Mendoza, Patrizia Nicole G.

| 1M

Election Law
Case Digests
1.​ Center for People Empowerment 16.​Quinto v. COMELEC
in Governance vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 189698, 22 February 2010
GR No. 189546, September 21, 17.​Abcede v. Imperial
2010 103 Phil. 136
2.​ Bagumbayan VNP vs. COMELEC 18.​Loreto-Go v. COMELEC
GR No. 222731, March 8, 2016 G.R. No. 147741, 10 May 2001
3.​ Ibrahim vs. COMELEC 19.​Ejercito v. COMELEC
GR No. 192289, January 14, 2013 G.R. No. 212398, 25 November
4.​ Jaramilla v. COMELEC 2014
GR No. 155717, October 23 2003 20.​Pilar vs. COMELEC
5.​ Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC 245 SCRA 759
G.R. No. 205720, 21 January 2015 21.​Sison v. COMELEC
6.​ Lokin v. COMELEC G.R. No. 134096, 3 March 1999
G.R. No. 193808, 26 June 2012 22.​Soliva v. COMELEC
7.​ Cagas v. COMELEC G.R. No. 141723, 20 April 2001
G.R. No. 209185, 25 October 2013 23.​Pimentel III v. COMELEC
8.​ National Press Club v. COMELEC G.R. No. 178413, 13 March 2008
207 SCRA 1 24.​Barangay Association for National
9.​ Chavez v. COMELEC Advancement and Transparency
G.R. No. 162777, 31 August 2004; (BANAT) Party-List, v. COMELEC
10.​Akbayan Youth v. COMELEC G.R. No. 177508, 7 August 2009
G.R. No. 147066, 26 March 2001 25.​Lloren v. COMELEC
11.​Asistio v. Trinidad-Pe Aguirre G.R. No. 196355, 18 September
G.R. No. 191124, 27 April 2010 2012
12.​Ututalum v. COMELEC 26.​Rosal v. COMELEC
181 SCRA 335 G.R. No. 168253, 16 March 2007;
13.​Rommel Apolinario Jalosjos v. 27.​Maliksi v. COMELEC
COMELEC G.R. No. 203302, 12 March 2013
G.R. No. 191970, 24 April 2012 28.​Orceo v. COMELEC
14.​Frivaldo v. COMELEC G.R. No. 190779, 26 March 2010
174 SCRA 245 29.​Causing v. COMELEC
15.​Penera v. COMELEC G.R. No. 199139, 9 September 2014
G.R. No. 181613, 25 November 30.​Arroyo v. Department of Justice
2009 G.R. No. 199082, 23 July 2013
Mendoza, Patrizia Nicole G. | 1M

1.​ Center for People Empowerment in Governance vs. COMELEC

GR No. 189546, September 21, 2010

Facts​
In preparation for the 2010 national and local elections, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) adopted an Automated Election System (AES) using technologies such as the
Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines. On May 26, 2009, the Center for People
Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG), a non-government organization, requested access to
the source codes of the PCOS, Consolidation/Canvassing System (CCS), and other
COMELEC-developed software, invoking Section 12 of R.A. 9369. This law requires COMELEC
to make the AES source code available for review by interested political parties and groups.
COMELEC initially granted access to the PCOS and CCS codes but withheld the Data
Capturing System (DCS) source code, arguing it was not part of the election process covered
by the law. Later, COMELEC claimed the source code was still unavailable due to pending
delivery, customization, and certification. Despite assurances of availability under a “controlled
environment,” the source code was never released before the May 2010 elections. CenPEG
filed a petition for mandamus, asserting that COMELEC failed to comply with its legal duty and
that public review remained essential even after the elections.

Issue​
Whether or not COMELEC was required to make the AES source code available for public
review.

Ruling​
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that under Section 12 of R.A. 9369, COMELEC had a clear legal
obligation to promptly make the AES source code available once the technology was selected.
The Court found COMELEC’s delay and excuses unjustified and emphasized that public access
to the source code is essential to ensure transparency and credibility in automated elections.
The Court granted the petition and directed COMELEC to immediately release the source code
to CenPEG and other interested parties for independent review.

2.​ Bagumbayan VNP vs. COMELEC

GR No. 222731, March 8, 2016

Facts​
For the 2016 National and Local Elections, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) adopted
a paper-based Automated Election System (AES) utilizing Vote-Counting Machines (VCMs).
These machines were capable of producing a Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT)—a
printed receipt showing a voter's selections, allowing them to verify whether their vote was
correctly recorded. Section 6(e), (f), and (n) of R.A. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369, mandates
that the AES must include such minimum system capabilities, including the VVPAT, to ensure
transparency, accuracy, and credibility of elections. However, COMELEC decided not to activate
the VVPAT functionality, citing concerns that printed receipts could be used for vote buying and
that it would significantly slow down the voting process. Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. and
other petitioners filed a petition for mandamus, asserting that COMELEC's refusal to implement
the VVPAT violated its legal duty to enforce the election law as written.

Issue​
Whether or not COMELEC may lawfully refuse to implement the VVPAT feature mandated
under R.A. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369.
Mendoza, Patrizia Nicole G. | 1M

Ruling​
No. COMELEC is constitutionally tasked to enforce the election laws, including the provisions
of R.A. 8436, as amended, which require the use of a VVPAT as a minimum safeguard in the
AES. The law uses the word "must," making the implementation of these system capabilities
mandatory. COMELEC cannot disregard these requirements based on policy preferences or
administrative concerns such as fear of vote buying or longer voting times. While COMELEC
has discretion in the conduct of elections, it does not have the authority to amend or disregard
statutory mandates. Instead of bypassing the VVPAT requirement, COMELEC should develop
appropriate safeguards and procedures to implement it in a way that maintains both ballot
secrecy and election integrity.

3.​ Ibrahim vs. COMELEC

GR No. 192289, January 14, 2013

Facts​
Kamarudin Ibrahim filed his certificate of candidacy to run for Vice Mayor in a municipality in
Maguindanao for the 2010 elections. Later, the Acting Election Officer, Rolan Buagas, submitted
a list to the COMELEC Law Department naming candidates allegedly not registered voters in
the area—this included Ibrahim. Acting on this, COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution dated
December 22, 2009 disqualifying Ibrahim on the ground that he was not a registered voter of the
municipality, without any formal petition or complaint having been filed. Ibrahim filed a
Petition/Opposition challenging the disqualification, but COMELEC en banc denied it on May 6,
2010, again relying on certifications by Buagas and the Acting Provincial Election Supervisor.
Despite the pending resolution, Ibrahim won the election, but his proclamation was suspended
by the Municipal Board of Canvassers chaired by Buagas. He then filed a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 64 to challenge COMELEC’s actions.

Issue​
Whether or not the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
Ibrahim without a proper petition and prior to election

Ruling​
Yes. The COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion. It has no authority to act
directly on disqualification matters without a proper complaint or petition, especially when the
case falls under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code concerning misrepresentation in the
certificate of candidacy. Jurisdiction initially lies with a division of the Commission. The en banc
may only act upon appeal. Ibrahim was not given due process, and COMELEC’s action violated
the constitutional requirement for its quasi-judicial functions to be exercised first by a division.

4.​ Jaramilla v. COMELEC

GR No. 155717, October 23 2003

Facts​
In the May 14, 2001 elections for Sangguniang Bayan members in Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur, both
petitioner Alberto Jaramilla and respondent Antonio Suyat ran for office. After the canvassing,
Jaramilla was proclaimed as the 8th winning candidate with 4,815 votes, while Suyat ranked 9th
with 4,779 votes. Later, Suyat discovered an error in the tabulation of votes for Precinct
34A1—Jaramilla was credited with 73 votes in the Statement of Votes, although the
corresponding Election Return only reflected 23 votes. This resulted in a 50-vote discrepancy in
favor of Jaramilla.
Mendoza, Patrizia Nicole G. | 1M

Suyat filed an Urgent Motion before the COMELEC en banc to correct the manifest error, which
COMELEC treated as a petition for correction. Jaramilla opposed, arguing that the petition was
filed beyond the 5-day reglementary period, lacked a certification against forum shopping, and
was not accompanied by the required docket fees. COMELEC en banc nonetheless granted the
petition, annulled Jaramilla’s proclamation, ordered the correction of the erroneous vote entry,
and directed a new proclamation that placed Suyat as the 8th winning candidate.

Issue​
Whether or not the COMELEC en banc acted within its powers and followed proper procedure
in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for correction of manifest error.

Ruling​
Yes. The COMELEC en banc validly exercised its administrative powers under the Constitution
in correcting a manifest error in the Statement of Votes. The discrepancy involved a clerical
mistake in copying figures from the Election Returns to the Statement of Votes, which did not
require the opening of ballot boxes or judicial fact-finding. Under prevailing jurisprudence, such
cases fall within COMELEC's administrative authority and need not pass through a division
before being decided en banc.

Moreover, COMELEC has the discretionary power under its Rules of Procedure to suspend the
application of its technical rules, including deadlines, certification requirements, and filing fees,
in the interest of justice and in order to uphold the true result of the election. Since Jaramilla did
not deny the tabulation error nor provide any evidence to rebut the election documents
presented, and given that the correction served to reflect the accurate vote count, the Court
affirmed COMELEC’s resolution and dismissed the petition.

5.​ Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 205720, 21 January 2015

Facts​
The Diocese of Bacolod displayed two large tarpaulins within its compound expressing
opposition to the Reproductive Health (RH) Law and categorizing senatorial candidates into
“Team Buhay” (pro-life) and “Team Patay” (pro-death) based on their stance on the law. The
tarpaulins measured 6 by 10 feet each. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued a
notice ordering the removal of these tarpaulins on the grounds that they were oversized election
propaganda, violating campaign material size limits under COMELEC regulations. Instead of
complying with the order or seeking relief from the COMELEC, the Diocese directly filed a
petition with the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the removal order and
asserting their right to freedom of expression.

Issue
Whether or not the action of the COMELEC may be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court.

Ruling​
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that direct review by the Court was proper and allowed. It
emphasized that under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a petition for certiorari can be brought
directly to the Supreme Court to address grave abuse of discretion by a government agency.
Given the importance of the constitutional right to freedom of expression at stake and the
urgency posed by the election period, the Court found it unreasonable to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies first. The Court recognized that delays or procedural requirements
Mendoza, Patrizia Nicole G. | 1M

could cause irreparable harm by chilling political speech during an election period, justifying
immediate judicial intervention to prevent potential abuse of power by the COMELEC.

6.​ Lokin v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 193808, 26 June 2012

Facts
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) received competing nominations from two factions
of the registered party-list CIBAC for the 2010 elections. One faction, led by Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva, submitted a Certificate of Nomination signed by Villanueva and the party’s
secretary-general. The opposing faction, represented by Pia B. Derla, filed another Certificate
including different nominees. COMELEC issued a resolution giving due course to both filings but
left the determination of the legitimate representatives pending. Upon review, the COMELEC
First Division found that Pia Derla’s claim as acting secretary-general was unsubstantiated and
that her Certificate was unauthorized and invalid. It thus expunged her Certificate from the
records and recognized the nominees filed by Villanueva’s faction. This decision was affirmed
by the COMELEC en banc. The petitioners, nominees under Derla’s faction, sought mandamus
relief from the Supreme Court to compel COMELEC to proclaim them as official nominees.

Issue
Whether or not the COMELEC erred in exercising its authority to determine the legitimate
nominees of a registered political party.

Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that the COMELEC properly exercised its constitutional authority
under Section 2, Article IX-C to enforce election laws, including resolving intra-party leadership
disputes necessary for registering political parties and determining their legitimate
representatives. The Court cited precedents confirming COMELEC’s jurisdiction to decide on
the identity of the political party’s officers and nominees. It held that no grave abuse of discretion
was committed since the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to prove Derla’s
authority or membership in the party. The ruling emphasized that the power to enforce and
administer all laws relative to elections includes ascertaining the lawful nominees of party-list
organizations, consistent with the Party-List System Act. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
dismissed the petition and affirmed COMELEC’s expungement of the unauthorized nomination,
recognizing Villanueva’s faction as the official nominees of CIBAC.

7.​ Cagas v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 209185, 25 October 2013

Facts
Marc Douglas Iv C. Cagas, then representative of the first legislative district of Davao del Sur,
filed House Bill No. 4451 which was enacted into Republic Act No. 10360. This law created the
new province of Davao Occidental and mandated that a plebiscite be held within 60 days from
the law’s effectivity to approve the creation of the province. The plebiscite was to be supervised
and conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). However, before the law took
effect, COMELEC had suspended all plebiscites due to preparations for the national and local
elections scheduled in May 2013. Later, COMELEC decided to hold the plebiscite for Davao
Occidental on October 28, 2013, coinciding with the Barangay Elections to save costs. Cagas
challenged this decision, arguing that COMELEC had no authority to change or delay the
plebiscite date set by law through a mere resolution, asserting that only Congress could amend
the law’s schedule.
Mendoza, Patrizia Nicole G. | 1M

Issue
Whether or not COMELEC exceeded its authority by rescheduling the plebiscite date for Davao
Occidental?

Ruling
No. The Supreme Court ruled that COMELEC acted within its jurisdiction and authority. The
Constitution grants COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws related to elections,
including plebiscites. While RA 10360 sets a timeframe for the plebiscite, the Constitution does
not fix a specific date for such votes, leaving the scheduling to COMELEC’s discretion as part of
its election management duties. This discretion allows COMELEC to adjust election schedules
when necessary, such as coordinating with other elections to optimize resources and efficiency.
Therefore, the Court upheld COMELEC’s decision to hold the plebiscite alongside the Barangay
Elections, dismissing Cagas’ petition for lack of merit.

8.​ National Press Club v. COMELEC

207 SCRA 1

Facts
Petitioners challenged Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646, arguing that it amounted to
censorship by prohibiting paid media-based political propaganda during the 1992 election
period. They asserted that this restriction singled out only election-related publications for
suppression with criminal penalties, thereby abridging freedom of speech and freedom of the
press. Petitioners emphasized the media’s vital role in providing comprehensive public
information and facilitating public opinion during elections. They contended that the limitation
would substantially reduce the volume of information available to voters by restricting campaign
materials to only those appearing in the COMELEC-allocated media time and space, effectively
limiting candidates’ ability to communicate with the electorate. COMELEC, on the other hand,
justified Section 11(b) as a constitutional exercise of its power under Article IX(C)(4) of the 1987
Constitution to regulate media use during election periods. The regulation aims to ensure equal
opportunity, time, and space for all candidates to promote fairness and prevent wealthier
candidates from monopolizing media access.

Issue
Whether or not Section 11(b) of RA No. 6646 unconstitutionally restricts freedom of speech and
freedom of the press?

Ruling
No. The Court ruled that COMELEC, under Article IX(C)(4) of the 1987 Constitution, is expressly
authorized to supervise and regulate the use of media franchises and permits during election
periods to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space among candidates. Section 11(b) applies
only during election periods and restricts the purchase and sale of paid political advertisements,
not news reporting, editorial commentaries, or journalistic expressions of opinion. The regulation
does not suppress free media coverage but addresses the need to equalize the playing field
among candidates by preventing those with greater financial resources from dominating access
to mass media. The provision also requires COMELEC to procure and fairly allocate free
“COMELEC time” and “COMELEC space” for candidates, ensuring balanced exposure. The
Court found that these limitations bear a reasonable relation to the constitutional goal of
equalizing political opportunities, and thus, Section 11(b) does not violate freedom of speech or
the press. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
Mendoza, Patrizia Nicole G. | 1M

9.​ Chavez v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 162777, 31 August 2004;

Facts
Francisco I. Chavez, a taxpayer and citizen, challenged Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 6520, which required candidates who become such after endorsing products or appearing
in advertisements to remove those materials within three days, or be presumed guilty of
premature campaigning under the Omnibus Election Code. Chavez had signed endorsement
contracts and allowed billboards displaying his image and name for various products before he
filed his candidacy for Senator. After he became a candidate, COMELEC ordered him to remove
these billboards, claiming they indirectly promoted his candidacy before the official campaign
period. Chavez sought to prevent COMELEC from enforcing this provision, arguing that it was
unconstitutional, an invalid use of police power, an ex post facto law, violated the Fair Elections
Act, and was overly broad.

Issue
Whether or not COMELEC validly exercised its power to enforce Section 32, requiring removal
of advertisements featuring candidates’ images to prevent premature campaigning.

Ruling
Yes. The Court upheld COMELEC’s authority to enforce Section 32 as a valid exercise of police
power to regulate election campaign materials. It explained that once Chavez became a
candidate, the billboards endorsing products with his image took on a partisan political
character, indirectly promoting his candidacy. COMELEC’s regulation aims to prevent premature
campaigning and ensure equal opportunity among candidates, especially to avoid giving an
undue advantage to wealthier or more popular candidates who can afford extensive media
exposure. The Court found the regulation reasonable and necessary to maintain free, orderly,
and honest elections, consistent with COMELEC’s constitutional powers to supervise and
regulate media use during elections. The provision was not an ex post facto law because the
offense was in failing to remove the materials after becoming a candidate, not in the prior
endorsement contracts. The Court also ruled that the Fair Elections Act allows COMELEC to
supervise all election propaganda, and Section 32 did not prohibit billboards outright but
regulated their use to prevent abuse. Thus, COMELEC acted within its powers to enforce the
law fairly and effectively.

10.​Akbayan Youth v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 147066, 26 March 2001

Facts
Youth groups including AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, and KOMPIL II requested the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold a two-day special registration for voters who
missed the December 27, 2000 deadline for the May 14, 2001 General Elections. They claimed
about 4 million youth were disenfranchised by the early cutoff. COMELEC denied the request
citing Section 8 of R.A. 8189, which prohibits voter registration within 120 days before a regular
election, and argued that the commission lacked sufficient time to complete other necessary
pre-election activities. The youth groups filed petitions for certiorari and mandamus seeking to
nullify the resolution and compel COMELEC to hold the special registration. The Solicitor
General recommended an additional registration to accommodate disenfranchised voters, but
the Court found no abuse of discretion by COMELEC in denying the request.

Issue
Mendoza, Patrizia Nicole G. | 1M

Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the request for a
special voter registration period after the December 27, 2000 deadline.

Ruling
No. The Court ruled that COMELEC acted within the bounds of the law, particularly Section 8 of
R.A. 8189, which prohibits registration within 120 days before a regular election. Registration is
a precondition to suffrage but must comply with procedural deadlines set by law to ensure
orderly and peaceful elections. The Court emphasized that COMELEC’s discretion in scheduling
registration cannot be controlled by mandamus, as mandamus only compels ministerial duties,
not discretionary acts. The Court further held that petitioners failed to show they were denied
registration during the lawful period and noted the principle that the law aids the vigilant, not
those who neglect their rights. The petition for special registration was denied.

11.​Asistio v. Trinidad-Pe Aguirre

G.R. No. 191124, 27 April 2010

Facts
On January 26, 2010, Enrico R. Echiverri filed a Petition for Exclusion against Luis A. Asistio
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) Branch 52 of Caloocan City, claiming that Asistio
was not a resident of the address stated in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor in the
2010 elections—123 Interior P. Zamora St., Barangay 15, Caloocan City. Echiverri alleged that
although Asistio was listed as a registered voter in Barangay 15, his actual residence was in
Barangay 17, where he was not registered to vote. The MeTC issued a Notice of Hearing, and
Asistio, through counsel, answered that his actual residence was at No. 116 P. Zamora St.,
Barangay 15, and that he mistakenly relied on the lease contract address (123 Interior P.
Zamora St.) when filing his COC. After trial on the merits, the MeTC ruled on February 5, 2010,
to remove Asistio from the list of permanent voters of Caloocan City. Asistio appealed to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), which dismissed his appeal for failure to pay the required docket
fees simultaneously with the filing of the notice of appeal, despite Asistio’s counsel purchasing
postal money orders on the same date as the appeal but tendering them the day after. Echiverri
argued that this procedural defect divested the RTC of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

Issue
Whether or not Asistio should be excluded from the permanent voters’ list for failure to meet
residency requirements under election laws.

Ruling
No. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Asistio, reversing both the MeTC decision and the RTC
order dismissing his appeal. The Court emphasized that under Section 117 of the Omnibus
Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and Section 9 of the Voters Registration Act of 1996
(RA 8189), a voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place
where the person intends to vote for at least six months. The Court clarified that "residence"
legally means domicile, which involves physical presence and the intention to remain. Domicile
is not easily lost and requires proof of actual removal, bona fide intent to abandon, and acts
consistent with such intent. Asistio’s long-standing residence in Caloocan for over 72 years, his
continuous voter registration there, and his public service as a representative and mayoral
candidate demonstrated his bona fide domicile in the city. The Court found no proof that Asistio
established residence elsewhere or abandoned Caloocan. Further, the alleged false or
non-existent address on his COC did not equate to abandonment of domicile. Regarding the
docket fees, the Court ruled that Asistio substantially complied with procedural requirements by
purchasing postal money orders on the day of filing the appeal, which was sufficient to vest
Mendoza, Patrizia Nicole G. | 1M

jurisdiction on the RTC. Consequently, Asistio’s name should remain in the permanent list of
voters of Barangay 15, Precinct 1811A, Caloocan City.

12.​Ututalum v. COMELEC
181 SCRA 335

Facts
Nurhussein A. Ututalum and Arden S. Anni were candidates for the Second District
congressional seat in Sulu during the May 30, 1987 elections. Ututalum filed written objections
to the election returns from Siasi, claiming the returns were tampered with due to a suspiciously
large number of votes for Anni compared to the registered voters. The Provincial Board of
Canvassers dismissed his objections as they were filed late. Anni was proclaimed winner and
assumed office. Separately, Lupay Loong filed a petition before COMELEC to annul the List of
Voters of Siasi because of alleged massive irregularities and statistical improbabilities.
COMELEC granted the petition, annulled the voters list, and ordered a new registration, which
was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Ututalum was not a party to the annulment petition and had
his own petitions dismissed by COMELEC. He then questioned the annulment resolution before
the Supreme Court, arguing it should affect the validity of the election returns.

Issue
Whether or not the annulment of the List of Voters constitutes a valid ground for a
pre-proclamation contest to invalidate the election returns and results.

Ruling
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the annulment of the List of Voters based on irregularities
and statistical improbabilities does not provide a basis for pre-proclamation contests.
Pre-proclamation controversies are confined to challenges against specific election returns
submitted to the Board of Canvassers and must be raised with timely verbal objections during
canvassing. Issues such as fraud, padded voter lists, or annulment of voter registration are
proper grounds for election protests filed after proclamation, not for pre-proclamation contests.
Moreover, once candidates have been proclaimed winners, pre-proclamation contests become
moot and should be dismissed. The annulment of the voters list in a separate proceeding
cannot retroactively invalidate accepted election returns without due process. The proper
remedy for challenging election results after proclamation is to file an election protest before the
appropriate forum.

13.​Rommel Apolinario Jalosjos v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 191970, 24 April 2012
Facts
Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City in 1973 and moved to Australia at age eight, where
he became an Australian citizen. In 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines, taking an
oath of allegiance and reacquiring Filipino citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225. He also
renounced his Australian citizenship. Upon return, Jalosjos lived in Barangay Veteran’s Village,
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, with his brother and acquired a residential property and a fishpond in
the province. He applied to register as a voter in Ipil, which was initially approved but contested
by the local Barangay Captain, Dan Erasmo, Sr. Both the Municipal and Regional Trial Courts
upheld Jalosjos’ voter registration. Later, Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
governor of Zamboanga Sibugay. Erasmo opposed the COC, arguing that Jalosjos failed to
comply with the one-year residency requirement under the Local Government Code and made
material misrepresentations. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled against Jalosjos,
finding he did not prove a bona fide intention to establish domicile in Ipil and was only a
Mendoza, Patrizia Nicole G. | 1M

transient visitor at his brother’s house. COMELEC disqualified him from running for governor.
Jalosjos sought relief from the Supreme Court after winning the election.

Issue
Whether or not Jalosjos sufficiently proved his domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay to satisfy the
one-year residency requirement for a candidate for provincial governor.

Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the one-year residency requirement, which is synonymous
with domicile, requires both physical presence and intent to reside permanently. Jalosjos
demonstrated this through his physical presence in Ipil, property acquisition, voter registration,
and renunciation of Australian citizenship. The Court emphasized that domicile is not invalidated
by residing in a relative’s house rather than owning property, as ownership is not a qualification
for candidacy. The Court found that Jalosjos abandoned his former domiciles (Quezon City and
Australia) and effectively established a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay. The COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in disqualifying him for lack of residency. Consequently, the Court
set aside COMELEC’s ruling and affirmed Jalosjos’ qualification as a candidate and winner of
the gubernatorial election.

14.​Frivaldo v. COMELEC
174 SCRA 245
Facts
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon in January 1988. Soon after, the League
of Municipalities, through its president Salvador Estuye, filed a petition with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to annul Frivaldo’s election. They argued that Frivaldo was not a Filipino
citizen when he ran for office because he had been naturalized as a United States citizen in
1983 and had not formally re-acquired Philippine citizenship before the 1988 elections. Frivaldo
admitted to having become a U.S. citizen but claimed he did so only to protect himself from
persecution during Martial Law and that he returned to the Philippines after the EDSA
Revolution to help restore democracy. The Solicitor General and COMELEC maintained that
naturalization in the U.S. meant Frivaldo lost his Philippine citizenship, rendering him ineligible
to hold public office. The law requires candidates for local elective positions to be Filipino
citizens and qualified voters in the area where they run. The electorate’s vote could not override
this citizenship requirement.

Issue
Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a Filipino citizen qualified to run for and hold the office of
governor in 1988.

Ruling
No. The Court found that Frivaldo’s naturalization as a U.S. citizen resulted in the loss of his
Philippine citizenship. He failed to prove he had re-acquired his Filipino citizenship before the
election. Citizenship is a strict and indispensable qualification for public office under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, the Local Government Code, and the Constitution. The people's vote
cannot validate the candidacy of someone who lacks this essential qualification. The Court held
that allegiance to the Philippines is a constitutional requirement for public office, and Frivaldo’s
exclusive allegiance to another country disqualified him. Therefore, his proclamation and
assumption to office were null and void, and he was ordered to vacate the governorship.

15.​Penera v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 181613, 25 November 2009
Mendoza, Patrizia Nicole G. | 1M

Facts
Rosalinda A. Penera and Edgar T. Andanar were both candidates for the position of mayor in
Sta. Monica. Prior to the official campaign period, Andanar filed a petition with the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) seeking to disqualify Penera on the ground that she engaged in
premature election campaigning. Andanar alleged that before the start of the authorized
campaign period, Penera and her supporters conducted a motorcade through several
barangays, publicly announcing their candidacies, waving to the people, and distributing
candies to onlookers as a form of political activity aimed at influencing voters ahead of time.
Penera admitted that a motorcade took place but argued that it was a traditional and customary
practice in nearby areas following the filing of certificates of candidacy (COCs), and did not
constitute illegal campaigning. Despite her explanation, the COMELEC found that the conduct
amounted to premature campaigning and disqualified her from continuing as a candidate.

Issue
Whether or not Rosalinda A. Penera engaged in illegal campaigning before the official campaign
period

Ruling
Yes. The Court affirmed the COMELEC’s disqualification of Penera. Under Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code, it is unlawful for any person or party to engage in election campaign or
partisan political activity except during the designated campaign period. The law is explicit in
prohibiting any political activity designed to influence voters before the campaign period begins.
Evidence presented included testimonies and affidavits describing the motorcade’s passage
through multiple barangays, the waving and greeting of supporters, and the throwing of candies
to the public, all clear manifestations of electioneering. Penera’s own admission that she
participated in the motorcade further confirmed the violation. Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code prescribes the penalty of disqualification from candidacy or from holding office for any
candidate found guilty of premature campaigning. The Court emphasized that allowing such
conduct to go unchecked would undermine the integrity of the electoral process. Hence,
Penera’s disqualification was proper and justified to uphold the rules governing fair and orderly
elections.

16.​Quinto v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 189698, 22 February 2010

Facts
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 8678, which includes
guidelines on filing Certificates of Candidacy (CoCs) for the 2010 national and local elections.
Under Section 4(a) of this resolution, any person holding a public appointive office is considered
automatically resigned from their position once they file their CoC. This rule does not apply to
those holding elective offices, who may file their CoCs without being deemed resigned.
Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., both government appointees
intending to run for elective positions, challenged this rule. They argued that it unfairly forces
appointive officials to resign while allowing elective officials to keep their posts. They also
claimed that provisions in Republic Act No. 9369, the law underpinning the resolution, contain
conflicting statements that should be reconciled to avoid automatic resignation upon filing a
CoC.

Issue
Mendoza, Patrizia Nicole G. | 1M

Whether or not appointive officials should be automatically considered resigned when they file
their Certificates of Candidacy, while elective officials are allowed to retain their positions.

Ruling
Yes. The Court initially ruled that the automatic resignation of appointive officials was
unconstitutional because it discriminated against them unfairly compared to elective officials.
Both types of officials can influence elections, so treating them differently was not justified.
However, after reconsideration, the Court reversed its earlier ruling. It reasoned that elected
officials are chosen by voters for a fixed term, so exempting them from automatic resignation
respects the people’s will. Appointive officials, on the other hand, serve at the pleasure of their
appointing authorities and do not have the same mandate, so requiring their automatic
resignation is justified to protect the integrity and impartiality of the public service during
elections. Therefore, Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 and related provisions in
RA 9369 and the Omnibus Election Code are constitutional. This decision allows appointed
officials to retain their positions while running for elective office.

17.​Abcede v. Imperial
103 Phil. 136

Facts​
Alfredo Abcede filed his certificate of candidacy for President with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) before the 1957 election. The COMELEC summoned him and other candidates to
show cause why their certificates should be considered filed in good faith and given due course.
After a hearing, the COMELEC resolved not to give due course to Abcede’s certificate, citing
that it was not filed bona fide. The COMELEC found that Abcede previously ran for senator
twice, garnering no votes, and was associated with a fraudulent scheme banned by the
government. The COMELEC held that Abcede’s candidacy was a capricious act without
genuine intent to pursue election, thus burdening the election machinery and wasting public
funds. The COMELEC claimed discretion to reject certificates not filed in good faith, based on
administrative grounds, although the law requires it to receive and acknowledge certificates as a
ministerial duty. Abcede challenged the resolution through certiorari and mandamus, arguing the
COMELEC overstepped its authority by refusing to give due course to his candidacy despite his
compliance with procedural and constitutional qualifications.

Issue​
Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to refuse to give due course to a certificate of
candidacy on grounds that it was not filed in good faith

Ruling​
No. The COMELEC does not have discretion to refuse due course to a certificate of candidacy
that complies with the legal and constitutional qualifications and procedural requirements. The
law imposes a ministerial duty on COMELEC to receive, acknowledge, and process certificates
of candidacy without passing on the bona fides or political viability of the candidate. Determining
whether a certificate is filed in good faith or whether a candidate has a realistic chance of
winning is a matter of policy beyond COMELEC’s administrative powers and lies within the
legislative or electoral process itself. The COMELEC cannot impose additional substantive
qualifications or refuse candidacies to avoid administrative burdens or to protect election
integrity by excluding candidates on vague grounds. The qualifications for public office are fixed
by the Constitution, and COMELEC’s power is limited to administrative enforcement, not to
judging the legitimacy of candidacies. Thus, Abcede’s certificate of candidacy must be given
due course, as the COMELEC’s refusal constituted an overreach and illegal act.
Mendoza, Patrizia Nicole G. | 1M

18.​Loreto-Go v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147741, 10 May 2001

Facts​
Petitioner Catalina L. Go, incumbent representative of Leyte’s 5th District, filed certificates of
candidacy (COCs) for two positions in the 2001 elections: mayor of Baybay, Leyte on February
27, and governor of Leyte on February 28. She also attempted to file an affidavit of withdrawal
for her mayoral candidacy simultaneously with her governor COC on February 28, but the
provincial election supervisor refused to accept it, instructing her to file it instead with the
municipal election officer of Baybay. Due to the deadline at midnight and travel time between
Tacloban (provincial office) and Baybay (municipal office), petitioner faxed her withdrawal
affidavit, which was received at the Baybay election office at 12:28 a.m. on March 1, 2001, 28
minutes past the deadline. The original affidavit was filed later that day. COMELEC declared
petitioner disqualified from running for both positions because the withdrawal was filed late and
both COCs were considered still effective past the deadline.

Issue​
Whether or not petitioner’s withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor was valid despite
being filed past the deadline and with a different election office.

Ruling​
Yes. The Court ruled that petitioner’s withdrawal was valid and effective despite the late filing
past the midnight deadline and the filing with the municipal election officer instead of the
provincial supervisor. Under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code),
a candidate who files multiple COCs may withdraw one by submitting a sworn declaration
before the deadline. The law does not require the withdrawal affidavit to be filed specifically with
the same office where the candidacy was filed. The COMELEC resolution mandating withdrawal
to be filed only with the election officer where the original COC was filed is directory and not
mandatory or jurisdictional. The substantial compliance through timely fax filing shortly after
midnight was accepted. Thus, the withdrawal was effective, rendering petitioner eligible to run
only for governor. The COMELEC resolution disqualifying her for both positions was annulled for
lack of legal basis.

19.​Ejercito v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 212398, 25 November 2014

Facts​
Three days before the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections, petitioner Emilio Ramon
“E.R.” Ejercito, then the incumbent Governor of Laguna and a candidate for re-election, was the
subject of a disqualification case filed by his rival, Edgar San Luis. San Luis alleged that Ejercito
committed vote-buying and overspending during the campaign period. Specifically, Ejercito
distributed "Orange Cards" that allowed voters to receive medical services in government
hospitals across the province. This was considered a material inducement in violation of election
laws.

Moreover, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) found that Ejercito incurred campaign
expenses far exceeding the allowable limit under Section 100 of the Omnibus Election Code
and COMELEC Resolution No. 9615. Based on Laguna’s 1,525,522 registered voters, Ejercito
was allowed to spend only ₱4,576,566.00. However, he spent more than ₱23 million just for
television advertisements. Ejercito argued that the disqualification case was improperly filed,
Mendoza, Patrizia Nicole G. | 1M

asserting that it should have been treated as an election offense and brought before a different
forum.

Despite a pending disqualification petition, Ejercito was proclaimed the winning candidate,
securing over 549,000 votes. However, the COMELEC First Division disqualified him under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, ordered him to cease from performing his duties as
Governor, and declared the position vacant. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the ruling, and
Ejercito elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari.

Issue​
Whether or not Ejercito should be disqualified for exceeding the authorized campaign spending
limit and for using government resources to induce voters.

Ruling​
Yes. Ejercito was validly disqualified for violating campaign finance laws and engaging in acts
that amounted to vote-buying. The Supreme Court upheld the COMELEC’s findings that Ejercito
exceeded the allowable limit for campaign expenditures, and clarified that the limit includes all
expenses incurred by the candidate, his supporters, and contributors with his consent. The
Court emphasized that under Section 100 of the Omnibus Election Code, any
contribution—whether cash or in kind—made with the candidate’s consent must be counted
toward his total campaign expenditures.

The Court further ruled that Ejercito's use of the "Orange Cards" constituted vote-buying and
improper use of public resources to unduly influence voters. The acts fell within the grounds for
disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC acted within its
jurisdiction in deciding the disqualification case, which was distinct from a criminal prosecution
for election offenses. Since Ejercito was found to have committed acts of vote-buying and
campaign overspending, his proclamation could not cure the disqualification. The vacancy in the
office was properly declared, and the Vice Governor validly assumed the post pursuant to the
Local Government Code.

20.​Pilar vs. COMELEC

245 SCRA 759

Facts​
Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy (COC) on March 22, 1992, for the position of
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the Province of Isabela. However, just three days
later, on March 25, 1992, he formally withdrew his candidacy. Despite the withdrawal, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), through Resolution Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065,
imposed a fine of ₱10,000.00 against Pilar for failing to file a Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures (SOCE), as mandated under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2348.

Pilar filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that he was not required to file the SOCE since
he withdrew his candidacy and never actually participated in the election. He maintained that
the law was intended only for those who actively ran for office and either won or lost. The
COMELEC denied his motion and later dismissed his petition when raised to the En Banc (UND
No. 94-040), prompting Pilar to file a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court,
contending that he should not be penalized as he had ceased to be a candidate after the
withdrawal.
Mendoza, Patrizia Nicole G. | 1M

Issue​
Whether or not a person who withdraws their certificate of candidacy is still required to file a
Statement of Contributions and Expenditures.

Ruling​
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the obligation to file a Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures applies to “every candidate” under Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166, regardless of
whether the person pursued the candidacy to the end. The Court emphasized the legal maxim
ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus—when the law does not distinguish, courts
should not distinguish.

The law uses the term “every candidate” without qualification or exception for those who
withdrew. Moreover, Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code)
expressly provides that the filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not affect any
civil, criminal, or administrative liabilities incurred. The Supreme Court added that even a
short-lived candidacy could involve receiving contributions or incurring expenses, and thus the
filing requirement remains necessary to promote transparency and accountability. As such, Pilar
remained liable for the ₱10,000.00 fine for failing to submit the required statement, despite his
early withdrawal from the race.

21.​Sison v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 134096, 3 March 1999

Facts​
Joseph Peter S. Sison filed a petition before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
suspend the canvassing of votes and/or the proclamation of winners in Quezon City and to
declare a failure of elections. He alleged that massive and orchestrated fraud occurred after the
voting, particularly during the preparation, custody, and canvass of election returns, resulting in
a failure to elect. He cited various irregularities, including tampered and missing election returns,
unsecured ballot boxes, unauthorized persons accessing election documents, and
manufactured returns in Barangay New Era. While his petition was pending, the Quezon City
Board of Canvassers proclaimed the winners. COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of
sufficient evidence and because the grounds raised did not fall under the proper
pre-proclamation issues enumerated in Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code or the
instances for declaring a failure of elections under Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Sison
elevated the case to the Supreme Court, alleging that COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
and denied him due process.

Issue​
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition to
suspend canvassing and declare a failure of elections in Quezon City.

Ruling​
No. The Supreme Court ruled that COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The
Court held that the allegations in the petition did not meet the legal requirements under Section
6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 to justify a declaration of failure of elections. There was no
showing that elections were not held, suspended, or that the results failed to elect due to force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or analogous causes. The Court also noted that the petition
essentially raised a pre-proclamation controversy, which became moot after the proclamation of
winners. Under Republic Act No. 7166, pre-proclamation controversies are terminated once the
term of the office begins, and the proper remedies at that point would be an election protest or
Mendoza, Patrizia Nicole G. | 1M

quo warranto. Additionally, due process was not violated since Section 18 of R.A. No. 7166
allows the COMELEC to resolve pre-proclamation issues based on records and evidence
submitted by the Board of Canvassers. COMELEC acted within its discretion and in accordance
with the law, and the petition was accordingly dismissed.

22.​Soliva v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 141723, 20 April 2001

Facts​
In the May 1998 elections held in Remedios T. Romualdez (RTR), Agusan del Norte,
candidates from two opposing political groups vied for local posts—petitioners ran under the
LAKAS-NUCD party while private respondents ran under the Laban ng Makabayang Masang
Pilipino (LAMMP). After the elections, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed all LAKAS
candidates as winners. Six days later, private respondent Bacquial filed a petition with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) seeking a declaration of failure of elections. He alleged
massive electoral fraud, vote-buying, terrorism, ballot box tampering, switching and stuffing of
ballots, and unauthorized transfer of ballot boxes and counting to a multipurpose gymnasium.
Bacquial further claimed that one of petitioner Soliva's men attempted to shoot him as he was
about to vote.

The petition was later amended to include other LAMMP candidates. COMELEC granted the
petition, declared a failure of elections in RTR, nullified the proclamation of the winning
candidates, and ordered the holding of special elections. Petitioners challenged the ruling,
arguing that COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion by granting the petition without
conducting a formal hearing or requiring the presentation of witnesses and evidence. The
Solicitor General supported COMELEC, asserting that the allegations—unrefuted by
petitioners—justified the declaration of a failure of elections under existing election laws.

Issue​
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring a failure of
elections and calling for special elections in the municipality of RTR, Agusan del Norte.

Ruling​
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
declaring a failure of elections. The Court held that COMELEC, under the 1987 Constitution, the
Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), and Republic Acts Nos. 7166 and 6646
(as amended by R.A. 9369), is vested with broad and plenary authority to enforce election laws
and ensure the conduct of free, orderly, honest, and credible elections. Under Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC may declare a failure of election in three scenarios: when
the election has not been held due to force majeure, violence, fraud, or analogous causes;
when the election was suspended before the official closing hour; or when after voting,
irregularities prevent the election results from reflecting the true will of the voters.

The Court found that COMELEC's factual findings were supported by evidence, including
unrebutted affidavits and the undisputed unauthorized transfer of vote counting to a different
location without COMELEC's approval and without the presence of watchers from the opposing
party. These irregularities compromised the integrity of the electoral process. Given that the
safeguards under COMELEC Resolution No. 2971 were violated, and the will of the electorate
was not properly reflected, the declaration of failure of elections and the call for special elections
were warranted and lawful.
Mendoza, Patrizia Nicole G. | 1M

23.​Pimentel III v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 178413, 13 March 2008

Facts​
After the May 14, 2007 national elections, 11 senators were proclaimed. The last remaining
seat—12th place—was contested between Aquilino “Koko” Pimentel III and Juan Miguel Zubiri.
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC), sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBC),
created a Special Provincial Board of Canvassers (SPBOC) for Maguindanao to re-canvass
votes due to questions surrounding the authenticity and due execution of the Certificates of
Canvass (COCs) from the province. Pimentel, through his counsel, raised objections alleging
that the second Maguindanao COC submitted was spurious, tampered with, and based on
unofficial or substitute election returns. He claimed his team was denied the opportunity to
question witnesses like Provincial Election Supervisor Lintang Bedol and MBOC chairpersons,
violating his right to due process. Despite this, the SPBOC proceeded with the canvass, and
Zubiri was eventually proclaimed as the 12th winning senator and assumed office. Pimentel filed
a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Supreme Court, asking to nullify the
Maguindanao canvass and stop the proclamation. Zubiri moved for dismissal, arguing that since
he had already been proclaimed and had assumed office, the jurisdiction now lay with the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET).

Issue​
Whether or not the Supreme Court and COMELEC had jurisdiction to entertain a
pre-proclamation controversy involving a senatorial election after the candidate had been
proclaimed and assumed office.

Ruling​
No. The Supreme Court held that under Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, once a
senator has been proclaimed, taken their oath, and assumed office, any contest relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of said senator falls under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). While Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended
by Republic Act No. 9369, allows certain exceptions to the general rule prohibiting
pre-proclamation cases (such as correction of manifest errors and questions on the authenticity
and due execution of COCs), these apply only when raised before Congress or the COMELEC
en banc sitting as the NBC. Local boards of canvassers like the SPBOC-Maguindanao remain
bound by the prohibition under Sections 15 and 20 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881) and related provisions under R.A. No. 6646 and R.A. No. 7166. The Court
emphasized that the proper forum for Pimentel’s election protest was the SET. Hence, the
petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

24.​Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT)

Party-List, v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 177508, 7 August 2009

Facts​
BANAT party list challenged the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9369, which amended RA
7166 to consolidate rules on automated and manual election processes. BANAT argued that RA
9369 improperly combined multiple subjects in one bill, violating Article VI, Section 26(1) of the
Constitution that requires each bill to have only one subject expressed in its title. They also
contended that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 contained provisions unrelated to election
automation and questioned whether these sections unlawfully allowed the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) or Congress to handle pre-proclamation controversies involving national
Mendoza, Patrizia Nicole G. | 1M

elective posts. BANAT asserted that this conflicted with Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution,
which gives exclusive jurisdiction to the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals over election
contests involving their members. The petitioner feared that allowing COMELEC or Congress to
decide such cases before proclamation would infringe on the constitutional mandate of the
electoral tribunals and disrupt the integrity of election processes.

Issue​
Whether Sections 37 and 38 of RA 7166, as amended by RA 9369, unlawfully allow COMELEC
or Congress to handle pre-proclamation controversies, violating the exclusive jurisdiction of
electoral tribunals under the Constitution.

Ruling​
No. The Supreme Court ruled that Sections 37 and 38 do not violate the Constitution. The
Court explained that these provisions pertain only to the procedural aspects of handling
pre-proclamation controversies and do not grant COMELEC or Congress the power to decide
election contests involving the qualifications or returns of elected members. The exclusive
jurisdiction over such contests remains with the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals as
mandated by Article VI, Section 17. The Court reaffirmed that while COMELEC can regulate the
canvassing and proclamation process, any contest relating to the actual election results and
qualifications of members must be decided solely by the respective electoral tribunals. Thus, the
challenged sections are consistent with Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, RA 6646 as amended by RA
9369, and RA 7166, preserving the constitutional balance between election administration and
electoral dispute resolution.

25.​Lloren v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 196355, 18 September 2012

Facts​
Petitioner Bienvenido William D. Lloren and respondent Rogelio Pua, Jr. were candidates for
Vice-Mayor of Inopacan, Leyte, in the May 10, 2010 elections. Pua was proclaimed winner with
5,682 votes over petitioner’s 4,930 votes. Petitioner filed an election protest before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) alleging vote-buying, intimidation, defective PCOS machines, and election
fraud. The RTC dismissed the protest for insufficiency in form and failure to pay the required
cash deposit. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal and paid ₱1,000 appeal fee to the RTC within
the prescribed five-day period. He then paid ₱3,200 appeal fee to the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) by postal money order on the
15th day from the filing of the notice of appeal. Despite this, the COMELEC First Division
dismissed the appeal for failure to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period, relying on
Section 4, Rule 40 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which required payment within
five days from receipt of the decision. Petitioner moved for reconsideration and allegedly paid
the ₱300 motion fee by postal money order, but the COMELEC En Banc denied the motion for
reconsideration citing failure to pay the motion fee on time. Petitioner filed this certiorari petition
to annul the COMELEC orders.

Issue​
Whether or not petitioner timely perfected his appeal by paying the required appeal fees under
the applicable COMELEC rules and resolutions

Ruling​
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner timely perfected his appeal by paying the ₱1,000
appeal fee to the RTC within five days from the decision and paying the ₱3,200 appeal fee to
Mendoza, Patrizia Nicole G. | 1M

the COMELEC ECAD within fifteen days from the filing of the notice of appeal, in accordance
with COMELEC Resolution No. 8486 and the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests (A.M. No.
07-4-15-SC). The COMELEC First Division erred in dismissing the appeal based on an outdated
interpretation of Rule 40, Section 4 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules, which had been superseded
by Resolution No. 8486. The Court held that the appeal fee payment period was properly
extended to 15 days from the filing of the notice of appeal with the trial court, and petitioner
complied with this. Regarding the motion for reconsideration, the Court found the denial for
non-payment of the ₱300 motion fee arbitrary and capricious. The COMELEC could have
refused action on the motion until fees were paid or dismissed the motion if fees were ultimately
unpaid, but outright denial was not mandatory. Therefore, the orders dismissing the appeal and
denying the motion for reconsideration were null and void, and the case was remanded for
further proceedings consistent with the Court’s ruling.

26.​Rosal v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 168253, 16 March 2007;
Facts
Noel E. Rosal and Michael Victor Imperial were candidates for mayor of Legaspi City in the
2004 elections. Rosal was proclaimed the winner with 44,792 votes against Imperial’s 33,747.
Imperial filed an election protest, alleging various irregularities including vote miscounting,
substitution of votes, and disenfranchisement. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Second Division conducted a revision of the ballots from contested precincts, which significantly
reduced Rosal’s vote count and increased Imperial’s votes, narrowing the margin. Rosal
claimed that many of the revised ballots were spurious and planted after the election, and
sought to present witnesses to prove this. The COMELEC denied his motions to subpoena
these witnesses, reasoning that it had the authority to determine ballot authenticity on its own.
Eventually, the COMELEC declared Imperial the winner and ordered Rosal to vacate the
mayoralty. Rosal filed a petition with the Supreme Court, arguing that the denial to present
evidence violated his right to due process.

Issue
Whether or not petitioner was denied due process when the COMELEC prevented him from
presenting witnesses to prove the ballots were fraudulent.

Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion by
denying petitioner the opportunity to present evidence that could challenge the authenticity of
the ballots. While the ballots themselves are the best evidence in an election contest under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 and related election laws, the COMELEC’s authority to examine
ballots does not exclude the parties’ right to present relevant evidence. Preventing petitioner
from calling witnesses to support his claim effectively deprived him of a fair hearing and due
process, which are guaranteed under Republic Act No. 7166 and the amended election laws.
The Court emphasized that election contests must be resolved on the basis of competent
evidence, and that parties must be given a reasonable chance to present their case. The case
was remanded back to the COMELEC for proper proceedings consistent with these
requirements.

27.​Maliksi v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 203302, 12 March 2013
Facts
In the 2010 local elections for Mayor of Imus, Cavite, Saquilayan was proclaimed the winner by
the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Maliksi, the candidate with the second highest votes, filed
Mendoza, Patrizia Nicole G. | 1M

an election protest before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, alleging irregularities in the
counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. Upon revision of the votes, the RTC declared
Maliksi as the duly elected mayor and ordered Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing
mayoral functions. Saquilayan appealed the decision to the COMELEC First Division. During the
pendency of the appeal, the RTC granted Maliksi’s motion for execution pending appeal,
allowing Maliksi to assume office. However, without notifying the parties, the COMELEC First
Division ordered a recount based on the printouts of ballot images stored in CF cards and
required Saquilayan to deposit funds to cover the expenses of decrypting and printing the
ballots. Maliksi was not given prior notice or an opportunity to participate or object to the recount
process. The First Division also failed to issue a formal order authorizing the recount, which
deprived Maliksi of the chance to file a timely petition or motion contesting the procedure.

Issue
Whether or not the COMELEC First Division properly conducted a recount during its appellate
jurisdiction without notifying the parties and issuing a formal order.

Ruling
No. The COMELEC First Division acted beyond its jurisdiction by conducting a recount during its
appellate review. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 and related provisions in Republic Act No.
7166, as well as Sections 241 to 248 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, the authority to
conduct recounts rests with the COMELEC divisions only when exercising exclusive original
jurisdiction over election protests involving elective regional, provincial, and city officials.
Meanwhile, municipal election contests fall under the original jurisdiction of the RTC, where
revisions and recounts must be conducted with due process—meaning parties must be notified,
allowed to participate, and present objections. The procedure requires that decryption and
printing of ballot images be done during the revision or recount proceedings, overseen by a
non-partisan technical person to ensure the authenticity of the images. Conducting the recount
without informing Maliksi or issuing a formal order violated his right to due process, denying him
the opportunity to challenge the recount or seek judicial relief. Furthermore, the orders requiring
Saquilayan to post and augment cash deposits did not specify any factual basis or findings of
ballot tampering, which are essential prerequisites before printing ballot images and recounting.
The failure to observe these procedural safeguards and the lack of proper notice rendered the
recount invalid and the First Division’s actions unlawful under the governing election laws,
including Republic Act No. 6646, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369.

28.​Orceo v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 190779, 26 March 2010

Facts​
Petitioner Atty. Reynante B. Orceo challenged the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 8714,
which prohibits the bearing, carrying, or transporting of firearms and other deadly weapons
during the election period. The Resolution defined the term “firearm” to include airsoft guns and
their replicas/imitations, thus subjecting these items to the gun ban from January 10, 2010 to
June 9, 2010. Petitioner argued that airsoft guns are recreational sporting equipment that should
not be considered firearms under the law, as Republic Act No. 7166 and related laws do not
expressly include airsoft guns within the definition of firearms. He contended that the inclusion
of airsoft guns in the gun ban unlawfully criminalizes possession and use of such equipment,
thereby putting him and other airsoft enthusiasts at risk of election offenses during the ban
period. Petitioner asserted that the COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction by expanding the
definition of firearms to include airsoft guns and their replicas, which are not dangerous
weapons under existing laws. He prayed for the annulment of the Resolution insofar as it
Mendoza, Patrizia Nicole G. | 1M

covered airsoft guns, and requested that the COMELEC desist from enforcing the ban on such
items.

Issue​
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in including airsoft guns and their
replicas/imitations in the definition of "firearm" under Resolution No. 8714 for the election gun
ban.

Ruling​
Yes, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in including airsoft guns in the
term “firearm” for the purpose of the election gun ban, but the inclusion of replicas and imitations
was unwarranted. Under Republic Act No. 7166, the COMELEC is empowered to promulgate
rules and regulations to enforce the prohibition on carrying firearms during election periods,
aimed at ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. The Court upheld the
COMELEC’s discretion to broadly define “firearm” to include airsoft guns and airguns,
recognizing the practical danger of using realistic-looking recreational guns to intimidate or sow
fear among voters, which undermines the electoral process. The regulation aligns with existing
laws such as PNP Circular No. 11, which governs airsoft guns as restricted sporting devices
requiring licensing and permits for possession and transport. This classification supports the
reasonableness of including airsoft guns under the gun ban to prevent misuse during elections.
However, the Court distinguished that replicas and imitations of airsoft guns, which do not
discharge any projectiles and are not regulated by law, should not be classified as firearms for
election offense purposes. Thus, the ban on replicas and imitations was struck down. The
COMELEC’s rules, as limited by this distinction, were found to be within its lawful authority and
consistent with the goal of safeguarding the election process from intimidation or violence
caused by firearms or firearm-like weapons.

29.​Causing v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 199139, 9 September 2014
Facts
Elsie S. Causing served as the Municipal Civil Registrar (MCR) of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. During
the election period, Mayor Hernan D. Biron, Sr. issued Memorandum No. 12, Series of 2010,
ordering Causing’s physical detailing to the Office of the Municipal Mayor. Causing filed a
complaint before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) claiming that this movement
constituted an illegal personnel transfer or detail, which is prohibited during the election period
without prior COMELEC authority, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 8737, particularly Sections 5
to 6, and provisions of the Omnibus Election Code under Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Mayor
Biron contended that the purpose of the physical relocation was administrative supervision due
to complaints about Causing’s negative behavior with co-employees and the public, and that
Causing’s official position and functions remained intact. The Provincial Election Supervisor
found no probable cause to proceed with the complaint, a finding affirmed by the COMELEC En
Banc.

Issue
Whether or not physically relocating Elsie Causing’s office during the election period is a
prohibited transfer or detail under election laws

Ruling
No. The physical relocation or reassignment of Causing’s office did not constitute a prohibited
transfer or detail under the Omnibus Election Code or COMELEC regulations. The Court held
that a “transfer” under COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 involves a formal personnel movement
Mendoza, Patrizia Nicole G. | 1M

from one agency or division to another, often requiring issuance of an appointment, while a
“detail” is a temporary movement to another office without appointment but still involves
reassignment of functions. In this case, Causing was not stripped of her functions or position as
Municipal Civil Registrar; she was only required to physically report to a different office space
within the same agency. The Court emphasized that mere physical relocation without changing
official duties does not amount to transfer or detail. The ruling stressed that election offense
provisions are penal in nature and must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Since
there was no probable cause to believe that Mayor Biron committed an election offense by
ordering Causing’s physical relocation, the complaint was properly dismissed. Thus, under the
relevant provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Sections 5-6, 241-248, 261, 269), Republic
Act No. 6646 as amended, and Republic Act No. 7166, the act did not constitute an election
offense.

30.​Arroyo v. Department of Justice

G.R. No. 199082, 23 July 2013

Facts​
Following the discovery of new evidence and witnesses indicating widespread electoral fraud
and manipulation during the 2004 and 2007 national elections, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 9266 creating a joint committee with the Department of
Justice (DOJ) to conduct preliminary investigations into alleged election offenses and
anomalies. This joint committee was supported by a fact-finding team tasked with gathering
documentary and testimonial evidence. The investigation focused on electoral sabotage and
manipulation in provinces such as North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao. The joint
committee recommended preliminary investigations against several individuals, including Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo, Benjamin Abalos Sr., and Mike Arroyo, among others. The joint committee
also promulgated its own rules of procedure and referred cases for prosecution. Petitioners,
including Arroyo and Abalos, challenged the creation and operation of the joint committee,
alleging violations of constitutional principles such as the equal protection clause, due process,
separation of powers, and the independence of COMELEC.

Issue​
Whether or not the creation and operation of the joint COMELEC-DOJ committee for
investigating alleged election offenses during the 2004 and 2007 elections violate constitutional
guarantees on equal protection, due process, separation of powers, and the independence of
the COMELEC.

Ruling​
No. The Supreme Court held that the creation of the joint committee and fact-finding team was
within the powers granted to COMELEC under Article IX-C, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution
and the Omnibus Election Code, which authorize COMELEC to investigate and prosecute
election offenses and to avail itself of assistance from other government prosecuting arms like
the DOJ. The Court found that the joint committee did not create a new public office but rather
represented a collaboration between existing agencies with concurrent jurisdiction over election
offenses. The Court ruled that the equal protection clause was not violated because the
committee’s focus on the 2004 and 2007 elections was justified by the newly discovered
evidence and the nature of the offenses under investigation. Due process was observed, as the
joint committee was composed of separate bodies—a fact-finding team and a committee
responsible for investigation—with procedures that ensured fairness and impartiality. The Court
also found no violation of separation of powers since the joint committee did not usurp
legislative authority but exercised powers delegated by the Constitution and statutes. Lastly, the
Mendoza, Patrizia Nicole G. | 1M

Court maintained that COMELEC’s independence was preserved because resolutions finding
probable cause had to be approved by COMELEC, ensuring its control over the prosecution of
election offenses.

—----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Instructions: (Deadline: June 19)

1.​ Write (1) One Case Digest per 1 Long Bond paper. Try to space it out since some of the
digests are short. Try to make it look like it fits in one whole full paper.
2.​ Write my name at the TOP LEFT corner: “Mendoza, Patrizia Nicole G. |1M” for every
case digest.
3.​ Follow the format of every digest. First, in the top middle part of the paper, write the case
name, followed by the Facts, Issue, and then Ruling:

Case: Blah blah vs blah bleh

Facts:
Once upon a time…
Issue:
Whether or not…
Ruling:
Yes/ No. The Supreme Court..

4.​ Copy the Title Page. (yes including the list of cases im sorry in advance…)
5.​ Lmk what drink u would like from ZUS xDDD and if u want ur payment to be cash or
gcash hehe