narratives designed to cause chaos and exacerbate so-
cial divisions. Consequently, partisan animosity boiled over.
This hostility may feel extreme, but it is not new. In fact, it goes back to the
very beginning of the constitutional republic. George Washington understood
the problems partisanship could create, and in his 1796 farewell address, Wash-
ington denounced “the spirit of party” in words that have an eerily contem-
porary ring:
This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its root in
the strongest passions of the human mind. . . . The disorders and miseries
which result gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose

xiii
xiv Preface: How We Got Here

in the absolute power of an individual; and sooner or later the chief of some
prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns
this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of public
liberty. . . .
[The spirit of party] serves always to distract the public councils and
enfeeble the public administration. It agitates the community with ill-
founded jealousies and false alarms, kindles the animosity of one part
against another, foments occasionally riot and insurrection. It opens the
door to foreign influence and corruption, which finds a facilitated access
to the government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus,
the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will
of another.2
Washington’s wish for an apolitical, unified nation did not come to pass. In-
stead, parties became pillars of American political and social life. Fledgling par-
ties vigorously contested the presidential elections of 1796 and 1800, resulting
in division, chaos, and contested results. As parties became more ingrained in
the American psyche—and later enshrined in election law—a two-party system
took root. Soon, it became impossible to imagine the political system function-
ing without parties. Partisan newspapers became features of public life, con-
veying the positions of the earliest American parties to their supporters. Later,
the two major parties acted as vital agents of political socialization for a wave
of Irish immigrants in the 1840s and a historic number of European migrants
in the 1890s.
George Washington Plunkitt, boss of New York City’s infamous Tammany
Hall machine, candidly told a reporter in 1905 how he wooed young men into
his Democratic organization:
I hear of a young feller that’s proud of his voice, thinks he can sing fine. I
ask him to come around to Washington Hall and join our Glee Club. He
comes and sings, and he’s a follower of Plunkitt for life. Another young
feller gains a reputation as a baseball player in a vacant lot. I bring him into
our baseball club. That fixes him. You’ll find him workin’ for my ticket
at the polls next election day. Then there’s the feller that likes rowin’ on
the river, the young feller that makes a name as a waltzer on his block, the
young feller that’s handy with his dukes—I rope them all in by givin’ them
opportunities to show themselves off. I don’t trouble them with political
arguments. I just study human nature and act accordin’.3
 Preface: How We Got Here xv

During the nineteenth century, presidents were often secondary in promi-

nence to local and state party leaders, who doled out thousands of patronage jobs
to their most loyal supporters—positions that often made the difference between
prosperity and ruin. But party influence wasn’t always about jobs. Party leaders
were vital intermediaries—assisting those in trouble with the law; providing aid
to victims of fire or some other tragedy; and creating fraternal organizations or
other social outlets. Former first lady Michelle Obama remembers how her fa-
ther, Fraser Robinson, acquired his patronage job at the Chicago water filtration
plant and, in return, served as a neighborhood precinct captain. Obama writes:
He’d held the post for years, in part because loyal service to the party ma-
chine was more or less expected of city employees. Even if he’d been half
forced into it, though, my dad loved the job, which baffled my mother
given the amount of time it demanded. He paid weekend visits to a nearby
neighborhood to check in on his constituents, often with me reluctantly in
tow. . . . When somebody had problems with garbage pickup or snow plow-
ing or was irritated by a pothole, my dad was there to listen. His purpose
was to help people feel cared for by the Democrats—and to vote accord-
ingly when elections rolled around.4
Time eroded the power of these local party organizations as an expanding
civil service substantially reduced the number of patronage jobs. Today, national
party organizations like the Democratic National Committee, Republican Na-
tional Committee, and their congressional counterparts have subsumed the
once-powerful party bosses to dominate national and (frequently) state poli-
tics. This centralization of party power coincides with a partisanship that sees
fewer voters split their tickets between Democrats and Republicans; more citi-
zens contributing small dollar amounts to the national parties and candidates of
their choice; and opportunities for wealthy individuals to contribute vast sums
without any public attribution (a phenomenon known as “dark money”). Party
identification has become the most important factor in how people vote, trans-
forming elections into a kind of political Armageddon. After the 2020 contest,
66 percent said it was either the “single most important election” or “one of the
most important” in their lifetimes.5
The partisanship we live with today can be traced back to different views of
American government that divided the nation’s founders. Alexander Hamilton
and Thomas Jefferson, two members of George Washington’s first cabinet, were
adversaries whose differences were so contentious they eventually caused both
xvi Preface: How We Got Here

to resign. Hamilton believed that freedom was a peculiarly American trait but
needed to be paired with a strong central government led by a strong executive
to prevent it from running amok. Jefferson also believed freedom to be a core
American value, but he felt it could only be preserved by local civic virtue nur-
tured in the absence of a strong central government. In Jefferson’s view, there
were substantial differences among the states, and local authorities should have
the power to determine what works best in their communities.
For more than two centuries, the debate initiated by Hamilton and Jefferson
about the size and role of government has imperfectly but consistently shaped
partisan divisions. Although the issues separating the two sides have changed
and changed again, the central tenets of their disagreement have not. Since the
Democratic and Republican Parties began regularly competing after 1860, each
party has at times embraced elements of the Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian po-
sition. In the late nineteenth century, Democrats advanced agrarian interests by
advocating Jeffersonian localism while Republicans promoted a rapidly nation-
alizing industrial sector. Then, during the Great Depression, Democrats became
the party of Hamiltonian nationalism and oversaw an unprecedented expansion
of the national social welfare state. In the late twentieth century, Republican
Ronald Reagan gave voice to Jefferson’s ideal of local control even as he presided
over an expansion of the federal government. Subsequently, Bill Clinton bowed
to the popularity of Reagan’s appeal and modified the Democrats’ Hamiltonian
stance of relying on government to solve problems, going as far as to declare that
“the era of big government is over.”6
In their current incarnation, Democrats align more with Hamilton and his
approach to vesting major responsibilities in a federal government that can
respond to the exigencies of the moment. This is particularly true in a post-
COVID 19 world where Joe Biden and his fellow Democrats want to use fed-
eral power to address looming crises—be it with direct relief for those displaced
by the pandemic, investing in physical and human infrastructure, or dealing
with climate change. Republicans in turn have long advocated limited govern-
ment with less taxation and regulation—defending Donald Trump’s tax cuts
and viewing states and localities as the appropriate locus of government activity.
Congressional Republicans unanimously opposed Biden’s American Families
Plan to deal with COVID-19, which included direct payments to families and
childcare tax credits, and also unanimously opposed his Build Back Better legis-
lation, designed to expand the social safety net. They are backed in these efforts
by rank-and-file Republicans. After the 2020 election, 62 percent of Trump
 Preface: How We Got Here xvii

voters said congressional Republicans “should do their best to stand up to Biden

on major policies, even if it means little gets passed.”7
One reason why the parties have not been steadfast in their embrace of the
Hamiltonian or Jeffersonian position is that Americans prefer some combina-
tion of both. Bill Clinton drew this simple analogy between Jefferson’s embrace
of liberty and Hamilton’s advocacy for community:
Take a penny from your pocket. On one side next to Lincoln’s portrait is
a single word: “Liberty.” On the other side is our national motto. It says,
“E Pluribus Unum”—“Out of Many, One.” It does not say, ‘Every man for
himself.’ That humble penny is an explicit declaration—one you can carry
around in your pocket—that America is about both individual liberty and
community obligation. These two commitments—to protect personal
freedom and to seek common ground—are the coin of our realm, the mea-
sure of our worth.8
Nevertheless, the political parties have often forced Americans to choose
one side or the other—sometimes resulting in their hatred for both. Herbert
Croly argued that Hamilton “perverted [the] national idea as much as Jefferson
perverted the American democratic idea, and the proper relation of these two
fundamental conceptions one to another cannot be completely understood until
this double perversion is corrected.”9 Thus, there have been historic oscillations
as both parties adjusted their perspectives as to whether Hamilton’s emphasis on
authority and a strong federal government, or Jefferson’s preference for a devo-
lution of power to state and local officials meets the moment. Often, Americans
want both even if they can’t have both.
The Hamilton-Jefferson debate has even extended to what parties should
look like and how they should act. Hamilton’s preference for a strong, cen-
tralized approach to politics has seen both parties become much stronger at
the national level in terms of organization and money—sometimes using these
resources to shape elections at the state level. Yet when it comes to selecting
their presidential candidates, the party establishments have weakened. Demo-
crats have long been unable to dictate their party’s nominee, allowing primary
voters to make that decision since 1972. Historically, Republicans deferred to
their party’s leaders to select their presidential candidates until Donald Trump
smashed whatever power a weakened national Republican establishment re-
tained. Indeed, Trump’s go-it-alone, one-man control over the GOP—even
in his post-presidency—is unlike anything we have ever witnessed. Even past
xviii Preface: How We Got Here

strong presidents (Franklin D. Roosevelt comes to mind) had to defer to party

bosses whenever the situation required.
Thus, even when they have been sympathetic to Jefferson’s preference for a
weak national government, organizationally the parties have transformed them-
selves into national behemoths that Hamilton might have welcomed. Still, the
groups that identify with the two parties are very different. Democrats have
a multicultural appeal and a broad, at times unwieldy coalition that includes
progressive, liberal, and moderate elements. This diversity of supporters can
complicate governance when the party holds power, especially when it has excep-
tionally narrow congressional majorities like it did following the 2020 election.
Republicans are more monolithic, especially since Donald Trump took control
of the party rank-and-file, although there are differing opinions as to whether
Trump’s position as a modern-day party boss will last. Outright near-unanimous
Republican opposition to Joe Biden in the early days of his presidency put tre-
mendous pressure on the Democratic party’s coalition to hold together despite
internal differences.
This book tells the story of American political parties—why they formed,
how they function, and where they are headed. It is a saga filled with many
twists and turns, surprises, and uncertain outcomes along the lines sketched
out between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. Chapter 1 describes
in greater detail the emergence of the arguments developed by Hamilton and
Jefferson about the appropriate scope and nature of the federal government that
have reverberated through the long history of political parties in America and
provide the backdrop for the framework of this book. Chapter 2 details the
first century of American political party development and explores how parties
forged a uniquely American character while adapting to new times and technol-
ogies. Chapter 3 takes this history into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries,
focusing on forces that molded party organizations into powerful institutions
at the turn of the twentieth and on forces that eroded and then helped rebuild
them at the turn of the twenty-first.
Chapter 4 describes the ongoing evolution in how parties choose their presi-
dential nominees, with emphasis on how the rise of personality politics and the
emergence of social media have shaped nomination politics and undermined
formerly powerful party organizations. Chapter 5 notes how party loyalties can
strengthen during periods of realignment (when new coalitions of voters upend
previous political coalitions) and erode during periods of dealignment (when
independent voters become decisive in elections). Chapter 6 looks closely at the
challenges posed to parties by social media. Chapter 7 explores the importance
 Preface: How We Got Here xix

of money in politics, examines the current state of campaign finance laws (or
lack thereof), and considers how the Internet and super-rich individuals have
revolutionized fundraising. Chapter 8 examines the role of the party in govern-
ment, including the importance of the national party organizations. Chapter 9
looks at the role of third parties in the American two-party system and notes
that at key junctures they have helped the major parties adjust to changing pub-
lic demands. We conclude by considering what lies ahead for a party system that
appears to be buckling under the weight of a rapidly changing America.
In its complexity and entirety, the saga of the US party system is fascinating
because of the continued evolution of its actors. With each election, we learn
more about how the two major parties address the eternal and emerging ques-
tions of our politics. We will begin most naturally with an election like no other
in our lifetimes: the extraordinary story of 2020 and how partisan combat and
its aftermath upset centuries-old norms of party behavior while bringing the
republic itself to the brink. While the 2020 election and its aftermath add an
important chapter to our story, as we note in the conclusion, the final ending
has yet to be written.
 Introduction: An Election Like No Other

W
e have never witnessed anything like the 2020 election
and its aftermath, where the centrist tendencies essential to the
success of the American two-party system gave way to a politics of
absolutism that manifested in an insurrection against the government. Consider
the extraordinary events of late 2020 and early 2021, when expectations of a
peaceful transfer of power were superseded by partisan violence.
It was a moment of outsized participation marked by great partisan energy,
when 159 million Americans voted in person or by mail amidst a once-in-a cen-
tury pandemic. After days of counting ballots, Joe Biden emerged as the winner,
having secured 306 electoral votes to Donald Trump’s 232. This was a devastat-
ing loss for Republicans, who in the space of just four years had surrendered the
presidency, House, and Senate—the first time that had happened to the party
since Herbert Hoover was defeated for reelection in 1932.
But the counting of the ballots marked only the beginning of an unprece-
dented moment in American history. On January 6, 2021, President Trump
incited a crowd to stop the official certification of the electoral votes by a joint
session of Congress. Inflamed by Trump’s rhetoric that urged his supporters to
“fight like hell” because “if you don’t fight like hell, you’re not going to have a
country anymore,” thousands marched from the White House and stormed the
Capitol.1 Armed with guns, bear spray, zip ties, and other weapons, the rioters
constructed a makeshift gallows on the Capitol grounds intended for congres-
sional leaders, including Vice President Mike Pence and House Speaker Nancy
Pelosi. Members of Congress scrambled to get out of harm’s way and into secure
locations, while congressional staffers barricaded their offices, hid under confer-
ence tables, and feared for their lives. Five people died during the insurrection,
including one Capitol police officer; two officers perished by suicide shortly
afterward.
One week later the House of Representatives impeached Trump for a second
time. House Democrats were unanimous in their support for impeachment, and
they were joined by ten Republicans, including the then-number three GOP
leader, Wyoming congresswoman Liz Cheney, the daughter of a former Republi-
can vice president. Following a Senate trial held just days after Trump left office

1
2 Introduction: An Election Like No Other

in February 2021, fifty-seven senators voted to convict the former president—

including seven Republicans. Despite falling ten votes short of the two-thirds
needed for conviction, it was the most bipartisan judgment ever leveled in an
impeachment trial and marked the first time that multiple members of a presi-
dent’s party supported conviction.
Inaugurated as the nation’s forty-sixth president two weeks after the at-
tempted insurrection, Joe Biden made a plea for an American democracy that
he called “precious,” yet “fragile.”2 He was not the first or only figure to take
note of the tenuous nature of the American political system during a fraught
moment in history. Former President Barack Obama saw an American system
of government under siege:
America as an experiment is genuinely important to the world not be-
cause of the accidents of history that made us the most powerful nation
on Earth, but because America is the first real experiment in building a
large, multi-ethnic, multicultural democracy. And we don’t know yet if
that can hold. There haven’t been enough of them to say for certain that
it’s going to work.3
Lara Trump, the former president’s daughter-in-law, saw the zero-sum stakes
of the 2020 election this way: “This is not just a choice between Republican
and Democrat or left and right. This is an election that will decide if we keep
America America—or if we head down an unchartered, frightening path to-
wards socialism.”4
Biden struck a hopeful tone at his inauguration, but the proceedings were set
against the threat of additional violence and a pandemic that by then had already
killed more Americans than all of those who died during World War II. Ringed
by thousands of troops, Biden took the presidential oath just hours after Donald
Trump departed Washington, DC, for his Florida estate. For the first time since
Andrew Johnson refused to attend the inauguration of Ulysses S. Grant in 1869,
a departing chief executive was nowhere to be found on the inaugural platform.
It was a symbolic statement about resistance to the peaceful transfer of power
that echoed the rebellion days before.
The only other comparable precedent was 1801—the first time an Amer-
ican political party handed over the reins of government to its opposition—
when Thomas Jefferson was sworn into office just hours after the defeated John
Adams decamped for his native Massachusetts. Like 2020, the Adams-Jefferson
contest of 1800 was an ugly, highly partisan affair with ramifications for the
continuity of government. Federalist John Adams loathed Democrat Thomas
Jefferson who, in turn, lambasted his opponent for approving the Alien and
 Introduction: An Election Like No Other 3

Sedition Acts that made criticism of the president a crime and landed pro-Jef-
ferson newspaper editorialists in jail. One Jefferson supporter captured the elec-
tion’s importance: “To reign by fear and not by affection was ever bad policy. I
am confident that the people of America are too fond of freedom to surrender
it passively; and that whenever any body of men disclose views inimical to their
interests, they will hurl them into insignificance.”5
Like 2020, the contentious election of 1800 was followed by an even more
contentious aftermath. Owing to an Electoral College mechanism that didn’t
account for the emergence of political parties, Thomas Jefferson’s running mate,
Aaron Burr, won an equal number of votes to Jefferson in the Electoral College.
Under the Constitution, the House of Representatives had to resolve the mat-
ter. Controlled by the Federalist Party, whose most well-known public spokes-
person was Alexander Hamilton, members of the congressional majority were
confronted with an unappetizing choice: which of their rivals would they select
to be the next president? After a weeks-long deadlock and with Hamilton’s en-
dorsement, the Federalist House chose Jefferson as the lesser of two evils. Adams
left office, but a period of political vitriol followed. Four years later, Burr assassi-
nated Hamilton in a duel. Within a decade, the Federalist Party itself devolved
into political insignificance.
The election of 1800, and John Adams’s acceptance of defeat, created what
James MacGregor Burns described as a vital extra-constitutional right: the
peaceful transition from a party-in-power to its opposition. Burns noted that
this customary transfer of power from one political party to another—one that
still eludes many other nations—showcased America at its best:
A crucial liberty, one that had not been tested during the twelve-year hege-
mony of Federalist government, was established in the election of 1800—the
freedom of the opposition not only to oppose, but to prevail peacefully. Not
only did this constitute evidence to the world that the American polity was
far more stable than it may have appeared, it was a notice to future American
political leaders that they need not contemplate coups or venture violence
in order to succeed. Much to the contrary, the path to political power in
the United States was shown to lead directly to and through the ballot box,
ensuring for generations to come the freedom of meaningful political oppo-
sition and the regular, orderly peaceful transfer of political power.6
This peaceful transfer of power and acceptance of constitutional norms
shaped how American political parties developed around a set of democratic
values. Louis Hartz, a political theorist best known for his commentary on
American political culture, maintained that the United States had achieved a
4 Introduction: An Election Like No Other

national consensus centered on the importance of individual freedoms: “It is

a remarkable force this fixed, dogmatic liberalism of a liberal way of life. It is
the secret root from which have sprung many of the most puzzling aspects of
American cultural phenomena.”7 Englishman G. K. Chesterton wrote in 1920
that the United States was founded on a “creed,” saying: “That creed is set forth
with dogmatic and even theological lucidity in the Declaration of Independence;
perhaps the only piece of practical politics that is also theoretical politics and
also great literature.”8 This creed allowed for little tolerance of extremes and
was decidedly centrist in nature. Lewis Cass, the 1848 Democratic nominee for
president, once told a Tammany Hall audience of party bosses in New York City
that he was “opposed to all the isms of the day” like “communism and social-
ism.”9 Abraham Lincoln warned that if the Declaration of Independence were
amended to read that “all men are created equal, except Negroes, foreigners, and
Catholics,” then “I should prefer emigrating to some country where they make
no pretense of loving liberty—to Russia, for instance, where despotism can be
taken pure, and without the base alloy of hypocrisy.”10
The American penchant for middle-of-the-road politics formed a foundation
for our two-party system. President Dwight Eisenhower once noted, “There is
in our affairs at home, a middle way between untrammeled freedom of the indi-
vidual and the demands for the welfare of the whole nation. This way must avoid
government by bureaucracy as carefully as it avoids neglect of the helpless.”11 The
search for the middle led to the development of two broad parties, a phenome-
non that happened almost simultaneously with the adoption of the US Consti-
tution. Although the names and allegiances of the parties have changed many
times, a two-party system with its origins in the formative years of American
political parties has endured for more than two centuries. As political scientist V.
O. Key observed: “Human institutions have an impressive capacity to perpetuate
themselves or at least to preserve their form. The circumstances that happened
to mold the American party system into a dual form at its inception must bear a
degree of responsibility for its present existence.”12
As the two-party system began to form, a public consensus about the bound-
aries of political debate formed with it, the product of the disagreements be-
tween Hamilton and Jefferson and their influence as party leaders. They estab-
lished the parameters of conflict that would take place between two dominant
parties by posing and answering several key questions:

1. How do we limit our freedoms and still possess them?

2. How much government should we have, and when is it too excessive?
 Introduction: An Election Like No Other 5

3. When do we need a national government to act in the interests of all

our citizens?
4. When is it appropriate to leave matters to local customs and practices?

Hamilton believed that Americans were inextricably linked by a common

bond of citizenship that required action by the federal government, and espe-
cially the president, when times demanded it. Writing in The Federalist, Hamil-
ton observed, “Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of
good government.” Hamilton added that energetic executives were “essential to
the protection of the community against foreign attacks” as well as the “steady
administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular
and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course
of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambi-
tion, of faction, and of anarchy.”13 For Hamilton, the best presidents were proac-
tive executives who protected individual rights and acted on behalf of the nation.
Thomas Jefferson, on the other hand, preferred a more limited federal role,
believing local communities should take the lead and act in the citizen’s best
interests and that the nation’s diversity meant that different states and locales
would choose different alternatives. In 1825, Jefferson warned about the ex-
panding power of government and believed that “the salvation of the republic”
rested on the regeneration and spread of the New England town hall meeting.14
As two-party competition developed between Democrats and Republicans,
vigorous debates emerged between them revolving around these poles. From
time to time, the leading parties shifted positions. Democrats began their storied
history as devotees of Jeffersonian Localism, espousing the doctrine of “states’
rights.” Republicans initially staked their political fortunes on a Hamiltonian
Nationalism that would keep the Union together amidst a Civil War. Later Re-
publicans espoused building railroads, creating land-grant colleges and universi-
ties, and giving the federal government a powerful voice in protecting industrial
workers as the nation’s economy shifted from an agricultural to an industrial
base. The Great Depression altered the parties’ accustomed roles. Democrats, led
by Franklin D. Roosevelt, wanted the federal government to bring relief to the
nation’s unemployed and provide greater economic security, including passage
of Social Security. Republicans took Jefferson’s side, believing that Roosevelt’s
New Deal programs infringed individual freedoms and threatened the sanctity
of local rule.
The parties never quite played their assigned roles perfectly. During the Ei-
senhower years, Republicans presided over a massive expansion of the federal
6 Introduction: An Election Like No Other

government, including creating the nation’s interstate highways. In the Clinton

years, Democrats scaled back their expectations about what the federal govern-
ment can and should do. Complicating matters is the tendency for the public
to want some combination of Hamiltonian nationalism and Jeffersonian local-
ism. Journalist Walter Lippmann once observed that Americans did not like to
choose between these two schools of thought: “To be partisan as between Jeffer-
son and Hamilton is like arguing whether men or women are more necessary to
the procreation of the race. Neither can live alone. Alone—that is, without the
other—each is excessive and soon intolerable.”15 Throughout history, voters have
reversed course when they perceive that one party offers too much government
and the other too little. But if either Hamilton or Jefferson had come back to
life at any point in the late nineteenth or twentieth centuries, they would have
recognized themselves in the tone of Democratic and Republican Party leaders.
Now, however, after four years of the Donald Trump presidency, two im-
peachment trials, and political polarization that echoes the fracturing of the
party system of the 1850s, there arises a question as to whether the public
consensus recognized by political theorists and historians has come apart. Put
another way, is the continuance of our two-party system assured, or will the
Democrats and Republicans splinter into three or four parties? The question is
a serious one. As previously noted, Lewis Cass, the 1848 Democratic presidential
nominee, embraced moderation by rejecting all the extreme “isms” of his day.
But the Trump presidency was built on an important “ism”—populism—which
sees “the people,” whom it purports to represent, as producers who personify the
American Dream, while its enemies are takers—that is, elites, immigrants, and
those who reject conventional social mores. In its essence, populism is all about
us versus them: the makers vs. the takers. In 1995, political scientist Wilson
Carey McWilliams noted that the populism of the Right [favors] “old hatred
and [creates] new resentments, threatening what remains of civic community.”16
It specifically threatens to undermine the moderation that makes the two-party
system possible.
Donald Trump was defeated in 2020, but the populist movement he leads is
poised to define the Republican Party for the foreseeable future. Political com-
mentator Michael Lind writes:

In the Republican party, the inherited program shared by much of the con-
servative movement and the party’s donors, with its emphasis on free trade
and large-scale immigration, and cuts in entitlements like Social Security
and Medicare, is a relic of the late 20th century, when the country-club
 Introduction: An Election Like No Other 7

wing of the party was much more important than the country and western
wing. The anger and sense of betrayal of the newly dominant white work-
ing class in the Republican party makes perfect sense. . . . Mr. Trump ex-
posed the gap between what orthodox conservative Republicans offer and
what today’s dominant Republican voters actually want—middle-class en-
titlements plus crackdowns on illegal immigrants, Muslims, foreign trade
rivals, and free-riding allies.17
Whenever populism ascends, rhetorical excess inevitably follows. Michael
Kazin writes: “By calling the enemy an ‘octopus,’ ‘leech,’ ‘pig,’ or ‘fat cat,’ a populist
speaker suggested that ‘the people’ were opposing a form of savagery as much as a
structure inimical to their interests. Character assassination was always essential to
the rhetorical game.”18 For four years, Donald Trump engaged in a form of charac-
ter assassination on Twitter, replete with dismissive name-calling (e.g., “Crooked
Hillary” Clinton, “Sleepy Joe” Biden, and “Crazy Nancy” Pelosi). In 2016, Hillary
Clinton charged that Trump “built his campaign on prejudice and paranoia. He
is taking hate groups mainstream, and helping a radical fringe take over the Re-
publican Party.”19 Clinton was prophetic, as white supremacists and armed militias
staged the violent Capitol insurrection that resulted in mayhem and murder.
Back in 1964, political scientist Richard Hofstadter anticipated contempo-
rary populism by noting the emergence of a “paranoid style” that was beginning
to creep into our political discourse:
As a member of the avant-garde who is capable of perceiving the conspir-
acy before it is fully obvious to an as yet unaroused public, the paranoid is
a militant leader. He does not see social conflict as something to be me-
diated and compromised, in the manner of the working politician. Since
what is at stake is always a conflict between absolute good and absolute
evil, the quality needed is not a willingness to compromise but the will to
fight things out to a finish. Nothing but complete victory will do. Since
the enemy is thought of as being totally evil and totally unappeasable, he
must be totally eliminated—if not from the world, at least from the theater
of operations to which the paranoid directs his attention. This demand
for unqualified victories leads to the formulation of hopelessly unrealistic
goals, and since these goals are not even remotely attainable, failure con-
stantly heightens the paranoid’s frustration. Even partial success leaves him
with the same sense of powerlessness with which he began, and this in
turn only strengthens his awareness of the vast and terrifying quality of
the enemy he opposes.20
8 Introduction: An Election Like No Other

Hofstadter’s description of the “paranoid style” captures the qualities that

underlay Trump’s appeal and his ability to remake the Republican Party in his
image. As Donald Trump Jr. told the crowd gathered to hear his father prior to
their storming of the Capitol, their presence should be a warning to those Repub-
licans who wanted to certify the Electoral College votes: “This isn’t their party
anymore,” he said. “This is Donald Trump’s Republican party.”21 Trump Jr. was
right. A poll taken immediately following Trump’s second impeachment trial
found 75 percent of Republicans wanted Trump to continue playing a promi-
nent role in the Republican Party.22 Seventy-one percent of Republicans believed
impeaching and convicting the former President was an act of disloyalty.23
The result has been to strip the Republican Party of its conservative principles
and stymie the development of conservative policies and programs. This became
apparent in 2020 when the GOP followed Trump’s instructions and re-adopted
its 2016 platform without changing a word. It was an unprecedented action that
left voters adrift as to what Trump and the Republican Party would do if he had
won a second term. Democrats, as is customary, adopted a full-length party plat-
form that defined their approach to the major issues of the day—including the
COVID-19 pandemic, race relations and policing, immigration, climate change,
and foreign policy. Republicans essentially expressed their loyalty to one man.
Sixty years ago, a committee of the American Political Science Association
issued this prescient warning:
When the President’s program actually is the sole program . . ., either his
party becomes a flock of sheep or the party falls apart. In effect, this con-
cept of the presidency disperses the party system by making the President
reach directly for the support of a majority of the voters. It favors a President
who exploits skillfully the arts of demagoguery, who sees the whole country
as his political backyard, and who does not mind turning into the embodi-
ment of personal government.24
History has shown that whenever populist grievances become dominant,
populism itself descends into its own paranoid style and eventually recedes into
the background. Trump’s takeover of the Republican Party has created its own
unique politics of grievance and has brought many former white working-class
Democrats who resent globalism and the country’s changing political demog-
raphy into their ranks. But the transformation of the Republican Party into a
Trumpian populist entity threatens to eliminate the political consensus that has
shaped American discourse for nearly three centuries and potentially the exis-
tence of the two-party system itself. The anger Republicans exhibit has spilled
 Introduction: An Election Like No Other 9

over into our civic life. Today, 55 percent of Republicans believe “the traditional
American way of life is disappearing so fast that we may have to use force to save
it.”25 Thirty-nine percent say that “if elected leaders will not protect America,
the people must do it themselves, even if it requires taking violent action.”26
Even if Republicans remain out of power, the threat posed by right-wing pop-
ulism to the survival of the party system is real. Party scholars often focus on the
majority party—why it succeeds in gaining power and what ideas it has to offer.
But the minority party also plays a vital role in stable governance. It defines its
disagreements with the majority, even as it selects those issues upon which they
agree. Those disagreements, often filled with echoes of Hamilton and Jeffer-
son, are presented to voters who determine which side they prefer. The minority
party can also co-opt the development of third parties and simplify the choice
voters must make.
Back in 2014, Republican South Carolina senator Lindsey Graham, said,
“The country needs a vibrant Republican party.”27 He was right. In politics,
ideas matter and move nations, and a vibrant Republican Party would choose
areas of disagreement with Democrats and offer policy alternatives. Today,
ideas are in short supply as the Republican Party has abandoned its conservative
principles to indulge in personality politics. Time will determine whether that
lasts, but it calls into question if the long-standing consensus derived from the
Hamilton-Jefferson debates will continue, or whether the two-party system is
past its zenith.
This is where the party system stands in the aftermath of the 2020 election.
To understand how we got here, it is best to return to the beginning and look
at the history of political party development in America, at how once-weak po-
litical parties grew into the dominant institutions we know today. We will tell
that story in the next two chapters, starting in chapter 1 with an account of
how nascent parties took root in what Burns once described as the “vineyard of
liberty” that characterized the early United States.28
 Ch a pter 1

Hamilton vs. Jefferson: How Political Parties Began

T
he Framers of the US Constitution were well versed in the
writings of Aristotle, Locke, Montesquieu, and other democratic
thinkers. From their extensive reading of history, they understood the
dangers of unchecked ambition and the necessities of free speech and minority
protections that are so vital in creating a representative democracy. The tripar-
tite system of government they devised—consisting of a president, Congress,
and judiciary—has endured with only modest revisions to the US Constitution.
Upon leaving the presidency in 1796, George Washington urged that the Con-
stitution “be sacredly maintained—that its administration in every department
may be stamped with wisdom and virtue.”1 Forty-two years later, Abraham Lin-
coln told the Springfield, Illinois, Young Men’s Lyceum that the Constitution
should become “the political religion of the nation.”2
Yet while the Framers realized success in establishing instruments of gover-
nance, they struggled over how to organize elections. Popular, democratic elec-
tions were a novel experiment that many believed could not happen without
widespread turmoil and violence. One Massachusetts delegate to the Consti-
tutional Convention in Philadelphia contended that the “evils we experience
flow from the excess of democracy.”3 Alexander Hamilton agreed: “The peo-
ple are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or determine right.”4 By the
twenty-first century, however, the “excess of democracy” had become universal.
In 2017, there were 35,879 cities and townships; 12,880 independent school
districts; 3,031 counties; and 38,266 special districts spread across the US, many
with elected leaders.5
The Constitution’s Framers were skeptical of political parties, thinking of
them as factions to be avoided. So, it was to their great astonishment that politi-
cal parties proved to be the agents that made the document’s provisions and the
complex system of elections work. Parties afforded a way of organizing elections,
legitimizing opposition, and guaranteeing peaceful transitions of power. Once
in office, they often helped elected officials work together and bridged some of

10
 Hamilton vs. Jefferson: How Political Parties Began 11

the differences both between and among government institutions. One might
assume, therefore, that political parties would be welcome instruments of gov-
ernance. Quite the contrary. For more than 200 years, Americans have stead-
fastly refused to embrace party-led government—preferring instead that their
leaders act in a nonpartisan manner. In 1956, John F. Kennedy wrote a Pulitzer
Prize–winning book, Profiles in Courage, which extolled those who placed con-
science above party.6 Sixty years later, Republican presidential nominee Donald
Trump took a different tack, this time underscoring the public’s distaste for
both major parties: “We look at politicians and think: This one’s owned by this
millionaire. That one’s owned by that millionaire, or lobbyist, or special group.”7
Voters rewarded Trump’s Republican Party by giving them complete control of
the federal government in 2016. But their investment was fleeting. Two years
later, they soured on Trump’s leadership and handed control of the House of
Representatives to Democrats. Two years after that, they gave Democrats the
White House and Senate as well.
The remainder of this chapter sets the foundation for our discussion of the
evolution and role of political parties in America. We start by looking at the
love-hate relationship Americans have with parties and how this has influenced
party development. Next, we address what roles parties play and how they differ
from other players in the political system. The chapter ends with a discussion of
the disparate perspectives on political parties held by Hamilton and Jefferson,
which will help to structure our understanding of party development.

Political Parties: Institutions Americans Love to Hate

The Founding Fathers were elitists who wanted to minimize the role citizens
would play in choosing their officeholders. They were especially fearful of polit-
ical parties, arguing that it was necessary, in Madison’s words, to “break and con-
trol the violence of faction [meaning parties and other special interest groups].”8
James Madison, George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, John Adams, and
Thomas Jefferson believed that an enlightened citizenry would have no use for
parties. Instead of parties, Madison hoped other mediating institutions would
“refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of the
chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their
country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it
to temporary or partial conditions.”9 Madison believed a multitude of interests
would proliferate through continental expansion, thus making the development
of large, mass-based parties virtually inconceivable: “You make it less probable
12 chapter 1

that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of
other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all
who feel it to discover their own strength and to act in unison with each other.”10
Madison’s belief that parties were unsuited filters for mass expressions of pub-
lic opinion was based on his reading of history. He believed human beings were
emotional creatures, often embracing different religions and political leaders with
a zealotry that usually ended in chaos and violence. Most of Madison’s contempo-
raries agreed, and they despised political parties as vehicles that would, inevitably,
ignite uncontrollable political passions. George Washington was especially crit-
ical of partisan demagogues whose objective, he claimed, was not to give people
the facts from which they could reasonably make up their own minds but to make
them blind followers. In an early draft of a 1792 speech renouncing a second
term (never delivered when he had a change of heart), Washington maintained
that “we are all children of the same country . . . [and] that our interest, however
diversified in local and smaller matters, is the same in all the great and essential
concerns of the nation.”11 Determined to make good on his intention to leave of-
fice in 1796, Washington issued his famous farewell address, in which he admon-
ished his fellow citizens to avoid partisanship at any cost, noting that the “spirit of
party” caused great division and agitated passions that helped divide the nation.12
Washington was hardly alone in admonishing partisanship. Six years before
Washington’s famous farewell and prior to the end of the Revolutionary War,
John Adams bemoaned the country’s elites drift toward party politics: “There is
nothing I dread so much as a division of the Republic into two great parties, each
arranged under its leader and converting measures in opposition to each other.”13
Abigail Adams, observing the effects of partisan attacks on her husband during his
presidency, wrote, “Party spirit is blind, malevolent, un-candid, ungenerous, un-
just, and unforgiving.”14 James Monroe, the nation’s fifth chief executive, urged his
backers to obliterate all party divisions. When Abraham Lincoln sought reelection
in 1864 under the newly created National Union banner, half a million pamphlets
were published bearing titles such as “No Party Now but All for Our Country.”15
Today’s party leaders also seem skeptical about a place for parties in the Amer-
ican setting. In the keynote address that launched Barack Obama’s national ca-
reer at the 2004 Democratic National Convention, the future president spoke of
the ills that stem from dividing the country into partisan groups:

The pundits like to slice and dice our country into Red States and Blue
States; Red States for Republicans, Blue States for Democrats. But I’ve
got news for them. We worship an awesome God in the Blue States, and
 Hamilton vs. Jefferson: How Political Parties Began 13

we don’t like federal agents poking around our libraries in the Red States.
We coach Little League in the Blue States and have gay friends in the Red
States. There are patriots who opposed the war in Iraq and patriots who
supported it. We are one people, all of us pledging allegiance to the stars
and stripes, all of us defending the United States of America.16

Because this message resonates with so many people, political figures often
find it advantageous to downplay political labels. Seeking reelection in 1972,
Richard Nixon instructed his staff not to include the word “Republican” in any
of his television advertisements or campaign brochures. Four years later, Gerald
R. Ford was bluntly told by his advisors not to campaign for Republican candi-
dates lest his support erode among independents and ticket splitters.17 Asking
Republicans and Republican-leaning voters in 2020 whether they considered
themselves to be more a supporter of Donald Trump, or more a supporter of the
Republican party, 52 percent labeled themselves Trump supporters first.18 Cam-
paigning for reelection in 2020, Trump mentioned the Republican Party only
five times in his acceptance speech: twice referring to Abraham Lincoln; twice
pledging to keep Americans safe from rioters and looters; and once to promise
that the party would protect those with preexisting health conditions should
Obamacare be overturned by the Supreme Court.19 For his part, Joe Biden
mentioned the Democratic Party just once and in a bipartisan context, saying:
“[W]hile I will be the Democratic candidate, I will be an American president. I
will work as hard for those who didn’t support me as I will for those who did.”20
Students of political parties, however, give them more kudos than the pub-
lic. In his book The American Commonwealth, published in 1888, James Bryce
began a tradition of scholarly investigation of political parties by devoting more
than 200 pages to the subject. His treatment was laudatory: “Parties are inev-
itable. No free large country has been without them. No one has shown how
representative government could be worked without them. They bring order out
of chaos to a multitude of voters.”21 More than a century later, scores of academi-
cians agree with Bryce. In a 1996 amicus curiae (friend-of-the-court) brief filed
with the US Supreme Court, the Committee for Party Renewal, a bipartisan
group of political scientists, summarized the views held by most party scholars:

Political parties play a unique and crucial role in our democratic system of
government. Parties enable citizens to participate coherently in a system of
government allowing for a substantial number of popularly elected offices.
They bring fractious and diverse groups together as a unified force, provide
14 chapter 1

a necessary link between the distinct branches and levels of government,

and provide continuity that lasts beyond terms of office. Parties also play
an important role in encouraging active participation in politics, holding
politicians accountable for their actions, and encouraging debate and dis-
cussion of important issues.22

Three Important Party Distinctions

One topic that bedevils any examination of parties in America is how one
defines them. What is a political party? What makes one organization more
“party-like” than another? What are the differences among interest groups, cam-
paign consulting firms, political action committees, and political parties? What
are the various components of political parties? Are parties member-oriented, or
are they simply tools for an office-seeking elite?
Scholars have wrestled with these and other related questions for decades.
Many of these topics are discussed in the chapters that follow, but a few clarifi-
cations are in order. They center around three questions:

1. How do political parties differ from other organizations, particularly those

concerned with the outcome of government activity?
2. What are the various elements that comprise American political parties?
3. What do parties seek to accomplish and how are their activities related to
these goals?

These three questions have occupied considerable scholarly attention since

the formal study of US parties began in earnest after World War II. But they
have a renewed urgency in today’s interconnected, fast-paced world. Even though
the Internet allows individuals to access thousands of web pages dealing with
politics, and social media gives individuals an ever-greater voice, the major par-
ties still matter. Democrats and Republicans hold positions on a variety of issues
and identifying with a particular political party provides vital cues to voters. In
2020, the Gallup organization identified several large partisan discrepancies on
the importance of the candidates’ positions on key issues when casting their vote:

• Healthcare: Democrats ranked this issue 32 points higher than Republicans.

• Coronavirus Response: Democrats ranked this issue 32 points higher than
Republicans.
• Race Relations: Democrats ranked this issue 27 points higher than
Republicans.
 Hamilton vs. Jefferson: How Political Parties Began 15

• Climate Change: Democrats ranked this issue 65 points higher than

Republicans.
• Economy: Republicans ranked this issue 8 points higher than Democrats.
• Abortion: Republicans ranks this issue 8 points higher than Democrats.
• Terrorism/National Security: Republicans ranked this issue 22 points
higher than Democrats.
• Crime: Republicans ranked this issue 15 points higher than Democrats.
• Gun Policy: Republicans ranked this issue 16 points higher than Democrats.
• Taxes: Republicans ranked this issue 18 points higher than Democrats.23
Simply put on nearly every major issue confronting the United States, Dem-
ocrats and Republicans have different worldviews. In this environment, the
strategic objectives of the two major parties matter a great deal because their
partisans ascribe great weight to them.

How Parties Differ from Other Organizations

At first glance, strangers to the American party system might find little distinc-
tion between parties and interest groups. Indeed, Madison’s own discussion of
“faction” is vague, and scholars have tangled with this issue for nearly two centu-
ries. So, what, if anything, distinguishes a political party from, say, the American
Association of Retired Persons, the Environmental Defense Fund, the National
Rifle Association, or the National Association of Manufacturers? We point to
four important distinctions:
1. Parties run candidates for office under their own label. Although interest
groups may consistently back candidates of one party, such as the American
Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organization’s (AFL-CIO)
support of Democrats or the National Association of Manufacturers’ sup-
port of Republicans, they do not have a party label and do not officially
nominate candidates for office.
2. When it comes to determining policy, parties have a broad range of con-
cerns. The 2020 Democratic Party platform had much to say about the
pandemic, restoring the economy, civil rights, LGBTQ rights, immigra-
tion, foreign policy, national defense, and climate change.24 Republicans
promoted smaller government; education, healthcare, and criminal justice
reforms; drilling for more energy resources; and border security.25
3. Unlike political parties, interest groups have a much narrower set of
concerns.26 The American Association of Retired Persons, for example,
16 chapter 1

is keenly interested in policies affecting older Americans but pays scant

attention to environmental legislation. The Environmental Defense Fund
makes its views plain on modifications to the Endangered Species Act but
offers little input on how to combat terrorism. Likewise, the National Rifle
Association offers its unadulterated opposition to gun control but has little
to say on other issues such as reforming Social Security.
4. Political parties are subject to state and local laws, and the relationship
between parties and the states is an intimate one. Interest groups, on the
other hand, are private organizations operating under some state and
federal regulations and with the aid of constitutional protections of free
speech, assembly, and petition.
Interest groups and parties have worked together on numerous occasions.
The present-day merging of gun rights, as advocated by the National Rifle As-
sociation, with a cooperating Republican Party is one example. The close ties
between advocates who support dealing with the effects of climate change and
the Democratic Party is another. Today, there are so many overlapping activities
between political parties and interest groups that the competition between the
two has become especially intense—a development that is discussed in greater
detail in chapter 2.

The Components of American Political Parties

In ancient Greece, when the priestess of Apollo at Delphi made ready to deliver
a prophecy, she positioned herself on a special seat supported by three legs, the
tripod.27 The tripod gave the priestess a clear view of the past, present, and fu-
ture. Political scientists in the early 1950s likened political parties to that tripod
of so long ago, contending that parties are also supported by three legs: party in
the electorate, party organization, and party in government.28
• Party in the electorate (PIE) refers to those who identify with a particular
party. In some countries, party organizations require active participation to
be considered a member, which often means paying a membership fee. In
the United States, however, party membership is not nearly as well defined.
Here, the “party in the electorate” denotes a person’s psychological attach-
ment to a particular party. Some root for a political party the way others
might cheer on their favorite baseball team. Attaching oneself to a political
party in this fashion can manifest itself in a range of activities, although
party identification can also be weak and not automatically translate into
 Hamilton vs. Jefferson: How Political Parties Began 17

partisan behavior. Some people will vote exclusively or primarily for can-
didates of their party, although it is possible to identify with a party and
still vote for the opposition, or even not vote at all. Some people choose to
register as a Republican or Democrat when they sign up to vote, but for-
mal registration is not a requirement for being included in the party in the
electorate. Other formalized party activities may include participation in a
party primary, raising money at a party fundraiser, making telephone calls,
or advocating for a party on social media to help get out the vote for a party’s
candidate.
• Party organization (PO) refers to the formal apparatus of the party or the
party bureaucracy. It encompasses physical assets like the party headquar-
ters, collective activities like quadrennial national conventions, elites and
rank-and-file workers, and regulations governing how activities are struc-
tured and how leaders and workers are to behave. When party meetings
are held, members of the organization show up. When partisans pass out
literature during a campaign, the party organization is responsible for deliv-
ering the pamphlets. The Republican National Committee (RNC) and the
Democratic National Committee (DNC) each have headquarters in Wash-
ington, DC, and Democratic and Republican state party committees can be
found in every state capital.
• Party in government (PIG) refers to those who have captured office under
a party label. In 2021, Democrats in the Senate comprised one segment of
the Democratic Party in government led by majority leader Chuck Schumer,
while Senate Republicans comprised one segment of the Republican Party
in government led by minority leader Mitch McConnell. Similarly, in the
House of Representatives, Speaker Nancy Pelosi spoke for the Democrats
while minority leader Kevin McCarthy represented the Republicans. As
president, Joe Biden is the overall head of the Democratic Party in govern-
ment, a role Donald Trump held for the Republican Party when he was pres-
ident. Branches of the party in government may be found in any legislative,
executive, or judicial body that organizes itself along partisan lines, from the
president and Congress down to states, counties, cities, and towns.

In the 1950s, the tripod model of political parties seemed both accurate
and parsimonious. Partisanship was broad and fixed as tightly as one’s religion.
The public was divided between Democrats and Republicans, and they voted
accordingly. What few “independents” there were generally did not vote and
therefore placed themselves outside the political system. Legislative leaders were
18 chapter 1

important figures. Party organizations were fixtures in nearly every community

and controlled nominations for most elective offices. Citizens were active in
party organizations, either for ideological reasons or for the sense of belonging
to the larger community that partisan activity engendered. Elected officials car-
ried the party banner openly. In an age of black-and-white television, the tripod
model nicely captured how the three party components neatly fit together.

Does the Tripod Model Still Work?

The rise in the importance and availability of information has changed the way
parties operate. During the agricultural era, the key to production was land; in
the Industrial Era, it was human labor; today, it is trained intelligence. In the
early 1970s, sociologist Daniel Bell heralded the coming of a new postindustrial
society that placed a premium on the gathering and dissemination of informa-
tion.29 In the twenty-first century, American life has been transformed by several
interrelated developments:

• Most of today’s workers are salaried professionals. In 2019, more than

sixty-four million workers held management, professional, and related occu-
pations.30 Labor union membership, which peaked in 1954 at 35 percent of
the workforce, fell to 10.8 percent in 2020.31
• A college degree has become a “union card” for employment. Today, the
largest portion of the labor force is composed of millennials, and the wage
gap between those who have a college degree and those who do not is the
highest in history. In 2018, millennials who held a bachelor’s degree or
higher had a median income of $56,000, while those who were high school
graduates had a median income of just $31,300.32
• Social media has reshaped the way Americans interact with each other and
has diminished the once restrictive boundaries of time and space. Email,
Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, LinkedIn, Twitter, Parler, Reddit, Tik
Tok, and other social media outlets have become established means of social
and political interaction. More than 80 million Americans followed Don-
ald Trump on Twitter while he was president (before he was permanently
banned from the platform), making it Trump’s primary means of communi-
cating with voters. Older forms of communication (e.g., printed newspapers,
presidential news conferences, and traditional television network program-
ming) became increasingly outdated and ineffectual.
 Hamilton vs. Jefferson: How Political Parties Began 19

• New occupational structures, and with them new lifestyles and social classes,
are creating new elites, including a self-selected political elite that works to
influence political outcomes online through blogs and social networking.

What Do Political Parties Seek to Accomplish?

In one respect, the answer to this question is simple: Parties seek to win elec-
tions. Winning means parties can seize power and control one or more branches
of the federal, state, or local governments. Seizing power can also have material
benefits, as parties collect the so-called spoils of office. Several notable political
party definitions follow this logic:
• “A political party is a group organized to gain control of government in the
name of the group by winning election to public office” (Joseph Schlesinger).33
• “A political party [is] any group, however loosely organized, seeking to elect
government officeholders under a given label” (Leon Epstein).34
• “Political parties can be seen as coalitions of elites to capture and use politi-
cal office. [But] a political party is more than a coalition. A political party is
an institutionalized coalition, one that has adopted rules, norms, and pro-
cedures” (John Aldrich).35
Others argue that a party’s true purpose is to implement its ideology by adopt-
ing a particular set of policies. Winning elections and controlling the govern-
ment are means to changing the course of government. Some definitions of party
capture this objective:
• “[A] party is a body of men [sic] united, for promoting by their joint endeav-
ors, the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are
all agreed” (Edmund Burke).36
• “[A] political party [is] an organization that seeks to achieve political power
by electing members to public office so that their political philosophies can
be reflected in public policies” (Jay M. Shafritz).37
The foremost problems with using the election-policy dimension to capture
the essence of parties are that it is static and incomplete, and it discounts the
diversity of party structures in the United States. The history of parties is con-
tinually evolving as new conditions arise. Suggestions that US parties are “elec-
tion driven,” “policy oriented,” or searching for the “vital center” are tied to the
assumption that it has always been so and that all party organizations scattered
20 chapter 1

throughout the nation follow a similar pattern. A close reading of US history

suggests that party goals and activities have varied over time. As we will see
shortly, sometimes parties have leaned toward the election-centered definition;
at other times they have been closer to the policy-driven perspective. Therefore,
instead of defining party goals in any sort of concrete way, conceivably the best
approach is to remain mindful of the dichotomy between winning elections or
remaining true to one’s principles, then trying to discern when each perspective
best fits a given moment in history.

Origins: Hamilton vs. Jefferson

After traveling what was then the breadth of the United States in 1831 and 1832,
Alexis de Tocqueville remarked, “All the domestic controversies of the Americans
at first appear to a stranger to be incomprehensible or puerile, and he is at a loss
whether to pity a people who take such arrant trifles in good earnest or to envy
that happiness which enables a community to discuss them.”38 During much of
the twentieth century, Tocqueville’s complaint was echoed in the oft-heard line:
“There’s not a dime’s worth of difference between the Democratic and Republi-
can parties.” Today, party polarization had rendered this old adage moot.
Nonetheless, historians have placed much value in the belief that the United
States is a special country set apart from its European origins. Announcing his
2020 candidacy for the presidency near Independence Hall in Philadelphia, Joe
Biden focused on this notion that the United States is more than a physical lo-
cation found on a globe: “Folks, America is an idea, an idea that’s stronger than
any army, bigger than any ocean, more powerful than any dictator or tyrant. It
gives hope to the most desperate people on earth, it guarantees that everyone is
treated with dignity and gives no safe harbor. It instills in every person in this
country the belief that no matter where you start in life, there’s nothing you can’t
achieve if you work at it.”39
Such expressions constitute what some have called American Exceptional-
ism,40 which has long held a place in American political culture. Expressions
such as “the American Dream” and “the American Way of Life” (along with
the damning phrase “un-American”) reflect the distinctiveness many Americans
have long found in the experiment devised by the Framers. Historians have been
struck by the rigidity of the American mind reflected in this attitude. As one
observed, “Who would think of using the word ‘un-Italian’ or ‘un-French’ as we
use the word ‘un-American’?”41
 Hamilton vs. Jefferson: How Political Parties Began 21

But such ideological rigidity does not mean that partisan disagreements are
lacking, either in the history books or in contemporary news accounts about pol-
itics. After the Constitution was ratified and George Washington took his place
as the nation’s first president, Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson began
to act, as Jefferson recalled, “like two cocks.”42 The raging battle between these
two stubborn and forceful men was personal and political. Both were staunchly
committed to individualism, freedom, and equality of opportunity, yet they
strongly differed on how these values could be translated into an effective form
of governance.
Those disagreements came from the vastly different solutions each man devised
to a vexing problem—namely, how liberty could be restrained such that it could be
enjoyed. For his part, Hamilton preferred that liberty be coupled with authority:
“In every civil society, there must be a supreme power, to which all members of
that society are subject; for, otherwise, there could be no supremacy, or subordina-
tion, that is no government at all.”43 Jefferson, meanwhile, preferred that liberty be
paired with local civic responsibility. It was on that basis that the enduring struggle
between Hamiltonian nationalism and Jeffersonian localism began.
Hamiltonian nationalism envisions the United States as one “family,” with a
strong central government and an energetic president acting on its behalf. Ad-
dressing the delegates to the New York State Convention called to ratify the
Constitution, Hamilton noted, “The confidence of the people will easily be
gained by good administration. This is the true touchstone.” To him, “good
administration” meant a strong central government acting on behalf of the na-
tional—or family—interest. Thus, any expression of a special interest was, to use
Hamilton’s word, “mischievous.”44 But Hamilton had his own partialities, favor-
ing the development of the nation’s urban centers and an unfettered capitalism.
His espousal of a strong central government aroused considerable controversy.
Unlike Hamilton, Jefferson had a nearly limitless faith in the ordinary citi-
zen. To a nation largely composed of farmers, he declared, “Those who labor in
the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever He had a chosen people.”45 Jef-
ferson’s devotion to liberty made him distrust most attempts to restrain it, par-
ticularly those of the federal government: “Were we directed from Washington
when to sow, and when to reap, we should soon want bread.”46 In 1825, Jefferson
warned of the expanding power of government and wrote that the “salvation of
the republic” rested on the regeneration and spread of the New England town
meeting.47 The best guarantee of liberty in Jefferson’s view was to restrain the
mighty hand of government. Table 1.1 highlights several additional differences
22 chapter 1

Table 1.1: The Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian Models of American Governance

Hamiltonian Nationalism Jeffersonian Localism

Views the United States as one Sees the United States as a series of
national “family.” diverse communities.
Prefers a concentration of power in the Prefers to give power to state and local
federal government so that it may act in governments so that they can act in def-
the interest of the national family. erence to local customs.
Inclined to constrain liberty for the sake More inclined to favor liberty and wary
of national unity by marrying liberty of national authority. Prefers to concen-
with a strong central authority. trate governmental power at the state and
local levels.
Trusts in elites to run the government. Trusts in the common sense of average
Americans to run the government.
Prefers a hierarchical party structure Prefers a decentralized party structure
populated by “professional” party populated by so-called amateur politi-
politicians. cians, who often are local party activists.
Sees parties as vehicles whose primary Views parties as more ideologically based.
purpose is to win elections and control Commitment to principles is viewed
the government. as even more important than winning
elections.

between Hamilton’s and Jefferson’s view of government, with a special focus on

how these differences might relate to the party system.
This debate between the political descendants of Hamilton and Jefferson is
the touchstone for partisan conflict and party politics in America that contin-
ues to this day. Martin Van Buren, among many others, traces the evolution of
parties to the factional disputes between Hamilton and Jefferson. According to
Van Buren,
The two great parties of this country, with occasional changes in name only,
have for the principal part of a century, occupied antagonistic positions upon
all important political questions. They have maintained an unbroken succes-
sion, and have, throughout, been composed respectively of men agreeing in
their party passion, and preferences, and entertaining, with rare exceptions,
similar views on the subject of government and its administration.48

Over time the two parties, with changing names and roles, recast Hamil-
tonian nationalism and Jeffersonian localism to suit their evolving interests.
 Hamilton vs. Jefferson: How Political Parties Began 23

During the Civil War and the Industrial Era that followed, Republicans stood
with Hamilton, whereas Democrats claimed Jefferson as one of their own and
promoted states’ rights. Since the days of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal,
Democrats have generally aligned themselves with Hamilton, likening the na-
tion to a family. In a 2020 televised address to high school graduates confined to
their homes during the coronavirus pandemic, Barack Obama stressed the need
to engage in communal activity:

No one does big things by themselves. Right now, when people are scared,
it’s easy to be cynical and say let me just look out for myself, or my family, or
people who look or think or pray like me. But if we’re going to get through
these difficult times; if we’re going to create a world where everybody has
the opportunity to find a job and afford college; if we’re going to save the
environment and defeat future pandemics, then we’re going to have to do it
together. So be alive to one another’s struggles. Stand up for one another’s
rights. Leave behind all the old ways of thinking that divide us—sexism,
racial prejudice, status, greed—and set the world on a different path.49

Whereas Obama, Biden, and their fellow Democrats espouse a reinvigorated

Hamiltonian nationalism, the Republican Party, during the New Deal, and es-
pecially during the Ronald Reagan years, immersed itself in the values cherished
by Jeffersonian localism. Campaigning for the presidency in 1936, Republican
Alf Landon assailed the “folly” of Roosevelt’s New Deal and denounced the
“vast multitude of new offices” and the “centralized bureaucracy” from which
“swarms of inspectors” swooped over the countryside “to harass our people.”50
Landon promised that his restrained and prudent management of the federal
bureaucracy would result in an outpouring of freedom by adherence to a simple
dictum: “I want the Secretary of the Treasury to be obliged to say to committees
of Congress every time a new appropriation is proposed, ‘Gentlemen, you will
have to provide some new taxes if you do this.’”51
Though our values may be constant, the circumstances in which they are
applied are not, and at critical junctures, Americans have shifted between Ham-
iltonian nationalism and Jeffersonian localism. The whiff of civil war, the onset
of a depression, the ravages of inflation, a pandemic, and a violent attack on the
seat of government inevitably cause Americans to take stock of their situation,
reevaluate their expectations of government, and choose a political party and a
course of action in a manner consistent with the enduring values of freedom,
individualism, and equality of opportunity. Such shifts in public attitudes are
24 chapter 1

sometimes influenced by a dominant personality. Abraham Lincoln reasserted

Hamilton’s vision of a national family to save the Union, and Franklin Roos-
evelt redefined Hamiltonian nationalism to meet the challenges of the Great
Depression. Ronald Reagan revitalized Jeffersonian localism when he called out
the federal government as the problem, not the solution to our problems. In
2021, Democrats advocated a reinvigorated Hamiltonian nationalism to address
intertwined public health, economic, racial, and climate security challenges that
would transform American government much as FDR did in the 1930s. Biden
hung side-by-side portraits of Hamilton and Jefferson in the Oval Office, noting
the two men were “hallmarks of how differences of opinion, expressed within
the guardrails of the Republic, are essential to democracy.”52
Sometimes, Americans do not want to choose between Hamiltonian na-
tionalism and Jeffersonian localism. Instead, they want to enjoy the fruits of
both. So, for instance, progressive activists engaged online to reform the Dem-
ocratic Party align themselves with the first three Hamiltonian positions and
the last three Jeffersonian positions in table 1.1 without feeling any sense of
contradiction. They view the United States as a national “family” (albeit made
up of diverse communities), believe concentrated federal power is necessary to
bring about a progressive agenda, and are willing to trade off a degree of liberty
in exchange for a greater government safety-net. At the same time, they trust
the wisdom of average Americans—such as those who have chosen to engage in
online political activism—over elite decision-making, oppose Democratic Party
professionals, and chafe when they perceive elected Democrats abandoning prin-
ciple to win elections.
This melding of Hamiltonian nationalism and Jeffersonian localism is not
unusual in American history. It reasserts itself during periodic swings from one
faction to the other, when the parties test their ideas and battle for dominance
amidst changing political and social problems. Over time, this enduring battle
has produced surprising results. Hamilton would be astonished to learn that his
concept of a national family is being used to promote the interests of have-nots,
especially women and minorities, or as the basis for universal health insurance.
But as this book suggests, political parties cannot escape the vineyards tilled by
Hamilton and Jefferson, whose ideas give expression to American ideological
impulses and serve as instruments to implement the constitutional designs of
the Framers in a world they never could have envisioned.
Today, political parties remain an important part of the democratic process.
For all their many deficiencies, parties afford average Americans the best avenue
for speaking their minds and being heard. As you read the chapters to follow,
 Hamilton vs. Jefferson: How Political Parties Began 25

you are invited to assess for yourself the role and consequence of political par-
ties in our system. You will find that despite the changes political parties have
experienced through the centuries, it is still possible to find Hamilton’s and Jef-
ferson’s fingerprints on the parties that dominate today’s politics. Culturally,
economically, geographically, and demographically, the United States has been
a fluid work in progress since those two men fashioned organizations that for-
malized the political divisions of post-Revolutionary War America. That these
organizations would somehow evolve into the groups that continue to function
in a world where information is transmitted at the speed of light is a testament
to the enduring nature of a set of institutions that were not even imagined by
the Constitution’s authors. As they face each other across a widening ideolog-
ical divide, today’s Republicans and Democrats continue a dialogue with deep
historical and institutional roots.
 Ch a pter 2

The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of Party Politics

T
he most frequently quoted line in the study of political
parties was penned in 1942: “It should be flatly stated,” wrote polit-
ical scientist E. E. Schattschneider, “that the political parties created
democracy and that modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties.”1
Schattschneider’s proclamation is found in nearly every text on political par-
ties written since the 1940s (you just read it here), and most political scientists
still accept his assertion as a fact. Yet, to the average citizen, political parties are
synonymous with corruption, gridlock, and elitism. Therefore, it should come
as no surprise that political parties have had a tortured and tormented history.
Although Americans, along with the British, can claim to have invented the
modern political party, few take pride in this accomplishment and most deplore
their modern-day manifestations. According to a 2021 survey, 78 percent of
Americans agree that “traditional parties and politicians don’t care about people
like me”; only 20 percent disagree.2 Thus, it should come as no surprise that for
more than two hundred years, political parties have searched for their rightful
place in the American polity without ever quite finding it.

The Colonial Experience

Contemporary political parties have their roots in colonial America, where
pre-Revolutionary War parties were little more than extensions of rival family
clans such as the Wards and Hopkins in Rhode Island and the DeLanceys and
Livingstons in New York. The contests between these clans invariably centered
on an ideological dispute over the reach of royal authority in the colonies, which
began almost as soon as the British ships carrying settlers to Jamestown left
port in 1607. On one side were those loyal to the Crown and the appointed
royal governors; those opposed were faithful to the elected colonial assemblies.
Those supporting the Crown were often wealthy, having received immense land
grants from the king, whereas those who did not share these special privileges

26
 The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of Party Politics 27

were tradesmen, small shop owners, and those who tilled the soil and became
accustomed to the hardships of the New World. These poor, adventurous out-
casts were suspicious of authority figures, especially the king, and their political
cynicism was deep-seated.
Although these divisions structured colonial politics, localism and diversity
prevented mature parties from forming. In pre-Revolutionary America, each col-
ony had its own customs, history, and political identity. Moreover, there was a
great diversity of individual interests among small-freehold farmers, plantation
slaveholders, merchants, ship owners and builders, emerging manufacturers, and
others. In addition, there were numerous ethnic and religious groups, divided
between those who desired an aristocratic and consolidated republic and those
who preferred a more democratic regime with power concentrated in the states.
The American Revolution forged these cleavages into a debate about
self-governance. Tradesmen and laborers despised King George III and favored
severing ties with Britain. Dubbed patriots, many advocated violence to end
what they saw as British subjugation. Increased taxation, coupled with Royal
disregard of their interests, prompted several high-profile protests, such as the
Boston Tea Party of 1773 and the sinking of the Gaspee off the Rhode Island
coast one year earlier. Edmund Burke, a member of the British House of Com-
mons at the time, noted that “the state of America has been kept in continual
agitation. Everything administered as [a] remedy to the public complaint, if it
did not produce, was at least followed by, a heightening of the distemper.”3
Colonial loyalists remained faithful to the British Crown, and they regarded
the patriots as rabble-rousers. With the uprisings at Lexington and Concord in
1775, the contest between the patriots and loyalists became an outright civil war,
with well-organized patriots winning control of state governments throughout
the colonies. Through societies like the Sons of Liberty, they held rallies, spon-
sored “committees of correspondence” to spread their views, and recruited im-
portant community leaders to their cause. Patriot leader Thomas Paine espoused
the virtues of self-rule in his 1776 pamphlet Common Sense, and John Adams
organized his fellow Bostonians to fight against “foreign” influence in colonial
affairs. Their activities were less focused on winning elections (there were few
voters at the time) than on shaping public opinion.
Even before the Revolutionary War ended, Adams wrote to a correspon-
dent, “There is nothing I dread so much as a division of the Republic into two
great parties, each arranged under its leader and converting measures in op-
position to each other.”4 But enduring conflict over the structure and scope of
post-Revolutionary governing institutions moved the new nation inexorably in
28 chapter 2

the direction of opposing camps. Differences that turned violent precipitated

the collapse of the Articles of Confederation, the young republic’s first govern-
ing document. For a brief time after the Revolution, a short-lived boom in im-
ports from England pushed the cost of agricultural and manufactured goods
downward. Money became scarce, resulting in a severe economic depression that
began in the late 1770s and lasted nearly a decade. Working-class citizens and
small farmers were hardest hit. Bank foreclosures skyrocketed. Most states levied
heavy taxes in a largely unsuccessful attempt to eliminate their wartime debts.
By the mid-1780s, the demands for action grew louder.
To avoid bloodshed, some states passed laws to postpone foreclosures and
allow farmers to use agricultural products to help pay loans. But none of these
actions eased the governing crisis, which came to a head when former army cap-
tain Daniel Shays led a mob of farmers against the state government of Massa-
chusetts in 1787. Their purpose was to prevent foreclosures on their debt-ridden
land by keeping the country courts of western Massachusetts from sitting until
the next election. The state militia eventually dispersed the mob, but the upris-
ing, which became known as Shays’s Rebellion, galvanized the states to convene
delegates in Philadelphia for the purpose of drafting a new governing document.
The differences underlying Shays’s Rebellion persisted during and after the
Constitutional Convention. The Constitution’s supporters, who became known
as Federalists, and those who opposed its ratification, dubbed Anti-Federalists,
carried their disputes from Independence Hall in Philadelphia to the various
state capitals. Anti-Federalists contended that representatives in any national
government must reflect a true picture of the people, possessing an intimate
knowledge of their circumstances and needs. This could only be achieved, they
argued, through small, relatively homogeneous republics such as those already
constructed in the existing states. One prominent Anti-Federalist spokesperson
asked, “Is it practicable for a country so large and so numerous . . . to elect a rep-
resentation that will speak their sentiments? . . . It certainly is not.”5 Federalists
believed that a representative republic was possible and desirable—especially if
populated by those “who possess [the] most wisdom to discern, and [the] most
virtue to pursue, the common good of society.”6

Federalists vs. Democratic-Republicans

George Washington assumed the presidency in 1789 believing that parties were
unnecessary and that he could bypass them by creating an “enlightened admin-
istration.” To that end, Washington took into his Cabinet the leading political
 The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of Party Politics 29

antagonists of his time: Alexander Hamilton as treasury secretary and Thomas

Jefferson as secretary of state. Less than a year after becoming president, Wash-
ington’s experiment of having a government without parties faltered. Hamilton
and Jefferson vehemently disagreed in the Cabinet councils over how to manage
the growing economic crisis.
Hamilton offered a sweeping plan to revive the sagging economy—the most
controversial portion of which involved the complete assumption of debts in-
curred by the states during the Revolutionary War. To Hamilton and his Fed-
eralist followers, this policy was not only sound economics but good politics: by
helping those who backed the revolt against King George III, confidence in the
national government would be restored, and nearly $80 million would be put
in the pockets of those most likely to reinvest in the nation’s tiny infrastructure.
The result would be an increase in the flow of goods and services accompanied
by a general rise in living standards.
To pay for full assumption, Hamilton proposed an excise tax on distilled spir-
its that became known as the Whiskey Tax. Because most whiskey producers
were farmers in the South and West, this measure shifted the tax burden from
northeastern business owners to small farmers—in effect, punishing those most
likely to support Jefferson’s Democratic-Republicans. Additionally, to ensure
that enough money would fill the federal coffers, Hamilton advocated estab-
lishing a Bank of the United States that would make loans and collect interest
payments while it curbed the diverse practices of state-chartered banks. The
idea of a national bank, not one of the powers specifically given to the Congress
in the Constitution, created enormous animosity between advocates of states’
rights and those seeking a more powerful national government—a dispute that
would not be resolved until 1819 by the Supreme Court in the case of McCull-
och v. Maryland.
Jefferson and the Democratic-Republicans believed that federal assumption
of state debts would create a windfall for the monied class, especially those liv-
ing in New England. Opposition to Hamilton’s scheme was led in the House of
Representatives by James Madison. He agreed with Hamilton that the economy
needed strengthening, but he fretted about the shift of capital from the agricul-
tural states (including his native Virginia) to a few northeastern manufacturing
states. Moreover, Madison thought the Whiskey Tax would be a financial disas-
ter for small farmers. His prediction came true in 1794, when farmers in western
Pennsylvania caused an uprising that became popularly known as the Whiskey
Insurrection. Madison corralled seventeen House members to his side—about
one-quarter of the chamber. About the same number of legislators opposed him.
30 chapter 2

At the conclusion of the First Congress, an exasperated Hamilton exclaimed,

“It was not till the last session that I became unequivocally convinced that Mr.
Madison, cooperating with Mr. Jefferson, is at the head of a faction decidedly
hostile to me and my administration; and actuated by views, in my judgment,
subversive to the principles of good government and dangerous to the union,
peace, and happiness of the country.”7 Vice President John Adams likewise be-
moaned the “turbulent maneuvers” of factions that could “tie the hands and de-
stroy the influence” of those who desired to promote the public interest. Adams
told his son-in-law that the partisan battles between Hamilton and Jefferson had
created a “division of sentiments over everything.”8
The battle between Hamilton and Madison extended beyond the halls of
Congress to the newspapers. In a move that foreshadowed the inextricable link
that would develop between political parties and the mass media, Hamilton
forged a close alliance with John Ward Fenno, publisher of the Gazette of the
United States. Madison, not willing to let Fenno’s editorials go unanswered,
persuaded Philip Freneau to edit a rival newspaper, the National Gazette. These
party-controlled newspapers, although having a small number of subscribers
(the Gazette of the United States had only 1,500), quickly became the most pop-
ular method of communicating with the party faithful.9 Together, they helped
clarify this first battle between Hamiltonian nationalism and Jeffersonian lo-
calism, even as they exacerbated the animosity between these two leaders. The
battle of epithets that played out in the country’s young newspapers ensured that
partisanship would overflow the Washington administration to capture much
of American society.
Despite intense congressional opposition, Hamilton’s economic plan
won approval after some wily backroom maneuvering. Jefferson played a key
behind-the-scenes role, endorsing the bill in exchange for assurances that the
federal capital would be moved south from New York City to a new District of
Columbia. But Jefferson’s role in advancing Hamilton’s initiative alienated his
agrarian constituents. Seeking to mend political fences, Jefferson embarked on
a tour with his ally James Madison during the spring of 1791 that was to have
profound consequences for party development. Ostensibly, the duo set out on a
nature tour to “observe the vegetation and wildlife in the region,” but their real
purpose was to sample public opinion. In effect, they were testing the waters for
the formation of a new political party. In New York City, Jefferson and Madi-
son met with Robert Livingston and George Clinton—two longtime rivals of
Hamilton—as well as Senator Aaron Burr, who was attempting to broaden his
political influence.
 The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of Party Politics 31

Two years later, in 1793, Jefferson and Hamilton renewed their struggle.
This time, the issue was how to respond to the French Revolution. To Jeffer-
son and his followers, the French cry for “liberty, equality, and fraternity” was
an extension of the American Revolution. Thomas Paine was so moved by the
French revolutionaries that he journeyed to France to help the cause. At the same
time, the German Republican Society was formed in Philadelphia. Its members
sympathized with the French revolutionaries and believed that the American
Revolution was losing momentum because of Hamilton, who, they claimed, was
endangering the promise of democracy contained in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence. By 1798, there were forty-three of these popular societies, organized in
every state except New Hampshire and Georgia.
To Hamilton and his Federalist backers, the French Revolution signaled the
emergence of anarchy and a rejection of traditional Christian values. They were
horrified by the mob violence and feared that the emerging republican move-
ment could lead America down the same path. Jefferson remarked that these
different reactions to the French Revolution “kindled and brought forth the
two [political] parties with an ardor which our own interests merely could never
incite.”10 Jefferson dubbed Hamilton’s party the “monocrats.” For his part, Jef-
ferson never referred to his party as the “Democrats” because the term conjured
visions of mob rule; he preferred the name “Republicans” to describe his emerg-
ing political organization. Historians use the term Democratic-Republicans to
describe Jefferson’s party.
When the bloody beheadings of the Terror of 1793 became known, reser-
vations about the French experiment became widespread. Seeking to cool the
growing political passions in his own country, President Washington sent James
Monroe to Paris and John Jay to London to obtain treaties that would protect
American shipping interests and keep the United States out of the European
political thicket. But when Jay returned with an agreement that many believed
was partial to the British, a political firestorm erupted. The treaty was so con-
troversial that Washington waited six months before submitting it to the Senate
for ratification in 1795, where it barely received the two-thirds majority required
for passage.
By 1796, Hamilton’s controversial economic policies and the Jay Treaty di-
vided public opinion and led to the creation of the nation’s first official polit-
ical parties. The Federalists took their name to signal their intention to create
a strong, centralized government. (Note that this group of Federalists does not
refer to the supporters of the Constitution crafted in Philadelphia in 1787.)
The opposing Democratic-Republicans wished to make clear that they were
32 chapter 2

devoted to the people and “the republican principle” of representative gover-

nance. (During the Andrew Jackson era the Democratic-Republicans became
known as the Democrats, which continues to exist today.) Most Federalists were
affluent businessmen from the northeastern states, whereas Democratic-Repub-
licans won backing from small farmers in the mid-Atlantic and southern states.
The division proved so powerful that in 1796 a presidential election was hotly
contested for the first time. Thomas Jefferson was so opposed to the Jay Treaty
that he accepted the Democratic-Republican call to lend his name as a presiden-
tial candidate. The battle between Federalist John Adams and Democratic-Re-
publican Jefferson was a close one, with Adams winning 71 electoral votes to
Jefferson’s 68. Under the peculiar constitutional arrangements of the time—
which did not anticipate or account for political party competition—runner-up
Jefferson became vice president.
The 1796 Adams-Jefferson contest was more than a struggle between two
men—it was a battle between two political organizations. Although there were
scores of local political groups before 1796, some even using the term parties, the
election of 1800 saw the emergence of political organizations as we know them
today. Propelled by a strong conviction that the Federalist-controlled US govern-
ment was abandoning sacred “republican principles,” Jefferson and the Demo-
cratic-Republicans formed a party replete with grassroots supporters, which ran
slates of candidates for numerous offices on a platform of issues that appealed to
the American sense of limited government and a prevailing fear of placing too
much authority in one individual.
In what proved to be a futile attempt to stem the growing Democratic-Re-
publican tide, John Adams and his Federalist followers in Congress sought to
emulate Jefferson’s organizational skills. Because they had less grassroots sup-
port—there were no Federalist clubs to speak of—organizing proved difficult.
Yet, by virtue of the fact that they ran the government, they could use their po-
sitions to press their advantage in the process confirming some of the Founders’
fears about the factional dangers of partisanship. Thus, the Federalist-controlled
Congress passed the 1798 Sedition Act, which made it a misdemeanor to publish
false or malicious information and provided that anyone convicted of conspiring
to hinder the operations of the federal government would be subject to heavy
fines and possible imprisonment. The Alien Acts, which became law in the same
year, made it easier to deport political adversaries who were not citizens—es-
pecially the growing Irish population, which was pro-Democratic-Republican,
as well as any migrating French revolutionaries. Fourteen indictments were is-
sued between 1798 and 1800. One Democratic-Republican was jailed because
 The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of Party Politics 33

he carried a placard protesting the acts; another was sentenced to six months
for attempting, in the words of a Federalist-appointed judge, to “mislead the
ignorant and inflame their minds against the President.”11
Jefferson worried that these new laws might make it possible for the Federal-
ists to install one of their own as a president-for-life. Thus, the organizing efforts
of Jefferson and Madison became a whirlwind of activity as the election of 1800
approached. Democratic-Republican members of Congress met in Philadelphia
and formally endorsed Jefferson for president and Aaron Burr for vice president.
The Federalists responded by nominating a ticket consisting of John Adams
of Massachusetts and Thomas Pinckney of South Carolina—the first of many
North-South pairings.
As in 1796, the Adams-Jefferson contest was hard fought. Hamilton warned
his Federalist followers that no defections would be tolerated in the Electoral
College. But Hamilton’s admonition notwithstanding, Jefferson prevailed. As
in the first Adams-Jefferson race, the southern states backed Jefferson while
most of the Northeast sided with Adams. But the switch of New York from
Adams to Jefferson—the culmination of Jefferson’s courting of New Yorkers
that began with his 1791 “nature tour”—paid off. Clinton and Livingston, to-
gether with Burr’s New York City organization, rallied the troops on Jefferson’s
behalf. New York’s electoral votes gave Jefferson an eight-vote plurality in the
Electoral College. The Democratic-Republican victory, which had to be rati-
fied in the House of Representatives, extended to both houses of Congress. As
Jefferson later recalled, “The Revolution of 1800 was as real a revolution in the
principles of our government as that of 1776 was in its forms.”12 That revolu-
tion, as John Adams later observed, was the rejection of what Adams called “the
monarchial principle”—a reference to his belief that those in power would do
what is right for the country regardless of partisanship. After Jefferson’s victory,
future presidents would be party leaders. Adams himself blamed his lack of party
standing for his defeat: “Jefferson had a party; Hamilton had a party; but the
commonwealth [a reference to Adams] had none.”13 Jefferson replied that polit-
ical parties had become an inevitable part of public life that had separated the
two founding brothers.
In the two decades following Thomas Jefferson’s election, Democratic-Re-
publicans strengthened their hold on the government. But this did not stop the
partisan bickering between Jeffersonian localists and Hamiltonian nationalists
and their successors. One of the very first, and most bitter, partisan battles Jef-
ferson faced involved the “midnight appointments” of loyal Federalists to the
federal judiciary made by John Adams upon leaving the presidency in March
34 chapter 2

1801. The Federalists hoped that by making these appointments they could
limit the damage done by the Democratic-Republicans until the next election
in 1804. One of those appointed by Adams was William Marbury, who was
slated to become a justice of the peace. The incoming secretary of state, James
Madison, refused to deliver Marbury’s nominating papers after the outgoing
Federalist secretary of state, John Marshall, failed to deliver them in time. In
response, Marbury and seven others sued the government, claiming that Mad-
ison had defaulted on his duty to serve his appointment papers. The Supreme
Court heard the case of Marbury v. Madison in 1803. In a landmark ruling,
Chief Justice John Marshall (the same former secretary of state who had been
appointed to the court by John Adams) wrote that Marbury was entitled to
his appointment, but Congress had exceeded its authority when it gave the Su-
preme Court the power to order Madison to surrender the papers, which it had
done in a provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Marshall thus wormed his way
out of a certain confrontation with President Jefferson while expanding the
Federalist principle of strong central government by claiming for the court the
authority to declare acts of the other branches unconstitutional, an authority
known as judicial review.14
The next twenty years saw what historians sometimes call the Era of Good
Feelings because of the apparent lack of political disagreement. In truth, the
Democratic-Republicans were so powerful and organized that for the only time
in American history there was essentially a one-party government with no se-
rious electoral competition. The trio of Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe estab-
lished a Virginia dynasty that controlled the White House; in the five elections
held between 1804 and 1820, Democratic-Republicans won between 53 and 92
percent of the Electoral College votes and held between 61 and 85 percent of
the seats in Congress.
Meanwhile, the Federalists had started down a path to political obscurity,
sealed by their reaction to the War of 1812. Federalists, who retained a strong
base of support in the New England states, vehemently opposed the war, be-
lieving that it would seriously impede vital trade with England. They dubbed
the conflict “Mr. Madison’s War,” and New Englanders continued to illicitly
trade with the British, sometimes even withholding money and militia from
the war effort. Democratic-Republicans, in turn, stoked popular outrage at the
British impressment of American sailors—the removal of British-born sailors
from American vessels and forced entry into the British navy—and believed that
the rampant nationalism would unify their diverse party. Partisan passions esca-
lated after Congress declared war on Great Britain in 1812. When the Federal
 The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of Party Politics 35

Republican, a Federalist newspaper located in Baltimore, editorialized against

the war, an angry mob razed the building where it was printed. Elsewhere, Fed-
eralist sympathizers were beaten, stabbed, and even tarred and feathered. Two
years later the Federalists met in Hartford, Connecticut, and proposed generous
peace terms. Rumors persisted that the Federalists favored the secession of the
New England states from the Union, and the party, already weakened by its
antiwar stance, fell into disrepute. By 1820, the Federalists had become political
dinosaurs, not even bothering to nominate a token candidate to oppose James
Monroe in that year’s presidential contest. Hamilton’s party faded into the his-
tory books; however, Hamilton’s ideas did not.

Jackson and Mass-Based Parties

The strength of the Democratic-Republicans ultimately was their undoing. By
1810, the House of Representatives was filled with a variety of Democratic-Re-
publicans. Some were traditional states’ rights advocates; others wanted an en-
larged role for the federal government to enhance westward expansion. Thus,
even though most elected officials were Democratic-Republicans, the label be-
came increasingly ambiguous. By 1824, the intraparty divisions had widened
into a chasm. Five candidates, each representing a different faction, aggressively
sought the presidency: Henry Clay, the Speaker of the House and champion of
westward expansion; John C. Calhoun, secretary of war and supporter of states’
rights; Andrew Jackson, the hero of the Battle of New Orleans; John Quincy
Adams, son of the former president and secretary of state under Monroe; and
William Crawford, former treasury secretary and, like Calhoun, a doctrinaire
states’ rights advocate. The Congressional Caucus (the means by which Demo-
cratic-Republican nominees had been chosen since 1800) convened in Washing-
ton, DC, in February and selected Crawford to be the party’s standard-bearer
with Calhoun as his running mate. The remaining three candidates boycotted
the caucus and persuaded their respective state legislatures to place their names
in contention.
On election day, Jackson led in the popular votes cast, winning 153,000 more
than the combined votes cast for Adams and Crawford. But Jackson failed to
win an electoral majority. The all-important Electoral College vote split, with
Jackson receiving ninety-nine votes; Adams, eighty-four; Crawford, forty-one;
and Clay, thirty-seven. Under such conditions, the Constitution turns the mat-
ter over to the House of Representatives for a final decision among the top three
contenders. Clay, excluded from consideration, backed Adams, who reciprocated
36 chapter 2

by promising to make Clay secretary of state in the new administration. Because

he was the powerful speaker of the House, Clay was able to clinch the House
vote, and the presidency, for Adams.
Jackson’s supporters were outraged by what they believed was a corrupt bar-
gain between Adams and Clay. They considered Adams a usurper in the White
House, and in several state capitals they plotted a comeback, with New York
senator Martin Van Buren providing the organizational muscle. Van Buren cor-
rectly suspected that his home state could be decisive in the 1828 election, and
he formed an alliance with Jackson that would help put “Old Hickory” over the
top and avenge his 1824 defeat.
By 1826, several states had changed their laws allowing voters to choose del-
egates to the Electoral College rather than leaving the task to the various state
legislatures. A general loosening of voter qualifications also greatly enlarged the
size of the potential electorate. Meanwhile, Jefferson’s party continued fractur-
ing. On one side were the Adams-Clay followers who were determined to imple-
ment internal improvements to the nation’s infrastructure. Like the Federalists
of two decades earlier, they were convinced that national prosperity necessitated
an active government. On the other side were the so-called traditional Demo-
cratic-Republicans whose ranks included Van Buren. They opposed internal im-
provements, including road and canal construction, because they believed such
projects would violate state sovereignty. Jackson had managed to keep his dis-
tance from both factions, remaining a popular figure without an official party
organization—until Van Buren took charge of his campaign.
Van Buren’s first step toward involvement in national politics was to solidify
his following in Congress. He quickly became leader of the Democratic-Repub-
licans, a name he preferred to “Republicans” because it expressed solidarity with
the more egalitarian agrarian wing of the party. Van Buren undertook scores of
trips around the country, campaigning for Jackson wherever he went. His goals
were to arouse public indignation against the Adams-Clay deal, conduct door-
to-door canvasses in every town, and make sure that Jackson supporters went to
the polls on election day. Adams’s forces derided Jackson as a military butcher
and even called the chastity of his wife into question. Nonetheless, Jackson
handily beat Adams, winning all of the South, the new western states, and Van
Buren’s New York. Just as significant, voter turnout doubled from 25 percent
in 1824 to 50 percent in 1828. Jackson and Van Buren were the first to under-
stand the power of mass-based party politics. Political parties were now firmly
established as a primary vehicle for translating public sentiments into governing
policies. Henceforth, parties became a mainstay of American political life.
 The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of Party Politics 37

With his victory, Jackson’s Democratic-Republican wing, which shortened

its name to the Democratic Party, had consumed Jefferson’s Party. Henry Clay,
John C. Calhoun, and others banded together as the opposition Whigs. Their
name was intended to summon up the spirits of those who composed the patriot
party during the heyday of the American Revolution and the British Whigs
of the eighteenth century. Whigs stood for restrained executive powers, west-
ward expansion, and protective tariffs. Thus, by the mid-1830s, a two-party
system had taken root on American soil. But unlike the earlier political skir-
mishes between Hamilton and Jefferson, ideological differences were gradually
supplanted by a “politics of personality,” as people decided they either loved or
hated Jackson. In addition, by raiding the federal treasury Van Buren purchased
an additional degree of party unity. The bargain was straightforward: State and
local Democrats would be given dollars from the national treasury if they called
themselves Democrats, supported Jackson on most matters, and took no contro-
versial policy stands. As for issues of local concern, they were free to do as they
saw fit. This move established a pattern of reciprocal deference characterized
by both linkages and autonomy between state and federal party organizations.
In this case, local party organizations would be linked to the state and national
organizations, but they were also free to manage their own affairs.
By forming a political machine capable of winning elections, Van Buren won
the grudging admiration of his opponents. Van Buren’s organization consisted
of a single recognized party leader capable of mobilizing supporters and award-
ing valuable patronage (i.e., jobs). By virtue of superior organization and ample
resources, parties had moved beyond a mere collection of like-minded followers
to organizations able to control government. Indeed, organization has been a
watchword in party politics ever since. As we will see in subsequent chapters,
the resource-driven nature of party organizations shapes contemporary politics
and defines the role parties play in the twenty-first century.
During Jackson’s presidency, power shifted from the affluent to the common
citizen. Jacksonian Democracy had several consequences, the most significant
of which was an immense increase in both the number of officials chosen by
election and the number of people allowed to participate in electoral politics.
Between 1824 and 1848, voter turnout increased from 25 percent to 79 percent,
and in some states was as high as 92 percent. State and national party conven-
tions emerged as important decision-making bodies in selecting candidates for
office. A partisan press flourished, as parties used newspapers to communicate
with their expanding ranks of followers—a low-tech precursor to the partisan
websites of the twenty-first century.
38 chapter 2

To Van Buren, this new political environment posed both challenges and op-
portunities. Could the ever-increasing range of political voices be harmonized into
consistently supporting one political party? Could issues attract new backers, or
would appealing personalities be the key to winning new supporters? Van Buren
maintained that the answers to these questions lay in building a party organization
that was committed to principles even as it dispensed political favors. But jobs, not
principles, formed the basis of politics in the 1830s and 1840s. The emergence
of the spoils system (as in, “to the victor belong the spoils of the enemy”15) had a
single purpose: to fill government jobs at every level with loyal party workers. Even
the mailman was a party loyalist. The spoils system meant that those filling these
so-called patronage jobs would work diligently for the party or risk being bounced
from the payroll. Because holding a job depended on one’s party activity, giving
time and money to the party became a means of ensuring economic security.
Over time, the spoils system changed the essence of politics. Elections were
no longer solitary affairs confined to the affluent. Instead, they were community
events, as issues and candidates were debated over the “cider barrel.” Party or-
ganizations sponsored picnics, socials, and dinners and held rallies, demonstra-
tions, and conventions. By immersing themselves in the social fabric of civic life,
parties kept citizens involved and inspired their loyalty on election day. Many
voters proudly displayed their party affiliation by wearing political buttons on
their lapels, a practice that was commonplace through the twentieth century and
anticipated automobile bumper stickers. Indeed, party devotion affected more
people and reached more deeply than many ever considered possible. The result
was a stable pattern of voting; true independents and vote-switching between
elections were rarities, phenomena that also characterize today’s politics.
By the late nineteenth century, parties organized politics by affording so-
cial outlets, presenting tickets of candidates, drafting platforms, and initiat-
ing meaningful cues and symbols for voters. American politics became party
politics. Parties provided coherence to political thought, even as they created
a politics of “us versus them,” which was heightened during and immediately
following the Civil War.

Although sectionalism had been a factor in American politics since 1796, the
growing economic disparities between North and South during the first decades
of the nineteenth century intensified those regional differences. The North was
increasingly urban and ethnically pluralistic as it developed a strong industri-
al-based economy, whereas the South remained mostly agricultural. These eco-
nomic disparities led each region to see its political interests differently. Over
 The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of Party Politics 39

time, the politics of the two regions became increasingly irreconcilable. In 1846,
Pennsylvania Democratic congressman David Wilmot introduced legislation
prohibiting slavery in any territory acquired from the Mexican War. The Wil-
mot Proviso passed in the House, where representatives from states prohibit-
ing slavery were in the majority, but pro-slavery Southerners blocked it in the
Senate. Bitter animosities ensued, splitting the Democrats and Whigs in half.
Northern Democrats moved toward establishing a new abolitionist party while
Southern Democrats defended slavery. The Whig Party split into two factions:
Conscience Whigs supported the Wilmot Proviso while Cotton Whigs believed
that the federal government had no business outlawing slavery. When the Whig
Party refused to consider the Wilmot Proviso during the 1848 election, many
Conscience Whigs left the party in disgust.
By 1854, any remnant of party unity was shattered when the Kansas-Ne-
braska Bill became law and annulled the Missouri Compromise of 1820 by
permitting slavery if voters in these two states approved. The Kansas-Nebraska
Bill created a political firestorm and ignited violence between supporters and
opponents in the two states. Proslavery Democrats backed the new law and ex-
cluded abolitionist Democrats from party councils. Opposition to the new law
was widespread in the North, resulting in protests that led to the creation of the
Republican Party. After an 1854 Republican gathering in Ripon, Wisconsin,
one participant observed, “We came into the little meeting held in a schoolhouse
Whigs, Free Soilers, and Democrats. We came out of it Republicans.”16 Four
years later, the Republicans attained major party status when Democrats lost 40
percent of their northern seats in the House of Representatives, enabling the Re-
publicans to win control—an extraordinary achievement. In 1860, Republicans
nominated Abraham Lincoln for president; in a four-way race, he won every free
state except New Jersey. Democrats became the party of the South; Republicans,
the party of the North; and the Whigs collapsed from their inability to reconcile
the incompatible demands of their Conscience and Cotton factions.
While slavery sealed the Whigs’ fate, the question of immigration also con-
tributed to the party’s demise. Powerful nativist, anti-Catholic sentiments buf-
feted northern Whigs following a huge influx of Irish immigrants. The failure
of the Irish potato crop in 1840, and the death from famine of over a million
people, prompted more than 750,000 Irish to emigrate to the United States from
1841 to 1850, eroding Anglo-Saxon Protestant denominations of many north-
ern cities. Anti-Catholic riots erupted in Boston, Philadelphia, and New York.
As anti-immigrant fervor spread, an organization called the Know-Nothings
gained influence. The Know-Nothings believed that “foreigners ha[d] no right
40 chapter 2

to dictate our laws, and therefore ha[d] no just ground to complain if Americans
see proper to exclude them from offices of trust.”17 Their name derived from
members’ statements that they “kn[e]w nothing” about this secret society’s ex-
istence. Appearing on the ballot as the American Party, their contempt for the
foreign-born was directed at Roman Catholics, who, they believed, owed their
primary allegiance to the Pope rather than the Constitution—a prejudice that
was not fully expunged until John F. Kennedy became the first Catholic presi-
dent in 1961.
The Know-Nothings enjoyed their greatest success in 1854 when they suc-
cessfully competed in Massachusetts, New York, Maryland, Kentucky, and Cal-
ifornia. In Massachusetts, where Irish Catholic immigrants had been pouring
into the state at a rate of more than 100,000 per year, the Know-Nothings won
all but 3 seats in the more than 350-seat state House of Representatives, every
congressional seat, and all statewide offices including the governorship. One
despondent Whig declared, “This election has demonstrated that, by a major-
ity, Roman Catholicism is feared more than American slavery.”18 In 1856, the
Know-Nothings attempted to capitalize on their victories by selecting former
president Millard Fillmore to be their presidential candidate. Fillmore and Re-
publican candidate John C. Fremont split the antislavery vote, resulting in Dem-
ocrat James Buchanan’s victory.
The schism was eventually repaired as the Know-Nothings became subsumed
into the ranks of an insurgent Republican Party, which established a popular
majority and retained it from its inception until the Great Depression of the
1930s. Republicans benefitted at the polls from having been the party that saved
the Union and emancipated the slaves. Civil War veterans were reminded by
GOP leaders to “vote as you shot,” and their partisan loyalties were reinforced by
generous benefits allocated by Republican-controlled Congresses.
Republicans became associated with Hamiltonian national measures as the
nineteenth century progressed, and industrialization swept the country. They ap-
pealed to farmers by supporting the Homestead Act, which offered cheap land in
the West. They won support from business and labor by advocating high protec-
tive tariffs and land grants designed to develop transcontinental railroads. During
this period, Democrats were more closely associated with Jeffersonian localism
and states’ rights, as they remained the party of the South. But they rarely won
national elections. Only when the Republicans were divided, or nominated weak
candidates, were Democrats able to win the presidency, as happened with Grover
Cleveland in 1884 and 1892, and with Woodrow Wilson in 1912 and 1916.
 The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of Party Politics 41

Political Machines
European immigration exploded between 1890 and 1930, when more than
fifteen million left Europe—roughly equal to the total number of immigrants
from all countries to enter the United States between 1820 and 1890. For those
stepping from the steerage ships, confusion about where to stay and find employ-
ment predominated. The Industrial Revolution provided jobs, but at low wages
and under insufferable conditions. Few services existed to help the downtrod-
den. In this every-man-for-himself atmosphere, political party machines helped
ease the transition for many immigrants and in the process cemented one-party
rule in large American cities. By 1900, robust party machines ruled in New
York, Chicago, St. Louis, Boston, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Kansas City, and
Minneapolis. At the state level, machines controlled Pennsylvania, New York,
Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin.
In exchange for a job, food, and occasional help with the law, party “bosses”
asked for votes on election day. George Washington Plunkitt, one-time head of
New York’s Tammany Hall machine, was infamous for his candid portrayal of
how the machine worked, and he won the undying loyalty of those who bene-
fitted from it. The more people the machine helped, the greater its grasp of the
reins of power. State political bosses, mayors, and ward leaders doled out thou-
sands of patronage jobs to loyal party workers. Awarding jobs after a campaign
was a top priority. One party leader reputedly met with his director of patronage
every week to pursue every application for every city job down to the lowliest
ditch digger. In fact, patronage was an important party tool that continued to
be widely used until the 1960s and, in some places, until the end of the twenti-
eth century.
Party machines were aided by local election laws that ensured voting was not
a private matter, permitting machines to exercise a corrupt hold on power. Prior
to 1888, each party printed its own ballot, usually in a distinctive color. Voters
chose a party ballot and placed it in the ballot box. Split-ticket voting was not
possible under this system, and the public selection of a ballot made it no secret
whom the voter preferred. Moreover, election “inspectors” were appointed by the
party bosses to view the proceedings, sometimes even getting their supporters to
vote more than once or to vote under the name of a deceased person. Character-
istically, the bosses required firms doing government business to pay a kickback
fee. The same held true to secure favorable health and safety inspections and
zoning regulations.
42 chapter 2

Overt corruption was tolerated because party leaders had such a devoted fol-
lowing. If someone’s house burned, a child was arrested, or there was no food
in the pantry, it was the boss who came to the rescue. As Chicago resident Jane
Anderson wrote in 1898,

If the Boss’s friend gets drunk, he takes care of him; if he is evicted for rent,
arrested for crime, loses wife or child, the Boss stands by him and helps him
out. . . . The Boss gives presents at weddings and christenings; buys tick-
ets wholesale for benefits, provides a helping hand at funerals, furnishing
carriages for the poor and a decent burial for the destitute when they are
dead, keeping his account with the undertaker and never allows a county
burial. To ask where the money comes from which the Boss uses this way
would be sinister.19

From the 1830s to the 1890s, political parties shaped the government and
the way average citizens thought about politics. But the twentieth century saw
profound changes in the characteristics and relative influence of the parties.
Starting with the progressive era at the dawn of the twentieth century, parties
began to lose their strength and entered a long period of decline, only to emerge,
reinvented and revived, as something quite different than they were during the
era of the party machine. We will consider that part of the story in chapter 3.
Throughout their history, however, the rivalry between Alexander Hamilton
and Thomas Jefferson persisted, as party leaders split over how much influence
the federal government should have in local affairs. In the nineteenth century,
Democrats supported Jeffersonian limits on the national government; in the
twentieth century, this would become the Republican Party’s position. But so
deeply embedded is the ongoing debate between Hamilton and Jefferson that it
endures in the twenty-first century. For instance, consider this entry from the
conservative blog Red State, which attempts to connect support by Democrats
for Donald Trump being “silenced” by Facebook and Twitter to another time
when Democrats attempted to, in the words of the diarist, “silence dissenting
political opinion by force”:

During the war of 1812, Federalists opposed the war as they believe it was
manufactured by the Jefferson Democrats to further that party’s politi-
cal interests. As soon as war started, Alexander Hanson used the Federal
Republican to denounce Madison and the war. Within days, a mob of
Jefferson Democrats destroyed the newspaper’s office including the print-
ing press. Hanson fled for his life.20
 The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of Party Politics 43

In a different context, this entry appeared on the progressive blog Daily Kos,
citing a moment of agreement between Jefferson and Hamilton as it pertains to
the Senate filibuster:
Thomas Jefferson wrote an early manual for the Senate establishing “pro-
cedures for silencing senators who debated ‘superfluous, or tediously.’”
They had experienced the need for supermajorities in the Articles of
Confederation, and explicitly abandoned them in the Constitution. In
Federalist 22, Alexander Hamilton wrote about supermajority require-
ments, “What at first sight may seem a remedy, is, in reality, a poison.”21
In an era defined by instantaneous communication, debates invoking Ham-
ilton and Jefferson about the role of government persist on the major parties’
websites, on ideological blogs, and on Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat,
and Parler. Thus, remnants of nineteenth-century American political develop-
ment continue in the very partisan and highly networked twenty-first century,
a reminder that party competition today remains heavily influenced by the dif-
ferences responsible for the emergence of the party system.
 Ch a pter 3

Party Organizations in the Twenty-First Century

T
he philosophical differences between Alexander Hamilton
and Thomas Jefferson that spawned the creation of political parties in the
United States extended to different conceptions of how political parties
should be organized. Recall that Hamilton sought national solutions to problems
afflicting all Americans, which required having a strong federal government and
an active president. Jefferson thought the national government should exercise
restraint and let state and local governments take the lead in solving problems.
Not surprisingly, for Hamilton’s followers, global solutions to big problems
required a type of party discipline that assigned great importance to national par-
ties writing platforms and promising action. They wanted national parties to be
powerful organizations, able to command enough discipline to get the executive
and legislative branches of the federal government to act in concert—an objective
not easily achieved in a political system defined by federalism and separation of
powers. Jefferson’s preference for local solutions meant that state and local party
institutions should be diverse organizations paying close attention to local cus-
toms and nominating candidates who best fit that state’s political culture.
The development of contemporary party organizations followed a jagged
path oscillating between the Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian models. It begins
with the emergence of strong party machines at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury and subsequent attempts to reform them. These reform efforts were bipar-
tisan, spearheaded by the progressive wings of both major parties, just as party
machines were bipartisan, with Democrats using patronage to control cities
and Republicans organizing rural and (eventually) some suburban areas. It con-
tinues with the rise of national party organizations from underdeveloped and
under-resourced institutions to power players in American politics.

The Progressive Era

Party machines reigned over an America defined by great inequalities brought
about by the Industrial Revolution. By the turn of the twentieth century,
44
 Party Organizations in the Twenty-First Century 45

colossal fortunes had been made by the likes of John D. Rockefeller, Cornelius
Vanderbilt, and J. P. Morgan, industrial giants who controlled the production
and delivery of everything from oil to sugar, copper to beef, tobacco to rubber,
and candy to locomotives. But many urban residents huddled in tiny tenements
after working long hours in unsightly factories and sweatshops. Farmers suffered
from falling prices for their goods, low inflation, and the private ownership of
railroads. Appalachian coal miners were forced to accept insufferable working
conditions because the government did little to help, and there was no other
work available. Poverty-stricken twelve-and thirteen-year-old children were
often pressed into work because their small bodies could fit more easily into the
tiny mineshafts.
Calls for reform abounded but went largely unheeded. That meant virtually
no government intervention in ending child labor, alleviating horrendous work-
ing conditions, and improving the poverty-level wages paid by the industrial
giants. Frustrated by government inaction and gridlock, the working class mo-
bilized. Labor unions, such as the Federation of Labor and the Knights of Labor,
quickly expanded. But they were no match for a government aligned with corpo-
rate interests. When the unions decided to strike, government injunctions were
issued to summon workers back to the factories. Union leaders were jailed for
conspiracy and contempt for not obeying the injunctions. Labor riots ensued,
like the 1894 Pullman Car Strike that spread from Chicago to the Northwest.
After several outbursts of violence, President Grover Cleveland sent thousands
of federal troops and marshals into Chicago in August 1894 under the pretense
of protecting mail deliveries. With that, the strike came to a screeching halt.
Without federal assistance, lower-class workers—many of whom were im-
migrants—looked for help from their local party organizations. As we saw in
chapter 2, machine leaders could dispense jobs to the party faithful in return for
supporting the party and voting for its candidates on Election Day. A reporter
covering George Washington Plunkitt, leader of New York’s Tammany Hall
machine, described in great detail how the life of a party boss was consumed
by attending to the needs of the people who would keep the machine in power:
2 A.M.: Aroused from sleep by the ringing of his doorbell; went to the
door and found a bartender, who asked him to go to the police station and
bail out a saloon-keeper who had been arrested for violating the excise law.
Furnished bail and returned to bed at three o’clock.
6 A.M.: Awakened by fire engines passing his house. Hastened to the
scene of the fire, according to the custom of the Tammany district leaders,
to give assistance to the fire sufferers, if needed. Met several of his election
46 chapter 3

district captains who are always under orders to look out for fires, which
are considered great vote-getters. Found several tenants who had been
burned out, took them to a hotel, supplied them with clothes, fed them,
and arranged temporary quarters for them until they could rent and fur-
nish new apartments.
8:30 A.M.: Went to the police court to look after his constituents.
Found six “drunks.” Secured the discharge of four by a timely word with
the judge, and paid the fines of two.
9 A.M.: Appeared in the Municipal District Court. Directed one of
his district captains to act as counsel for a widow against whom dispos-
sess proceedings had been instituted and obtained an extension of time.
Paid the rent of a poor family about to be dispossessed and gave them a
dollar for food.
11 A.M.: At home again. Found four men waiting for him. One had
been discharged by the Metropolitan Railway Company for neglect of
duty, and wanted the district leader to fix things. Another wanted a job
on the road. The third sought a place on the Subway and the fourth, a
plumber, was looking for work with the Consolidated Gas Company. The
district leader spent nearly three hours fixing things for the four men, and
succeeded in each case.
3 P.M.: Attended the funeral of an Italian as far as the ferry. Hurried
back to make his appearance at the funeral of a Hebrew constituent. Went
conspicuously to the front both in the Catholic church and the synagogue,
and later attended the Hebrew confirmation ceremonies in the synagogue.
7 P.M.: Went to district headquarters and presided over a meeting of
election district captains. Each captain submitted a list of all the voters in
his district, reported on their attitude toward Tammany, suggested who
might be won over and how they could be won, told who were in need, and
who were in trouble of any kind and the best way to reach them. District
leader took notes and gave orders.
8 P.M.: Went to a church fair. Took chances on everything, bought ice
cream for the young girls and the children. Kissed the little ones, flattered
their mothers and took their fathers out for something down at the corner.
9 P.M.: At the clubhouse again. Spent $10 on tickets for a church excur-
sion and promised a subscription for a new church bell. Bought tickets for
a baseball game to be played by two nines from his district. Listened to the
complaints of a dozen pushcart peddlers who said they were persecuted
 Party Organizations in the Twenty-First Century 47

by the police and assured them he would go to Police Headquarters in the

morning and see about it.
10:30 P.M.: Attended a Hebrew wedding reception and dance. Had pre-
viously sent a handsome wedding present to the bride.
12 P.M.: In bed.1

In a different context, activities like these could be seen as remarkable con-

stituent service. But as the power of the city machines grew, so did corruption.
Plunkitt himself tried to justify what he did as “honest” graft, which he regarded
as taking advantage of the opportunities afforded by being in power (“I seen my
opportunities and I took ’em,” he once said2)—as opposed to “dishonest” graft,
or outright stealing from the city coffers. Not surprisingly, reformers didn’t see
things this way. The early years of the twentieth century saw a strong enough
reform movement to support a national Progressive Party, whose 1912 platform
described how the party machines controlled by both Democrats and Republi-
cans had become a threat to liberty:

Political Parties exist to secure responsible government and to execute

the will of the people. From these great tasks both of the old parties have
turned aside. Instead of instruments to promote the general welfare, they
have become the tools of corrupt interests which use them impartially to
serve their selfish purposes. Behind the ostensible government sits en-
throned an invisible government owing no allegiance and acknowledging
no responsibility to the people. To destroy this invisible government, to
dissolve the unholy alliance between corrupt business and corrupt politics
is the first task of the statesmanship of the day.3

Former president Teddy Roosevelt sought to reclaim his old job under the Pro-
gressive Party banner that year, despite his earlier association with the Republican
Party establishment. Roosevelt began his political career after returning as a hero
from the Spanish-American War in 1898. He was elected governor of New York,
thanks to the backing of the GOP boss, Senator Thomas C. Platt, but was quickly
sickened by the graft that characterized New York politics. Rather than aban-
doning party politics, Roosevelt hoped to make the Republican Party an agent
of reform. His efforts did not sit well with Republican bosses, and they vowed to
get rid of their nemesis. Platt engineered Roosevelt’s nomination as the 1900 Re-
publican vice-presidential candidate, believing the then obscurity of the vice pres-
idency (it had been mostly a dead-end job in the nineteenth century) would surely
48 chapter 3

bury Roosevelt. That plan backfired when President McKinley was assassinated
in 1901, and Roosevelt became the twenty-sixth president of the United States.
Roosevelt’s initial reform agenda was relatively modest. Besieged by con-
servative, business-minded congressional Republicans on the one hand and
reform-minded Progressives on the other, he chose a middle-of-the-road course.
In 1908, Roosevelt declined to seek reelection, opting to support his longtime
friend, Secretary of War William Howard Taft, who easily defeated Democrat
William Jennings Bryan. But Roosevelt was frustrated by Taft’s failure to es-
pouse progressive reforms and sought the presidency again in 1912. However,
wresting the Republican nomination from an incumbent president proved im-
possible. After Taft’s renomination Roosevelt accepted an invitation to join with
other disaffected progressive Republicans and run for president as a third-party
candidate. Their new Progressive Party adopted the nickname “Bull Moose”
(following Roosevelt’s declaration that he was “as strong as a bull moose”). The
Bull Moose platform called for the direct election of US senators, women’s suf-
frage, restricting the president to a single six-year term, a constitutional amend-
ment allowing an income tax, the institution of a minimum wage, the prohibi-
tion of child labor, the creation of a Department of Labor, and even overturning
some judicial decisions. These proposals collectively sought to weaken the polit-
ical parties, empower voters, and create a stronger social safety net.
Roosevelt finished second, winning more votes than Taft—the best perfor-
mance for a third-party presidential candidate in the twentieth century. But
the Republican split enabled Democrat Woodrow Wilson to enter the White
House. The Progressive Party faded from the scene in 1916, after Roosevelt
refused its nomination, and most of its followers returned to the Republican
ranks. Robert M. LaFollette Sr. was the Progressive Party’s presidential nominee
in 1924 and attracted 16 percent of the popular vote but won only his home state
of Wisconsin. In retrospect, though, the 1912 election had a decisive impact on
the progressive struggle. Democrats, as well as conservative Republicans, could
no longer withstand the power of the reform wave, and both parties became
vulnerable to insurgents who promised to weaken their organizations. President
Wilson won enactment of several Progressive planks, as did most state and local
governments. By attacking political parties so vehemently and scoring so solidly
with the voters, the Progressives ensured that the remainder of the twentieth
century would be an anti-party age.
It took decades of gradual and persistent reform efforts for Progressives to
change how political parties operated. Reform initiatives began in 1870, shifted
into high gear during the 1890s, and slowed after the 1912 elections. Initial
 Party Organizations in the Twenty-First Century 49

accomplishments set up subsequent opportunities, as once a state or city was

“cleaned up,” residents elsewhere took notice and demanded reform in their own
communities. Almost like an avalanche, the Progressive Movement gathered more
followers as it pushed ahead, until large portions of its agenda were established.
Key progressive reforms implemented during this period included the introduc-
tion of the Australian ballot, direct primary elections, a merit system to replace
the spoils system, municipal ownership of utilities, ballot initiatives, nonpartisan
municipal elections, direct election of US senators, and women’s suffrage.
The Australian Ballot. When each party was allowed to print its own ballot
on distinctive colored paper, machine politicians could keep track of how people
voted and retaliate against anyone who voted against them. Bribery in the form
of vote buying was also easy. The Australian ballot, named after its country of
origin, curbed these abuses. It required that election ballots be prepared by the
states, not party organizations. Ballots were to be identical and to include the
names of all candidates seeking office, thereby enabling voters to cast a secret
ballot. It did not eliminate intimidation and bribery, but party henchmen could
now lose an election and never know who was responsible. The new ballot also
enabled citizens to split their tickets—that is, to vote for candidates of opposing
parties running in the same election. The Australian ballot was first introduced
in Kentucky in 1880; by 1896, most states had followed suit.
Direct Primary Elections. Existing election laws made it easy for party bosses
to keep reform-minded candidates off the ballot by controlling the nominating
process. To qualify for the ballot, candidates had to receive the party’s nomi-
nation, which was cleared by party leaders in private and subsequently ratified
at local or state party conventions. A civic-minded reformer might consider
running for office under a third-party label, but most state election laws were
written with the consent of Democrats and Republicans, making it functionally
impossible for insurgent candidates and parties to participate in the election
process. Direct primary elections provided a solution to this dilemma. Instead
of a small group of party leaders choosing a nominee, all party supporters would
be given the opportunity. Nominations would be made through elections, called
primaries, where the entire party membership had a say.
The Merit System. Supported by generally well-to-do urban reformers (called
“mugwumps”), the idea of filling government posts based on merit rather than
favoritism posed a direct threat to the patronage relationships at the heart of
political machines. Attacking the patronage system denied party machines the
ability to provide government jobs to faithful subordinates, while assuring that
government positions would be filled with qualified people—a novel idea at the
50 chapter 3

time. Thus, the merit system (later termed the civil service) became a pillar of
the Progressive platform, favored by reformers weary of lackluster government
services. The idea was not initially well-received by party leaders but following
the assassination of President James Garfield by a disappointed job seeker in
1881, Congress established the Civil Service Commission to set standards for
employment and create thousands of permanent federal jobs that would con-
tinue regardless of which party controlled the White House. By the turn of the
twentieth century, most states followed the federal government’s example, deal-
ing a decisive blow to party leaders.
Municipal Ownership of Utilities. At the turn of the twentieth century, util-
ity companies that had been awarded their franchises by the party machines
charged exorbitant rates even as they provided poor service. The companies were
guaranteed huge profits, raising costs on customers who had no choice but to
pay. Party leaders kept profits high because they were receiving huge kickbacks
from the companies in exchange for franchise rights. Reformers realized that
breaking this cozy relationship required public regulation of utility companies,
and they pushed measures to do so through state and local governments. Many
of these businesses remained privately owned, but in exchange for the franchise
they agreed to allow a public board or commission to set rates. Other services,
such as garbage collection, sewage removal, and transportation, would be as-
sumed by government under new agencies administered by employees who got
their jobs through the merit system.
Ballot Initiative, Referendum, and Recall. One way to link voters to their
government is to give average citizens a direct say in what government does.
Another is to dismiss elected officials should they lose voter confidence. In an
era of partisan corruption, Progressives championed these reforms. The ballot
initiative requires a legislature to consider specific measures. The referendum
gives voters a voice on policy matters by gathering enough signatures to place
a measure on a ballot. The recall allows voters to remove elected officials in a
special election before their term of office is over. South Dakota was first to
authorize ballot initiatives in 1898; Oregon was first with referenda in 1902 and
with recalls in 1908. After California instituted ballot initiatives in 1910 under
outspoken Progressive Republican governor Hiram Johnson, these measures
earned national attention, and by the 1920s about three-fourths of the states
allowed initiatives, referenda, and recalls. Today, these forms of direct popular
participation are commonplace. In 2003, California voters recalled unpopular
Democratic governor Gray Davis and replaced him with Republican Arnold
Schwarzenegger. In 2012, Wisconsin voters rejected a recall of controversial
 Party Organizations in the Twenty-First Century 51

Republican governor Scott Walker after he successfully sought legislation limit-

ing the collective bargaining rights of public unions. In 2021, California voters
rejected a recall of Governor Gavin Newsom following measures he undertook
in the face of the coronavirus pandemic, including mandatory mask wearing and
business closures. Besides recalling unpopular officeholders, voters have voiced
their preferences on a host of policy questions including LGBTQ rights, cam-
paign finance reform, gambling, and the legal use of marijuana.
Nonpartisan Municipal Elections. Progressives generally believed that the
problems facing most municipalities were technical and could be solved by a
combination of professional administration and scientific principles. Following
this logic, Progressives pushed for nonpartisan city elections, where candidates
were not identified by party label. Boston was the first to implement this reform
in 1909; two decades later, twenty-six of the nation’s largest cities followed suit.
This reform has been only modestly successful. Although the party labels of
municipal candidates may not be printed on the ballot, it is generally no mystery
which candidates are sponsored by a particular political party.
Direct Election of US Senators and Women’s Suffrage. Two additional Progres-
sive measures helped reduce the influence of party machines: the direct election
of US senators and extending the vote to women. Under Article I of the Consti-
tution, the election of senators was left to state legislatures. Progressives argued
that this provision, combined with a six-year term and staggered elections, insu-
lated the upper chamber from public opinion. They provided the impetus for
the Seventeenth Amendment (ratified in 1913) that allowed citizens to cast a
ballot for individual senatorial candidates. As a result, parties had to rally their
supporters behind specific Senate candidates as opposed to supporting individual
legislators who would confirm a senatorial choice. Women’s suffrage was another
Progressive cause. In 1890, Wyoming was the first state to grant women the right
to vote, followed by Utah and Idaho in 1896. Even though the women’s suffrage
movement was centered in the East (primarily New York and Massachusetts),
change did not come to that region until 1919, when the Nineteenth Amendment
to the Constitution was ratified and women everywhere attained the right to
vote. Credit for its passage lies with the grit and determination of women de-
manding equality, especially Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton. But
Progressive reformers also lent their voices to the cause because they believed that
once women were enfranchised, corrupt party machines would suffer at the polls.
Although the enfranchisement of women did not bring an immediate end to the
party machines, the influx of women to the electorate required parties to pay
greater attention to mass mobilization.
52 chapter 3

Over a period of decades, Progressives gradually but fundamentally altered

the party system by changing politics from a private affair to a public concern.
During the 1800s, parties operated as private organizations free from govern-
ment interference. Progressives demanded public oversight and government
regulation of most party activities, transforming the parties into quasi-public
agencies subject to legislative control. The success of this effort weakened party
machines: the direct primary stripped party leaders of their ability to completely
control nominations; the secret ballot reduced voter intimidation and election
fraud; the merit system lessened patronage opportunities; public control of util-
ity companies drained party coffers; the direct election of US senators removed
the ability to control federal elections through local officeholders; and women’s
suffrage expanded the electorate.
Placed on the defensive by disclosures of corruption and a growing sense of
public outrage, party bosses inevitably yielded to the reforms. But this did not
mean that party organizations suffered. In fact, many reform measures that
reduced corruption inadvertently worked to strengthen the two-party system.
Although the direct primary precluded complete control over nominations by
party leaders, a candidate’s ability to get on a state primary ballot required a mas-
sive number of signatures. This labor-intensive process was something parties
were well-suited to accomplish. Senators were subject to direct popular election,
but they needed a party nomination to win a place on the ballot and initially
relied on party organizations to run their campaigns. The merit system reduced
patronage, yet there remained scores of “exempt” and “temporary” positions to
be filled. Utilities might be controlled by boards and commissions, but the city
government-corporate nexus was far from broken. Party war chests continued
to overflow with contributions from businesses.
Some Progressive reforms ironically strengthened the major parties’ legal
standing. The new laws curtailed the worst abuses of the machine era but made
independent and minor-party candidacies more difficult. Instead of adhering
to the Australian practice of omitting party designation on the ballot, most
states adopted a general election ballot that required party labels to be placed
alongside a candidate’s name. It was easy for the two major parties to keep this
official ballot recognition because state law reserved a place for the two parties
that received the most votes in the last election. All other parties would have to
circulate petitions before the next election to gain ballot access, a difficult and
extremely time-consuming chore.
Voter registration is another Progressive Era change that may have undercut
the interests of reformers. In a provocative book entitled Why Americans Still
 Party Organizations in the Twenty-First Century 53

Don’t Vote, and Why Politicians Want It That Way, scholars Frances Fox Piven
and Richard Cloward argue that voter registration requirements, implemented
around the turn of the twentieth century, were designed to shrink the size of the
electorate.4 In the aftermath of the 2020 election, voter registration has again
become a controversial issue. During his reelection campaign, Donald Trump
attacked direct mail voting,5 falsely claiming the practice is riddled with fraud
(in fact, the states of Washington, Oregon, Colorado, Utah, and Hawaii conduct
their elections entirely by mail without incident6). After Trump lost, dozens of
states enacted restrictive laws to address unsubstantiated claims of fraud that had
the effect of making voting more difficult. Many of these laws seek to shorten
the time frame during which voters can request an absentee ballot; allow states
to purge voters from the rolls; eliminate drop boxes for absentee ballots; impose
strict signature requirements on absentee ballots; require strict voter identifica-
tion; limit the time period for early voting; reduce the number of polling places
in African-American communities; and even, in the case of Georgia, prohibit
the distribution of food and water for those waiting in line to vote. Some states
went so far as to remove the responsibility to certify elections from their secre-
taries of state and to place it in the hands of Republican-controlled state legis-
latures, raising the prospect that electoral votes from those states would not be
awarded to the popular voter winner in future presidential elections.7

The New Deal and Party Politics

Progressive reforms of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries directly
attacked Jeffersonian style of local governance by empowering nonpartisan ad-
ministrative agencies to fight corruption at the local level. Jeffersonian localism
was dealt a second blow during the 1930s when Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New
Deal policies directed the national government to take an unprecedented role
in protecting its citizens. FDR’s ascendency followed decades of Jeffersonian
ascendency made possible by Republican Party dominance of national politics.
Except for the presidencies of Grover Cleveland and Woodrow Wilson, Republi-
cans controlled the federal government from Reconstruction through the Great
Depression. Warren Harding in 1920, Calvin Coolidge in 1924, and Herbert
Hoover in 1928 were elected by decisive margins and profited from a strong
national economy and an enduring Republican majority in the electorate. But
everything changed on October 24, 1929, when the stock market crashed, and
the Great Depression began. Stock values dropped nearly 75 percent, and by
1931 unemployment reached 25 percent. Farmers were especially hard hit, seeing
54 chapter 3

prices for commodities drop to their lowest levels since 1910. Thousands of chil-
dren were unable to attend school due to a lack of shoes.
In 1932, Democrat Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the popular governor of
New York (and cousin to Teddy) was elected president in a landslide. FDR won
forty-two states to President Hoover’s six, and Democrats carried both houses
of Congress by overwhelming margins. In the Senate, Democrats won fifty-nine
of ninety-six seats; in the House, Democrats had 312 members to the Republi-
cans’ 123. Roosevelt moved rapidly to take advantage of these enormous major-
ities, proposing a flurry of legislation designed to provide immediate relief to
the “ill-nourished, ill-clad, and ill-housed.” Congress approved the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA), the National Recovery Administration (NRA), the
Works Progress Administration (WPA), the Public Works Administration
(PWA), the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), and the Social Security Act.
The first hundred days of Roosevelt’s administration, which saw the creation of
what came to be known as the New Deal, set a standard for legislative activity
against which all of Roosevelt’s successors have been measured.
FDR’s New Deal drastically transformed the national government and the
political parties. Abandoning its laissez-faire posture, the federal government
became an active, national player whose primary responsibility was to ensure the
economic well-being of the people. The New Deal signaled the emergence of an
administrative state whereby the federal government regulated some elements
of the economy; elevated the cause of organized labor, farmers, and the elderly;
and redistributed wealth through a progressive income tax. It also transformed
the relationship between citizens and government. Prior to Roosevelt, a rugged
individualism prevailed. But the Great Depression made it possible for Roos-
evelt to construct a federal foundation for economic security. The inalienable
rights secured by the Constitution—speech, press, worship, due process—were
supplemented by Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms, two of which included “freedom
from want” and “freedom from fear.”8
The rise of executive-centered government was a serious blow to local party
organizations. Local and state powers diminished as Americans looked to the
president for leadership. Under Roosevelt, Democrats established a national
headquarters in 1932, and Republicans quickly followed suit. By the 1950s, the
cumulative effects of the Progressive and New Deal reforms on political par-
ties became apparent. The rise of nonpartisan administration was so complete,
and the concentration of power at the federal level so entrenched, that the last
vestiges of the spoils system had been removed. Hamiltonian nationalism was
enjoying a renaissance, both in terms of policy and marking the beginnings of
 Party Organizations in the Twenty-First Century 55

stronger party organizations, the latter not becoming fully apparent until the
beginnings of the twenty-first century. On a policy level, the desire for federal
action was so great that Jefferson’s preference for a more limited federal govern-
ment came to be viewed as a radical departure from the norm. In 1964, Repub-
lican presidential nominee Barry Goldwater pledged to restore Jeffersonian lo-
calism, telling the Republican Convention: “Extremism in the defense of liberty
is no vice. Moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue.”9 He lost forty-four
states to Lyndon B. Johnson.

Television and Candidate-Centered Politics

Aside from Progressivism and the New Deal, the Cold War deeply affected
party politics and helped to make politics more of a national affair. Initially, the
rise of communism was a boon to Republicans, who had been shut out of the
White House in five consecutive elections from 1932 through 1948. From 1952
to 1988, Republican presidential candidates benefitted from increased Cold
War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Promising to
deliver “peace through strength,” Dwight D. Eisenhower, Richard M. Nixon,
Ronald Reagan, and George H. W. Bush won the presidency in part by project-
ing a combination of steadiness and toughness. Republicans won seven of the
ten presidential elections held between 1952 and 1988. But the party paid a high
price for its victories. Eisenhower, Nixon, Reagan, and the first President Bush
were “plebiscitary presidents”—winning personal triumphs without increasing
the number of people who called themselves Republicans. Thus, although the
Cold War served the interests of Republican presidential candidates, the grow-
ing personalization of political campaigns initially weakened the Republican
Party. Democrats also grew weaker, as their congressional incumbents ran in-
creasingly personal campaigns, often emphasizing their own local accomplish-
ments rather than broad party themes. Over time, voters came to view politics
in terms of individual candidates rather than party competition.
At the same time, a professional class of political consultants pushed aside the
party activists who had conducted campaigns since the emergence of American
political parties. These professionals used mass-based voter contact techniques
to reach large numbers of voters through television and direct mail, employing
techniques learned in marketing firms rather than in the trenches of partisan
political warfare. The professionalization of campaigning turned electioneer-
ing into a contest driven by strategists and handlers. Today, the national party
organizations and nearly every congressional candidate, most state legislators,
56 chapter 3

and a growing number of municipal officials hire campaign consulting firms,

who provide a breathtaking range of services necessary to waging mass cam-
paigns: polling, conducting focus groups, demographic research, message de-
velopment, fundraising, managing direct mail, radio and television production,
and event planning.
More than any other factor, television turned campaigns into exercises in
consumer marketing and candidates into clay to be molded and sold to the pub-
lic as reflections of what people tell pollsters they want in their politicians. As
an entertainment medium that plays directly to people’s emotions, television
is an ideal vehicle for reaching voters at a gut level, and smart candidates man-
aged by savvy handlers used it to great effect to connect with voters on a large
scale—without forming the direct associations characteristic of the machine era
of patronage politics. In the television age, politics became an exercise in manip-
ulating mass public opinion.
Acquiring a party’s nomination by abandoning the party in favor of person-
alized voter outreach dates back to when television was an infant medium in
the 1950s. Dwight D. Eisenhower was the first presidential candidate to employ
television advertising, and, not coincidentally, he was the first of several “citizen
politicians” to seek and win the presidency on the strength of their personal
biographies and with the help of a carefully calibrated television campaign. On
February 2, 1952, Citizens for Eisenhower opened its doors, managed not by
Republican partisans but by a mortgage banker and the president of the Ford
Foundation and propelled by advertising executives who had run successful
television campaigns for consumer products like aspirin.10 They presented Ei-
senhower as a nonpartisan office seeker who was simply renting the top slot on
the Republican ticket, selling the public on the idea that the likable World War
II hero with humble Midwestern roots was a natural for the presidency. For their
part, voters could support Eisenhower without making a partisan commitment.
It was a marriage of convenience.
Richard M. Nixon emulated Eisenhower’s approach in 1968 but took it a
giant step further by using television to reinvent himself after his failed 1960
presidential campaign and an unsuccessful run for governor of California in
1962. In the parlance of hired image consultants, Nixon suffered from “high
negatives” among voters who did not trust him after a checkered career clouded
by ethical questions. But television, and the consultants Nixon hired, allowed
him to create the image of a “New Nixon”: honest, open, sympathetic, and ac-
cessible. In an age of candidate-centered campaigns, Nixon could not have been
elected without an image makeover; however, in the previous era of strong party
 Party Organizations in the Twenty-First Century 57

organizations it is unlikely that party leaders would have given him the oppor-
tunity to try.
Candidates continue to employ television to sell themselves to voters, spend-
ing enormous amounts on advertising. But cable television, the Internet, social
media, and the ability to gather detailed information about voters have revolu-
tionized campaign advertising. In the late twentieth century when three broad-
cast networks reigned supreme, ad campaigns were broad in scope, repeating the
same themes and messages to a national audience. Today, candidates can target
specific groups of voters, customizing the campaign’s message and selecting the
most efficient medium for communicating it.

Institutional Retrenchment
Just as presidential campaigns were becoming candidate-centered affairs, the
national political parties engaged in efforts to reinvent themselves to become rel-
evant in changing political times. The Republican Party was the first to reform.
In 1973, the GOP was in serious trouble as the economy soured; then, in 1974,
the Watergate scandal forced Nixon’s resignation. The 1974 midterm elections
proved disastrous for Republicans, when a large class of Democratic freshmen,
dubbed “Watergate babies,” was elected in heretofore safe Republican districts.
Following Jimmy Carter’s 1976 victory, some prognosticators predicted that the
Republican Party was headed for extinction.
Given the prevailing pessimism, leaders in the Republican National Commit-
tee (RNC) decided to reconfigure the party. The task of reimagining the GOP
fell to the newly appointed party chair, William Brock, a former US senator
from Tennessee. To enhance Republican electoral prospects, Brock initiated a
four-part strategy: (1) aggressive fundraising; (2) organizational improvements;
(3) better candidate recruitment; and (4) changing the party’s image.
Fundraising. Believing Republicans needed more money to win elections,
Brock decided to solicit funds from ordinary voters, using some of the same
techniques for party building that campaign consultants used on behalf of elect-
ing candidates. Computerized lists of potential supporters were used to send
letters asking for small contributions. Although the response to these direct mail
solicitations was low, those who gave were placed on a donor list and asked every
six months or so to contribute more money. The approach worked. In 1977, the
RNC expanded its base of contributors from 250,000 to 350,000. Three years
later, a phenomenal 1.2 million Republicans were sending in checks payable to
58 chapter 3

the RNC. Even though the average contribution was just $25, total receipts grew
from $12.7 million in 1976 to more than $26 million in 1980.11
Organizational Improvements. Brock revamped the organizational structure
of the national committee by installing fifteen regional directors to help plan
strategy and bolster the state parties; establishing task forces to encourage states
to develop long-range plans; providing regional finance directors to help raise
money; and assigning one organizational expert to each state committee. Brock
also initiated a program whereby state and local party organizations could use
RNC-owned equipment and sophisticated technologies at a minimal cost. A
massive computer network enabled the state and local Republican parties to
download a variety of software programs to expedite accounting, word process-
ing, direct mail, get-out-the-vote drives, mailing list maintenance, and politi-
cal targeting. Finally, the RNC provided GOP candidates with low-cost poll-
ing services.
Candidate Recruitment. Brock also realized that these tools meant nothing
without good candidates. He instituted a “farm team” approach to candidate
development by recruiting prospective Republicans to seek lesser offices with the
support of the national party, believing that successful local candidates would
be the rising Republican stars of the future. Between 1977 and 1980, more than
ten thousand Republicans, mostly state and local candidates, attended candi-
date-recruitment sessions sponsored by the Republican National Committee.12
Image Repair. Finally, Brock sought to refurbish the Republican Party’s tat-
tered image. Prior to his tenure, the Republican Party had the reputation of
appealing primarily to older, white well-to-do men. Brock wanted these “coun-
try club Republicans” to make way for more women and minorities. To help
these efforts along, he began publishing the lively opinion journal Commonsense
whose purpose was to invigorate the party with new ideas designed to appeal to
voters who might be open to becoming Republicans.
The Democratic Party’s reaction to Brock’s reforms was to say, in effect,
“Stop until we can catch up!” Following Jimmy Carter’s defeat in 1980, Demo-
crats knew that the national party needed an overhaul. Under the leadership of
Charles Manatt, who was chosen to serve as party chair in 1981, the DNC was
reorganized to provide stronger managerial leadership and fundraising prowess.
Manatt tripled the number of DNC staffers, began a series of training seminars
for state and local candidates, organized a State Party Works program that al-
lowed state parties access to state-of-the-art campaign techniques and strategies,
devised a massive voter registration program, and copied the RNC’s successful
direct mail efforts.13
 Party Organizations in the Twenty-First Century 59

Besides the Republican National Committee and the Democratic National

Committee, the congressional campaign committees also underwent an over-
haul and grew both in power and prestige. These congressional committees per-
form candidate recruitment and development functions for House and Senate
candidates, with the objective of winning (or preserving) party majorities in the
House and Senate. They are the Democratic Congressional Campaign Com-
mittee (DCCC), the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC),
the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), and the National
Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC).
Organizationally, congressional campaign committees are very old institu-
tions. The NRCC was established in 1866 by radical Republicans from the
Northeast to protect against political retaliation from their rival Andrew John-
son of Tennessee, who became president after Abraham Lincoln’s assassination
in 1865 and controlled the Republican National Committee by virtue of his
holding the presidency. Not to be outdone, a group of pro-Johnson Democrats
created the DCCC. Senators had little need for these legislative party organi-
zations until the Seventeenth Amendment instituted direct election of senators
in 1913. Senate campaign committees were established by both parties shortly
thereafter.
Despite these early origins, congressional campaign committees were unim-
portant players at the national level until the 1970s. Serving as little more than
fundraising apparatuses for incumbents to collect money in Washington and
channel it back to their local districts, the committees lacked professional staff
and permanent headquarters. That began to change in the 1960s, as the cost of
campaigning began to escalate, television became an integral part of political
campaigns, and progressive reformers stripped local parties of much of their pa-
tronage, resulting in fewer volunteers showing up at party headquarters. Mem-
bers of Congress turned to the congressional campaign committees for help.
Once again, Republicans were the first innovators. Taking their lead from Bill
Brock, the Senate and House Republican campaign committees devised exten-
sive direct mail programs. The result was an avalanche of cash that continues to
build. During the 2020 calendar year, the Republican national and congressio-
nal party committees raised a combined total of $845 million.14
Democrats followed a similar path. Under the aggressive leadership of Cali-
fornia congressman Tony Coelho, the DCCC implemented scores of new fund-
raising programs. Coelho made it a practice to visit hundreds of business and
trade associations asking for contributions. According to then-Representative
Barney Frank, “Tony Coelho was very good at explaining the facts of life to
60 chapter 3

PACs: If you want to talk to us later, you had better help us now.”15 In 2020,
the combined Democratic national and congressional party committees raised
a total of $457 million.16

Parties and the Advent of Social Media

Richard Nixon’s success at reinventing himself became the template for how to
run a media campaign and was emulated by other candidates who, with pro-
fessional assistance, crafted biographical appeals that resonated with iconic
American lore: Jimmy Carter as the Lincolnesque figure who would never lie
to you; Ronald Reagan as the cowboy who came to town to clean up the mess
made by others; Bill Clinton as the everyman from Hope, Arkansas; Barack
Obama as the candidate of “hope” and “change”; Donald Trump as a symbol of
the unchecked power of wealth and celebrity in America; and Joe Biden as the
blue-collar kid from Scranton, Pennsylvania.
But the advent of social media moved us into a new age when politics is not
driven exclusively by television. Today, social media websites like Facebook
and Twitter are a major source of news and information. According to a 2020
IPSOS survey, a plurality of Americans (27 percent) say their main source of
news comes from social media or digital online sources.17 Internet activism has
emerged on both the left and right as countless numbers of Americans engage
in political action.18
As we will see in chapter 6, the development of online presidential politics can
be traced to the 2004 presidential campaign of former Vermont governor How-
ard Dean who shocked the political world by taking an obscure, long-shot can-
didacy to the verge of the Democratic nomination on the strength of hundreds
of thousands of supporters who self-organized on the Internet. Four years later,
Internet supporters made the difference in Barack Obama’s unlikely run against
Hillary Clinton for the Democratic nomination and the presidency. Obama
updated his online presence in 2012 to incorporate social media that was in its
infancy during his first campaign. In 2016, presidential candidate Bernie Sand-
ers nearly overcame overwhelming odds by garnering supporters and dollars via
the Internet in his primary battle against the party favorite, former secretary of
state Hillary Clinton. As for Clinton, she hired many of Obama’s web-savvy
advisors, while her general election opponent, Donald Trump, elevated tweeting
into a campaign art form. In 2020, the Trump campaign again relied on mining
 Party Organizations in the Twenty-First Century 61

data from online users and using his Twitter feed to engage his followers, while
Joe Biden beefed up his digital engagement after ending most in-person events
during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Conclusion
Americans have never fully embraced political parties. As we have seen, public
distaste for parties lingered throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
even as they became more deeply rooted in the political system. Parties were
tolerated because they helped create an efficient means of organizing mass-based
politics. Just when they reached their zenith, a reform wave swept the nation
and systematically dismantled much of the leverage party machines held on the
system. Progressives stripped party organizations of their institutional strengths
and helped change public attitudes toward them. Direct primaries reduced the
capacity of party leaders to control who got on the ballot. Referenda allowed
average citizens to go over the heads of elected officials to change public policy.
Through it all political parties have proved to be resilient, emerging in the 21st
century as strong national institutions.
The long arc of party institutional development has witnessed a shift from
local, Jeffersonian-style organizations to national operations that are Hamilto-
nian in their approach to politics. The national parties now occupy permanent
buildings in Washington, D.C., raise enormous sums of money, and play an im-
portant role in candidate selection (particularly at the congressional level). Party
leaders hold positions of national importance. The chairs of the party commit-
tees are key spokespersons for their parties, and they help to establish the party
message. Even state parties have assumed more power and have become reliant
on help from their national counterparts. This is a profound change from their
initial incarnation as grassroots, locally based organizations with little involve-
ment in national affairs.
But chapter 4 will show that when it comes to presidential campaigns, the
national parties are not so dominant. Like the transformation of party organi-
zations over the past century, there has been a major upheaval in the way parties
choose their presidential candidates. However, instead of centralizing power in
the party organizations, these changes have handed control of the nomination
process to rank-and-file primary voters, sometimes producing results that party
leaders wanted to avoid but were unable to stop.
 Ch a pter 4

Nominating Presidents

T
he presidential nomination process has undergone strange
twists and turns ever since the Framers established the Electoral College
as the initial means of choosing presidents. Over the years, two ques-
tions have guided reforms to the nomination process: what kind of presidents do
we want, and what type of nomination process is most likely to produce them.
The varied answers to these questions have revolved around Hamiltonian and
Jeffersonian perspectives on presidential selection. Should choosing a party’s
presidential nominee be a national decision? This would be the preferred Hamil-
tonian method. Or should the presidential nominee be a consensual choice, with
the decision left to those representing diverse regions of the country? Jefferson’s
emphasis on the country’s diversity suggests this is the best approach.
In 1912, former president and presidential candidate Theodore Roosevelt
summarized the Hamilton/Jefferson debate over choosing presidents, indicat-
ing his preference for a Hamilton method, which he believed would produce his
preferred type of president—a “leader”—and minimize the risk of producing his
least-preferred type, a “boss”:
The leader leads the people; the boss drives the people. The leader gets his
hold by open appeal to the reasons and conscience of his followers. The
boss keeps his hold by manipulation, intrigue, by secret and furtive ap-
peals to the very base forms of self-interest. . . . Leadership is carried on in
the open light of day; bossism derives its main strength from what is done
under the cover of darkness.1
Those who subscribe to a Jeffersonian approach hold a very different view.
For them, the selection of a presidential nominee must be consensual, and to
accomplish this the deliberations must necessarily be private. Candidates should
be judged by their peers, even if that verdict is rendered in closed “smoke-filled”
rooms by other elites. From these deliberations a nominee will emerge with

62
 Nominating Presidents 63

sufficient institutional party backing to mount a winning campaign and form a

successful administration.
Over the centuries, presidential selection has transformed from a Jeffersonian
model in which states and localities led by party bosses were key to winning
presidential nominations to a Hamiltonian approach that places the choice in
the hands of primary voters who make a national decision absent many local
concerns. The story of this evolution is the main topic of this chapter. To give
context to this history, we will begin at the end, with the most recent presiden-
tial election, when a global pandemic upended the rules of campaigning and
forced the parties to rethink their campaign practices.

The Strange Case of 2020

There was nothing unusual at first about the 2020 presidential primary sea-
son. An incumbent president with no serious intra-party challengers2 faced an
out-party with a long list of candidates vying to replace him, many of whom
were present or former senators and representatives or governors and mayors
with executive experience.3 Democrats sensed that Donald Trump was vulner-
able, so a large field of would-be opponents got to work building organizations
and raising money long before the first primary or caucus vote was held. This
is how contemporary presidential party politics works. The process of running
for president has become so expensive and complex that potential candidacies
require years of planning. In fact, Trump announced his intention to run for
reelection earlier than any previous incumbent—on the day of his inaugura-
tion. Democrats quickly lined up to oppose him, starting with longshot can-
didate congressman John Delaney in July 2017.4 Twenty-seven others would
eventually follow.
It was the most diverse field in history, featuring six women, three Black can-
didates, three candidates of Asian ancestry, a Latino candidate, and an openly
gay candidate. There were philosophical divisions between candidates who rep-
resented the progressive wing of the Democratic Party and those who were more
traditionally liberal. At the front of the pack were Biden, the best-known candi-
date in the field, and his most consequential challenger, Vermont senator Bernie
Sanders, the runner-up for the 2016 Democratic nomination. Behind them were
a half-dozen or so others who were getting serious attention from voters. As 2019
turned to 2020, it appeared possible that primary voters would not be able to
coalesce behind a candidate before that summer’s nominating convention.
64 chapter 4

Then the global pandemic struck and upended everything. In-person cam-
paigning abruptly stopped in March 2020 and was replaced by virtual events. In
this vastly altered environment and with the nation in crisis, Democrats quickly
brought their contest to an unexpected and unprecedented resolution.
Joe Biden was the unlikely beneficiary of this sudden denouement. He had
stumbled badly in the first caucuses in Iowa and Nevada and in the first pri-
mary in New Hampshire—so badly, in fact, that no previous candidate had per-
formed as poorly in the early contests and survived to win the nomination. The
victor in these early contests was Bernie Sanders, whose favored position in the
race concerned some party leaders who feared that a self-described democratic
socialist could not win a national election. Then, with the country on the verge
of shutting down, Biden pulled off one of the most unlikely comebacks ever
recorded. Bolstered by overwhelming support from Black voters and viewed by
rank-and-file Democrats as the most likely candidate to defeat Trump, Biden
staged a blowout win in the South Carolina primary that gave him the momen-
tum he needed to dominate primaries on what is termed “Super Tuesday,” when
a host of states from California to Massachusetts held their contests.
These victories permitted Biden to surpass Sanders in the number of conven-
tion delegates pledged to his candidacy. His lead soon became insurmountable,
and what had been shaping up to be a drawn-out contest came to a sudden halt.
In rapid succession, Biden’s main challengers dropped out and endorsed him—
just in time for Biden to claim the mantle of presumptive nominee before the
campaign went dark. The greatest public health crisis in more than a century
forced state after state to postpone their primaries during the spring and sum-
mer months, and the campaign entered a long, eerie intermission before Sanders
bowed to the inevitable and dropped out.
General election campaigning was significantly altered by the pandemic as
well. Like William McKinley in 1896, who “stood” for election by campaigning
from the front porch of his house, Biden and Trump were initially forced to
forego large rallies and dramatically scale down their efforts. Social media events
replaced large in-person gatherings, and virtual organizing replaced knocking on
doors. Even the lavish quadrennial national conventions were replaced by largely
prerecorded television productions. Although Trump resumed campaign rallies
in August, Biden continued to avoid large crowds. Drive-in campaign events and
virtual fundraising became creative new ways to appeal to supporters. The vir-
tual Democratic Convention presented celebrities and ordinary citizens in short,
scripted videos designed to reinforce the party’s general election message and
 Nominating Presidents 65

was the first national convention to be nominated for an Emmy. Anita Dunn,
a senior adviser to President Biden who had a prominent role in Biden’s 2020
campaign, speculated that “we will never go back to a traditional convention.”5
In a post-pandemic world, it remains to be seen if virtual campaigning and fund-
raising will remain commonplace.
Viewed from a historical perspective, uncertainty caused by the disruptions
of 2020 is just a new twist in an evolving presidential nomination process that
is a centuries-old work in progress. There was a period in which Congress, after
briefly relying on the flawed Electoral College to select nominees, ran the nomi-
nation process. This was followed by a convention system where party leaders ex-
ercised decision-making power, then a primary-based system that emerged out of
reforms designed to empower rank-and-file partisans. The primary system itself
has been the subject of perpetual tinkering. These changes determined whether
presidential nominees would be chosen by national party leaders responding to
national problems, by state leaders responding to local issues, or by rank-and-file
voters responding to a combination of both.
At every turn, party reformers have been guided by the twin questions of
what kind of presidents we want and what sort of nomination system is likely
to produce them. The way the parties answered these questions shaped the kind
of candidates produced by the nomination process. And as every set of rules has
unintended consequences, subsequent generations of reformers were often left
to tinker with the adverse effects of their predecessors’ efforts.

What It Takes to Be Nominated

In 1962, a reporter asked President John F. Kennedy what advice he would give
to a future president. Kennedy responded, “know the country you seek to lead,”
adding, “If you find the opportunity to know and work with Americans of di-
verse backgrounds, occupations, and beliefs, then I would urge you to take ea-
gerly that opportunity to enrich yourself.”6 Six decades later, Americans might
still agree with Kennedy’s assessment but, unsurprisingly, they have added even
more qualifications to his short list. These include having some prior execu-
tive experience (such as serving as a vice president, governor, or mayor), being
of sound character, and being an effective advocate of policies deemed to be
in the public interest. But how to find such persons remains elusive given the
marathon nature of today’s nomination process. In the sixty years since John
F. Kennedy issued his job description, would-be presidents have bemoaned the
66 chapter 4

fact that to be a successful candidate one must foreswear any other occupation,
abandon one’s family, and single-mindedly devote most waking hours to raising
money—requirements that have nothing to do with being a successful president.
Time. The 2020 Democratic candidates knew that campaigning would be
their new full-time job. Joe Biden could undertake the task because he had
no other responsibilities. Senators and representatives who sought the nomi-
nation were generally able to take time away from their day jobs. The private
citizens who sought to win the party’s nod—including entrepreneur Andrew
Yang, hedge fund manager Tom Steyer, and former New York mayor Michael
Bloomberg—were independently wealthy. But those who had executive respon-
sibilities were at a disadvantage because they found it difficult to leave their full-
time obligations. Washington State governor Jay Inslee, Montana governor Steve
Bullock, and New York City mayor Bill de Blasio all departed the race shortly
after they entered. Each discovered that running for president was incompatible
with the everyday demands of running a state or large city.
For his part, Donald Trump had been running for president for many years
with the help of the media platform afforded him through his starring role as a
reality television mogul on The Apprentice. In 2000, Trump made an abortive
bid for the nomination of the Reform Party (a short-lived third party created by
businessman Ross Perot after his unsuccessful 1992 independent presidential
campaign).7 Trump later contemplated a run for the 2012 Republican nomi-
nation, eventually bowing out and reluctantly endorsing Mitt Romney. Soon
after Romney lost, Trump copyrighted his 2016 slogan “Make America Great
Again”—a sign he would spend the next four years seeking to try again.8 In 2016,
Trump was joined by sixteen other Republican aspirants who, like many of the
2020 Democrats, often had the word “former” affixed to their titles.9
Commitment. Time is not the only thing that keeps prospective presidents
from running. Candidates need to be willing to sacrifice their families and de-
vote four, eight, or more years of their lives to seeking the presidency. They need
to be willing to do whatever it takes to raise the large sums of money required to
run in a marathon contest. They need the determination to compete in a gruel-
ing process, a willingness to cede their privacy to cameras and reporters, and the
wherewithal to subject themselves to round-the-clock Secret Service protection.
In a meeting with then senator Barack Obama prior to his 2008 presidential
run, David Plouffe, who would become Obama’s campaign manager, told the
putative candidate he had two stark choices: “You can stay in the Senate, enjoy
your weekends at home, take regular vacations, and have a lovely time with your
family. Or you can run for president, have your whole life poked at and pried
 Nominating Presidents 67

into, almost never see your family, travel incessantly, bang your tin cup for do-
nations like some street-corner beggar, lead a lonely, miserable life.”10
To have a chance of victory, first-time candidates must invest vast quantities
of time and money introducing themselves to the party faithful. In 2020, Min-
nesota senator Amy Klobuchar and California senator Kamala Harris essen-
tially moved to Iowa, the first caucus state, but achieved little success breaking
through with voters. South Bend, Indiana, mayor Pete Buttigieg and Massa-
chusetts senator Elizabeth Warren planted themselves in Iowa as well. Bernie
Sanders had the luxury of rebooting his 2016 organization, but he still needed
to devote considerable attention to the early primary states.
Too Much Money. In 2020, Joe Biden raised $1.625 billion, and Donald
Trump raised $1.094 billion11—astronomical sums necessary to run for presi-
dent in the current system, a good portion of which comes from special interest
groups. Apart from the time and commitment required of the candidates to
raise such outsized sums, the amount of money that floods the process can cast
doubts on the system itself. Americans especially resent the influence exercised
by special interests over the presidential campaign process. In 2015, majorities
thought it would be “effective” to reduce the “influence of money in politics”
by placing limits on how much an outside group could spend on a candidate’s
campaign, how much a political party could spend, or how much an individual
candidate could spend regardless of where the money came from.12
This has not been easy to accomplish. In 2010, the Supreme Court ruled
in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission that political speech and
money went hand-in-hand, and that both are protected by the First Amend-
ment.13 The impact of this decision was fully evident in the 2020 race, as out-
side sources spent $582 million on behalf of Biden and $320 million support-
ing Trump.14 Other wealthy individuals contributed vast sums through what
is termed “dark money” by creating ostensibly non-profit organizations and
contributing millions to them for the purpose of advancing the interests of a
particular candidate.
Expenditures of this size and nature are unpopular with the public. Bernie
Sanders premised his two presidential bids on the notion that Wall Street wields
too much power and makes elected officials beholden to big contributors. In his
2015 announcement speech, Sanders declared: “Today, we stand here and say
loudly and clearly that enough is enough. This great nation and its government
belong to all of the people, and not to a handful of billionaires, their Super-PACs,
and their lobbyists.”15 In 2020, Sanders continued to renounce corporate money
while raising an astonishing $211 million, most of it in small dollar increments.16
68 chapter 4

Meanwhile, Donald Trump premised part of his 2016 appeal on the notion that
he couldn’t be bought because of his personal wealth.17
The vast amounts of money required to become president have created a
strong public impression that the presidential selection system is broken. This
is reinforced by the interminable length of the nominating campaign. When it
comes to selecting a chief executive, Americans want the process to be fair, yet
provide for majority rule; deliberative, yet quick; representative, but with some
having a greater voice than others. Those in the national party establishments
have tried unsuccessfully to resolve these contradictory impulses, but as we will
see, their discussions have centered around procedural details that fall within
the jurisdiction of the party organization which do not address the overarching
public concern of creating a process that will produce effective presidents. In
recent years, efforts to reform the selection process have focused on matters like
which state or states should go first in selecting presidential candidates; when
and where the national party conventions should be held; how many party of-
ficeholders should be permitted to attend the national conventions and in what
capacity; and what proportions of men, women, Blacks, Latinos/as, Asian Amer-
icans, Native Americans, and other groups should comprise the various state
delegations. These concerns are a present-day continuation of a centuries-long
effort to get the selection process right, fueled then as now—as we will see— by
the debates between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson as to which is
the best path to take.

From John Adams to Joe Biden: Enduring

Problems in Presidential Selection
The process for selecting presidents hasn’t always been as backbreaking as it is
today, but if today’s method of selecting a nominee may be less than ideal, it is
only the latest in a long series of flawed approaches. At no point since the Consti-
tution was ratified in 1789 has the United States employed a consistent method
for choosing its presidents, no less a selection system that effectively balances the
national character of the presidency with a role for states and localities. For most
of American history, nominees have been selected by methods that have been
subject to the whims of party elites and the ambitions of individual candidates.
First Attempt: The Electoral College. The Framers understood that finding
a method to ensure the selection of a consistently good president was one of
the most conspicuous failures of the Constitutional Convention. Convening
in Philadelphia in 1787, the delegates considered myriad schemes before finally
 Nominating Presidents 69

settling upon the Electoral College. As devised by the Framers, each state would
have a prescribed number of electors equaling its congressional delegation, based
on the number of senators (two) plus the number of representatives (which varies
from state to state based on its population). Under the Electoral College system,
each elector would cast two votes for president. The Framers believed that state
loyalties would determine the first vote (i.e., votes would go to “favorite sons”)
but that the second vote would be for someone of national stature. Making
his case for presidential selection by the people, Alexander Hamilton wrote in
The Federalist that the electors’ “transient existence” and “detached situation”
made the Electoral College a wise instrument for choosing the right kind na-
tional leader:18
[The Framers] have not made the appointment of the president to depend
on any pre-existing bodies of men, who might be tampered with before-
hand to prostitute their votes; but they have referred it in the first act to the
people of America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary
and sole purpose of making the appointment.19
However, the Electoral College only worked as planned in the elections of
George Washington in 1788 and 1792. In each case, Washington won unan-
imous victories—the only president ever to receive such a distinction. But by
1796, the Federalist and Democratic-Republican parties were more organized
and vigorously competing for votes—thereby negating Hamilton’s intention
that the Electoral College would find the best person with the greatest national
standing to serve as president. In 1800, the system completely broke down when
Thomas Jefferson recruited Aaron Burr to run with him as his intended vice
president. Burr broke his promise to defer to Jefferson and have him become
president in the event of a tie vote. Instead, Burr sought the presidency outright
with the result being a deadlock in the House of Representatives that was broken
by the leader of the opposition party, Federalist Alexander Hamilton. By 1804,
the Electoral College that had once been the object of Hamilton’s effusive praise
was completely overhauled when Congress and the states approved the Twelfth
Amendment that allowed for “tickets” of presidential and vice-presidential
candidates.
The experiment of selecting presidential nominees using the Electoral Col-
lege ended quickly, but the Electoral College still plays a central and at times
problematic role in the final selection of the president. After slavery, it is one
of the most flawed parts of the original Constitution and the subject of endless
reform proposals. Calls for abolishing the Electoral College mount each time
70 chapter 4

it appears that a presidential candidate could win the Electoral College with-
out winning the most popular votes—something that happened in 1828, 1876,
1888, 2000, and 2016, and nearly happened in 1960, 1968, 1976, 2004, and
2020. In 2019, 53 percent of Americans preferred doing away with the Electoral
College and making the selection of the president solely dependent on the win-
ner of the popular vote.20
Given this sentiment, it’s not surprising that there has been ongoing tinkering
with the Electoral College. In 1972, Maine decided to allocate its electoral votes
by congressional district, with the winner of each receiving an electoral vote.
Nebraska followed suit twenty years later. Split decisions in those states occurred
in 2008 when Barack Obama won one electoral vote from Nebraska; in 2016,
when Donald Trump received one electoral vote from Maine; and in 2020, when
Trump again received one electoral vote from Maine and Joe Biden received one
electoral vote from Nebraska.
In 2020, the Supreme Court considered the issue of “faithless electors,” those
individuals who did not follow the dictates of their state’s popular vote when
casting their electoral college votes. Fifteen states had laws penalizing electors
who did not vote for the popular vote winner, some of which included financial
penalties. In 2016, these penalties did not stop seven electors from bolting from
their state’s popular vote winner (five from Hillary Clinton and two from Don-
ald Trump),21 including four electors from Washington State who were fined
$1,000 apiece.22 The Supreme Court unanimously decided that states could
require electors to vote for that state’s popular vote winner, noting that the US
Constitution gives states the right to appoint electors “in such Manner as the
legislature thereof may direct.”23
Yet Congress and the public have failed to sustain serious interest in making
major changes to the Electoral College, despite its flaws and unpopularity. Even
though it has misfired in two of the last six elections, and despite the fact that Joe
Biden could have won a popular vote majority as large as seven million and still
lost if a combined forty thousand voters had changed their minds in Wisconsin,
Georgia, and Arizona,24 most proposals to reform the Electoral College have
failed. These include:

• Having all states cast their electoral votes on a proportional basis like Maine
and Nebraska.
• Creating bonus electors that would be awarded to a candidate who won the
national popular vote to ensure the national popular vote winner is elected
president.
 Nominating Presidents 71

• Allocating electoral votes based on proportional representation.

• Eliminating the electoral college entirely and electing the president based on
the popular vote, with the proviso that if a candidate fails to win a majority,
a runoff between the top two candidates would follow.25

Second Attempt: The King-Making Caucuses. Legendary party boss William

Marcy Tweed once remarked, “I don’t care who does the electin’ as long as I
do the nominatin’.”26 The issue of who should “do the nominatin’” has vexed
the American polity for more than two-hundred years. With the emergence of
political parties and the collapse of the Electoral College as a means for choos-
ing presidential candidates, attempts to reform the nominating systems set the
Hamiltonian perspective on national authority against the Jeffersonian prefer-
ence for local accountability.
The second try at choosing presidential nominees was the Congressional
Caucus (commonly nicknamed the “King Caucus”). It consisted of House and
Senate members who belonged to the same party. They would meet, discuss
the pros and cons of various candidates, and emerge with a nominee. As a na-
tional institution that represented state and local interests, it was thought that
a gathering of congressional party leaders to choose a president was a sensible
alternative to the Electoral College. Moreover, it was generally assumed that
presidents would come from the national legislature, so it seemed only natural
that Congress would choose from among the prospective candidates.
The Congressional Caucus functioned relatively well during the period
of light inter-party competition during the Era of Good Feelings, producing
three consecutive two-term presidents from Virginia. But the system com-
pletely broke down in 1824 as the last of the Founding Fathers, James Monroe,
was exiting the presidency. That year, the caucus nominated William Craw-
ford, who commanded little support outside the halls of Congress and was
badly beaten in the election. A five-way scramble for the presidency ensued,
and John Quincy Adams, the son of John Adams, became president. By the
late 1820s, the caucus system became a target of supporters of defeated can-
didate Andrew Jackson who vehemently argued that the entire nominating
process epitomized aristocratic rule and thwarted the popular will. Jackson
had a point since he decisively won the popular vote in 1824 and finished with
the most electoral votes as well.
Third Attempt: Party Conventions. The collapse of the Congressional Caucus
created an opening for a new method of nomination. Initially, the youthful parties
gravitated toward a Jeffersonian-like convention system that took local sensibilities
72 chapter 4

into account. Thomas Ritchie, editor of the Richmond Enquirer, urged a national
convention, in a letter addressed to Martin Van Buren dated January 2, 1824:
Vain is any expectation found upon the spontaneous movement of the
great mass of the people in favor of any particular individual, the elements
of this great community are multifarious and conflicting and require to be
skillfully combined to be made harmonious and powerful. Their action,
to be salutary, must be the result of enlightened deliberation, and he who
would distract the councils of the people, must design to breed confusion
and disorder, and to profit by their dissensions.27
In Ritchie’s view, party conventions allowed for a successful fusion of Hamil-
tonian nationalism and Jeffersonian localism. The convention could speak with
an authoritative voice in selecting the nominee, but individual states maintained
their sovereignty in choosing the delegates. In 1831, the Anti-Masonic Party
held the first political convention in Baltimore. A year later, the Democratic
Party followed suit. The Democrats were driven toward the convention system
not only because it seemed more “democratic” but because President Andrew
Jackson wanted to replace Vice President John C. Calhoun who had become an
outspoken administration critic. One key Jackson operative pointed out “the
expediency, indeed absolute necessity, of advising our friends everywhere to get
up a national convention to convene at some convenient point, for the purpose
of selecting some suitable and proper person to be placed upon the electoral
ticket with General Jackson, as a candidate for the vice presidency.”28 Eventually,
the convention was held and the delegates chose a Jackson loyalist, Martin Van
Buren, for the vice-presidential slot.
Over the years, nominating conventions became vital party instruments by
providing a forum for making key decisions about who would head the presi-
dential ticket, what issue positions the party would emphasize, and how their
nominee would be supported if elected. Conventions are still held today, in
mid-summer before the general election, usually in one of the nation’s largest
cities in an important electoral state. In 2020, Democrats planned to hold a
convention in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Republicans intended to gather in
Charlotte, North Carolina, before both locations were scrubbed due to the
pandemic. As we will see, however, conventions no longer serve the purpose of
selecting nominees.
Until the 1970s, state and local party leaders chose convention delegates.
These party leaders ran the show, instructing delegates on what platform po-
sitions to support and which candidates to back. Leaders were guided by local
 Nominating Presidents 73

considerations, especially which of the candidates would run best in their own
communities. With delegates representing numerous and diverse states and lo-
calities, deal-making would ensue among party leaders and the identity of the
presidential nominee was often unknown as the convention convened. During
the early twentieth century when party bosses wielded their greatest power,
Democrats took an average of ten ballots to select their nominees; Republicans
took five. As boisterous and contentious as these gatherings could get, conven-
tions were a way of reconciling local and national interests to nominate a winner,
a fusion of Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian thinking.
Initially, the Republican Party of the late nineteenth century was most hospi-
table to Alexander Hamilton’s notion of a national family. Republicans viewed
their party as a national organization that was critical to selecting successful
presidential tickets. During a credentials fight at the 1876 Republican Conven-
tion, one delegate asked, “whether the state of Pennsylvania shall make laws for
his convention; or whether this convention is supreme and shall make its own
laws?” The delegate answered his own question with a distinctly Hamiltonian
flourish, saying: “We are supreme. We are original. We stand here representing
the great Republican Party of the United States.”29
Democrats adopted a wholly different approach, believing they should adhere
to the traditions of their progenitor, Thomas Jefferson. At their first convention
in 1832, the party adopted a rule under which no candidate could be nominated
for president unless two-thirds of the delegates agreed. Democrats also invented
the “unit rule,” a device that allowed a state to cast all its votes for one candi-
date if a majority so desired. These changes presented considerable difficulties
in getting the southern and northern wings of the party to agree on nominees.
Thus, it took forty-nine ballots to nominate Franklin Pierce in 1852 and seven-
teen to select James Buchanan four years later. The two-thirds rule and the unit
rule accentuated the federal character of the Democratic Party’s nominating
process—something the party desperately sought to protect. Rising to defend
the unit rule, a delegate to the 1880 Democratic Convention excoriated the Re-
publicans as “a party which believes . . . that the states have hardly any rights left
which the Federal Government is bound to respect . . . [and] that the state does
not control its own delegation in a national convention. Not so in the convention
of the great Democratic Party. We stand, Mr. President, for the rights of the
states.”30 Jefferson couldn’t have said it better.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the debate intensified over which
approach to take in nominating presidents—one rooted in Hamilton’s idea of
nationalism or Jefferson’s preference for localism. The struggle took place not
74 chapter 4

only between the two parties but within them. During the first years of the
twentieth century, the Republican Party developed a growing Progressive fac-
tion that wanted to nationalize party affairs since local politics was often rife
with corruption. Progressive leader Theodore Roosevelt advocated the creation
of a national presidential primary in 1912. Failing that, Progressives wanted state
parties to establish a direct primary, believing that Teddy Roosevelt would dom-
inate them. Fourteen states followed this route, and Roosevelt beat incumbent
William Howard Taft in all the primaries. But Republican stalwarts, led by Taft,
preferred having state GOP leaders retain their decisive voice in selecting presi-
dential candidates. Taft’s dismal third-place finish in 1912 resulted in a further
nationalization of the nominating process. Progressive advocacy of the direct
primary was extended to most elective offices, including the presidency. By 1916,
twenty-three states with 65 percent of the delegates had adopted presidential
primaries, though the party bosses still retained their power to determine the
party nominee. Even so, a slow process had begun whereby party regulars would
be shown to the convention exits.
Democrats, meanwhile, continued to support a Jeffersonian-like approach
in choosing their presidents. Although Woodrow Wilson backed Theodore
Roosevelt’s call for a national primary, the 1912 Democratic platform upheld
the rights of the states and condemned as a “usurpation” Republican-inspired
efforts “to enlarge and magnify by indirection the powers of the Federal Gov-
ernment.”31 Thus, any attempt to nationalize the party’s rules would be turned
aside. In fact, southern leaders blocked the nomination of Speaker of the House
Champ Clark, who was unable to obtain the two-thirds support from the dele-
gates needed to win the nomination. Seeking compromise, the delegates turned
to New Jersey Democratic governor Woodrow Wilson, whose birthplace was
Staunton, Virginia.
But not all was harmonious within the Democratic ranks. Waves of immigra-
tion wrought havoc in Democratic Party councils. These foreign-born Ameri-
cans, mostly Roman Catholics, gravitated to the Democrats early and sought a
voice in their state and national conventions. Most supported New York gover-
nor Alfred E. Smith in his quest for the Democratic presidential nomination in
1924. But the two-thirds rule prevented Smith from capturing the nomination.
After 103 ballots, an exhausted convention finally turned to John W. Davis, a
well-known lawyer whose views on race were acceptable to the South.
The many attempts to quell these internal party squabbles did not solve the
nominating dilemma, because the argument between the Hamiltonian and Jef-
fersonian perspectives became linked to the ongoing debate about what kind
 Nominating Presidents 75

of president we should have. Those advocating a Hamiltonian nation-centered

system believed leaders with popular support make the best presidents, even if
they aren’t likely to be beholden to party bosses. Those who subscribed to a Jef-
fersonian approach held that candidates need sufficient institutional backing to
mount a winning campaign and form a successful administration.
Interlude: Presidential Selection and the Rise of Hamiltonian Nationalism.
During the nineteenth century, the youthful parties zigzagged between the
Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian approaches to presidential nominating, never
quite sure how to balance the two. But during the Progressive Era, Hamiltonian
nationalism started to gain the upper hand. Recall that the principal goal of
the progressive movement was to create a more open and democratic electoral
process. One means to accomplish this was to allow average voters a say in nom-
inations. By 1912, a dozen states adopted presidential primaries, and a few years
later about one-half followed suit.
Back then, the outcome of these primaries was only advisory, as convention
delegates were not automatically assigned to the winners, making them little
more than political “beauty contests.” The results provided information to party
leaders as to which candidates were popular, but convention delegates were not
bound to support them. This gave local party leaders bargaining leverage at the
conventions. Although the growth of presidential primaries was at first only a
symbolic step toward a national nomination process, it was an important one
for what it foreshadowed.
Beginning with Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Democratic Party adopted a
Hamiltonian approach to picking its presidential candidates. In 1936, Roosevelt
succeeded in having the Democratic Convention strike down the two-thirds
rule, despite vigorous resistance from southerners. Former navy secretary and
ambassador to Mexico Josephus Daniels spoke for the administration: “The
Democratic Party today is a national party, and Northern, Southern, and West-
ern states would have greater representation in the party conventions under a
majority rule.”32 Southerners argued that revoking the two-thirds rule would
drastically reduce the role of individual states in the nomination process. On the
surface, it was a call to a Jeffersonian-like system. Below the surface, Southerners
realized that if a two-thirds majority was needed for the nomination, they could
act in unison to veto any nominee they did not like, most pointedly nominees
who held liberal positions on racial issues. The end of the two-thirds rule was a
blow to these efforts.
Following Roosevelt’s four successful presidential campaigns, Democrats
continued in the Hamiltonian tradition as their nominating process became
76 chapter 4

increasingly nationalized. In 1952, a Democratic National Committee mem-

ber lost his seat because he supported Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower for
president. Four years later, the Democratic Convention passed a resolution that
required a state to list the party’s presidential nominee on its ballot for its del-
egates to be seated in the convention hall.33 A major step toward nationalizing
the parties occurred in 1964, when the so-called Mississippi Freedom Democratic
Party claimed to be more representative of that state’s Democratic voters than
the “regulars” who ran the state Democratic Party. Asked to settle the dispute
between the two factions, the 1964 Democratic Convention passed a resolution
forbidding discrimination in choosing delegates. Henceforth, delegates would be
chosen without regard to their race, creed, or national origins. If a state delegation
did not comply with the new rule, it could be ejected from the convention hall. A
committee chaired by New Jersey governor Richard Hughes would be responsible
for implementing the rule. On July 2, 1967, Hughes wrote to the DNC and all
state Democratic Party chairs outlining six requirements each state must meet to
comply with the charge of the 1964 convention. Failure would mean that the seats
would be vacated and filled by the convention—an unprecedented act at that time.
Not all states met Governor Hughes’s criteria. In 1968, the Democratic
Convention tossed out all the Mississippi and half of the Georgia delegations
for violating the Hughes resolution. In addition, the delegates abolished the
146-year-old unit rule that permitted a state to cast all its votes for a presidential
candidate even if other candidates had support within the delegation. Then, in
the aftermath of what became a violent and tumultuous national convention,
Democrats went so far as to authorize the creation of the McGovern-Fraser Com-
mission that would recommend dramatic reforms to the nominating process.
Fourth Attempt: The McGovern-Fraser Commission. At first, it appeared that
the 1968 convention would be a dull affair because Lyndon B. Johnson, the
sitting Democratic president, gave every indication of seeking another term of
office, and not since Chester Arthur in 1884 had a party denied an incumbent
president renomination. However, Johnson’s plans were upended when Eugene
McCarthy, a little-known senator from Minnesota, decided to run against him
as an anti-Vietnam War candidate. McCarthy had few resources and even less
backing from party leaders. But with a battalion of antiwar activists drawn from
college campuses, McCarthy opposed Johnson in the New Hampshire primary.
Johnson defeated McCarthy as expected, but his margin of victory was a min-
iscule eight points—an extremely poor showing for an incumbent president.
Johnson read the result as a sign that a successful reelection campaign would be
difficult to wage, and in a dramatic turn of events, he stunned the country by
 Nominating Presidents 77

saying in a nationally televised address, “I shall not seek, and I will not accept,
the nomination of my party for another term as your president.”34
Johnson’s departure did not mean that most Democratic Party leaders were
ready to back McCarthy—quite the contrary. If Johnson was out, the choice of
establishment Democrats was his second in command, Vice President Hubert
H. Humphrey. Given the relative unanimity of party leaders supporting his
candidacy, Humphrey did not need to campaign in any of the seventeen states
holding primaries in 1968. This infuriated anti-Vietnam War demonstrators
among the Democratic Party rank-and-file, who charged that Humphrey was
a member of the Johnson administration that had escalated US involvement
in Vietnam. Robert F. Kennedy, the brother of the late president and a US sen-
ator from New York, entered the primaries and, along with McCarthy, fueled
an anti-Humphrey movement. For a while, it looked as though Kennedy had a
chance to win the nomination. He drew large crowds, received substantial media
attention, and won most of the primaries he entered. Whether Kennedy would
have been nominated is left to historical debate, as an assassin ended his life on
the night he won the California primary.
Kennedy’s assassination left the nation in a state of shock and the Demo-
cratic Party in tatters. So deep were the internal party divisions that essentially
two conventions were held in Chicago during the summer of 1968: the tradi-
tional one in the convention hall, and an anti-party protest in the streets outside.
Mayor Richard J. Daley, Chicago’s Democratic boss, refused to grant the crowds
of young college students who descended upon the city a permit to demonstrate
against the Vietnam War, but the students demonstrated anyway. Daley’s police
attacked them with clubs and tear gas, creating what authorities subsequently
described as a “police riot.” Inside the hall, in a jarring contrast to the violence
outside, party leaders nominated Humphrey amid the usual convention hoopla.
Presidential chronicler Theodore H. White wrote darkly that Humphrey has
been “nominated in a sea of blood.”35
The protests in the streets, a widespread perception that Humphrey won his
party’s nod unfairly because he had not competed in a single primary, and raucous
dissent within the Democratic ranks led to the creation of the McGovern-Fraser
Commission. As George McGovern, then a US senator from South Dakota,
recalled, “Many of the most active supporters of Gene McCarthy and Robert
Kennedy and later of me, believed that the Democratic presidential nominat-
ing process was dominated by party wheel horses, entrenched officeholders, and
local bosses. They believed that despite the strong popular showing of McCar-
thy and Kennedy in the primaries, a majority of the convention delegates were
78 chapter 4

selected in a manner that favored the so-called establishment candidates.”36 The

McGovern-Fraser Commission, which he led, arrived (not surprisingly) at a sim-
ilar conclusion. In evocative language, it urged Democrats to change their ways:
“If we are not an open party; if we do not represent the demands of change, then
the danger is not that the people will go to the Republican Party; it is that there
will no longer be a way for people committed to orderly change to fulfill their
needs and desires within our traditional political system. It is that they will turn
to third and fourth party politics or the anti-politics of the street.”37
Chaired first by McGovern and later by Minnesota congressman Donald
Fraser, the commission (which was officially called the Committee on Party
Structure and Delegate Selection) adopted several recommendations that fur-
ther nationalized presidential politics, including:
• A reaffirmation of the abolition of the unit rule, an action already approved
by the 1968 Democratic Convention.
• Refusing to seat delegates chosen in backrooms.
• Prohibiting certain public or party officeholders from serving as delegates
to county, state, and national conventions by virtue of their official position.
• Banning proxy voting, a practice used by party bosses to cast votes on behalf
of absent delegates often without their knowledge.
• Ordering states to choose delegates during the calendar year in which the
convention is held.
• Requiring states to post public notices announcing the selection of a dele-
gate slate that would be committed to a particular candidate and inviting
the rank and file to participate in the selection process.
• Creating a Compliance Review Division within the DNC to ensure that
states obeyed the McGovern-Fraser recommendations.
In effect, the McGovern-Fraser Commission told the party establishment to
“reform or else.” As McGovern recalled: “In public statements, speeches, and
interviews, I drove home the contention that the Democratic Party had but two
choices: reform or death. In the past, I noted, political parties, when confronted
with the need for change, chose death rather than change. I did not want the
Democratic Party to die. I wanted our party to choose the path of change and
vitality. That was the function of the reforms.”38
But behind the reforms lay another agenda: removing the so-called “Old
Democrats”—mostly white, middle-aged, establishment types who supported
the Vietnam War—and replacing them with “New Politics Democrats” who
were younger, college-educated professionals, women, and minorities who were
 Nominating Presidents 79

anti-war, anti-establishment, and anti-party. The commission exceeded all ex-

pectations in achieving this objective. At the 1968 Democratic Convention, just
14 percent of the delegates were women, two percent were under age thirty, and
only 5 percent were Black. Four years later, women accounted for 36 percent of
the delegates; those under age thirty, 23 percent; Black delegates, 14 percent.
But increased diversity came with a high electoral price tag. In an unprece-
dented act, the 1972 Democratic Convention voted to exclude the delegates from
Cook County, Illinois (including Chicago), led by Chicago party boss Richard
Daley, and replaced them with pro-McGovern delegates led by a young civil
rights activist named Jesse Jackson. The US Supreme Court subsequently af-
firmed the convention’s right to do this using decidedly Hamiltonian language:
“The convention serves the pervasive national interest in the selection of candi-
dates for national offices and this national interest is greater than any interest
of any individual state.”39 Establishment Democrats were astounded at the con-
vention’s actions and their ratification by the Supreme Court. Daley delegates
had won the Illinois primary, whereas Jackson’s slate had not even competed.
Moreover, Daley was viewed as key to winning this electoral vote-rich state
in the fall. As it turned out, McGovern (who won the 1972 nomination in part
by understanding the new rules better than anyone) lost Illinois (and forty-eight
other states) to Republican Richard M. Nixon. But by removing the Daley del-
egation on the grounds that it had less than the requisite number of women,
young, and Black delegates, the convention opened a Pandora’s box on the mat-
ter of representation and delegate selection. As McGovern later acknowledged,
“Whatever the commission originally intended, in administering the guide-
lines on minorities, women, and young people, it eventually moved very close to
adopting a de facto quota system.”40
Today, the issue of representation remains at the forefront of Democratic
Party politics. In 2020, Democratic Party rules required each state party reach
out to historically under-represented groups and that delegate selection should
prioritize “African Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans, Asian Americans
and Pacific Islanders and women.” Moreover, each state delegation should be
evenly divided between men and women.41
Along with mandating specifics of the composition of each state’s delegation,
the commission also sought changes in how they were to be selected. The 1968
fiasco drove home to the reformers that party bosses held the power to select
nodminees in a closed process. The commission’s proclamation that delegate
selection must be “open, timely, and representative” was somewhat vague, but
there was no doubt that it was written with the intention of opening windows in
80 chapter 4

the proverbial smoked-filled room. As few states wished to jeopardize their role
at the next convention by violating the spirit of the McGovern-Frasier reforms,
most state Democratic Party leaders shrugged their shoulders and abandoned
their state conventions in favor of primaries and caucuses where the rank and
file would make their presidential preferences known. As compensation, these
leaders would retain a decisive voice in selecting their own candidates for state
and local offices.
The shift from party leaders to primary voters deciding who would be the
next president has been significant. In most of the states that hold primaries,
voters choose how many delegates each candidate will have at the nomination
convention. A candidate who nets 50 percent of the primary votes, for instance,
will receive 50 percent of the state’s delegation. The actual delegates themselves
are usually selected by state party meetings and conventions, but, unlike the
“advisory” primary system of the Progressive Era, they are bound to support
the candidate they were sent to support, at least on the first ballot. Other states
have a “pure” primary system whereby voters directly elect delegates to the na-
tional convention, with each would-be delegate’s candidate preference listed on
the ballot. Delegates chosen under this system are duty-bound to support their
affiliated candidate.
Republicans Follow the McGovern-Fraser Lead. The gusts of change blow-
ing through Democratic Convention halls rattled Republican windows, too.
Although not subject to the recommendations of the McGovern-Fraser Com-
mission, Republicans felt its effects when state legislatures passed laws man-
dating state presidential primaries. Several state legislatures, largely controlled
by Democrats, passed laws mandating presidential primaries for both parties.
Republicans also engaged in a modest effort to alter their rules in the name
of fairness. The 1972 Republican convention authorized the creation of a Del-
egate-Organization (DO) Committee. The purpose of the DO Committee
(called the “Do-Nothing Committee” by critics) was to recommend measures
for enhancing the numbers of women, youth, and minority delegates at future
Republican conventions. The committee proposed that traditional party leaders
be prohibited from serving as ex-officio delegates; that party officials should
better inform citizens how they could participate in the nomination process;
and that participation should be increased by opening the primaries and state
conventions to all qualified citizens.
But the 1976 Republican Convention rejected several of the committee’s
more important recommendations, including allowing persons under twen-
ty-five years of age to vote in “numerical equity to their voting strength in a
 Nominating Presidents 81

state;” encouraging equal numbers of men and women delegates; and having
one minority group member on each of the convention’s principal committees.
Later, the RNC rejected a recommendation that it review state affirmative ac-
tion plans, and the GOP has refused to abolish winner-take-all primaries.
Today, Republicans continue to have winner-take-all primaries in selected
states. In 2020, Donald Trump called for an end to primaries and caucuses,
preferring to have state party conventions choose the delegates instead. Failing
that, Trump argued for more winner-take-all primaries, in a successful effort to
quash any significant intra-party challenges to his renomination.42

The Unintended Consequences of the McGovern-Fraser Reforms

In its effort to open the presidential selection process to the party-in-the-elector-
ate, the McGovern-Fraser reforms unleashed several unintended consequences.
These include the end of political conventions as the locus of the nominating
process; the creation of today’s marathon nomination schedule; the emergence
of outsider candidates; and a power shift from party elites to media elites and
social networking activists.
The Demise of Conventions. In the 1965 edition of The World Book Encyclo-
pedia, nominating conventions were described as forums for allowing “all cit-
izens an opportunity to observe one of the processes of representative govern-
ment. And when two strong candidates seek nomination, a national convention
is more exciting than a World Series.”43 But it has been years since a convention
has been more exciting than a World Series. In 1972, Richard Nixon antici-
pated contemporary party conventions by scripting every moment of the event
for television. Nixon faced no serious opposition in his quest for renomination
and viewed the convention as a four-day infomercial in which his party could
message voters and produce dramatic images (including a huge balloon drop
at the end). Since then, conventions gradually became staged opportunities
for parties to showcase their best arguments and images. But scripted conven-
tions held no suspense and therefore no news value, and over time television
networks cut back on their coverage as ratings steadily fell. In 2020, just 24.6
million viewers watched the Democratic Convention compared to 29.8 mil-
lion in 2016. Similarly, 23.8 million watched the 2020 Republican Convention
compared to the 32.2 million that viewed the proceedings in 2016. Viewership
on social media enhanced these figures but accounted for people watching only
select moments of the conventions rather than the gavel-to-gavel viewership
they once commanded.
82 chapter 4

A Proliferation of Primaries. The McGovern-Fraser Commission had not

intended to create a marathon presidential campaign, but that has been the ef-
fective result of substantially increasing the number of presidential primaries.
In 1960, John F. Kennedy could announce his presidential campaign early in
the year and win his party’s nomination after running in only three prima-
ries. As we have seen, the 2020 presidential campaign started just as the 2016
campaign ended, and the 2024 campaign (at least on the Republican side) is
already underway.
In 2020, forty-seven of the fifty states scheduled Democratic primaries—only
Iowa, Nevada, and Wyoming held caucuses—and Republicans generally followed
a similar path (although several primary dates were moved to mid-and late sum-
mer, and some Republican primaries were canceled in favor of state party-run
conventions because of the pandemic). While 2020 presented its own unique set
of circumstances, it remains true that successful presidential candidates must run
virtually everywhere, meaning that in years without a public health crisis they
must have a presence in two, or three, or even four different places at once.
Primary and caucus dates change every presidential election cycle, but custom
and tradition keep Iowa and New Hampshire at the top of the schedule as the
first caucus and primary states, respectively. To add diversity to these two small
states with mostly white non-urban populations, the Democratic Party has en-
sured that Nevada and South Carolina follow them. Their addition also adds
regional balance to the early primary calendar. Democrats are currently debating
whether Nevada and South Carolina should be moved ahead of Iowa and New
Hampshire and whether the Iowa caucus should be scrapped altogether in favor
of a primary. Such debates follow a pattern: since 1972, the rules for conducting
presidential contests have undergone revisions every four years.
In 2020, Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, and South Carolina held their con-
tests during the month of February. There is a clear advantage to going early
because candidates who do poorly early on find it difficult to raise money and
tend to lose supporters, so as the primary calendar progresses the field of poten-
tial nominees shrinks. This motivates states to hold their primaries and caucuses
as early as possible after the first four and has led to a glut of contests typically
on the same day in early March, dubbed “Super Tuesday” (in 2020, there were
sixteen Super Tuesday primaries).44
Primary rules affect candidate strategies and can complicate the marathon
presidential contest. Historically, Republicans have preferred winner-take-all
primaries with the popular vote winner receiving all of that state’s delegates.
Democrats adhere to a 15 percent rule whereby candidates must win 15 percent
 Nominating Presidents 83

of the vote in a congressional district to earn delegates. The more votes above
15 percent, the more delegates awarded. This complicated process requires an
intricate familiarity with the election calendar and party rules. Some states
hold open primaries whereby anyone can vote. Others have semi-open prima-
ries where only registered party members and independents can participate. Still
others have closed primaries where only individuals registered with the party
can cast ballots.
Caucus states require party members to assemble in public forums, which can
last for several hours, and openly declare whom they support. Unlike primaries,
which are state-run elections, caucuses are party-run affairs, and they tend to
attract activists and strong partisans who do not mind devoting an evening or an
afternoon to participating. Once fairly widespread, caucuses have fallen out of
favor. In 2020, the Iowa Democratic party had difficulty tallying and reporting
their results, causing a long delay in announcing the winner and further under-
mining the reputation of caucuses as a means for selecting convention delegates.
The Emergence of Outsider Candidates. The McGovern-Fraser Commis-
sion facilitated George McGovern’s insurgent anti-Vietnam War candidacy in
1972. It would not be the last time an outsider would be favored by the rules his
commission had put in place. Successful insurgent candidacies have included
Democrat Jimmy Carter and Republican Donald Trump. Other insurgencies
have made establishment favorites work hard to win their party nomination. In
1976, Ronald Reagan ran as an insurgent against incumbent President Gerald
Ford and nearly defeated him for the Republican nomination. Forty years later,
Bernie Sanders waged a spirited insurgency against the highly favored Hillary
Clinton that took the entire primary season to resolve. And we saw how Joe
Biden, a forty-plus-year political veteran, was seriously challenged by Sanders,
as well as by Kamala Harris, Elizabeth Warren, and newcomer Pete Buttigieg.
In the post-McGovern-Fraser world, no establishment-backed candidate is ever
certain to win their party’s nomination because the primary process gives out-
siders an opportunity to capture a political moment in time and parlay it into a
presidential nomination.
The Press and Social Media Play Important Roles. As the nomination process
became primary-centered, it also became candidate-centered, with candidates
needing to appeal directly to voters to win primaries and amass delegates rather
than working within party structures to win the support of party leaders. This
shift caused candidates to turn to the media to broadcast their message to voters
to earn their support. Initially, the process was driven by television. Today, social
media has assumed an important role.
84 chapter 4

One unanticipated result of the party reform process is that instead of shift-
ing control over the nominating system from party elites to the rank and file,
reform efforts have transformed individual candidates into free agents who
campaign on television and online, unwittingly making media elites important
power brokers. This development has thrust both journalists and social media
influencers into the heart of the process, replacing party elders as the new king-
makers. Collectively, these reporters and influencers exercise a form of “peer
review,” acting as political analysts who send cues about who is (and who is not)
a serious candidate. Candidates play to these influencers and amplify their pos-
itive messaging on their social media feeds.
Traditional political reporters are fascinated with the campaign horserace—
who’s up, who’s down, and why. In the months before primary voting begins,
they look at metrics like which candidates raised the most money and how they
rank in public opinion polls to assess whose future looks bright and whose star
is fading. In fact, this preprimary period has been dubbed the “money primary”
where criteria for success include a candidate’s standing in the national polls, how
much money they have raised, and the strength of their respective organizations.
Once the primaries begin, these same reporters assess a candidate’s viability
by looking at wins and loses measured against prior expectations of how they
believed candidates would perform. In 2016, Donald Trump’s unexpected
first-place New Hampshire finish gave him an added bump in media coverage
(and campaign donations). Four years later, Pete Buttigieg received a polling
“bounce” from his unexpected (to reporters) photo finish in Iowa. Eight days
later, Bernie Sanders, Buttigieg, and Amy Klobuchar found themselves in the
media spotlight after beating press expectations in New Hampshire. Outsider
candidates who can maintain a level of overperformance can parlay press at-
tention into a long run through the primary season—and possibly into a party
nomination. This gives journalists and social media influencers the ability to
broker outcomes in a manner once reserved for party elites.

Reforming the Reforms: Democrats Tinker with the Rules

The unintended consequences of the McGovern-Fraser reforms have not stopped
Democrats from continuously tinkering with their presidential nomination sys-
tem. The 1972 Democratic Convention authorized the creation of a Commis-
sion on Delegate Selection and Party Structure chaired by Baltimore’s then city
councilwoman Barbara Mikulski. The Mikulski Commission reaffirmed the
idea of choosing convention delegates through direct primaries and state party
 Nominating Presidents 85

caucuses and having a delegate’s presidential preference clearly expressed on a

state ballot. But even more radically, the commission recommended that anyone
receiving 10 percent of the primary or caucus votes receive a proportionate share
of the delegates. The DNC agreed with the basic thrust of the recommenda-
tion but raised the threshold to 15 percent. This furthered the revolution in the
nominating process that began with the McGovern-Fraser Commission, putting
party bosses out of business and giving candidates motivated more by ideology or
opportunity than pragmatism a realistic opportunity to seize the reins of power.
This did not work out well for Democrats, who went on to lose all but one
presidential election in the 1970s and 1980s. Consequently, they kept trying
to adjust the nomination process to produce competitive candidates. Reform
commissions abounded. In 1975, Democratic National Committee chairman
Robert Strauss created the Commission on the Role and Future of Presidential
Primaries, chaired by Morley Winograd, the Michigan State Democratic chair.
The Winograd Commission recommended that each state Democratic Party
“adopt specific goals and timetables” to carry out affirmative action programs,
citing women, Blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans as groups for which re-
medial action was needed to overcome the effects of past discrimination. Upon
receiving the commission report, the DNC immediately ordered that state del-
egations comprise equal numbers of men and women (a rule that continues to
be enforced).
Taken together, these changes banished much of the Democratic Party estab-
lishment from the convention proceedings. Before the McGovern-Fraser Com-
mission, 83 percent of Democratic governors, 68 percent of senators, and 39 per-
cent of representatives attended the 1968 Democratic Convention as delegates
or alternates.45 In 1984, New York Times columnist Tom Wicker wrote that the
Democratic Party’s obsession with representation in the selection process had
overcome its desire to win presidential contests: “[Democrats have become] a
party of access in which the voiceless find a voice while Republican control of
the presidency has permitted them to maintain enough coherence and unity to
become a party of government.”46
Jimmy Carter’s 1980 landslide loss to Ronald Reagan prompted the creation
of the Hunt Commission, chaired by North Carolina governor James Hunt,
which undertook to restore some modicum of elite influence to the nominat-
ing process. It called for the creation of “superdelegates”—that is, Democratic
officials and party officeholders who would be automatic convention delegates.
Not officially bound to any candidate, superdelegates could, in theory, reverse
the verdict of the rank-and-file primary voters in a closely contested nomination
86 chapter 4

race. They were an important part of the 2016 contest between Hillary Clinton
and Bernie Sanders. That year Clinton won overwhelming support from the su-
perdelegates.47 Many were reluctant to support Sanders given that he served as an
independent in the Senate who caucused with Democrats but did not identify as
one. Sanders’ supporters cried foul and rejected the concept of superdelegates on
the grounds that they were not selected by primary voters. Clinton and Sanders
struck a deal to create a new Unity Commission that would dramatically reduce
the number of superdelegates and bind them to the results of their respective
state primaries and caucuses, thus moving the Democratic Party 180 degrees
away from the reforms of the Hunt Commission. In 2020, there were just 771
Democratic superdelegates out of a total of 4,750, and they were precluded from
voting on the convention’s first ballot. Under the new rules, only if a convention
were deadlocked and required more than one ballot could superdelegates cast a
vote.48 Sanders and his reformers understood how unlikely that was to occur. No
party convention has required a second ballot since 1952, effectively making the
superdelegates superfluous.

Looking to the Future

After centuries of altering the method of selecting presidential nominees and
multiple reform commissions, the riddle that confronted the Framers remains:
How do we find an optimal way to select the president and what characteristics
do we want the president to have? As the nationally elected executive, we might
side with the Hamiltonian perspective that the president should be a leader who
can articulate issues and solutions that are in the national interest. But who gets
to define the “national interest”? Is it the individual and corporate contributors
whose dollars fuel successful presidential campaigns? Is it reporters and social
media influencers who set the terms of success in nomination campaigns? Is it
those few individual candidates willing to endure a grueling selection process
for the chance of being the one left standing at the end? Or is it state and local
party leaders who believed that winning candidates were good for their party
and the country?
When it comes to choosing a president, the focus on the individual rather
than the party, which has prevailed since 1968, complicates answers to these
questions. The Framers’ attempt to devise a presidential selection system that
would create a presidency free of partisan constraints resulted in the creation of
the Electoral College, which failed to work almost as soon as parties developed.
By the mid-1800s, political parties became more firmly rooted in American
 Nominating Presidents 87

tradition, and the party convention, which emphasizes group activity rather than
individual choice, supplanted the congressional caucus. The party convention
enjoyed a long life, in part because it fused a Jeffersonian-like federalism with
Hamiltonian nationalism and became a source of social activity in an era when
parties were an important socializing force. But as a collective decision-making
entity the traditional convention is no more—a victim of reform and the am-
bitions of would-be presidents. Today, conventions ratify; they do not decide.
While ambition has always been a characteristic of presidential candidates,
today’s system rewards those with unquenchable determination like never be-
fore. No longer do presidential candidates wait in line for party leaders to tell
them it’s their turn. In 1960, reporter Richard Reeves wrote that the most im-
portant feature of John F. Kennedy’s career was his ambition:
He did not wait his turn. He directly challenged the institution he wanted
to control, the political system. After him, no one else wanted to wait ei-
ther, and few institutions were rigid enough or flexible enough to survive
impatient ambition-driven challenges. He believed (and proved) that the
only qualification for the most powerful job in the world was wanting it.
His power did not come from the top down nor from the bottom up. It
was an ax driven by his own ambition into the middle of the system, biting
to the center he wanted for himself. When he was asked early in 1960 why
he thought he should be president, he answered: “I look around me at the
others in the race, and I say to myself, well, if they think they can do it why
not me? ‘Why not me?’ That’s the answer. And I think it’s enough.”49
Since Kennedy uttered those words, every presidential candidate has said, in
effect, “Why not me?” In presenting themselves to the public, these driven con-
tenders have relied on their own personas, rather than their party affiliations,
to help them get elected. Celebrity politics is entertaining, but it is not party
politics. While Donald Trump was morphing from a cultural figure into a seri-
ous presidential candidate, his ties to the Republican Party were, at best, nom-
inal. Trump had previously given campaign contributions to many Democrats,
including Hillary Clinton, and he had changed party registration five times,
having been alternately a Democrat, a member of the Reform Party, an inde-
pendent, and a Republican. Meanwhile, Bernie Sanders came close to winning
the Democratic nomination in 2016 and 2020, despite having had no previous
affiliation with the party.
The investment required to run for president can yield dividends for can-
didates even if they lose, making the decision to run attractive to ambitious
88 chapter 4

politicians. Ted Cruz, Ben Carson, and Chris Christie all became media per-
sonalities after their unsuccessful 2016 presidential runs. Kamala Harris, Pete
Buttigieg, Amy Klobuchar, Elizabeth Warren, and Andrew Yang saw their pub-
lic profiles enhanced by their failed 2020 candidacies. For Buttigieg, running
unsuccessfully for president led to a high-profile cabinet appointment in the
Biden administration. Harris, of course, became vice president.
More than two centuries after looking to the Electoral College as a means for
choosing presidents, the nomination system remains an imperfect work in prog-
ress. There almost certainly will be future tinkers, and besides wondering what
kind of president we want, we may also be wise to ask “How do we get a president
who can govern effectively?” Because the way the selection process rewards some
candidates and punishes others is directly related to the skills the winner will
bring to the office. Systems of presidential selection have sequentially rewarded
individuals of strong reputation with ties to a congressional elite, then insid-
ers with strong connections to power brokers, and then popular figures with
a media presence who can raise a lot of money and speak directly to voters. As
these criteria shifted control of the selection process from elites and insiders to
candidates and their supporters, political parties have lost the ability determine
who will win the most coveted prize in politics: nomination by a major party
for the presidency of the United States. The dilemma of trying to create a nom-
ination system that fuses Hamiltonian nationalism with a Jeffersonian concern
for state and local sensibilities remains unsolved in favor of the Hamiltonian
approach now favored by both Democrats and Republicans.
 Ch a pter 5

Party Brand Loyalty and the American Voter

H
istorically, election nights have been exciting affairs. But
in 2020, election night turned into election week, as millions of vot-
ers, seeking to avoid the ravages of the COVID-19 pandemic, cast
their ballots by mail. Those who turned out in person voted overwhelmingly for
Donald Trump, creating what some analysts described as a “red mirage” as state
after state reported these same-day votes immediately, giving the incumbent an
early lead. Then, as predominantly Democratic mail-in ballots were tallied in
the hours and days after the polls closed, the contours of the election came into
focus. Joe Biden won the presidency by a resounding seven million popular votes,
but his margins of victory in such swing states as Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Ari-
zona, Nevada, and Georgia were tantalizingly close. Donald Trump refused to
accept the results, and the post-election chaos that resulted—including an insur-
rection at the US Capitol as the electoral votes were being certified—ignited a
combustible political atmosphere. Two months after the election, two-thirds of
Republicans believed that Biden’s election was not legitimate while 97 percent
of Democrats said it was.1
As the post-2020 election drama indicates, we are living through an especially
charged partisan moment, when the two major parties consist of nonoverlapping
coalitions of voters who would move the country in diametrically opposite direc-
tions. This has divided the nation into two camps and turned national elections
into existential all-or-nothing events. We see the divide in historically low defec-
tion rates among Republican and Democratic voters, with few abandoning their
party to support the opposition. In 2020, 94 percent of Democrats supported
Joe Biden while 94 percent of Republicans backed Donald Trump.2 This high
level of party unity has been consistent in twenty-first century presidential elec-
tions, and it is a sharp break from several post–World War II elections of the
twentieth century when crossover party voting was much more widespread. In
2020, there were virtually no Joe Biden Republicans or Donald Trump Demo-
crats when voters marked their ballots.

89
90 chapter 5

Although we may be living in a time of hyper-partisanship, it is hardly the

first time Americans have been strongly divided by party identification. We
have seen how the vociferous disagreements between Hamilton and Jefferson
the dawn of the party age sharply divided Hamilton’s Federalist Party from Jef-
ferson’s Democrats. For the remainder of the nineteenth century, voting was
not a soul-searching exercise for Americans who maintained consistent political
identities.
This chapter treats voters as political consumers and explores how they re-
late to partisanship and political parties. We will consider the process by which
party brand loyalty develops and examine how scholars have sought to measure
it. Then, we will examine how lasting, long-term individual changes in parti-
sanship can lead to enduring shifts in party coalitions, or what we call partisan
realignment. Finally, we will describe the electoral coalitions that have emerged
to shape today’s politics. Throughout history, the sharp divides exhibited by
Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson have generated passion and drama,
as voters evaluate the positions of the parties and decide which to support.

The Importance of Party Identification

There is a rich intellectual history that endeavors to understand why people
identify with a political party by examining their political attitudes, beliefs, and
behavior. Bernard R. Berelson and Paul F. Lazarsfeld pioneered the study of
how people make voting decisions in the 1940s.3 They developed a sociological
model in which socioeconomic standing (education, income, and class); religion
(Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish); and place of residence (rural or urban) formed
an “index of political predisposition” that often determined party identifica-
tion, which, in turn, strongly influenced choices made at the ballot box. Thus, a
well-educated, white, upper-class Protestant from upstate New York would most
likely be a Republican, whereas a Black, blue-collar worker from Detroit would
most likely be a Democrat. Their approach to voting behavior emphasized the
importance of political predispositions over the persuasive elements of political
campaigns. Identifying with a political party was regarded as a declaration about
who you were and where you were born, making voters largely impervious to the
campaign pleas of Democrats and Republicans.
The sociological model explained the partisan leanings that existed from
the post–Civil War era until the New Deal. During this period, Republicans
shouted at other like-minded Republicans to vote for their candidates, and
Democrats did much the same—but few minds were changed. Although it may
 Party Brand Loyalty and the American Voter 91

have resonance in today’s deeply divided electorate, the sociological model fell
out of favor with the weakening of party loyalties during the 1950s and into
the 1960s and 1970s.4 In 1952, millions of Democrats voted for Republican
Dwight D. Eisenhower, giving the World War II hero a landslide ten-point vic-
tory. What influenced so many Democrats to back Eisenhower were issues—es-
pecially the Korean War. The Gallup Organization found that 65 percent of
voters felt Eisenhower was the best candidate able to break a vexing stalemate
in Korea.5 Four years later, Eisenhower defied the existing Democratic majority
to win again by fourteen points. Eisenhower’s landslide victories illustrated the
deficiencies associated with the sociological model. While race, ethnicity, and
location mattered in helping to form partisan inclinations, voter attitudes about
candidates and issues could also be important factors in determining who would
be victorious. This raised important substantive and methodological questions:
what individual political attitudes mattered, and how could they be measured?
Some answers were contained in The American Voter, a seminal work pub-
lished in 1960. Authors Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and
Donald Stokes presented a sociological-psychological model of voting behavior.
They agreed with Berenson and Lazarsfeld that demographics factor into voting
behavior, but they also believed that partisanship had a strong psychological di-
mension. Thus, children of parents with strong partisanship tended to identify
with their parents’ political party, whereas the children of parents without a
clear partisan preference tended to be ambivalent about politics. Once estab-
lished, party identification (or what is often referred to as party ID) frequently
persisted throughout a person’s adult life. Using data gathered in the 1950s,
Campbell and his colleagues found that nearly 85 percent of respondents stuck
with the same party throughout their lives, and a majority never voted for a
candidate of the other party.6
The American Voter is considered an important work because it introduced
a new way of understanding how people vote. Ethnicity, race, region, religion,
different economic structures (including education, occupation, and class), and
historical patterns (including parental partisanship and social class) converge in
an individual’s durable identification with a party. Once partisanship is formed,
it serves as a filter to screen information about politics through the lens of one’s
preferred party. These partisan lenses are evident to students of twenty-first cen-
tury politics. The Gallup Organization, which has measured the partisan ap-
proval gap dating back to Dwight D. Eisenhower, reported that Donald Trump
posted a then-record 77 percentage-point gap in approval ratings between Dem-
ocrats and Republicans during his presidential term. In the early months of the
92 chapter 5

Biden presidency, 96 percent of Democrats approved of Joe Biden’s performance

while just 10 percent of Republicans did so—a record partisan gap of 86 points.7
From its inception, The American Voter provided a baseline to measure how
a person’s party identification influenced individual voting choices. But like
Berelson and Lazarsfeld before them, Campbell et al. were influenced by the
prevailing political conditions of the time, which in their case was the relatively
placid late 1950s. Subsequent research would challenge and refine their conclu-
sions. In 1971, Gerald Pomper found a significant increase in the correlation
between individual policy preferences and party identification. Pomper exam-
ined seven issues (federal aid to education, government provision of medical care,
government guarantees of full employment, federal enforcement of fair employ-
ment, housing policy, school integration, and foreign aid) and found a linear
relationship between issue preferences and party identification existed on every
issue except foreign aid, whereas in the 1950s only one issue was correlated with
party ID. Additionally, the proportion of voters viewing Democrats as the more
liberal party increased since 1956, which Pomper took to mean that between the
1950s and 1960s “considerable political learning” had taken place.8
But voters don’t always have the time or inclination to ferret out a candidate’s
position on the issues. Anthony Downs, in his 1957 book An Economic Theory
of Democracy, offered a rational choice theory of voting behavior, arguing that
the benefits of arriving at a “correct” voting decision that aligns with a voter’s
preferences may not be worth the costs of compiling extensive information on
the candidates.9 Most voters want to cast an informed vote, but often lack the
time or energy to sift through the complex details of each candidate’s policy
stands and personal character. Party identification gives the busy voter a quick
and easy solution. Voters can take an information shortcut by understanding the
basic contours of what each party stands for, match that information with their
own values (thereby developing a party identification), and then vote for the
candidate that aligns with their party ID. Thus, an Election Day decision can be
made in a few quick seconds because the voter need only know each candidate’s
party to cast an “informed” vote.

Measuring Party Identification

While questions of how party identification is acquired and how it influences
vote choice have long dominated the study of political behavior, scholars have
also engaged in a closely related debate over how to measure party identification.
The most common technique employs a seven-point ordinal scale developed by
 Party Brand Loyalty and the American Voter 93

public opinion pollsters. Voters are classified by their answers to two questions.
First, respondents are asked if they consider themselves Republicans, Democrats,
or independents. Those who answer that they are either Republicans or Demo-
crats are asked a follow-up question about how strongly they identify with their
chosen party. Those who classify themselves as “independent” are subsequently
asked whether they are closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party.
Respondents are then grouped into one of seven categories: (1) strong Demo-
crat, (2) weak Democrat, (3) independent-leaning Democrat, (4) true indepen-
dent, (5) independent-leaning Republican, (6) weak Republican, and (7) strong
Republican.
The advantage of this approach is that it suggests degrees of partisanship. It
is reasonable to assume that some Democrats and Republicans are more closely
connected to their parties than others, and that many so-called independents
lean more toward one of the parties. According to one poll taken during the
2020 presidential campaign, 42 percent of Americans identified as Democrats
and 38 percent identified as Republicans. But when we break down these fig-
ures by strength of partisanship, we find that 25 percent said they were “strong
Democrats;” 6 percent said they were “not very strong Democrats;” 11 percent
were “independents who leaned toward Democrats;” 23 percent said they were
“strong Republicans;” 5 percent identified as “not very strong Republicans”; and
10 percent said they were “independents who leaned toward Republicans.” Just
13 percent identified as true “independents.”10

The Making of an Idea: Party Realignment

We have discussed how individuals form partisan attachments, but what about
the electorate as a whole? Taken together, the party affiliations of the entire body
politic—collectively, the party in the electorate— form an underlying structure
of voting behavior. This structure can endure over long periods of time, but it is
fluid enough to change in response to shifting conditions. The structure of vot-
ing behavior can determine which party has the advantage in electoral competi-
tion, the policies that are favored to emerge from government, and even whether
voters prefer Hamiltonian nationalism or Jeffersonian localism when it comes to
what they believe the federal government ought to do or not do. Sometimes these
changes are momentary, but other times they reflect deep seated shifts in voter
preferences and can be enduring. How can we tell the difference? It may require
the passage of time to know. After Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1936 landslide re-
election victory, one analyst declared that he could “see no interpretation of the
94 chapter 5

returns which does not suggest that the people of America want the president
to proceed along progressive or liberal lines.”11 In fact, voters had concluded they
wanted the federal government to act aggressively to combat the Great Depres-
sion, and they rewarded Roosevelt by returning him to office two more times.
In 1980, Republican pollster Richard Wirthlin interpreted Ronald Reagan’s
stunning victory as “a mandate for change . . . [that meant] . . . a rejection of the
New Deal agenda that had dominated American politics since the 1930s.”12 This
assessment came to pass when Republicans won landslide presidential victories
in the next two elections over liberal Democrats. In both cases, political scientists
ultimately concluded that the structure of the American party system had under-
gone a significant and lasting transformation. The 1936 and 1980 contests gave
way to historic changes in party identification that reshaped the party coalitions.
It is possible that the 2020 election represents another such juncture, with the
public turning away from the less-government Jeffersonianism of the Reagan era
in favor of Hamiltonian activism to address long-neglected issues in the wake
of the coronavirus pandemic, mounting economic inequalities, and a reckoning
on racial inequality. We will consider this possibility in the book’s conclusion.

V. O. Key and the Concept of Party Realignment

Political scientist V. O. Key Jr. was the first to argue that some elections were
more important than others. Few may remember that Franklin Pierce won the
presidency in 1852, or James Buchanan in 1856, or James Garfield in 1880, but
history notes Abraham Lincoln’s realigning election victory in 1860. From Key’s
perspective realigning elections stand out for their lasting significance in the arc
of political history, where crisis and catastrophe play a significant role in shuf-
fling the electoral deck for generations.
Lincoln’s victory in 1860 under the banner of the new Republican Party was
one such election. Lincoln’s successful prosecution of the Civil War and his proc-
lamation of a “new birth of freedom” in the Gettysburg Address convinced a
majority of voters that Republicans could be trusted to steer the ship of state into
the future. For decades thereafter, Republicans dominated their opponents in
federal elections, relegating the once-majority Democrats to second-tier status.
Franklin Roosevelt’s election in 1932 produced the same result for Demo-
crats. Previously a party devoted to a Jeffersonian “states’ rights” platform, FDR’s
Hamiltonian New Deal agenda to combat the Great Depression convinced a
majority of voters that the Democratic Party could best handle the nation’s
 Party Brand Loyalty and the American Voter 95

economy and look after the interests of the average American, ending decades
of Republican dominance.
Key explained the process of realignment through a concept he described as
critical elections. His initial understanding was that critical elections are char-
acterized by sharp reorganizations of party loyalties over short periods of time
in response to traumatic national events that the previous alignment of politi-
cal parties was unable to successfully manage. In these contests, voter turnout
is high, and new, long-lasting party coalitions are formed. Subsequently, Key
modified his original idea to allow for the possibility that lasting changes in par-
tisanship are sometimes not so dramatic. Rather, party loyalties can erode among
some groups and regions over many years. Key termed these changes secular
realignments, defining them as “a movement of the members of a population
category from party to party that extends over several presidential elections and
appears to be independent of the peculiar factors influencing the vote at indi-
vidual elections.”13 Key placed no time limit on the pace of this change, noting
that it could take as long as fifty years.
Key’s ideas about critical elections and secular realignments gained wide-
spread notice among political scientists. Enhancing its appeal was the pro-party
argument that underpinned realignment theory. Parties were credited with
being important agents in maintaining the stability of the constitutional order.
Instead of resorting to arms or tearing up the US Constitution whenever ca-
tastrophe struck, political scientists believed that voters used political parties to
engineer significant policy changes. The US Constitution works because polit-
ical parties work, or so went the argument.
As analysis of electoral change expanded to include polling data that could
pinpoint changes within narrowly defined population groups (e.g., white
non-college educated vs. white college educated voters), party realignment took
on added significance. Walter Dean Burnham, a major proponent of the realign-
ment concept, published Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Pol-
itics (1970), in which he transformed Key’s simple idea of critical elections into a
generalized theory of party realignment. Burnham outlined five conditions that
characterized the “ideal-typical” partisan realignment:

• There are short, sharp reorganizations of the major party voter coalitions
that occur at periodic intervals.
• Third-party revolts often precede party realignments and reveal the inca-
pacity of “politics-as-usual.”
96 chapter 5

• There is abnormal stress in the socioeconomic system that is strongly asso-

ciated with fundamental partisan change.
• Ideological polarizations and issue distances between the major parties
become exceptionally large by normal standards.
• Realignments have durable consequences and determine the general out-
lines of important public policies in the decades that follow.14

Using this classification scheme, Burnham cited the elections of Andrew

Jackson in 1828, Abraham Lincoln in 1860, William McKinley in 1896, and
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932 as having met the conditions of party realignment.
In each case, voter interest and turnout were high, there were significant third-
party revolts either in the actual election or in the contests leading up to it, and
the differences between the parties were exceptionally large, even considering the
Hamiltonian-Jeffersonian divide. In making his calculations, Burnham discov-
ered a rhythm to US politics–namely, that realigning elections occur once every
twenty-eight to thirty-six years. Thus, if a realigning election happened in 1932
as Burnham suggests, one could expect another realignment to occur circa 1968.
Indeed, an argument can be made that Republican Richard M. Nixon’s close
victory over Democrat Hubert H. Humphrey in 1968 met the conditions of
a classic party realignment. The differences between the two parties on issues
such as civil rights, the Vietnam War, and what became known as the “social
issues” (crime, abortion, pornography, etc.) were significant. Moreover, there
was a major third-party revolt by supporters of Alabama governor George C.
Wallace, whose presidential candidacy garnered 14 percent of the popular vote
(a feat not surpassed until 1992 when Ross Perot captured 19 percent of the bal-
lots cast). As Republican political analyst Kevin Phillips perceptively wrote in
his 1969 book The Emerging Republican Majority, “Far from being the tenuous
and unmeaningful victory suggested by [some] critical observers, the election of
Richard M. Nixon as president of the United States in November 1968 bespoke
the end of the New Deal Democratic hegemony and the beginning of a new era
in American politics.”15
But if 1968 was a realigning election it had a quite different feel from those that
preceded it. Although Republicans began a string of presidential victories, Dem-
ocrats retained comfortable majorities in both houses of Congress for many years
afterwards. Democrats controlled the Senate from 1968 to 1980, narrowly losing
control in the 1980 Reagan landslide but reclaiming majority status in 1986, and
they held the House majority until 1994. Reagan won reelection in a landslide in
 Party Brand Loyalty and the American Voter 97

1984, but Democrats maintained a seventy-one-seat margin in the House—the

largest edge for a party that did not control the White House since 1895.
Thus, while the party system created by Franklin D. Roosevelt had died, the
“ideal-type” of partisan realignment forecast by Burnham failed to materialize.
Scholars tried to resolve this inconsistency.16 Some attributed the Republican
failure to produce a classic realignment to the aftereffects of Watergate. In 1974,
Democrats added forty-nine seats in the House—enough to ensure control for
twenty years until Newt Gingrich and his Republican allies took over. Others
attributed the failure of either party to achieve a classic realignment to presidents
who were all too willing to eschew their party affiliations to win more votes.
This begs the question of why they would do this if they felt they could assem-
ble winning coalitions with the support of their fellow partisans in the elector-
ate—a question that speaks to changes in the strength of partisan preferences
that we will address shortly.
If Nixon’s 1968 election marked the beginning of a realignment, and if Burn-
ham is correct that realignments occur once every twenty-eight to thirty-six
years, then we might have expected another realigning election to have occurred
by 2004 (the outside limit of the thirty-six-year period). However, the evidence
is mixed. Democrats did win the presidency in 2008, 2012, and 2020, and Re-
publicans have not won a popular vote presidential majority since 2004. In 2016,
Donald Trump prevailed in the Electoral College, but lost the popular vote by
2.9 million—a margin almost six times greater than George W. Bush’s popular
vote loss to Al Gore. In 2020, Biden accrued more popular votes than any pres-
idential candidate in history. At the same time, control of Congress has toggled
back and forth between the parties, making divided government the norm.

Challenges to Party Realignment Theory

Despite the attempts of Key and Burnham to develop a predictive theory of
party realignment, one problem persisted: voters refused to cooperate. This was
partly the result of waning voter attachment to either party. From the late 1960s
through the early 1980s, there was a dramatic decline in the percentage of vot-
ers who identified as Democrats or Republicans, choosing instead to identify
as independents. This was a period of dealignment—meaning that voters were
moving away from both political parties. One 1983 poll found most respondents
said there was “no difference” between Democrats and Republicans when it
came to reducing crime, stopping the spread of communism, dealing effectively
98 chapter 5

with the Soviet Union, providing quality education, reducing the risk of nuclear
war, providing health care, reducing waste and inefficiency in government, or
protecting the environment.17 During this period, many voters either stopped
regarding themselves as Democrats or Republicans or they adopted neutral at-
titudes toward the parties.
The failure of party realignment to live up to expectations caused many po-
litical scientists to question the concept. In a major critique of party realignment
theory entitled “Like Waiting for Godot,” political scientist Everett C. Ladd
maintained that Key and Burnham’s emphasis on party realignment modeled
after the New Deal period had been “mostly unfortunate.”18 In Ladd’s view, the
New Deal was a unique period when parties mattered, and Franklin D. Roos-
evelt loomed large over the political horizon. Ladd contended that by applying
the party realignment model to more recent elections, political scientists had
been asking the wrong question. Rather than wonder whether a party realign-
ment had occurred, Ladd suggested that it would be better to ask the following:
• What are the major issues and policy differences between the two major
parties, and how do these separate political elites and the voting public?
• What is the social and ideological makeup of each major party at both the
mass and elite levels?
• What are the principal features of party organization, nomination proce-
dures, and campaign structure?
• In each of the previous three areas, are major shifts currently taking place?
What kind? What are their sources?
• Overall, how well is the party system performing?19
Political scientist David R. Mayhew echoed Ladd’s criticism of party realign-
ment theory, arguing that narrowly studying these critical elections missed
important contextual elements—such as the midterm elections of 1874, which
resulted in a Democratic takeover of the House of Representatives during a pe-
riod of Republican dominance, and the surprising victory of Harry S. Truman
in 1948 thanks to a shift within the Democratic Party favoring civil rights.
Mayhew tested the assumptions made by realignment advocates and concluded
that they do not apply broadly across American political history. Only the New
Deal realignment of the 1930s came close, and that, Mayhew argued, was a
unique moment.20
Ladd and Mayhew’s critiques notwithstanding, political scientists persist in
their efforts to find elections that conform to the traditional understanding of
partisan realignment or to revise and update the concept. During the Reagan
 Party Brand Loyalty and the American Voter 99

era, John Kenneth White and Richard B. Wirthlin coined the phrase “rolling
realignment” to describe the electoral changes taking place.21 Building on Key’s
concept of secular realignment, they described a rolling party realignment as a
process involving four distinct stages:
1. A change in the political agenda. During the 1930s, Americans embraced
the idea that government works. By 1981, most Americans agreed with
Ronald Reagan when he declared in his inaugural address, “In this present
crisis, government is not the solution to our problem. Government is the
problem.”22 The Reagan Revolution consisted of limiting the expansion of
federal responsibilities and a Jeffersonian return of power to state and local
governments or the individual.
2. A change in partisan self-identification as expressed in public opinion
polls. The question, “In politics do you think of yourself as a Democrat,
Republican, independent, or something else?” is a subjective query. When
the political agenda changes, partisan identification will inevitably change
with it as one party becomes identified with the new political thinking.
3. Changes in party registration. Frequently, party registration is a lagging indi-
cator of partisan change. For example, although Ronald Reagan had been
campaigning for Republicans since 1952, it took him ten years to formally
switch his California party registration from Democrat to Republican.
Similarly, many southern Democrats supported the Reagan agenda years
before formally changing their party registrations.
4. Changes at the bottom of the ballot. Every state ballot lists offices that are
virtually invisible. New Yorkers elect their local county coroners; Texans
vote for railroad commissioners; in Illinois, state university trustees are
elected posts. In such races, party identification means everything. Thus,
when voters place an X next to the names of these obscure candidates, they
often are expressing a partisan preference. Long-lasting changes in these
races suggest that a party realignment is underway.
The stages White and Wirthlin described are not linear, that is, voters could
move back-and-forth amongst them. But the combined result can indicate a
party realignment—however slowly and imperfectly it may be taking place. Yet
the rolling Republican realignment they envisioned failed to materialize. By the
time Reagan left office in 1989, Republicans held fewer seats in the House and
Senate than they did after he won the presidency in 1980. George H. W. Bush
suffered a massive rejection at the polls in 1992, winning just 38 percent of the
ballots. Even after Republicans seized Congress in 1994, GOP identifiers failed
100 chapter 5

to increase measurably. In 2000, George W. Bush lost the popular vote to Al

Gore. And in 2004, Bush was able to muster a bare majority of the popular vote
(51 percent). Although White and Wirthlin were right to suggest that successive
realignments to the New Deal were not going to be the short, sharp reorgani-
zations of party loyalties akin to those of the 1930s, something went awry in
the inevitable steps toward a Republican realignment that they believed would
follow, however slowly, in Reagan’s wake.
Today, the debates about whether a party realignment is occurring still per-
sist. Is a partisan realignment, as originally conceived by Burnham and Key,
still possible? Do the Democratic victories in the presidential contests of 2008,
2012, and 2020, and their sizable popular vote majorities in 2016 and 2020,
herald a long-term change in electoral preferences? Or are they particular to the
candidates rather than a reflection of the standing of the parties? And does any
of this mean that a new realignment is imminent?
Beginning with Barack Obama’s election in 2008, more scholars began to
pay attention to a sharpening electoral divide based on demographic differences
and who turns out to vote. Factors like race, religious preferences, lifestyle (e.g.,
whether you were married or not, or whether you owned a gun or not), regional
differences, age, and gender have been strong predictors of electoral choices since
2008, when Barack Obama won overwhelming support from Blacks, Hispan-
ics, and Asians. He was the preferred candidate of those who either seldom or
never attended church services; dominated among voters who were not married
(especially single women) and among young voters; was preferred by those who
did not own guns; ran strongly in the Northeast, upper Midwest, and along the
Pacific coast; and did far better among women than men.23 With several of these
demographic entities on the rise, their strong support for Obama suggested that
the makings of a new Democratic era could be underway.24 But the 2020 elec-
tion was inconclusive and subsequent elections will be necessary to determine
whether the rising American electorate of minorities, single voters, women, and
young people is enough to power the Democrats to sustained victories.
Given these trends, the question of who votes has become increasingly im-
portant. Can Democrats turn out high numbers among the groups of voters
that favor them? Can Republicans find increased numbers of rural, non-college
educated white voters and blue-collar workers to counterbalance demographic
trends favoring Democrats? The answer to these questions will help future po-
litical scientists understand the shifting plates of contemporary partisan politics.
 Party Brand Loyalty and the American Voter 101

The Rise of Hamiltonian Nationalism in A Polarized Age

Barack Obama entered the presidency in 2009 determined to rise above the
partisanship of the George W. Bush years. But his call for an end to excessive
partisanship fell on deaf ears. Democrats strongly supported Obama (includ-
ing the rank and file and members of Congress), while Republicans unified in
their opposition (both inside Washington and in the country at large). Journal-
ist Robert Draper writes that on inauguration night 2009 Republican leaders
gathered for a dinner on Capitol Hill. Lamenting their fate, these party leaders
agreed that Republicans would stick together to unanimously oppose Obama on
all his policy initiatives with the goal of making him a one-term president. As
future House Speaker Paul Ryan put it: “The only way we’ll succeed is if we’re
united. If we tear ourselves apart, we’re finished.”25
Like Obama, Joe Biden issued a call for an end to partisanship, saying in his
2020 victory speech that while he was a “proud Democrat,” he would govern
as an “American President.” While Biden has called for an end to “a grim era
of polarization,”26 Senate Republican minority leader Mitch McConnell says
he is “100 percent” focused on “stopping” any Biden administration legislative
initiatives—a promise that, as of this writing, McConnell and his fellow Re-
publicans have largely kept.27
What is certain is that the last two decades have witnessed the emergence
of a polarized electorate and strong national parties, especially when it comes
to party organization. The twenty-first century has seen the creation of an en-
hanced Hamiltonian-like party system where partisan activities are directed
from the top down. The national parties have become mobilization machines
with the Internet becoming an ever more important tool in mobilizing base vot-
ers. Debates about party realignment theory may continue, but there is little de-
bate about the intensity of voter preferences or the depth of the partisan divide.
Partisanship matters, and the parties’ abilities to use the tools of the Internet
and mobilize supporters (both inside and outside of Washington, DC), are the
subjects of the next three chapters.
 Ch a pter 6

Parties and Social Media

H
ad Donald Trump run for president in 2004, he would have been
without his most potent media weapon. Throughout the 2016 cam-
paign, Trump masterfully drew attention to himself through Twitter,
sending his unfiltered thoughts to followers and driving the traditional news
agenda with the help of reporters who couldn’t resist discussing the latest out-
rageous thing he said. Sometimes his tweeting got him in genuine trouble, as
when he responded to Hillary Clinton’s allegation that he had mistreated former
Miss Universe Alicia Machado with an overnight Twitter explosion where he
ranted about Machado’s appearance and incorrectly asserted that she had made
a “sex tape.”1
In the final days of the 2016 campaign, Trump’s advisors kept the candi-
date off Twitter to tone down his over-the-top persona so as not to frighten
late-breaking undecided voters.2 But for his ability to make others respond to
him on his terms, Trump’s use of social media was as brilliant as it was un-
precedented. The reality television host understood how to leverage millions
of followers and the unparalleled visibility of a presidential race to maximum
advantage. He continued to use Twitter to maintain a real-time connection
to his supporters throughout his presidency, making Twitter a governing tool
that replaced conventional communication vehicles like press conferences and
media events, and he relied on it heavily during his 2020 re-election campaign.
When he was banned from the platform after the January 6, 2021, insurrection
at the Capitol, he lost his primary means for influencing the news agenda and
remaining in the headlines as a private citizen. As a former president, Trump
sued Facebook, Twitter, and Google in a long-shot attempt to regain access to
those platforms, recognizing how difficult it is to reach his erstwhile followers
without a social media platform.
In keeping with the candidate-centered nature of contemporary campaigns
and the personality-centered nature of the presidency, Trump’s use of social
media was thoroughly individualistic. Twitter gave Trump freedom from the

102
 Parties and Social Media 103

institutional constraints sometimes exercised by parties or the media by making

him a free agent with respect to the Republican Party and a gatekeeper with
equal power to journalists. If his presidential campaigns and administration
had a messaging strategy, it was executed by Trump himself at the rate of 280
characters at a time, not by political professionals. He understood that social
media rewards outrageous claims and had no problem playing to the norms of
Twitter in defiance of long-established standards of how presidential candidates
and presidents would act.
Although this may have brought him condemnation from his opponents, it
enabled him to set the terms of the debate. Whether it was Hillary Clinton re-
acting to the latest Trump campaign tweet rather than advancing a vision for her
presidency or journalists magnifying the latest outrageous Trump pronounce-
ment from the White House, Trump understood that reporters and supporters
would not be able to resist his Twitter eruptions and the fallout they created. His
followers who received them directly, and millions more who heard about them
through mainstream reporting, would consume Trump’s brash, over-the-top ut-
terances like the latest installment of a reality TV show.
Donald Trump’s use of Twitter was the latest development in a rapidly chang-
ing media environment that has left candidates and parties struggling to figure
out how to maximize the political potential of the Internet and keep up with its
expanding scope and shifting shape. His freeform social media efforts represent
one type of opportunity afforded by the Internet to candidates interested in
seeking office as a free agent without the backing of traditional parties. Another
type of opportunity for political expression is represented by a highly developed
set of online institutions created by parties and grassroots organizations that
harness the bottom-up collective action capabilities of cyberspace and bring
them to bear on campaigns and public policy.
Collectively, these individual and coordinated efforts represent the range of
social media influence on our politics. On the right, President Trump excelled
in using social media to advance his America First agenda and keep core support-
ers engaged in his presidency. On the left, progressive groups have built an im-
pressive online organizational presence that mobilized to push the Democratic
Party in a progressive direction during the 2016 campaign, served as the basis
for political resistance in the Trump era, and pressures the Biden administration
on policy goals. To understand how we arrived at a place where presidents and
ordinary people alike have access to media tools that allow them to shape politi-
cal agendas, it is worthwhile to go back to the late 1990s, when the Internet was
a curiosity, to retrace the steps that brought us to this moment.
104 chapter 6

Dean Unlocks the Genie

The Internet always had potential as a political medium, but like television and
radio before it, people first needed to figure out how to use the Internet for
political purposes. Just as Republicans proved adept at harnessing the power of
television advertising in the 1950s and direct mail and cable technology in the
1980s, conservatives were first movers in online politics and had a more exten-
sive Internet presence in the 1990s. By the end of the first decade of the twen-
ty-first century, however, Democrats and their progressive allies had caught up.
Later, the right would re-emerge as skillful practitioners of social media tools.
During the 1996 election season, the RNC homepage received 75,000 hits a
day—a meager number by contemporary standards but a huge figure back then.
Republicans used the Internet to broadcast immediate responses to Bill Clin-
ton’s State of the Union address in 1997, and the RNC chair held regular online
chats. By 2000, the GOP site boasted numerous links to allow users to make
financial contributions, find facts about policy topics, buy GOP-related prod-
ucts, and—significantly—communicate by email. This may sound unimpressive
today, but two decades ago it was revolutionary. The Republican website was
regarded as so substantive that it was dubbed “Best Party Site” by Campaign and
Elections magazine.
By 2002, the RNC had spent some $60,000 to create gopteamleader.com,
designed to give nearly 100,000 activists information on how to contact radio
stations and newspapers to disseminate Republican views on a range of issues.
The site also offered incentives such as mouse pads and fleece pullovers for users
who completed “action items” listed on the site. Points were awarded, for exam-
ple, for recruiting GOP activists or for emailing members of Congress to support
Republican initiatives.3
Democrats found themselves playing catch-up, as they had with previous
technological innovations. In 1996, the DNC’s website received only fifty thou-
sand hits per day. One year later, the DNC updated its homepage to include
a user survey, volunteer sign-up sheet, and a help page with voter registration
forms from the Federal Election Commission. By 2002, visitors could access
daily news briefings and links to other state and local Democratic Party orga-
nizations, and even take a chance at winning $1,000 for the most creative flash
animation. Taking a cue from Republicans, they turned to the Internet to or-
ganize rudimentary grassroots efforts on their website, Democrats.org.4 These
improvements helped the DNC reach parity with the RNC. But the Internet
didn’t emerge as a contemporary political force until an obscure former Vermont
 Parties and Social Media 105

governor named Howard Dean came out of nowhere on the strength of an In-
ternet campaign to become a frontrunner for the 2004 Democratic presidential
nomination.
Dean was an opinionated politician who was not afraid to challenge his par-
ty’s orthodoxy, and his outspokenness contributed significantly to his online ap-
peal. Appearing before party activists at the Democratic National Committee’s
Winter Meeting in February 2003, Dean gave voice to what many were saying
privately about how Democrats approached the Bush administration. “What I
want to know,” a full-throated Dean told his audience, “is why in the world the
Democratic Party is supporting the president’s unilateral attack on Iraq. What
I want to know is why are Democratic Party leaders supporting tax cuts . . . I’m
Howard Dean, and I’m here to represent the Democratic wing of the Demo-
cratic Party.”5
Dean’s remarks struck a nerve. For liberals disenchanted with what they re-
garded as tepid opposition to the Bush administration, Dean offered something
new: a Democrat not afraid to take on his party in full view of key party fig-
ures. All they needed was a way to organize and express their support, and the
Internet provided them with a vehicle. The venue they found to connect with
each other was as unlikely as the candidate himself: Meetup.com, a nonpolitical
site designed to unite people with common interests. The concept was simple:
type in the activity you’re interested in and your zip code, and the website re-
turned a date and time for like-minded others to meet in the real world. By
making it possible for disparate people with the same concerns to find each
other and facilitate in-person meetings, Meetup.com coincidently addressed
the initial organizational problem faced by supporters of an obscure candidate,
and soon after Dean’s DNC address, “Howard Dean” rapidly became a prom-
inent meet-up category.6
The Dean meet-up effort expanded exponentially, and the candidate’s small
staff struggled to remain one step ahead of what their supporters were build-
ing. Working around the clock, they launched the weblog “Blog for America” to
serve as a nerve center for the blossoming online campaign.7 The blog provided
a way for the Burlington staff to keep supporters apprised about what they were
doing, but more importantly it gave them a way to connect with each other and
self-organize. Blog for America hosted diary and comment features, permitting
supporters to initiate their own topics and respond to what others were writ-
ing. And respond they did—to everything ranging from policy ideas, to the
candidate’s polling numbers, to how the mainstream media was covering their
candidate, to ideas for political action.8 At its peak, hundreds of thousands had
106 chapter 6

taken it upon themselves to engage in Internet-based campaigning, creating a

citizen army that multiplied the efforts of the candidate’s staff and propelled the
Vermont governor to frontrunner status weeks before the 2004 Iowa caucus.9
They also raised money in unprecedented amounts and in an entirely new
way—through small-dollar contributions made by ordinary citizens who re-
sponded to the candidate’s online pitch for cash. The campaign developed a
convention whereby they would post a baseball bat icon on the blog whenever
they wanted to raise funds and fill the bat in with red ink proportional to the
percentage of the goal they had achieved. After a while, some blog readers began
asking the campaign to “put up a bat” to raise money off an achievement like
strong polling numbers or a particularly impressive public performance by their
candidate.10
Despite these virtues, Internet activism came with risks to the campaign’s
leadership. If a supporter said something off-message or did something em-
barrassing that was caught on video, the campaign organization would have
to address it. Furthermore, the rapid acceleration of Dean’s online movement
outpaced the campaign’s ability to hire and train full-time staff, leaving Dean’s
staff exhausted and always trying to keep pace with its Internet growth.11 These
factors combined to make Dean’s Internet supporters both a necessary blessing
and a source of constant strain.
Ultimately, Dean’s opponents resorted to traditional political methods—a
withering television advertising attack on the frontrunner—to undermine his
campaign. Dean experienced the limitations of Internet politics as well. As the
primary season approached, the once-exponential growth in his supporters flat-
tened considerably, in part a reflection of the limited reach of high-speed Inter-
net access in 2003. As a result, Dean was unable to withstand the assault waged
by his opponents and finished a distant third in the Iowa caucuses when just
weeks before he had been favored to win. His fate was sealed when he addressed
his supporters with a loud yelp of support designed to lift their spirits that made
the candidate appear unhinged on camera. A video of the moment went viral
on the Internet overnight; in an ironic twist, the medium that made the Dean
campaign possible had helped bury it.
Although Dean failed, he turned traditional campaigning on its head. Ever
since party reforms turned presidential campaigns into candidate-centered af-
fairs with the rise of primaries and concomitant decline in the influence of party
elites, ingenious long-shot candidates like Jimmy Carter occasionally succeeded
in upending more seasoned opponents. But no one had ever done it like Howard
Dean, on the strength of bottom-up political fundraising and citizen-initiated
 Parties and Social Media 107

organizing channeled through the Internet. It set the stage four years later for a
more advanced Internet effort by another long-shot candidate, Barack Obama.
And it heralded the arrival of an online activist infrastructure, which would
self-organize in a manner similar to the Dean campaign and challenge the au-
tonomy of the two parties from without.

Obama Sets the Standard

During the 2008 presidential campaign, Republican vice-presidential nominee
Sarah Palin mocked Barack Obama for having been a community organizer. It
turned out that Obama’s knowledge of bottom-up organizing meshed perfectly
with the advantages of Internet politics, enabling him to leverage the medium
to identify and mobilize millions of new voters en route to the first successful
Internet-fueled presidential victory.
But Obama’s shrewd understanding and skillful manipulation of the Internet
generated unprecedented amounts of money while identifying and mobilizing
millions of voters. Like Dean before him, Obama excelled at building an online
presence that encouraged his partisans to form an army of supporters. Benefit-
ting from a more advanced Internet that reached more people, and a campaign
team that had learned from Dean’s successes and failures, Obama blended tradi-
tional candidate-centered, television-based campaigning with a powerful Inter-
net operation that proved effective enough to win the nomination and capture
the presidency.
Obama sought to avoid the pitfalls that dogged the Dean campaign without
extinguishing his supporters’ enthusiasm and initiative. The effort required find-
ing the right combination of empowerment and control, balancing a campaign’s
need for top-down coordination with the decentralization necessary to take ad-
vantage of the Internet’s social networking capabilities. The engine running this
effort was Obama for America (OFA), a state-of-the-art website offering a host
of online tools through which supporters could customize their contribution to
the campaign without the risk that their actions would run the campaign off the
rails. Where the Dean campaign outsourced its networking through Meetup.
com, Obama’s website integrated social networking tools. Through MyBO
(pronounced “my boh” and standing for “my Barack Obama”), supporters could
customize their web presence and participate in the campaign’s version of Face-
book—or link directly to Obama’s actual Facebook page. Users could establish a
profile, write their own campaign blog, comment on the blog posts of others, find
other Obama supporters in their zip code, and identify and join local Obama
108 chapter 6

groups with people who had similar interests, ranging from Veterans for Obama
to Environmentalists for Obama.12 The Obama campaign was the first to have
profiles on AsianAve.com, MiGente.com, and BlackPlanet.com, social network-
ing sites targeting the Asian, Latinx, and Black communities.
This organizational structure liberated Obama from relying on local party
operatives to perform the fieldwork for primary and caucus challenges, enabling
him to build his own organizational structure from the ground up with the help
of volunteers who came to the campaign through the Internet. The same held
true for the campaign’s sophisticated turnout operation, which funneled respon-
sibility for identifying and mobilizing voters to low-level volunteers operating
within a highly differentiated organizational structure, balancing the freedom
of supporters to self-motivate with traditional elements of campaign com-
mand-and-control. The Obama campaign made the unprecedented decision to
share its turnout goals—considered confidential by campaigns worried about un-
derperforming—with volunteers who in turn felt empowered by the campaign’s
decision to entrust them with getting voters to the polls. “If we tell a team leader
that the vote goal for this neighborhood is 100 votes,” said one of the campaign’s
state directors, “and we give them a list with 300 names of supporters and per-
suadable voters on it, they respond with, ‘Wow, I can make this happen.’”13
After he was elected president and became de facto head of the national Dem-
ocratic Party, Obama retooled his website and folded it into the everyday oper-
ation of the DNC, as we mentioned in chapter 3. This signaled his intention to
keep a social networking presence alive during his presidency while remaking
the party in the image of his successful Internet model. Rechristened Organiz-
ing for America, OFA worked alongside the administration from its new home
inside Democratic National Committee headquarters in Washington to build
support for key Obama initiatives, notably the healthcare reform effort that
dominated politics in 2009.
As the 2010 congressional midterm elections drew near, OFA went to work
on behalf of congressional Democrats, applying social networking tools to mo-
bilize first-time voters who were inspired by Obama in 2008, gambling that
Obama’s bottom-up mobilization approach would work without the president’s
presence on the ballot. The results were not good. Facing a strong headwind in
the form of a poor economy and widespread anger from swing voters who felt
the administration had over-reached and overspent, OFA was unable to mobilize
the 2008 electorate that put Obama in office, and Democrats suffered historic
losses in congressional and state contests.
 Parties and Social Media 109

The Netroots Challenge Democrats

Advances in the availability of high-speed Internet access during the first de-
cade of the twenty-first century facilitated the growth of a virtual space where
ordinary people could engage in political discourse, venting about things they
did not like and planning to take action to change them. As like-minded indi-
viduals on the left and right began publishing political blogs, and as a few of
these blogs developed into sizable virtual communities, a political blogosphere
took shape. Reflecting deeply held partisan feelings on both sides, bloggers on
the left would link to each other with abandon while generally refusing to link
to bloggers on the right to avoid giving them additional traffic that would in-
flate the size of their community. Bloggers on the right reciprocated, generally
refusing to link to liberal blogs. As a result, two distinct hemispheres evolved in
political cyberspace: a conservative or “right blogosphere” and a progressive or
“left blogosphere.”
Although they emerged simultaneously, they differed in size and structure.
Like the Republican Party, conservatives were first to establish a notable pres-
ence in cyberspace; in the years immediately following the turn of the century,
the largest and most active blog communities were on the right; as with previous
technological innovations, the left found itself playing catch-up. However, ani-
mated by opposition to the Iraq War and the Bush Administration in general, a
vital left blogosphere took shape by 2005, and between 2003 and 2005, a period
when overall political blog traffic increased six-fold, progressive online sites in-
creased their traffic at a much higher rate than comparable conservative sites.14
Moreover, the left blogosphere was developing in a horizontal fashion suitable
to taking advantage of the social networking capabilities of the Internet. By 2010,
the top blogs of the left were all community blogs, meaning they permitted ordi-
nary users to post original ideas in diaries rather than restricting that function
to “front page” bloggers formally affiliated with the sites, and allowed people to
post comments about blog posts, diaries, and even the comments of other users.15
Over time, this structure birthed a movement, which self-consciously modeled
itself on the twentieth-century reform-minded Progressives we discussed in
chapter 3. Emerging online from the grassroots, the progressive “netroots” (or
“Internet grassroots”) movement came to life via the left (or progressive) blogo-
sphere. Structurally, the netroots encompass a web of national, state, local, and
issue-oriented blogs, along with like-minded progressive organizations with a
strong web presence, like Moveon.org (which formed to oppose Republican
110 chapter 6

efforts to impeach Bill Clinton during the modern Internet’s infancy in the late
1990s), Act Blue (a website for directing small-dollar campaign contributions
to progressive candidates), and Democracy for America (an online organization
devoted to identifying, recruiting, and funding progressive candidates that grew
out of the Dean campaign). In keeping with the horizontal structure of the ne-
troots, they developed as the organic product of many people using the Internet
to work toward a shared set of goals,16 and by linking to each other, these sites
enhanced each other’s visibility and effectiveness. In recent years, the progres-
sive netroots have become more centralized and coordinated as first-generation
organizations matured into professionalized institutions with paid staff and
consultants working on behalf of online progressive advocacy groups. But they
originated with the uncoordinated efforts of people with an activist bent at a
time when it was easy for them to establish their presence on the Internet.
The right blogosphere emerged differently, owing in part to the existence of a
long-standing conservative movement operating within and outside the Republi-
can Party. From elected Republicans to conservative think tanks, talk radio, and
other media outlets, conservatives had fashioned an idea and messaging appara-
tus that operated with great efficiency and effectiveness. The right blogosphere
developed within this vertically organized structure, offering conservatives a
new outlet for messaging and maintaining interest among the faithful. However,
the hierarchical structure of the existing conservative movement had the effect
of limiting the development of community blogs on the right, restricting the
emergence of new voices, and limiting the number of venues where many voices
would gather to argue and debate as in a virtual town hall.17 Consequently, the
preeminent ideas expressed in the right blogosphere typically mirrored those
expressed by Republican politicians.
Not so for the netroots. As a movement that developed online without main-
stream party support, netroots progressives often found themselves at odds with
elected Democrats. Animated by challenges to corporate influences they feel
tip the political balance of power away from ordinary citizens, netroots activists
have been willing to take on the Democratic Party whenever they feel it tilts
too heavily toward the interests of the privileged, to the point of recruiting and
raising funds for primary challenges to Democrats who otherwise would not
feel the heat of accountability to progressive interests. During the 2006 election
cycle, the netroots channeled their organizing and fundraising toward winning
a Democratic majority in the House and Senate, but once that objective was
realized, their attention shifted to pushing Congress in a progressive direction
by supporting “better Democrats” over incumbents who in their view worried
 Parties and Social Media 111

more about what others in Washington thought about them than the concerns
of progressive voters.
As they entered the second decade of the twenty-first century, the netroots
proved to be a factor in Democratic primary contests, at times challenging in-
cumbent Democrats supported by Democratic party insiders. One of the ironies
of these efforts is how they came at the expense of Barack Obama, a Democratic
president who owed his election victory to a sophisticated understanding of In-
ternet politics. This rift owes more to the inside-outside dynamic separating the
Washington political establishment from the netroots than to an appreciation of
how to use the Internet as a political tool. As party leader, it was Obama’s respon-
sibility to protect the Democratic congressional majorities he inherited when he
was elected in 2008. Given the high rate of incumbent reelection over time, the
path of least resistance to maintaining that majority would ordinarily be to dis-
courage primaries that, if successful, create open seats that the party would have
to defend without the advantages of incumbency. From the president’s perspec-
tive, stumping for Democratic incumbents was in the best interest of the party.
However, those engaged with the Internet left see things like activists, not
partisans. They regard blind support for incumbents as counterproductive to
maintaining congressional majorities, believing that selectively promoting
progressive primary challengers is an effective way of advancing movement
goals, despite the aggregate odds favoring incumbents. And they believe that
having more progressive candidates in Congress would work to strengthen the
long-term political prospects of the Democratic Party. These strategic differ-
ences put them at odds with many party regulars, even a Democratic president
who was a pioneer in online organizing.
Differences between mainstream Democrats and netroots activists extended
beyond campaigning to legislating. Nowhere was this more evident than during
the long campaign to enact healthcare reform in 2009 and 2010, when an online
push for reform often clashed with administration efforts, and bloggers who
had supported Barack Obama’s election found themselves deeply at odds with
his governing approach. Netroots activists wanted to secure passage of health-
care reform with a strong public component—initially a single-payer plan, then,
when the administration took this option off the table, a public insurance option
or wider accessibility to Medicare. The administration wanted to pass a health-
care plan—period. They needed to compromise to get anything done, and a
public plan was opposed by powerful interests.
A sophisticated inside-outside strategy developed online through the network
of progressive sites that had previously engaged in political action. Working on the
112 chapter 6

inside, the netroots partnered with the congressional progressive caucus, a large
but—in the view of netroots activists—generally ineffectual group that tended
to give in to more conservative Democrats, coordinating strategy with congres-
sional progressives while pressuring them to hold the line on progressive objec-
tives. Operating from the outside, they used their online resources to raise money
for Democrats who supported a public option while organizing against sending
progressive dollars to those who did not.18 These efforts revealed the reach and
limitations of online activism, as they helped keep the healthcare initiative on
track but were insufficient to get a public healthcare option over the finish line.
When the large 2020 field of presidential hopefuls took shape, it looked like
Democrats were heading for another conflict between its online grassroots sup-
porters and party insiders. Netroots progressives were especially loyal to sena-
tors Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders, while party elites were apprehensive
about either candidate’s ability to win a general election. The candidate with the
least evident netroots support19 was the candidate who insiders believed had the
best chance of winning—Joe Biden, the older white male insider not known for
having a progressive record. This division was especially worrisome to longtime
political practitioners because, as we have seen, party elites long ago lost control
of the presidential nominating process.
Perhaps this conflict would have come to fruition under normal condi-
tions, but as the pandemic shut down the country and Biden recovered from
near-defeat to emerge as a consensus candidate, online progressives got behind
him to avoid what they considered a greater evil—the reelection of President
Trump. For his part, Biden acknowledged their support by listening to their con-
cerns. He invited Elizabeth Warren to be an influential campaign advisor and
reached out to Bernie Sanders. He stopped looking backwards to the Obama
years—a characteristic of his primary campaign that turned away progressives—
and recast himself as a bridge to a progressive future. Once in office, he brought
progressives into his government and advocated policies that might have seemed
more likely to emerge from a Warren or Sanders administration on matters like
healthcare, the environment, civil rights, and political reform. Consequently, in
the early months of his administration, Biden avoided the conflicts with online
activists that pockmarked the Obama years.

The “Tea Party” Challenges Republicans

Although sometimes equated in the press with netroots progressives for their
mirror-image political objectives, “Tea Party” conservatives—who emerged as a
 Parties and Social Media 113

viable political force during the 2010 election cycle—did not exclusively begin
as an online movement. Several websites claimed a version of the Tea Party name
and purported to be home to the movement, including Tea Party Patriots (tea-
partypatriots.com) and Tea Party Nation (teapartynation.com). These sites, like
their counterparts on the left, hosted discussion forums, provided action alerts
and information on movement activities, and housed blogs with discussion
threads. Unlike the netroots, however, some groups flying the Tea Party banner
were funded and organized by Washington insiders.20
Where netroots activists worked to reduce corporate influences in the Dem-
ocratic Party as they pursued progressive legislation, Tea Party activists emerged
as an ideologically conservative influence on mainstream Republicans. In a re-
markably brief time, they made their mark on electoral politics, advancing a
brand of libertarian conservatism that challenged the constitutionality of all
but the most essential activities of the federal government, condemned deficit
spending and high taxes, and rejected Obama administration efforts to expand
the government’s role in healthcare and energy policy.
Like the progressive netroots, Tea Party candidates targeted wayward in-
cumbents for defeat, and with visible success. In several high-profile primary
contests, Tea Party-backed candidates upset candidates who had the backing
of national Republican Party officials. Energized and mobilized, Tea Party
supporters were reliable general election voters, eager to vote during normally
low-turnout off-year elections. However, as they picked off more mainstream
Republican candidates in primaries, they made it harder for Republicans to win
over voters in the political middle who are decisive in close contests, while forc-
ing the Republican Party to expend resources contesting elections that might
not have been close with more conventional nominees.

Netroots and the Tea Party: Jeffersonian

Politics on a Hamiltonian Scale
For the Tea Party activists and netroots progressives, the image of an ideal Amer-
ica could not be more different. The Tea Party would move America in the direc-
tion of a rugged individualism without much taxation or the social safety net it
supports, where states would be free to make decisions without the interference
of the national government, businesses would be less burdened by regulatory
control, and individual and corporate taxes would be reduced. Netroots pro-
gressives envision an America based on community, where taxes and regulation
are necessary to support a commons that would be destroyed if government were
114 chapter 6

downsized and where government would serve popular rather than corporate
interests. It is a vision rooted more directly in Hamiltonian nationalism, where
the nation is a family presided over by a strong central government, than in Jef-
fersonian localism, which in turn is closer to the libertarian bent of the Tea
Party. In this regard, the two groups line up with the long-standing alignment
of Hamiltonian-minded Democrats and Jeffersonian Republicans. Beyond these
generalizations, however, distinctions between the two groups are less clear. Tea
Party activists are far more comfortable with the unfettered capitalism pro-
moted by Hamilton, while netroots activists share with Jefferson an abiding
faith in the goodness of ordinary citizens. And each group poses a bigger threat
to the party to which it is closest than to the other side.
As for their means, Internet politics—regardless of the ends to which they
are applied—enable people to come together in virtual gatherings for the pur-
pose of taking collective social action. It is in this respect a sort of twenty-first
century town meeting—the Jeffersonian commons in cyberspace—where any-
one of like mind with Internet access can read a blog, post a diary, engage in
spirited exchanges on comment threads, plot strategy, give money, and mobilize
and motivate friends, relatives, and strangers. By virtue of its scale, however, it
is something more than a town hall; rather, it is a national forum independent
of location, an organic meeting that people enter and exit at will, unbounded by
the limitations of space or time. It is something neither Jefferson nor Hamilton
could have imagined: a town meeting with national reach, Jeffersonian localism
on a Hamiltonian scale.
This is also the aspirational side of Internet politics. There is a dark side as
well. An unregulated commons can be a forum for misinformation, a place
where conspiracy theories grow. In the years following the emergence of the Tea
Party, we have seen the Internet function as a place where political speech has
been used to persuade and organize—as well as deceive. This is especially so with
social media, which came to prominence along with the rise of Donald Trump,
who subsumed the Tea Party, coopted the Republican Party, and waged the first
Twitter presidential campaign in the later part of the decade.

Trump Takes to Twitter and Takes over a Party

Where the Tea Party upended Republican Party politics in the early years of the
2010s, Donald Trump consumed the party in the later portion of the decade by
building an unbreakable bond with Republicans in the electorate. Much of his
success could be attributed to the enormous following he developed on Twitter,
 Parties and Social Media 115

the medium that was Trump’s communication lifeblood during his presidency
and two presidential campaigns. Trump used Twitter to stay in the spotlight,
establish himself as the primary gatekeeper of news, set the agenda for his ad-
ministration, and motivate his followers to political action. So extensive was his
use of Twitter and so central to his style of campaigning and governing that it is
impossible to imagine the Trump years without it.
Because Twitter is designed to communicate brief ideas in real time, it pro-
vides skilled users with the opportunity to create an ongoing monologue with
committed followers, which can expand into dialogues with other followers
through reactions and retweets. But to use Twitter to maximum effect—to get
tweets to go viral—requires spontaneity, irreverence, direct language, and a cer-
tain lack of restraint. These qualities came naturally to President Trump, who
campaigned and governed as a disruptive agent opposed to the status quo. For
conventional politicians, who need to be guarded in what they say, a Twitter
feed could be a resource for disseminating information and keeping in touch
with supporters. For someone like President Trump, the constant stream-of-con-
sciousness contact was the basis for a deeper and more intimate virtual connec-
tion that helped cement the loyalty of his followers.
Trump’s ability to command the attention of millions had profound ramifi-
cations for the Republican Party. When he sought the Republican presidential
nomination in 2016, Trump was an outsider who was as critical of Republicans
as Democrats. He aimed his populist rhetoric at party stalwarts like former Flor-
ida Governor Jeb Bush,21 using his opponent’s dynastic position as the son and
brother of former Republican presidents to attack establishment privilege and—
on Twitter—demean Bush as a “loser” and a “whiner”22 as part of a larger effort
to turn his supporters against the party status quo. Over time, the technique
worked. Trump was once the target of vehement opposition by Republican fix-
tures like South Carolina senator Lindsey Graham and Texas senator Ted Cruz,
but the loyalty exhibited by Trump’s supporters in the electorate turned these
erstwhile opponents in government into vocal supporters, even though Trump
was unapologetic about attacks he leveled against them and the party orthodoxy
they represented. They needed the support of Trump’s loyalists, too, because
over time the Republican base had become the Trump base.
Twitter also enabled Trump to rival traditional gatekeepers of information
in the press and set the news agenda for his administration. By tweeting his
thoughts directly to the public, he could sidestep journalists, editors and news
producers and get his ideas directly to his supporters. The more outrageous and
outspoken Trump’s tweet storms, the harder it was for traditional journalists to
116 chapter 6

avoid covering them, thereby magnifying his Twitter presence through conven-
tional news coverage, and ensuring that the agenda he set would reach beyond
his followers to people who got their news from legacy media like television and
newspapers.
Driving the news agenda through social media permitted President Trump
to be an arbiter of facts, which proved to be a critical and controversial element
of his presidency. All presidents are subject to critical coverage, but where his
predecessors might have confronted negative stories head-on, President Trump
would denounce news he did not like as false or fake. By one count, President
Trump used the phrase “fake news” almost 2,000 times during his presidency.23
Most notably, in the final weeks of his administration, when he was in-
sisting that the 2020 election was rigged, Trump repeatedly took to Twitter
to denounce mainstream news reports of his defeat as fake. “The only thing
more RIGGED than the 2020 Presidential Election is the FAKE NEWS SUP-
PRESSED MEDIA,” he tweeted on December 4, 2020, using all caps to empha-
size the emotional quality of the message.24 “Everyone is asking why the recent
presidential polls were so inaccurate when it came to me,” Trump tweeted sev-
eral weeks earlier, “Because they are FAKE, just like much of the Lamestream
Media!”25 On other occasions during his presidency, Trump blamed the media
for presenting fake facts about the investigation by Special Counsel Robert
Mueller into his alleged ties to Russian interference into the 2016 election,
allegations that he was accepting money in exchange for presidential pardons,
unfavorable economic news, criticism of his administration’s approach to the
pandemic—essentially anything that conflicted with the positive narrative he
wanted to present to the public.26
In addition to complicating the ability of social media users to decipher facts
from falsehoods, the proliferation of claims about false news and direct chal-
lenges to the authority of journalists to report the facts raised doubts about the
veracity of an independent press. Perhaps not surprisingly, rank-and-file Repub-
licans at the end of the Trump administration were less likely than Democrats
and independents to believe mainstream news reporting. A 2020 survey con-
ducted by the Gallup Organization found that two-thirds of Republicans held
an unfavorable view of the press and were less likely than others to believe news
reports are objective.27 If the onset of Internet politics at the turn of the century
witnessed the political division of cyberspace into left and right blogospheres,
which years later had developed into nonoverlapping political ecosystems, by the
end of the century’s second decade the social media revolution left the country
divided by party over fundamental questions of factual truth.
 Parties and Social Media 117

Trump’s Twitter assault on facts came to a dangerous and ironic end in the
final days of his administration when he incited supporters at a rally outside the
White House to march on Congress and challenge the certification of electoral
votes that enshrined Joe Biden’s victory in the 2020 election.28 The subsequent
insurrection at the Capitol by his supporters, who believed through Trump’s
repeated claims on social media that the election had been stolen, resulted in
Trump’s permanent suspension from Twitter—along with Facebook and other
large social media platforms—to prevent “the risk of further incitement of vio-
lence.”29 Within a week, the House of Representatives had impeached President
Trump—for the second time—for incitement of insurrection. The vote was bi-
partisan, with ten Republicans joining every Democrat.
With the Republican Party divided and about to be turned out of power, the
man who had dominated it for the previous five years was quiet. The Capitol
rebellion had terminated his social media presence and silenced his voice. But
the world had changed because of his aggressive use of social media tools and
because of a revolution in the availability of information. Apart from providing
the president with a loud and instantaneous bully pulpit, the constant presence
of viral images and messages added an edgy and chaotic element to campaign
politics and governance. More than simply engaging the base, viral content like
memes and stories—sometimes containing false information, sometimes spe-
cifically planted by candidates or their surrogates—served to accentuate the
division of the country into red and blue camps based on the social media peo-
ple consumed.
Meanwhile, the campaigns and parties perfected the art of raising funds and
messaging online, through targeted solicitation on social media sites like Face-
book. The Trump and Biden campaigns both used microtargeting techniques
that enabled messages to ricochet through echo chambers on the right and left
that trace their roots to the right and left blogospheres of the prior decade but
with far greater ability to influence by virtue of how fragmented the media en-
vironment has become and how much easier it is to acquire and analyze user
information. Data-mining techniques, whereby the campaigns and parties could
identify and micro-target supporters and opponents by analyzing patterns of on-
line media use, gave them unprecedented access to granular information about
voters and allowed them to use that information to customize their fundrais-
ing and turnout messages. Finding patterns in huge datasets enabled campaign
planning with unprecedented precision. But it also allowed campaigns to target
recipients with messages designed to inflame and motivate them to either give
money or turn out on Election Day.
118 chapter 6

The Internet, which less than twenty years earlier was a curious new technol-
ogy ready to be exploited for political purposes by the first groups that figured
out how it worked, had by 2020 become the primary means by which parties
and candidates communicated with voters and raised money. However, while it
helped raise unprecedented amounts of campaign cash and mobilize voters at a
rate unseen in modern times, social media also produced an information envi-
ronment where increasingly people on both sides of the political divide stopped
engaging with each other. A technology born of the hope that it would unite
people around political action still holds that promise, but recent years have
demonstrated just how alienating it can be when people are brought together
around messages and ideas designed to divide as they mobilize.
 Ch a pter 7

Campaign Finance and Transitional Political Parties

A
s parties are buffeted by a changing media environment, so
also are they shaped by a gusher of money that has flooded the political
system in breathtaking amounts. An avalanche of funds has strength-
ened and professionalized the national party committees, giving them unprec-
edented access to resources they lacked for much of their history and fueling a
Hamiltonian-style nationalization of the parties. At the same time, individual
candidates are also collecting unprecedented amounts of cash. Much of this
money comes from individual donors contributing online, while mega-wealthy
individuals have taken advantage of campaign finance rules that permit them to
donate millions without any public knowledge.
These developments have added intensity to an ongoing debate about the
role of money in our political system. Reformers view large and hidden cam-
paign contributions as a vehicle for bending the system to the interests of con-
tributors, which may be at odds with the interests of the broader public. They
have suggested numerous proposals to correct this, including limits or bans on
large-dollar contributions, public financing of federal campaigns, and better
government enforcement and oversight of campaign finance laws. Their efforts
have been countered by a Supreme Court that views campaign spending as a
form of protected expression and a Congress that has been reluctant to alter the
political playing field by tinkering with campaign finance rules, especially while
under pressure from large contributors who do not want to see their influence
undermined.
The debate over the appropriate role of money in politics can be boiled down
to the following questions:

1. How much money given to a political candidate is too much?

2. Are corporate donations inherently corrupt?
3. What limits, if any, should be placed on corporate and/or individual dona-
tions to political candidates?

119
120 chapter 7

4. Should federal campaigns rely mostly on local contributions?

5. Is money a form of speech that deserves protection under the First
Amendment?
6. If money is a constitutionally protected form of speech, does this protection
permit unlimited contributions to political candidates?
7. At what point do large contributions become a form of political bribery?

Jeffersonian Localism and Early Campaigns

Early political campaigns were local affairs conducted through newspapers.
During much of the nineteenth century, Jeffersonian localism defined every
aspect of running for office: control of local newspapers, disbursement of local
party jobs, and mobilization of local volunteers. It was an amateur enterprise,
but it was highly effective.
As we saw in chapter 1, the surest way to win favorable attention for candi-
dates in the early days of the republic was to own a newspaper or sponsor the ed-
itor. Thus, in 1791, Thomas Jefferson gave Philip Freneau a part-time clerkship
in the State Department so that he would move to Philadelphia to become editor
of the National Gazette, the paper that became the mouthpiece for Jefferson’s
Democratic-Republican Party. Alexander Hamilton, meanwhile, was a major
financial backer of the competing Gazette of the United States. As late as the
mid-nineteenth century, newspapers were a major source of campaign expendi-
tures. When a wealthy backer wanted to aid the presidential candidacy of James
Buchanan in 1856, he contributed $10,000 to start a sympathetic newspaper.
Likewise, Abraham Lincoln secretly purchased a small Illinois newspaper to
advance his presidential ambitions in 1860.1
“Treating” was another common form of electioneering during the early
days of the republic. Candidates would sponsor events at which voters would
be treated to lavish feasts.2 Thus, when George Washington ran for the Virginia
House of Burgesses in 1751, he reportedly purchased a quart of rum, wine, beer,
and hard cider for every voter in the district (a manageable task because there
were only 391 voters).3 In 1835, Ferdinand Bayard, a Frenchman traveling in the
United States, commented that “candidates offer drunkenness openly to anyone
who is willing to give them his vote.”4 Besides owning newspapers and treating
political supporters, candidates also sent mailings to voters, printed pamphlets
for distribution, and organized rallies and parades. By the 1840s, pictures, but-
tons, and novelty items were widely distributed.
 Campaign Finance and Transitional Political Parties 121

Although it was costly to purchase newspapers and distribute campaign par-

aphernalia, collecting massive sums of money was unnecessary. Prior to 1828,
only white males could vote, there were property qualifications in some states,
and voting was even restricted in some places to those belonging to a particu-
lar religious denomination.5 Fewer voters meant fewer expenditures. Modes of
communication were limited to word of mouth and the print media. After the
formation of the spoils system in the 1830s (whereby party workers were re-
warded with government jobs), volunteers were called upon to organize parades
and get voters to the polls. Entrenched party loyalties made it easy to identify
supporters, as there was little partisan movement from one election to the next
and straight-ticket voting was the norm.

Mark Hanna, the Campaign of 1896, and the

Rise of Hamiltonian Nationalism
Mark Hanna is often credited with being the first campaign consultant in U.S.
history, having orchestrated William McKinley’s 1896 presidential victory.6 He
also helped transform the role of money in politics, once famously saying, “There
are two things that are important in politics—the first is money, and I can’t
remember what the second one is.”7 This was an astonishing statement, given
the secondary role of money in elections during the first century of our nation’s
history. Why did this change?
A tremendous surge in campaign funds coincided with the vast transforma-
tion of the U.S. economy following the Civil War. By the 1870s, the Industrial
Revolution was in full swing, the nation’s industrial infrastructure was boom-
ing, and Americans were migrating to the nation’s largest cities. Relationships
were forged between party machines and captains of industry, in which the
latter pumped money into party coffers with the understanding that elected
officials would not interfere with the free market.
The election of 1896 marked a turning point in the tale of money and poli-
tics. William McKinley pledged to continue the GOP’s laissez-faire economic
policies, whereas William Jennings Bryan, McKinley’s Democratic opponent,
wanted more government regulation of business. Fearing a Democratic Party
groundswell would threaten the free-market economic system should Bryan be-
come president, Republicans mounted the best-bankrolled campaign to date.
For the first time, corporations made political contributions directly from their
company treasuries. Mark Hanna met with financiers like J.P. Morgan and John
122 chapter 7

D. Rockefeller to solicit funds.8 The return was enormous, including $250,000

from Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company; $174,000 from western railroads;
even $50,000 in cash from a single railroad executive.9
The Republicans’ massive war chest, estimated at $3.5 million, allowed
Hanna to sponsor hundreds of speakers for small gatherings and debates, pro-
duce more than 200 million pamphlets (the GOP headquarters employed over
100 full-time mail clerks) and hundreds of thousands of posters, buttons, and
billboards; invest heavily in newspaper advertising; and hire legions of workers
to register new Republicans and get them to the polls.10 McKinley simply stayed
at home in Canton, Ohio, where trainloads of supporters numbering 750,000
in total (or one out of every 20 voters), were brought to his front porch. Many
carried envelopes of cash.11 In September alone, McKinley and the Republicans
raised $570,000, while the Democrats raised a mere $650,000 for their entire
campaign.12 Bryan accused McKinley of trying to buy the presidency,13 but to
no avail. McKinley won with 51.7 percent of the vote, the highest Republican
percentage since the reelection of Ulysses S. Grant in 1872.14
Mark Hanna’s efforts were significant in two ways. First, the 1896 election
was the first time that systematic fund-raising techniques were used in a presi-
dential campaign. No longer would party operatives wait for the money to come
in; instead, they would go out and get it. Second, Hanna demonstrated that
political advertising could rule the day. Word-of-mouth campaigning and rely-
ing on volunteers were becoming obsolete. Press releases, direct mail, billboards,
soon radio, and later television and the Internet, would transform electioneering
by creating national messages that were developed by strategists at the highest
levels and could be disseminated to voters using new messaging tools.
In addition to a shift in campaign tactics, the US was experiencing a rapid
expansion of the electorate thanks to immigration and women’s suffrage. With
more voters to reach, political parties needed more resources, and an age of ag-
gressive fund-raising began. It was once reported that when a union leader came
to a US senator to urge support for protections against child labor at the turn
of the century, the senator supposedly replied, “Sam, you know damn well as I
do that I can’t stand for a bill like that. Why those fellows this bill is aimed at—
those mill owners are good for $200,000 a year to the party. You can’t afford to
monkey with a business that friendly.15
Hanna and the Republican Party created a new type of political campaign
in the image of Hamiltonian nationalism. By designing a centralized campaign
structure and using new, top-down techniques to communicate with a mass
electorate, Hanna and his colleagues began a rapid retreat from locally based
 Campaign Finance and Transitional Political Parties 123

campaigning that grew with the passage of time and vastly transformed Ameri-
can politics. Going forward, political parties became professional organizations
and a nexus for gathering large sums of money. Elections would be conducted
by party professionals, and the party machines would exert considerable control
over policymaking. Party bosses expected those in government to ante up, and
anyone interested in shaping public policy was expected to woo them. Party cof-
fers were filled through small numbers of huge contributions from so-called fat
cats. By 1928, over half the funds in the Democratic and Republican treasuries
came from contributions of $5,000 or more—a sum that could buy 10 family cars
at that time.16 The cornerstone of Hamiltonian parties is money—and lots of it.

Television Marketing and the Skyrocketing Costs of Campaigns

If the cost of elections rose during the Industrial Revolution, it skyrocketed
during the technological revolution that has transformed American politics in
the twenty-first century. In 2020, Joe Biden raised over $1.6 billion, with over
$1 billion coming from individual donors to his campaign.17 Donald Trump
raised $1.045 billion, with $774 million coming from individual contributors.18
Indeed, the cost of running for every political office has grown at a staggering
rate. In 2020, more than $7 billion was spent on congressional races.19
The single greatest force behind these outsized sums is media expenditures.
Most voters hear from politicians through television, radio, and social media,
while the Internet allows campaigns to acquire digital information about indi-
vidual voters. Advertising and information acquisition costs can be enormous.
Veteran political strategist Roger Stone, later pardoned by Donald Trump for
making false statements and tampering with witnesses in the federal investiga-
tion of Trump’s 2016 campaign, explained why the costs of media advertising
have risen exponentially:

There’s so much competition in the marketplace in terms of informa-

tion. There’s information overload. There’s 100 cable channels, there’s
digital TV, there’s your tablets, your Netflix type sites, your Twitter, your
Facebook. I mean, we’re bombarded with information from everywhere.
There’s a magazine [and a website] for every discipline you can think of.
You want a magazine for biking? There’s a biker’s magazine. You want
a motorcycle magazine? There’s a motorcycle magazine. If you’re into
fly-fishing, there’s a fly-fishing magazine. Knitting, there’s a knitting mag-
azine. So, I mean, it’s a lot harder to reach people because they have all this
124 chapter 7

information at their fingertips, and therefore everything takes greater rep-

etition, far greater than it used to, say, when television was in its infancy.20

The emergence of professional campaign consultants has also fueled election

costs. In 1896, Mark Hannah could singularly organize and run a presidential
campaign. Today, campaigns require a team of media gurus, pollsters, fundrais-
ing professionals, legal advisors, and direct mail experts. These professionals do
not come cheap. Consider what it cost Donald Trump to run for re-election.
During the first ten months of 2020, the Trump campaign spent $1.4 billion on
media professionals, legal bills, and direct payments to Trump-owned properties
for campaign events. These included $41 million for legal matters; $55 million
for payroll and associated fees, and $17 million for one-time campaign manager
Brad Parscale’s digital and consulting firm. American Made Media Consultants,
a firm established by the Trump campaign to handle its advertising and paid
media, was paid a whopping $453 million. Because of this profligate spending,
by mid-October the Trump campaign and the Republican National Committee
were left with only $223.5 million of the $1.6 billion they had raised since 2017.21

The Rise of Political Action Committees

Interest groups have played an important role in funding elections for over a
century. During the Industrial Revolution, businesses, trade associations, and
labor unions channeled large donations to parties and their candidates. Even
though reform measures limited direct contributions from corporations, banks,
and labor union, many loopholes existed. In 1943, the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO) circumvented contribution restrictions by creating a sep-
arate fund to receive and spend voluntary contributions—a new organizational
unit it called the political action committee (PAC). It was legal, the CIO argued,
because none of the monies used to support the group or given to candidates
came directly from the labor union itself.
By the late 1950s, scores of businesses and professional associations began to
develop their own PACs.22 But the real growth period began in the 1970s. In 1974,
there were roughly 600 PACs.23 Today, 5,738 so-called “Super PACs” are regis-
tered with the Federal Election Commission. These Super PACs can receive un-
limited contributions from individuals, corporations, and labor unions and spend
that money independently of a specific campaign in support of a candidate. In
addition, 70,943 so-called “Hybrid PACs” are registered with the Federal Election
 Campaign Finance and Transitional Political Parties 125

Commission. These Hybrid PACs solicit money from individuals, corporations,

and labor unions, and use that money to support candidates for political office.24
Today, outside groups are a major source of funding for political campaigns.
For example, in 2020, America First Action, Preserve America, and the Com-
mittee to Defend the President spent a combined total of $270 million on
Trump’s behalf.25 Joe Biden’s campaign had help from Future Forward, Priorities
USA, and American Bridge, which spent a combined $368 million to advocate
for his candidacy.26

Congress, the Supreme Court, and Campaign Finance

What difference does it make whether some outside groups or individuals give
money during elections while others do not? One could argue that contributing
money is one way citizens can participate in the democratic process. This argu-
ment is often heard from opponents of campaign finance reform who claim that
the more money there is in electoral politics, the better off the system is. After
all, they reason, is not the act of contributing money an exercise of freedom
of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment? Viewed from this perspective,
the massive influx of money into campaigns is nothing more than democracy
churning on all cylinders.
Most Americans do not share this upbeat view. In 2019, three-in-four Amer-
icans opposed Supreme Court decisions that allowed for unlimited amounts
of money to directly support or oppose political candidates.27 These results are
hardly surprising, since there remains a long-standing belief that money plays a
competing role in the development of public policy and should be subject to gov-
ernment regulation. Americans are suspicious of money in politics, as the vast
majority never contribute to a candidate or a political party. According to a 2020
Pew Research survey, only 20 percent of Americans gave money to a candidate
running for office in the past year.28
Prior to the Progressive Era, there were few efforts to curb the flow of money
in elections. In 1867, Congress passed legislation prohibiting assessments on
navy yard workers. Nine years later, the ban was extended to all federal employ-
ees.29 The most prominent of these reforms occurred in 1883 when Congress,
prompted by the 1881 assassination of President James A. Garfield by a disap-
pointed office seeker, passed the Civil Service Reform Act. Besides creating the
civil service, the law continued the ban on assessing federal government employ-
ees for political contributions.30
126 chapter 7

In 1907, Congress passed the Tillman Act, which made it a crime for any cor-
poration or national bank to contribute to either congressional or presidential
candidates. A Senate report concluded that “[t]he evils of the use of [corporate]
money in connection with political elections are so generally recognized that the
committee deems it unnecessary to make any argument in favor of the general
purpose of this measure. It is in the interest of good government and calculated
to promote purity in the selection of public officials.”31 Three years later, Con-
gress required House candidates to disclose the source of their party committee
contributions if they operated in two or more states—but only after the elec-
tions. The law, passed by a Republican-controlled Congress, was strengthened in
1911 when Democrats came to power. The new law established spending limits
and required pre-election disclosure of finances in House and Senate races.32
The Teapot Dome scandal that gripped the Warren Harding Administration
led to additional cries for reform. In 1925, Calvin Coolidge signed the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act into law. This legislation required quarterly reports (even
in nonelection years) of contributions to federal candidates and to multistate
political committees. The law reaffirmed the spending limits, but it was easily
circumvented as candidates established a multitude of supporting committees,
thus making it hard to determine the total amount of receipts and expenditures
in any given campaign.33
Another flurry of reform measures occurred during the late 1930s and early
1940s—most notably the Hatch Act of 1939, officially called the Clean Politics
Act. This measure made it a crime for any federal employee to become an active
political participant, and for anyone to solicit funds from people receiving federal
relief. Within a year, several amendments were added—including the first federal
limit on contributions from individuals (they could give no more than $5,000 to
a candidate for federal office), and a prohibition on contributions from banks and
corporations to include labor unions as part of the Taft-Hartley Act. Congress
enacted the measure over the veto of President Harry S. Truman, who warned
that the expenditure ban was a “dangerous intrusion on free speech.”34 During the
Trump years, the Hatch Act was repeatedly violated as administration officials un-
dertook political activities, even using the White House as a backdrop—violations
that were not prosecuted by the Justice Department. Calls to reform the Hatch
Act have become more frequent, but no legislation has been passed by Congress.
In fact, attempted campaign finance reforms have largely been meaningless.
The flow of large sums of money into campaigns has not slowed down; rather,
it is simply channeled along different paths.35 Although the names given these
statutes sound impressive, they failed to create public authorities responsible for
 Campaign Finance and Transitional Political Parties 127

collecting the disclosure reports and prosecuting any illegal activity. Moreover,
the laws were fraught with many loopholes. One was a provision that limited
reporting requirements to “campaign periods,” allowing contributors to evade
the law by donating to candidates prior to the start of any designated period.
Moreover, expenditure limits applied only to a particular candidate, not to the
separate committees that sprang up on a candidate’s behalf (e.g., “Friends to
Elect Mary Smith to Congress”). Additionally, corporations evaded contribu-
tion prohibitions by reimbursing corporate executives who sent money to can-
didates. Under-the-table gifts were also commonplace. Finally, there was a lack
of will among elected officials to enforce the existing regulations. There is no
record of a single prosecution for campaign finance violations from the passage
of the Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 until the 1970s.

Watergate and Campaign Finance Reform

By the 1970s, reform was back on the congressional agenda. Spending on tele-
vision was increasing campaign costs, while incumbents from both parties were
worried that well-financed challengers could connect with voters through the
mass media and toss them out. The shocking disclosures of fat-cat contributions,
including businessman Clement Stone’s $3 million gift to Richard M. Nixon’s
1968 presidential campaign, added to the pressure for reform.
Two significant measures became law in 1971. The Revenue Act created a
fund for presidential campaigns and allowed voters to check off a one-dollar
donation on their tax forms to help support the fund (it was increased to three
dollars in 2001), and the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) was an am-
bitious attempt to tighten reporting requirements and limit campaign media
expenditures. Unlike prior disclosure laws, FECA mandated that all campaign
expenditures and contributions of over $100 be disclosed, regardless of when
they were given. Moreover, reports would be filed with the General Accounting
Office and made public within 48 hours. Media expenditures—including televi-
sion, radio, billboards, and newsprint—would be limited to $50,000, or 10 cents
per voting-age resident (whichever amount was larger).36
The FECA did increase disclosure levels, but the law had little impact on
the 1972 elections. As in the past, candidates found different channels through
which to spend their funds. But the story of campaign finance reform was about
to take a dramatic turn. Investigations of Nixon’s involvement in the cover-up of
the break-in at the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Water-
gate Hotel revealed that the Committee to Reelect the President (CREEP) had
128 chapter 7

established its own secret fundraising program. Of the $63 million collected by
Nixon, $20 million came from 153 donors who gave $50,000 or more. Com-
menting on the breadth of the Watergate scandal, John Gardner, head of the
public interest group Common Cause, said: “Watergate is not primarily a story
of political espionage, nor even of White House intrigue. It is a particularly mal-
odorous chapter in the annals of campaign financing. The money paid to the
Watergate conspirators before the break-in—and the money passed to them later
[to keep quiet]—was money from campaign gifts.”37
A shocked public, together with a Democratic-controlled Congress, led a re-
form effort and passed legislation establishing contribution limits and a regula-
tory system for enforcement (see Table 7.1). Despite his reservations, President
Gerald R. Ford signed it into law, noting that “the times demand this legislation.”38

A Challenge to the Supreme Court: Buckley v. Valeo

This moment of reform did not last long. As soon as FECA took effect in 1976,
it was challenged in the courts. The case was brought by a diverse set of plain-
tiffs, including U.S. senator James Buckley, a conservative Republican from New
York; US senator Eugene McCarthy, a liberal Democrat from Minnesota; the
New York Civil Liberties Union; and Human Events, a conservative publica-
tion. In Buckley v. Valeo (Francis R. Valeo was the secretary of the Senate),39
Buckley and his allies maintained that campaign spending was a form of speech
protected by the First Amendment. The government argued that democracy
required a level playing field, and this meant limits should be placed on both
campaign contributions and expenditures.
On January 30, 1976, the Supreme Court found that some, but not all, of
the FECA restrictions were constitutional. They let stand limits on how much
money individuals and political committees could contribute; they permitted
public financing of presidential elections, so long as it was voluntary (meaning
that candidates could refuse public monies and spend their own campaign dol-
lars instead); and they required disclosure of campaign contributions and ex-
penditures of more than $100. But the Supreme Court also struck down several
features of the new law, including the overall spending caps; limits on what can-
didates and their spouses could contribute to their own campaigns; and limits
on individual expenditures.40 Concerning its rejection of overall spending limits,
the Court noted, “A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can
spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the
quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth
of their exploration and the size of the audience reached.”41
 Campaign Finance and Transitional Political Parties 129

Table 7.1 Highlights of the 1974 Campaign Finance Reform

Created a Federal Election Commission consisting of six members (three Democrats

and three Republicans) and charged them with enforcing federal election statutes.
Set an individual contribution limit of $1,000 per primary, runoff, and general elec-
tion not to exceed $25,000 to all federal candidates annually.
Set a contribution limit of $5,000 per political action committee (PAC) to federal
candidates with no aggregate limit.
Set a $1,000 independent expenditure limit on behalf of a federal candidate.
Banned any contributions to federal candidates from foreign sources.
Set a $10 million spending limit per presidential candidate for all presidential
primaries.
Set a $20 million limit per presidential candidate for the general election races.
Set a $100,000 limit for US Senate primary candidates.
Set a $150,000 limit for US Senate general election races.
Set a $70,000 limit for US House primary races.
Set a $70,000 limit for US House general election.
Limited party spending to $10,000 per candidate in US House elections.
Limited party spending to $20,000 per candidate in US Senate elections.
Limited party spending to two cents per voter in presidential general elections.
Expanded public funding of presidential elections (both primary and general). Pri-
mary elections would allow private funds to be matched with public funds to a cer-
tain level.
Created an extensive list of disclosure and reporting requirements. Each campaign
must have one central committee through which all contributions and expenditures
on behalf of a candidate must be reported to the Federal Election Commission.

Source: Mary W. Cohn, ed., Congressional Campaign Finances: History, Facts, and
Controversy (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1992), 44–46. These were
amendments to the 1971 FECA law.

Reforming the Reforms: The Bipartisan

Campaign Reform Act of 2001
New reforms emerged from public opposition to the increased amounts of
money given to candidates and campaigns during the 1980s and 1990s, largely
from several novel types of campaign contributions which found their way
around existing laws. One of these was “soft money,” which was not regulated by
130 chapter 7

the Federal Election Commission. Soft money was collected by the national par-
ties—including the Democratic National Committee, the Republican National
Committee, and their corresponding House and Senate committees—and used
for party-building activities ranging from public education to voter mobiliza-
tion. “Hard money,” in contrast, refers to contributions made by individuals to
federal candidates that are subject to the caps imposed by FECA and are moni-
tored by the Federal Election Commission.
From 1994 to 2000, the total amount of soft money raised by the Democratic
and Republican parties rose more than fourfold from $102 million to $495 mil-
lion.42 Disgusted by the bipartisan evasion of FECA, consumer activist Ralph
Nader ran for president in 2000, contending that the campaign finance system
was broken and corrupted the system of checks and balances created by the U.S.
Constitution. Said Nader: “If we don’t have a more equitable distribution of
power, there is no equitable distribution of wealth or income. And people who
work hard will not get their just rewards. And the main way to shift power, if you
had to have one reform, is public financing of public elections.” Nader was not
alone in his assessment. Elected officials from both parties agreed that the sys-
tem was broken and in need of reform. Former senator Warren Rudman (R-New
Hampshire) said it best: “You can’t swim in the ocean without getting wet, you
can’t be part of this system without getting dirty.” Even donors acknowledged
that money bought access. As one of them put it, “As a result of my $500,000
soft money donation to the Democratic National Committee (DNC), I was of-
fered the chance to attend events with [President Clinton], including events at
the White House a number of times.”43
Prior to the 2000 election, senators John McCain, a Republican from Ari-
zona, and Russ Feingold, a Democrat from Wisconsin, led a bipartisan effort to
change the campaign finance laws. They were joined in the House by Representa-
tives Christopher Shays, a Republican from Connecticut, and Martin Meehan, a
Democrat from Massachusetts. Spearheading the opposition was Senator Mitch
McConnell, a Republican from Kentucky. Clinging to the idea that money is a
form of free speech, McConnell, along with a handful of Republicans, filibus-
tered the McCain-Feingold effort. Unless they could muster sixty votes needed
to end a McConnell-led filibuster, campaign finance would go nowhere.
The election of 2000 was pivotal. Democrats made gains in both houses of
Congress, with many of the newcomers pledging to “clean things up.” Debate on
the reform measure was finally set for March of 2001. After nearly two weeks of
compromise, McCain and Feingold were able to break the filibuster and win over
enough moderate Republicans by increasing the cap on individual contributions
 Campaign Finance and Transitional Political Parties 131

from $1,000 to $2,000. But the battle was far from over. House Republicans of-
fered an alternative to the Shays-Meehan plan that allowed contributions to the
party committees above the proposed $90,000 limit. This less sweeping measure
was meant to appeal to Black and Hispanic Democratic legislators, since the na-
tional party committees were instrumental in mobilizing minority communities
to get out the vote. But Shays and Meehan knew that their bill would have to
be identical to the one passed in the Senate to avoid a House-Senate conference
committee that could potentially kill the measure. After months of further de-
bate, Congress finally passed the legislation in 2002. McCain-Feingold, offi-
cially called the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) became law.
The final version of the law included a ban on contributions to any national
political party. The bill also banned issue advocacy ads thirty days before pri-
mary elections and sixty days prior to a general election. However, the ban on
soft money did not apply to PACs, which were free to raise unlimited amounts
of money. Even so, the passage of McCain-Feingold created its own set of con-
troversies. The very day that the BCRA was signed into law, Mitch McConnell
and a host of other federal legislators, along with various interest groups and
minor parties, challenged it in the federal courts. The core of their complaint
was that McCain-Feingold represented an assault on free association and expres-
sion. This was based on the restrictions the new law placed on issue advocacy
and expressed advocacy for a given candidate sixty days prior to an election.44
Previously, the Supreme Court ruled that political parties could spend unlim-
ited amounts on issue advocacy advertisements so long as they were not done in
concert with any candidate’s campaign.45
In the 2003 case of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme
Court ruled in favor of keeping McCain-Feingold’s ban on soft money contribu-
tions. Writing for a five-to-four majority, Justices John Paul Stevens and Sandra
Day O’Connor condemned the use of soft money in political campaigns:
Just as troubling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo corrup-
tion is the danger that officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or
the desires of their constituencies but according to the wishes of those who
have made large financial contributions. . . . The best means of prevention
is to identify and remove the temptation. The evidence set forth . . . con-
vincingly demonstrates that soft-money contributions to political parties
carry with them just such a temptation.46
But the final paragraph of the majority opinion contained a prescient predic-
tion: “Money, like water, will always find an outlet.”47 The flow of money into
132 chapter 7

campaigns would continue, and McConnell v. FEC would not be the last word
from the Supreme Court on the subject of campaign finance.

Gutting the Reforms: The Supreme Court Weighs in

Evidence that the Supreme Court decision in McConnell v. FEC was begin-
ning to fray mounted during George W. Bush’s second term. Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor retired, Chief Justice William Rehnquist died, and President Bush
filled the vacancies with conservatives Samuel Alito and John Roberts. This
rapid turnover shifted to Court to the right.48
By 2007, the Roberts-led Court struck down as unconstitutional the
McCain-Feingold ban on using a candidate’s name in issue advocacy advertise-
ments thirty days before a primary and sixty days prior to a general election. In a
five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court declared: “Discussion of issues cannot
be suppressed simply because the issues may also be pertinent in an election.
Where the First Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to the speaker, not the
censor.”49 It was the first of several decisions that would effectively open the
spigot for money to flow to parties and campaigns.
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. Four years later, the Su-
preme Court dealt an even more profound blow to campaign finance reform
in the landmark 2010 case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.
The case arose out of a campaign movie about then 2008 presidential candi-
date Hillary Clinton financed by the conservative group Citizens United. The
film (called Hillary, The Movie) depicted Clinton in a negative light, claiming
she was “driven by power,” “steeped in sleaze,” “deceitful,” and “would lie about
anything.”50 In January 2008, Citizens United sought to broadcast its movie on
video-on-demand channels provided by cable service providers. Citizens United
wanted to purchase advertisements to promote the film. Both were scheduled to
air within thirty days of the first presidential primaries, violating the provision
in the McCain-Feingold Act that prohibited third-party groups from broad-
casting advertisements advocating either for or against a candidate immediately
before an election. Although the words “vote against” were not found in the
film, the message was clear that Clinton should be defeated.
The Supreme Court used the case to issue a sweeping five-to-four decision
claiming that the First Amendment included the right of corporations and
others to engage in free unregulated speech,51 and determined that the portion
of McCain-Feingold act making it a felony to expressly advocate either for or
against candidates (either thirty days before a primary or sixty days before a
 Campaign Finance and Transitional Political Parties 133

general election) violated the First Amendment.52 Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Anthony Kennedy declared: “No sufficient governmental issues justified
limits on the political speech of non-profit corporations. . . . For these reasons,
political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by
design or inadvertence. . . . There is simply no support for the view that the First
Amendment, as originally understood, would permit the suppression of political
speech by media corporations.”53
Virtually the only portion of the McCain-Feingold law the Court left intact
was its disclosure requirements. Justice Kennedy found that disclosure did not
inhibit political speech, noting that “disclosure permits citizens and sharehold-
ers to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This transparency
enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to dif-
ferent speakers and messages.”54 But even this point was vigorously contested by
Justice Clarence Thomas, who argued that disclosures of political contributions
supporting California’s Proposition 8, a 2008 law that overturned the Califor-
nia Supreme Court’s decision legalizing gay marriage, resulted in intimidation
and harassment. Said Thomas: “I cannot endorse a view of the First Amendment
that subjects citizens of this Nation to death threats, ruined careers, damaged
or defaced property, or pre-emptive and threatening warning letters as the price
for engaging in core political speech, the primary object of First Amendment
protection.”55
The majority view was countered by Justice John Paul Stevens, who main-
tained that Congress was entirely correct to view unregulated sums of campaign
money as a corrupting influence:
[O]ver the course of the past century Congress has demonstrated a recur-
rent need to regulate corporate participation in candidate elections to “[p]
reserv[e] the integrity of the electoral process, preven[t] corruption, . . .
sustai[n] the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen, protect
the expressive interests of shareholders, and [p]reserve[e] . . . the individual
citizens’ confidence in government. . . . Time and again, we have recog-
nized these realities in approving measures that Congress and the States
have taken.56
Stevens noted that corruption “can take many forms,” adding, “Bribery may
be the paradigm case. But the differences between selling a vote and selling ac-
cess is a matter of degree, not kind. And selling access is not qualitatively differ-
ent from giving special preference to those who spent money on one’s behalf.”57
Thus, he argued that unrestricted campaign dollars would result in widespread
134 chapter 7

public “cynicism and disenchantment, an increased perception that large spend-

ers ‘call the tune’ and a reduced ‘willingness of voters to take part in democratic
governance.’”58 In a parting shot, Stevens bluntly stated: “While American de-
mocracy is imperfect, few outside the majority of this Court would have thought
its flaws included a dearth of corporate money in politics.”59
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission. In 2014, the Supreme Court
took aim at the contribution limits in the McCain-Feingold law. The vehicle
was a case involving Shaun McCutcheon, an Alabama resident who donated to
various Republican Party committees, including the Republican National Com-
mittee and its congressional counterparts. In the 2011-2012 cycle, McCutcheon
contributed $33,088 to sixteen federal candidates, and wanted to contribute
to twelve more Republicans running for congressional office, seeking to give
each a symbolic $1,776 contribution. The Alabama Republican also contributed
$27,328 to several non-candidate committees, and $25,000 in total to the Re-
publican National Committee, the National Republican Senatorial Committee,
and the National Republican Congressional Committee. McCutcheon said his
objective was to encourage Republican candidates to adhere to the doctrine of
“smaller government and more freedom.”60
But McCutcheon wanted to spend even more and was forbidden from doing
so by a portion of the McCain-Feingold law that capped individual contribu-
tions to all federal candidates at $48,600 and limited individual contributions
to political parties to $74,600. Joined by the Republican National Committee,
McCutcheon contended these limits violated his First Amendment rights. In
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme Court sided with
McCutcheon. The five-to-four decision left intact limits on individual contribu-
tions to specific candidates for federal office but lifted the $48,600 and $74,000
individual limits placed on total contributions to all candidates and to political
parties respectively.
Chief Justice Roberts spoke for the majority:

To require one person to contribute at lower levels because he wants to

support more candidates or causes is to penalize the individual for robustly
exercising his First Amendment rights. In assessing the First Amendment
interests at stake, the proper focus is on an individual’s right to engage in
political speech, not a collective conception of the public good. The whole
point of the First Amendment is to protect individual speech that the ma-
jority might prefer to restrict, or that legislators or judges might not view
as useful to the democratic process.61
 Campaign Finance and Transitional Political Parties 135

Roberts added that the only congressional interest when it came to regulating
campaign money is preventing quid pro quo corruption. But allowing individu-
als, including McCutcheon, to spend large sums of money does not fall within
that purview: “no matter how desirable it may seem, it is not an acceptable gov-
ernmental objective to ‘level the playing field,’ or to ‘level electoral opportuni-
ties,’ or to ‘equalize the financial resources of candidates.’”62
In his dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer noted that the decision “creates a loop-
hole that will allow a single individual to contribute millions of dollars to a po-
litical party or to a candidate’s campaign. Taken together with Citizens United
v. Federal Election Commission . . . today’s decision eviscerates our Nation’s
campaign finance laws, leaving a remnant incapable of dealing with the grave
problems of democratic legitimacy that those laws were intended to resolve.”63

Aftermath: A Torrent of Cash

Not surprisingly, the flow of money into campaign coffers has escalated with
each passing year. In 2000, George W. Bush became the first Republican pres-
idential candidate to refuse federal financing for his primary campaign.64 In
2004, Democrat Howard Dean raised an astounding $45 million, largely from
small online contributions, becoming the first Democratic primary candidate to
forego federal matching funds.65 In 2008, Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton
raised more money than all their Democratic competitors combined.66 That fall,
Obama became the first major party nominee to forego federal financing of his
general election campaign. Four years later, both Obama and Mitt Romney es-
chewed federal funding of their campaigns. In 2016, Donald Trump and Hillary
Clinton did the same, as did Trump and Joe Biden in 2020. Federal funding of
presidential contenders—either in the primaries or general election—has be-
come essentially meaningless because candidates can raise so much money from
individual donors either in large or small quantities. In 2020, the average do-
nation to the Trump campaign and related party committees supporting them
was $71; similarly, the average donation to Biden’s candidacy and related party
committees was $76.67 Because serious candidates are no longer accepting federal
funds, there has been a significant decline in the number of citizens checking
off the three-dollar contribution on their tax returns—down from 28 percent
in 1976 to 4 percent in 2018.68
Meanwhile, money continues to flow in other ways designed to evade fed-
eral laws. So-called 527 groups, a name that refers to a provision in the federal
tax code, are one means. These tax-exempt organizations are not subject to any
136 chapter 7

limits in the amounts they receive or how they spend them. Citizens United, on
the right, and MoveOn.org, on the left, are examples of such organizations. In
2020, progressive 527 groups spent $1.568 billion to advocate or oppose ideolog-
ically compatible candidates; conservative organizations spent $1.272 billion.69
Campaign money has found several other creative ways to flow like water.
So-called 501c groups (also named after a provision of the Internal Revenue
Service code), labor unions, trade associations, or social welfare organizations
can raise and spend virtually unlimited sums of money so long as it is not their
“primary activity” or “major purpose.”70 The principal difference between 527
groups and 501c groups is that 527s are required to disclose the identities of their
donors; 501cs are not. Moreover, 501cs are not required to disclose their expen-
ditures. This so-called “dark money” has become an important factor in cam-
paigns—an avalanche of funds that rivals or even exceeds reported small-dollar
donations from individuals. The public does not get to see who is contributing
dark money or how it is spent. Some wealthy individuals with strong political
interests, like oil magnates and Republican donors Charles and David Koch,
find this to be a preferred means of exercising their political influence without
making their intentions (or dollars) known to the public.71
Dark money flows even when there are no active campaigns underway. As
President Biden was seeking congressional enactment of the infrastructure pro-
posals in his American Jobs Plan and Build Back Better plan, dark money groups
called Unite the Country Now, Building Back Together, the American Working
Families Action Fund, and Real Recovery Now! were planning to spend mil-
lions in unreported cash advocating Biden’s plans. Amanda Loveday, one of the
Democratic operatives working with Unite the Country Now, said her group
intended “to expand our efforts beyond our election work to educating Ameri-
cans about how President Biden and his administration is getting America back
on track and building better opportunities for middle-class Americans.”72
Any possibility that either Citizens United or McCutcheon would be over-
turned vanished when Donald Trump added three conservative justices to the
Supreme Court. Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett
are all likely to uphold the Court’s position on campaign finance laws. Like-
wise, Congress has been unable to pass significant reforms that might with-
stand the free speech issues raised by the Court. Republican-controlled Con-
gresses have blocked any effort to address the effects of money in politics.
Democratic-controlled Congresses have suffered a similar fate. Any legislation
that would make it to a president’s desk has been blocked by the Senate filibuster.
 Campaign Finance and Transitional Political Parties 137

And should a Republican occupy the White House, any proposed law that might
make it there is subject to an all-but-certain veto.
But limited prospects for success have not dampened congressional reform
efforts. The “For the People Act,” which passed the House of Representatives in
2021, would ban campaign contributions from foreign nationals, require addi-
tional disclosure of outside groups sponsoring political advertisements, ban dark
money by requiring all organizations to disclose their large donors, and provide
public funds to finance all federal campaigns for office. The measure would also
break a longstanding partisan deadlock on the Federal Election Commission,
which has all but stopped enforcing campaign law violations, by reducing the
number of commissioners from six to five. Federal Election Commissioner Ellen
Weintraub has called the agency dysfunctional, as irreconcilable ideological dif-
ferences between Democratic and Republican commissioners have brought the
FEC to a standstill.73
When the For the People Act reached the Senate, all fifty Democrats voted to
debate the measure and all fifty Republicans opposed, far short of the sixty votes
needed to prevent a filibuster. The future of the bill will turn on the willingness
of Democrats to eliminate or modify the sixty-vote threshold and enable the
measure to advance to a vote. Outside groups mobilized to pressure senators to
act, but the Senate rejected any modification of the sixty-vote threshold needed
to pass any reforms. Absent a change of mind, the status quo will remain in place
and an ever-higher deluge of dollars will continue its cascade to campaigns and
the political parties who sponsor them.
 Ch a pter 8

Elected Officials in an Age of Hyper-Partisanship

I
n the late evening hours of January 6, 2021, following the attack
on the US Capitol by a mob of angry citizens incited by Donald Trump and
enraged by what they believed was the theft of the 2020 election, members
of Congress resumed the work of certifying the electoral votes that would final-
ize Joe Biden’s presidential victory. A bitter partisanship hung heavily over the
proceedings. Eight Republican senators joined with 139 House Republicans to
challenge the electoral votes from Arizona, Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Wiscon-
sin based on the same false claims that instigated the rebellion just hours earlier.1
Just one week later, the House voted to impeach Trump a second time, charging
him with sedition and inciting a riot. Every Democrat supported impeaching
Trump; only ten Republicans joined them.
Partisanship has rarely been this toxic, but the reinvention of American parties
as Hamiltonian-like national organizations has upended the way Congress and
the presidency operate. It has turned congressional party leaders into partisan
national figures, giving them a national prominence that is almost unprecedented
in American history, and has elevated the importance of the president’s role as
party leader. Congress was designed to be a relatively decentralized Jefferso-
nian-like institution; partisanship has transformed it into a centralized body that
Hamilton might have praised. The result is a de facto “responsible party” system
where party members vote in lockstep and exhibit the kind of party discipline
one would expect to find in parliamentary systems like that of Great Britain.
But this pseudo-parliamentary approach has been grafted onto the presidential
system set forth in the US Constitution with its separation of executive and leg-
islative powers that assumed institutional loyalty rather than partisan allegiance.
The result is an angry gridlock. Extreme party discipline exhibited by mem-
bers of Congress reflects a hyper-partisanship that has made it extraordinarily
difficult for Congress to act. Majorities and minorities both have tools they can
use to obstruct the other side when partisanship demands that the other side
not get its way. In Congress, the majority party gets to chair all the committees

138
 Elected Officials in an Age of Hyper-Partisanship 139

and determine the legislative agenda. This gives the majority party tremen-
dous authority over policy outcomes and intensifies partisan polarization. At
the same time, the Senate’s supermajority requirement of sixty votes to pass
non-budgetary laws makes it simple for unified minorities to derail even widely
popular legislation.
It was not supposed to work like this. As we have seen, the writers of the US
Constitution eschewed political parties and warned that party competition cor-
rupts leaders and prevents them from acting in the national interest. This is why
political parties are not mentioned in the Constitution, why federal institutions
like Congress and the Electoral College were designed without political parties
in mind, and why George Washington warned that partisan conflict could en-
danger the republic, agreeing with Alexander Hamilton that it was best to select
leaders based on their character as distinguished citizens concerned with the
national interest.
This chapter examines the operation of the party-in-government in an age
of hyper-partisanship. We will explore how partisanship has turned Congress
into a sclerotic institution and examine the elevation of the president’s role as
national party spokesperson. Over the years, presidents have promised to put the
interests of country ahead of their party, and this has been possible to do in less
divisive times. In the best of cases, party allegiances can even boost a president’s
effectiveness. But at moments like ours when the country is deeply divided, the
Framer’s concerns are validated, as roiling partisanship makes effective govern-
ing difficult, if not impossible.

The President as Party Leader

In a supercharged partisan atmosphere, the president’s party leadership role can
assume outsized importance, especially when it comes to advancing their party’s
agenda, which is set by the president and ratified by Congress. In 2009, no Re-
publicans voted for Barack Obama’s Affordable Care Act (Obamacare), which
was enacted entirely by Democrats. In 2017, Donald Trump received unanimous
Republican support for his $1.4 trillion tax cut legislation. Among Democrats,
no Senator supported the law, and in the House just twelve Republicans opposed
it.2 Joe Biden’s ambitious American Relief Plan to combat the COVID-19 pan-
demic made its way to the president’s desk thanks to overwhelming Democratic
support. In the House, only one Democrat opposed the measure while every
Republican voted no. In the Senate, the bill won the backing of every Democrat
but no Republicans.
140 chapter 8

In addition to being important, the party leader role can also be divisive in
times of extreme partisanship. With voters unlikely to split their tickets between
presidential and congressional candidates, members of Congress of the presi-
dent’s party are likely to come from states carried by the president. Presidential
party leadership exercised under these circumstances can serve to intensify par-
tisan divisions, as shared partisan interests between the president and members
of Congress often override institutional loyalties. In 2020, only voters in Maine
split their tickets between the presidency and the Senate, choosing Democrat
Joe Biden and reelecting Republican Susan Collins.3 Voters in every other state
aligned their Senate preferences with their presidential vote.
Presidents have been party leaders as long as there have been political parties,
but the role is not especially intense in less-polarized times when political parties
are viewed as necessary mechanisms that make government work rather than
opposite camps engaged in zero-sum conflict. In his 1913 inaugural address,
when Democrats held the presidency and both houses of Congress for only the
second time since the Civil War, Woodrow Wilson acknowledged his role as
party leader, saying: “No one can mistake the purpose for which the Nation now
seeks to use the Democratic Party. It seeks to use it to interpret a change in its
own plans and point of view.”4 More than a decade later, a conservative Republi-
can president, Herbert Hoover, likewise saw his party as an indispensable part-
ner: “We maintain party government not to promote intolerant partisanship but
because opportunity must be given for the expression of the popular will, and
organization provided for the execution of its mandates. It follows that Govern-
ment both in the executive and legislative branches must carry out in good faith
the platform upon which the party was entrusted with power.”5
Becoming leader of one’s party is one of the most important roles assumed
by any president. As political scientist Clinton Rossiter noted: “No matter how
fondly or how often we may long for a President who is above the heat of polit-
ical strife, we must acknowledge resolutely his right and duty to be leader of his
party. He is at once the least political and most political of all heads of govern-
ment.”6 Presidential candidates ascend to party leadership upon accepting the
nomination of their party, and if elected they become the face and voice of their
party while in office. Presidents nominate party stalwarts to chair their party’s
national committee, and their choices are automatically ratified. As party leader,
presidents set the legislative agenda, command the television airwaves, assume
a dominant social media presence, and often dictate the political discussion.
Some presidents have used their role as party leader to great effect. In his in-
augural address, Franklin Roosevelt called for “action, and action now,” noting
 Elected Officials in an Age of Hyper-Partisanship 141

that the Great Depression created conditions whereby he would “wage a war
against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were
in fact invaded by a foreign foe.”7 When Roosevelt’s bank reform bill was intro-
duced shortly afterwards, a Democratic House member reportedly said: “Here’s
the bill. Let’s pass it!”8 And that’s what happened without a word of the new
law being read by most legislators. In a similar way, unified Democrats passed
President Biden’s nearly $2 trillion American Rescue Plan designed to combat
the economic crisis brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic. Echoing FDR,
Biden declared, “I am going to act, and I am going to act fast.”9
Party unity allowed Ronald Reagan to change the direction of the country
when he assumed the presidency in 1981, rallying fellow Republicans to support
tax cuts, increased defense spending, and higher federal deficits—dramatically
shifting priorities from the previous five decades of liberal government. In 2001,
George W. Bush took a page from Reagan and won quick congressional approval
of tax cuts during a five-month period when Republicans controlled both houses
of Congress and were united in supporting their new president.10
Some presidents have not worn the role of party leader well. Richard Nixon
cast the Republican party aside and created his own personal organization, the
Committee to Reelect the President, which became ensnared in the Watergate
scandal. Barack Obama did little to build his party’s brand at the state level,
presiding over the loss of thirteen governorships and over 800 state legislative
seats—the worst performance for an incumbent party since Dwight Eisen-
hower.11 Donald Trump was more vested in his own fate than in the fortunes
of the Republican Party. Following his reelection defeat, Trump complicated
Republican chances of holding onto their Senate majority by not wholeheartedly
campaigning for the party’s candidates in two decisive Georgia Senate races.

The Party in Congress

Just as a president’s party affiliation counts for nearly everything in a super-
charged political environment, political parties matter more than ever in today’s
Congress. Parties determine the leaders of the House and Senate. The majority
party controls all committee and subcommittee chairs, and committee chairs are
expected to support their party’s candidates and raise money to help elect them.
Candidate recruitment, once a Jeffersonian process decentralized around state
and local parties, has evolved into a Hamiltonian process centralized around
national party campaign committees, who recruit candidates and shower them
with cash. This gives the national party committees outsized responsibility in
142 chapter 8

congressional politics, and they do not hesitate to insert themselves into selecting
those House and Senate candidates they believe have the best chance of winning.
Congressional parties developed almost immediately after the US Constitu-
tion was ratified in response to the philosophical divisions that arose over major
issues during the first years of the constitutional republic. We have seen how
Federalists, led by Alexander Hamilton, rapidly unified in opposition to their
Democratic-Republican rivals, led by Thomas Jefferson. As their policy dis-
agreements intensified, party voting quickly became the norm. From the Third
United States Congress that convened in 1793 through the Seventh Congress
that ended ten years later, Federalists voted together between 83 and 90 percent
of the time. Likewise, Democratic-Republicans voted together between 73 and
80 percent of the time.
Looking at this period, political scientist John F. Hoadley writes that congres-
sional party development passed through four distinct stages: (1) factionalism,
(2) polarization, (3) expansion, and (4) institutionalization. In the first stage,
factions developed and were centered on a variety of disparate issues and charis-
matic personalities. But these divisions were rarely organized and lasted only a
short while. In the second stage, the factions stabilized into permanent groups
that opposed each other on a broad range of issues. During the expansion phase,
the public was drawn into partisan arguments. Finally, in the institutionaliza-
tion phase, a permanent linkage was made among the party organizations, the
party-in-the-electorate, and the party-in-government.12
Formalized party structures have developed over the centuries in Congress as
well as in forty-nine state legislatures (Nebraska has a nonpartisan unicameral
legislature). Both parties meet every two years at the beginning of each con-
gressional session to select House and Senate leaders. The senior leader in the
House of Representatives is the Speaker, the only constitutionally mandated
leadership position that technically could be filled by anyone (the Constitution
doesn’t even require the Speaker to be a sitting member of Congress) so long
as she is the choice of the majority party.13 The Speaker sets the agenda for the
House, rules on points of order, announces results of votes, refers legislation to
committees, names lawmakers to serve on the committees, and maintains order
and decorum. By controlling the powerful Rules Committee and chairing her
party’s committee assignment panel, the Speaker can bestow (or withhold) tan-
gible and intangible rewards to members of both parties.
Although Republicans and Democrats will nominate candidates, only the
majority party will have enough votes needed to elect the Speaker. The losing
minority party candidate becomes the minority leader, while the House majority
 Elected Officials in an Age of Hyper-Partisanship 143

leader serves as second in command and works closely with the Speaker. House
majority and minority whips, along with their deputies, encourage party dis-
cipline, gather intelligence, promote attendance at important votes and party
events, maintain headcounts to make sure legislation has enough support to
pass, persuade colleagues to support party-sponsored measures, and forge lines
of communication between the rank-and-file and party leaders. Each party has
policy and campaign committees, whose chairs round out the House leadership.
Policy committees develop a legislative plan, while campaign committees raise
and distribute funds to help their party members win reelection.
Because partisan loyalty requires fidelity to the party caucus’s choice, defec-
tions on leadership votes or other matters of partisan importance are especially
rare, and bucking the party’s leadership can generate serious consequences. In
2021, Congresswoman Liz Cheney held the position of House Republican
Conference chair, the third-highest leadership rank in the minority party. But
Cheney was appalled at the Capitol insurrection and voted to impeach Donald
Trump, whom she held responsible—a position at odds with her fellow Repub-
lican leaders and most of the Republican caucus. House Republicans were so
incensed that they took the unusual step of voting to remove Cheney from her
leadership position, replacing her with New York congresswoman and Trump
loyalist Elise Stefanik, who promised to work closely with the Republican lead-
ership team. In an equally unusual move, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi sub-
sequently appointed Cheney to a select committee investigating the events of
January 6, which she established when congressional Republicans balked at a
bipartisan investigation. It is rare for a party leader to assign a member of the
opposition to a committee or for a member to accept such a nomination. Os-
tensibly a bipartisan choice, Pelosi was playing to the hyper-partisan conditions
that saw Cheney expelled from Republican leadership in the first place by using
the Cheney nomination to claim Republican support for an investigation that
Republicans sorely wanted to avoid.
In the Senate, the Constitution stipulates that the vice president serves as the
presiding officer and, in case of a tie, casts the deciding vote. In practice, the vice
president attends Senate sessions only on ceremonial occasions or when votes are
expected to be close. During eight years as vice president, Joe Biden never had to
break a tie. However, by June of 2021, with each party holding fifty Senate seats,
Vice President Kamala Harris had already cast six tie-breaking votes.14
When the vice president is absent, the Constitution stipulates that a “presi-
dent pro tempore” preside. By custom, this officer is a member of the majority
party with the longest continuous service. Today, that person is Pat Leahy, a
144 chapter 8

Table 8.1 Party Leadership Positions in the House and Senate, 117th Congress

House Senate
Speaker: Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) Majority Leader: Chuck
Schumer (D-NY)
Majority Leader: Steny Hoyer (D-MD) Majority Whip: Richard Durbin (D-IL)
Majority Whip: Jim Clyburn (D-SC) Minority Leader: Mitch McCon-
nell (R-KY)
Minority Leader: Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) Minority Whip: John Thune (R-SD)
Minority Whip: Steve Scalise (R-LA) President Pro Tempore: Pat
Leahy (D-VT)
Minority Conference Chair: Elise
Stefanik (R-NY)

Vermont Democrat who was first elected to the Senate in 1974. In practice,
junior members of the Senate typically preside over the chamber because the job
is considered more of a chore than an honor.
As in the House, both parties in the Senate separately choose their leaders
biennially by secret ballot. The Senate majority leader heads the majority party;
the Senate minority leader leads the opposition. The remaining Senate leader-
ship posts are much the same as in the House. There are whip organizations
and chairs of policy committees and campaign committees. Table 8.1 notes the
leadership of both parties in the 117th Congress.

Divided Parties in Congress, 1937–1994

For much of American history, there was sufficient ideological overlap between
the parties that interparty coalitions were decisive in determining legislative
outcomes. During most of the twentieth century, intra-party divisions required
members of Congress to seek allies from outside their parties to pass legislation.
From 1937 until 1994, Congress was functionally controlled by a coalition of
“Dixiecrats”—an alliance of conservative Southern Democrats and old-guard
Republicans who opposed Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, especially when it
came to civil rights legislation. Virginia Democrat Howard Smith was a po-
tent symbol of the Dixiecrat coalition. As chairman of the powerful House
Rules Committee, Smith refused to consider legislative proposals presented by
 Elected Officials in an Age of Hyper-Partisanship 145

Democratic presidents and congressional leaders and even opposed the elections
of John F. Kennedy in 1960 and Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964. With Smith and
the Dixiecrat-Republican coalition in opposition, President Kennedy (who had
previously served in both the House and Senate) lamented:
The fact is that the Congress looks more powerful sitting here than it did
when I was there in Congress. But that is because when you are in Congress
you are one of 100 in the Senate or one of 435 in the House. So, the power
is divided. But from here I look at Congress, particularly the bloc action,
and it is a substantial power.15
As Kennedy’s frustrations demonstrate, it can be challenging for presidents to
overcome partisan obstacles in Congress. It can take a grave national crisis (such
as both World Wars, the Great Depression, the September 11 terrorist attacks,
or the COVID-19 pandemic), a rare foreign policy consensus (as was the case
during the cold war), or a period of political abnormality (such as Lyndon John-
son’s 1964 Democratic landslide or Ronald Reagan’s 1980 Republican sweep) to
overwhelm the congressional tendency for delay and inaction.

Advocacy for Responsible Party Government

By the mid-twentieth century, the inability of both parties to produce a truly
party-oriented government frustrated political scientists and led them to search
for ways to achieve greater party accountability. Those who believed parties
should have the decisive role in making public policy advocated for “responsi-
ble party government,” where the party in power manages the government and
enacts the program spelled out in its platform. For its part, the opposition party
develops alternative policies and makes its case to the voters. At the next elec-
tion, the public is asked to judge whether the party in power has done a good job
and which party has the better program for the future.
The doctrine of responsible party government was best expressed in a 1950 re-
port commissioned by the American Political Science Association (APSA) titled
Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System.16 This report was the capstone
of a multiyear effort by the APSA-sanctioned Committee on Political Parties,
consisting of the leading party scholars of that time. In a dramatic departure
from the vision of the founders, it treated parties as “indispensable instruments
of government.”17 and stated that if the parties were in trouble, so was the na-
tion’s system of government. To support this claim, the report noted doubts that
surrounded Democratic president Harry S. Truman’s ability to lead following
146 chapter 8

the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the division of power created by the 1946
elections when Republicans assumed control of Congress while Democrats held
the presidency, and the inability of either branch to agree on much-needed civil
rights legislation. By the time the report was published in 1950, the APSA com-
mittee concluded that both parties had disintegrated to the point where they
could no longer effectively address the problems facing the country. The report
warned that unless the party system was overhauled, three disastrous conse-
quences would follow: (1) the delegation of “excessive responsibility to the pres-
ident,” who would have to generate support for new public initiatives through
personal efforts without the benefit of party; (2) continued disintegration of
both major parties caused by their relative ineffectiveness; and (3) a presiden-
tial-congressional logjam that “might set in motion more extreme tendencies to
the political left and the political right.”18
In the decades following its publication, party scholars extolled the report for
its analysis of the problems parties faced, and they saw its warning of a weaker
party system fulfilled in a more powerful but party-less presidency. In reality,
the APSA committee stifled what was once a lively debate about the role parties
should play in government that began at the turn of the twentieth century. Back
then, scholars viewed the responsible party doctrine with considerable skepti-
cism. As one wrote, “This theory [of responsible party government] appeared
alluring enough to be adopted by some writers of prominence, and expanded in
certain cases, with brilliancy of literary style. It has, however, one defect: it is not
borne out by the facts.”19
One early advocate of responsible parties was Woodrow Wilson. A promi-
nent political scientist who served as APSA president before he was president of
the United States, Wilson told the Virginia Bar Association in 1897: “I, for my
part, when I vote at a critical election, should like to be able to vote for a definite
line of policy with regard to the great questions of the day—not for platforms,
which Heaven knows, mean little enough—but for men known and tried in
public service; with records open to be scrutinized with reference to these very
matters; and pledged to do this or that particular thing; to take a definite course
of action. As it is, I vote for nobody I can depend upon to do anything—no, not
even if I were to vote for myself.”20 A decade later, Wilson added: “There is a
sense in which our parties may be said to have been our real body politic. Not
the authority of Congress, not the leadership of the President, but the discipline
and zest of parties has held us together, has made it possible for us to form and
to carry out national programs.”21
 Elected Officials in an Age of Hyper-Partisanship 147

The doctrine of responsible party government held a powerful grip on

mid-twentieth century scholars, even as events made the idea of a strong
party-in-government unlikely at the time. During forty consecutive years of
Democratic Party control of the House of Representatives from 1954 to 1994,
responsible party government had little meaning. Instead of relying on their
party to win, Democrats used the tools of incumbency to preserve their offices.
Congressional staffs became a kind of permanent campaign staff—answering
mail, acting as ombudsmen, and serving as the “eyes and ears” of the legislator in
the district. Money also helped Democrats win, as interest groups steered their
dollars to all-but-certain-to-win incumbents.
But once in Congress, Democrats ignored party appeals. Southerners had
long abandoned their Democratic loyalties, as exemplified by the emergence
of the Dixiecrat coalition. By the 1970s, Democrats began stripping congres-
sional leaders of their powers. Following the Watergate-dominated elections
of 1974, a crop of newly elected Democrats was determined to sacrifice party
leadership for the purpose of more openness and accountability. They flexed
their muscle by deposing three incumbent committee chairs in a bold repudi-
ation of the once ironclad seniority rule that assured the chairmanship to the
most senior committee member of the majority party. Moreover, they adopted
a Subcommittee Bill of Rights that reduced the power of the Speaker and
the committee chairs. These changes allowed committee Democrats to pick
their chairs and to fix the jurisdictions of subcommittees so that their ability
to control certain subjects could not be given to another committee by party
leaders. They also gave each subcommittee a budget it controlled, created more
staff positions, and guaranteed members of every committee at least one choice
subcommittee assignment. These reforms stripped recalcitrant conservative
Southern Dixiecrats of their jealously guarded powerful committee chairman-
ships. But in so doing, reform-minded Democrats fragmented power within
their own party.
By 1994, party leadership in Congress was at a low ebb. A series of weak Dem-
ocratic speakers were held hostage by stubborn committee chairs who were quite
willing to resist demands for party loyalty. Bill Clinton, who had high hopes that
unified Democratic Party control of the presidency and Congress would result
in significant legislative accomplishments, found those hopes dashed when his
1993 healthcare initiative went down in flames. The Democratic Party was re-
pudiated in the 1994 midterm contests, as voters handed control of the House
to the Republicans for the first time in forty years.
148 chapter 8

The Arrival of Responsible Party Government, 1994–Present

The 1995 Republican takeover of Congress was more than a shift from one
party to another. The incoming seventy-three Republican freshmen differed
significantly from their predecessors in both style and ideological persuasion.
Stylistically, many saw themselves as “citizen politicians” dispatched by their
constituents to Washington, DC, for a brief period before coming home. To
fortify themselves from becoming too comfortable in the nation’s capital, many
Republican newcomers chose to live in their congressional offices, sleeping on
their couches by night and showering in the House gymnasium by day. Their
choice not to live year-round in (or near) the capital precluded them from de-
veloping the close personal relationships that could smooth over professional
differences and maintain collegiality—a stark difference from the past. During
the 1960s, for example, House Republican leader Gerald R. Ford moved with
his wife, Betty, from their native Michigan to Alexandria, Virginia, where they
raised their four children alongside other congressional families. Once, Pres-
ident Lyndon Johnson called from the White House during a Thanksgiving
recess and thought he had reached Ford in Grand Rapids when, in fact, Ford
was just a few miles away.22
But it was in their politics that the Republican freshmen were uniquely dif-
ferent. Motivated by conservative principles, the 1994 class was especially re-
sponsive to pleas to keep the faith when it came to implementing their legislative
agenda. Of thirty-three House roll calls taken in 1995, House GOP members
were unanimous on sixteen. For the entire series of roll calls, the median num-
ber of Republican dissents was one.23 On average, 97 percent of the Republican
freshmen voted in lockstep with their party, and no one fell below 90 percent.24
This uniformity gave Speaker Newt Gingrich an opportunity to assume pow-
ers that none of his Democratic predecessors dared to imagine. He twice passed
over the ranking Republican on the Judiciary and Commerce committees and
installed his own loyalists as committee chairs.25 On the all-important Appro-
priations Committee, Gingrich let his colleagues know that he was in charge
by promoting a Republican who was fifth in seniority to be its chair.26 Then,
Gingrich required each Republican committee member sign a “letter of fidelity”
that gave him the final say over how much the federal budget would be cut.”27
Gingrich rewarded his freshmen firebrands with unusual access. In a highly
irregular move, the most powerful and exclusive committees of the House—
Rules, Ways and Means, and Appropriations—got new freshmen members over
the objections of their Republican chairs. As one grateful recipient observed,
 Elected Officials in an Age of Hyper-Partisanship 149

“Newt really enjoys seeing some of us work because he sees the same rabble-rouser
that he was a few years ago. Without Newt, the class wouldn’t be such a dynamic
class. Newt Gingrich asks: ‘What do the freshmen think?’ And he’s giving us
more than anyone else would have.”28 Such largesse paid off handsomely, as Gin-
grich was able to keep his fellow Republicans in line.
The Republican takeover coincided with a rise in party-centered voting that
began during the 1980s among Republicans who were part of Ronald Reagan’s
conservative activist following, which has since grown in strength. Donald
Trump enjoyed near-unanimous Republican loyalty in Congress. Trump’s 2017
plan to enact a massive tax cut was supported by all but twelve House Republi-
cans and every Senate Republican.29 Trump enjoyed similar party unity in the
Senate when it came to confirming federal judges. His centerpiece pledge to
repeal the Affordable Care Act, also had strong party support, although not
quite enough to win approval of the controversial measure.30
As Republicans became more ideologically conservative, Democrats moved in
a more liberal direction. Democrats were forged into a homogenous group by the
exit of Southern conservatives from the party’s congressional ranks, the rising
prominence of social and cultural issues (such as abortion and LGBTQ rights),
the party’s near-unanimous opposition to the Iraq War, and the two Trump im-
peachment trials. By 2019, there were effectively no conservatives remaining in
the caucus. That year, Democrats in the House and Senate earned a paltry three
percent positive rating from the American Conservative Union.31
Over time, partisanship has upended the way Congress conducts its business.
Members now vie for appearances on cable news shows and are adept at using
social media to score clicks and retweets. Democratic congresswoman Alexan-
dria Ocasio-Cortez skillfully uses Instagram, Twitter, and Facebook to commu-
nicate with her constituents and with a much broader national audience. The
New York representative has twelve million followers on Twitter (nearly double
Speaker Pelosi’s seven million followers).32
Republicans have proven themselves to be just as capable at using social media.
In 2021, newly elected House freshman Madison Cawthorn announced, “I have
built my staff around comms [communications] rather than legislation.” Another
freshman member, Marjorie Taylor Greene, garnered tremendous media attention
in the first days of the 117th Congress. Greene, a supporter of the conspiracy group
Q-Anon who “liked” social media posts advocating the assassinations of Nancy
Pelosi, Barack Obama, and Hillary Clinton, posted a video of her harassing David
Hogg, a political organizer and survivor of the Parkland, Florida, school shoot-
ing.33 Arriving in Washington, DC, Greene live-streamed herself walking through
150 chapter 8

a Capitol hallway wearing a facemask below her chin that read “Censored.” Re-
publican leadership refused to strip Greene of her committee assignments for her
behavior, but Democrats used their majority power to do so, noting that Greene’s
threats against the lives of Pelosi and others were beyond the pale.
For Greene and her avid followers, legislating is not the point. As one Wash-
ington Post writer put it, “She’s not here to legislate; she’s here to livestream.”34
This is consistent with an argument made by two congressional scholars,
Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, who wrote that the “Republican
Party has become an insurgent outlier—ideologically extreme; contemptuous
of the inherited social and economic policy regime; scornful of compromise;
unpersuaded by conventional understanding of facts, evidence, and science; and
dismissive of the legitimacy of its political opposition.”35
As congressional partisanship has increased, disillusionment among members
of Congress has risen with it. In 2021, Ohio Republican senator Rob Portman
surprised his colleagues by announcing he would not seek reelection, saying this
is “a tough time to be in public service.” Portman blamed partisanship for his
withdrawal: “We live in an increasingly polarized country where members of
both parties are being pushed further to the right and further to the left, and
that means too few people who are actively looking to find common ground.”36
Others echo privately what Portman has said publicly.

The Rise of the Public Speakership

One consequence of the acute partisan warfare in Washington, DC, has been
a more visible House Speakership. During the long reign of Democratic Party
rule prior to 1994, House Speakers ceded much of their power to committee
chairs. This suited most Speakers, as many of them were old-style operatives
who worked behind closed doors. Sam Rayburn, one of the most powerful of
the Democratic Speakers during the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s, had what
was known as his “Board of Education” where favored members would privately
gather to discuss pending business and make deals over bourbon and branch
water. But Rayburn kept an exceptionally low public profile. Once, when asked
to appear on a Sunday political talk show, Rayburn responded:
I do appreciate your wanting me to be on Meet the Press, but I never go on
programs such as yours. . . . The trouble about my going on one program is
then I would have no excuse to say to the others that I could not go on their
program. It is a chore that I have never relished and one I doubt would be
 Elected Officials in an Age of Hyper-Partisanship 151

any good. . . . I would have to tell you what I tell all the others, and that is
that I do not go on these programs.37
This began to change in 1981 when House Speaker Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill
found himself as the senior Democrat in Washington following Ronald Rea-
gan’s 1980 landslide, which saw Republicans win the White House and the US
Senate. As the major opposition voice to the new president, O’Neill beefed up
his communications staff, worked on his speaking style, and began regularly
appearing on television and cable news programs to push back against Reagan’s
conservative agenda.
A decade later, Speaker Newt Gingrich took the public Speakership further,
making an unprecedented nationally televised address and sharing a debate
stage with President Clinton to discuss campaign finance reform. As Gingrich
later acknowledged, “The most accurate statement of how I see the Speaker-
ship [is] somebody who could somehow combine grassroots organizations, mass
media, and legislative detail into one synergistic pattern.”38 Gingrich redesigned
the Speaker’s office to accommodate his desire to “go public” by creating four
media-oriented staff positions: press secretary, deputy press secretary, press as-
sistant, and communications coordinator. The effects were immediate: during
his first three months in power, Gingrich was mentioned in an unprecedented
114 stories on the three nightly network news programs.
When Democrats won control of the House in 2018, but with Republicans
still in charge of the Senate and White House, Nancy Pelosi assumed a pub-
lic role like the one Tip O’Neill had during the Reagan years. Pelosi’s voice in
speaking for her party was especially important during the first impeachment
trial of Donald J. Trump. After 2020, with Democrats in control of the White
House and Congress, President Biden assumed the role of chief party spokes-
person, and Pelosi maintained a lower profile while remaining a power to be
reckoned with in the House.

Congress and the “Little Arts of Popularity”

As politics has succumbed to hyper-partisanship, party disagreements have be-
come disagreeable. After the January 6 riots, the tension on Capitol Hill was
palatable. Metal detectors were installed, and some members refused to pass
through them to gain access to the floors of Congress. Democrats felt threatened
by Republican members who insisted on bringing guns into the House chamber.
Informal interactions with members from the opposite party all but ceased.
152 chapter 8

This ugly partisanship is far different from what the Founders envisioned.
Writing in The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton declared that the best legisla-
tors were those who vote their consciences for policies they believed to be in
the national interest and ignore pleas to do otherwise. Hamilton derided “the
little arts of popularity”39—a dig at those who paid too much attention to public
opinion—preferring strong congressional leaders who could muster support for
unpopular positions that would benefit the nation. (Recall that Hamilton him-
self was instrumental in House support of Jefferson’s 1800 election as president
over rival Aaron Burr.)
On the other hand, Thomas Jefferson was much more sensitive to the need
of lawmakers to pay attention to the folks back home—undoubtedly one reason
why he was elected president and Hamilton was not. Given his predilection for
viewing the country as a diverse collection of communities, Jefferson believed
legislators should act as delegates from their respective states. In 1825, he wrote
that the “salvation of the republic” rested on the regeneration and spread of de-
vices like the New England town meeting.40 He is reputed to have told a nephew:
“State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The former will decide it
as well, and often better than the latter, because he has not been led astray by
artificial rules.”41
The rise of Hamiltonian nationalism and national congressional leaders who
constantly bicker with one another has produced a public backlash. A 2021
survey found just 36 percent approved of Congress’s job performance.42 After
Joe Biden was elected, 71 percent wanted congressional Republicans to “find
ways to work” with him; just 25 percent said it was more important to keep
Biden “in check.”43 But at the outset of the Biden presidency there are few signs
that congressional partisanship will give way to bipartisan cooperation, despite
Biden’s hope to unite the country across party lines in a way that the past three
presidents could not.
With the parties in government becoming polarized and nationalized, it is
reasonable to ask if the high level of rancor we are experiencing is sustainable,
and whether a third party might emerge to compete with Republicans and Dem-
ocrats. That prospect will be explored in the next chapter.
 Ch a pter 9

Third Parties in the Twenty-First Century

D
uring moments of intense partisanship, people can rebel
against the choice between Hamiltonian nationalism and Jefferso-
nian localism if they feel the parties are too extreme in their views. On
such occasions third parties can gain some traction, despite the many obstacles
the two-party system has placed in their way. Americans generally like the idea
of third parties because they prefer more options when they vote. According
to a 2020 survey, one-in-five individuals would have backed an independent
third-party congressional candidate if one had been listed.1 But few third-party
congressional candidates find much public support come Election Day, and
those who do win find themselves outsiders in an institution built by and for
the two major parties.
Even though they rarely elect candidates, third parties can make a difference
in electoral outcomes. In 2020, Libertarian Party candidate Jo Jorgensen received
38,491 votes in Wisconsin, more than Joe Biden’s winning margin of 20,682
votes. In Arizona, Jorgensen received 51,465 votes, again far greater than Biden’s
winning margin of 10,457 votes. Similarly, in Georgia, Jorgensen got 62,229
votes, nearly six times more than Biden’s plurality of 11,779 votes. And in Penn-
sylvania, Jorgensen received 79,441 votes, nearly equal to Biden’s winning margin
of 82,155 votes. If all these Libertarian-minded voters had supported Donald
Trump, he would have been reelected with 289 electoral votes—19 more than
the necessary 270, despite losing the popular vote by more than seven million.
Third parties can also matter in Congress. Presently, three US senators serve
without having been elected on a major party label—Bernie Sanders of Vermont,
Angus King of Maine, and Lisa Murkowski of Alaska. But all have cast their lot
with the major parties (Sanders and King are independents who caucus with the
Democrats, and Murkowski is a Republican who lost her party’s primary but
won election as a write-in candidate). They know that remaining outside the
major party caucuses offers little in the way of access to power.

153
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On rare occasions, elected members will leave a major party. Two House
Republicans left their party during the 116th Congress to become indepen-
dents after disputes with their leadership. Michigan Republican Justin Amash
broke with Donald Trump in 2019 and called for his impeachment.2 Amash
was promptly excluded from the Republican conference, and his defection was
greeted with derision by his former GOP colleagues. Donald Trump labeled
him “one of the dumbest and most disloyal men in Congress.”3 At the end of the
congressional session, Amash was joined by fellow Michigan Republican Paul
Mitchell who left the party after Donald Trump’s repeated assertions that Joe
Biden’s victory was fraudulent. Mitchell argued that Trump and like-minded
Republicans were doing “long term harm to our democracy” with their baseless
accusations of voter fraud.4
Despite the precarious position of third-party officeholders, third parties con-
tinue to form and some even endure. This is particularly true at the state and
local level. In the last quarter century, independent and minor party candidates
have won the governorships of Maine, Connecticut, Minnesota, and Rhode
Island and have run credible campaigns in other states. Political scientist Rich-
ard Davis notes that there are several states where third parties have made their
presence known. For example, in Oregon, the Independence Party organized in
2007; in Rhode Island, the Moderate Party formed in 2009; in South Carolina,
the American Party started in 2014; in Utah, the United Utah Party formed in
2017; and in Minnesota, the Reform Party has reconstituted itself into the In-
dependence Party.5 The Libertarian and Green Parties have also run candidates
at the state and local level.
When we speak of third parties or minor parties (the terms can be used in-
terchangeably) we refer to entities that, like Republicans and Democrats, have
formal organizational structures and procedures, write platforms, nominate
candidates for office, and have formal officers, like state party chairs. (Indepen-
dents, on the other hand, are typically well-known free agents who run for office
without the support of formal party structures.) They persist for long periods of
time—far longer than one election.
Splinter parties differ from minor parties in that they are “one-hit wonders”
that emerge when candidates with a following set aside their major party affil-
iation and go it alone, typically because they are unable to resolve a significant
disagreement with the major party. Notable splinter presidential candidates in-
clude J. Strom Thurmond in 1948, who deplored Harry S. Truman’s embrace
of civil rights and splintered from the Democratic Party to run for president as
a Dixiecrat; George C. Wallace in 1968, a Democrat who rejected Lyndon B.
 Third Parties in the Twenty-First Century 155

Johnson for the same reason and ran for president on the American Independent
Party; and John B. Anderson in 1980, a Republican who disagreed with the
conservative policies of Republican nominee Ronald Reagan.
Splinter parties can exert influence in national politics when the major party
coalitions fracture and they play a spoiler role. One such example happened in
1912 when Theodore Roosevelt ran as a third-party Bull Moose Progressive.
Although Roosevelt lost, he split the Republican vote, denying incumbent Re-
publican president William Howard Taft a second term.
Minor party candidates can also play spoiler when elections are remarkably
close. In 2000, Green Party presidential candidate Ralph Nader castigated the
Clinton administration for not seriously pursuing campaign finance reform
and becoming too strongly associated with corporate interests—a charge that
redounded to the detriment of Clinton’s vice president and 2000 Democratic
nominee Al Gore. Nader won backing from progressives who were disenchanted
with what they saw as the conservative direction the Democratic Party had
taken under Clinton. With their support, Nader won 2.7 percent of the popu-
lar vote—more than the margin of victory in a close presidential election won
by George W. Bush.

Why Third Parties Form

Playing a spoiler role is consequential, but why do third parties form in a polit-
ical system where two large parties win almost every election? Political scien-
tist Clinton Rossiter once described the United States as having a “tyrannical”
two-party system, where “we have the Republicans and we have the Democrats,
and we have almost no one else . . . in the struggle for power.”6 Still, in 2020,
Libertarian presidential nominee Jo Jorgensen appeared on all fifty state ballots
and the District of Columbia; Green party nominee Howie Hawkins appeared
on thirty state ballots; even Kanye West was on the ballot in twelve states. They
all lost (Kanye won a paltry sixty thousand votes). So, why go to the effort?
The answer is that, despite the famous adage, winning isn’t always everything.
Some third parties compete because their adherents feel the major parties do not
speak to their concerns. We will see that the history of splinter parties encom-
passes a litany of grievances against one or both major parties, often short-lived
but intensely held. So, for instance, if you were a segregationist in 1948 and
could not support the Democratic candidacy of a president who had advanced a
civil rights agenda, but did not align politically with the Republican alternative,
you had a rationale for supporting the Dixiecrats. Or, if you were a supporter of
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balanced budgets in 1996 and felt that neither major party was serious about
your concerns, you may have been drawn to the Reform Party and the candidacy
of Ross Perot.
In other instances, third parties draw adherents from people with ideological
views that are not addressed by the major parties. This explains the appeal of the
Green Party, whose environmental agenda extends beyond the policy positions
of the Democratic Party. It explains why Bernie Sanders, the democratic socialist
who twice sought the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination, has through-
out his career been elected to public office as a socialist. His views have histor-
ically placed him to the left of the most liberal wing of the Democratic Party.
Third-party leaders and the voters who support them understand that the
odds of victory are long, because third parties face enormous institutional bar-
riers and constraints imposed by American political culture. In this chapter,
we will examine significant third parties in American history and explore the
institutional and cultural obstacles to their success.

Institutional Barriers to Third Parties

Several institutional and cultural factors make it difficult for third parties to
compete with Republicans and Democrats. In some instances, these barriers are
intentional, placed there by the major parties for the express purpose of main-
taining their dominance. In other cases, the barriers are rooted in American
political culture and development. Institutional barriers include single-member
electoral districts, the Electoral College, the executive-centered nature of Amer-
ican governance, ballot access restrictions, direct primaries, campaign finance
laws, and restrictions placed on third parties barring participation in the pres-
idential debates. Cultural barriers include the tendency for voters to seek com-
promise and the historically centrist nature of American public opinion that has
reinforced the dominance of two large political parties that until recently have
looked for supporters in the middle of the political spectrum.
Single-Member Electoral Districts. In some democracies—including Austria,
Germany, Japan, and Israel—a voting system known as proportional represen-
tation is used to elect legislative candidates who, in turn, choose the leader of
the government. This system has two important components that influence
party formation. First, more than one elected official is sent to the national or
provincial assembly from each legislative district. Second, the number of repre-
sentatives elected is directly proportional to the votes that a party receives on
election day. If, for example, the Socialist Party of Austria receives 20 percent
 Third Parties in the Twenty-First Century 157

of the ballots, and a district has five members, then the Socialists can expect to
send one member to parliament from that district. The key element that fosters
minor party activity is that there are benefits even when the party does not win
a plurality of votes. Extremist or rigidly ideological parties are encouraged to
participate because the multimember proportional representation system makes
it possible for them to achieve representation in the legislature and participate
in government.
This is in sharp contrast to the United States, which relies on a winner-take-all
single-member district system for choosing most of its officeholders. Single
member districts, like US House districts, send only one member each to the
legislature. This system awards all the representation for that district to the plu-
rality vote winner—the candidate receiving the most votes. No matter how hard
candidates of minor parties might work, they will not receive any representation
unless they win the most votes on election day, and as minor parties this out-
come is very unlikely. This is why Duverger’s Law, named after political scientist
Maurice Duverger, states that in winner-take-all systems two large parties that
can assemble broad coalitions of voters are likely to form, while third parties will
be discouraged from competing.
To better illustrate the contrast between the multimember proportional
representation system and the winner-take-all single-member district method,
imagine a situation in which four parties are competing for a single seat. Let’s
say that Party A is at the far left of the ideological spectrum (the most liberal);
Party B, left-of-center; Party C, right-of-center; and Party D, the far right (the
most conservative). In this hypothetical election, Party A wins 20 percent of the
votes; Party B, 30 percent; Party C, 27 percent; and Party D, 23 percent. Under
the proportional system, each party will receive roughly the same number of
legislators in the national assembly, with a small edge going to Party B. Under
the winner-take-all single-member district system, only Party B would send leg-
islators to the capitol. The British, who use the winner-take-all method, liken
such electoral outcomes to horse races and have characterized winners in their
system as being “first past the post.”
In a winner-take-all single-member district system, there are strong incen-
tives for political parties located near each other on the ideological spectrum
to merge. Using the previous example, operatives from Party C might say to
Party D, “You know, we don’t agree on everything, but we think alike. If we
joined forces, we could surely overtake Party B. After all, they netted only 30
percent of the vote in the last election, whereas together we grabbed 50 percent.”
Under these rules, Party C’s operatives know that it does not matter whether
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there are four, fourteen, or forty parties vying for support. In a winner-take-all
single-member district system, there is no payoff for coming in second.
The Electoral College. At the presidential level, the Electoral College com-
pounds the institutional barriers to minor party success. Recall from chapter 4
that most states award their electoral votes on a winner-take-all basis, and win-
ning candidates need a majority of electoral votes to be elected president. This
system punishes candidates like Ross Perot, who ran competitively nationwide
but not at the level he needed to achieve to compete in the Electoral College.
Perot won an impressive 19 percent of the vote in 1992, and his support was
broad-based, but he didn’t win any electoral votes because he didn’t finish first in
any state. Alternatively, third-party candidates with regional strength may finish
first in some states and win some electoral votes but almost never in enough
states to compile an Electoral College majority. Teddy Roosevelt won 88 elec-
toral votes in 1912 on the strength of his standing as a former president, but it
wasn’t close to what he needed to be elected.
Nor would third-party candidates likely be favored in the unlikely situation
that they could prevent the major candidates from winning an Electoral Col-
lege majority. Even if no candidate were to win an electoral vote majority and
the presidential election was decided by the House of Representatives (this hap-
pened only once in the disputed presidential election of 1824, when the House
chose John Quincy Adams), it is hard to imagine that a body composed entirely
of Democrats and Republicans would select a third-party candidate.
The “I Don’t Want to Waste My Vote” Syndrome. Given the dominance of the
two major parties, voters often do not want to “waste their vote” on a third-party
candidate who is unlikely to win because there is so much at stake. The “I don’t
want to waste my vote” phenomenon was very much in evidence in 2020. Be-
cause Donald Trump dominated the election landscape, and voters were of a
mindset to vote either for or against Trump, third-party candidates found them-
selves shut out of the conversation. Billionaires, including Michael Bloomberg,
Mark Cuban, and Howard Schultz decided to forego independent bids so as not
to play spoiler and knowing that the “I don’t want to waste my vote” syndrome
would doom their potential candidacies.
Ballot Access Restrictions. Regulations to limit ballot access also restrict minor
party development. Getting a new party on the ballot and keeping it there poses
extraordinarily difficult legal challenges. The major parties do not have this
problem, as they have automatic ballot access by virtue of their dominance. For
example, some states stipulate that a party whose gubernatorial candidate wins
10 percent of the vote is automatically listed on the next election ballot. Because
 Third Parties in the Twenty-First Century 159

Democrats and Republicans almost always garner that many votes, they have
virtually automatic ballot access. But minor parties must work to get on the bal-
lot, and the process can be complex. In 2020, the Green Party was denied ballot
access in Pennsylvania and Wisconsin because it had filed improper paperwork.
Petitions by the party to state courts were rebuffed.
Direct Primaries. In political systems where nominations are controlled by
party elites, intra-party dissidents can leave to form their own parties. In the
United States, the direct primary system has the effect of channeling dissent
into the two major parties.7 Frustrated voters can support a maverick candidate
in a major party primary—and maverick candidates may be drawn to major
party primary competition in order to be relevant, as happened in 2016 and
2020 when Bernie Sanders—a rare third-party candidate elected repeatedly to
Congress as a socialist—left his long-standing position outside of the two major
parties to compete in the Democratic Party’s presidential contests.
Campaign Finance Laws and Presidential Debates. The presidential campaign
finance system poses another institutional barrier to minor party success. The
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) stipulates that a presidential candidate
is eligible for public funds, provided that the party’s nominee receives a given
percentage of votes in the previous election. For “major parties,” a 25 percent
threshold is required. If this goal is met, then the nominee is entitled to full
funding (although neither major party has accepted this money since 2012).8
For minor party candidates, the threshold is only 5 percent, but the amount
they receive from the federal government is far less than what their Democratic
or Republican counterparts get. Ross Perot, who won 19 percent of the vote in
1992, was given $29 million in public funds in 1996—less than half of what Bill
Clinton and Bob Dole received. Ralph Nader, who won 2.7 percent of the pop-
ular vote as the 2000 Green Party candidate, was not eligible for federal funds
in 2004. Neither the Libertarian nor the Green Parties received public funding
in 2020, and thanks to their poor showings (1 percent and .25 percent of the
popular vote respectively), neither will receive public funds in 2024.
The inability of the minor parties to receive a share of public funding is a
prime example of how Democrats and Republicans write the rules to oppose
changes that would benefit others. The financial obstacles third parties must
overcome have only increased since the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Cit-
izens United vs. Federal Election Commission. Today, with the cost of seeking
the presidency exceeding $1 billion dollars for each major party, candidates need
to rely on small dollars from activists and mega-dollars from wealthy donors.
Minor parties have little access to either monetary source. Without help from the
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federal government, they must try to gain as much media attention as possible to
be visible to the public. But political journalists devote their time and attention
to candidates they believe can win, putting third-party candidates in a catch-22.
This dilemma has also presented itself when third-party candidates have
asked for time on the presidential debate stage. In 1996, the Commission on
Presidential Debates (a private organization) ruled that Ross Perot was not a
serious contender and declined his request to participate in the televised de-
bates. A similar situation occurred in 2000, when the Commission on Presi-
dential Debates ruled that Green Party candidate Ralph Nader was ineligible.
The commission even denied Nader a seat in the audience for the first George
W. Bush–Al Gore face-off, causing Nader to loudly complain about the unfair
treatment. In 2020, no third-party candidate appeared on the debate stage with
Donald Trump and Joe Biden.

Cultural Barriers to Third Parties

Institutional constraints like single-member districts, the Electoral College, di-
rect primary laws, and ballot access restrictions perpetuate the existence of the
two-party model in the United States. Cultural barriers present an additional
obstacle to third-party development. A nation’s political culture encompasses
the fundamental values and beliefs that influence society and guide political
behavior. It is the umbrella under which political activities take place and where
public questions are resolved. Several core values help maintain a two-party
system, including adherence to peaceful resolution of conflicts, acceptance of
compromise and incremental change, and a strong endorsement of the nation’s
governing framework.
Americans accepted the constitutional arrangements that the Framers insti-
tuted in 1787 and, in 1801, peacefully recognized the transfer of power from
the Federalists to the Democratic-Republicans—a transfer of power from one
party to another that remains a rarity in today’s world. From these origins,
Americans came to expect that power would be peacefully passed following le-
gitimately held elections, which historically has had a moderating influence on
public opinion.
Stability in the scope of political discourse has also contributed to the endur-
ance of the two major parties. Despite a tumultuous history, American political
debate has remained narrowly defined by the struggle between Hamiltonian
nationalism and Jeffersonian localism. The battle between the two camps has
attached to a wide range of issues, but the essential nature of the conflict about
 Third Parties in the Twenty-First Century 161

the proper place for the federal government vis-à-vis the states has endured. The
dominance of the two paradigms has left little room for third parties to mature
and become established in the American firmament.

Significant Third Parties in US History

Although history has not been kind to minor parties, several have changed
the direction of political debate and influenced election outcomes. From
the Anti-Masons of the 1820s through to the present day, the history of our
two-party competition has been periodically influenced by the emergence of
third parties that, while too weak to win elections, were influential enough to
shape them.
The Anti-Mason Party. For decades prior to the Revolution, nearly every
large community had a Masonic Lodge, or what was called a Freemason orga-
nization. These secretive clubs were composed of middle-and upper-class white
Protestants, often the leading businessmen of their communities who were inter-
ested in the issues of the day and had a strong belief in moral self-improvement.
Prominent Masons included George Washington, Henry Clay, and Andrew
Jackson. According to historian Phyllis F. Field, “In a nation with high rates of
geographic mobility, Masonry provided a convenient way for nomadic American
middle-class men to integrate themselves quickly into a new community and feel
at home there.”9
But Masonic elitism and secret rites created a public backlash—especially
among religious fundamentalists. An anti-Mason movement was born follow-
ing the mysterious disappearance of New York Freemason William Morgan in
1826, after he threatened to reveal the secret rituals of the group. Anti-Masons
maintained that secretive cliques were conspiring against the working class
and, through their bizarre rituals such as frequent cross burnings, were a threat
to Christianity. Within four years of their humble beginnings in 1826, the
anti-Masons became a powerful political force—the first significant minor party
to emerge in the young nation. In 1831, they held a presidential nominating con-
vention—a novel idea for its day—and chose as their candidate former attorney
general William Wirt.
The Anti-Mason Party finished a distant third in the 1832 presidential elec-
tion when Wirt proved to be an ineffectual campaigner. It garnered 100,000
votes (8 percent) to finish behind Democrat Andrew Jackson and Whig Party
candidate Henry Clay. However, Wirt finished first in Vermont, winning that
state’s seven electoral votes—the first time a third-party candidate had amassed
162 chapter 9

any support in the Electoral College. The Anti-Masons fared better in state
contests, winning the governorships of Vermont and Pennsylvania, and several
congressional and state legislative seats in New York, Vermont, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and Connecticut.
By the mid-1830s, the Anti-Mason Party began to fade, partly because President
Andrew Jackson endorsed policies that gave political leverage to working-class
voters. More than anything else, the Anti-Mason Party disappeared because the
Freemason movement was out of step with the democratic impulses of the 1830s.
There was less public concern about elitism in the years after Jackson’s election
established the broad-based citizen-centered political party.
The Free-Soil Party. Several antislavery groups nipped at the edges of the
political system prior to the 1840s. The most notable of these were the Barn-
burners, the Conscience Whigs, and the Liberty Party. Controlled by extremists
and religious fanatics whose ideas about ending the interstate slave trade were
considered radical—even in a time of rising opposition to slavery—these groups
were relatively short-lived.
The Free-Soil Party had better luck. The impetus for their founding in 1848
was the debate over the Wilmot Proviso, which limited the extension of slav-
ery into the new western territories. Operating on a platform of “free soil, free
speech, free labor, and free men,” the Free-Soil Party combined opposition to
slavery with a desire for cheap western land. As the Free-Soil Party gained fol-
lowers, it became more pragmatic than its abolitionist predecessors. It advocated
policies that would allow Blacks to vote and attend school. At the same time,
Free-Soilers bowed to existing racial prejudices by arguing that the Wilmot Pro-
viso would keep Blacks in the South.10 Free-Soilers did not endorse the abolition
of slavery, nor did they denounce either the Fugitive Slave Act, or the three-fifths
clause of the US Constitution (which counted Blacks as “three-fifths” of a per-
son for the purpose of determining representation in the House). Other planks
that broadened the Free-Soil Party’s appeal included cheaper postage rates, re-
duced federal spending, tariff reform, the election of all civil officers, and free
homesteading in the west.11
In 1848, the Free-Soil Party held a convention in Buffalo, New York, with
nearly 20,000 delegates and spectators in attendance. Hopes were high when
they nominated former president Martin Van Buren for president and Charles
Francis Adams, son of John Quincy Adams and grandson of John Adams, for
vice president. Despite the ticket’s high name recognition, Van Buren and Adams
won just 10 percent of the popular vote and failed to carry a single state. Congres-
sional results were equally disappointing, as the party won a mere twelve seats.
 Third Parties in the Twenty-First Century 163

Shortly after the 1848 election, the Free-Soil Party disappeared. Most Free-Soil-
ers returned to the parties they previously supported, albeit with a renewed de-
termination to change their parties’ respective stands on slavery-related issues.
This movement back to the major parties caused considerable strife that resulted
in the current two-party alignment of Republicans and Democrats when Repub-
licans replaced the Whigs and Democrats became the party of the South.
The American (Know-Nothing) Party. For many Americans living in urban
areas, immigration was a primary concern prior to the Civil War. A vast num-
ber of working-class, native-born Protestants were deeply troubled by the heavy
influx of Irish Catholics beginning in the early 1840s. Jobs, cultural differences,
and the transformation of the United States into an ethnic polyglot became con-
tentious political issues. In 1854, the American Party emerged in response to
these anxieties. Originally organized around two groups known as the Supreme
Order of the Star-Spangled Banner and the National Council of the United States
of America, adherents were dubbed the Know-Nothings after a reporter asked
a member about their secret meetings only to be told that he “knew nothing.”
The party’s core philosophy was simple: “Americans should rule America. . . .
Foreigners have no right to dictate our laws, and therefore have no just ground to
complain if Americans see proper to exclude them from offices of trust.”12 The
Know-Nothing platform included planks mandating that immigrants live in the
United States for twenty-one years before being allowed to vote; that they never
hold public office; and that their children should have no rights unless they were
educated in public schools. Taking aim at Catholics and their allegiance to the
Pope, the Know-Nothings declared, “No person should be selected for political
station (whether of native or foreign birth), who recognizes any alliance or obli-
gation of any description to foreign prince, potentate or power.”13
The popularity of the Know-Nothings is one of the darker tales in US history.
In 1854, the party achieved extraordinary success by capturing scores of con-
gressional and state legislative seats, mostly in the Northeast. In Massachusetts,
where immigrants were pouring in at a rate of one hundred thousand per year,
the Know-Nothings won an astounding 347 of 350 state house seats and all the
state senate, congressional, and statewide contests, including the governorship.
In New York, they elected forty members of the state legislature and took con-
trol of the governorship. The party also won the governorships of Rhode Island,
New Hampshire, and Connecticut.
In 1856, the Know-Nothings became caught up in the politics of slavery.
At the party’s convention in Philadelphia, Northern delegates wanted to nom-
inate a presidential candidate who opposed the extension of slavery into the
164 chapter 9

new western territories. Southerners blocked the move, and Northern delegates
bolted out of the convention hall. The remaining Southern delegates nomi-
nated former president Millard Fillmore as their candidate for president and
Andrew Jackson Dodelson of Tennessee for vice president. The Fillmore-Do-
delson ticket captured 875,000 votes, or 21 percent of the popular vote, and
eight Electoral College votes (from the state of Maryland). After two stunning
showings at the polls, the Know-Nothings faded rapidly. Passage of the 1854
Kansas-Nebraska Act accentuated the slavery issue and created deep sectional
divisions within the party. The Republicans—a Northern, antislavery party—
burst on the scene, and most Northern Know-Nothings joined their ranks. In
the South, the Know-Nothings were absorbed by the former Whigs. By 1860,
the Know-Nothings were no more.
The Greenback and Populist (People’s) Parties. During the early 1870s, the
nation entered hard times, and midwestern farmers suffered from plummeting
crop prices. Railroads were the only means by which to ship midwestern farm
goods to major markets in the East, and privately owned companies charged
exorbitant rates. Adding to the farmers’ plight was a deflation of the currency,
which made it difficult for them to pay their high bills.
The first efforts to organize agricultural interests culminated in the forma-
tion of hundreds of local groups called farmers’ alliances, or granges. Mixing po-
litical and social activities, the granges united farmers into a cohesive voting bloc.
Many who belonged to the granges were supportive of a third party, and after
the economic panic of 1873 the Greenback Party was created. The Greenback
Party (also known as the Greenback-Labor Party) proposed an inflated currency
based on cheap paper money known as “greenbacks” that were first introduced
during the Civil War.14 Their argument was simple: by making the greenback
legal tender, there would be enough money in circulation to ease the burden of
indebted farmers and laborers.
In 1878, Greenback congressional candidates won more than one million
votes and fourteen US House races. Two years later they nominated General
James Weaver of Iowa as their presidential candidate. By that time, however,
the national economy improved, and the Greenback Party lost its initial appeal.
Weaver won just 300,000 votes, and the Greenbacks sent just eight members
to Congress. In 1884, the Greenbacks found their presidential support almost
cut in half.
Overproduction and increased world competition led to another agricultural
crisis in the early 1890s. The remaining Greenbacks merged with a new party
called the Populists, or People’s Party, in 1891. Unlike the Greenbacks, the
 Third Parties in the Twenty-First Century 165

Populists’ demands were more radical and far-reaching: “We meet in the midst
of a nation brought to the verge of moral, political, and material ruin. . . . From
the womb of governmental injustice, we breed the two great classes—tramps
and millionaires.”15 Among other things, the Populist platform proposed public
regulation of railroads and telegraphs; free coinage of silver and gold (to increase
currency in circulation); creation of postal savings banks; prohibition of alien
ownership of land; a graduated federal income tax; direct election of US sena-
tors; and a reduction of the workday to eight hours.
The Populists readily won adherents in the Midwest, West, and even the
South. One historian summarized the new party’s appeal this way: “The Populist
Party was the embodiment of an attitude, a way of looking at life that had been
prevalent for almost 20 years, and a general position taken against concentrated
economic power.”16 The Populists selected former Greenback James Weaver as
their 1892 presidential nominee. Weaver won just 8 percent of the popular vote
(about a million votes) and twenty-two Electoral College votes, with nearly all
his support coming from western states. But the Populists effectively split the
Republican vote, giving Democrat Grover Cleveland a chance to capture the
presidency. Democrats also won control of both houses of Congress—a rarity in
this Republican-dominated era. Populist strength grew in 1894, when they won
nearly 1.5 million votes and elected six US senators and seven House members,
all from the West.
Then, in 1896, something unusual happened: both the Populists and the
Democrats nominated William Jennings Bryan for president. Bryan endorsed
many Populist planks, most notably, the elimination of the gold standard.17 Al-
though Bryan lost, many of the Populist Party’s proposals were accepted by both
parties and incorporated into law during the twentieth century.
The Progressives: 1912–1924, 1948, and Today. In chapter 3, we outlined
the rationale behind the Progressive movement, its numerous successes against
machine-dominated locales, and its eventual coalescence into a third party in
1912 behind former President Theodore Roosevelt. Calling for a “new national-
ism,” Roosevelt bolted the Republican Convention to form the Progressive (Bull
Moose) Party, running on a platform that promised stricter regulation of corpo-
rations; downward revision of tariffs; popular election of US senators; women’s
suffrage; and support for the referendum, ballot initiatives, and recall elections.
With 27 percent of the popular vote and eighty-eight Electoral College votes,
Roosevelt finished in second place behind Democrat Woodrow Wilson. Wil-
liam Howard Taft, the Republican nominee, finished third—the first time that
had happened to a GOP presidential candidate since the party’s inception.
166 chapter 9

Roosevelt’s strong showing in 1912 was the high point of the Progressive
movement. Thereafter, President Woodrow Wilson pursued a Progressive
agenda—including passage of new antitrust laws, banking regulations, and
scores of business reforms. But the Progressive Party did not die completely, es-
pecially in states with strong populist traditions. In 1924, Robert La Follette—a
former US representative, US senator, and governor of Wisconsin—became the
Progressive Party’s presidential nominee. La Follette was an articulate champion
of labor reform, business regulation, a graduated income tax, and a constitu-
tional amendment providing for direct election of judges to the federal courts.
His party’s platform proposed public ownership of the nation’s waterpower,
strict control and conservation of natural resources, farmers’ cooperatives, and
legislation to make credit available to farmers and small businessmen. La Follette
captured 17 percent of the popular vote (4.8 million ballots) but won only thir-
teen Electoral College votes (from his home state of Wisconsin). With his death
in 1925, La Follette’s brand of progressivism died as well. Though his children
and grandchildren became active in politics and continued to push the Progres-
sive agenda, they did not attract much attention beyond the Wisconsin borders.
In 1948, the Progressive Party reemerged. That year, a left-wing group led
by former vice president Henry A. Wallace bolted from the Democratic Party.
At issue was President Harry S. Truman’s “get tough” policy toward the Soviet
Union, which Wallace strongly opposed. The Progressive Party accused Tru-
man of being vociferously anticommunist, which they said stemmed from “the
dictates of monopoly and the military” and resulted in “preparing for war in the
name of peace.”18 To the utopian-minded Progressives, peace was “the prerequi-
site of survival.”19 The Progressive Party called for a wholesale reversal in how
the US government dealt with domestic communism. It favored eliminating
the House Un-American Activities Committee and rejected any ban of the US
Communist Party, or the required registration of its members, likening such
legislation to the Alien and Sedition Acts.
In July 1948, Progressive Citizens of America selected Wallace as its presiden-
tial candidate. As the Progressive Party standard-bearer, Henry Wallace drew
large crowds including many young liberals, blue-collar workers, and Black vot-
ers. His liberal supporters worried Truman, who would need them to win, and
Truman attempted to undermine Wallace by linking him to the US Commu-
nist Party. At campaign stops, Truman vowed, “I do not want, and I will not
accept the political support of Henry Wallace and his communists.”20 Wallace’s
public statements made Truman’s task an easy one. A Gallup poll taken shortly
 Third Parties in the Twenty-First Century 167

before the Progressive convention found 51 percent agreed that the Progressive
Party was communist dominated.21
Despite Wallace’s political shortcomings, he influenced the election result.
When the ballots were counted, Wallace received 1,157,172 votes (slightly more
than 2 percent). This was enough to throw three states to GOP presidential nom-
inee Thomas E. Dewey: New York, Maryland, and Michigan. If Wallace had
done somewhat better in California and had not been kept off the Illinois ballot,
the 1948 contest might have been decided in the House of Representatives.
Progressive ideas have been a recurring force in US politics, although pro-
gressivism has assumed different meanings in different eras. Originally, its focus
was centered in the religious belief that the human condition could be infinitely
improved. By the end of the nineteenth century, progressivism meant ridding
the political system of corrupt influences. At the turn of the twentieth century,
Progressives wanted greater participation by average citizens in government af-
fairs, and they believed government could be improved by bringing scientific
methods to bear on public problems.
In the late twentieth century, a new progressivism emerged in the image of
nineteenth-century progressivism, centered around the desire to rid the political
process of the influence of big money in order to make it more responsive to
ordinary voters. In 1991, the Progressive Caucus was created in the House of
Representatives. Today, it has 94 House members and one US senator, Bernie
Sanders, making it the largest group within the House Democratic caucus.22 Its
core principles are fighting for immigrant rights and reforms; making voting
easier; advocating fair trade; promoting climate justice; supporting labor unions;
universal healthcare; racial equality; and criminal justice reform.23 Given the
split within the Democratic Party between moderates and progressives, the
Progressive Caucus has assumed growing importance as more members have
joined its ranks. With Congress so evenly divided between the parties, progres-
sive support, with backing from more moderate members, is essential to pass
any legislation.
States’ Rights Party (1948) and the American Independent Party (1968). After
the Civil War, the roots of the Democratic Party became deeply planted in the
South. During the 1930s, Franklin D. Roosevelt broadened the Democratic
coalition to include labor, middle-and lower-class urban residents, Catholics,
Blacks, and Jews, transforming the Democratic Party into a majority coalition.
Relations between progressive Northern Democrats and conservative Southern
Democrats became a marriage of convenience. Northern Democrats controlled
168 chapter 9

the White House, thanks to their Southern partners, and Southern Democrats
chaired important congressional committees, thanks to their party’s majority
status and adherence to the seniority rule.
By the late 1940s, the marriage between Northern and Southern Democrats
was heading for divorce. Civil rights split the two factions apart in 1948, when
the Democratic Convention adopted a strong pro-civil rights plank. Many
southern delegates walked out and reconvened in Birmingham, Alabama. The
gathering adopted the name States’ Rights Party and quickly became known
as the Dixiecrat Party, given its overwhelming southern base of support. The
convention reiterated a Jeffersonian plank extracted from the 1840 Democratic
Party platform: “Congress has no power under the Constitution to interfere
with or control the domestic institutions of the several states, and . . . such states
are the sole and proper judges of everything appertaining to their own affairs
and not prohibited by the Constitution.”24 This states’ rights argument was de-
signed to keep racial segregation intact.
The delegates nominated J. Strom Thurmond, then governor of South Caro-
lina, as their presidential candidate. On Election Day, Thurmond garnered 1.1
million votes (2.4 percent) and won thirty-eight Electoral College votes from
five southern states. The party closed shop after the 1948 election, and Thur-
mond went on to have a successful political career in both major parties while
retaining his segregationist views. In 1954, Thurmond won a write-in Senate
campaign after the state Democratic Party rejected him.25 Ten years later, Thur-
mond formally switched his party registration from Democratic to Republican.
In 2002, he retired from the US Senate as a Republican at age one hundred.
The final blow to the Democratic coalition assembled by Franklin Roos-
evelt came in 1968. Once again, the breakdown centered on efforts to broaden
legal protections for Blacks. The American Independent Party was established
in 1968 as the personal organization of Alabama governor George C. Wallace.
Elected governor in 1962 as a Democrat and ardent segregationist, Wallace en-
tered the national spotlight one year later when the federal government ordered
the integration of public colleges. In a televised display of defiance, Wallace and
his state troopers blocked access to the University of Alabama to two incoming
Black students before eventually stepping aside.
After an unsuccessful (but impressive) primary campaign against Lyndon B.
Johnson in 1964, Wallace abandoned the Democratic Party in 1968 to form his
own party, which followed his get-tough, law-and-order, segregationist beliefs.
With old-time populist themes and a powerful gift for oratory, Wallace won
nearly ten million votes, or 13.5 percent of the total. His forty-six electoral votes
 Third Parties in the Twenty-First Century 169

from five southern states came from Democrats who used the Wallace candi-
dacy as a way station before entering the Republican Party. In 1972, Richard
M. Nixon won the vast majority of the 1968 Wallace supporters. By the 1980s,
Wallace voters began supporting Republicans for other offices such as gover-
nor, members of Congress, and state legislature. Wallace, meanwhile, reentered
Democratic presidential politics in 1972, only to be shot and permanently par-
alyzed at a rally in Maryland. Although he later won the Alabama governorship
as a Democrat, Wallace’s days in presidential politics were over. His American
Independent Party and its offshoot, the American Party, continued to nominate
candidates for a while before fading into obscurity.
The Reform Party. Billionaire businessman Ross Perot’s two presidential bids
illustrate the difference between independent candidacies and minor parties. In
1992, Perot ran for president as a free agent without fielding candidates for other
offices or establishing party institutions. Using his hefty pocketbook to finance
his campaign, Perot ran on a platform that emphasized the importance of a bal-
anced budget during a time of economic difficulty and the need to enact campaign
finance reform. His foremost strength was his charisma and can-do attitude.
After winning an impressive 19 percent of the vote, Perot organized a new
political party centered on his signature issues of a balanced budget and cam-
paign finance reform. Labeled the Reform Party, by 1996 it qualified to run
slates of candidates in all fifty states. It had a national organization, developed
formal rules, and held a convention to nominate its presidential candidate, who,
not surprisingly, was Perot. This time, however, Perot accepted federal funds,
thus saving him from once again having to finance his own campaign. But Perot
received only 8 percent of the vote, a signal that the days of the Reform Party
were numbered.
Because the party received $12.6 million from the federal government for
the 2000 general election (based on Ross Perot’s 1996 showing), it became a
target for would-be candidates looking for a vehicle for a presidential run. Some
of these candidates held views that were far removed from the party’s original
emphasis on eliminating deficit spending. Donald Trump became a member of
the party and established an exploratory committee in 1999 before eventually
dropping out. Republican speechwriter Patrick J. Buchanan, who unsuccessfully
sought the Republican presidential nomination in 1992, competed for and won
the 2000 Reform Party nomination by defeating physicist John Hagelin, who
had been the 1996 Natural Law Party’s candidate for president.
The contest over the Reform Party nomination divided Perot supporters. In
a convention marred by physical confrontations, both Buchanan and Hagelin
170 chapter 9

claimed to have enough support to clinch the nomination. Ultimately, the Fed-
eral Election Commission decided that Buchanan was the legitimate nominee
and awarded him the $12.6 million. Disgusted at the turn of events, Perot re-
fused to back Buchanan and endorsed Republican nominee George W. Bush.
Meanwhile, professional wrestler Jesse Ventura, who had been the Reform Party’s
greatest success story after winning the governorship of Minnesota as a Reform
candidate, left the party—calling it “hopelessly dysfunctional.”26 Buchanan fared
poorly in the 2000 election, winning fewer than one million votes out of more
than one hundred million cast, and the Reform Party faded into obscurity.
The Green Party. During the Clinton administration, some Democrats be-
came restive with the president’s abandonment of traditional New Deal liberal-
ism. In 1996, the Green Party echoed this sentiment and selected Ralph Nader
as its presidential candidate. Nader did not actively seek the presidency; rather,
he let his name appear on the ballot and made no campaign appearances. Nad-
er’s presence likely cost Clinton a victory in Colorado but had no effect on the
overall outcome.
Things were different in 2000. With Republicans in control of Congress,
Bill Clinton was compelled to strike deals with them, telling confidants, “Stra-
tegically, I want to remove all divisive issues for a conservative [Republican
presidential] candidate, so all the issues are on progressive terrain.”27 But Nader
and the Greens complained that far from being progressive, both Clinton and
the Republicans sided with corporate interests. Nader decided to confront the
Clinton-Gore administration, charging that its obsession with deficit reduction
and not using the powers of government more forcefully when it came to pro-
tecting the environment and promoting campaign finance reform had trans-
formed the Democrats into a “me-too” party that emulated the Republican’s
embrace of corporate and Wall Street interests.28
Nader won 2.73 percent of the total popular votes cast in 2000, making him
a “spoiler” in the race. The 97,488 votes Nader received in Florida made a real
difference, given that George W. Bush’s statewide margin was 537 votes out of
nearly 6 million cast. Nader had a similar effect in New Hampshire, where his
22,198 votes far exceeded Bush’s winning margin of 7,211. Had Gore won either
state he would have been elected president.
Democrats were aware of their missed opportunity to win the White House
in 2000, and they made sure their supporters were not tempted to vote for Ralph
Nader in 2004. That year, Nader did run again, but received less than 1 percent
of the vote. By 2008, Nader abandoned the Green Party and ran as an indepen-
dent, garnering 739,278 votes—the most of any of the third-party candidates,
 Third Parties in the Twenty-First Century 171

but still just one-half of 1 percent of the total votes cast. It was his last foray into
presidential politics.
In 2016, the Green Party enjoyed a resurgence, having been energized by the
failed Democratic bid made by Vermont senator Bernie Sanders. With Sanders
out of the running, some of his supporters gravitated to the Green Party nomi-
nee, Dr. Jill Stein, who cast herself as a Sanders ally, telling supporters that “the
Bernie Sanders movement lives on outside the Democratic Party.” Like Sanders,
Stein castigated the power exercised by Wall Street, supported measures to elim-
inate student debt, endorsed the Black Lives Matter movement, opposed Donald
Trump’s plan to build a wall on the US-Mexican border, and called for clean,
renewable energy sources.29 Both Clinton and Sanders made strong arguments
to potential Green Party supporters not to waste their votes on a third-party can-
didate. Sanders explicitly told supporters that while the Green Party is “focusing
on very, very important issues . . . you’re going to end up having a choice. Either
Hillary Clinton is going to be president, or Donald Trump.”30
As late as early October, polls showed Stein winning 3 percent of the national
vote.31 But by Election Day, Stein’s vote share fell to a mere 1 percent. Still, her
presence arguably made a difference in two states—Michigan and Wiscon-
sin—where Stein’s total exceeded Trump’s margin of victory. Four years later,
Democrats promised action on climate change, racial justice, and economic in-
equality, and Green Party candidate Howie Hawkins barely made a dent in the
presidential race. Such appropriation of a third-party agenda is typical of how
major parties have reacted throughout history to threats posed by minor parties.

A Third-Party Revival?
Could we be entering a period of third-party revival? A 2021 Gallup poll found
62 percent feel a third party is needed because the two major parties do a poor
job of representing the American people —the highest percentage Gallup has
ever recorded. The survey also found that favorable views of the Republican
Party had declined to a mere 37 percent (Democrats were at a comparatively
healthy 48 percent). Fully 50 percent of respondents described themselves as
independents, also the highest percentage Gallup has recorded in a single poll.32
Historically, third parties have won public support when voters found the
major parties lacking in their responses to the major issues of the day. Abolition-
ist parties developed because of slavery, the Populists and Greenbacks because of
economic issues, the Progressives because of corruption, and segregationist par-
ties in response to civil rights legislation. Although the winner-take-all electoral
172 chapter 9

system, the Electoral College, barriers to ballot access, and a host of historical
and cultural forces sustain the two-party model, minor parties have played a
critical role at key moments before fading into the history books.
Several scholars have explored the idea that minor parties help shape the party
system in ways major parties cannot. Theodore J. Lowi, a former president of the
American Political Science Association, writes, “New ideas and issues develop or
redevelop parties, but parties, particularly established ones, rarely develop ideas
or present new issues on their own. . . . Once a system of parties is established,
the range and scope of policy discussion is set, until and unless some disturbance
arises from other quarters.”33 The “disturbance” Lowi speaks of is the develop-
ment of aggressive third parties. Lowi notes there have been four historical eras
where Democrats and Republicans have been especially innovative: 1856–1860;
1890–1900; 1912–1914; and 1933–1935. During these years, party leaders be-
came more susceptible to mass opinion because of third-party competition. Once
the policy innovations were achieved, however, third parties withered away.
How will third parties fare in an era when Americans say they are dissatis-
fied with the two major parties? Certainly, today’s social networking capabil-
ity makes it easier for minor party leaders to connect with potential supporters
at a minimal cost. Certain ballot reforms may also be a boon to third parties.
Ranked-choice voting, first used in Maine and now adopted in other jurisdic-
tions like Alaska and New York City, allows voters to select second and third
choices. If no candidate receives 50 percent of the vote, the second and third
preferences of voters who supported candidates at the bottom of the list are
added to the tally of the candidates at the top, until a candidate crosses the 50
percent threshold. This system gives voters an incentive to select third-party can-
didates as their first choice, potentially overcoming the “wasted vote” syndrome
that has bedeviled third parties who have succumbed to Duverger’s Law.
One tantalizing possibility is that former Republicans pushed out of their
party by Donald Trump will feel motivated to start a third party with the in-
tention of marginalizing post-Trump Republicans. During his four years in the
White House, Trump recast the Republican Party in his image, making it more
reactionary and beholden to a populist base. In this regard, today’s Republicans
look more like third-party insurgencies of the past and less like the large, catch-all
parties favored by the winner-take-all electoral system. More than one-hundred
former Republican officials have discussed forming a “center-right” third party.
Former GOP representative Charlie Dent explains that these disgruntled leaders
“want a clean break from President Trump, and we are rallying around some core
founding principles like truth and honesty, and democracy and rule of law.”34 For
 Third Parties in the Twenty-First Century 173

his part, Trump has threatened to form a “Patriot Party,” leading a third-party
movement that would threaten the ability of more establishment-minded Repub-
licans to win elections.35 Whether either third party will come to pass is unclear,
but the fracturing of the Republican Party creates the potential for a third party
that could reshape American politics in the coming decade.
Whatever may happen, the obstacles that prevent the creation of a viable
third party are daunting. Over the past three decades, the centralization and
professionalization of electoral politics has accentuated a profound shift toward
Hamiltonian nationalism. Major party candidates must amass huge war chests,
with successful presidential campaigns having to raise extraordinary amounts of
money just to be competitive. These efforts are beyond the reach of most third
parties, despite the fervent backing of their most ardent supporters. Congres-
sional failure to pass meaningful campaign finance reform legislation means
that the torrent of cash flooding into the major party coffers will continue. In
addition, the centralization of the two major party committees gives Democrats
and Republicans a tremendous advantage. Third parties are often decentralized
organizations that have very little power at the top. For these reasons, it is most
likely that minor parties will continue to exert their greatest influence at the
margins, even if such marginal influences are at times profound.
 Conclusion

Where Are We Going?

T
his book began by addressing the formative conflicts between Alex-
ander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson that led to the establishment
of American political parties, then explored how Hamiltonian nation-
alism and Jeffersonian localism have evolved through the centuries. While
the issues confronting us today may be unique to the twenty-first century, the
essence of the founders’ disagreement remains the same: what is the desired bal-
ance between government action and individual rights, and between centralized
control and personal freedom? Alexander Hamilton wanted a strong federal gov-
ernment acting with dispatch in the interest of every citizen. Thomas Jefferson
preferred a weaker federal government with greater deference paid to state and
local entities.
As an institutional matter, the parties have resolved this dispute decidedly in
Hamilton’s favor. Originally small, localized, Jeffersonian institutions, political
parties have grown through the years to become larger, more organized, and
more centralized at the federal level. From their origins in Jefferson’s “nature
tour,” through the development of mass-based parties under Andrew Jackson,
to the professionalization of party activities under William McKinley, to the
nationalization of the parties in the twentieth century, party organization has
assumed a clear Hamiltonian perspective—a national approach to political ac-
tivity with the party committees exercising real power. The centralization of
party organizations at the federal level is now fueled by a stream of cash that
flows regularly into party coffers. It is likely irreversible.
As a policy matter, however, the debate between Hamilton and Jefferson
rages on. In terms of what the parties advocate, we have seen periods when
Hamiltonian nationalism has eclipsed Jeffersonian localism and times when
Jefferson’s perspective was ascendant. Likewise, we have seen Democrats and
Republicans switch their positions over time as to which of the founders they
identify with more when it comes to the role government should play in the
lives of ordinary Americans. During the New Deal era initiated by Franklin

174
 Where Are We Going? 175

Roosevelt, the electorate wanted a bigger, more active, and socially responsible
federal government. By the Reagan years, majorities had come to see govern-
ment through the eyes of accountants, believed it taxed and spent too much,
and wanted to see it restrained.
Where are we now? Are the Jeffersonian values of the Reagan era behind us?
Do voters prefer a more Hamiltonian active government? How will the parties
respond to profound generational and demographic changes? Is a realignment
underway that can answer these questions, or will the hyper-partisanship that
defines this moment in political history blunt the forces of change? Is a realign-
ment even possible in today’s supercharged partisan and information-driven
environment?
The last question is particularly important, as it concerns the shattering of
norms that once prevailed when it came to the conduct of the two major par-
ties, especially today’s Republican party. Consider the unprecedented events
emanating from Donald Trump’s 2020 defeat in the context of party behavior,
and ask: What would drive President Trump to call for an insurrection to stop
the certification of his electoral loss? What would lead his fellow rank-and-file
Republicans to carry it out? Why would some congressional Republicans vote
to reject the electoral votes of states he lost without any confirmed evidence of
vote fraud? Why would some of them perpetuate the false narrative that the
election had been stolen to justify Trump’s actions and avoid convicting him in
an impeachment vote? Given such conduct, it is reasonable to wonder if we are
experiencing the collapse of regular party competition as we have come to know
it. Can our two-party system survive this fraught moment? And, if not, what
might replace it?
The party system in place since the Reagan years appears to be at an inflection
point where a new alignment is guaranteed. But unlike other periods of disrup-
tion, there is no guarantee of a system-affirming outcome. The behavior of the
Republican party-in-government and party-in-the-electorate raises the question
of whether the party system can handle the stress of a political party gone rogue.
What if it cannot? We will consider four possibilities for the future of the party
system, ranging from the extraordinary to the conventional: the emergence of
a new conservative third party to fill the political space vacated by Republicans
as they move farther right; the total collapse of the Republican Party following
their inability to compete for the votes of a diverse, progressive electorate; the
collapse of the constitutional order following a successful challenge to the po-
litical system itself; and a peaceful party realignment around the interests and
issues of an emerging electorate.
176 conclusion

To understand how we got here, it is worthwhile to look back at the remark-

able parallels in the rise and fall of the last two party systems: the center-left New
Deal coalition forged by Franklin Roosevelt, which was validated by Dwight
Eisenhower, expanded by Lyndon Johnson, challenged by Richard Nixon, and
collapsed under Jimmy Carter, and the center-right coalition forged by Ronald
Reagan, which was validated by Bill Clinton, expanded by George W. Bush,
challenged by Barack Obama, and collapsed under Donald Trump.
As with any party system, the Roosevelt and Reagan coalitions inevitably
declined as new situations emerged, which they were either unable or unpre-
pared to address. The crucial difference in the arc of the two systems is how
the majority party responded to this decline. Democrats, who maintained re-
sidual strength in the House of Representatives and at the state level well into
the 1980s, refused to acknowledge their loss of major party status until they
suffered a string of lopsided presidential defeats, giving the ascendant Reagan co-
alition space to take root. As that coalition lost strength around the turn of this
century, Republicans dedicated themselves to retaining power in the minority.
This choice has become increasingly harder to sustain through normal electoral
channels, placing the political system under increasing stress.

The New Deal Party System: 1933–1980

Franklin D. Roosevelt established a Democratic Party coalition built on Ham-
iltonian nationalism that dominated politics in the middle decades of the twen-
tieth century. Although FDR is remembered for his 1933 inaugural address in
which he uttered the famous words, “The only thing we have to fear is fear it-
self,” the sentence that gained the most applause on that cold March day from an
audience devastated by the Great Depression was this: “I shall ask the Congress
for the one remaining instrument to meet the crisis—broad Executive power to
wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to
me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.”1
Roosevelt’s promise of decisive action met the moment. In his first hundred
days, FDR enacted much of his New Deal program. A host of alphabet soup agen-
cies were created by a Democratic-controlled Congress motivated to act with a
minimum of debate. The Works Progress Administration (WPA), Public Works
Administration (PWA), Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), Youth Progress
Administration (YPA), Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA), and National Re-
covery Act (NRA) all became law, followed by the creation of Social Security.2
 Where Are We Going? 177

Republicans committed to a small Jeffersonian-style government lambasted

the new laws, believing they infringed on individual freedoms. But Roosevelt’s
call for “action, and action now”3 gained the Democratic Party broad public sup-
port. In his 1936 reelection campaign, FDR won forty-six of forty-eight states,
and Democrats increased their congressional majorities to record levels. The
only president to win the White House four times, Roosevelt eventually forced
Republicans into a “me-too” posture, promising that, if elected, they would not
eliminate FDR’s initiatives. This came to pass when Dwight Eisenhower, the
first Republican to hold the Oval Office in two decades, stated: “Should any
political party attempt to abolish Social Security and eliminate labor laws and
farm programs, you would not hear of that party again in our political history.”4
When Barry Goldwater pushed back against Republican “me-tooism” as the
party’s 1964 presidential nominee, he went down to a resounding defeat at the
hands of Democrat Lyndon B. Johnson. Seeking the presidency in his own right,
Johnson previewed his vision for expanding the New Deal into a Great Society,
which he envisioned as “a place where every child can find knowledge to enrich
his mind and to enlarge his talents . . . where the city of man serves not only
the needs of the body and the demands of commerce but the desire for beauty
and the hunger for community.”5 In the aftermath of his 1964 landslide victory,
Johnson followed the Roosevelt model and proposed a slew of federal programs
designed to promote Black voting rights, eliminate racial discrimination, build
more public housing, clean the nation’s air and water, and enhance the federal
government’s role in public education. He realized major legislative accomplish-
ments, including passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 and the establishment of Medicare and Medicaid.
But the demise of the New Deal coalition was evident even before Johnson’s
accomplishments took hold, the product of its own success in creating a rela-
tively comfortable middle class and confronting racial inequities. In a final po-
litical strategy meeting in the White House just days before he was assassinated,
John F. Kennedy fretted about his standing in the nation’s burgeoning suburbs
where middle class homeowners replaced their need for government assistance
with worries about taxes.6 To woo these voters, Kennedy proposed a middle-class
tax cut, a law Lyndon Johnson signed in the months following Kennedy’s death.
Concurrently, white southerners, who had long resisted efforts by Democratic
administrations to advance civil rights, began peeling away, supporting George
Wallace’s racially charged third-party challenge in large enough numbers to
throw the 1968 election to Republican Richard Nixon.
178 conclusion

In office, Nixon attempted to consolidate a new coalition of southern and

suburban whites into a lasting coalition. His efforts were derailed by Water-
gate, but they anticipated the coalition that would power Ronald Reagan to
victory in 1980 as majorities soured on the policies of the Great Society and
white southerners realigned as Republicans. Jimmy Carter tried to govern and
win reelection with a fragmented and flailing New Deal coalition, but it proved
impossible. Democrats would continue to nominate New Deal liberals, but they
would never again elect one.

The Reagan Party System: 1980–2020

Running for president in 1980, Ronald Reagan cited Kennedy’s tax cut as one
of the few areas of agreement he had with the late President. Reagan’s decisive
win began a revival of Jeffersonian localism, put the Republican party firmly
in charge of the presidency, and laid the groundwork for eventual Republican
control of Congress. Inaugurated in 1981, Reagan directly repudiated the New
Deal governing philosophy, bluntly stating: “Government is not the solution to
our problem; government is the problem.”7
Most Americans agreed. In a stunning reversal, polls found a dramatic shift
regarding the respective roles of the federal and state governments. In 1936, 56
percent favored a concentration of power in the federal government; 44 percent
preferred power be left to the states. By 1987, the positions were reversed: 63 per-
cent wanted power concentrated in state governments; just 34 percent preferred
the federal government.8 This was reflected in other polls. In 1985, 57 percent
agreed that “Washington is trying to do too many things that should be left to
individuals and private businesses;” just 38 percent wanted more government
involvement to solve the country’s problems.9
At the start of the Reagan era, Republicans had a natural electoral majority
that developed out of a long stretch of economic stagnation and white pushback
to the civil rights gains of the 1960s. Between 1968 and 1988, Republicans won
five of six presidential elections, four by landslide margins. The Republican base
splintered when George H. W. Bush raised taxes, opening the door to Ross Per-
ot’s third-party challenge and allowing Bill Clinton to sneak into the presidency
by winning 43 percent of the vote in 1992—2.5 points less than the previous
Democratic nominee Michael Dukakis had secured enroute to losing forty states.
To win the presidency, Clinton had to resort to the same “me-too” tactics
Eisenhower used during the New Deal alignment. He promised to be a “New
Democrat” who would not rely on the federal government to solve problems. At
 Where Are We Going? 179

first, Clinton violated that promise by trying to overhaul the healthcare system,
a project that ended in defeat and left his presidency in tatters. Clinton recov-
ered by acknowledging the country was living through a Jeffersonian moment
and turned his attention to reducing the federal deficit, working with the Re-
publican-controlled Congress to make reductions in federal spending. Seeking
reelection in 1996, Clinton told the Congress that the “era of big government is
over”—a line that could have been easily uttered by Reagan.10
But the electorate was becoming more diverse, and by 1996 Clinton was able
to win close to a majority of the vote. The next two presidential elections would
be tight and competitive, and by the turn of the twenty-first century, Republicans
could no longer count on a natural majority to keep them in power. Their presi-
dential victory in 2000 was facilitated by a 5-4 ruling in the Supreme Court that
broke along ideological lines. Republicans have not won a popular vote majority
in the four elections since George W. Bush’s narrow reelection victory in 2004.
Aspiring to the presidency in 2008, Barack Obama recognized Bill Clinton’s
supporting role in political history, saying, “I think Ronald Reagan changed the
trajectory of America in a way . . . that Bill Clinton did not.”11 Obama hoped to
be a transformational president. But like Nixon in 1968, he was able to dent but
not transform the electoral status quo, anticipating but not solidifying the coa-
lition that twelve years later would elect his vice president, Joe Biden. In 2010,
Obama achieved a crucial legislative milestone with the passage of the Afford-
able Care Act, but he also succeeded in uniting Republicans in opposition to his
administration and powered the Tea Party rebellion that same year, handing
Republicans the House and Senate.
Normally, back-to-back defeats like Republicans suffered in 2008 and 2012
would lead a party to reassess itself, and Republicans did make an attempt at
self-examination following their second loss to Barack Obama. In a report ti-
tled the Growth and Opportunity Project, the Republican National Commit-
tee committed to expanding its appeal to a nation becoming younger and more
diverse.12 National Republicans recognized they were going to have to adjust to
remain competitive as the Reagan coalition aged and disappeared and concluded
that perceived racial, gender, religious, and social intolerance was costing them
a generation of supporters. Party leaders understood that if they did not moder-
ate their positions on immigration, race, and social issues they potentially faced
political oblivion. However, large numbers of Republicans in the electorate were
uninterested in a modified agenda, and four years after issuing a call for moder-
ation, Republicans nominated Donald Trump and committed to a more radical
vision of racial politics.
180 conclusion

Despite warnings against sliding deeper into the politics of white grievance,
Republicans began exploring ways to exercise power while slipping into the mi-
nority, making a reckoning with the party platform less urgent. As the country
changed around them, a geographic fluke concentrated an emerging informa-
tion age majority of young, multicultural, and secular voters in a minority of
states, thereby greatly underrepresenting them in institutions like the Senate and
the Electoral College. And the overwhelming Republican victories in the 2010
midterm elections gave Republicans in states like Pennsylvania, Ohio, North
Carolina, Wisconsin, Florida, and Texas control of redistricting following the
decennial census, permitting them to draw congressional boundaries to allow
House Republicans to be overrepresented with respect to their share of the ag-
gregate congressional vote.
Gerrymandering certainly wasn’t new, and it was hardly the exclusive province
of Republicans, but the extent and degree of gerrymandering was so pronounced
that it began to disrupt the ordinary functioning of the two-party system. In
extremely gerrymandered districts, where Democrats could not win, Republi-
can incumbents feared primary challenges from their right far more than they
feared Democratic challengers on their left, pushing them away from the center
and dramatically reducing any incentives to compromise. The ingredients for
radicalization were there even before Donald Trump stole the Republican base
from a leadership that found itself powerless to contain him.
Unable to recalibrate in a way that would expand their appeal, Republicans
became increasingly dependent on utilizing their power to bend the institutions
of government to their advantage. Voter ID laws that disproportionately disen-
franchised voters of color and extensive purges of voter rolls became more aggres-
sive when the Supreme Court gutted the Voting Rights Act13 on the strength of
a majority made possible by holding the White House after losing the Electoral
College in 2000. When that majority was threatened by the death of Antonin
Scalia during the last year of President Obama’s term, the move toward under-
mining republican institutions took an ominous turn. Senate majority leader
Mitch McConnell used his power to prevent a hearing on Obama’s nomination
of Appellate Court judge Merrick Garland to fill the seat, justifying his actions
through a questionable precedent about not seating a new justice in an election
year. Four years later, McConnell dispatched with this rationale and expedited
confirmation hearings for Trump nominee Amy Coney Barrett following the
death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg while early votes were already being cast
in the 2020 election.
 Where Are We Going? 181

The mechanisms that permitted Republicans to remain in power as a mi-

nority were beginning to compound one another. In the Barrett case, the nomi-
nee of a president who attained his office without benefit of the popular vote was
confirmed by a Senate in which California, the most populous state, has equal
representation to Wyoming, the least populous, despite having sixty-eight times
the population and in which Republicans managed to gain two seats in the 2018
election despite losing the aggregate Senate vote by eight points.14 Prior to the
Barrett nomination, McConnell had used a legislative majority representing a
minority of the country to fill the federal courts with the nominees of a presi-
dent elected by a minority of the country, after having previously used that same
minority to block the nominations of Trump’s Democratic predecessor, who had
twice been elected by a popular majority.
Republicans, of course, did not create republican institutions like the Senate
and the Electoral College, but their increased reliance on mechanisms designed
to amplify minority rights to establish minority rule was an unhealthy sign for
a political party operating in a democratic system. It is a short but significant
step from bending the system to breaking it entirely and the logical next step
when the returns on undermining the system diminish. The breaking point
came when four years of the Trump presidency saw Republicans cede control of
the White House, the House, and the Senate. After Trump rejected his defeat,
party elites could have rejected him, but doing so would have ignited a rebellion
by the Republican base. So, they were silent or encouraging while Trump made
every attempt to overturn the election outcome. When lawsuits failed, when
pressure on state election officials failed, when pressure on state and national
Republican elected officials failed, when multiple state recounts failed, when
Trump failed to stop the casting of electoral votes in November, and when he
failed to convince Vice President Mike Pence that he had the authority to throw
out electoral votes in his capacity as president of the Senate, Trump found him-
self out of options with the clock ticking down. At that moment, with the tacit
endorsement of his party, years of undermining the political system turned to
overthrowing it as a last resort to cling to power.
In their rejection of the difficult work of moderating and modernizing their
party—a project that almost certainly would have required a stretch in the po-
litical wilderness—it was inevitable that the interests of a Republican Party that
lost its grip on the future would be increasingly at odds with the necessities of
republican governance, like honoring election outcomes and recognizing the
legitimacy of the opposition. Instead of recalibrating, Republicans resorted to
182 conclusion

limiting ballot access in many states, making it harder for minorities to vote,
reducing early voting, reducing the availability of drop boxes where voters could
place their absentee ballots, and, in Georgia, even prohibiting distribution of
food and water to those waiting in long lines to vote.
Most ominously, some states moved the legal responsibility to certify elec-
tion results from independently elected secretaries of state to gerrymandered
Republican-controlled state legislatures. If these laws had been in effect in 2020,
it is easy to see how Republican legislative majorities in Arizona, Georgia, and
Wisconsin could have refused to certify Joe Biden’s Electoral College victory in
those states and plunged the country into a constitutional crisis. Congress could
override these measures by passing the For the People Act and the John Lewis
Voting Rights Act, but the Republican representation advantage in the Senate,
coupled with the effects of the filibuster, makes doing so difficult. Democrats
can fight Republican voter suppression acts in federal and state courts, but those
efforts were complicated in 2021 when the Supreme Court—on the strength of
the appointees secured by McConnell’s strongarm tactics—further gutted the
Voting Rights Act in a way that requires challengers to prove the intent of the
new laws is discriminatory.
Collectively through these actions, the Republican Party has telegraphed its
intention to defer any attempt to modernize in a way that would make it com-
petitive in an electorate that increasingly rejects the core Jeffersonian philosophy
of the Reagan era. In doing so, the party has positioned itself to retain power as a
minority entity through the use and abuse of republican institutions or possibly,
as the failed insurrection suggests, through force. What happens next? We will
consider four scenarios.

Scenario One: Emergence of a Third Party

If it is true that politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum, there is an opportunity for
a third party to emerge to fill the gap on the center-right created by the growing
radicalization of the Republican Party. During the Trump years, the Republican
Party departed from the conservative moorings of Reaganism, becoming a radi-
cal party and leaving ideological conservatives politically homeless.
While it is not uncommon for a once-dominant party to lose intellectual en-
ergy as a party system ends, it may not be an exaggeration to say that post-Trump
Republicans have cast aside the touchstone values of fiscal conservatism and per-
sonal responsibility that were once the party’s hallmark to become a vehicle for
the grievances of those resistant to the racial, cultural and economic changes
 Where Are We Going? 183

enveloping the country. As the party slips from its intellectual roots, party pol-
itics becomes fixed on the expression of outrage rather than on the discussion
of issues or the search for policy solutions. Performance, not policy, is valued.
Matters rise to prominence if they channel the anger and frustration of the base,
such as whether critical race theory should be taught in public schools, whether
transgendered kids should be required to use bathrooms that conform to their
birth gender, or whether a “cancel culture” discriminates against those who do
not share prevailing cultural values. Matters like these do not present themselves
as topics for serious policy consideration but are effective for riling up the party
base on social media. Donald Trump understands this dynamic, as do Republi-
cans like Marjorie Taylor Greene and Matt Gaetz.
This poses an acute dilemma for those who place themselves to the right of
the Democratic Party but who have no interest in a reactionary politics of social
or racial grievance. The formation of a new conservative party to fill the void
would seem like a natural response to their dilemma, save for two problems:
there may not be enough voters to support a viable third party, and as we noted
in chapter 9, the obstacles to the development and efficacy of a third party
are legion.
It is noteworthy that a new center-right party has not emerged as of 2021,
even though the conditions favoring it have been present for some time. At the
elite level, there has long been a vocal contingent of “Never Trump” Repub-
licans—opinion leaders like George Will and William Kristol, and political
operatives like one-time Bush and McCain advisor Steve Schmidt—who have
renounced the Republican Party as dangerously anti-democratic. They have in-
vested in anti-Trump organizations like the Lincoln Project, an affiliation of
disaffected Republican operatives committed to preventing Trump’s re-election.
But they have not extended their well-bankrolled efforts to the formation of a
political party.
The reason why rests at the grassroots level. There may not be enough
“homeless” conservative voters among the party-in-the-electorate to support a
viable third party, as large numbers of Republicans remain supportive of Don-
ald Trump. A conservative party cannot be competitive unless it can peel off
conservative-leaning Democrats on its left or conservative-leaning Trump sup-
porters on its right. But as we have seen, as the parties have sorted themselves
ideologically, few conservative Democrats remain. And those who support Don-
ald Trump do not prioritize a conservative policy agenda.
Without sufficient support in the electorate, it would be a quixotic under-
taking for conservative elites to invest in developing a party organization given
184 conclusion

the expense and work it would require. The institutional barriers to the forma-
tion of third parties are enormous, and the likelihood of more than momentary
success is small.

Scenario Two: Collapse of the Republican Party

A more extreme possibility would be the demise of the Republican Party as an
electoral force, something we have not seen since the Whig Party disintegrated
in advance of the Civil War. As far-fetched as this may sound, Republicans are
not set up to compete effectively on a level playing field and have made them-
selves anathema to the two generations of voters that will soon constitute a ma-
jority of the population.
Although the Supreme Court, Senate, Electoral College, and House gerry-
manders will continue to pay Republicans institutional dividends into the im-
mediate future, they cannot indefinitely stave off the demographic tidal wave
that grows with every election cycle. Furthermore, these efforts can be mitigated
legislatively by Democrats should they deliver tangible results that satisfy their
activist base and appeal to more independent-minded voters. Making govern-
ment work is a top priority for the Biden administration with “deliverables”
on COVID relief, economic injustice, and infrastructure reform—items which
Biden has characterized as “shots in arms and money in pockets,” as well as shov-
els in the ground.15 Democrats will have to address divisions in their own coali-
tion about how to address obstacles presented by the sixty-vote Senate filibuster
threshold, but if they succeed in delivering results, the Republican party will
find itself increasingly at odds with public sentiment and will struggle to survive
at the national level.
Democrats and their allies in the electorate could also take direct aim at Re-
publican efforts to disenfranchise voters. They could advance legislative initia-
tives designed to expand the electorate and protect the right to vote, although
these efforts face the same legislative hurdles as Biden’s policy proposals. Passage
of the “For the People Act” would make it easier to register and vote and would
place congressional redistricting in the hands of nonpartisan commissions, ef-
fectively ending partisan gerrymanders. Passage of the John Lewis Voting Rights
Act would restore and expand the protections of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
that were removed by the Supreme Court.
Grassroots political action to combat the new restrictive voting laws, register
new voters, and help Democratic voters navigate their way through unchartered
territory would empower emerging electorates across the Sun Belt, making
 Where Are We Going? 185

Democrats more competitive in states like Georgia, Arizona, and Texas where
dramatic demographic changes have been met with voter suppression efforts. Ju-
dicial reform initiatives, potentially including expansion of the Supreme Court,
would rebalance the Court in response to the Garland and Barrett nominations,
although President Biden and some congressional Democrats have been resistant
to such a change. Statehood for the District of Columbia and, if they so choose,
Puerto Rico would marginally correct representation inequities in the Senate
(along with bringing full citizenship to residents of both jurisdictions). The Sen-
ate held a hearing on DC statehood in 2021, the farthest such a proposal has
ever advanced, but resistance among some Senate Democrats makes enactment
unlikely. Likewise, 52 percent of Puerto Ricans supported statehood in 2020,
but that proposal, too, faces congressional obstacles.16
The political will to pass these measures may not be evident today, but pol-
itics is a fluid enterprise and political circumstances change. It would not take
much padding to the Democrats’ slender congressional majorities to bring about
meaningful political reform and make it increasingly hard for Republicans to
hold power by aggressively working the rules of the game to their advantage.
Would they collapse under these circumstances? History suggests they are
more likely to adjust. The story of major party competition is one of change
and adaptation. Only the Federalists, who failed to organize effectively, and the
Whigs, who were torn in half by slavery, disappeared after being major players
in two-party competition. And the emergence of modern parties makes it less
likely for one to vanish than was the case 160 years ago. Institutionally, party
organizations are far more entrenched today than they were in the 1850s, and
there are states and localities where the Republican Party will thrive regardless
of what happens at the national level. Obstacles to the emergence of a third party
that we discussed above make it unlikely that Republicans will be challenged by
a new party the way antislavery Republicans challenged the Whigs.
But it is also clear that Republicans are dependent on a base that rejects
compromise. Neglecting their wishes would make it impossible for the party
to compete. If at the same time Democrats can consolidate power around their
fledgling majority, it’s not difficult to imagine a situation where Republicans
can’t win elections with or without their base. What then?
While it is theoretically possible for the Republican party to wander into
oblivion while the Democratic tent expands to encompass the center-right in a
twenty-first century version of the Era of Good Feelings, this is unlikely to be a
sustainable arrangement. Two-party systems need two parties to be effective—
and they need both parties to buy into the fundamental tenets of democracy.
186 conclusion

That the Republican Party as currently constituted has demonstrated a willing-

ness to embrace anti-constitutional ends opens the possibility that the Consti-
tution rather than the party could collapse.

Scenario Three: Collapse of the Constitutional Order

The most alarming possibility is that a party of the center-right does not form,
political reform does not happen, the Biden administration is unsuccessful, and
Republicans return to power while still committed to Trumpism. In this sce-
nario, the embrace of the authoritarianism that motivated the Capitol insurrec-
tion could reestablish itself, either behind Trump or a Trump acolyte who coopts
the allegiance of core Trump supporters.
This possibility is viable as long as the objective of the Republican Party is
to prevent the emerging electorate from holding power, which as demographic
trends advance will be possible only by disenfranchising increasingly large num-
bers of voters. The Trump years offer a blueprint for how this might unfold.
Prior to the 2016 election, Donald Trump made it clear to his supporters that
the only way he could lose is if the election were rigged. In office, he made the
unsubstantiated claim that he won the popular vote in 2016 because millions
of votes for Hillary Clinton were fraudulent. He repeated the claim of fraud
prior to the 2020 election, and when he lost, he alleged that a great victory had
been stolen from him and his supporters—a stance he continues to maintain
and amplify. Conservative media has intensified these claims. Most elected Re-
publicans, fearing Trump’s wrath and the anger of their constituents, are un-
willing to acknowledge that the election was clean, and Biden won. During the
congressional certification of the electoral vote on January 6, many Republicans
challenged the electoral count. Today, a Republican Party fearful of alienating
its core voters is extremely wary of provoking Trump’s wrath, as he can doom
their reelection bids by endorsing primary challengers he finds sympathetic.
Their only move is to stand by and support him if they hope to have a future in
the Republican Party.
Constitutional democracy is directly threatened by this marriage of charis-
matic leader, legislative enablers, and a base that regards remaining in power as
the only way to fend off existential danger. It is a combination that was not pres-
ent during Reagan’s ascendency at the end of the New Deal alignment, nor was
it a factor during the FDR realignment despite the dire conditions of the Great
Depression. If there is a resonant moment in our history, it is the Republican
realignment of 1856–1864, when a new party coalition was born out of civil war.
 Where Are We Going? 187

But if the constitutional order is strong enough to resist the threat posed by
the presence of an anti-constitutional political party, it is also possible that this
disruptive moment will resolve itself in a familiar way resembling other rocky
but successful transitions between political systems.

Scenario Four: Conventional Realignment

We have noted that new party systems emerge when declining systems become
unable to address new challenges, and that aptly describes this moment. Presi-
dent Biden took office during a time of overlapping emergencies that his Repub-
lican predecessor was ill-equipped to manage: the worst public health crisis in
a century and the attendant economic carnage caused by the pandemic; a racial
justice crisis elevated in salience when the murder of George Floyd at the hands
of white policemen sparked sustained protests; and a looming environmental ca-
tastrophe underscored by the collapse of statewide infrastructure after a freak ice
storm shuttered Texas in early 2021, followed by record-shattering temperatures
across the Northwest the following summer. How effectively Biden manages
these challenges will determine whether the multicultural and intergenerational
coalition that elected him becomes a permanent electoral force. The task ahead
for Biden is enormous, but crises of this magnitude create opportunities for par-
ties if they can effectively address them.
Biden started with important advantages, notably high levels of public sup-
port personally and for his key initiatives. After nearly six months in office, 55
percent approved of Biden’s performance, and approval of his handling of the
coronavirus pandemic stood at 68 percent.17 Sizable majorities supported his
priorities to increase the minimum wage to $15 per hour (61 percent); reenter
the Paris Climate Agreement (63 percent); allow children illegally brought into
the US to remain and apply for citizenship (83 percent); permit undocumented
immigrants to become citizens (65 percent); reverse Donald Trump’s Muslim
ban (57 percent);18 and enhance Obamacare (68 percent).19 As Biden turned his
attention to dealing with the nation’s crumbling infrastructure and combating
climate change through his $2.3 trillion American Jobs Plan, he was buoyed by
56 percent support for his efforts; only 34 percent opposed.20
Biden’s ascendency dovetails with a decline in the Republican Party’s fortunes.
At the start of his presidency, 63 percent said the Republican Party was on the
“wrong track, and 54 percent wanted Donald Trump to “remove himself from
politics entirely.” Following the January 6 insurrection, Republican registration
figures dropped precipitously, and a survey sponsored by The Economist/You
188 conclusion

Gov found the number of Americans calling themselves Republicans declined

five points to 37 percent between November 2020 and February 2021.21
These numbers reflect an early embrace of the Biden agenda and widespread
public rejection of Trump and his policies. But something more is at work.
During the 2020 campaign, Biden linked the pandemic and attendant eco-
nomic devastation to the racial injustice and climate crises he would assume
as president. In so doing, he advocated a comprehensive, activist approach to
government the likes of which we have not seen a president advance since the
New Deal. His agenda is breathtaking in scope: an overhaul of the nation’s in-
frastructure, including building electric automobile charging stations; an im-
migration bill that provides a path to citizenship to undocumented workers;
expanding the nation’s broadband capabilities to underserved rural communi-
ties; new civil rights and voting rights acts; and an expansion of Obamacare. It
is not coincidental that Biden hung a portrait of FDR in the Oval Office, along
with statutes of civil rights icons Eleanor Roosevelt, Martin Luther King, Rosa
Parks, Robert Kennedy, and Caesar Chavez—all proponents of an expansive
federal government role.22
To this end, it is noteworthy that the opening legislative move on the
COVID-19 relief package moved swiftly through Congress to Biden’s desk.
Presidents Obama, Clinton, and Carter, who had many more congressional
Democrats to work with, met with far more internal resistance for their large
initiatives. But, as we saw, they were operating in different political eras, with
Carter dependent on the warring factions of a deteriorating New Deal coalition,
and Obama and Clinton representing the minority party when the prevailing
assumptions of the Reagan era were still robust. While Biden’s Democratic con-
gressional majorities are slender in a way Franklin Roosevelt’s were not, the sub-
stantial public support for his initiatives suggests that the foundation may exist
for a new political alignment.
The crises Biden inherited in 2021 were on a scale not seen since the Great
Depression, and their emergence may have increased the public appetite for a
Rooseveltian-style Hamiltonian nationalism. In a reversal from the Reagan
years, the public is voicing its support for more government activism. Prior to
the 2020 election, the Gallup Organization registered 54 percent support for
the position that the federal government “should do more” to solve the country’s
problems, whereas only 41 percent thought it was doing too many things that
“should be left to individuals and businesses.”23 When things are going well,
voters are inclined to sit back and voice skepticism about government and its
associated costs. But when things are going poorly, voters demand action.
 Where Are We Going? 189

Ultimately, the public will register a verdict on Biden’s efforts, both in the
midterm election of 2022 and the presidential election in 2024. Much will rest
on how quickly America achieves post-pandemic normalcy, and whether that
brings new possibilities for economic and social justice. If Biden falls short, a
turn toward greater divisiveness is likely, and each of the scenarios discussed
above becomes more possible. But if he is successful, Republicans will become, in
the words of Biden senior advisor Mike Donilon, “a party shrinking its appeal.”
Republicans have opted to oppose Biden’s initiatives the same way they opposed
his two Democratic predecessors, but the risks of obstruction will escalate be-
cause the political circumstances are different. As Donilon observed, “Opposing
President Biden’s American Rescue Plan only exacerbate[s] Republicans’ pre-
dicament. The GOP is putting itself at odds with a rescue package supported
overwhelmingly by the American people.”24 The same logic applies to Biden’s
infrastructure and climate change plans.
During the past forty years, the party in power typically suffers losses in mid-
term elections. It may require an exception to that pattern for Republicans to
reevaluate their political viability. Should Republicans lose congressional seats in
2022, it would be a sign that the political system is responding to public opinion
and the party system is functioning as it has in the past, with a turn toward a new
party alignment built on a strong Hamiltonian role for the federal government.
In the final words of his inaugural address, President Biden said:
We will be judged, you and I, for how we resolve the cascading crises of
our era. Will we rise to the occasion? Will we master this rare and difficult
hour? Will we meet our obligations and pass along a new and better world
for our children? I believe we must, and I believe we will. And when we do,
we will write the next chapter in the American story.25
What that next chapter will look like, and how our political parties adapt to
the new realities of our time, will likely turn on whether Biden is correct.
 Notes

Preface: How We Got Here

1. See Carroll Doherty and Amina Dunn, “What Biden and Trump Supporters
Tell Us in Their Own Words about America’s Political Divisions,” Pew Research Cen-
ter, December 17, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/12/17/what-
biden-and-trump-supporters-tell-us-in-their-own-words-about-americas-political-
divisions/
2. George Washington, “Farewell Address,” September 17, 1796. For a tran-
script of Washington’s speech, see https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/
farewell-address.
3. William L. Riordan, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall: A Series of Very Plain Talks on
Very Practical Politics (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), 25–26.
4. Michelle Obama, Becoming (New York: Crown, 2018), 33–34.
5. Ipsos poll, January 21–30, 2021. Text of question: “Compared to past presidential
elections during your lifetime, do you see the 2020 election as the single most important
election of your lifetime, more important than most other elections, about as important
as other elections, or less important the most other elections?” The single most import-
ant election of your lifetime, 28 percent; more important than most other elections, 38
percent; about as important as other elections, 28 percent; less important than most
other elections, 4 percent; refused, 2 percent.
6. Bill Clinton, “State of the Union Address,” Washington, DC, January 23, 1996.
For a transcript of the speech, see https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-
before-joint-session-the-congress-the-state-the-union-10
7. Suffolk University, poll, February 15–20, 2021. Text of question: “President Biden
says he wants to pursue bipartisanship and reduce the nation’s polarization. Which
comes closer to your view? Congressional Republicans should do their best to work with
Biden on major policies, even if it means making compromises; congressional Republi-
cans should do their best to stand up to Biden on major policies, even if it means little
gets passed.” Work with Biden, 26 percent; stand up to Biden, 62 percent; undecided,
12 percent. Survey of Trump voters only.
8. Cited in E. J. Dionne Jr., Our Divided Political Heart: The Battle for the American
Idea in an Age of Discontent (New York: Bloomsbury, 2012), 70–71.
9. Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life, reprint ed. (New York: Archon
Books, 1963), 29.

190
 Notes to Introduction 191

Introduction: An Election Like No Other

1. Mark Danner, “Be Ready to Fight,” New York Review of Books, February 11, 2021, 4.
2. Joe Biden, “Inaugural Address,” Washington, DC, January 20, 2021. For a
transcript of Joe Biden’s speech, see https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/
inaugural-address-53
3. Quoted in Jeffrey Goldberg, “Why Obama Fears for Our Democracy,” Atlantic,
November 16, 2020.
4. Lara Trump, “Address to the Republican National Convention,” August 26, 2020.
For a transcript of Lara Trump’s speech, see https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/
lara-trump-2020-rnc-speech-transcript
5. Edward J. Larson, A Magnificent Catastrophe: The Tumultuous Election of 1800,
America’s First Presidential Campaign (New York: Free Press, 2007), 106.
6. James MacGregor Burns, Cobblestone Leadership: Majority Rule, Minority Power
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 29.
7. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Po-
litical Thought since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1955), 7.
8. Quoted in Everett Carll Ladd, The American Ideology: An Exploration of the Ori-
gins, Meaning, and Role of American Political Ideas (Storrs, CT: Roper Center for Public
Opinion Research, 1994), 32.
9. Quoted in John Gerring, “A Chapter in the History of American Party Ideology:
The Nineteenth Century Democratic Party, 1828–1892,” paper presented at the North-
eastern Political Science Association, Newark, New Jersey, November 11–13, 1993,
36–37. Cass made these remarks on September 2, 1852.
10. See Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick,
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 323.
11. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Annual Message to Congress on the State of the
Union,” Washington, DC, February 2, 1953. For a transcript of the speech, see https://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/annual-message-the-congress-the-state-
the-union-16
12. Daniel M. Shea, ed., Mass Politics: The Politics of Popular Culture (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1999), 207.
13. Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist Number 70,” in The Federalist, ed., Edward
Mead Earle (New York: Modern Library, 1960), 454.
14. Robert Kennedy, To Seek A Newer World (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 56.
15. James Reston, “Liberty and Authority,” New York Times, June 29, 1986, E-23.
16. Wilson Carey McWilliams, “The Old Populism vs. the New,” Commonweal, June
2, 1995, 24.
17. Michael Lind, “Trumpism and Clintonism Are the Future,” New York Times,
April 16, 2016.
192 Notes to Introduction

18. Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion: An American History (New York: Basic
Books, 1995), 1.
19. Hillary Clinton, “Speech on the Alt-Right Movement,” Reno, NV, August
25, 2016. For a transcript of the speech see https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
the-fix/wp/2016/08/25/hillary-clintons-alt-right-speech-annotated/
20. Richard Hofstadter, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics,” Harper’s, No-
vember 1964, 82.
21. Dominick Mastrangelo, “Trump Jr.: Trump Supporters in D.C. ‘Should Send a
Message’ to GOP ‘This Isn’t’ Their Party Any More,” The Hill, January 6, 2021, https://
thehill.com/homenews/532886-donald-trump-jr-gathering-of-trump-supporters-in-
dc-should-send-a-message-to-gop.
22. Quinnipiac University, poll, February 11–14, 2021. Text of question: “Would
you like to see Donald Trump play a prominent role in the Republican party, or not?”
Republicans: yes, 75 percent; no, 21 percent; don’t know/no answer, 4 percent.
23. CBS News, poll, February 5-8, 2021. See https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
impeachment-trial-trump-conviction-opinion-poll/.
24. Committee on Political Parties, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System
(New York: Rinehart and Company, 1950), 94.
25. See Daniel A. Cox, “After the Ballots Are Counted: Conspiracies, Political Vio-
lence, and American Exceptionalism,” Survey Center on American Life, February 11,
2021, https://www.americansurveycenter.org/research/after-the-ballots-are-counted
-conspiracies-political-violence-and-american-exceptionalism/.
26. See Cox, “After the Ballots Are Counted.”
27. Chuck McCutcheon, “Future of the GOP,” CQ Researcher, Volume 24, Issue 38,
October 24, 2014, 891.
28. James MacGregor Burns, The Vineyard of Liberty (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1982).

Chapter 1
1. George Washington, “Farewell Address,” September 17, 1796. For a transcript of
the speech see https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/farewell-address
2. Abraham Lincoln, “Address to the Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois,”
in Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings, 1832–1858 ed., Don E. Fehrenbacher (New
York: Library of America, 1989), 32–33.
3. See James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 (New York:
W. W. Norton and Company, 1987), 39.
4. See Max Farand, ed., The Record of the Federal Convention of 1787 (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1966), 1: 299.
5. U.S. Census Bureau, “A More Efficient Census of Governments.” See https://www.
census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/visualizations/2016/comm/cog_infographic.
pdf. Accessed June 11, 2020.
 Notes to Chapter 1 193

6. John F. Kennedy, Profiles in Courage (New York: Harper and Row, 1956).
7. Donald J. Trump, Crippled America: How to Make America Great Again (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2015), 98.
8. James Madison, “Federalist 10,” in The Federalist, ed. Edward Meade Earle (New
York: Modern Library, 1937), 77.
9. Madison, “Federalist 10,” 59.
10. Madison, “Federalist 10,” 61.
11. James Thomas Flexner, Washington: The Indispensable Man (New York: New
American Library, 1974), 263.
12. George Washington, “Farewell Address,” September 17, 1796. For a transcript of
Washington’s speech see https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/farewell-address
13. David McCullough, John Adams (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 422.
14. See A. James Reichley, The Life of the Parties: A History of American Political
Parties (New York: Free Press, 1992), 29.
15. David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (New York: Touchstone Books, 1995), 537.
16. Barack Obama, “Keynote Address to the 2004 Democratic National Convention,”
Boston, July 27, 2004. For a transcript of the speech, see https://www.pbs.org/newshour/
show/barack-obamas-keynote-address-at-the-2004-democratic-national-convention
17. President Ford Committee, “Ford Campaign Strategy Plan,” August 1976. Cour-
tesy of the Gerald R. Ford Library.
18. NBC News/Wall Street Journal, poll, May 28–June 2, 2020. Text of question:
“Do you consider yourself to be more a supporter of Donald Trump or more a supporter
of the Republican party?” Supporter of Donald Trump, 52 percent; supporter of the
Republican Party, 38 percent; both (volunteered), 4 percent; neither (volunteered), 4
percent; not sure, 2 percent.
19. Donald J. Trump, “Acceptance Speech,” Republican National Convention, Wash-
ington, DC, August 27, 2020. For a transcript of the speech, see https://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/documents/address-accepting-the-republican-presidential-nomination-4
20. Joe Biden, “Acceptance Speech,” Democratic National Convention, Wilmington,
DE, August 20, 2020. For a transcript of the speech, see https://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/documents/address-accepting-the-republican-presidential-nomination-4
21. James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, vol. 1 (Chicago: Sergel, 1891), 119.
22. Amicus curiae brief filed by the Committee for Party Renewal in Colorado Re-
publican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission, February
1996, 3. John K. White, personal copy.
23. Megan Brenan, “Economy Tops Voters’ List of Key Election Issues,” Gallup, Oc-
tober 5, 2020, https://news.gallup.com/poll/321617/economy-tops-voters-list-key-elec-
tion-issues.aspx.
24. “Democratic Party Platform, 2020,” accessed September 3, 2020, https://democrats.
org/where-we-stand/party-platform/
25. In an unprecedented move, Republicans did not adopt a 2020 platform saying
they stood by President Trump’s “America First agenda.” See Republican National
194 Notes to Chapter 1

Committee, “Resolution, Regarding the Republican Party Platform,” August 24, 2020,
https://prod-cdnstatic.gop.com/docs/Resolution_Platform_2020.pdf.
26. “Republican Party Platform,” accessed July 30, 2016, https://prod-cdn-static.gop.
com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL%5B1%5D-ben_1468872234.pdf.
27. See Everett Carll Ladd with Charles D. Hadley, Transformations of the American
Party System (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), 1.
28. The PIE, PO, PIG model was first developed by Ralph M. Goldman in 1951.
See Ralph M. Goldman, Party Chairmen and Party Faction, 1789–1900 (PhD diss.,
University of Chicago, 1951), introduction and Ralph M. Goldman, The National Party
Chairmen and Committees: Factionalism at the Top (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1990).
29. Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
30. “The Professional and Technical Workforce: By the Numbers,” Department for
Professional Employees, AFL-CIO, 2021 Fact Sheet, https://static1.squarespace.com/
static/5d10ef48024ce300010f0f0c/t/61523a1c51633b57b4df9ffb/1632778782192/
The+Professional+and+Technical+Workforce+2021.pdf.
31. See https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm. Last modified date
Janaury 22, 2021.
32. Drew DeSilva, “Ten Facts about American Workers,” Pew Research Center, Au-
gust 29, 2019. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5d10ef48024ce300010f0f0c/t/61
523a1c51633b57b4df9ffb/1632778782192/The+Professional+and+Technical+Work-
force+2021.pdf.
33. Joseph A. Schlesinger, Political Parties and the Winning of Office (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan, 1991).
34. Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction Books, 1990).
35. John H. Aldrich, Why Parties?:The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties
in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
36. Edmund Burke, “Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents” (1770), in
The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, ed. Paul Langford (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1981), 317.
37. Jay M. Shafritz, The Dorsey Dictionary of American Government and Politics (Chi-
cago: Dorsey Press, 1988).
38. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Richard D. Heffner, (New
York: New American Library, 1956), 90.
39. Joe Biden, “Announcement Speech,” Philadelphia, PA, April 25, 2019. For a
transcript of the speech, see https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/ath/date/2019-04-25/
segment/01.
40. Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New
York: W. W. Norton, 1996).
41. Daniel Boorstin, The Genius of American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1953), 14.
 Notes to Chapter 2 195

42. William Nisbet Chambers, “Party Development and the American Mainstream,”
in The American Party Systems, ed. William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burn-
ham (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 6.
43. Gerald Strouzh, Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1970), 16.
44. See Morton J. Frisch, ed., Selected Writings and Speeches of Alexander Hamilton
(Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1985), 316.
45. Ted Morgan, FDR: A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), 38.
46. Richard Reeves, The Reagan Detour (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), 19.
47. Robert F. Kennedy, To Seek A Newer World (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 56.
48. James A. Reichley, “Party Politics in a Federal Polity,” in Challenges to Party Gov-
ernment, ed. John Kenneth White and Jerome M. Mileur (Carbondale: Southern Illi-
nois Press, 1992), 43.
49. “Read the Full Transcript of Barack Obama’s High School Commencement
Speech,” New York Times, May 16, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/16/us/
obama-graduation-speech-transcript.html.
50. “1936 Republican National Platform,” as reprinted in the New York Times, June
12, 1936, 1.
51. Alfred M. Landon, “Text of Governor Landon’s Milwaukee Address on Social
Security,” New York Times, September 27, 1936.
52. Annie Linskey, “A Look Inside Biden’s Oval Office,” Washington Post, January
21, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/20/biden-oval-office/.

Chapter 2
1. E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government: American Government in Action (New
York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1942), 1.
2. Axios/Ipsos, poll, January 11–13, 2021. Text of question: “How much do you agree
or disagree with each of the following statements? Traditional parties and politicians
don’t care about people like me.” Strongly agree, 38 percent; somewhat agree, 40 percent;
somewhat disagree, 17 percent; strongly disagree, 3 percent; no answer, 2 percent.
3. Howard Bement, ed., Burke’s Speech on Conciliation with America (Norwood, MA:
Ambrose and Company, 1922), 45, 54–55, 61.
4. David McCullough, John Adams (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 422.
5. “Essays of Brutus, October 18, 1787,” in The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitu-
tional Convention Debates, ed. Robert Ketcham (New York: Signet Classics, 2003), 277.
6. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, “Federalist 57,” The Federalist,
ed. Edward Mead Earle (New York: Modern Library, 1937), 370.
7. A. James Reichley, The Life of the Parties: A History of American Politics (New York:
Free Press, 1992), 42.
196 Notes to Chapter 2

8. McCullough, John Adams, 422.

9. Cited in Thomas E. Patterson, The American Democracy (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1990), 350.
10. James Thomas Flexner, Washington: The Indispensable Man (New York: New
American Library, 1974), 276.
11. Henry F. May, The Enlightenment in America (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1976), 108–9.
12. Donald Sisson, The American Revolution of 1800: How Jefferson Rescued De-
mocracy from Tyranny and Faction and What This Means Today (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1974), 11.
13. Joseph J. Ellis, Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation (New York: Vin-
tage Books, 2000), 204.
14. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cr. 137 (1803).
15. See A. James Reichley, “Party Politics in a Federal Polity,” in, Challenges to Party
Government, ed. John Kenneth White and Jerome M. Mileur (Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press, 1992), 44. The originator of the phrase was New York governor
William Marcy, a close Van Buren ally.
16. George H. Mayer, The Republican Party 1854 –1964 (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1964), 26.
17. Elinor C. Hartshorn, “Know-Nothings,” in Political Parties and Elections in the
United States: An Encyclopedia, ed. L. Sandy Maisel (New York: Garland, 1991), 549.
18. William E. Gienapp, “Formation of the Republican Party,” in The Encyclopedia
of American Political Parties and Elections, ed. L. Sandy Maisel (New York: Garland,
1991), 399.
19. James Albert Woodburn, Political Parties and Party Problems in the United States
(New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1903), 416–17.
20. “Guest Opinion: Jefferson Democrats’ Dark History of Using Mob Rule
to Silence Dissenting Press,” Red State, January 12, 2021, https://redstate.com/
redstate-guest-editorial/2021/01/12/308876-n308876.
21. Joan McCarter, “McConnell’s White Supremacist Roots are Showing in His
Filibuster Fight,” Daily Kos, February 22, 2021, https://www.dailykos.com/stories/
2021/1/22/2011214/-Obama-called-the-filibuster-a-Jim-Crow-relic-He-s-right-It-s-time
-it-was-gone.

Chapter 3
1. William Riordan, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall: A Series of Very Plain Talks on Very
Practical Politics (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), 91–93.
2. Riordan, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall, 1–3.
 Notes to Chapter 3 197

3. Progressive Party, “Progressive Platform, 1912,” in National Party Platforms,

1840–1968, ed. Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson (Urbana: University of Il-
linois Press, 1970), 173.
4. Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Why Americans Still Don’t Vote, and
Why Politicians Want It That Way (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000), 8.
5. On June 22, 2020, Trump tweeted: “Because of MAIL-IN BALLOTS, 2020
will be the most RIGGED election in our nations [sic] history—unless this stupidity is
ended. We voted in World War One & World War Two with no problem, but now they
are using Covid to cheat by using Mail-Ins,” CNN, June 22, 2020, https://www.cnn.
com/2020/06/22/politics/trump-voter-fraud-lies-fact-check/index.html.
6. Carl Smith, “Is America Ready to Vote by Mail,” Governing, April 15, 2020.
https://www.governing.com/next/The-2020-Elections-Is-America-Ready-to-Vote-
by-Mail.html.
7. See “Voting Laws Roundup: May 2021,” The Brennan Center for Justice, May 28, 2021,
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-
may-2021.
8. Franklin D. Roosevelt, “State of the Union Address,” Washington, DC, Janu-
ary 6, 1941.
9. Barry M. Goldwater, “Acceptance Speech,” Republican National Convention, San
Francisco, CA, July 16, 1964.
10. Edwin Diamond and Stephen Bates, The Spot: The Rise of Political Advertising on
Television (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988).
11. Philip A. Klinkner, The Losing Parties: Out-Party National Committees, 1956–
1993 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 39.
12. A. James Reichley, The Life of the Parties: A History of American Political Parties
(New York: Free Press, 1992), 356.
13. Paul S. Herrnson, Party Campaigning in the 1980s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1988), 37.
14. “Republican National Committee: Fundraising Overview, 2020 Cycle.” See
https://www.opensecrets.org/parties/totals.php?cycle=2020&cmte=RNC. Accessed
January 18, 2021.
15. Reichley, The Life of the Parties, 365.
16. “Democratic National Committee: Fundraising Overview, 2020 Cycle.” See
https://www.opensecrets.org/parties/totals.php?cmte=DNC&cycle=2020. Accessed
January 18, 2021.
17. IPSOS, poll, June 5–8, 2020. Text of question: “Which of these is your main
source of news?” Fox News, 12 percent; CNN, 7 percent; MSNBC, 3 percent; AB-
C/CBS/NBC News, 24 percent; New York Times or Washington Post, 2 percent; digital
or online news, 17 percent; your local newspaper, 3 percent; public television or radio, 9
percent; social media, 10 percent; other, 5 percent; none of these, 7 percent.
198 Notes to Chapter 3

18. Matthew R. Kerbel, Netroots: Online Progressives and the Transformations of

American Politics (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2009).

Chapter 4
1. James W. Ceaser, Presidential Selection: Theory and Development (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1979), 176.
2. Trump had three challengers for his renomination: former Massachusetts governor
William Weld, radio talk show host Joe Walsh, and former representative Mark Sanford.
3. The Democratic candidates were former vice president Joe Biden; Vermont senator
Bernie Sanders; Representative Tulsi Gabbard; Senator Elizabeth Warren; former New
York City mayor Michael Bloomberg; Senator Amy Klobuchar; former South Bend,
Indiana, mayor Pete Buttigieg; Tom Steyer; former Massachusetts governor Duval Pat-
rick; Andrew Yang; Senator Michael Bennet; Representative John Delaney; Senator
Cory Booker; Marianne Williamson; former Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
secretary Julian Castro; Senator Kamala Harris; Montana governor Steve Bullock, for-
mer representative Joe Sestak; Wayne Messam; former representative Beto O’Rourke,
Representative Tim Ryan; New York City mayor Bill de Blasio; Senator Kirsten Gilli-
brand, Representative Seth Moulton; Washington governor Jay Inslee, former governor
John Hickenlooper; Representative Eric Swalwell, and Richard Ojeda. See https://www
.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/us/politics/2020-presidential-candidates.html.
4. This was Maryland congressman Delaney who announced his presidential can-
didacy on July 28, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/31/us/politics/john-del-
aney-drops-out.html.
5. Peter Marks, “Democratic Convention Team Tries for an Emmy Win as Well,”
Washington Post, June 27, 2021, E-1.
6. Fred Blumenthal, “How to Prepare for the Presidency,” Parade Magazine, 1962.
Reprinted in The World Book Encyclopedia (Chicago: Field Enterprises Educational
Corporation, 1965), 678–79.
7. See Michael Kranish and Marc Fisher, Trump Revealed: The Definitive Biography
of the 45th President (New York: Scribner, 2017), 285–87.
8. Kranish and Fisher, Trump Revealed, 292.
9. The lengthy list of Republican candidates included former Florida governor Jeb
Bush, neurosurgeon Ben Carson, Texas senator Ted Cruz, Ohio governor John Kasich,
former Virginia governor Jim Gilmore, Florida senator Marco Rubio, real estate entre-
preneur Donald Trump, former Texas governor Rick Perry, Wisconsin governor Scott
Walker, Louisiana governor Bobby Jindal, South Carolina senator Lindsey Graham, for-
mer New York governor George Pataki, former Arkansas governor Mike Huckabee, for-
mer Pennsylvania senator Rick Santorum, Kentucky senator Rand Paul, former Hewlett
Packard CEO Carly Fiorina, and New Jersey governor Chris Christie.
 Notes to Chapter 4 199

10. John Heilemann and Mark Halperin, Game Change: Obama and the Clintons,
McCain and Palin, and the Race of a Lifetime (New York: Harper Collins, 2010), 63.
11. See “2020 Presidential Race,” Open Secrets, accessed December 23, 2020, https://
www.opensecrets.org/2020-presidential-race. Figures represent combined candidate
campaign committee money and outside expenditures.
12. Associated Press-National Opinion Research Center, Money in Politics Survey,
November 2015. Text of question one: “Here are some possible ways to change the
current system of financing political campaigns in the United States. How effective
do you think each of the following would be in reducing the influence of money in
politics? Extremely effective, very effective, somewhat effective, not very effective, not
effective at all? Limits on how much an outside group can spend on a candidate’s cam-
paign.” Extremely effective, 25 percent; very effective, 29 percent; somewhat effective,
33 percent; not very effective, 8 percent; not effective at all, 5 percent. Text of question
two: “Here are some possible ways to change the current system of financing political
campaigns in the United States. How effective do you think each of the following
would be in reducing the influence of money in politics? Extremely effective, very ef-
fective, somewhat effective, not very effective, not effective at all? Limits on how much
a political party can spend on a candidate’s campaign.” Extremely effective, 23 percent;
very effective, 29 percent; somewhat effective, 35 percent; not very effective, 8 percent;
not effective at all, 5 percent. Text of question three: “Here are some possible ways
to change the current system of financing political campaigns in the United States.
How effective do you think each of the following would be in reducing the influence
of money in politics? Extremely effective, very effective, somewhat effective, not very
effective, not effective at all? Limits on how much a candidate can spend on his or her
campaign, regardless of the source of the money.” Extremely effective, 25 percent; very
effective, 26 percent; somewhat effective, 33 percent; not very effective, 9 percent; not
effective at all, 6 percent.
13. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 50 (2010).
14. See “2020 Presidential Race.”
15. Bernie Sanders, “Announcement Speech,” Burlington, Vermont, May 26, 2015.
For a transcript of the speech, see https://www.c-span.org/video/?326214-1/senator
-bernie-sanders-i-vt-presidential-campaign-announcement#
16. See “Bernie Sanders (D),” Open Secrets, accessed August 10, 2020, https://www
.opensecrets.org/2020-presidential-race/candidate/bernie-sanders?id=N00000528.
17. Donald J. Trump, Crippled America: How to Make America Great Again (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2015), 98.
18. Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist 68,” in The Federalist, ed. Edward Meade Earle
(New York: Modern Library, 1937), 50.
19. Hamilton, “Federalist 68,” 442.
20. NBC News/Wall Street Journal, poll, April 28–May 1, 2019. Text of question:
“U.S. presidential elections are determined by the Electoral College where the candidate
200 Notes to Chapter 4

that wins a state receives votes based upon that state’s population. This means our con-
stitution allows for a president to be elected without winning the national popular vote.
Which approach do you prefer in electing a president. . .continuing to use the Electoral
College or amending the constitution to determine the winner by national popular
vote?” Continuing to use the electoral college, 43 percent; amending the constitution
to determine the winner by national popular vote, 53 percent; note sure, 4 percent.
21. These included one Clinton elector from Hawaii (who voted for Bernie Sanders),
four Clinton electors from Washington State (three who voted for Colin Powell and one
for Faith Spotted Eagle, a Native American); and two Trump Texas electors (one who
voted for John Kasich; another who sided with Libertarian Ron Paul).
22. Three electors voted for former secretary of state Colin Powell and one elector
voted for Faith Spotted Eagle, a Native American from South Dakota. Meanwhile two
Trump electors in Texas did not vote for him and one elector in Hawaii sided with Ber-
nie Sanders. See https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/four-washington-
electors-break-ranks-and-dont-vote-for-clinton/. Accessed August 7, 2020.
23. See Chiafalo et al. v. Washington, No. 19-465. https://www.supremecourt.gov/
opinions/19pdf/19-465_i425.pdf. Accessed August 7, 2020.
24. If that had happened, there would have been a 269-269 tie in the Electoral College
and the election would have been decided in the House of Representatives where each
state delegation had one vote. Although Democrats controlled the House, Republicans
controlled more state delegations which would have allowed Trump to win.
25. For more on some of these proposals see Paul Schumaker, “Analyzing the Electoral
College and Its Alternatives,” in Choosing a President: The Electoral College and Beyond,
ed. Paul D. Schumaker and Burdett A. Loomis (New York: Chatham House Publishers,
2002), especially 10–30.
26. James MacGregor Burns, The Power to Lead: The Crisis of the American Presi-
dency (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 220.
27. Ceaser, Presidential Selection, 147.
28. The Autobiography of Martin Van Buren, vol. 2, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick (New
York: DeCapo Press, 1973 edition), 584.
29. Howard L. Reiter, Selecting the President: The Nominating Process in Transition
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 133–34.
30. Reiter, Selecting the President, 134.
31. Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, National Party Platforms, 1840–1968
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), 169
32. Charles R. Michael, “Majority Will End Two-Thirds Rule,” New York Times,
June 23, 1936, 13.
33. Some southern states, in a protest to the Democratic Party’s pro-civil rights stance,
refused to list Democratic nominee Adlai Stevenson on the ballot in 1952.
34. Lyndon B. Johnson, “Address to the Nation,” Washington, DC, March 31,
1968. For a transcript of the speech, see https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/
 Notes to Chapter 4 201

the-presidents-address-the-nation-announcing-steps-limit-the-war-vietnam-and
-reporting-his.
35. Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, 1968 (New York: Atheneum,
1969), 376.
36. George McGovern, Grassroots: The Autobiography of George McGovern (New
York: Random House, 1977), 130. Eugene McCarthy became a candidate in November
1967; Robert Kennedy entered in mid-March 1968; Lyndon Johnson withdrew from
the race on March 31; Hubert Humphrey became an official candidate in late April
(after most of the primary deadlines had passed). The charge that Humphrey was not
a representative candidate of the Democratic Party rank and file remains a contested
one. Humphrey easily led McCarthy in the Gallup polls as the party’s choice for the
presidential nomination and was competitive in a three-way contest involving Eugene
McCarthy, Robert Kennedy, and Humphrey. For more information see Richard Scam-
mon and Ben J. Wattenberg, The Real Majority: An Extraordinary Examination of the
American Electorate (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970).
37. Democratic National Committee, Commission on Party Structure and Delegate
Selection to the Democratic National Committee. Mandate for Reform: A Report of the
Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection to the Democratic National Com-
mittee (Washington, DC: Democratic National Committee, April 1970).
38. McGovern, Grassroots, 137.
39. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419, U.S. (1975).
40. McGovern, Grassroots, 48.
41. Democratic National Committee, “Delegate Selection Rules for the 2020 Demo-
cratic National Convention,” adopted by the Democratic National Committee, August
25, 2018. https://democrats.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/2020-Delegate-Selection
-Rules-12.17.18-FINAL.pdf. Accessed January 15, 2022.
42. See “Republican Delegate Rules,” Ballotpedia, accessed August 8, 2020, https://
ballotpedia.org/Republican_delegate_rules,_2020.
43. Walter F. Morse, “Political Convention,” The World Book Encyclopedia, vol. 15
(Chicago: Field Enterprises Educational Corporation, 1964), 553–54.
44. These were Alabama, American Samoa, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Demo-
crats Abroad, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennes-
see, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia.
45. Nelson W. Polsby, Consequences of Party Reform (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1983), 114.
46. Tom Wicker, “A Party of Access?” New York Times, November 25, 1984, E17.
47. See https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/graphics/2016-delegate-tracker/. Ac-
cessed September 21, 2016.
48. See “Republican Delegate Rules.”
49. Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1993), 14.
202 Notes to Chapter 5

Chapter 5
1. Quinnipiac poll, January 15–17, 2021. Text of question: “Do you think Joe Biden’s
victory in the 2020 presidential election is legitimate or not legitimate?” Legitimate, 64
percent; not legitimate, 31 percent; don’t know/no answer, 5 percent. Democrats: Legit-
imate, 97 percent; not legitimate, 0 percent; don’t know/no answer, 2 percent. Republi-
cans: Legitimate, 28 percent; not legitimate, 67 percent; don’t know/no answer, 5 percent.
2. Edison Research, exit poll, November 3, 2020.
3. See Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard R. Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People’s Choice:
How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1940); and Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N.
McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1948).
4. See, for example, Walter DeVries, and V. Lance Tarrance, The Ticket-Splitter: A
New Force in American Politics (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Press, 1972).
5. Gallup poll, October 9–14, 1952. Text of question: “Which presidential candi-
date—Stevenson or Eisenhower—do you think could handle the Korean situation
best?” Eisenhower, 65 percent; Stevenson, 19 percent; no difference (volunteered), 8
percent; no opinion, 8 percent.
6. Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The
American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960), 148.
7. See Jeffrey M. Jones, “Biden Sparks Greater Party, Education Gaps than Predeces-
sors,” Gallup, April 15, 2021, https://news.gallup.com/poll/346622/biden-sparks-great-
er-party-education-gaps-predecessors.aspx. Accessed June 23, 2021.
8. Gerald M. Pomper, “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System? What,
Again?” Journal of Politics 33 (1971): 936.
9. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and
Row, 1957).
10. NBC News/Wall Street Journal, survey, August 9–12, 2020. Text of question:
“Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an inde-
pendent, or something else? (If Democrat or Republican ask:) Would you call yourself
a strong (Democrat/Republican) or not a very strong (Democrat/Republican)? (If not
sure, ask:) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party, closer to the Dem-
ocratic Party, or do you think of yourself as strictly independent?” Strong Democrat, 25
percent; not very strong Democrat, 6 percent; independent/lean Democrat, 11 percent;
strictly independent, 13 percent; independent/lean Republican, 10 percent; not very
strong Republican, 5 percent; strong Republican, 23 percent.
11. Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism and War (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 16.
12. “Moving Right Along? Campaign ’84’s Lessons for 1988: An Interview with
Peter Hart and Richard Wirthlin,” Public Opinion (December/January 1985): 8.
 Notes to Chapter 5 203

13. V. O. Key Jr., “Secular Realignment and the Party System,” Journal of Politics 21
(May 1959): 199.
14. Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Poli-
tics (New York: Norton, 1970), 10.
15. Kevin P. Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New Rochelle, NY: Ar-
lington House, 1969), 25.
16. See for example Byron E. Shafer, The End of Realignment? Interpreting American
Electoral Eras (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991).
17. Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, survey, September 20–22, 1983. Text of question:
“Do you feel that the Democratic Party or the Republican Party can do a better job of
handling . . . or don’t you think there is any real difference between them?” The “no
difference” results were as follows: reducing crime, 58 percent; stopping the spread of
communism, 52 percent; dealing effectively with the USSR, 48 percent; providing qual-
ity education, 47 percent; reducing the risk of nuclear war, 46 percent; providing health
care, 46 percent; reducing waste and inefficiency in government, 45 percent; protecting
the environment, 45 percent.
18. Everett C. Ladd, “Like Waiting for Godot: The Uselessness of Realignment for
Understanding Change in Contemporary American Politics,” Polity 22, 3 (Spring
1990): 512.
19. Ladd, “Like Waiting for Godot,” 518.
20. See David R. Mayhew, Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 141.
21. John Kenneth White, “Partisanship in the 1984 Presidential Election: The Roll-
ing Republican Realignment,” paper prepared for the 1985 Annual Meeting of the
Southwestern Political Science Association, March 20–23, 1985, Houston, Texas.
22. Ronald Reagan, “Inaugural Address,” Washington, DC, January 20, 1981.
For a transcript of the speech, see https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/
inaugural-address-11
23. John B. Judis and Ruy Teixeira, The Emerging Democratic Majority (New York:
Scribner, 2002).
24. John Kenneth White, Barack Obama’s America: How New Conceptions of Race,
Family, and Religion Ended the Reagan Era (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
2009) and John Kenneth White, What Happened to the Republican Party? (And What
It Means for Presidential Politics) (New York: Routledge, 2016). See also Stanley B.
Greenberg, America Ascendant (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2015).
25. Robert Draper, Do Not Ask What Good We Do (New York: Free Press, 2012), xviii.
26. Joe Biden, “Victory Speech,” Wilmington, DE, November 7, 2020, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/11/07/annotated-biden-victory-speech/.
27. Allan Smith, “McConnell Says He’s ‘100 Percent’ Focused on ‘Stopping’ Biden’s
Administration,” NBC News, May 5, 2021. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/
joe-biden/mcconnell-says-he-s-100-percent-focused-stopping-biden-s-n1266443.
204 Notes to Chapter 6

Chapter 6
1. Louis Nelson, “Trump Assails Former Miss Universe and Clinton in Early Morn-
ing Tweet Blitz,” Politico, September 30, 2016, http://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/
trump-alicia-machado-clinton-tweet-attack-228940.
2. Maggie Haberman, Ashley Parker, Jeremy W. Peters, and Michael Barbaro, “Inside
Donald Trump’s Last Stand: An Anxious Nominee Seeks Assurance,” New York Times,
November 6, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/07/us/politics/donald-trump
-presidential-race.html?_r=0.
3. Chuck Raasch, “Political Parties Deploy Web Erratically, Study Says,” Gannett
News Service, April 11, 2002.
4. Raasch, “Political Parties Deploy Web Erratically.”
5. Governor Howard Dean, Remarks, Democratic National Committee Win-
ter Meeting, Washington, DC, February 21, 2003. https://p2004.org/dnc0203/
dean022103spt.html. Accessed January 15, 2022.
6. Joe Trippi, The Revolution Will Not Be Televised: Democracy, the Internet, and the
Overthrow of Everything, rev. ed. (New York: Harper Paperbacks, 2008), 85–86.
7. Trippi, The Revolution Will Not Be Televised, 89.
8. Matthew R. Kerbel and Joel David Bloom, “Blog for America and Civic Involve-
ment,” Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 10, 4 (2005): 3–27.
9. Trippi, The Revolution, 141–45.
10. Matthew R. Kerbel, Netroots: Online Progressives and the Transformation of Amer-
ican Politics (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2009), 135.
11. Trippi, The Revolution, 157–79.
12. Kerbel, Netroots, 138–39.
13. Cited in Sean Quinn, “On the Road: Toledo, OH,” FiveThirtyEight, October 14,
2008. See Matthew R. Kerbel, Netroots: Online Progressives and the Transformation of
American Politics (New York: Routledge, 2009), 174.
14. Chris Bowers and Matthew Stoller, “Emergence of the Progressive Blogosphere:
A New Force in American Politics,” New Politics, August 10, 2005. http://www
.newpolitics.net/node/87?full_report=1, 15.
15. Bowers and Stoller, “Emergence of the Progressive Blogosphere.”
16. Jessica Clark and Tracy Van Slyke, Beyond the Echo Chamber: Reshaping Politics
Through Networked Progressive Media (New York: The New Press, 2010).
17. Matthew R. Kerbel and Christopher J. Bowers, Next Generation Netroots: Re-
alignment and the Rise of the Internet Left (New York: Routledge, 2016).
18. Matthew R. Kerbel, “The Dog That Didn’t Bark: Obama, Netroots Progressives,
and Healthcare Reform,” presented at the 2010 Dilemmas of Democracy Conference,
Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, March 2010.
19. See, for instance, monthly reader polls conducted by the progressive website Daily
Kos. Among community members, Biden consistently polled as an afterthought.
20. Christopher Snow Hopkins, “Twelve Tea Party Players to Watch.” National Jour-
nal, February 4, 2010.
 Notes to Chapter 7 205

21. Quint Forgey, “Trump vs. the Bushes: A Political Rivalry of It’s Time,” Politico,
December 1, 2018, https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/01/trump-bush-rivalry
-1037143.
22. Colin Campbell, Donald Trump Went on a Day-Long Assault of Jeb Bush on
the Eve of the Next All-Important Primary,” Business Insider, February 8, 2016, https://
www.businessinsider.com/donald-trump-jeb-bush-new-hampshire-primary-2016-2.
23. Alex Woodward, “’Fake News’: A Guide to Trump’s Favourite Phrase—
and the Dangers It Obscures,” Independent, October 2, 2020. See https://www
.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-election/trump-fake-news-counter
-history-b732873.html.
24. Trump, Donald (@realDonaldTrump). 2020. “The only thing more RIGGED
than the 2020 election is the FAKE NEWS SUPPRESED MEDIA.” Twitter, Decem-
ber 4, 2020, 2:55 p.m.
25. Trump, Donald (@realDonaldTrump). 2020. “Everyone is asking why the recent
presidential polls were so inaccurate when it came to me. Because they are FAKE, just
like much of the Lamestream Media!” Twitter, November 11, 2020, 6:51 p.m.
26. See Donald Trump’s Twitter archive, Factba, https://factba.se/biden/topic/
twitter. Accessed September 1, 2021.
27. “American Views 2020: Trust, Media and Democracy,” Knight Foundation, Au-
gust 4, 2020. See https://knightfoundation.org/reports/american-views-2020-trust
-media-and-democracy/.
28. “Capitol Riots: Did Trump’s Words At Rally Incite Violence?,” BBC News, Jan-
uary 13, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55640437.
29. Twitter Permanent Suspension of @realDonaldTrump, https://blog.twitter.com/
en_us/topics/company/2020/suspension.html.

Chapter 7
1. Herbert E. Alexander, Financing Politics: Money, Elections, and Political Reform,
3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984), 5–6.
2. Robert J. Dinkin, Campaigning in America: A History of Election Practices (West-
port, CT: Greenwood Press, 1989), 8.
3. Center for Responsive Politics, A Brief History of Money in Politics (Washington,
DC: Center for Responsive Politics, 1999), 3.
4. As cited in Dinkin, Campaigning in America, 13.
5. Center for Responsive Politics, A Brief History of Money in Politics, 3.
6. For more on this see Karl Rove, The Triumph of William McKinley: Why the Elec-
tion of 1896 Still Matters (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2015).
7. As cited in Center for Responsive Politics, A Brief History of Money in Politics, 3.
8. See Rove, The Triumph of William McKinley, 333.
9. Cited in Paul W. Glad, McKinley, Bryan, and the People (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee
Publisher, 1991), 168.
206 Notes to Chapter 7

10. See Glad, McKinley and the People, p. 169 and Kenneth Jost, “Campaign Finance
Debates,” CQ Researcher 20: 457–80, accessed July 7, 2010, http://library.cqpress.com/
proxycu.wrlc.org/cqresearcher/cqresre2010052800.
11. Rove, The Triumph of William McKinley, 373–74.
12. Rove, The Triumph of William McKinley, 333.
13. Rove, The Triumph of William McKinley, 338.
14. Rove, The Triumph of William McKinley, 262. For an interesting discussion of the
role of money in the 1896 election, see Keith Ian Polakoff, Political Parties in American
History (New York: Wiley, 1981), 259–66.
15. The union leader mentioned here was Samuel Gompers, founder and first presi-
dent of the American Federation of Labor; the senator was Boies Penrose. The quotation
is cited in Center for Responsive Politics, A Brief History of Money in Politics, 5. See also
George Thayer, Who Shakes the Money Tree? American Campaign Practices from 1789
to the Present (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974).
16. The study was conducted by Louise Overacker. See Frank J. Sorauf, Money in
American Elections (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman/Little Brown College Division,
1988), 16–25.
17. See https://www.opensecrets.org/2020-presidential-race/joe-biden/candidate?id
=N00001669. Accessed January 29, 2021.
18. See https://www.opensecrets.org/2020-presidential-race and https://www.open-
secrets.org/2020-presidential-race/donald-trump/candidate?id=N00023864. Accessed
January 29, 2021.
19. See Open Secrets, “Cost of Election,” https://www.opensecrets.org/elections-over-
view/cost-of-election?cycle=2020&display=T&infl=N. Accessed January 29, 2021.
20. William J. Feltus, Kenneth M. Goldstein and Matthew Dallek, Inside Campaigns:
Elections through the Eyes of Political Professionals (Washington, DC: Congressional
Quarterly Press, 2019), 134.
21. See Soo Rin Kim, “How Trump’s Team Spent Most of the $16 Billion It Raised over
Two Years,” ABC News, October 24, 2020, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trumps-
team-spent-16-billion-raised-years/story?id=73795897. Accessed January 29, 2021.
22. PACs are defined in the law as organizations that receive contributions from fifty
or more individuals and contribute money to at least ten candidates for federal office.
23. “Number of Federal PACS Increases,” Federal Election Commission, press re-
lease, March 9, 2009.
24. See https://www.fec.gov/press/resources-journalists/political-action-committees
-pacs/; https://www.fec.gov/data/committees/?committee_type=O; and https://www
.fec.gov/data/committees/. Accessed January 29, 2021.
25. See https://www.opensecrets.org/2020-presidential-race/donald-trump/candi-
date?id=N00023864. Accessed January 29, 2021.
26. See https://www.opensecrets.org/2020-presidential-race/joe-biden/candidate?id
=N00001669. Accessed January 29, 2021.
 Notes to Chapter 7 207

27. Marquette Law School, poll, September 3–11, 2019. Text of question: “Do you
favor or oppose the recent Supreme Court decisions that decided that corporations and
unions can spend unlimited amounts of money to directly support or oppose political
candidates?” Strongly favor, 3 percent; somewhat favor, 11 percent; somewhat oppose,
22 percent; strongly oppose, 53 percent; don’t know, 10 percent.
28. Pew Research Center, poll, July 27–August 2, 2020. Text of question: “Here’s a
list of activities some people do and others do not. . . . Contributed money to a candidate
running for public office or to a group working to elect a candidate.” Yes, in the past year,
20 percent; no, not in the past year, 80 percent.
29. See Kenneth Jost, “Campaign Finance Debates,” CQ Researcher 20: 457–80,
accessed July 7, 2010, https://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id
=cqresrre2010052800.
30. Under the spoils system, it was common for public employees to kick back a por-
tion of their salary to the party machine. This practice remained commonplace at the
local level.
31. Cited in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 50 at 42 (2010).
32. See Jost, “Campaign Finance Debates.”
33. The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 applied only to congressional candi-
dates. It said nothing about presidential campaigns.
34. Cited in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 50 at 27 (2010).
35. Sorauf, Money in American Elections, 26.
36. Sorauf, Money in American Elections, 26.
37. Cited in Mary W. Cohn, ed., Congressional Campaign Finance: History, Facts, and
Controversy (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1992), 42.
38. As cited in Alexander, Financing Politics, 38.
39. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
40. The Supreme Court also ruled that only the president, not Congress, could ap-
point members of the Federal Election Commission.
41. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
42. Maisel and Brewer, Parties and Elections in America, 150.
43. Ralph Nader, Crashing the Party: Taking on the Corporate Government in an Age
of Surrender (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002), 289.
44. Issue advocacy advertisements do not expressly tell voters to vote for or against
a particular candidate. Rather, they imply such a position by featuring a candidate’s
position on an important issue. Thus, an issue advocacy advertisement can say, “Can-
didate Jones supports a balanced budget amendment.” Or, “Candidate Smith opposes a
balanced budget amendment.”
45. See Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604
(1996). The Court ruled that as long as the issue advocacy advertisement did not say
the words, “elect,” “vote for,” “defeat,” or “vote against,” they were permitted. Many
believed that the Court’s decision erased the wall between issue advocacy and expressed
208 Notes to Chapter 7

advocacy (i.e., vote for candidate X) that had been constructed in several previous court
cases (including Buckley v. Valeo).
46. Quoted in Maisel and Brewer, Parties and Elections in America, 164.
47. Maisel and Brewer, Parties and Elections in America, 164.
48. See Adam Liptak, “Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades,” New
York Times, July 24, 2010, 1.
49. Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
50. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BOYcM1Z5fTs. Accessed December 22,
2016.
51. The five justices in the majority were Anthony Kennedy, John Roberts, Clarence
Thomas, Antonin Scalia, and Samuel Alito. The four dissenters were John Paul Stevens,
Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Sonya Sotomayor, and Stephen Breyer.
52. McCain-Feingold restricted television advertisements that were capable of reach-
ing fifty thousand people in the thirty-or-sixty-day period prior to a primary or a general
election. These advertisements were banned if there was “no reasonable interpretation
other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.”
53. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 50 at 37 (2010).
54. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 50 at 55.
55. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 50 at 6.
56. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 50 at 56.
57. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 50 at 57.
58. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 50 at 60.
59. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 50 at 90.
60. Adam Liptak, “Supreme Court Strikes Down Political Donation Cap,” New York
Times, April 2, 2014. See https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/us/politics/supreme
-court-ruling-on-campaign-contributions.html. Accessed September 1, 2021.
61. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. (2014). The five justices in the majority were John
Roberts, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito. The
four justices in the majority were Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Stephen Breyer, Sonya Soto-
mayor, and Elena Kagan.
62. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. (2014).
63. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. (2014).
64. Year 2000 Republican presidential candidate Steve Forbes also refused to accept
federal matching funds.
65. For more on this see Joe Trippi, “Down from the Mountain,” speech, February 9,
2004, https://archive.org/details/digidemo2004-trippi. Accessed May 21, 2017.
66. See http://www.opensecrets.org. Accessed March 18, 2010.
67. Shane Goldmacher, Ella Koeze, Rachel Shorey and Lararo Gamio, “The Two
Americas Financing the Trump and Biden Campaigns,” New York Times, October
25, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/10/25/us/politics/trump-biden
-campaign-donations.html. Accessed January 29, 2021.
 Notes to Chapter 8 209

68. See https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/rethinking-presidential-election

-campaign-fund. Accessed January 29, 2021.
69. See https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2020&disp
=O&type=P&chrt=. Accessed January 29, 2021.
70. See Maisel and Brewer, Parties and Elections in America, 188.
71. See Jane Mayer, Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the
Rise of the Radical Right (New York: Doubleday, 2016).
72. See https://www.axios.com/newsletters/axios-sneak-peek-d7bc6417-0f8a-4ea4-
b27f-4c9aa860687c.html?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_cam-
paign=newsletter_axiossneakpeek&stream=top. Accessed June 29, 2021.
73. Ellen Weintraub, “Trump’s Pick for White House Counsel Is Wrong for the
Job,” Washington Post, December 9, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
i-worked-with-trumps-pick-for-white-house-counsel-he-doesnt-care-about
-corruption/2016/12/09/76f0793c-bcac-11e6-94ac-3d324840106c_story.html. Ac-
cessed September 1, 2021.

Chapter 8
1. Harry Stevens, Daniela Santamarina, Kate Rabinowitz, Kevin Uhrmacher, and
John Muyskens, “How Members of Congress Voted on Counting the Electoral Col-
lege Vote,” Washington Post, January 7, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/
graphics/2021/politics/congress-electoral-college-count-tracker/.
2. See Thomas Kaplan and Alan Rappeport, “Republican Tax Bill Passes Senate in
51-48 Vote,” New York Times, December 19, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/19/
us/politics/tax-bill-vote-congress.html and Christina Wilkie and Jacob Pramuk, “House
Votes to Send Massive Tax Overhaul to Trump’s Desk,” CNBC, December 20, 2017.
3. Woodrow Wilson, “Inaugural Address,” Washington, DC, March 4, 1913.
For a transcript of the speech, see https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/
inaugural-address-47
4. Kaplan and Rappeport, “Republican Tax Bill Passes Senate in 51-48 Vote” and
Wilkie and Pramuk, “House Votes to Send Massive Tax Overhaul to Trump’s Desk.”
5. Woodrow Wilson, Inaugural Address, Washington, DC, March 4, 1913.
For a transcript of the speech, see https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/
inaugural-address-47
6. Stanley Kelley Jr., Interpreting Elections (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1983), 127.
7. Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency, rev. ed. (New York: New American
Library, 1962), 28.
8. Adam Cohen, Nothing to Fear: FDR’s Inner Circle and the Hundred Days That
Created Modern America (New York: Penguin Books, 2009), 40.
210 Notes to Chapter 8

9. Jonathan Alter, The Defining Moment: FDR’s Hundred Days and the Triumph of
Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 251.
10. Joe Biden, “Remarks by President Biden on the State of the Economy and the
Need for the American Rescue Plan.” Washington, DC, February 5, 2021. See https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/05/remarks-by-pres-
ident-biden-on-the-state-of-the-economy-and-the-need-for-the-american-rescue-plan/
11. Republican control of the Senate was short-circuited when Vermont senator
Jim Jeffords left the GOP to become an independent and affiliated himself with the
Democrats.
12. “Analysis on the Election from the State Perspective,” National Conference of
State Legislatures, November 14, 2016, https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Statevote/Stat-
eVote_Combined%20Presentation.pdf.
13. See John F. Hoadley, “The Emergence of Political Parties in Congress, 1789–
1803,” American Political Science Review 74 (1980): 761, 768–769.
14. Interestingly, the provision does not require that this person be an actual member
of the House, although all Speakers have been members.
15. See https://www.senate.gov/legislative/TieVotes.htm. Accessed June 28, 2021.
16. Dale Vinyard, The Presidency (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1971), 107.
17. Committee on Political Parties, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System
(New York: Rinehart, 1950).
18. Committee on Political Parties, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, 15.
19. Committee on Political Parties, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System,
92, 94, 95.
20. M. I. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Party System (New York: Macmillan,
1910), 380.
21. Woodrow Wilson, “Leaderless Government,” The Public Papers of Woodrow Wil-
son, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 1, 336–59.
22. David E. Price, Bringing Back the Parties (Washington, DC: Congressional Quar-
terly Press, 1984), 103.
23. See Michael R. Beschloss, Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1963–
1964 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 64.
24. Gerald M. Pomper, “Parliamentary Government in the United States?” The State
of the Parties: The Changing Role of Contemporary American Parties, ed. John C. Green
and Daniel M. Shea (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 260.
25. See John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde, “The Transition to Republican Rule in
the House: Implications for Theories of Congressional Politics,” Political Science Quar-
terly 112 (Winter 1997–1998), 563. In fewer than a hundred days, eight of the contract’s
ten items had been approved by the House, thanks to nearly unanimous support from
the GOP freshmen. Only two measures failed: term limits, thanks to the opposition of
Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde, and a provision prohibiting the Pentagon
from using funds for UN peacekeeping operations.
 Notes to Chapter 8 211

26. These were Henry Hyde and Thomas Bliley.

27. This was Robert Livingston of Louisiana.
28. Nicol C. Rae, Conservative Reformers: The Republican Freshmen and the Lessons
of the 104 th Congress (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1998), 69.
29. Rae, Conservative Reformers, 70–71.
30. See Kaplan and Rappeport, “Republican Tax Bill Passes Senate.”
31. See https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/115-2017/h256. Accessed February 8,
2021.
32. See http://acuratings.conservative.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2020/04/CLA
_ratingsofcongress_2019_web.pdf. Accessed February 8, 2021.
33. See https://www.socialbakers.com/statistics/twitter/profiles/detail/138203134-aoc.
Accessed February 8, 2021. Also see https://www.socialbakers.com/statistics/twitter/pro-
files/detail/15764644-speakerpelosi. Accessed February 8, 2021.
34. See John Kenneth White, “In Marjorie Taylor Greene, a Glimpse of the Future,”
The Hill, February 5, 2021.
35. Simon van Zuylen-Wood, “Marjorie Taylor Greene Isn’t Here to Legislate. She’s
Here to Livestream,” Washington Post, February 5, 2021.
36. Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, It’s Even Worse than It Was (New
York: Basic Books, 2016), xv.
37. https://www.portman.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/portman-statement
-political-future. Accessed February 8, 2021.
38. Douglas B. Harris, “The Rise of the Public Speakership,” Political Science Quar-
terly (Summer 1998), 198.
39. Randall Strahan, Leading Representatives: The Agency of Leaders in the Politics of
the U.S. House (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 142.
40. Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist 68,” in The Federalist, ed. Edward Meade Earle
(New York: Modern Library, 1937), 414.
41. Robert F. Kennedy, To Seek a Newer World (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 56.
42. See https://www.monticello.org/site/research-and-collections/i-would-rather-be-
judged-12-farmers-12-scholars-spurious-quotation. Accessed June 28, 2021.
43. Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research, poll, January 28–
February 1, 2021. Text of question: “Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the way
Congress is handling its job? Would you say you approve of the way Congress is handling
its job strongly or just somewhat? Would you say you disapprove of the way Congress
is handling its job strongly or just somewhat?” Strongly approve, 7 percent; somewhat
approve, 29 percent; strongly disapprove, 25 percent; somewhat disapprove, 25 percent.
44. Monmouth Polling Institute, January 21–24, 2021. Text of question: “Do you
think it is more important for Republicans in Congress to find ways to work together
with Joe Biden or more important for them to keep Biden in check?” Find ways to
work together with Joe Biden, 71 percent; keep Biden in check, 25 percent; don’t know,
4 percent.
212 Notes to Chapter 9

Chapter 9
1. NBC News/Wall Street Journal/Telemundo, poll, September 13–16, 2020. Text of
question: “If the choice in your district had the following, would you be more likely to
vote for a Republican candidate for Congress, a Democratic candidate for Congress or
an independent third-party candidate for Congress?” Republican candidate, 20 percent;
Democratic candidate, 51 percent; independent/third-party candidate, 20 percent; not
sure, 9 percent.
2. Justin Amash, “Our Politics Is in a Death Spiral. That’s Why I’m Leaving the
GOP,” Washington Post, July 4, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
justin-amash-our-politics-is-in-a-partisan-death-spiral-thats-why-im-leaving-the-
gop/2019/07/04/afbe0480-9e3d-11e9-b27f-ed2942f73d70_story.html.
3. Karen Zraick, “Justin Amash, a Trump Critic on the Right, Leaves the GOP,”
New York Times, July 4, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/04/us/politics/jus-
tin-amash-trump.html.
4. Nicholas Fandos, “Representative Paul Mitchell Leaves Republican Party Over
Its Refusal to Accept Trump’s Loss,” New York Times, December 14, 2020, https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/12/14/us/representative-paul-mitchell-leaves-republican-par-
ty-over-its-refusal-to-accept-trumps-loss.html.
5. Richard Davis, ed., Beyond Donkeys and Elephants: Minor Political Parties in Con-
temporary American Politics (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2020), 2–3.
6. Clinton Rossiter, Parties and Politics in America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1960), 3.
7. This argument is made in John F. Bibby and L. Sandy Maisel, Two Parties—Or
More? The American Party System (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 58.
8. Barack Obama became the first major party nominee not to accept federal funding
in 2008, as Obama was able to raise a total of $747.8 million for his entire campaign.
Today, the Federal Election Campaign Act is essentially null and void, as neither major
party is willing to accept public funding for either the primaries or the general election.
9. Phyllis F. Field, “Masons,” in Political Parties and Elections in the United States: An
Encyclopedia, ed. L. Sandy Maisel (New York: Garland, 1991), 641–42.
10. Robert J. Spitzer, “Free-Soil Party,” in Political Parties and Elections in the United
States: An Encyclopedia, ed. L. Sandy Maisel (New York: Garland, 1991), 409–10.
11. Edward W. Chester, A Guide to Political Platforms (New York: Archon Books,
1977), 58.
12. See Elinor C. Hartshorn, “Know-Nothings,” in Political Parties and Elections
in the United States: An Encyclopedia, ed. L. Sandy Maisel (New York: Garland,
1991), 549–50.
13. See Chester, A Guide to Political Platforms, 70.
14. Earl R. Kruschke, Encyclopedia of Third Parties in the United States (Santa Bar-
bara, CA: ABC-Clio, 1991), 71.
15. Chester, A Guide to Political Platforms, 121–35.
 Notes to Chapter 9 213

16. Frederick J. Augustyn Jr., “Populists (People’s) Party,” in Political Parties and Elec-
tions in the United States: An Encyclopedia, ed. L. Sandy Maisel (New York: Garland,
1991), 849–50.
17. But in a strange twist, the Populists refused to endorse the Democratic
vice-presidential candidate, Arthur Sewall, a banker from Maine.
18. “Progressive Party Platform, 1948,” in Kirk H. Porter and Donald Brace John-
son, eds., National Party Platforms: 1840–1968 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1970), 437.
19. “Progressive Party Platform, 1948,” in Porter and Johnson, National Party Plat-
forms: 1840-1968, 439.
20. Harry S. Truman, “St Patrick’s Day Address,” New York City, March 17, 1948.
For a transcript of the speech see https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/
st-patricks-day-address-new-york-city.
21. Gallup poll, June 16–23, 1948. Text of question: “Do you think that the Henry
Wallace third party is run by Communists?”
22. Chris Moody, “Election Results Confirm House Democratic Caucus in 2011
Will Be Smaller, More Liberal,” Daily Caller, November 4, 2010.
23. For more, see https://progressives.house.gov/what-we-stand-for. Accessed Janu-
ary 30, 2021.
24. Kruschke, Encyclopedia of Third Parties in the United States, 183.
25. Thurmond’s record stood until 2010, when Lisa Murkowski won reelection to
her US Senate seat from Alaska on a write-in campaign. Murkowski had been defeated
in the Republican primary after former governor Sarah Palin endorsed Murkowski’s
challenger, Joe Miller.
26. “Ventura Leaves Reform Party,” PBS Online NewsHour, December 10, 2002.
27. Michael Waldman, Potus Speaks: Finding the Words That Defined the Clinton
Presidency (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 181.
28. See Nader, Crashing the Party, 289.
29. Jill Stein, “Acceptance Speech,” Green Party Convention, Houston, Texas, August
6, 2016. For a transcript of the speech, see https://blog.4president.org/2016/2016/08/
transcript-of-dr-jill-steins-presidential-nomination-acceptance-speech-at-green-party-
national-conve.html
30. Eric Levitz, “Sanders Suggests That Voting for a Third-Party Candidate Who
Can’t Win Probably Not Best Way to Stop Trump,” New York Magazine, July 26, 2016,
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/07/bernie-gives-supporters-red-light-on-
green-party.html. Accessed November 26, 2016.
31. Fox News, poll, October 3–6, 2016. Text of question: “If the 2016 presidential
election were held today, how would you vote if the candidates were Democrats Hillary
Clinton and Tim Kaine, Republicans Donald Trump and Mike Pence, Libertarians
Gary Johnson and Bill Weld, and Green Party candidates Jill Stein and Ajamu Baraka?
(If don’t know ask:) Well, which way do you lean?” Democrats Hillary Clinton and
Tim Kaine including leaners, 42 percent; Republicans Donald Trump and Mike Pence
214 Notes to Chapter 9

including leaners, 40 percent; Libertarians Gary Johnson and Bill Weld including lean-
ers, 7 percent; Green Party candidates Jill Stein and Ajamu Baraka including leaners,
3 percent; other (volunteered), 1 percent; wouldn’t vote (volunteered), 2 percent; don’t
know, 6 percent.
32. Jeffrey M. Jones, “Support for Third U.S. Political Party at High Point,” Gallup
poll, press release, February 15, 2021.
33. Theodore J. Lowi, “Toward a Responsible Three-Party System,” in The State of the
Parties: The Changing Role of Contemporary Party Organizations, ed. John C. Green and
Daniel J. Coffey (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011), 47.
34. See https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/11/politics/republican-officials-discuss-form-
ing-party/index.html. Accessed February 12, 2021.
35. Andrew Restuccia, “Trump Has Discussed Starting a New Political Party,” Wall
Street Journal, January 19, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/trump-impeachment
-biden-inauguration/card/90pPMzFPqr5fMzg1Bkbs. Accessed January 30, 2021.

Conclusion
1. Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Inaugural Address,” Washington, DC, March 4, 1933.
For a transcript of the speech, see https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/
inaugural-address-8.
2. For more information see Jonathan Alter, The Defining Moment: FDR’s Hundred
Days and the Triumph of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).
3. Roosevelt, “Inaugural Address.”
4. Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New
York: Basic Books, 1982), 50.
5. Lyndon B. Johnson, “Commencement Speech,” University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor, May 22, 1964. For a transcript of the speech, see https://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/documents/remarks-the-university-michigan.
6. John Kenneth White, Barack Obama’s America: How New Conceptions of Race,
Family, and Religion Ended the Reagan Era (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
2009), 42.
7. Ronald Reagan, “Inaugural Address,” Washington, DC, January 20, 1981.
For a transcript of the speech, see https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/
inaugural-address-11.
8. John Kenneth White, The New Politics of Old Values (Hanover, New Hampshire:
University Press of New England, 1990), 131.
9. ABC News/Washington Post, poll, January 11–16, 1985. Text of question: “Some
people think the government in Washington is trying to do too many things that should
be left to individuals and private businesses. Others disagree and think the government
should do more to solve our country’s problems. Which of these two views is closer to
 Notes to Conclusion 215

your own?” Many things should be left to individuals and private businesses, 57 percent;
government should do more, 38 percent; no opinion, 5 percent.
10. Bill Clinton, “State of the Union Address,” Washington, DC, January 23,
1996. For a transcript of the speech, see https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/
address-before-joint-session-the-congress-the-state-the-union-10.
11. “In Their Own Words: Obama on Reagan,” see https://archive.nytimes.com/
www.nytimes.com/ref/us/politics/21seelye-text.html. Accessed February 21, 2021.
12. Republican National Committee, “Growth and Opportunity Project,” See
https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/624293/republican-national-committees
-growth-and.pdf. Accessed September 1, 2021.
13. Adam Liptak, “Supreme Court Invalidates Key Part of Voting Rights Act,” New
York Times, June 25, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/us/supreme-court
-ruling.html.
14. Ari Berman, “GOP Senators Representing a Minority of Americans Are Pre-
venting a Fair Impeachment Trial,” Mother Jones, January 22, 2020, https://www.
motherjones.com/politics/2020/01/gop-senators-representing-a-minority-of-ameri-
cans-are-preventing-a-fair-impeachment-trial/.
15. See https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/politics/100000007655482/biden-coro-
navirus-checks-vaccinations.html. Accessed June 30, 2021.
16. See https://ballotpedia.org/Puerto_Rico_Statehood_Referendum_(2020). Ac-
cessed June 30, 2021.
17. Associated Press-NORC, poll, June 10–14, 2021. Text of approval question:
“Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the way Joe Biden is handling his job as
president? Would you say you approve of the way Joe Biden is handling his presidency
strongly or do you approve just somewhat? Would you say you disapprove of the way
Joe Biden is handling his presidency strongly or do you disapprove just somewhat? (If
don’t know/refused ask:) If you had to choose, do you lean more toward approving or
disapproving of the way Joe Biden is handling his job as president?” Strongly approve,
26 percent; somewhat approve, 29 percent; do not lean either way, 1 percent; lean to-
ward disapproving, 1 percent; somewhat disapprove, 14 percent; strongly disapprove,
29 percent. Text of coronavirus question: “Overall, do you approve of the way Joe Biden
is handling the coronavirus pandemic?” Approve, 68 percent; disapprove, 31 percent;
skipped/refused, 1 percent.
18. Tim Malloy and Doug Schwartz, Quinnipiac University poll, February 3, 2021,
https://poll.qu.edu/images/polling/us/us02032021_uszn68.pdf. Accessed February 19,
2021.
19. Politico/Harvard Public Health poll, December 15–20, 2020. Text of question:
“Here are some things being discussed as possible priorities for President-Elect Joe Biden
and the new Congress. For each one, please tell me whether or not you think it should
be an extremely important priority. How about keeping the Affordable Care Act, also
known as the ACA or Obamacare, and making improvements in it? Should that be an
216 Notes to Conclusion

extremely important priority or not?” Extremely important priority, 68 percent; not an

extremely important priority, 30 percent; don’t know/refused, 2 percent.
20. NPR/PBS News Hour Marist poll, April 7–13, 2021. Text of question: “President
Joe Biden announced his American Jobs Plan, a $2.3 trillion plan intended to address
infrastructure, climate change, and job creation. From what you’ve read or heard, do you
support or oppose this plan?” Support, 56 percent; oppose, 34 percent; heard of it and
unsure, 4 percent; have not heard about it, 6 percent.
21. Mike Allen, “White House Memo: Obstruction Will Cost GOP,” Axios, Feb-
ruary 17, 2021 and https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/12/a-large-share-of-republicans-
want-trump-to-remain-head-of-the-party-cnbc-survey.html.
22. Annie Linskey, “A Look Inside Biden’s Oval Office,” Washington Post, January
21, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/20/biden-oval-office/.
23. Gallup poll, August 31–September 13, 2020. Text of question: “Some people
think the government is trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals
and businesses. Others think that government should do more to solve our country’s
problems. Which comes closer to your view?” Doing too much, 41 percent; should do
more, 54 percent; mixed (volunteered), 4 percent; no opinion, 1 percent.
24. Mike Allen, “White House Memo: Obstruction Will Cost GOP,” Axios, Feb-
ruary 17, 2021, https://www.axios.com/white-house-memo-obstruction-will-cost-gop-
6ed83850-4467-40a8-915d-4cae10d10593.html. Accessed September 1, 2021.
25. Joe Biden, “Inaugural Address,” Washington, DC, January 20, 2021. For a transcript
of the speech, see https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/inaugural-address-53.