(Ebook PDF) Explorations: Conducting Empirical Research in Canadian Political Science 3Rd Canadian Edition Install Download
(Ebook PDF) Explorations: Conducting Empirical Research in Canadian Political Science 3Rd Canadian Edition Install Download
https://ebooksecure.com/product/ebook-pdf-explorations-
conducting-empirical-research-in-canadian-political-science-3rd-
canadian-edition/
http://ebooksecure.com/product/ebook-pdf-the-fundamentals-of-
political-science-research-3rd-edition/
http://ebooksecure.com/product/ebook-pdf-beginning-research-in-
political-science-by-carolyn-forestiere/
http://ebooksecure.com/product/ebook-pdf-qualitative-research-in-
action-a-canadian-primer-3rd-edition/
http://ebooksecure.com/product/ebook-pdf-conducting-research-
social-and-behavioral-science-methods-2nd-edition/
(eBook PDF) The Fundamentals of Political Science
Research 2nd Edition
http://ebooksecure.com/product/ebook-pdf-the-fundamentals-of-
political-science-research-2nd-edition/
http://ebooksecure.com/product/ebook-pdf-biological-science-
third-canadian-edition-3rd-edition/
http://ebooksecure.com/product/ebook-pdf-statistics-a-tool-for-
social-research-3rd-canadian-edition/
http://ebooksecure.com/product/ebook-pdf-digging-deeper-a-
canadian-reporters-research-guide-3rd-edition/
http://ebooksecure.com/product/original-pdf-sociology-in-
action-3rd-canadian-edition/
Third Edition
Explorations
Conducting Empirical Research
in Canadian Political Science
Glossary 372
References 385
Index 395
There is, then, an applied character to the text. But this approach should not imply an
avoidance of normative issues. We recognize that an interest in the shoulds and oughts of
politics is what draws many students into political science. We also recognize that normat-
ive questions cannot be reduced to empirical questions; knowing how the world is does not
tell us how it should be. At the same time, a great deal of normative debate in politics and
political science employs empirical evidence and understanding. Should there be seat-belt
laws? Prohibition of smoking in public places? Controls on violence in television program-
ming? Limitations on campaign spending in federal or provincial elections? Our answers to
such questions partially depend on assumptions about empirical effects. Thus, a nuanced
empirical understanding of the political world is a means to a richer normative debate and
not a way of avoiding such discussion.
While this text emphasizes the benefits of using the scientific method in understanding
and evaluating the empirical—or observable—world, it is also important to remain mindful
of the method’s limitations, particularly as they relate to the social sciences. Although the
scientific method purports to be a way of understanding the world on the basis of observ-
able facts, we will show that, at times, these facts are a matter of dispute. There are many
possible reasons to explain different perceptions of reality, and these will be introduced and
explored throughout the text.
Underlying this assumption about the importance of empirical understanding is the
reality that research skills are essential in the contemporary labour market. An ability to
design, conduct, and, more commonly, assess empirical research is no longer a frill; it is rap-
idly becoming a necessity. Research literacy is as essential to today’s job market as literacy was
to the job market of earlier generations. We are convinced that, of all the courses you take,
research methods courses are the most immediately relevant to getting and keeping a job.
Finally, we would like to emphasize the thematic intent of the book’s title, Explorations.
It is not our intent to give the last word on empirical research methodology, for the field is
rich, vast, and complex. We hope to open some doors, to provide you with a rough under-
standing of empirical research in political science. Our aim is to equip you with both the
basic skills you need to handle research material and an appreciation of the strengths and
weaknesses of empirical research. The text, then, is no more than a preliminary exploration.
The destinations identified for each chapter are not final but are way stations on what, for
many readers, will undoubtedly become a much longer journey. For others, we trust that
you will find the exploration interesting and helpful as you continue to run up against polit-
ical issues and debates throughout your life.
A number of people assisted in the writing of this new edition. We thank the anonymous
reviewers and the following who took time to comment on the manuscript: Kelly Blidook,
Memorial University of Newfoundland; Elizabeth Bloodgood, Concordia University; Jason
Roy, Wilfrid Laurier University; and Ruben Zaiotti, Dalhousie University.
We thank Roger Gibbins for his work as co-author on the first edition and for support-
ing our revision of the text. We also extend our appreciation to Martin Gaal (University
Many of you will be enrolled in your first common to refer to the discipline and the
course in political science research meth- university or college department as polit-
ods. Some of you might even be coming ical science. Chapter 1 considers what such
to this course, and this book, with a sense a label implies for the ways people in this
of trepidation about the math involved in academic discipline gain knowledge and
political science research. Many of the stu- understanding of their subject matter. In
dents we’ve taught have expressed such Chapter 2 we differentiate between quant-
concerns. So, let’s be frank about this mat- itative and qualitative approaches to polit-
ter at the outset. This book introduces a ics, which are both valid and useful. We
number of techniques that can be used emphasize the quantitative approach but
to assess the strength of relationships expressly consider qualitative approaches
between variables, and we often represent in several chapters.
these relationships by using quantitative The discussion then turns to applying
data. This approach means that we will be the scientific method to the study of polit-
counting and grouping people’s responses ics. In Chapter 3, we ponder the role that
to assess how strongly one characteristic theory plays in our empirical models and
is related to another. To help summarize examine the degree to which we can use
these relationships, a number of statistical quantitative methods to identify causal
techniques—based on mathematical for- relationships in politics. This chapter also
mulas—are introduced. introduces the idea of testing hypotheses
This book, therefore, includes some as a way of conducting empirical research
math. However, political science research and identifies a number of alternative
involves much more than conducting tests models for such hypothesis-testing.
of the relationships between variables. We Chapters 4 and 5 raise the question of
begin with a broader discussion of the use how political scientists define concepts in
of the scientific approach in studying polit- the research and how such concepts are
ics. Many of you are enrolled in a course in “operationalized” as variables that can
a department of political science. Although be measured. The language used in polit-
a couple of generations ago such a depart- ical science research must be precise so
ment might have been called political eco- that, when a term is used to describe a
nomy or simply politics, today it is more phenomenon, there is as little confusion
or disagreement as possible regarding These chapters set the stage for the
the meaning of that term. As we’ll see, more detailed discussions in Part II, con-
achieving this goal is more difficult than it cerning research design and data collec-
might seem. tion, and Part III, focused on data analysis.
This part concludes with Chapter 6, The goal is to ensure that you understand
a discussion of ethics as it relates to con- each stage of the research process and, by
ducting research on human beings. Such following the steps outlined throughout
research requires that subjects be treated the text, become more informed con-
with respect and dignity and that a num- sumers of political science research. You
ber of safeguards be in place to ensure will begin to develop tools to conduct your
compliance with such an expectation. own projects as well.
Destination
By the end of this chapter, you should be able to
An aim of the scientific approach to politics is to use critical thought as a guide to our
perceptions of the political world. Boldly stated, the scientific study of politics attempts to
provide a method whereby observations of the political world can be relatively independent
of the observer. Stated more cautiously, it can help in determining when and why political
perceptions differ.
Not surprisingly, this book takes the view that pursuing the goals of scientific analysis is
worthwhile. Yet we accept the premise that most political research falls far short of the goal
of providing similar observations and interpretations of political reality. A good deal of our
attention will be focused on understanding why political scientists so often disagree about
so many of the most fundamental questions of politics. This discord does not mean that our
understanding of politics has not progressed. On the contrary, much knowledge has been
gained. In some areas of political science, including the study of voting, elections, and polit-
ical belief systems, the scientific approach has so transformed both political practice and
research that they are unrecognizable from earlier generations. Nonetheless, the scientific
approach to politics is not a simple template that can be applied holus-bolus to any political
problem or research question. Its application requires detailed and careful attention from
students and researchers alike.
An example of a divisive issue may help illustrate the role of the scientific approach.
One of the most common features of political life in advanced industrial democracies is the
persistence of female underrepresentation in legislative assemblies. In the 2011 Canadian
general election only 76 of the 308 people (24.7 per cent) elected to the House of Commons
were women. Hence, the fact that women are underrepresented in legislatures can scarcely
be disputed. Far more controversial are the explanations that account for this finding. Some
argue that women are underrepresented out of choice, that they are less inclined than men
to seek elective public office. This explanation can be broken down into the following
propositions: (1) women and men are socialized to have different preferences and/or (2)
women and men have different responsibilities throughout the life cycle that, for instance,
place a greater onus on women for child-rearing and thereby allow men to engage in other
activities, including participating in political parties and seeking election. Another possible
explanation is the systematic bias against strong women candidates that may exist in polit-
ical parties. That is to say, the parties may present barriers that make it difficult for female
candidates to win nominations for office, particularly in highly competitive ridings.
Which of these three explanations for the underrepresentation of women in legis-
latures is the most accurate and informative?1 The answer is important because it can have
profound implications for public policy. If female underrepresentation is caused mainly by
the parties systematically excluding women, the solution (assuming one believes, as we do,
that this is a problem) may be quite different than if it stems largely from gender-specific
differences in either the life cycle or socialization. (Each of these explanations may contain
a partial truth about the causes of differences in political representation.) The key feature of
the scientific approach to politics is that it requires the formulation of testable hypotheses
(see p. 59–60) and the marshalling of empirical data that can confirm or fail to confirm the
hypotheses. It provides a way of applying empirical data to normative questions and public
policy debates.
observations. The more people who observe a phenomenon and the more times it is
observed, the more willing we are to accept it as fact. An empirical statement does not
indicate preferences or values but presents observable facts.
A key issue for empirically based research is the degree to which facts exist independently
of the observer. Witnesses to an accident quite literally perceive things very differently. With
the attendant legal and financial implications of an event such as a traffic accident, it may be
Thus, Dahl’s later work clearly makes normative judgments: liberty is good and,
given that democracy is the best means to liberty, democracy should be pursued.
in the interest of those concerned to observe things differently: neither driver wishes to be
charged with a traffic offence nor have his or her insurance premiums rise. There may be an
incentive, either conscious or unconscious, for perceptions of reality to be distorted.
Some researchers regard this particular example of “fact” filtering as generalizable in
perceptions of the social and political world. In this view, facts are not completely objective,
but perceptions of fact are influenced or mediated by the social and political context of the
observer. To the extent that this statement is true, it may be difficult to fully separate facts
and values or the empirical and normative aspects of the study of politics.
There are other ways in which normative and empirical analysis overlap in the study
of politics. Empirical research is used to question the conclusions of normative analysis,
and normative analysis often employs empirical facts in its arguments. Consider envir-
onmental debates. Environmentalists state empirical facts—changing climate conditions,
endangered species—before stating normative positions: we should reduce emissions, clean
up the oceans, and so on. Similarly, opposition to the environmental movement’s normative
positions contains appeals to empirical fact. Julian Simon (1995, 11) strongly asserts, “Every
measure of material and environmental welfare in the United States and in the world has
improved rather than deteriorated . . . there is every scientific reason to be joyful about
the trends in the conditions of the Earth.” Some of the most contentious environmental
debates occur when there is no concrete, agreed-upon empirical evidence. For instance,
do harp seals really deplete cod stocks? Is the global temperature increasing, or are we just
witnessing short-term fluctuations around a constant norm? Is it safer to transport bitumen
from the Alberta oil sands to the west coast of British Columbia by rail or by a dedicated
oil pipeline? While this text is concerned with empirical research, you should note how
frequently empiricism is used in normative debates.
What Is Science?
At its root, science is a set of rules that help us understand the world around us. The rules
describe how we know, not what we know. Science is a method for acquiring knowledge
rather than the knowledge itself. We would call something science not because of the sub-
ject that was being studied but because of the way in which it was being studied. If a study is
done according to the rules of science, it is science. The scientific method consists of formu-
lating hypotheses about the causal relationship between variables and empirically testing
the hypotheses. The goal is to ensure that many observers, acting independently, will make
similar observations and draw similar conclusions about the cause-and-effect relationship.
agreement characterizes mature sciences, enabling the progression from one paradigm (a
framework for understanding) to another. By contrast, the social sciences are characterized by
considerable disagreement over the definition and measurement of key terms. Disagreement
persists—and perhaps always will—over the definition of terms such as democracy, effective
representation, and social class (a topic explored in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5).
A third difference between the two branches of science is the degree of determinacy of
the results. In the natural sciences, the goal is to derive laws of behaviour. In the social sci-
ences, the presence of human agency—free choice—means that outcomes are never com-
pletely determined. Instead of deriving laws of behaviour, the social sciences use probability
in stating the generalized form of causal relationships. The discipline tends to use probabil-
istic statements such as “Young people are less likely than the middle-aged to participate in
politics” rather than deterministic phrases such as “Young people participate less in politics
than do the middle-aged.”
Despite these differences, the scientific method has a number of features that make
it an attractive epistemology, or approach to knowledge. One strength is that it attempts
to remove, or at least to minimize, the effect of the observer on the observed. Two people
working independently of each other to explore a given topic and using the same methodo-
logy under similar conditions should perceive the same result. In this respect, the scientific
method begins with the assumption that no single observer is uniquely suited to perceive
the real world in ways that are denied to all others. Because of the independence of res-
ults from observers, no observer is inherently better able to acquire scientific knowledge.
This principle points to the central place that replication has in science. If the results of a
scientific study cannot be independently verified, they are not accepted as an addition to
that area’s body of knowledge. Therefore, it is essential that results of scientific research
are reported in ways that enable others to verify them through repeated testing of the
empirical relationships.
A second strength of the scientific approach results from its orientation toward cause
and effect. In all scientific research, there is some outcome or set of outcomes that one
wishes to explain. This outcome, or effect, must be clearly stated and defined. There must
also be at least a minimal amount of variance to be explained. In other words, there must
be some change over time or across space or differences in outcome patterns across cases
in the sample. We could not explain, for example, why people voted (voter turnout) in an
election if everyone voted because there is no variance in electoral participation to explain.
The causes of voting (or non-voting) could be examined only if a comparative referent was
introduced by including a set of non-voters in the database.
The task of the research then becomes one of finding which characteristics cause
people (or cases) to vary in outcome. Research will usually involve testing the strength of
alternative causes of an outcome. Continuing with the example of the likelihood of voting,
we could speculate that education may be a factor that affects turnout: people with a higher
level of education are more likely to vote than those with lower education. This idea is called
measurable evidence with which to test hypotheses, and to build theories on the basis of the
observed empirical tests. Furthermore, the expectation is that other researchers, observing
the world independently, can arrive at the same conclusion. The postulates of science (dis-
cussed in the next section) are extrapolations of these positivist principles.
Positivism is sometimes contrasted with interpretivism. The fundamental principle of
interpretivism is that it is not possible, and may not even be desirable, to try to separate the
observer from his or her observations. This perspective holds that human beings infuse the
world with meaning; therefore, it is not reasonable to expect that independent observers
would perceive events in an identical manner. In contemporary social science research, the
different perspectives brought through the positivist and interpretivist approaches can be
seen in the differences between the quantitative and qualitative approaches. These methods
are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.
The assertion that the effects of the observer on the observed can be minimized is
hotly contested by the proponents of postmodernism. The underlying premise of
postmodernism is that reality is socially constructed and that the observer cannot be
separated from what he or she purports to see. Furthermore, not only will one con-
struction of the world differ from another, but there is also no method (and certainly
no scientific method) that enables us to determine which perspective is accurate or
correct. Indeed, postmodernism calls into question such notions as “accurate” or “cor-
rect”; the perspective that prevails will be the one backed by those with power. In this
sense, power defines the nature of reality.
Postmodernism has had a dramatic impact on the arts, cultural studies, the
humanities, and the social sciences. Although the tenets of postmodernism are hotly
contested, they should be taken into account by anyone hoping to be conversant with
contemporary political and cultural dialogue. For an excellent conceptual introduc-
tion, see Pauline Marie Rosenau’s Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences: Insights,
Inroads, and Intrusions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
Postulates of Science
The scientific method asserts that knowledge can best be acquired by following certain
rules or sets of rules that can lead to the formulation of lawlike generalizations about the
social and political world. This methodology is predicated on certain beliefs (postulates)
about nature and how nature can be known. If we do not accept these beliefs, the scientific
method becomes less compelling. In an ironic twist, the method cannot be used to test these
postulates. Although this foundational paradox has led some to reject the scientific meth-
od’s validity, others are prepared to accept, or at least to turn a blind eye to, this incongruity
and to judge the usefulness of scientific research by its output.
We find that all empirical research is premised on the following six postulates (see
Nachmias and Nachmias 1987, 6–9):
1. Nature is orderly. Earlier we discussed the characteristic feature of scientific research
as centring on cause-and-effect relationships. Such an orientation has meaning only when
one accepts the belief that natural phenomena are ordered in causal sequences. The belief
that everything has a cause, that nothing is random, is known as determinism, a term intro-
duced in the previous section. In some aspects of our lives, a belief in the ordered sequencing
of events is non-controversial. For example, in baseball we know that a home run ball results
from the force of its impact with a baseball bat, which causes the ball to travel over the fence.
The scientific method can be used when nature is ordered in such a way, and applying the
method to social and political reality implies a belief in a similar type of ordering. It suggests
that people do not protest at random and that revolutions do not occur by chance alone. In
short, political attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours are not random occurrences.
This postulate does not imply that all people respond identically when faced with sim-
ilar situations, for we know that this is not the case. (One of the reasons for variation may
be that people experience similar situations in dissimilar ways; thus, one could say that the
situations differ.) Nonetheless, use of the scientific method in political science implies a
belief in the causal ordering of social and political reality, even if our understanding of that
ordering is extremely limited at this time.
2. We can know nature. The belief that nature is orderly is devoid of empirical implic-
ations if the order cannot be revealed to us. Consequently, science postulates that, through
a rigorous application of the scientific method, the pattern of natural phenomena can be
revealed. This belief implies that no one has a privileged position in the search for know-
ledge. An awareness of the pattern assumed by a causal relationship does not spring from
one’s special gifts of perception nor is the structure of reality divinely revealed. Instead,
knowledge about nature is available in equal measure to everyone. Furthermore, such
knowledge results from an application of the scientific method, not from the observer’s
personal characteristics. Some may use that method with greater precision, insight, or cre-
ativity than others, but it is ultimately the method itself that reveals the patterned structures
of natural and social phenomena.
Barclay laughed.
“If you undertake it in that spirit,” he said, “I think you will
succeed. At any rate you have my best wishes.”
CHAPTER XI
TWO POETS.
Miss Melinda Athanasia Jones devoted herself during the day to the
composition of a poem to be read to the guests whom she expected
in the evening. She wanted to produce a good impression upon
them. Her vocation, so she thought, was that of an authoress. She
had sent several poems to the Atlantic Monthly and Harper’s
Magazine at various times, but with singular unanimity both
periodicals had “respectfully declined” them all. Melinda understood
the reason well enough.
“It is because I am a Western literati,” she exclaimed to her
brother, with a lofty contempt for grammar. “If I were a Boston or
New York literati, they would be glad to get my productions.”
“I reckon you’re right, Melindy,” said her brother Ichabod. “Why
don’t you have your perductions, as you call ’em, mailed in Boston or
New York? You could send ’em to somebody there.”
“Thank you, I wouldn’t stoop to the subterfuge,” said Melinda,
reciting melodramatically:
“Good!” said her brother. “When did you make up them verses?”
“They are not mine,” confessed Melinda. “They are by Byron.”
“Are they, now? He was a smart feller, wasn’t he?”
“He was an inspired poet, Ichabod; but you wouldn’t understand
him. He soars into the realms of the evanescent.”
“Does he? Then I guess I couldn’t. I ain’t much on soarin’.”
At half-past seven o’clock a knock was heard at the door of
Melinda’s boudoir.
“Ichabod, open the door,” she said.
Her brother obeyed the command. As Barclay and Walter entered
the room, they beheld their fair hostess seated at the center table,
with a volume of poems resting on her lap, while one hand
supported her forehead, the elbow resting on the table. She had
practiced this attitude during the afternoon before a looking-glass,
and considered it effective.
She lifted her eyes slowly, appearing wrapt in meditation.
“Pardon my pensive preoccupation,” she said, rising and greeting
her guests. “I was communing with Milton. Do you often commune
with him, Mr. Barclay?”
“I haven’t had much time for that lately, Miss Jones. My friend
here is more poetical than I am.”
“Indeed, Mr. Howard, I am glad to hear that. You and me will be
congenial.”
“You flatter me, Miss Jones,” said Walter, looking sober, but
wanting to laugh.
“Do you ever provoke the muse, Mr. Howard?” asked Melinda, who
probably meant invoke.
“Sometimes,” said Walter. “I hear you are an authoress.”
“A little of one,” said Melinda, modestly.
“I hope you will favor us by reading something of your own.”
“Indeed, Mr. Howard,” said Melinda, with affected bashfulness, “I
should be afraid to submit my careless productions to gentlemen of
such literary taste. I did indeed throw off a few rhymes to-day, but---
-”
“We shall be glad to hear them, Miss Jones. Perhaps, after you
have read them, my friend, Mr. Howard, will read something.”
“Oh, that will be delightful! In that case I cannot refuse. Ichabod,
will you bring me that portfolio from the desk?”
Her brother, whom Melinda was in the habit of ordering around,
complied with his sister’s request.
Melinda drew out a sheet of note paper and unfolded it.
“I hope, Mr. Howard, you will not be severe upon my verses. They
were written this afternoon, in a fit of inspiration. You will see that
they reveal my too susceptible soul. I am subject to fits----”
“Why, Melinda,” broke in her brother, “you never told me you had
fits?”
“To fits of lonely contemplation,” continued Melinda, looking
severely at her brother, “and it was in one of these that I penned the
following stanzas.”
Melinda cleared her throat, and read as follows, in an impressive
voice:
“Oh, lay me to sleep in the deep, deep sea,
For my life is dark and drear;
Or give me the wings to soar aloft,--
I am tired of living here.
“It takes Melinda to string off the rhymes,” said Ichabod, who took
his sister at her own valuation, and firmly believed her to be a
genius. “She writes ’em just as easy!”
“Do you share her talent, Mr. Jones?” asked Walter, gravely.
“Me? I couldn’t write poetry if you was to pay me ten dollars a
line. I shouldn’t want to, either, if I’d got to feel as Melinda says she
does in them verses she just read.”
“It is the penalty of a too-sensitive soul. Surely you have had such
feelings, Mr. Howard. I am afraid you were not favorably impressed
by my poor verses.”
This she said, anxious to draw out expressions of admiration.
“The lines are very smooth, Miss Jones,” said Walter, “but I cannot
say I ever have quite such feelings. I am of a cheerful temperament,
and my muse would not soar to such lofty heights as yours.”
“I envy you, Mr. Howard,” said Melinda, with a sigh. “I wish my
muse were not so thoughtful and contemplative. Have you not some
poem you could read us? Mr. Barclay says you are a poet.”
“I am afraid Mr. Barclay has spoken without authority.”
“Come, Mr. Howard, you must read Miss Jones the verses you
wrote this afternoon.”
“What! Were you, too, provoking the muse, Mr. Howard?” asked
Melinda, with eager interest.
“I am afraid I was,” said Walter, gravely, choosing to understand
the young lady’s words literally.
In fact he had written a few verses, at Mr. Barclay’s suggestion,
“for the fun of it,” in order to contribute his quota to the feast of
reason expected in the evening.
“But I hope you will excuse my reading it,” he added, with affected
bashfulness.
“Indeed I will not. Mr. Barclay, help me to persuade Mr. Howard.”
Walter finally yielded, as he intended to do all the while, but on
condition that Mr. Barclay would read the poem. This being
accepted, Barclay read, with appropriate emphasis, the following
verses, which were modeled after a song found in a small collection
of minstrel verses in Walter’s possession:
“Around the little cottage
Waved fields of golden grain
And in it lived my heart’s delight,--
My Sophronisba Jane.
“How sweet!” murmured Melinda. “Indeed you are a true poet, Mr.
Howard.”
“Thank you,” said Walter, who had hard work not to laugh,
knowing himself what ridiculous rubbish his verses were.
“By Jove! that’s my style of poetry,” said Mr. Jones, energetically.
“I like that better than yours, Melindy.”
“Oh, it don’t compare with your sister’s, Mr. Jones,” said Walter,
modestly. “It doesn’t soar to such lofty heights.”
“Now, Mr. Howard, I think it excellent,” said Miss Jones, who was
delighted at the praise of her own production. “I cannot expect all to
be so contemplative as I am. My muse loves to dwell alone in
primeval solitude. Yours seeks the woodland glade.”
“You have expressed the difference admirably, Miss Jones,” said
Barclay, gravely. “Mr. Jones and myself unluckily cannot soar with
you and Mr. Howard. We can only look on in silent admiration.”
“Do you often indite verses, Mr. Howard?” asked Melinda. “I hope
you will show me all your productions.”
“I seldom write, Miss Jones. Whenever I do, I shall be sure to ask
your critical opinion of my verses.”
But it is unnecessary to detail the rest of the conversation. Later in
the evening some nuts, apples and raisins were passed around, to
which Melinda did full justice, notwithstanding her unsatisfied
longings and the solitude of her soul.
CHAPTER XII
LED BY A BOOTBLACK.
ebooksecure.com