The Government of India and the First Non-Cooperation Movement--1920-1922

Author(s): D. A. Low
Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Feb., 1966), pp. 241-259
Published by: Association for Asian Studies
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2051326
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The Government of India and the First
Non-Cooperation Movement-1920-1922

D. A. LOW

A s the study of the processes by which India and Pakistan achieved their inde-
pendence unfolds further, it seems probable that the most fruitful advances
will be made through studies of particular episodes and particular themes. In all this
there is little fear that the national movement itself will be neglected. Its rise to pre-
eminence is of perennial interest. But there is some danger that its opponents may be.
It is easy to see the British Raj as a monolithic, heavy-handed, imperialist bureauc-
racy; it frequently wore that appearance. Yet, plainly, British Governors and the
British Raj were human and sentient no less than nationalist leaders and the na-
tional movement itself. And the truth would seem to be that on at least one occasion
even that supreme authority, the British Government of India, showed itself not only
highly perspicacious but singularly adroit. In its first major encounter in I920-I922
with the national movement under Gandhi's leadership, it achieved a remarkable
success. Although in December 1921, at the height of the first great non-cooperation
campaign against the British, the Government of India found itself on the run, three
months later the non-cooperation movement was in ruins, and the Government's
authority had emerged intact. These dramatic events have generally been looked at
from the standpoint of Gandhi and the national movement. They will be looked at
here from that of the Government of India.
When open opposition to the continuance of British rule in India seriously reared
its head in the first decade of the twentieth century, the vitally important Home
Department of the Government of India took the view that nationalist agitation was
seditious.1 Such an attitude found its ultimate expression in measures like the Row-
latt Acts of I9I9 and in General Dyer's brutal massacre at Amritsar in the Punjab in
April of that year. If it had continued to dominate the thinking of the Government
of India, its subsequent conflict with Gandhi would almost certainly have taken a
very different course. But, as it happened, by I920 the Government of India had
changed its attitude.

At its Amritsar meeting in December I9I9, the Indian National Congress ex-
pressed grave concern about the events in the Punjab earlier in the year. They agreed,
however, to work the new Constitution which the British had been fashioning dur-
ing the past two years. But the better atmosphere which this created did not last. For

D. A. Low is Dean of the School of African and Asian Studies at the University of Sussex. The work
upon which this paper is based was done while he was Senior Fellow in History at the Australian Na-
tional University which awarded him financial and other assistance.
1 I hope to detail this on another occasion; but see, for example, Secretary, Home Department, to all
local Governments, 4 Mar. i9io, National Archives of India, New Delhi, Home (hereinafter H.) Po-
litical (hereinafter Poll.) 42-46, A, Mar. I9Io; and Note by Craddock, I7 May 19I3, ibid., 72-75, A,
May I9I3.

241

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 242 D. A. LOW

by May I920 a re
because many Indian Muslims were becoming extremely angry at the terms of the
peace treaty which were being imposed by Britain and her allies on the Sultan of
Turkey, the Khalifa of Islam; and in the second because many Indians had become
increasingly disturbed by the seeming hesitation with which General Dyer and other
officials responsible for the extravagant suppression of the Punjab disturbances in
I9I9 were being treated both in India and in England. A strong Khilafat movement
was gathering, and Congressmen were deeply agitated by the Punjab "wrongs." At a
special meeting in Calcutta in September I920 the Indian National Congress under
Gandhi's leadership decided to adopt his program of progressive non-violent non-co-
operation with the Government until these "wrongs" had been righted.2
Such was the situation with which the Government of India under the Viceroy,
Lord Chelmsford,3 had to deal in I920. For a start it was quite unprecedented. No
British Government in India had ever had to face such a concerted campaign before.
Clearly it was aimed at the early overthrow of British rule, and it threatened, at the
very least, widespread disorder. As we shall see there were plenty of people in the
Government who were quite prepared to take fierce repressive action against the
movement, and then brazen out the consequences. But as it happened they did not
now enjoy much influence either in the Viceroy's Council or in the Home Depart-
ment of the Government in Delhi. For to Chelmsford and his colleagues there seem
to have been several other more important considerations.
In the first place, for all their reluctance in Indian eyes to deal unequivocably with
General Dyer and his ilk, they too had been profoundly shocked by the events of
I919. As they were to say-and say again on a number of occasions-it had never
been British policy to rely upon "force, naked and undisguised." Faced, moreover,
with the logical consequences of a policy of repression, they-and certainly their
ultimate masters, the British Parliament and the British public-were bad oppressors.
Sooner or later they were apt to desist from the violent suppression of popular move-
ments, particularly when these took their inspiration, as in some respects this one did,
from Britain itself. It was vital, therefore, or so at least the cooler heads thought, to
explore every other possible course first. There was a strong feeling, too, that stern
repression was likely to cause a great deal more trouble than it was worth. The Gov-
ernment seems to have realized fairly early on that there was a great deal of sincerity
in Gandhi's preaching of non-violence. It was certainly in no sense in their interest to
stifle it. By the end of I920, moreover, the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms were about
to be launched. It looked as if Congress might boycott the new Councils which were
being established under them. The Moderates, however, who had broken away from
Congress in I9I8 (as well as a number of other non-Congress groups) were pre-
pared to work them, and after all the work which British Governments both in
India and in London had put into framing them, they naturally possessed a keen

2 General accounts of the events of I920-22, which have been followed here, will be found in
D. G. Tendulkar, Mahatma, Vols. I and 2, Bombay I95I, and in "India in I92I-22" by Professor Rush-
brook-Williams in "Statement exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress of India during the year I92l,"
P. P., Accounts and Papers, First Session, I922, Vol. XVI, 6oi sqq.
3 Chelmsford, Frederick John Napier Thesiger, 3rd Baron, Viscount I92I, Fellow of All Souls, Ox-
ford, Governor of Queensland I905-9, New South Wales I909-I3, Viceroy I9I6-2I, First Lord of the
Admiralty I924, Warden of All Souls I932.

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FIRST NON-COOPERATION MOVEMENT 243

interest in seeing the reforms put into operation. Moreover, in the view of its
architects, their introduction represented the one workable way out of the ex-
tremely forbidding situation which now faced British authority in India. It was
vital, therefore, that nothing should be done-by premature or excessive repres-
sion-to drive those who were prepared to work the new constitution into the arms
of the non-cooperators.
Accordingly, when in April I920 the Government of India first began to con-
sider the new situation which confronted them, they firmly decided that "a policy
of abstaining as far as possible from interference, in order to avoid making martyrs
of fanatical leaders or precipitating disorders" would yield the best results.4 They
might, of course, have gone further than this. They might have made some dra-
matic positive gesture towards the nationalists. But in view of the unhelpful attitudes
in London both over the Khilafat issue and over General Dyer, this was probably
out of the question. Abstention from interference with the non-cooperation move-
ment, however, soon became their settled policy, as was made very clear in June
I920. Twice the Army Command, fearful of the effects of Khilafat agitation upon
the allegiance of the Indian Army, voiced its objections to the Government policy. On
the second occasion the Chief of the General Staff declared

Our views on and attitude towards the Khilafat or similar agitation are different from
those of the Home Department.... Possibly the present policy may help the peaceful
introduction of the Reforms Scheme, but it is surely in the interests of the Reforms
Scheme itself and of the country to have an Indian Army, upon which the authority of
the Government... depends, absolutely free from seditious taint.

This only provoked, however, a crushing reply from the Viceroy. "While I am
always prepared," Lord Chelmsford minuted, "to listen to what the General Staff
may have to say on questions affecting the Army, it must be understood that notes
impugning the settled policy of the Government are most irregular."5 This policy of
non-interference with the non-cooperation movement was publicly set forth in the
Viceroy's speech to the Imperial Legislative Council in September I920, and two
months later it was officially promulgated in a Government "Resolution."6
Its strategy seems to have been accepted by most of the Local Governments of the
Provinces and Presidencies into which British India was divided.7 And yet even at
this early stage it did not pass unquestioned. In particular it provoked argument
from Sir Reginald Craddock, the Lieutenant-Governor of Burma and former Home
Member of the Government of India. In an exchange of correspondence in the latter

4 H. Poll., 341-354 and K. W., A, Feb. I92I: Government of India (hereinafter G. of I.) to all
local Governments and Administrations (hereinafter L.G.s), 28 April, 3 July I920, H. Poll., K. W. to
Deposit Print 20, May I92I.
5 Notes 2, I4, i8 June I920, H. Poll. 34I-354 and K. W. A, Feb. I92I: Cf. H. Poll., 49/192I,
p. 8 sqq; and the Government of India letters of 28 April, I2 June, 3 July, I920, H. Poll., K.W. to
Deposit Print, 20, May I92I.
6 Gazette of India, 6 Nov. I920, Resolution 4484: see also G. of I. to L.G.s, Sept. I920, H. Poll.,
K. W. to Deposit Print, 20, May I92I.
7 Note by McPherson, ii June I920, H. Poll., 341-354 and K. W., A, Feb. I92I: Note by Gwynne,
ii Jan. I92I, H. Poll., 3-C and K.W., Deposit (Print), July I92I: C. F. Adam, Life of Lord Lloyd,
London 1948, pp. 1I40-I .

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 244 D. A. LOW

part of I920 he an
ber, gave classic ex
imperial policy-m
lenged. In reply to an admonitory letter from Craddock, Vincent wrote on
27 October I920: "We are fully alive to the dangerous situation created by the acute
racial feeling that prevails but we doubt whether it would be improved by repres-
sive action on the lines you suggest." In particular he did not think it was the moment
to prosecute Gandhi; for this, he said,
would certainly consolidate extremist opinion in which there are many signs of division,
it would weaken moderates on whom the successful working of the reforms largely
depends, it would jeopardize the elections and inauguration of reforms and, if our
experience of last year is to be trusted, might lead to a renewal of general hartals
throughout the country followed by disorders comparable with those which occurred
last year in the Punjab. . . . I hope you will also realize our difficulties recognizing that
the gradual change from Autocratic to responsible Government cannot be effected without
taking risk (indeed we have few historical examples of such changes ever taking place
peacefully) that our difficulties in this matter are increased by many factors which are
of world-wide character and that they are not to be remedied by drastic repressive action
alone.

Craddock's mind, however, ran in quite different grooves. In the past, he protested,
it had been possible "to reckon on the strong conservative loyalty of the great masses
of India."
But these forces in support of Government can only be reckoned upon now, if action is
taken to suppress this non-cooperation conspiracy, before it has gained further ground
.... It is quite possible ... that active suppression of this movement and the arrest of the
arch conspirators will produce outbreaks of violence in various places. But it is much
better that these should occur and be dealt with when they can be dealt with, than that
events should be watched until the situation has passed out of control.... The outcry
and excitement, and possibly violence . . . will rapidly die down as soon as people at large
realise that the British Government in India is not the setting sun which they are rapidly
learning to believe it to be.9

There was little common ground here. The point, however, is not just that these
measures were vigorously debated. The vital fact is that in I920-I922 it was men of
Vincent's cast of mind who were in control, and views such as Vincent expressed
which prevailed, and that it could very easily have been otherwise.
Vincent's thinking during 1920 did, however, depend on his belief that Congress
would in the end resile from non-cooperation, since both he and his colleagues found
it exceedingly difficult to imagine that it could really be serious in its attachment to
such "a visionary and chimerical scheme." But having provisionally adopted non-co-
operation at Calcutta, Congress effected a quite substantial boycott of the elections to
the new Councils in November I920, and at its meeting in Nagpur in December,

8 Vincent, Sir William Henry Hoare, born I866, I.C.S., I887, Sec., Legislative Department G. of I.,
I9II-15, Member Ex-Council Bihar and Orissa 1915-17, Home Member I9I7-23, Vice President of
Council I92I, Member of Council of India (in London) 1923.
9 Craddock to Vincent, 27 Sept. I920; Vincent to Craddock, 27 Oct. I920; Craddock to Vincent,
14-I5 Nov. I920, H. Poll., 271-276, A, Dec. I920: Chief Secretary, Burma, to Sec. Home Dept., G. of I.,
5 Nov. I920, H. Poll. 340 of 1922.

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 FIRST NON-COOPERATION MOVEMENT 245

overwhelmingly confirmed its support for the non

moreover, soon got under way. The Government
judged and Vincent and his colleagues were forced to think again. The result was
that in January I92I there was a full-dress reconsideration by the Government of
India of its whole attitude towards the non-cooperation movement.

Under Vincent's guidance the Home Department reviewed the situation in detail.
They were worried about the potential effects of Gandhi's campaign on "the labour
element in the big towns" and on certain "large bodies of . . . tenants,"10 but after
careful consideration they reached the deliberate conclusion that the time had not yet
come for them to abandon their former policy. Each member of the Viceroy's Council
expressed his agreement with this view in a lengthy note, and in an important
letter to local Governments of 28 January 192I the Government of India set out its
considered opinion.

The policy which the Government of India have so far pursued in regard to the non-
cooperation movement [the letter stated] has been that of non-interference.... They have
taken the view that this movement, if left to itself, will eventually collapse; that repres-
sion would merely give the stimulus which persecution so often supplies; that a direct
attack on the leaders, and in particular on Gandhi, would probably precipitate violent out-
breaks with the inevitable aftermath of bitterness and racial hatred; and that any exten-
sive interference with the freedom of speech and liberty of the Press is inconsistent with,
and would be likely to prejudice, the working of the new constitution. At the same
time the limits to the policy of non-interference have been clearly indicated.... Neverthe-
less [the Government of India] have recognized that at any moment events may occur
which will necessitate the abandonment or modification of this policy and the adoption of
other, sterner, and more comprehensive measures; and they have therefore given anxious
consideration to the question whether. . . .any radical change in policy hitherto pursued
is necessary. On the information at present available they do not think that this conclu-
sion would be justified.11

Through four further reappraisals of their policy during the ensuing six months
the Government of India continued to adhere to this policy of non-interference. Until
a great deal more work has been done it is difficult to be at all precise about the
reality of the threat which the non-cooperation campaign presented to them. But no
local government felt free from its pressure, and, besides Craddock, at least four
other governors of provinces were soon feeling distinctly unhappy with their posi-
tion. From the United Provinces, Sir Harcourt Butler tartly remarked that he could
find "no support in recent experience for the view that people soon got tired of
anarchy." Lord Ronaldshay in Bengal, Lord Willingdon in Madras, and somewhat
later Sir George Lloyd in Bombay expressed similar anxieties, and it seems clear that
if the Government of India had at any time during I92I gone over to a policy of
active repression, local governments would quickly have fallen into line. The ten-
sions which prevailed were felt even in the Viceroy's council. The exceptionally able

10 For further details see Peter D. Reeves' article "The Politics of Order" also appearing in this issue
of The journal of Asian Studies.
11 The Notes and correspondence upon which this and the next two paragraphs are mainly based will
be found in H. Poll., 3G and K.W., Deposit (Print), July I92I: see also H. Poll., i9, A, May 192I;
252-3, A, Jan. I92I; 423-4, A, April I92I; 49/1I921; 4I5/I92I; I6-24 and K. W., A, June I92I;
44-5, A, June I921; II2/192I; 170/I921.

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 246 D. A. LOW

Finance Member, Sir Malcolm Hailey,12 remarked in January: "We cannot cure
domestic incompatibility with birthday presents"; and returning to the charge in
March, he wrote
. . . there is very little doubt that the matter has gone very much further than most of us
anticipated when the movement first took a definite shape.... The obvious fact is that
in a hundred directions it has stirred up feelings which sometimes take a racial turn and
at others take a direction not far different from what we generally describe as Bolshev-
ism. In an Eastern country success in administration depends quite as much on the main-
tenance of a general atmosphere of obedience to authority and acceptation of the existing
order of society as it does on the definite enforcement of statute law or the working of
the administrative machinery.... If these forces continue unimpaired, it is difficult to
suppose that the numerous classes which form the backbone of our administration or
who carry on our public utility services will remain unaffected. . . . It was obviously
statesmanlike to give it [the non-cooperation movement] every chance of working itself
to destruction, and our attitude of toleration counted for much for the improvement in
the political situation. But it seems clear that toleration, to say the least has not effected
nearly as much as we had hoped from it.

For all that he accepted his colleagues' decision to persist with their policy of non-
interference; the Home Department found nothing in the Governors' strictures
upon it to justify a change; the Government's policy won the approval of the mod-
erates in an important debate in the Imperial Legislative Council in March I921;13
and it was upheld by the new Viceroy, Lord Reading, following his arrival in April.14

All the time, however, the non-cooperation movement was gathering momentum,
and eventually towards the end of July the Government took the first step towards
the arrest of Gandhi's foremost allies, the Ali brothers, who were the acknowledged
leaders of the Khilafat movement.15 On July eighth and ninth the brothers had taken
a major part in drawing up a resolution at the Khilafat conference in Karachi which
said that it was "wholly unlawful for every Muhammadan at this time to remain or
enlist in the English army . . . and it is the duty of Muhammadans in general . . . that
they should carry these injunctions to Muhammadans of the Army." When this was
reported to Lord Rawlinson, the Commander-in-Chief (and as such a member of the
Viceroy's Council), he promptly declared that the time had come for "action on the
part of the authorities." Vincent, Reading and the Viceroy's Council felt bound to
agree: there had been distinct evidence that Shaukat Ali had been tampering with the
Army. Two months later the Ali brothers and four of their colleagues were arrested,
and in due course tried, convicted and sentenced to upwards of two years' imprison-
ment.16

12 Hailey, Sir Malcolm, now Lord Hailey, O.M., born i 872, I.C.S. i895, Secretary Punjab Government
I907, Chief Commissioner Delhi I9I2-I8, Finance Member I9I9-22, Home Member I922-24, Governor
Punjab I924-9, U.P. 1929-34, author An African Survey 1938 (revised edition 1956), Member Perma-
nent Mandates Commission I935-9.
13 imperial Legislative Asssembly Debates, Vol. I, I92I, pt. II, sub 23 Mar. I92I.
14 Reading, Rufus Daniel Isaacs, Marquess, b. I86o, Solicitor-General I9I0, Attorney-General 1910-13,
Lord Chief Justice 1913-2I, Special Envoy to U.S.A., 19I5, I9I7, I9I8, Viceroy I92I-26, Foreign Secre-
tary I93I, d. 1935.
15 Their arrest had been contemplated earlier, H. Poll., I6-24 and K.W., A, June I921; 3 (Conf.)
and K.W., Deposit (Print), July 192I; II2/1922.
16 H. Poll. 155/1922.

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 FIRST NON-COOPERATION MOVEMENT 247

So soon as the terms of the charge against them

public the words which had provided their basis.1
countless platforms across the country, and soon
nearly 50 prominent Indians with Gandhi at th
objections which could still be raised, the Secretary of the Home Department sug-
gested that this amounted to an open challenge to the Government which it could not
overlook, and that the time had accordingly come for Gandhi's arrest. But there
was then an important intervention by Sapru, the Indian liberal politician who was
the Law Member of Council. In a closely argued note to Vincent he urged that the
issue was

not so much a question of law as it is one of political expediency. ... We have waited so
long, I think we may yet wait a little longer, and I should wait for Mr. Gandhi to put
himself palpably in the wrong, so as to make it impossible for anyone to say that the Gov-
ernment should ignore what he was doing. We may either reach a stage when Mr. Gandhi
by some overt act will place himself so much in the wrong that we should be doing the
right thing in prosecuting him then, or we may reach a stage when a considerable body
of opinion will have detached itself from Mr. Gandhi and the situation will then have be-
come easier.

This argument not only convinced the Council; henceforth they made it their own:
they would stalk Gandhi, not martyr him.'8

But the conflict in India was now beginnning to sharpen seriously. The number
of violent clashes in different parts of the country was mounting steadily (in August
the most harrowing of the long series of fanatical Moplah rebellions broke out in
southern India: this was to some extent sui generis, but as the Home Department
pointed out, every tense situation now seemed likely to erupt in violence), and even-
tually at a meeting of the All-India Congress Committee in Delhi on 4 November
Gandhi announced that he would shortly begin civil disobedience by organizing the
non-payment of land revenue in the Bardoli taluka of Gujarat. The opening date for
this was soon fixed for 23 November.
By this time the whole situation for the Government of India was becoming un-
usually complicated because the Prince of Wales was about to begin a goodwill visit
to India.19 He was due to arrive in Bombay on 17 November, and the Government
of India was increasingly afraid that the growing turmoil in the country would over-
flow while he was there. At the least this would be a very grave embarrassment.
Congress, moreover, which had long since decided to boycott the visit, was soon
arranging a hartal (a closing of shops) to coincide with his landing; and on 17
November, in a number of cities, not least in northern India, a most successful
hartal was in fact effected. It was particularly successful in Calcutta, where from the
Government's point of view the situation became exceedingly serious: the police
clashed with Congress' National Volunteers, and, on their own admission, Govern-
ment forces temporarily lost control of the heart of the city. In Bombay on the same

17 This had been expected, Sapru to Vincent, i6 Aug. I92I, and Chief Sec. Bombay to G. of I., 25
Aug. I92I, tel., H. Poll., I55/I922.
18 H. Poll. 303/I92I.
19 Ibid.

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 248 D. A. LOW

day the situation was even worse. A crowd which was especially angry with the
Parsis in the city who were playing a full part in welcoming the Prince ashore, took
to rioting, looting and violence. Some Parsis and others retaliated, and, despite the
efforts both of Gandhi and the Government, the ensuing disturbances were not finally
quelled until five days later. Gandhi was so put out by the violence which now seemed
to have overtaken his campaign, that he embarked on a five day fast, and postponed
the date he had set for the institution of civil disobedience in Bardoli.

The Government of India saw the Bombay riots and the hartal in Calcutta as the
culmination of the whole series of violent episodes which had been occurring in vari-
ous parts of the country for several months past, and they now reacted more sharply
than ever before.20 On 24 November 192I, in one more long letter of instructions,
they told local Governments that "a stage has now been reached at which action on
a more drastic and comprehensive scale than has hitherto been attempted is now re-
quired."'21 Most local Governments needed little prompting. The Government of
Bengal in particular took very determined action. Various associations of National
Volunteers were proscribed; numerous political meetings prohibited; and those who
flouted the Government's orders were swiftly arrested. As a result many non-coop-
erators, including some very prominent ones like C. R. Das in Bengal, Lajpat Rai in
the Punjab, and Motilal Nehru in the U.P., soon found themselves in prison.
Nevertheless the Home Department still did "not believe that the time has yet
come for . .. a declaration of war to the knife against the leaders of the non-coopera-
tion movement." There were, it insisted, only two ways of governing India; either
with the cooperation or acquiescence of at least a considerable section of the popula-
tion, or "by force, naked and undisguised." So far every step taken against the non-
cooperation movement had "been taken with the approval, tacit and unenthusiastic
or critical it may be, but none the less real, of the Moderate elements in this country";
and they wanted to keep it that way.22
But in one vital respect they had miscalculated. For it very soon became clear that
the numerous proscriptions, arrests and prosecutions which had been carried out by
local Governments in the period after I7 November, and sanctioned by the Gov-
ernment of India's letter of 24 November, were having an extremely disturbing effect
upon the moderate elements in the country.23 They were now "openly expressing
dissatisfaction with Government policy," which they saw as unduly repressive, and
there was a very real possibility that they would swing over to the Congress side. For
the Government of India that threatened to create an exceedingly serious situation.
The crisis was reaching its climax.24

20 Ibid. H. Poll. 4II/1921.

21 H. Poll. 780/I922.
22 H. Poll. 4I5/I921.
23 e.g. Manifesto of Indian Association and National Liberal League, The Statesman, I7 December
192I: Bengalee, I7 Dec. I92I.
24Reading to all Governors, I9 Dec. I92I, Reading Mss. 23; I am deeply indebted to the Dow
Marchioness of Reading for special permission to see her husband's papers which seem to be the
place where this telegram (to which reference is made in both H. Poll. K.W., to 89/I922, and in
Mss. Vol. XXVII, National Library, Calcutta) and other telegrams quoted here, are to be found. See al
Reading's speeches at this time, Syed Sirdar Ali Khan, The Earl of Reading, London I924, pp. 24
"I am being flooded with telegrams and representations protesting against the recent repressive pol

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 FIRST NON-COOPERATION MOVEMENT 249

In a desperate attempt to control the situation R

the proposal which Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya had been pressing upon him,
that he should call a round table conference with the moderates and Gandhi.25
This idea had been discussed in Government circles on a number of occasions, but
hitherto it had always been rejected not only because it was felt that the Government
could not possibly concede what the non-cooperators wanted, but more particularly
because they were anxious not to undermine the moderates' position by going be-
hind their backs26 There was now no question, however, of offending the moder-
ates: it was a question of preventing them from slipping over into the Congress
camp. Reading, who was in Calcutta, was particularly worried because the Prince of
Wales was due to visit the city on 24 December: there was considerable danger of
another hartal on that date; and he feared that it might be as successful-and from
the Government's point of view as disastrous-as that which had taken place on
17 November. He therefore made it plain that if Gandhi would call off the non.
cooperation campaign-and in particular the hartal in Calcutta on 24 December-the
Government would rescind its repressive measures, release prisoners, and call a
round table conference.27
It has been generally understood that at this the British would have conceded
full responsible government to the provinces. Reading, however, did everything he
possibly could to insist that he would go to the conference quite uncommitted. But
he recognized that there was "generally throughout India . . . a desire for some form
of responsible government"; he was leaning heavily on his Law Member, Sapru,
whose sympathies plainly lay in favor of further constitutional advance; and on
i8 December in telegraphing to Montagu-"because I want you to understand clearly
what will be, or may be, the effect of our agreeing to enter into a Conference"-he
specifically stated that he could "conceive proposals for amendment of the present
Act with the object of improving the constitutional machinery and advancing on
the road to the ultimate goal of Dominion status." It is true that he was not prepared
to recommend such a step immediately. "But yet," he said, "I do see that the pace is
quickening." When the Cabinet in London received his telegram they had no doubts
about what was involved. "We cannot see," Montagu replied on their behalf, "how it
is possible to stop such a Conference developing into a simple demand for Swaraj,
and for proclaiming a scheme of government approved by Parliament only two years
ago and in operation for less than a year." Moreover, it seemed obvious to them (as
everything which the Viceroy and the Government of India said at this time would
clearly imply) "that a Conference which fails is infinitely worse than no Conference
at all."28

Government and in some cases a Conference has been suggested," Reading to Vincent, tel., 17 Dec. I92I,
H. Poll. 201/VI/I922.
25 Reading to Montagu, private telegrams, i5, i6, I7, i8 December 192I, Reading Mss. I0.
26Home Dept. Note 25 Apr. I921, H. Poll., 124, A, May I92I; Bajpai to Sapru [3 May 192I],
Sapru Mss. Vol. III, B8; Sinha to Sapru, 5 May I92I, Sapru Mss. Vol.-XXVII, S376: Notes by Vincent,
30 July 1921, by Sapru, 6 Aug. 192I and Order-in-Council 12 Aug. 192I, H. Poll., 89/II/I921; Note by
Vincent, io Nov., I921, H. Poll., 303/1921. M. R. Jayakar, The Story of My Life, I, Bombay 1958, p. 504.
Ch. VIII of this book contains an important amount of further material on this whole episode.
27 Reading to Montagu, private, telegram, i8 Dec. I92I, Reading Mss. I0. See also ibid. 17 Dec. I92I;
and Reading to Harcourt Butler, 22 Dec. 1921, ibid. 23.
28 Montagu to Reading, private, telegram, 20 Dec. 192I, Reading Mss. Io.

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 250 D. A. LOW

By i8 December
was ready to atte
delegation to attend upon the Viceroy in Calcutta on the twenty-first to settle the
details.29 On I9 December Reading-plainly under enormous strain-informed the
provincial Governors of what was afoot. A few of them telegraphed their assent. But
Willingdon in Madras made it plain that he was distinctly disturbed. Sir William
Marris in Assam objected most strongly. Sir George Lloyd in Bombay (who had
clearly been shaken by the riots in November) sent two telegrams in one day protest-
ing roundly; and Sir Harcourt Butler in U.P. wired that he and his council "would
regard the release of prisoners in these Provinces now as a complete surrender of
Government involving paralysis of administration."30 At this fateful moment, there-
fore, three or four of the most senior British Governors in India were directly
and even vehemently opposed to the Viceroy's policy. What was more the Cabinet
was against it too, as they made very clear in a long telegram which Montagu sent to
Reading after a hastily summoned Cabinet meeting.3' Yet, as Reading told Montagu
a few days later, "on the morning of 2ISt when I had not had your or Local Govern-
ment's answers, I was in a very difficult position and was prepared to act on my own
responsibility if the proper assurances had been forthcoming"32-so close did all con-
cerned come to a dramatic upheaval.
But it never occurred; and the British position was saved, because by the time
Reading saw the moderate delegation on the twenty-first Gandhi had eventually
decided to reject the overtures which had been made to him, except on conditions
which went beyond those which had been privately adumbrated.33 In his reply to the
deputation, Reading accordingly declared that since his terms had not been accepted,
there were no grounds for summoning a round table conference. He went out of his
way, however, to be conciliatory, because he was still desperately anxious to check
the erosion of moderate support; in particular he made it clear-since he had not
received the cabinet's veto-that the door to a round table conference still stood open
if his conditions should be met in the future.34 His speech had an important
effect. It did not improve the situation but it did prevent it from becoming worse. The
moderates were checked in their slide towards Congress, and on 24 December
the Prince of Wales visited Calcutta and was given a reception with which the Gov-
ernment was very well pleased.35

29 Sapru to Hignell (Private Secretary to the Viceroy), i6 Dec. I92I (2 letters), Sapru Mss. XXII,
R29o-i: Reading to Montagu, private, telegram, i8 Dec. I92I, Reading Mss. Io.
30 Reading to all Governors, telegram, I9 Dec. I92I, Reading Mss. I0: Governor, Bombay, to Viceroy
two telegrams, 20 Dec. I92I; Governor, Assam, to Viceroy, telegram, 20 Dec. I92I; Acting Governor,
Bihar and Orissa, to Viceroy, telegram, 20 Dec. I92I; Governor, Madras, to Viceroy, telegram, 20 Dec.
I92I; Private Secretary to Governor, Central Provinces, to Private Secretary to Viceroy, telegram, 20 Dec.
I92I; Governor, United Provinces, to Viceroy, telegram, 20 Dec. I92I; Lieutenant Governor, Burma, to
Viceroy, telegram, 2I Dec. I92I, H. Poll. K.W. to 89/I922; also in Sapru Mss. Vol. XXVII, V7.
31 See footnote 28.
32 Reading to Montagu, private, telegram, 24 Dec. I92I, Reading Mss. I0.
33 On I8 Dec. Sapru had received a telegram from Jamnadas Dwarkadas in Ahmedabad which read:
"Seen Gandhiji. Agrees attend Conference called by Viceroy or anyone without imposing any previous
condition," Sapru to Vincent, i8 Dec. I92I, Sapru Mss. Vol. XXVII, V8. On 20 Dec. I92I Gandhi wired
to Malaviya, "Regret exceedingly inability give undertaking asked. Non-cooperation can cease only after
satisfactory result conference. In no case have I authority decide for Congress," Tendulkar, II, p. 95.
94 Ali Khan, Reading, pp. 260-268.
85 Viceroy to Secretary of State, tel., 28 Dec. I92I, H. Poll. I8/I92I.

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FIRST NON-COOPERATION MOVEMENT 251

But there was no break in the crisis. Amidst continued excitement, Congress met
at Ahmedabad in the last week of December for its annual session. It rejected Read-
ing's offer of a round table conference. It gave Gandhi almost dictatorial powers;
and Gandhi himself now announced that he would go ahead with the inauguration
of civil disobedience in Bardoli. But he seems to have agreed with the Government
that at this stage the battle was primarily one for the allegiance of the moderates, for
he now placed in the forefront of his public declarations a vehement denunciation of
the repressive acts of the Government, which was patently designed to win moderate
sympathy. Sensing their own crucial position, a number of moderates led by such
middle-of-the-road men as Malaviya, Sankeran Nair, Jinnah and Jayakar hastily con-
vened an emergency "leaders" conference in Bombay on I4 January in a further at-
tempt to bring Reading and Gandhi together. Gandhi attended as an observer, and
in order to give the ensuing negotiations a chance to succeed, Congress postponed its
"offensive civil disobedience" until 3I January. Very quickly the Conference made an
approach to Reading for a round table conference. But it had not managed to per-
suade Gandhi to call off his non-cooperation campaign, and this enabled Reading to
reply that since Gandhi was not willing to carry out the Government's terms, the
Government, for its part, had nothing to offer either.36
By this time the Viceroy was in an exceedingly difficult position. The Cabinet had
left him no room for maneuver and was being distinctly unhelpful. For the first time
there was a distinct cleavage between the British and the Indian Members of the
Viceroy's Council. The latter wanted to leave the way open for rapid constitutional
advance along any road which might open up; the former were becoming impatient
with the whole idea.37 It was now obvious, moreover, that the Viceroy and his
policy were deeply suspect in the eyes of some of his most senior Governors. In
particular during January and February there was steadily increasing pressure from
Sir George Lloyd, the Governor of Bombay, who wanted to see Gandhi arrested im-
mediately.38

The essential point [Lloyd telegraphed to Reading on 7 January] is that if the policy of
Gandhi is allowed to continue unchecked, it will create a situation ending inevitably in
violence which Gandhi could not control even should he wish to do so, and which the
other probable results pointed out by me, in particular the defections of the moderate
party and corruption of the police and army, would render extremely difficult to retrieve.

In more than one telegram, Lloyd returned to the charge. But the Governor of India
would not be hustled; and it knew the reasons why. On I9 January the Secretary of
the Home Department noted at length that

It can no doubt be urged, and this is of course the essence of the Bombay contention,
that the non-cooperation movement has shown great vitality: that its hold upon the
country has grown and is growing; and that it is no longer safe to refrain from taking
action against the leaders. No one can deny that there are risks in refraining from action.
But the balance of argument is still in my opinion decisively against a prosecution at this
juncture. In the struggle with Gandhi the fight has always been a fight for position. In
November and December last the tactical advantage passed for a time to Gandhi. Dur-

36 H. Poll. 46I/I92I: H. Poll. K.W. to 89/I922.

87 H. Poll. 89/I/i922: H. Poll. 6I0/I922.
38 Adam, Lloyd, pp. i 6o sqq.

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 252 D. A. LOW

ing the present m

favour of Governm
up by Gandhi and
by Government ha
at a moment whe
efforts are concen
the issue is one of
by the Government for the moment would be lost. The pendulum would swing
round, probably violently, in favour of Gandhi, and the non-cooperation movement
would acquire an additional impetus and additional support. The one issue upon which
all sensible Indian opinion would be behind the Government is that of mass civil dis-
obedience. At present it seems clear Gandhi does not propose to take this step. .. . Sooner
or later however he will be forced into proclaiming mass civil disobedience. . . and then,
and then only, Government will be in a position to enter on the final struggle with him
and his movement without the risk of alienating such support as we have in the country,
and precipitating a crisis which would break the constitution.

Reading was now so convinced, however, that before long Gandhi would enter on
this "final struggle" that he told Lloyd on 23 January that he completely agreed "as to
the necessity for prompt prosecution. The only difference is that Government of
India wish to await Gandhi's next step which must be of a direct challenging char-
acter."39

On I February, Gandhi issued a public challenge to the Government. On the

sixth the Government of India replied with a long communique. The long awaited
moment for the final struggle had arrived.
Reading and his Council were now stretched to the limit. For on top of Lloyd's
expostulations there were now being added more from the Cabinet in London.40
Disorder, moreover, was spreading, particularly in the U.P. where on 4 February a
mob of villagers and national volunteers, some 2,000 strong, attacked and burnt the
thana buildings at Chauri Chaura in Gorakhpur district, and stripped, mutilated and
burnt the bodies of the police and government officials who were trapped inside.4' On
6 February the Secretary of State with the full support of both the Cabinet and the
Council of India telegraphed out in some anger that in London they were all

very anxious regarding the state of India. Every successive telegram adds to the impres-
sion that the situation is very serious. . . the continued freedom of Gandhi to organize
and issue justification of civil disobedience must lead to disaster.... We owe it to those
who would otherwise become his tools or dupes to protect them. The situation has
already passed beyond the stage where it can be adequately dealt with by press com-
muniques....

Reading in reply protested vigorously at the Cabinet's insinuations, and veh

defended the whole basis of his policy. But he told them that in view of G
latest statement he had now taken the crucial decision and had "instructed t

39 H. Poll. 489/I922.
40 Secretary of State to Viceroy, tel. 2 Feb. I922, and Home Department Notes, ibid.
41 H. Poll. 563/1922: H. Poll., 667/1922.

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FIRST NON-COOPERATION MOVEMENT 253

ernment of Bombay to take immediate steps for his arrest and prosecution." The
date for this was soon fixed for February 14.42
But his arrest as planned never took place.
The next few days were taut with tension. On 7 February Gandhi issued a sharp
rejoinder to the Government's communique. On the following day, however, news
of the Chauri Chaura incident became public and, as is well known, Gandhi im-
mediately took the momentous decision to suspend his whole campaign, and at Bar-
doli on ii and I2 February 1922 had this suspension endorsed by the Working Com-
mittee of the All-India Congress Committee.43
On I3 February Reading and his Council assembled to discuss the situation now
confronting them. They had already given orders to Lloyd in Bombay to effect
Gandhi's arrest on the following day. It was clear that the Cabinet in London was
expecting this to happen very soon. More immediately a major debate on the
situation in India was due to be held in the House of Commons on the fourteenth
and fifteenth and the Government in London was anxious to be able to announce in
the course of it that Gandhi's arrest was imminent. Furthermore it was now quite
plain that the Government of India's previous policy was under mounting attack
both from the most important governors of provinces and from the Cabinet in
London. And it was clear too that Gandhi had only suspended his campaign; he had
not called it off altogether.44 All in all, therefore, the pressures on the Government of
India had now reached such a point that on the morning of I3 February a majority
of the Viceroy's Council decided that the arrest of Gandhi on the following day
should take place as planned.
But Sapru, the Law Member, was extremely unhappy. After the meeting had
dispersed, he reread the press telegrams which had come in from Bardoli, and then
took up his pen and wrote personally to the Viceroy. Hitherto, he said, the Govern-
ment of India had had "no indication that Mr. Gandhi and the Working Com-
mittee realized the danger of the situation." To arrest him now would only "give a
fresh stimulus to the movement" and compel those who had worked for this sudden
change of program to stand by him to the end. In the circumstances it was vital, he
urged, that the Government of India

should not lose the moral advantage we have gained over Mr. Gandhi. . . but should on
the contrary exploit the new consciousness of danger to the benefit of the country and
the state. . . . In the end I shall respectfully and earnestly beg Your Excellency not in
the interests of Gandhi but in the larger interests of the country and the Government to
consider whether you cannot postpone his arrest tomorrow.45

Most dramatically Sapru's plea succeeded. Reading was worried about the possibility
of Sapru's resignation (and of its probable ill-effects upon the moderates) if he did

42 Secretary of State to Viceroy, tel. 6 Feb. I922; Viceroy to Secretary of State, 8 Feb. I922; Order in
Council, 8 Feb. I922, H. Poll. 489/I922.
43 H. Poll., 580/11/I922: Bombay to Home Dept., i8 Feb. I922, H. Poll., I8/I922.
44Secretary of State to Viceroy, tel. ii, I4 Feb. I922; Home Department, G. of I. to Bombay, tel.,
ii Feb. I922, H. Poll. 489/I922.
45 Sapru to Reading, I3 Feb. I922, Sapru Mss. Vol. XXII, R295.

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 254 D. A. LOW

not give way;48

the orders to eff
Lloyd was beside himself with anger.48 He wired back his "emphatic protest."
"The Bardoli resolutions," he fumed, "afford no justification for any modification
of policy or plan." But the Government of India held firm.49 And in the days that
followed their patience was richly rewarded. In the aftermath of Chauri Chaura most
moderates abandoned their flirtation with Congress, while some Congressmen be-
came so gravely concerned at the increasing signs there now were that their move-
ment could dissolve into violence that they made it very plain that they wanted it to
stop immediately. At the same time there were soon signs all around that for many
other Congressmen who did not share these sentiments, Gandhi's decision to
call his campaign to a halt had consituted a fearful blow to their morale. For eighteen
months past their enthusiasm had been building up to a very high peak. When he
suddenly ordered an immediate cessation, their sense of anti-climax was profound.
The spirit went out of them, and in the weeks that followed their enthusiasm crum-
bled and collapsed. By the end of March, the first non-cooperation movement was
no more.50
Why then in March5l did the Government evefitually arrest Gandhi? There
seem to have been four sets of reasons. First, it seems likely that they would have
been in serious trouble with the Cabinet in London if they had not. Secondly, Read-
ing, at the height of his exchanges with Lloyd in January and February, had com-
mitted himself quite explicitly to the "prompt arrest" of Gandhi. At that stage, it
is true, there was no idea that the non-cooperation movement might suddenly col-
lapse. But, as we have seen, Reading had emphasized to Lloyd that the only differ-
ence between the Government of India and the Government of Bombay concerned
not the issue itself but the moment at which to strike. He could not go back on this.
Then thirdly, when the All-India Congress Committee met in Delhi on 25 February
to consider the resolutions of its Working Committee at Bardoli on the eleventh and
twelfth, it specifically declared that the program of non-cooperation was not to be
abandoned. The inherent challenge to the Government's authority accordingly re-
mained, and many in the Government obviously felt that the time had come for them
to deliver their coup de grace.52 And fourthly, by mid-March it was safe to effect
Gandhi's arrest. He himself, early in the month, in anticipation of this event (which
he felt could not possibly be delayed for very much longer) issued a statement ask-
ing that there should be no public demonstrations whenever it did occur. But from

46 Reading to Montagu, private and personal, telegram, 14 Feb. 1922, Reading Mss. i6.
47 Home Dept., to Bombay, tel. 13 Feb. I922; Viceroy to Secretary of State, 14 Feb. 1922, H. Poll.
489/I922.
48 Bombay to Home Dept. 14 Feb. 1922. H. Poll. 489/I922. Lloyd had already, before the Bardoli de-
cision, warned the Government of India that in his view it would in no sense constitute a reason for the
postponement of Gandhi's arrest, see Bombay telegram, io Feb. I922, ibid.
49 Orders in Council, 15, i6 Feb. 1922, ibid.
50 e.g. various papers in H. Poll. 50I/I922: H. Poll., 897/I922: H. Poll. 941/I922: H. Poll. 900/1922
and see next footnote.
51 Order in Council [i Mar. 1922], H. Poll., 489/1922.
52 e.g. Notes by Innes and Rawlinson, 2i Feb. I922, H. Poll., 327/III/I922: Also H. Poll., 459/II/1922;
and 'Report of a discussion which took place at Viceregal Lodge on the 20th February 1922', H. Poll.,
459/I921: Viceroy to Secretary of State, 27 Feb. 1922, H. Poll. 678/1922: Viceroy to Secretary of State,
tel., i Mar. 1922, H. Poll., 489/1922.

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FIRST NON-COOPERATION MOVEMENT 255

the Government's point of view the more important consideration was that, after
Chauri Chaura, there was no longer any real danger that Gandhi's arrest would
alienate the moderates. Reading was still afraid there would be serious disturb-
ances,53 but when in fact Gandhi was arrested on io March I922 there was not a
single incident in the whole of the country. On i8 March he was convicted of bring-
ing "into hatred or contempt. . . the Government established by law in British
India" and sentenced to six years' simple imprisonment.
Thereafter the Indian national movement fell into sad disarray. Gandhi was in
prison. The Khilafatists soon defected. Within Congress itself there was a great
argument between those who now favored "Council entry" and those who wished
to maintain the existing boycott-between "pro-changers" and "no-changers." And
not for another five years was there to be anything like the countrywide enthusi-
asm which had been witnessed in I92I.
By June I922, therefore, the Government of India was, understandably enough,
congratulating itself on the way the crisis had been surmounted:
If we had attempted forcibly [they told the new Secretary of State, Lord Peel] to
suppress the non-cooperation movement at an earlier stage, we should in all probability
not only have provoked wide-spread disturbances-we have never doubted our capacity
to deal with such-but should have alienated Indian opinion, and have diverted to the
enemies of Government, that support which as the campaign proceeded, has been
ranged more and more, by the excesses and blunders of the non-cooperationists, on the
side of Government. The check administered to the movement would have been tem-
porary; before long the agitation would have been revived in one form or another with
renewed force, and a situation might well have arisen, in which the constitution could
no longer have been worked, and we should have been confronted with the necessity
either of making sweeping concessions or of governing by sheer force, and without that
cooperation of the Indian people, which has been the basis of British rule in the past
and is essential to its continued success. ...54
There was complacency here, but as a statement of the thinking which governed the
Government of India during I920-I922 it was perfectly fair.

Gandhi had dominated the non-cooperation campaign. Thanks largely to his ex-
ample the national movement had extended its hold into quite new quarters.55 On
the face of it, however, "swaraj," which he had promised within one year, was as far
away as ever. Part of the trouble here lay in the constant switches of emphasis which
he had made during the course of his campaign. Like the Government he had only
been feeling his way forward. In I920 he had begun with the righting of the Khila-
fatist and then of the Punjab wrongs: later in the year "Swaraj in one year" had be-
come his chief slogan. There followed the emphasis on the renunciation of titles;
then on the triple boycott of councils, colleges and courts; then on the collection of
a crore of rupees for the Tilak memorial fund, the crore of members for the Indian
National Congress, and the establishment of two lakhs of spinning wheels in Indian

53 Reading to Montagu, 9 Mar. 1922, Reading Mss. 4.

54 Viceroy to Secretary of State, tel., 7 June 1922, H. Poll. 410/II/1922: a further summary account
of their views is in Viceroy to Secretary of State, 5 Dec. 1922, H. Poll., 4IO/Ill/I922.
55 e.g. "The non-cooperation movement, whatever may be its other achievements, has spread political
ideas, I may say revolutionary ideas, among the masses of the people and their placid contentment has
been disturbed far beyond the anticipations of the late Secretary of State." Willingdon to Vincent, i July
1922, H. Poll., 4I8 and K.W./I922.

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 256 D. A. LOW

homes across the countryside. But between July and September I92I the emphasis
had switched to swadeshi; and thereafter to civil disobedience and the non-payment
of land revenue: in the midst of this, however, he had trained his sights on the
Government's sins in destroying freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, and
imprisoning some of those very widely respected men who had followed his cause.
This vacillation meant that preparations for active civil disobedence were never suffi-
cently organized. At the same time various doubts had had time to spread in the
minds of his followers; doubts in the minds of Khilafatists about the loyalty of
Hindus to the cause of the Muslims; doubts-after Moplah-in the minds of Hindus
about the reliability of Muslims. Doubts too in the minds of men as varied as Bepin
Chandra Pal, Rabindranath Tagore, M. R. Jayakar, and C. F. Andrews,56 about the
course which the campaign was taking; and doubts as well in the minds of many
others of his followers about whether, since the campaign was not yet yielding any
practical results, his non-violence creed should be taken so seriously: perhaps more
might be wrought by violence. When this point was reached, and violence erupted,
Gandhi-true to all his professions of non-violence-called the campaign swiftly to
a halt.
Here was a vital determinant in the unfolding of the whole story. But no less
vital was the stance adopted by the Government of India. Had they given themselves
over to violence-as Craddock, for example, was quite prepared to do-the whole
story would have been markedly different. So far, however, as the two main pro-
tagonists were concerned, the conflict in I920-I922, (for all their differences of ap-
proach), was a struggle between irreconcilable political principles with resort to
murder or violence of that sort ruled unacceptable. Whenever Gandhi saw violence
threatening to overtake his campaign, he called it to a halt. But equally-and we may
note the point especially-when in December 192I the Government of India saw its
whole position collapsing around it, it quite deliberately chose to advance towards
constitutional concession rather than give itself over to ruthless repression.
If, of course, Gandhi had allowed his movement to dissolve into violence, he
would have been false to his whole credo. But, what was more, men of moderate
opinion who held him in high esteem would have deserted him unequivocally (and
probably taken a number of Congressmen with them), and the Government would
have been free, if it had then so wished, to go over to active, full-scale repression,
with, at the very least, the support of a substantial number of influential moderates.
If on the other hand the Government had gone over to violent repression before the
national movement had given it-in moderate eyes-sufficient cause, it would have
blocked the road of steady constitutional progress which it had deliberately chosen
as the way to avoid a head-on collision with all Indian opinion.
In all this the weathercocks in the storm were the moderates. These were the
men who with Jamnadas Dwarkadas (speaking in the central Legislative Assembly
in January 1922) took the view that "You have to choose between Government of
any kind on the one hand and on the other anarchy, chaos, disorder which will for

56 Presidential address, Bengal Provincial Conference, 25 March I92I; Tagore, Towards Universal
Man, London I96I, p. 377; Andrews to Rabindranath Tagore, 25 Dec. I92I, B. Chaturvedi and M.
Sykes Charles Freer Andrews, a narrative, London I949, pp. I78-79 [I owe these three references to
John Broomfield]; Jayakar, Life, I, ch. 7.

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FIRST NON-COOPERATION MOVEMENT 257

centuries give a setback to the progress of this country."57 There was a significant
minority of such men. In the provinces, and at the centre, numbers of them manned
the legislatures established under the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. Except momen-
tarily, and uncertainly, in December and January I92I-I922, Gandhi never fully
appreciated their political importance. Their essential attitudes towards the conflict
were clear. Like Gandhi they were opposed to violence; like him they wanted India
to be self-governing; they would not, however, support non-cooperation: yet they
would not support governmental repression either. Throughout most of the non-
cooperation campaign they backed the Government; but when in November and
December I92I the Government went over to partial repression they began to transfer
their support to Congress. Had Gandhi agreed in December or January I92I-I922
to attend a round table conference, on the terms which Reading offered, there can be
very little doubt that they would have formed a common front with him.58 In the
circumstances of the time it is difficult to doubt that this would have caused the
British enormous embarrassment: it would have brought (as C. R. Das under-
stood59) a considerable moral victory to the non-cooperation movement; and it could
very well have secured substantial constitutional concessions as well. Of course the
Government in London could have repudiated Reading; or Reading could have
failed to satisfy the moderates. But in either event there can be little doubt that the
moderates would have seen a breach of faith and have reacted very sharply indeed.
This would have sealed their alliance with Gandhi (as a similar affront over the
Simon Commission did in I927), and, in the circumstances of I922, that would have
threatened a collapse of the constitution, and all which that implied in the further
desperate choices with which the Government would have been confronted. Unfor-
tunately for the immediate political success of the non-cooperation campaign, Gandhi
never seems to have sufficiently appreciated that in the circumstances which existed
at the end of I92I nothing was more likely to bring a dramatic victory to the na-
tionalist cause than a continued swing to his side of the moderates.
But the Government of India understood. Reading's telegrams to the provincial
Governors on I9 December make that very clear.

It is important to appreciate the position in which the Government stood. The

1920-I92I period was probably the worst moment for Britain's imperial rulers in
India in the ninety years between the Mutiny and I942. They had been cowed by the
events of I919 and the great rise in anti-British feeling which had ensued. By I920,
and even more by I92I, they were confronted by an opposition movement of a kind
and extent they had never encountered before. They had no idea at all about how
their conflict with it might develop, and their policy was plainly based upon little
more than an act of faith. In the words of the Duke of Connaught they repudiated
"in the most emphatic manner the idea that the administration of India has been or
ever can be based on the principle of force or terrorism."60 But if they were to abjure

57 I8 Jan. I922 Imperial Legislative Assembly Debates, Vol. II, I922, pt. II, p. I66o.
58 e.g. the debate in the Imperial Legislative Assembly on I8 Jan. I922, Debates, Vol. II, I922, Pt. 2.
Cf. the earlier debates in Feb. March and Oct. I92I.
59 S. C. Bose, The Indian Struggle, Calcutta I948, p. I00.
60 At the opening of the Imperial Legislative Assembly, 9 Feb. I92I.

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 258 D. A. LOW

force, what alternative had they for securing their authority in India? The "one
great underlying principle," Sir William Vincent told the Legislative Assembly in
January I92I, as if in reply, "is to promote the progress of this country towards re-
sponsible government and at the same time to preserve public tranquility."'" But was
there any assurance that this combination was now possible? Craddock, and other
people who came to think like him, said no; and Hailey concurred that there was
certainly no assurance. But both he and Vincent, together with their colleagues went
on to ask another question-about the maintenance of order. Which, they asked, was
likely to maintain order: quick, harsh, repressive action or a patient, watchful, wait-
ing-upon-events? Here they gave a different answer from Craddock's. They were in
entire agreement with him that nothing was more likely to destroy imperial authority
than disorder; but they were now profoundly convinced that harsh repression created
more problems than it solved. Yet in taking another course, they had no real prece-
dents to guide them; unlike their successors in I929, in I93I and in I942, they held no
concessions up their sleeve; and the risks were enormous. They knew their responsi-
bilities: they were charged with maintaining the authority of the Indian Empire-
that lodestar in the British vision of themselves as a great world power. They had no
illusions, moreover, about the nature and ramifications of the upheavals which were
now taking place all around them. They might very easily have so misjudged the
situation that they would have found themselves cut off from any means of recover-
ing their position except by some quite desperate course; and they might very well
have had an actual major uprising, or a general strike-their greatest fear62-on their
hands. Their only comfort was that they believed that in that event they would have
the support of the moderates in the country, while there was just the faint hope that
before anything quite so serious occurred, the conflict with Gandhi would see some
development which would turn to their advantage.
This of course was cold comfort. Nevertheless, with quite astonishing coolness
they first adopted and then stuck to their wait-and-see policy, and rebutted with
calmness and shrewdness the arguments of those within the walls of Government
who would have nothing of it. In formulating their refusal to take "drastic" action; in
deciding not once, but time and again, not to arrest Gandhi until the twelftlh
hour had struck, they found themselves facing, not only their own doubts, but in-
creasingly vehement opposition, first from the Army, then from the senior Govern-
ors of Provinces, and in the end from the Cabinet in London itself. Their policy, and
their long-continued adherence to it, was therefore, in no sense, a foregone conclusion.
On any number of occasions they could very easily have given way to their critics.
The consequences would obviously have been momentous; we have seen what hap-
pened when they let slip the dogs of war in November I92I. Even as it was, Hailey,
when surveying the choices which lay before them at the onset of the crisis, expres-
sed the opinion that "the present scheme of Reforms cannot, as far as the Govern.
ment of India is concerned, last ten years or anything like it."63
In fact they lasted fifteen. For the patience and perspicacity of the Government of
India eventually secured them a remarkable triumph. It was, of course, a negative

61 23 Mar. I92I Imperial Legislative Assembly Debates, Vol. I, I92I, pt. II, I520.
62 H. Poll. 4I8 and K.W./I922.
63 Note by Hailey, 22 Mar. I92I, H. Poll. 3C and K.W. Deposit (Print), July I92I.

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FIRST NON-COOPERATION MOVEMENT 259

triumph. Nothing had been done to secure the nationalist movement's cooperation.
But whereas in I920-I92I it had been a formidable force, by I922 it was in great dis-
array and from the Government's point of view the immediate threat was over.
Despite occasional temporary suspensions, moreover, the reformed constitution re-
mained in being; some Indians were usually found to work it; and there was neither
widespread armed repression nor, until I937, responsible Government for the Pro-
vinces.64
No one foresaw the precise denouement which occurred. The Government of
India's policy had, however, been geared quite precisely throughout to take advan-
tage of just some such development as eventually took place. All the way through
they had seen the struggle as a conflict for position.65 Whilst Gandhi was campaign-
ing against them, they were campaigning against Gandhi, and in the end they were
careful to see that he and his movement had all the rope they needed to hang them-
selves. Of course the tensions were enormous: in mid-December I92I they found
their position collapsing all around them. But in the end their luck was in. They had,
however, earned it.

04 Willingdon was ready to see it introduced in Madras fifteen years earlier, Willingdon to Vincent, I
July I922, H. Poll., 4I8 and K.W./I922.
65 See, in addition, Home Department Notes of 27 Feb., 2I, 22 Mar. I922, H. Poll., 678/I922.

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