276 MP 2024
276 MP 2024
NEW DELHI
Coram:
Shri Jishnu Barua, Chairperson
Shri Ramesh Babu, Member
Shri Harish Dudani, Member
And
In the matter of:
Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited,
Prakashgad, Plot No. G-9, Anant Kanekar Marg,
Bandra (E), Mumbai – 400015 …Petitioner
Vs
1. Ratnagiri Gas and Power Private Limited,
RGPPL Anjanwel, Taluka: Guhagar
District: Ratnagiri, Maharashtra-415 634
3. PFC Limited,
First floor, Urja Nidhi
1, Barakhamba Lane, Connaught Place
New Delhi - 110 001 …Respondents
Parties Present:
Shri C. S. Vaidyanathan, Senior Advocate, MSEDCL
Shri Sanjay Sen, Senior Advocate, MSEDCL
Ms. Mandakini Ghosh, Advocate, MSEDCL
Ms. Neha M. Dabral, Advocate, MSEDCL
Shri Vishal Binod, Advocate, MSEDCL
Shri Sagnik Maitra, Advocate, MSEDCL
Order in Petition No. 276/MP/2024 Page 1 of 61
Ms. Rimali Batra, Advocate, MSEDCL
Ms. Sanika Dalvi, Advocate, MSEDCL
Shri Abhishek Lalwani, Advocate, MSEDCL
Shri Ramji Srinivasan, Senior Advocate, RGPPL
Ms. Swapna Seshadri, Advocate, RGPPL
Shri Anand K. Ganesan, Advocate, RGPPL
Ms. Ritu Apurva, Advocate, RGPPL
ORDER
short ‘MSEDCL’) has filed this Petition under Section 79(1)(f) of the Electricity Act, 2003
(a) Declare that the invoices raised by the Respondent No. 1 against the Petitioner, as
more specifically set out in ANNEXURE P – 28 to this Petition, as void, non-est and
illegal;
(b) Restrain the Respondent No.1 from issuing any further invoices under the terminated
PPA dated 10.04.2007 and from uploading any further invoices on the PRAAPTI
portal, seeking payment thereof;
(c) Direct Respondents No. 2 and 3 to restore Petitioner’s short-term access and full
GNA;
(d) Restrain the Respondents from taking any coercive steps against the Petitioner in
furtherance of such impermissible, inapplicable, void, non-est and arbitrary invoices,
including by way of regulation of GNA and open access under the framework of the
LPS Rules;
(e) Pass ad-interim / interim / ex-parte order(s) in respect of the prayer (b), (c) and (d)
hereinabove; and
(f) Pass any other further order as this Hon’ble Commission may deem fit and proper in
the fact and circumstances of the case.
Background facts
2. Ratnagiri Gas and Power Private Limited (Respondent No.1 herein) is a joint
venture of NTPC Ltd, GAIL, MSEB Holding Company, ICICI, IDBI, SBI, and Canara
Bank. was established as a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to take over the assets of
Dabhol Power Project, which were owned by Dabhol Power Company Limited (in short
‘DPC’), a private company promoted and established by the erstwhile Enron Group.
The assets of DPC included a gas-based combined cycle power project with an
Power Project consisted of three Blocks, namely, Block I, Block II, and Block III, with
each of them having two Gas turbines and one Steam Turbine and a common LNG
Terminal. The Block-I of the Dabhol Power Project was established by the year 1999,
and work on Blocks-II and III and the LNG terminal was in progress in May 2001, when
its operation was closed down. Maharashtra State Electricity Board (in short ‘MSEB’)
(Supply) Act, 1948 was the beneficiary of the entire power generated from the above
project as per the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) and related agreements entered
into between DPC and MSEB. DPC and its promoter, Enron Group, ran into serious
financial and other difficulties and could not continue to operate the Dabhol Power
Project. Consequently, DPC and MSEB also went into litigation. These litigations
Government of Maharashtra and the Government of India for the project. The
operation in the Dabhol Power Project was eventually closed down in May 2001. Upon
its closure, the said Project and all its assets were placed under the control of a
Receiver appointed by the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in Suit No. 875/2002.
reviving the Dabhol Power Project, considering the huge investments made in the
project, the possibility of generating 2150 MW power from the project to meet the
shortage of electricity in the country, particularly in the State of Maharashtra and in the
larger public interest. After exploring several possibilities, it was finally decided that an
SPV would be formed with shareholdings by NTPC Limited, GAIL (India) Ltd.,
Canara Bank and the State Electricity Utility in the State of Maharashtra (MSEB
Holding Company Ltd) and vested with the task of revival of the project. The
banks and financial institutions, equity investment, etc., of the project after its takeover
by the SPV. In pursuance of the above-said decision, RGPPL was formed as an SPV
to take over the assets of Dabhol Power Project along with the generating units,
22.9.2005, the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay recorded the consent terms for the
scheme worked out and approved by the Government of India. In terms of the order
of the Hon’ble High Court and the approved financial scheme, the assets of Dabhol
Power Project, including the integrated LNG Terminal and associated infrastructure
facilities, were taken over by RGPPL from the Court Receiver on 6.10.2005, on an “as
arrangements for the sale of electricity in more than one State, with 95% of its capacity
allocated to the Petitioner, MSEDCL (the successor of MSEB), and the balance 5% as
Government of India has allocated the unallocated share of power for 3 months each
to Goa, Daman, Dadra & Nagar Haveli, and Madhya Pradesh. The generating station
has been granted Mega Power Project status by the Ministry of Power, Government
of India, on March 14, 2006. RGPPL executed a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA)
with the Petitioner on 10.4.2007, containing the terms and conditions for the supply of
to the Procurers located outside the State of Maharashtra, namely, Goa, Dadra &
Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu. The actual dates of commercial operation of the
5. In Petition No. 96/2007 filed by RGPPL, the tariff of Blocks-II and III of the
generating station was determined for the period from 1.9.2007 to 31.3.2009, vide
Commission’s order dated 4.6.2009, considering the capital cost of Rs. 351832 lakhs,
generating station for the period 2009-14 was determined by the Commission vide
order dated 18.8.2010. In the said order, the installed capacities of Blocks I to III of the
(MW)
Blocks (Units) As per Capacity from Capacity with
restructuring 1.4.2009 to effect
plan 18.5.2009 from 19.5.2009
Block – I 670 640.00
Block – II 740 663.54 663.54
Block – III 740 663.54 663.54
Total 2150 1327.08 1967.08
others, to resolve the issues arising out of the non-availability of domestic gas of the
required quantum and the reservations of the beneficiaries to allow to enter into
contracts for available alternate fuel i.e RLNG and consequences thereof and the
Commission vide order dated 30.7.2013 disposed of the said petition, holding that any
declaration of capacity by RGPPL based on RLNG as the primary fuel qualifies for the
computation of availability of the generating station for recovery of the fixed charges
after accounting for declaration of capacity on RLNG. The Commission did not
RGPPL.
7. Against this order, MSEDCL filed an appeal (Appeal No.261/2013) before the
Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (in short ‘APTEL’) on various counts. During the
liability to pay capacity charges, energy charges, and other charges under the PPA
dated 10.4.2007. During the pendency of this petition, MSEDCL vide letter dated
8.5.2014 terminated the PPA with effect from 1.4.2014, and the same was repudiated
by RGPPL vide letter dated 22.4.2014, followed by letter dated 3.6.2014. Thereafter,
by order dated 3.7.2014, the said petition (Petition No.183/MP/2013) was rejected as
not maintainable, on the ground that APTEL was seized of the issues in the appeal
“7……It is also pertinent to mention that the respondent has challenged the
Commission's order dated 30.7.2013 before the Tribunal in which the petitioner has
been impleaded as the respondent. The Tribunal while disposing of the I.A No.348/2013
(in Appeal No. 261/2013) filed by the respondent MSEDCL for stay of operation of the
order dated 30.7.2013 has observed that the question as to whether the Commission
has correctly interpreted the provisions of the PPA or not could be decided only after
hearing the parties. Thus, the Tribunal having been seized of the issue in the said
appeal, there is no reason for the petitioner to seek the intervention of the Commission
for a declaration that the respondent is liable for payment of capacity charges based on
declaration of availability as per terms of the PPA. The prayer of the petitioner is not
maintainable”
8. APTEL vide its judgment dated 22.4.2015, dismissed the Appeal No.261/2013
filed by MSEDCL, affirming the order of the Commission dated 30.7.2013, and holding
not give consent to the GSA/GTA. The relevant portion of the order is extracted below:
ORDER
“This instant appeal i.e. Appeal No. 261 of 2013 is hereby dismissed and the impugned
order dated 30th July, 2013 passed in Petition No.166/MP/2012 is hereby upheld.
Further, the appellant is under obligation to pay capacity charges to respondent No.2,
power generating company, even if the appellant does not give consent to GSA/GTA
because the appellant in place of natural gas or fuel is using R-LNG (primary fuel)”
9. The APTEL judgment dated 22.4.2015 was challenged by MSEDCL before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.4228/2015, and the Hon’ble Court disposed
“The question raised in the present appeal before this Court at this stage appears to be
academic in the absence of any coercive steps against the appellant for recovery. We,
therefore, decline to entertain this appeal at this stage. However, we give liberty to the
appellant to move this Court once again in the event it becomes so necessary.
The appeal is disposed of.”
10. Thereafter, RGPPL filed Execution Petition (E.P. No.18/2022) before the APTEL,
seeking execution of its judgment dated 22.4.2015 in Appeal No. 261/2013 (para 6
above). MSEDCL, however, filed Civil Appeal (C.A. No.1922/2023) before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court to set aside the APTEL judgment dated 22.4.2015. In this appeal,
MSEDCL raised the issue of termination of the PPA dated 10.4.2007. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court vide order dated 6.2.2023, stayed the execution proceedings (EP No.
18/2022), stating that no coercive steps shall be taken against MSEDCL in the said
petition. Consequent upon the proceedings being stayed as above, RGPPL withdrew
the execution petition, with liberty to approach later, if need be, and accordingly,
APTEL, vide its order dated 20.4.2023, dismissed the same as withdrawn. Thereafter,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide its judgment dated 9.11.2023, dismissed the Civil
Appeal (1922/2023) filed by MSEDCL and directed that the execution proceedings
filed by RGPPL before the APTEL, to be continued. The relevant portion of the order
11. Against the judgment dated 9.11.2023, MSEDCL filed Review Petition [(R.P.(c)
No. 1997/2023] before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, also claiming that the termination
of the PPA was not considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, despite attaining
finality. During the pendency of this review petition, RGPPL, in terms of the liberty
granted by APTEL and in terms of the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s direction, filed an
Execution Petition (E.P. No. 12/2023) before APTEL, seeking the execution of its
judgment dated 22.4.2015 (in Appeal No. 261/2013). However, MSEDCL filed IA
No.230/2024 before APTEL seeking stay of the execution proceedings, but, later
withdrew the same, vide order dated 11.3.2024. Thereafter, on 19.3.2024, the Hon’ble
under:
“2. Having perused the review petition, there is no error apparent on the face of the
record. No case for review under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules 2013
has been established. The review petition is, therefore, dismissed.”
proceedings in the light of the approaching trigger date for the curtailment of open
raised by RGPPL. MSEDCL also filed a Writ Petition (W.P. No. 24685/2024) before
the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay, seeking directions to set aside the invoices raised
by RGPPL and also to restrain RGPPL, from issuing fresh invoices under the allegedly
terminated PPA, and from uploading any invoices in the PRAAPTI portal. The Hon’ble
as under:
“(a) The Petitioner herein shall file their Petition before the CERC by 14th August 2024
along with an application for stay. These papers and proceedings shall also be served
on the Respondents by 14th August, 2024.
(a) The CERC is requested to take up the stay application of the Petitioner on 20th
August, 2024.
(b) In the interregnum and until 20th August, 2024, it is directed that there shall be no
reduction or withdrawal of access for sale and purchase of electricity as provided in Rule
7(c) of the said Rules. It is clarified that this will not affect the reduction. If any, that is
already triggered and /or taken place.
(c) It is clarified that the interim protection granted by us will be subject to the orders
passed by the CERC in the proposed stay application to be filed by the Petitioner. The
CERC shall decide the Petition and the application for the interim reliefs of the Petitioner
without being influenced by anything stated in this order.”
13. In the above background, MSEDCL has filed the present Petition (276/MP/2024)
seeking the relief(s) as in para 1 above, along with IA No.67/2024 (seeking urgent
(c) In the absence of a viable and approved gas source, RGPPL had incurably
failed to discharge its obligations under the PPA, and MSEDCL was left with no
other alternative but to terminate the PPA, post the expiry of the approved
GSA/GSTA. Even otherwise, Article 10.8 of the PPA also stipulates that any
failure in performance is caused by a Force Majeure event, which continues for
an uninterrupted period of 365 days, then the other party has the right to
terminate the PPA. It is pertinent to highlight that RGPPL, before this
Commission in its pleading in Petition No. 166/MP/2012, specifically stated that
its inability to achieve and maintain NAPAF since September 2011, owing to
the non-availability of domestic gas, was caused by the occurrence of the force
majeure events. Hence, by their own admission, the unavailability of fuel is a
consequence of an event of force majeure, namely, the stoppage of supply from
the KG-D6 basin. However, this Commission did not consider the issue of
admissibility of invoking the force majeure clause by RGPPL at that stage, for
the issue was rendered academic by this Commission in relation to the reliefs
sought by RGPPL in the said petition.
(e) Further, the Additional Secretary, MOP, GOI also addressed a letter dated
23.5.2014 to the Principal Secretary, Energy, Govt. of Maharashtra, inter alia
stating that RGPPL is required to repay its lenders a sum of Rs. 195 crores by
28.5.2014 in order to avoid being declared a non-performing asset (NPA), and
on this basis, requested MSEDCL to release at least Rs. 195 crores to RGPPL
before the said deadline. MSEDCL responded to the aforesaid letter dated vide
its letter dated 29.5.2014 reiterating that the PPA between RGPPL and
MSEDCL stood terminated, and that any further payment to RGPPL shall be in
contravention of the terms of such PPA and detrimental to the interests of the
consumers of MSEDCL. MSEDCL further set out the basis of its claims and
provided a detailed justification thereof in the said letter.
(ii) Pursuant to the aforesaid meeting at the PMO, a further meeting was held at
30.9.2015 in the PMO, where it was agreed between the parties, including RGPPL
and its promoter entities, that initially a PPA will be executed between the Indian
Railways and RGPPL, for a supply of 500 MW of capacity from RGPPL’s Project. It
was further emphasised in the said meeting that while immediate steps are to be
taken for the commencement of generation in respect of 500 MW, the ultimate
objective is to restart the entire Project. Agreement and consensus of all
stakeholders on such a course of action effectively confirmed and acknowledged
the understanding that the PPA between RGPPL and MSEDCL stood terminated,
as on the date of the meeting. As any further PPA for the supply of power from the
Project could not have been contractually permissible during the validity of the PPA
with MSEDCL, as 95% of the capacity of RGPPL’s Project was tied to MSEDCL.
Notably, with a view to facilitating such a revival of RGPPL’s Project, it was also
agreed in the said meeting that GoM would, in return, waive tax liability such as
CST, VAT, Entry Tax, Octroi, and also waive the liability of transmission charges/
losses recoverable from RGPPL.
(iv) Basis the aforesaid, it was clear that RGPPL had not only proceeded and acted
on the basis that the PPA with MSEDCL stood terminated, but also accepted
waivers and concessions to its benefit, which accorded purely on the basis that the
PPA stood terminated. It is stated that MSEDCL has received benefits to the tune
of Rs. 1140 crores, in respect of the said waivers and transmission charges/losses
in the amounts of approximately Rs. 342 crores. However, subsequently, acting in
a manifestly contrary and opportunistic manner, RGPPL issued a letter dated
10.5.2021 on MSEDCL raising an allegedly outstanding claim of Rs. 4458.20 crores
for the period till 31.3.2021, towards recovery of the alleged capacity charges.
k) MSEDCL duly disputed the said invoices as per the mechanism provided
under the LPS Rules. On 7.2.2024, NLDC, which is entrusted with the
responsibility of operating the national grid and also implementing the provisions
of the LPS Rules, informed MSEDCL by way of an email that, as per the
statement available in the PRAAPTI portal on 6.2.2024 (statement for trigger
date 8.2.2024), payments were due by MSEDCL. MSEDCL, without prejudice to
its rights and contentions, made the payment of Rs. 100 crores to RGPPL on
5.2.2024, under protest, to avoid the curtailment and regulation of its open
access under the LPS Rules.
n) After taking into account the benefit derived by RGPPL in the form of tax
waivers and other concessions accorded by GoM to the tune of about Rs. 1482
crores and the aforementioned payment of Rs. 500 crores by the Petitioner, there
is no amount outstanding to be paid to RGPPL for the period prior to the
termination. Further, post termination of the PPA, there cannot be any liability on
MSEDCL. In fact, MSEDCL has been constrained to make a surplus payment to
RGPPL under protest. MSEDCL reserves its rights and contentions to initiate
appropriate proceedings for the recovery of such amounts.
o) In view of the payment made by MSEDCL on 14.3.2024, T-GNA and full open
access of MSEDCL were restored temporarily. Separately, a meeting was held
on 15.3.2024 in the chairmanship of the Hon’ble Minister of Power, regarding the
issue of allegedly outstanding dues payable by MSEDCL to RGPPL. The
minutes of the aforementioned meeting were issued on 28.3.2024 vide an OM
issued by MOP. Notably, the GoM addressed the appropriate communication to
MOP, clarifying that some of the points raised by the GoM, have not been
properly recorded in the said MoM, and a correction of the minutes has been
sought. MSEDCL craves liberty to place such communication on the record, if
and when directed by this Commission, or otherwise deemed necessary.
r) RGPPL has also uploaded invoices pertaining to the period prior to 3.6.2022,
which is the date from which the provisions of the LPS Rules came into effect,
for seeking regulation of Petitioner’s open access, thereby, effectively seeking
the retrospective application of the LPS Rules, which is not contemplated in the
LPS Rules. Rule 5 of the LPS Rules provides for the treatment of any outstanding
dues up to the date of the notification of the LPS Rules, and contemplates that
such dues may be liquidated by way of equated monthly instalments. However,
Rule 5(2) states that such liquidation of past dues can be done in the manner
specified, only upon a written request from the concerned distribution licensee.
In the present case, MSEDCL has neither admitted, nor requested, nor agreed
to any liquidation of any alleged past dues of RGPPL, and hence the LPS Rules
are ipso facto inapplicable to any purported claims of RGPPL pertaining to the
period prior to the date of notification of the LPS Rules, i.e., 3.6.2022 .
t) Any other interpretation of the provisions of the LPS Rules, would result in a
manifestly unjust, arbitrary and anomalous outcome, namely, that any generating
company may issue any illegal invoice on a distribution company, without even
having a valid power purchase agreement with it, and upload the same on the
PRAAPTI portal, causing regulation of such distribution licensee’s open access.
It is humbly submitted that such an interpretation would be contrary to the
salutary objectives of the Electricity Act and would also be patently violative of
Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, and therefore, must be
eschewed. As stated, there is no existing PPA between MSEDCL and RGPPL,
and neither has RGPPL obtained any order from a competent court, directing the
payment of any sum of money to it.
u) Therefore, RGPPL is not entitled to seek any remedy or relief under the LPS
Rules as the provisions of the said rules are inapplicable to the present case,
especially in respect of the period prior to 3.6.2022, as the LPS Rules cannot be
applied retrospectively. However, despite the aforesaid, PFC, has effectively
permitted RGPPL to misuse the provisions of the LPS Rules, by taking into
consideration the void, illegal and non-est invoices (pertaining to the period after
PPA termination as well as invoices issued prior to applicability of LPS Rules)
uploaded by it on the PRAAPTI Portal, which has resulted in full curtailment of
MSEDCL’s open access for procuring short term power from bilateral contracts
or from power exchanges with effect from 17.6.2024 and 10% curtailment of the
GNA, with effect from 16.7.2024, as MSEDCL refused to accede to RGPPL’s
wrongful and unjust demands for payments of sums not due and payable by
MSEDCL.
w) The Writ Petition was urgently heard by the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay on
08.08.2024, and the Hon’ble Court, recognising the urgency involved and gravity
of the prejudice which may be caused to MSEDCL in case urgent reliefs are not
granted, directed status quo, in respect of the regulation of MSEDCL’s access to
be maintained until 20.8.2024. The High Court of Bombay further directed
MSEDCL to file the present Petition before this Commission and requested this
Commission to take up the Petitioner’s application for grant of interim relief on
20.8. 2024. The present Petition is in compliance with the aforesaid directions of
the Hon’ble High Court.
dd) The inclusion of Article 10.8 in the PPA leaves no doubt that the parties
intended to have a long stop date for any disruption in performance of the PPA,
after which the other party shall be permitted to terminate the PPA. Such an
article is critical to ensure that MSEDCL is not stuck with a stalled/non-performing
ee) Pertinently, the termination of the PPA was in the public interest, as the
continuation of the said PPA, as a significant quantum of MSEDCL’s power
procurement was blocked by an unreliable generator, which was unable to
supply power to it, thereby significantly affecting MSEDCL’s ability to maintain
reliable supply to electricity to crores of its consumers across the state. MSEDCL
cannot be saddled with any liability towards the capacity charges at least from
1.4.2014 onwards, particularly considering that there was no valid contract
existing between the parties from 1.4.2014 onwards. As such, RGPPL also does
not have any legal basis to unilaterally seek the scheduling of power from the
Petitioner and claim payment of tariff, when the PPA itself stands terminated.
The invoices raised on MSEDCL by RGPPL for the period after the termination
of the PPA are void, bogus, misconceived, and have no legal basis.
gg) The issue pertaining to the termination of the PPA did not form the subject
matter of dispute before this Commission, as it was terminated by MSEDCL,
subsequent to the culmination of proceedings before this Commission.
Therefore, this Commission had no occasion to consider and take into account
the aspect of termination of the PPA, and hence, the order passed by this
Commission has to be necessarily construed in the said context. In its judgement
dated 22.4.2015 in Appeal No. 261/2013, even the APTEL merely confirmed the
hh) Similarly, even the Hon’ble Supreme Court, by way of its judgement dated
9.11.2023, restricted its findings to the interpretation of the contractual provisions
and did not opine on the quantum or period for which capacity charges are
payable. It is evident there has not been any determination or finding with respect
to the quantum of capacity charges payable or the period for which it is applicable
and hence to infer or deduce such determination from the chain of actions taken
by RGPPL, as narrated above, is completely erroneous and contrary to the
settled legal principles. In such a scenario, it is impermissible for RGPPL to raise
arbitrary, wrongful, and self-serving invoices and upload the same on the
PRAAPTI portal, as if they have the force of law, and seek payment as well as
coercive action against MSEDCL.
Re: Validity of RGPPL’s claims for the period prior to the termination of the
PPA
ii) RGPPL’s purported claim of approximately Rs. 1400 crore for the period prior
to termination of the PPA is also grossly inflated and illegal. RGPPL had itself
admittedly and indisputably agreed to keep its claims pertaining to 2013-14 and
2014-15 in abeyance in accordance with the PMO MoM, in lieu of which it
benefitted from various concessions and waivers from the GoM. After deriving
the aforesaid benefits, based on the understanding, as set out in the PMO MoM,
RGPPL ought not to be permitted to resile from its promise, and claim the
recovery of amounts due for 2013-14, including any LPS. In any event, there is
no basis for RGPPL to claim any LPS for the past period, after having agreed to
keep the said claims in abeyance. The entire purpose of keeping the claims in
abeyance will stand negated if RGPPL is permitted to claim LPS for the said
period.
jj) After taking into account the benefit derived by RGPPL in the form of tax
waivers and other concessions accorded by GoM to the tune of about Rs. 1482
crores and the aforementioned payment of Rs. 500 crores by the Petitioner, there
is no amount outstanding to be paid to RGPPL for the period prior to termination.
In any event, without prejudice to the fact that RGPPL has enjoyed the benefit of
Rs. 1482 crore and MSEDCL was compelled to make further payment of Rs.500
crore, the payment of any claim prior to termination has to be made only after
reconciliation thereof, between the parties and subject to production of
appropriate documentary evidence. RGPPL’s attempts to enforce such wrongful
claims by misusing the mechanism provided under the LPS Rules are patently
illegal and self-serving, and ought to be disallowed by this Commission, in the
Order in Petition No. 276/MP/2024 Page 22 of 61
interest of justice. Moreover, MSEDCL has not purchased any power from
RGPPL after the termination of the PPA. Payment of such an undue amount to
RGPPL will not only result in unjust and undue commercial gain to RGPPL, but
also be tantamount to unjust enrichment by RGPPL at the cost of consumers of
MSEDCL.
ll) Further, as aforesaid, RGPPL is not entitled to seek any remedy or relief under
the LPS Rules, as the provisions of the said rules are inapplicable to the present
case, by virtue of there being no valid power purchase agreement between the
parties. Further, RGPPL cannot seek any remedy under the LPS Rules in respect
of the period prior to the date of notification of the LPS Rules, as the LPS Rules
cannot be applied retrospectively. Such unlawful and unjustified regulation of
open access and GNA of MSEDCL on account of RGPPL’s patently self-serving
and illegal quest for unjust enrichment is also violative of Article 21 of the
Constitution as it effectively and directs affects the rights of crores of consumers
of MSEDCL in the state, to have reliable and adequate supply of power.
vide its order dated 30.9.2024, disposed of the IA, holding as under:
“26. Considering the fact that neither the test of balance of inconvenience nor that of
irreparable injury has been satisfied, MSEDCL is not entitled to the grant of interim reliefs
as sought by them in the IA. IA stands disposed of in terms of the above. This is however,
subject to the final decision of the Commission in the main petition.
27. It is evident from the submissions of RGPPL that a total amount recoverable from
MSEDCL is in excess of Rs. 7000 crores, out of which an amount of Rs.1400 crores
related to the period 2013-14. However, it is noticed that an amount of Rs 471 crores
was only payable by MSEDCL in terms of the invoices uploaded in the PRRAPTI portal
by RGPPL to avoid the curtailment of power. Since MSEDCL is found not entitled to the
grant of interim reliefs, as aforesaid, we direct MSEDCL to make the payment of Rs.471
crore to RGPPL within 15 days from the date of this order. Upon such payment by
Order in Petition No. 276/MP/2024 Page 23 of 61
MSEDCL, RGPPL shall withdraw such restrictions from the PRAAPTI portal. The
recovery of the balance amounts by RGPPL shall, however, await the final decision of
this Commission in the main petition. Accordingly, we direct that no further coercive /
precipitative action shall be taken by RGPPL with regard to the recovery of the balance
amounts. Having said so, we direct RGPPL to ensure that the plant remains in operation.
28. We note that RGPPL has filed Execution Petition No.12/2023 before the APTEL
seeking execution of the APTEL’s judgment dated 22.4.2015 in Appeal No. 261/2013,
and the same is pending consideration. Needless to say, the decision of the
Commission, in this order, shall abide by the decision of APTEL in the said execution
proceedings.
29. IA 67/2024 stands disposed of accordingly…”.
Conduct of MSEDCL
(a) The conduct of MSEDCL itself should disentitle it from any relief. After having
raised the issue in its Civil Appeal which was dismissed vide judgement dated
9.11.2023 as well as in its Review Petition No. 1997/2023 which was also
dismissed by order dated 19.3.2024, MSEDCL raised the aspect of a unilateral,
illegal termination made by it vide its letter dated 8.5.2014 as a defence to the E
P No. 12/2023. MSEDCL argued this in detail and waited for the conclusion of
arguments, i.e., on 31.7.2024, to see the reaction of APTEL to such a contention.
(b) The regulation of the STOA of MSEDCL began on 17.6.2024. Since the
trigger date was approaching, MSEDCL filed applications seeking a direction to
RGPPL not to take any coercive steps with regard to the PRAAPTI portal. After
several failed attempts to get any order during the hearing and after the final
hearing before the APTEL on 30.7.2024, MSEDCL filed Writ Petition (Civil) No.
(L) 24685/2024 before the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay, without even filing a
formal petition before invoking the Writ jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Court. At the
hearing before the Hon’ble High Court on 8.8.2024, MSEDCL realised that the
bench of this Commission is available to invoke its adjudicatory remedies and
sought protection till the I.A. could be listed. The Hon’ble High Court directed
MSEDCL to file its petition by 14.8.2024 with a further direction to this
Commission to hear the I.A. on 20.8.2024. On 20.08.2024, this Commission
heard the I.A for stay (in I.A No. 67 of 2024), filed by MSEDCL and reserved it
for orders and vide order dated 30.9.2024, this Commission passed an interim
order.
Re: PPA stands terminated, and such termination has attained finality
(e) The contention of MSEDCL that the PPA stood terminated from the said date
in terms of its communication dated 8.5.2014, and as such, any invoice raised
by RGPPL or claims made for the further period thereafter are without any legal
backing, are wrong, and denied. It is MSEDCL, that is re-agitating the issue of
alleged termination of the PPA, without any legal or contractual backing. A
perusal of the MSEDCL letter dated 8.5.2014, on which the declaration is sought,
gives the reason for termination as the incorrect interpretation of Articles 4.3 and
5.9 of the PPA by RGPPL. However, since the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its
judgment dated 9.11.2023, has conclusively held that RGPPL’s interpretation is
correct, there can be no question of accepting a termination by MSEDCL on the
very same grounds. MSEDCL cannot be permitted to rely on a letter of
termination, which is against the ratio decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
(f) There is no provision in the PPA enabling either of the parties to terminate
the PPA unilaterally. MSEDCL had raised this ground in its civil appeal before
the Hon’ble Supreme Court (paras MM and NN), and the said civil appeal was
dismissed, confirming the judgment of APTEL and the order of this Commission.
MSEDCL sought to review the said judgment by filing a Review Petition, and one
of the grounds taken is with regard to the issue of the alleged termination not
Order in Petition No. 276/MP/2024 Page 25 of 61
being decided. Vide order dated 19.3.2024, the Review Petition was dismissed
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In these circumstances, to raise the issue of
alleged termination once again in the present petition will amount to rearguing
the grounds that it raised in the civil appeal and the review petition before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Court cannot be understood to have left
the question of termination open, especially when the review petition was
dismissed on merits, after perusal of the grounds taken.
(g) Even otherwise, the ground of termination is without merit for the following
reasons (i) The PPA between the parties is valid for a period of 25 years from
COD of the last generating unit, i.e, till 18.5.2034 (ii) There is no provision in the
PPA for an early termination and both the parties are bound to perform the PPA
till 18.5.2034 (iii) the purported termination attempted by MSEDCL vide letter
dated 8.5.2014 was immediately repudiated by RGPPL vide letter dated
22.5.2014 (iv) The position of RGPPL with regard to the unilateral termination as
sought by MSEDCL was conveyed in several letters including letters dated
22.5.2014, 3.6.2014, 13.4.2016, 21.6.2019, 10.5.2021, 24.11.2021 & 29.10.2022
(v) with effect from 1.4.2014, RGPPL has been faithfully declaring the availability
as per Article 4.3 of the PPA and all the schedule and energy accounting is being
maintained by WRLDC (vi) As per Section 28 of the Act as well as the PPA,
WRLDC has to accept the declaration of availability by RGPPL. It prepares the
Regional Energy Accounts, which reflect the availability declared by all
generating stations in the Western Region, including RGPPL.
(h) MSEDCL’s contention that RGPPL should have challenged the unilateral
termination is preposterous. RGPPL had promptly repudiated the termination
and continued to do so through several of its communications over the years.
RGPPL has a decree in its favour from all the courts requiring MSEDCL to make
payment of the capacity charges and also approving its interpretation of the PPA.
The bills raised are strictly in terms of this interpretation, which has also been
affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the tariff orders issued by this
Commission.
(i) MSEDCL is seeking to avoid the payment of capacity charges, relying on its
act of termination. If so, it was for MSEDCL at the relevant time to seek such a
declaration by filing appropriate proceedings before this Commission in
accordance with law. It is MSEDCL that cannot sleep over its rights and having
attempted successfully over the last several years to force RGPPL to challenge
the unilateral termination, now seeks to belatedly challenge and seek a
declaration that its termination was correct.
(j) The PPA is valid and subsisting and is being performed by RGPPL till date.
MSEDCL, on the other hand is seeking to take advantage of its own wrong, one
by engaging in a unilateral termination, two, by claiming that it is for RGPPL to
go and challenge such termination, even if indirectly done, and three, by
(k) The cause of action, if any, arose on 22.5.2014 when RGPPL repudiated the
unilateral termination of the PPA by MSEDCL. Therefore, a petition seeking a
declaration that the termination was correct could have been filed by MSEDCL
latest by 21.4.2017. Both, the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the APTEL, have now
settled that that the principles of limitation would apply in case a party seeking
adjudication of their rights under Section 79 of the Act, before this Commission
(Reliance placed on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme court in AP Power
Co-ordination Committee & ors v M/s Lanco Kondapalli Power Ltd (2016) 3 SCC
468 and N. Balakrishnan v M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123. The petition is
therefore barred by limitation.
(n) The contention of MSEDCL that RGPPL in its Petition No. 166/MP/2012 itself
claimed its inability to achieve NAPAF, caused due to the occurrence of force
majeure events, and therefore, the PPA was liable to be terminated under Article
10.8 of the PPA, is wrong and denied. RGPPL sought relaxation of NAPAF on
account of force majeure for want of domestic gas and the need to use RLNG
fuel. This Commission rejected the said prayer of RGPPL and held that any
declaration of capacity by RGPPL based on RLNG as primary fuel qualifies for
the computation of availability of the generating station for the recovery of the
fixed charges.
(o) Article 10.8 of the PPA dated 10.4.2007 provides that in the event that the
delay or failure of performance caused by a force majeure event continues for
an uninterrupted period of three hundred and sixty-five days from its occurrence
or inception, the party not claiming such force majeure event may, at any time
following the end of such 365-day period, terminate the agreement upon written
notice to the affected party. In the present case, there is no breach by RGPPL of
the PPA, which would give the right to termination in favour of MSEDCL. As per
the REA issued by WRPC for the month of July, 2016, out of the MSEDCL’s
entitlement of 17889283 units of electricity from RGPL, 531860 units were
scheduled by MSEDCL. It is clear that RGPPL was running its plant and was
ready to provide reliable power to MSEDCL throughout the different periods, but
MSEDCL has chosen not to schedule any power for reasons known only to itself.
MSEDCL cannot, therefore, state that the PPA was frustrated on account of the
inability of RGPPL to supply reliable power to MSEDCL. MSEDCL is seeking to
rely on an averment of RGPPL, which has been rejected by this Commission, to
contend that it was a force majeure event, enabling MSEDCL to terminate the
PPA. Also, MSEDCL never invoked the force majeure under Article 10.8 at any
time, and rather scheduled power from RGPPL in the month of July 2016.
(q) The contentions of MSEDCL that it cannot be saddled with any liability from
1.4.2014, since there was no valid contract, and that RGPPL had raised bogus
invoices without any basis, are wrong and denied. As shown with considerable
proof that the PA stands valid, MSEDCL is clearly liable to pay capacity charges
for the complete period when RGPPL declared power availability based on
RLNG. Except for the year 2013-14 and for the month of July, 2016 (during which
power was scheduled by MSEDCL), no energy charges have been billed by
MSEDCL for the period the power was not scheduled by them. The bills are
pertaining to fixed charges, as per the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
APTEL, and this Commission, and MSEDCL is liable to pay the same to RGPPL.
Re: Scope of the proceedings before the Commission, APTEL and the
Hon’ble Supreme Court
(r) The contention of MSEDCL that the scope of proceedings before the
Commission, APTEL and the Hon’ble Supreme Court was on the issues on
interpretation of the PPA only and did not involve the question of validity of
termination, would amount to hair splitting of the issues, which have attained
finality inter-parties, till the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
(s) A specific prayer claiming a direction to MSEDCL to pay the fixed charges
was made in Petition No.166/MP/2012 filed by RGPPL and the Commission in
paras 25 and 26, clearly holding that MSEDCL cannot disown its liability to pay
the fixed charges, when RGPPL declares capacity, based on RLNG as a primary
fuel in para 25. In para 26, the Commission directed that the fixed charges
recovery be made by RGPL, based on availability, after accounting for the
declaration of capacity by RLNG. During the pendency of Appeal No.261/2013
filed by MSEDCL, it issued a communication of purported termination on
8.5.2014, which was repudiated by RGPPL on 22.5.2014.
(t) APTEL vide judgment dated 22.4.2015 held that MSEDCL is required to pay
the capacity charges to RGPPL and that it is under an obligation to pay the
capacity charges to RGPPL, even if it does not give consent to the GSA/GTA,
for procuring the RLNG. The above are not mere declarations or principles as
being contended by MSEDCL now, but on the fixation of liability on MSEDCL to
pay the capacity charges to RGPPL so long as RGPPL declares availability
based on RLNG. The judgments of the courts are not paper decrees, but are
meant to decide the liabilities of the litigating parties before them . For MSEDCL
(u) The contention of MSEDCL with regard to there being no finding in the order,
upon the quantum of capacity charge payable, is misconceived. This issue has
already been argued by both parties in E.P No. 12/2023 and cannot be re-
agitated by MSEDCL in the present petition.
Re: Validity of RGPPL’s claim for the period prior to the termination of the
PPA
(v) The contention of MSEDCL that RGPPL’s claim for Rs 1400 crore (approx.)
for the period prior to the termination is grossly inflated and illegal. Also, the
contention that RGPPL had agreed to keep its claim for 2013-14 and 2014-15 in
abeyance in accordance with the PMO minutes of the meeting, and hence
RGPPL ought not to be permitted to resile from its promise and claim the
recovery of the amounts due for 2013-14 is denied. The meeting held by the
MOP, GOI on 17.8.2015 was only to discuss the sale of a certain amount of
electricity from the RGPPL substation to Indian Railways. One of the proposals
was to keep the issue of recovery of the outstanding amounts from MSEDCL to
RGPL in abeyance. However, there is no finding in favour of MSEDCL with
regard to the purported termination. MSEDCL is referring to the minutes
selectively, whereas there were further meetings and discussions under the
aegis of the MOP on 15.3.2024 and 23.3.2024, wherein the factual status has
been captured in detail. There is also no basis for MSEDCL to claim that the LPS
should not run on the amount of Rs 1400 crores, since the same was kept in
abeyance.
(w) The contention of MSEDCL that after taking into account the benefit derived
by RGPPL in the form of tax waivers and other concessions accorded by the
Govt pf Maharashtra to the tune of Rs 1482 crores and payment of Rs 500 crores
by MSEDCL, there is no amount pending to be paid to RGPPL for the period
prior to termination, is misleading. The concessions or exemptions granted by
the Government of Maharashtra claimed as Rs 1482 crore, are imaginary and
fictional. These have nothing to do with the present petition. MSEDCL cannot
claim that waivers for the said amounts were granted by the Government of
Maharashtra, without producing any document to show the veracity of the same
and as to how it relates to the capacity charges payable to RGPPL. No
arrangements were made with the Government of Maharashtra with RGPPL
towards receiving waivers or concessions, in lieu of the capacity charge
payments to be made by MSEDCL.
(x) It is incorrect on the part of MSEDCL to claim that RGPPL is not entitled to
any fixed charges prior to the alleged termination of the PPA. There can be no
bifurcation of the claims as alleged by MSEDCL towards pre and post, purported
(c) LPS Rules have been framed by the MOP, GOI, under Section 176 of the
Electricity Act and apply not just to RGPPL, but to all entities involved in the
Order in Petition No. 276/MP/2024 Page 31 of 61
electricity sector. MSEDCL has no difficulty in paying over Rs 22000 crores to
private generators, as a change in law claims, but is frustrating every possible
attempt at a resolution of the pending bills of RGPPL before every forum. It is
MSEDCL that is acting in an illegal manner, and a cost should be imposed on it
for such conduct and hiding behind the curtain of public interest.
17. During the hearing, learned Senior counsel for MSEDCL pointed out that while
IA No. 99/2024 has been filed seeking to amend the petition, IA No. 100/2024 has
been filed seeking interim reliefs. He, however, submitted that since the reply has been
filed by the Respondent RGPPL, MSEDCL may be granted two weeks’ time to file its
rejoinder to the same. The learned Senior counsel for the Respondent RGPPL did not
oppose the said request of MSEDCL, but pointed out that the reliefs sought in the IAs
were not maintainable, being consequential in nature, which may arise only after a
decision in the main petition. He accordingly prayed that the Commission may dispose
of the main petition after hearing the parties. The Commission, after hearing the
learned Senior Counsels for both parties, permitted MSEDCL to file its rejoinder. In
(b) Even the relief granted by the Commission was declaratory in nature,
wherein this Commission merely laid down its interpretation of certain terms of
Order in Petition No. 276/MP/2024 Page 32 of 61
the then existing PPA. As the termination of the PPA occurred subsequent to the
filing of the appeal before APTEL, the factum of termination of the PPA by
MSEDCL was not indicated thereunder. Since the issue of termination did not
form part of the original proceedings and constituted a separate cause of action
to be agitated by RGPPL, the issue of termination was beyond the scope of the
APTEL appeal. Even the APTEL’s judgment was purely declaratory in nature,
wherein it merely confined the Commission’s interpretation of certain terms of
the then existing PPA regarding the payment of the capacity charges, without
quantifying the amounts to be paid or the period for which the amounts are
payable.
(c) As per the settled law, the scope of civil appeal was limited to the issues
raised in the original proceedings and the grounds taken before APTEL, the said
position becomes clear by a bare perusal of the questions of law and the prayer
set out in the civil appeal. No adjudication was sought, expressly or impliedly, of
the validity of the termination of the PPA by MSEDCL. Given that the civil appeal
was filed subsequent to the termination of the PPA, MSEDCL, in the interest of
justice, merely disclosed the factum of termination of the PPA in the civil appeal
raising the grounds MM and NN, and no prayer, qua the termination of the PPA
was made by MSEDCL. Even the Hon’ble Supreme Court merely decided on the
principle of interpretation of the then existing PPA and did not opine or render
any finding on the issue of termination of the PPA, as such adjudication was
beyond the scope of the proceedings.
(d) The contention of RGPPL that a mere mentioning of the factum of termination
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court amounts to a constructive res judicata, by
virtue of Explanation V to section 11 of the CPC, is erroneous and has no
application, as the said explanation applies only in respect of the relief claimed,
and not in respect of any facts urged or the grounds taken. MSEDCL never
sought any relief whatsoever in relation to the termination of the PPA. Further,
the reference to the factum of termination and grounds raised on that basis in the
Review Petition (1997/2023) filed by MSEDCL does not constitute constructive
res judicata and the provisions of Explanation V are not attracted, even qua the
pleadings in the review petition. Moreover, the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the review petition were passed in chambers by circulation, without
expressing any opinion on the merits of the issues raised thereunder. The said
order amounted to a summary dismissal of the Review Petition, which does not
amount to a res judicata by virtue of the law settled by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court (relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Yogendra
Narayan Chowdhury v Union of India (1996)7 SCC 1.
Re: Enforcement of the PPA based on LPS Rules, without the declaratory
relief that the termination is bad in law, is not tenable.
(f) RGPPL has sought to enforce the provisions of the PPA and seek specific
performance thereof, even after it has been terminated by MSEDCL, by blatantly
misusing the provisions of the LPS Rules, 2022. RGPPL has, in no manner,
challenged the termination of the PPA before any competent court till date, and
the termination has, therefore, attained finality. As per the settled law, specific
performance of a terminated agreement cannot be sought without seeking any
declaratory relief against such termination (reliance placed on the Hon’ble
Supreme Court’s judgment in I.S.Sikandar v K.Subramani & ors (2013) 15 SCC
27. The judgment also clarifies that the onus of obtaining such declaratory relief
rests on the party that is aggrieved by the termination (and not on the party
terminating the contract). In fact, the limitation began to run qua RGPPL upon
issuance of MSECL’s termination letter, as it was RGPPL that was said to be
purportedly aggrieved by the termination. RGPPL, having not opted to challenge
the said termination, despite expressing its objections thereto, has rendered the
termination final, and any potential challenge thereto is barred by limitation.
(g) Without prejudice to the above submission that the termination of the PPA
has attained finality and its validity cannot be challenged at this stage, PPA has
been validly termination and the orders of this Commission, the judgments of the
APTEL and the Hon’ble Supreme Court, have no bearing on the issue of
termination of the PPA, being a completely separate cause of action.
Accordingly, the following is submitted:
Termination of the PPA is not vitiated by the orders passed in the original
proceedings and is also justified by continuous force majeure conditions.
(iii) The contention of RGPPL that the termination is bad in law as MSEDCL has
terminated the PPA on the same issues as decided in the orders passed in the
original proceedings is misconceived and without basis for multiple reasons.
Firstly, the termination of the PPA is a separate, subsequent event and hence a
different cause of action, which was not within the scope of the original
proceedings. As such, any orders passed in the original proceedings have no
bearing whatsoever on the issue of termination of the PPA. The basis of
termination of the PPA is entirely different from the issues raised in the original
proceedings. As is evident from the termination letter, the PPA was terminated
inter alia on account of the fact that RGPPL has failed to secure a viable long-
term gas supply agreement, the existence of which is fundamental to the
performance of its obligations under the PPA.
(iv) RGPPL’s inability to supply power under the PPA due to the unavailability of
gas is clearly evidenced by its consistent failure to meet the NAPAF norms over
the entire period of the PPA. As such, MSEDCL was entitled to terminate the
PPA as RGPPL was on constant breach of its supply obligations under the PPA,
and the said breach was further exacerbated and rendered irremediable due to
its failure to secure a viable and long-term gas supply agreement with effect from
1.4.2014. MSEDCL could not be reasonably expected to continue with a long-
term PPA of such a large contracted capacity with no visibility of the reliability of
supply.
(v) The issue involved in the original proceedings was purely and strictly limited
to RGPPL’s ability to declare capacity and claim fixed charges under Article 4.3.
As such, given that the termination did not concern the said issue, the orders
passed in the original proceedings have no application to the issue of termination
of the PPA. In addition, the termination of the PPA was also justified in
accordance with Article 10.8 of the PPA, which entitled one party to terminate
the PPA if force majeure conditions persisted beyond 365 days. Even if it is
assumed that lack of a long-term gas supply agreement and RGPPL’s consistent
and irremediable failure to meet the NAPAF norms were beyond its control and
caused due to force majeure conditions (as admitted by RGPPL itself), the said
situation, having continued much beyond a period of 365 days (and continuing
till date) entitles MSEDCL to validly terminate the PPA.
(vi) The Commission rejected RGPPL’s claim of force majeure in its order dated
30.7.2013 and had not rendered any finding on the issue of force majeure, as
the issue had become academic in the context of the reliefs sought in the said
MSEDCL had not scheduled any power from the RGPPLs project post-termination
of the PPA.
(viii) It is denied that MSEDCL has scheduled any power from RGPPL’s project
post the termination of the PPA, including in the month of July 2016, as
contended by RGPPL. WRPC has incorrectly recorded in the provisional REA
for the month of July, 2016, that MSEDCL had scheduled energy from RGPPLs’
project on 15.7.2016. The said error was pointed out to WRLDC, and after
recognizing the discrepancy, the error was rectified, and the MSEDCL’s schedule
from RGPPL’s project was revised to Zero MW for 15.7.2016. (A copy of the e-
mails issued by ERLDC along with the revised schedule on 15.7.2016 is
annexed.) Thus, no power was scheduled from RGPPL’s project post the
termination of the PPA.
MSEDCL is not liable to pay any fixed charges for the period prior to the
termination of the PPA.
(ix) The termination of the PPA was a critical event having significant legal and
contractual implications, including the direct implication of MSEDCL having no
liability to RGPPL under the PPA, post-termination. It is denied that MSEDCL
remains liable to pay Rs 1400 crore or any other sum claimed by RGPPL, for the
period prior to the termination of the PPA (2013-14). Any such liability of
MSEDCL for such period stands discharged by virtue of various concessions
granted to RGPPL by MSEDCL and the Govt. of Maharashtra, in furtherance of
the MoM held at the PM office on 17.8.2015 and the various payments to the
tune of Rs 972 crore, which MSEDCL was constrained to make to avoid
regulation of open access under the LPS Rules and in compliance of the
Commission’s order dated 30.9.2024. The said concessions were not provided
to RGPPL gratuitously.
(x) In fact, MSEDCL stands to recover a significant sum from RGPPL, being the
overpayment made to it, subject to the outcome of the present proceedings.
(xi) It is denied that any LPS is payable on any amount claimed by RGPPL for
the pre-termination period, as it was categorically decided that the GoM had
agreed to support RGPPL in the revival of its project to supply power to Indian
Railways on the clear understanding that the past claims of RGPPL shall be kept
in abeyance. From the documents on record, it is clear that both parties acted
based on this understanding. The clause to keep the claims in abeyance in the
PMO MoM will be rendered otiose and meaningless if RGPPL is permitted to
claim any LPS on such illegal claims.
RGPPL at length, the Commission reserved its order in the petition. At the request of
the learned Senior Counsels, the Commission permitted the parties to file their
respective notes of argument. In terms of this, MSEDCL filed its note of arguments
dated 15.1.2025, and RGPPL filed its written submissions dated 14.2.2025.
submissions made in the petition and in its rejoinder above, and the same is not
mentioned herein, for the sake of brevity. However, in addition, MSEDCL has
(a) As per the settled law, the principles of res-judicata have no application in
respect of the issues arising out of a subsequent cause of action. The
termination of the PPA was a subsequent event, which occurred after this
Commission passed an order in the original proceedings, and as such,
indisputably constituted a separate cause of action. Reliance placed on the
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in (i) Shamanur Sugars Ltd v
Bescom (2014 SCC Online APTEL 6), N. Suresh Nathan & ors v UOI & ors
(2010) 5 SCC 962, Mudunuri Subbaraju V State of AP (1988 SCC Online AP
23), and Thakuruddin Ramjash v S.N Mukherjee (1981 SCC Online Cal 200).
(c) RGPPL re-allocated power to the Indian Railways in 2015, thus triggering the
applicability of Article 2.2.3 of the PPA. RGPPL has, thereafter, also been
selling power on the trading exchange, which must also be accounted for in
terms of Article 2.2.3. RGPL failed to make any such adjustments in its illegal
invoices raised on MSEDCL, as was required to be done even as per the
terminated PPA. In addition, RGPPL failed to give effect to the Commission’s
order dated 8.3.2021 in Petition No. 434/GT/2020 (truing up of tariff for the
period 2014-19) and also the order dated 25.10.2021 in Petition
No.410/GT/2020 (tariff for the period 2019-24). RGPPL has not disputed the
above contentions and has merely stated that the aforesaid issues are a
subject matter of reconciliation.
21. While so, APTEL vide its judgment dated 17.1.2025 allowed the Execution
Petition No. 12/2023 (filed by RGPPL seeking execution of the APTEL judgment dated
XII. Conclusion
The Execution Petition is allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove and MSEDCL shall
pay RGPPL capacity charges of Rs.31,27,48,66,735/-, (Rupees Three Thousand
One Hundred and Twenty-Seven Crores Forty-Eight Lakhs Sixty-Six Thousand Seven
Hundred and Thirty-Five only) less the amount realized of Rs.6,50,28,02,079/-
(Rupees Six Hundred and Fifty Crores Twenty-Eight Lakhs Two Thousand and Seventy-
Nine only). Consequently, MSEDCL shall pay RGPPL Rs. 2477,20,64,656/- (Rupees
Two Thousand Four Hundred and Seventy-Seven Crores Twenty Lakhs Sixty-Four
Thousand Six Hundred and Fifty-Six only), (capacity charges of Rs. 31,27,48,66,735/-
minus realization of Rs.6,50,28.02,079/-), within four months from the date of receipt
of a copy of this order.
In case MSEDCL has paid Rs.471 Crores as directed by the CERC in its order in IA No.
67 of 2024 in Petition No. 276/MP/2024 dated 30.09.2024, and if the said amount was
payable towards capacity charges for the period covered by the present EP, MSEDCL
may deduct Rs. 471 Crores from Rs. 2477,20,64,656/-, and pay RGPPL Rs.
2006,20,94,656/- (Rupees Two Thousand and Six Crores Twenty Lakhs Ninety-Four
reiterated the submissions made in its reply, and the same is not mentioned herein,
for the sake of brevity. However, in addition, RGPPL has submitted the following:
Re: Miscellaneous
(c) MSEDCL’s reliance on Article 10.8 of the PPA to claim termination is also an
afterthought. On a plain reading, the clause applies only if there is a failure of
performance or a breach on the part of one of the parties. However, there is no
breach by RGPPL, which would give a right of termination in favour of MSEDCL.
MSEDCL has never invoked Article 10.8 at any time till the filing of the present
(d) The PPA is in force till 18.5.2034, and RGPPL has continuously performed
the PPA without any default or breach. RGPPL has faithfully declared the
availability from the generating station as per Article 4.3 of the PPA, and the
WRLDC, under Section 28 of the Act, has accepted the availability and
conducted the scheduling and energy accounting, while preparing the REA. For
the period prior to the purported termination i.e., for 2013-14, MSEDCL itself has
admitted the claim of RGPPL to be Rs 1400 crores. There is no answer to this
claim except to state that RGPPL had agreed to keep its claim for this period in
abeyance in accordance with the MOM held on 17.8.2015 in PMO. This
contention is misconceived, and a reference to an old meeting of 17.8.2015 is
not permissible, in view of the several subsequent meetings, including the ones
held by MOP on 15.3.2024 (MoM issued on 28.3.2024) and 4.4.2024 (MoM
issued on 22.4.2024).
(e) The claims regarding alleged waivers given by the Govt. of Maharashtra
have no correlation with the present petition. The Govt. of Maharashtra is not
even a Petitioner, and MSEDCL cannot indirectly be a claimant on their behalf.
It is wrong and denied that any waivers were granted by the Government of
Maharashtra to RGPPL. MSEDCL has raised several unfounded and
unsubstantiated allegations about the operation of the PRAAPTI Portal by
RGPPL. The portal is a product of the LPS Rules framed by the MOP under Sec
176 and applies not just to RGPPL but to all entities in the electricity sector.
RGPPL had prepared two separate detailed replies in I.A Nos. 99/2024 and
100/2024, dealing in detail with the allegations of MSEDCL with regard to the
PRAAPTI Portal. The said replies have been served on MSEDCL. However, no
notice has been issued in the said applications. It is submitted that RGPPL has
strictly followed the process prescribed on the PRAAPTI Portal.
are:
Issue No. (A): Whether the issue of termination of PPA dated 10.4.2007
has attained finality, as on 1.4.2014, as contended by MSEDCL?
Issue No. (B): Whether the principles of law of limitation and constructive
res judicata is applicable in the present case?
Issue No.(C): Relief(s) to be granted.
24. Before proceeding, we take note that in the Execution Petition 12/2023 filed by
RGPPL before APTEL, MSEDCL had filed an IA, bringing on record the information/
documents viz., Petition No. 276/MP/2024 (the present petition) along with IA
No.67/2024 and the Commission’s order dated 30.9.2024 in the said IA. In the said
execution case, MSEDCL also raised some pleas, including the question of PPA
termination finality and that it has no liability to RGPPL from 1.4.2014 (as raised in the
present Petition), and APTEL vide its judgment dated 17.1.2025, disposed of the same
as under:
“...The validity of termination of the PPA, vide letter dated 8.05.2014, is neither in
issue nor are we required to consider its validity in the present execution
proceedings. All that we have observed is that the grounds, which formed the
basis of termination of the PPA, appear to have been considered and held against
MSEDCL, by the CERC, this Tribunal and the Supreme Court. Suffice it to make it clear
that the aforesaid-observations made in this regard shall not be understood as our
conclusive opinion on this issue, for these are matters for the CERC to consider in
Petition No.276/MP/2024…”
Xxxx
As has been made clear by the CERC itself, in its order dated IA No. 67/2024 in Petition
No.276/MP/2014 dated 30.09.2024, the question whether termination by MSEDCL of
the PPA dated 10.4.0207 has attained finality is a matter to be adjudicated in the main
petition pending before the CERC. Needless to state that payments made by MSEDCL
to the Execution Petitioner, including those in terms of the order which we are no passing
in the present Execution Proceedings, shall not disable MSEDCL, in case any such relief
is granted by CERC in the Petition pending before it, from recovering the amounts from
the Execution Petitioner, along with interest, if any, awarded by the CERC.”
Accordingly, we proceed to examine the issues (A) and (B) together, as under:
25. MSEDCL has submitted that it has no liability towards RGPPL from 1.4.2014, as
the PPA stood terminated from the said date, in terms of its letter dated 8.5.2014, and
any such invoices raised or the claims made thereafter by RGPPL, are without any
contractual or legal backing and hence are bad in law. It also stated that RGPPL has
not challenged the termination of the PPA before any court or forum, and as such, the
termination has attained finality. MSEDCL has also stated that approximately ten years
have elapsed since the termination of the PPA, and as such, the termination of the
PPA has attained finality and any potential challenge to such termination would not
only be bad on merits, but is impermissible, for being barred by the law of limitation.
MSEDCL has argued that even if the termination of the PPA is a breach giving rise to
a cause of action, the said cause of action commenced on 8.5.2014, i.e, the date on
which the termination letter was issued by MSEDCL. It has been stated that since
more than three years have elapsed since such date and the period of limitation has
also ended, any action against the purported or alleged breach is barred by law and
beyond any judicial review. MSEDCL has contended that since the termination of the
PPA has not been challenged till date, such termination has attained finality, and any
claim to the contrary, after approximately 10 years from the date of such termination,
26. Per contra, RGPPL has argued that MSEDCL is not entitled to terminate the PPA
unilaterally and that it had, vide letters dated 22.5.2014 and 3.6.2014, repudiated the
purported termination, with a request to clear its outstanding dues. RGPPL has
submitted that it has a decree in its favour from all the Courts requiring MSEDCL to
PPA. While pointing out that it is MSEDCL who is re-agitating the issue of alleged
termination of the PPA, without any legal or contractual backing, RGPPL has stated
that if MSEDCL is seeking to avoid the payment of capacity charges, relying on its act
of termination, it was for MSEDCL, at the relevant time, to seek such declaration by
RGPPL has contended that MSEDCL cannot sleep over its rights and, having
attempted unsuccessfully over the last several years to force RGPPL to challenge the
unilateral termination, now seeks to belatedly challenge and seek a declaration that
its termination was correct. Stating that the cause of action arose on 22.5.2014, when
RGPPL repudiated the unilateral termination of the PPA by MSEDCL, RGPPL has
contended that a petition seeking a declaration could have been filed by MSEDCL,
latest by 21.4.2017, and having not done so, the petition is barred by limitation, in
terms of the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s judgment in APPCC & ors v Lanco Kondapalli
Power Ltd (2016) 3 SCC 468. RGPPL has also submitted that the petition is barred by
the principles of Explanation V to Section 11 of the CPC. Pointing out that MSEDCL
did not even bring up this aspect of termination as an alternate argument in its appeal
before APTEL, which was then pending, RGPPL has stated that MSEDCL, after losing
the appeal before APTEL, raised the issue of termination in the Civil Appeal filed by it
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court which was rejected on 9.11.2023, and later in the
Review Petition filed by it on the specific ground that the issue of termination had not
been dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which was also rejected vide order
dated 19.3.2024. In these circumstances, RGPPL has stated that for MSEDCL to raise
the issue of termination, ignoring the above orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is
agitated by RGPPL, the same was beyond the scope of the APTEL appeal. Pointing
termination of the PPA, MSEDCL has submitted that, as the civil appeal was filed
subsequent to the termination, it has in the interest of justice, merely disclosed the
factum of termination of PPA raising grounds in the civil appeal and no prayer qua the
termination of PPA was made by it. It has further submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme
Court merely decided on the principle of interpretation of the then existing PPA and
did not opine or render any finding on the issue of termination of PPA, and as such,
any adjudication was beyond the scope of the proceedings. MSEDCL, while
application, as the same applies only in respect of the relief claimed and not in respect
of the facts urged or the grounds taken, has submitted that it never sought any relief,
whatsoever, in relation to the termination of the PPA and the reference of the factum
of termination and grounds raised on that basis in the review petition filed by MSEDCL
does not constitute constructive res judicata and the provisions of Explanation V are
not attracted even qua the pleadings in the review petition. MSEDCL has added that
the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the review petition were passed in the
chambers by circulation, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the issues
raised and the said order amounted to a summary dismissal of the review petition,
which does not amount to a res judicata by virtue of the law settled by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in its judgment in Yogendra Narayan Choudhury v UOI (1996) 7 SCC
1. Accordingly, MSEDCL has argued that the scope of the appellate and review
proceedings before APTEL and the Hon’ble Supreme Court was limited to the issues
then-existing PPA, in particular, the interplay between Articles 4.3 and 5.9 of the PPA.
primary fuel for the generating station is Natural Gas and/or RLNG, and the provision
requirement. According to Article 5.9 of the PPA, RGPPL is required to obtain the
approval of MSEDCL prior to entering into any contracts for gas supply or gas
transportation. In view of the steady decline in the supply of domestic gas since
September 2011, RGPPL entered into an arrangement with GAIL for the supply of
RLNG. As RGPPL started declaring capacity on alternate fuel (RLNG), MSEDCL had
166/MP/2012 was filed by RGPPL before this Commission to (i) resolve the issues
arising out of the non-availability of domestic gas of the required quantum and the
reservations of the beneficiaries to allow RGPPL to enter into contracts for available
alternate fuel, i.e., RLNG and consequences thereof (ii) revise the NAPAF for RGPPL
for full fixed cost recovery at the actually achieved NAPAF level till fuel supply is
restored to the allocated contracted capacity and (c) direct the beneficiaries to pay the
fixed charges due to RGPPL. By order dated 30.7.2013, the Commission disposed of
“25.…In our view, the interpretation placed by MSEDCL on Article 5.9 is not sustainable
since it negates the provisions of Article 4.3 of the PPA. It is established principle of
interpretation of contracts that the contract is to be read as a whole and the different
provisions of the contract are to be harmoniously interpreted so that effect is given to
each one of them and no part of the contract becomes otiose. This principle needs to be
adhered to while interpreting Articles 4.3 and 5.9 of the PPA. When Article 5.9 is so
interpreted it would mean that consent of MSEDCL on the contracting terms of supply
Order in Petition No. 276/MP/2024 Page 45 of 61
of gas and its price is needed to enable it examine the implications on payment of
variable charge. The agreement between RGPPL and MSEDCL on the contracting
terms and price for supply of fuel to RGPPL, as provided under Article 5.9 is not a
necessary condition for declaration of capacity of the generating station under Article
4.3 of the PPA. The declaration of capacity under Article 4.3 of the PPA is independent
of the provision of Article 5.9 and is not dependent on any other factor, such as price of
fuel, etc. The recovery of fixed charges is to be governed by the declared capacity of the
generating station. It is true that making arrangement for supply of fuel for the generating
station is the responsibility of RGPPL. RGPPL has made arrangements for supply of
RLNG since it was not able to arrange supply of domestic gas because of the overall
shortage of gas in the country. MSEDCL in its discretion may not schedule the capacity
declared on RLNG since it has implications on the variable charges. However, it cannot
disown its liability to pay the fixed charges when RGPPL declares capacity based on
RLNG as the primary fuel in accordance with Article 4.3 of the PPA.
26. In the light of the above discussions, any declaration of capacity by RGPPL based
on RLNG as the primary fuel qualifies for the computation of availability of the generating
station for recovery of the fixed charges and accordingly the fixed charge recovery be
made by the petitioner based on availability after accounting for declaration of capacity
on RLNG.
27. In view of the above finding, we do not consider it necessary to get into the issues
of relaxation of NAPAF already approved by the Commission or the admissibility of
invoking Force Majeure clause by RGPPL.”
29. Pursuant to the above, RGPPL started declaring capacity on RLNG. However,
MSEDCL did not schedule power from the project and also declined to make payments
due to RGPPL for the declared DC, including the capacity charges in terms of its
obligations under the PPA and the Commission’s order. Accordingly, MSEDCL filed
Appeal No. 261/2013 before APTEL, and during the pendency of the said appeal,
MSEDCL vide letter dated 8.5.2014, terminated the PPA (with effect from 1.4.2014),
mainly on the ground that RGPPL has not been able to enter into GSA and that it was
not viable for MSEDCL to accept the supply from an alternate source (RLNG) in light
of the increased cost. In response, RGPPL, while pointing out that the PPA was valid
for a period of 25 years from COD (till 18.5.2034), repudiated the said termination by
MSEDCL as illegal, vide its various correspondences, and with directions to MSEDCL
to clear all its outstanding dues. Admittedly, RGPPL did not challenge the PPA
termination, perhaps on the count that it had a favourable order from the Commission,
nor had MSEDCL approached any forum seeking a declaration that its termination of
for termination in letter dated 8.5.2014, which involved the interpretation of Articles 4.3
and 5.9 were already pending consideration in the appeal filed before APTEL.
Pursuant to the APTEL judgment dated 22.4.2015 (in Appeal No. 261/2013) affirming
the Commission’s order dated 30.7.2013, MSEDCL filed Civil Appeal (1922/2023)
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and raised amongst others, the issue of termination
MM. The Appellant on 8.5.2014 had terminated the PPA dated 10.4.2007 with the
Respondent No.1 with effect from 1.4.2014 i.e immediately after expiry of the last GSA
duly approved by MSEDCL and because no GSA has since been approved by Appellant
herein as required in clause 5.9 of the said PPA and continuing with PPA without GSA
would not have served ant legal purpose.
NN. Respondent No.1, after termination of PPA, is raising monthly capacity charges bills
to Appellant from January, 2019, however Appellant has returned the bills raised by
Respondent No.1 as there is no valid contract in existence between RGPPL and
MSEDCL”
30. In case, MSEDCL felt that the issue of termination had attained finality and that
the same was a separate cause of action, to be agitated by RGPPL, there was no
reason for MSEDCL to raise the ground of PPA termination in the civil appeal and
seek a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. By raising such grounds in the civil
termination, which was rejected by the Hon’ble Court vide its order dated 9.11.2023
on merits (as in para 9 above) with a direction that the execution proceedings filed by
the RGPPL before APTEL to be continued. Further, the contention of MSEDCL that it
had merely disclosed the factum of PPA termination in the civil appeal and that it had
not sought any adjudication on the validity of the PPA termination or any relief was
sought in relation to the PPA termination, cannot be accepted, considering the fact
that MSEDCL had, in grounds (I) and (J) of the review petition by it (against order
dated 9.11.2023) raised a specific plea of PPA termination with effect from 1.4.2014
charges from 1.4.2014, under the head ‘Re: Termination of the PPA has not been
(I) Because the Impugned Order failed to address the fact that the appellant had
terminated the PPA on 08.05.2014 with effect from 01.04.2014 i.e immediately after
expiry of the last GSA duly approved by MSEDCL, since no consent has ben sought for
any GSA from MSEDCL (as was required in Article 5.9 of the said PPA), thereafter
continuing the PPA without GSA would not have served any useful purpose. The
impugned order does not discuss this aspect.”
(J) Because the Impugned Order has failed to consider that the PPA is a determinable
contract and that RGPPL has not challenged the termination of the PPA before any
forum till date. Thus, the said termination attained finality. Therefore, without prejudice
to the contentions as raised hereinabove, MSEDCL cannot be saddled with any liability
towards capacity charges from 1.4.2014, particularly considering that there was /is no
valid contract existing between the parties from 01.04.2014.”
31. The review petition was also dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order
dated 19.3.2024, holding that there was no error apparent on the face of the record
and that no case for review under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013
had been established. MSEDCL, having raised the issue of PPA termination from
1.4.2014 in the civil appeal vide grounds MM and NN and thereafter, in the review
petition vide grounds I and J stating that the PPA termination attained finality and that
it has no liability to pay the capacity charges, which were rejected by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, cannot now argue that the scope of the civil appeal/review petition
was limited to the issues raised in the original proceedings and that no relief
whatsoever, was sought by it in relation to the PPA termination. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court, in our view, cannot be understood to have left open the question of the PPA
termination by MSEDCL from 1.4.2014, when the civil appeal was rejected on
9.11.2023, without any liberty being granted to MSEDCL and when the review petition
was also dismissed subsequently vide order dated 19.3.2024, on the ground that there
was no error apparent on the face of the order dated 9.11.2023. In our view,
MSEDCL’s contention that the PPA termination attained finality from 1.4.2014 and that
stood rejected by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, vide its orders above. In this
the same issues before this Commission, in this petition. In our view, the relief(s)
sought for by MSEDCL, in the present petition (under para 1 above), is nothing but an
attempt by MSEDCL to seek a declaration that the PPA termination from 1.4.2014 was
correct and that it has no liability towards RGPPL to pay the capacity charges from
1.4.2014. This is not permissible as the question of PPA termination from 1.4.2014
attaining finality was deemed to have been rejected by the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
despite MSEDCL raising the same. Even otherwise, we notice that the APTEL
judgment dated 22.4.2015 and the Hon’ble Supreme Court judgment dated 9.11.2023
have specifically rejected the contentions, which formed the basis of the termination
of the PPA by MSEDCL. In the above backdrop, the submissions of MSECL stand
rejected, and we hold that the present Petition is not maintainable. In our view, the
PPA stands valid as on 1.4.2014, and MSEDCL is therefore, liable to pay the capacity
charges, in terms of the Commission’s order dated 30.7.2013 and the judgment of
APTEL dated 22.4.2015, which stood confirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court orders
dated 9.11.2023 and 19.3.2024, for the period when RGPPL declared power
Limitation
32. RGPPL has submitted that in response to the MSEDCL’s letter dated 8.5.2014,
unilaterally terminating the PPA with effect from 1.4.2014, it has repudiated the said
termination vide letter dated 22.5.2014 and through several other correspondences.
Pointing out that a petition seeking declaration that the termination was correct could
have been filed by MSEDCL latest by 21.4.2017, RGPPL has contended that
adjudication of the disputes under Section 79 of the Act would apply and is squarely
covered by the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in APPCC v Lanco Kodapalli
Power Ltd (2016) 3 SCC 468. Accordingly, RGPPL has submitted that the petition is
barred by limitation. Per contra, MSEDCL has argued that the termination of the PPA
attained finality as RGPPL failed to challenge the same before a competent court,
within the prescribed limitation period. It has been stated that the issuance of
repudiation letters by RGPPL has no basis in law unless the termination of the PPA
was sought to be set aside by a competent court, which RGPPL, undisputedly, failed
to do so. MSEDCL, stating that it has not sought any declaration on the validity of the
termination of the PPA, but has only sought the quashing of the illegal invoices raised
by RGPPL, has added that the PPA stands terminated with effect from 1.4.2014, and
33. We have considered the rival submissions. As stated earlier, MSEDCL had
unilaterally terminated the PPA vide letter dated 8.5.2014 (with effect from 1.4.2014),
and the same was repudiated by RGPPL vide letter dated 22.5.2014 with direction
upon MSEDCL to pay the fixed charges in terms of the PPA. RGPPL has not
challenged the PPA termination, and MSEDCL has also not sought any declaration
that its termination was correct, and it cannot be saddled with the liability for fixed
charges. However, the issue of PPA termination was raised before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court by MSEDCL in the civil appeal filed by it, which was rejected by the
Hon’ble Court vide order dated 9.11.2023 and thereafter, specifically in the review
petition mainly contending that (i) RGPPL had not challenged the PPA termination (ii)
the PPA termination has attained finality and (iii) MSEDCL cannot be saddled with the
liability of fixed charges after 1.4.2014, which was also rejected by the Hon’ble
the quashing of the illegal invoices raised by RGPPL, the same is on the backdrop of
its contention that the PPA termination attained finality with effect from 1.4.2014, which
was not entertained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its orders dated 9.11.2023 and
19.3.2024, as stated above. Even the submission of MSEDCL that RGPPL having not
opted to challenge the termination, has rendered the termination final and hence any
view that the same issue raised by MSEDCL for a specific finding, in the review
petition, was rejected by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is pertinent to mention that
RGPPL had a decree in its favour from all the courts, requiring MSEDCL to make the
payment of the capacity charges. Thus, MSEDCL, having raised the issue of PPA
termination, which stood rejected by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, cannot now, based
on the prayers in this petition, belatedly seek a declaration that the PPA termination
from 1.4.2014 was correct and that the same had attained finality as on 1.4.2014. Even
assuming, without admitting, that the PPA termination was effective from 1.4.2014,
MSEDCL ought to have filed a petition seeking such declaration, within the period of
three years from the date when the right to sue first accrued, i.e., when RGPPL
Schedule of the Limitation Act 1963. Having not done so, MSEDCL cannot now make
submissions to the contrary and claim the reliefs, based on the premise that PPA
termination attained finality from 1.4.2014, and it has, therefore, no liability to pay
RGPPL the capacity charges from 1.4.2014, as no valid contract exists between the
34. RGPPL has also contended that the petition is barred by the principles of
which was then pending, RGPPL has stated that MSEDCL, after losing the appeal
before APTEL, raised the issue of termination in the Civil Appeal and later, in the
Review Petition filed by it before the Hon’ble Supreme Court (on the specific ground
that the issue of termination had not been dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court),
and the same were rejected vide orders dated 9.11.2023 and 19.3.2024 respectively.
In these circumstances, RGPPL has stated that MSEDCL cannot be permitted to raise
the issue of termination, ignoring the above orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Per
contra, MSEDCL has argued that the principles of Explanation V of Section 11 of CPC
have no application, as the same applies only in respect of the relief claimed and not
in respect of the facts urged or the grounds taken. Reiterating that it never sought any
relief, whatsoever, in relation to the termination of the PPA and the grounds raised on
that basis in the review petition filed by MSEDCL, does not constitute a ‘constructive
res judicata’ MSEDCL has submitted that the provisions of Explanation V are not
attracted even qua the pleadings in the review petition. MSEDCL has added that the
orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the review petition was passed in the
chambers by circulation, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the issues
raised and the said order amounted to a summary dismissal of the review petition,
which does not amount to a res judicata by virtue of the law settled by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in its judgment in Yogendra Narayan Choudhury v UOI (1996) 7 SCC
1. Accordingly, MSEDCL has argued that the scope of the appellate and review
proceedings before APTEL and the Hon’ble Supreme Court was limited to the issues
involved in the original proceedings, which are purely matters of interpretation of the
then existing PPA, in particular, the interplay between Articles 4.3 and 5.9 of the PPA
provides as under:
36. Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) embodies the doctrine of
res judicata or the rule of conclusiveness of a judgment. It enacts that once a matter
subsequent litigation. MSEDCL has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
court in Yogendra Narayan Choudhury v UOI (1996) 7 SCC 1 to contend that since
the order in the review petition was passed in chambers by circulation, without
expressing any opinion on merits of the issues raised, the said order amounted to a
summary dismissal of the review petition which does not amount to res judicata. In our
view, the judgment relied upon by MSEDCL is not applicable in the present case. While
the said judgment is on the dismissal of SLP in limine without assigning any reasons,
in the present case, MSEDCL did not file any SLP, but raised the issue of PPA
termination in the civil appeal. The civil appeal having been dismissed, Explanation IV
and V of Section 11 of the CPC are applicable, and the issue of PPA termination is
deemed to have been negatived by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Court
having perused the Review Petition and having held that there is no error apparent on
the face of the record and that no case for review was made out by MSEDCL, under
dismissal, but a dismissal on merits. When the civil appeal, wherein the issue of PPA
termination was raised by MSEDCL, was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
vide order dated 9.11.2023, it cannot be argued that the Hon’ble Court was not seized
of the issue of PPA termination by MSEDCL. Further, MSEDCL having raised the
same issue in the review petition, which was also dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court on 19.3.2024, MSEDCL cannot now contend that the issue of PPA termination
can be raised again in this petition. This is not permissible. In our view, the dismissal
of the civil appeal and the review petition by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reinforces the
finality of the original judgment, which continues in full force. The principles of
constructive res judicata are squarely applicable in the present case, and therefore,
the submissions of MSEDCL are rejected. The petition is therefore, not maintainable
on this count.
Termination on merits
37. MSEDCL has also made submissions stating that the termination of the PPA is
valid on merits by pointing out in detail that RGPPL was on constant breach of its
supply obligations under the PPA, termination of PPA was in public interest, and that
the termination of the PPA was in accordance with Article 10.8 of the PPA. Per contra,
the fact that the present petition filed by MSEDCL is held to be not maintainable in law,
as per our discussions in the previous paragraphs, we refrain from examining the
Other Issues
38. MSEDCL has submitted that RGPPL claims for the period prior to the termination
of the PPA (i.e., 1.4.2014) are also grossly inflated and illegal. MSEDCL has pointed
pertaining to 2013-14 and 2014-15 in abeyance in accordance with the PMO MoM, in
lieu of which it benefitted from the various concessions and waivers from GOM. It has
also pointed out that after deriving the aforesaid benefits-based on the understanding,
as set out in the PMO, MOM dated 17.8.2015, RGPPL ought not to be permitted to
resile from its promise and claim the recovery of the amounts due for 2013-14,
including LPS. MSEDCL has further submitted that after taking into count the benefit
derived by RGPPL in the form of tax waivers and concessions accorded by GOM to
the tune of Rs 1482 crores and the payment of Rs 500 crores by MSEDCL, there is
no outstanding amount to be paid to RGPPL for the period prior to the termination. It
has argued that without prejudice to the fact that RGPPL has enjoyed the benefit of
Rs. 1482 crore and MSEDCL was compelled to make further payment of Rs.500 crore,
the payment of any claim prior to termination has to be made only after reconciliation
evidence. MSEDCL has contended that RGPPL’s attempts to enforce such wrongful
claims by misusing the mechanism provided under the LPS Rules are patently illegal
justice. MSEDCL has added that it had not purchased any power from RGPPL after
the termination of the PPA, and payment of such undue amount to RGPPL will not
only result in unjust and undue commercial gain to RGPPL but also be tantamount to
RGPPL has clarified that the meeting held by the PMO on 17.8.2015 was only to
discuss the sale of certain quantum of electricity from the RGPPL station to Indian
Railways and one of the proposals was to keep the issue of recovery of the outstanding
referring to the minutes selectively, RGPPL has stated that there were further
meetings and discussions under the aegis of the MOP on 15.3.2024 and 4.4.2024,
wherein the factual status has been captured in detail. RGPPL has submitted that the
Rs 1482 crore) are imaginary and fictional, and these have nothing to do with the
present petition. It has been argued that MSEDCL cannot claim that waivers for the
any document to show the veracity of the same and as to how it relates to the capacity
charges payable to RGPPL. MSEDCL has added that no arrangements were made
has contended that these arguments have been specifically taken as a defense in the
execution petition, and MSEDCL is re-raising the grounds for the purpose of creating
confusion and misleading this Commission, even on facts. RGPPL has clarified that
the purchase of power is completely irrelevant, when the claim by RGPPL is mainly
for the capacity charges for declaration of availability from its plant as each invoice
raised is mainly towards the capacity charges, as per the various tariff orders of this
Commission, reconciled with the NAPAF declared by WRPC on a daily basis. RGPPL
has also stated that it has not raised any invoice on energy charges, where MSEDCL
did not consume electricity, except for 2013-14 and July 2016, wherein energy was
scheduled by MSEDCL, and the invoices raised mainly have been towards the
39. We have examined the rival submissions. MSEDCL has contended that there is
no amount pending to be paid to RGPPL, taking into account the benefit derived by
MSEDCL. We note that the Government of Maharashtra had specifically raised the
issues of tax waiver and concessions alleged to have been granted to RGPPL, as a
defense in the Execution Petition (12/2023) filed by RGPPL before APTEL, and
“Both on the ground that the Government of Maharashtra is neither a necessary nor a
proper party to the present execution proceedings, and also on the ground that the
objection raised by them, to the grant of the relief sought for by the Execution Petitioner,
does not merit acceptance, we see no reason to entertain the impleadment petition or the
objection raised by the Government of Maharashtra on the merits of the EP filed by
RGPPL.
Needless to state that any claim, which the Government of Maharashtra may have against
the Execution Petitioner, can always be agitated by them in independent legal
proceedings”
40. RGPPL has also submitted that no arrangements were made by it with the
to mention that the Government of Maharashtra was not a party to the proceedings in
the present case. Also, no documents have been produced before us by MSEDCL to
the submissions of MSEDCL on this count are disposed of in terms of the decision of
APTEL in the execution proceedings as above. However, with regard the contention
of MSEDCL that RGPPL agreed to keep its claims for the years 2013-14 and 2014-15
in abeyance, in accordance with the PMO minutes of meeting, it has been pointed out
by RGPPL that the said meeting held by the PMO on 17.8.2015 was only to discuss
the sale of certain amount of power from RGPPL generating station to the Indian
Railways. Though these issues were also raised in the execution proceedings, we
note from the record that further meetings were held under the aegis of the MOP, GOI
agreed to make the payment of outstanding dues to MSEDCL. The relevant portions
I. Considering the regulator provisions and terms of PPA, the judgments of CERC,
APTEL and Hon’ble Supreme Court, MSEDCL will honour the principal amount of dues
as claimed by RGPPL, except for the fixed cost billed to MSEDCL during the period of
sale to railways which would stand withdrawn.
II. Considering the background of the entire matter, instead of a penal rate of LPS
calculated as per CERC regulation, RGPPL shall levy interest on the net outstanding
principal amount so as to only cover their cost of borrowings. In this regard RGPPL shall
levy interest @8% with quarterly compounding.
III. Based on the above, the net due amount calculated by RGPPL shall be payable by
MSEDCL to RGPPL in 40 equal instalments without further levy of LPS if the due
instalment is paid on respective due dates. The regular bills from March 2024 onwards
shall be payable as per PPA/prevailing LPS rules.
IV. As a precedence to the above, both MSEDCL and RGPPL shall agree that the plan
for settlement as above shall prevail over any outcome of ongoing legal proceedings.
V. The power offtake from the project would continue with MSEDCL till the term of PPA
and MSEDCL shall continue to honour the future bills raised by RGPPL.
VI. As a long-term solution MSEDCL may consider the transfer; (i) of the dedicated
power evacuation EHV lines to RGPPL/NTPC, at depreciated value as per books of
accounts and (ii) of its equity stake in RGPPL to NTPC, as per mutually agreed valuation.
NTPC in turn may explore alternatives means to utilize this capacity of RGPPL.
VII. The above resolution was apprised to the Hon’ble Minister for Power and New &
Renewable Energy.
41. MSEDCL, therefore, cannot rely upon the minutes of the meeting selectively and
raise frivolous pleas to deny the rightful claims of RGPPL. In our view, RGPPL is
for the complete period when it declared power availability, based on RLNG, read with
42. MSEDCL in this petition has sought relief(s), amongst others, a declaration that
the invoices raised by RGPPL against MSEDCL are non-est and illegal, and also to
restrain RGPPL from issuing further invoices under the terminated PPA dated
10.4.2007 and from uploading any invoices on the PRAAPTI portal seeking payment
(s) thereof. Pursuant to our findings in this order that the Petition filed by MSEDCL is
not maintainable, the reliefs sought by MSEDCL under para 1 of this order stand
rejected. MSEDCL has submitted that RGPPL is misusing the provisions of the LPS
Rules, 2022, by seeking the specific performance thereof, even after the PPA has
been terminated by MSEDCL. It is pertinent to mention that the LPS Rules,2022, were
notified by the MOP, GOI, in exercise of its powers under Section 176 of the Electricity
Act, 2003, and are applicable to all the entities in the power sector, including RGPPL.
We have in our interim order dated 30.9.2024 in IA No. 67/2024 (in Petition No.276/
RGPPL with regard to the recovery of the balance amounts and the same shall await
a final decision of this Commission in this petition. The relevant portion of the said
“27. It is evident from the submissions of RGPPL that a total amount recoverable from
MSEDCL is in excess of Rs. 7000 crores, out of which an amount of Rs.1400 crores
related to the period 2013-14. However, it is noticed that an amount of Rs 471 crores
was only payable by MSEDCL in terms of the invoices uploaded in the PRRAPTI portal
by RGPPL to avoid the curtailment of power. Since MSEDCL is found not entitled to
the grant of interim reliefs, as aforesaid, we direct MSEDCL to make the payment of
Rs.471 crore to RGPPL within 15 days from the date of this order. Upon such payment
by MSEDCL, RGPPL shall withdraw such restrictions from the PRAAPTI portal. The
recovery of the balance amounts by RGPPL shall, however, await the final decision of
this Commission in the main petition. Accordingly, we direct that no further
coercive/precipitative action shall be taken by RGPPL with regard to the recovery of
Order in Petition No. 276/MP/2024 Page 59 of 61
the balance amounts. Having said so, we direct RGPPL to ensure that the plant
remains in operation.”
43. It is noticed, that an amount of Rs. 471 crore has been paid by MSEDCL to
RGPPL, in terms of the interim order above. Since we have, in this order, rejected the
submissions of MSEDCL as not maintainable, and held that the PPA dated 10.4.2007
is valid even after 1.4.2014, RGPPL is entitled to claim the amounts outstanding from
MSEDCL by uploading the bills in the PRAAPTI portal. Consequent upon this, the
interim order directing RGPPL not to take any coercive/precipitative action against
44. It is pertinent to mention that our order dated 30.9.2024 in the said IA was subject
to the decision of APTEL in the Execution Petition No. 12/2023 pending before APTEL.
However, APTEL vide its order dated 17.1.2025, disposed of the said Petition, as
under:
XII. CONCLUSION:
The Execution Petition is allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove and MSEDCL shall
pay RGPPL capacity charges of Rs.31,27,48,66,735/-,(Rupees Three Thousand One
Hundred and Twenty Seven Crores Forty Eight Lakhs Sixty Six Thousand Seven Hundred
and Thirty Five only) less the amount realized of Rs.6,50,28,02,079/- (Rupees Six Hundred
and Fifty Crores Twenty Eight Lakhs Two Thousand and Seventy Nine only).
Consequently, MSEDCL shall pay RGPPL Rs. 2477,20,64,656/- (Rupees Two Thousand
Four Hundred and Seventy-Seven Crores Twenty Lakhs Sixty-Four Thousand Six Hundred
and Fifty-Six only), (capacity charges of Rs. 31,27,48,66,735/- minus realization of
Rs.6,50,28.02,079/-), within four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In
case MSEDCL has paid Rs.471 Crores as directed by the CERC in its order in IA No. 67
of 2024 in Petition No. 276/MP/2024 dated 30.09.2024, and if the said amount was payable
towards capacity charges for the period covered by the present EP, MSEDCL may deduct
Rs. 471 Crores from Rs.2477,20,64,656/-, and pay RGPPL Rs. 2006,20,94,656/- (Rupees
Two Thousand and Six Crores Twenty Lakhs Ninety-Four Thousand Six Hundred and Fifty-
Six only) within four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
It is made clear that, in case payment of Rs. 2477,20,64,656/- (Rupees Two Thousand
Four Hundred and Seventy-Seven Crores Twenty Lakhs Sixty-Four Thousand Six Hundred
and Fifty-Six only), or Rs. 2006,20,94,656/- (Rupees Two Thousand and Six Crores Twenty
Lakhs Ninety Four Thousand Six Hundred and Fifty Six only), as the case may be, is not
made within four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, Bank Account No.
0239256010710 of MSEDCL with Mumbai Industrial Finance Branch of Canara Bank and
A/c No. 016020110000033 of MSEDCL at Mumbai Large Corporate Branch of the Bank of
India shall stand attached, and the afore-said amounts shall be realized from the said bank
accounts.
45. It is further noticed that MSEDCL has filed an appeal (Civil Appeal No.4286/2025)
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the APTEL judgment dated 17.1.2025, and
The appellant, Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited, shall pay
half of the amount as computed, that is, half of Rs.2477.20 crores, to the Respondents by
way of six equal monthly instalments, beginning from 15.07.2025.
The instalments shall be paid as per the time fixed. Upon failure to pay the instalments
within time, the appellant MSEDCL, shall be liable top pay interest, as fixed and payable
by the Discom(s) to the generating companies in terms of the regulations or tariff orders
etc.
List the appeal for consideration in the week commencing 18.08.2025.
46. Accordingly, Petition No. 276/MP/2024 (along with the IAs) is disposed of in