Rajendra V Pai vs Alex Fernandes

Facts

Approximately 150 villagers had their lands acquired by the government for public purposes.
The appellant, Rajendra V. Pai, was an advocate and personally interested in defending
against the acquisition of land belonging to his family and other villagers.

Villagers confided in the appellant to contest the land acquisition proceedings for a
reasonable and fair quantum of compensation. Three complainants out of the 150 villagers
filed complaints against the appellant for professional misconduct.

Allegations included soliciting professional work, settling contingent fees based on

compensation and false identification in opening a bank account for compensation
withdrawal. The Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council found the appellant guilty
of professional misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act and directed the removal
of his name from the roll of advocates.

The Bar Council of India confirmed the order of the State Bar Council, debarring the
appellant from practising for life. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court under Section
38 of the Advocates Act.

Issues Raised

The issues raised in Rajendra V Pai vs Alex Fernandes were:

 Whether the orders passed by the State Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa and the
Bar Council of India are valid.
 Whether the punishment is commensurate with the gravity of professional
misconduct.

Arguments

The appellant contended that the villagers had voluntarily confided in him because he was an
advocate looking after litigation relating to his family land.

The appellant argued that the villagers had voluntarily agreed to contribute to the expenses of
litigation.

The appellant denied the charges of false identification in opening the bank account.

Judgement

The Supreme Court in Rajendra V Pai vs Alex Fernandes held that there was sufficient oral
and documentary evidence of gross professional misconduct. However, the punishment of
debarring the appellant for life was disproportionate to the facts and circumstances of the
case.

The Court in Rajendra V Pai vs Alex Fernandes modified the punishment, suspending the
appellant from practice for a period of seven years.

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Reasoning

The Court acknowledged the seriousness of the misconduct but considered the appellant’s
personal circumstances and the fact that only three out of 150 villagers had complained
against him. The Court in Rajendra V Pai v Alex Fernandes emphasised that debarring a
person from pursuing their career for life is an extreme punishment and should be approached
with caution.

The Court found that a seven-year suspension from practice would meet the ends of justice
without completely ruining the appellant’s career and livelihood.

In Re A an advocate

The advocate on record had sent the Minister of Law of the state of Maharashtra a post card
along with a letter advertising and soliciting for work. The same was forwarded by the
secretary to the govt. of Maharashtra to the Registrar of this court (SC). When this was
placed before the CJ, he directed the registrar to informally enquire whether this letter had in
fact been written by him. He admitted to having sent it, but was unaware of committing any
breach of etiquette.

The CJ constituted a committee and on their recommendation, a tribunal of 3 members of the

Bar and notice was served to the advocate to explain his alleged conduct. In reply, he denied
having written the letter and claimed the allegations were false and mala fide. He went on to
say that even if it were proved that it was written by him, there was nothing unprofessional
or objectionable and is not solicitation if one enquires from another whether he wishes to
have services of another advocate. When the Tribunal questioned him about whether the post
card was sent by him or from his office, he completely denied everything. The tribunal also
made him write and sign to compare the handwritings which matched.

He was confronted about the admissions made to the Registrar he claimed to not remember
details or making certain statements. The Registrar, on being called, affirmed his previous
statements. After recording the evidence, the Tribunal was satisfied that it had been written
by him and that he was not aware that it amounted to breach of professional etiquette.

Judgment:

The advocate has condemned himself a liar and is either ignorant of the rules of the
profession or has no regard for its ethics. If he is ignorant, there is inadequacy in his training
befitting a member of this profession. If he knew such conduct was improper, he is unworthy
of being a member of this profession. Suspension for 5 years.

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In Re: Mr. 'G', A Senior Advocate Of The ... vs Unknown on 27 May, 1954
Facts of the Case:

Mr. G, a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court, was summoned under Order IV, rule 30, of
the Supreme Court Rules, to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against
him. Mr. G, who was called to the Bar in England and later enrolled as an Advocate of the
Bombay High Court, entered into an agreement with a client on December 20, 1952. The
client agreed to pay Mr. G 50% of any recoveries made in legal proceedings. This agreement
was reported to the Bombay High Court, which referred the matter to the Bombay Bar
Council. The Bar Council found this agreement amounted to professional misconduct, and
the High Court suspended Mr. G from practice for six months. The Supreme Court was then
notified to take appropriate action concerning Mr. G's status as an Advocate of the Supreme
Court.

Issues:

1. Whether Mr. G's agreement with his client constituted professional misconduct.
2. Whether disciplinary action should be taken against Mr. G and what form it should
take.

Arguments:

For the Prosecution:

 The prosecution argued that Mr. G's agreement with his client was unethical and
constituted professional misconduct.
 They emphasized the need to maintain the integrity and high standards of the legal
profession.

For Mr. G:

 Mr. G argued that his agreement with the client was made out of necessity, as the
client could not afford the legal fees upfront.
 He contended that such agreements were not legally prohibited and were enforceable
under contract law.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court held that Mr. G's conduct amounted to professional misconduct. The
Court emphasized the special and rigid rules of professional conduct expected of advocates,
particularly senior advocates. It stated that the agreement between Mr. G and his client, while
legally unobjectionable if made by non-lawyers, was forbidden for members of the legal
profession to maintain the profession's integrity and dignity.

Ratio Decidendi:

1. Professional Conduct and Ethics: The Court reaffirmed that advocates are held to
higher standards of professional conduct. Agreements that might be permissible for

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 non-lawyers are not necessarily acceptable for advocates due to their professional
responsibilities and ethical obligations.
2. Historical and Comparative Jurisprudence: The Court referred to the long-
standing tradition in India and England that such agreements were not permissible for
legal practitioners. The rigid rules of champerty and maintenance, though not
applicable in India, influenced the professional conduct expected of advocates.
3. Jurisdiction of Disciplinary Action: The Court clarified that the Legal Practitioners
(Fees) Act, 1926, did not change the disciplinary jurisdiction or the definition of
professional misconduct as understood under the Bar Councils Act, 1926.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court concluded that Mr. G's conduct constituted professional misconduct.
Given the personal attacks Mr. G made against the learned Chief Justice in his petition under
Article 32 of the Constitution, the Court decided to impose a suspension. Mr. G was
suspended from practicing in the Supreme Court for a period that would expire concurrently
with his suspension from the Bombay High Court.

Significance:

This case is significant as it reaffirms the high ethical standards expected of legal
professionals in India. It underscores that while certain agreements might be legally
enforceable, they may still be deemed unethical for legal practitioners, thereby warranting
disciplinary action. The judgment serves as a reminder that the privileges enjoyed by
advocates come with corresponding responsibilities and strict adherence to professional
conduct.

In Re: Lalit Mohan Das AIR 1957 SC 250

Facts of the Case

The case involves Shri Lalit Mohan Das, a pleader practicing in Anandapur, Orissa. He had a
strained relationship with the Munsif of Anandapur, Shri L. B. N. S. Deo. The appellant made
objectionable remarks suggesting partiality and unfairness on the part of the Munsif, leading
to proceedings under Sections 13 and 14 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879.

Key Incidents:

1. July 15, 1953: The appellant made a remark in open court insinuating that the
Peshkar (court clerk) could be influenced, implying partiality by the Munsif.
2. September 25, 1953: The appellant accused the Munsif of being unfair in open court
during arguments.
3. September 29, 1953: The appellant publicly challenged the Munsif's order, accusing
the court of inconsistency and lack of principles.

The Munsif initiated proceedings against the appellant, which were forwarded to the High
Court of Orissa through the District Judge. The High Court suspended the appellant for five
years, leading to the appeal.

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Legal Issues

1. Authority of District Judge: Whether the District Judge could send back the report
to the Munsif after the proceedings had been initiated.
2. Professional Misconduct: Whether the appellant’s behavior constituted professional
misconduct.
3. Validity of Apology: Whether the apology submitted by the appellant and the
subsequent actions taken were sufficient to resolve the matter.
4. Mitigating Circumstances: Whether there were mitigating circumstances that should
affect the severity of the punishment.

Judgement

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision but reduced the suspension period due
to mitigating circumstances.

1. Authority of District Judge:

o The Court held that once a report is submitted to the High Court under Section
14 of the Legal Practitioners Act, only the High Court is competent to pass
final orders. It was not within the District Judge's power to send back the
report to the Munsif.

2. Professional Misconduct:
o The appellant’s conduct was deemed highly improper. As a member of the
Bar, he is an officer of the court and has a duty to uphold the court's dignity
and decorum. His public accusations against the Munsif amounted to
scandalizing the court, which is considered grave professional misconduct.

3. Validity of Apology:
o The Court found that the appellant's apology and the resolution passed by the
Bar Association were insufficient. The resolution suggested by the Additional
District Judge was not fully complied with, and the apology did not effectively
undo the damage caused by the appellant’s earlier actions.

4. Mitigating Circumstances:
o The Supreme Court considered two mitigating factors: the Munsif's initial
recommendation of a lighter punishment and the strained relations between the
appellant and the Munsif, which may have contributed to the appellant’s
behavior. Consequently, the Supreme Court reduced the suspension period
from five years to a lesser term (the exact reduction is unspecified in the
provided text).

Analysis

The Supreme Court's decision underscores the importance of maintaining the dignity and
respect of judicial proceedings. The case highlights several key principles:

1. Professional Conduct: Legal practitioners must balance their duty to their clients
with their duty to the court. Any behavior that undermines the court's authority or
integrity is unacceptable.

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 2. Authority and Procedure: The procedural aspects of disciplinary actions are crucial.
Once a report of misconduct is submitted to a higher authority (the High Court in this
case), lower authorities cannot unilaterally alter the course of action.
3. Rehabilitation vs. Punishment: While punishment is necessary for misconduct, the
courts also consider factors that may mitigate the severity of the punishment. This
approach aims to balance justice with fairness, considering the broader context of the
misconduct.

Conclusion

The case of In Re: Lalit Mohan Das emphasizes the dual responsibility of legal practitioners
to their clients and the court. It also illustrates the procedural rigor required in disciplinary
proceedings and the role of mitigating circumstances in determining appropriate sanctions.
The Supreme Court's judgement serves as a precedent for handling similar cases of
professional misconduct within the legal profession.

Shiv Narain Jafa vs Hon'Ble Judges Of High Court Of ... on 15 May, 1953
Introduction

The case revolves around the professional conduct of Mr. Shiva Narain Jafa, an Advocate
practicing at Budaun, who was suspended from practice by the Allahabad High Court for six
months. This decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of India, which delivered its
judgment, significantly impacting the understanding of professional misconduct within the
legal profession.

Background

In 1942, Ganesh was prosecuted for an attempted rape on a Chamar woman named Himman
under Section 376, Penal Code, read with Section 511, Penal Code. Ganesh was defended by
Mr. Jafa and was initially convicted and sentenced to five years' rigorous imprisonment, later
reduced to one year on appeal. Mr. Sanyal, the Assistant Sessions Judge who presided over
the trial, complained to the High Court about Mr. Jafa's conduct during the trial, leading to
disciplinary proceedings under the Indian Bar Councils Act.

Charges and Inquiry

The High Court directed the District Judge of Budaun to conduct an inquiry into Mr. Jafa's
conduct. The District Judge framed several charges against Mr. Jafa, leading to the
recommendation that he should not continue as a member of the Bar. The primary charges
were:

1. First Charge: Eleven subsidiary charges (A to K), with seven related to Mr. Jafa’s
conduct during Ganesh's trial.
2. Second Charge: Habitual scandalous and obscene questioning of women witnesses.
3. Third Charge: Deliberately raising groundless personal issues to bully and brow-beat
court officers.

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Findings of the High Court

The High Court acquitted Mr. Jafa of all charges except for two subsidiary charges, I-A and
I-F.

1. Charge I-A: Mr. Jafa applied for and obtained copies of statements of certain
witnesses under Section 162, Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). However, Hulasi, one
of the witnesses, was not called for the prosecution at the Sessions trial, making it
improper to request his statement. The High Court viewed this as a piece of sharp
practice amounting to professional misconduct.
2. Charge I-F: During cross-examination, Mr. Jafa allegedly put a scandalous question
to Babu Shiv Pershad, the Investigating Inspector, insinuating improper behavior with
Himman. The High Court deemed this question irrelevant and unjustified, constituting
professional misconduct.

Supreme Court’s Judgment

Justice Ghulam Hasan delivered the judgment for the Supreme Court, addressing the charges
and the High Court’s findings.

1. Charge I-A Analysis:

o The Supreme Court acknowledged that Mr. Jafa’s action violated Section 162,
CrPC.
o However, it noted that Mr. Sanyal failed to exercise proper jurisdiction in
ordering the supply of the copy.
o The Court concluded that Mr. Jafa’s conduct did not constitute sharp practice
warranting suspension but recognized it as a possible good-faith error.

2. Charge I-F Analysis:

o The Court found the question carried a veiled insinuation but noted that
neither the Sub-Inspector objected nor the Court disallowed it.
o The question aimed to impeach the Sub-Inspector’s credibility, particularly
regarding the conflicting statements about his return time, adding some
validity to the insinuation.
o The Supreme Court did not consider this sufficient for severe disciplinary
action.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court, considering all circumstances, found the suspension of six months too
severe. Instead, it opted to issue a warning to Mr. Jafa, expressing disapproval of his lack of
discretion and hoping it would make him more careful in the future. The suspension order
was set aside, and no order was made as to costs.

Implications

This case highlights the nuanced approach required in disciplinary actions against advocates.
It underscores the importance of context, intent, and the balance between upholding
professional standards and recognizing honest errors. The judgment serves as a critical

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reference for understanding the boundaries of professional conduct and the appropriate
response to breaches within the legal profession.

P.J. Ratnam v. D. Kanikran AIR 1964 SC 244

Introduction

The case of P.J. Ratnam v. D. Kanikran (AIR 1964 SC 244) is a landmark decision by the
Supreme Court of India that delves into the intricacies of professional conduct and ethics
within the legal profession. The decision underscores the necessity for lawyers to adhere to
high standards of professional behavior and the repercussions of failing to do so.

Facts of the Case

The appellant, P.J. Ratnam, was an advocate practicing law. The respondent, D. Kanikran,
accused Ratnam of professional misconduct. Kanikran alleged that Ratnam had engaged in
activities unbecoming of an advocate, thereby breaching the professional code of conduct.
The case was initially heard by the Bar Council, which found Ratnam guilty of misconduct.
Ratnam then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

The primary issues before the Supreme Court were:

1. Whether P.J. Ratnam had indeed committed professional misconduct.

2. The appropriate disciplinary action to be taken if misconduct was proven.

Arguments
Appellant (P.J. Ratnam)

 Ratnam argued that the allegations against him were unfounded and not supported by
concrete evidence.
 He contended that his actions did not amount to professional misconduct and were
within the permissible bounds of legal practice.
 Ratnam also argued that the punishment meted out by the Bar Council was excessive
and unwarranted.

Respondent (D. Kanikran)

 Kanikran maintained that Ratnam had clearly violated the professional code of
conduct.
 He provided evidence and instances of Ratnam’s behavior that were allegedly
unethical and unprofessional.
 Kanikran argued for strict disciplinary action to uphold the integrity of the legal
profession.

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Judgment

The Supreme Court, after examining the facts and arguments presented, held that P.J. Ratnam
had indeed engaged in professional misconduct. The Court emphasized the following points
in its judgment:

1. Standard of Professional Conduct: The Court reiterated that advocates are expected
to maintain a high standard of professional conduct and ethics. Any deviation from
these standards must be dealt with strictly to preserve the dignity and integrity of the
legal profession.
2. Evidence of Misconduct: The Court found sufficient evidence to substantiate the
allegations of misconduct against Ratnam. The evidence presented clearly indicated
that Ratnam’s behavior was unbecoming of an advocate.
3. Disciplinary Action: The Court upheld the disciplinary action taken by the Bar
Council, emphasizing that strict measures are necessary to deter such behavior and
maintain public confidence in the legal system.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in P.J. Ratnam v. D. Kanikran serves as a significant

precedent in the realm of professional ethics for lawyers. It highlights the judiciary's
commitment to upholding the sanctity of the legal profession by ensuring that advocates
adhere to the highest standards of conduct. The case underscores the principle that
professional misconduct will not be tolerated and will be met with appropriate disciplinary
action to preserve the integrity and trust vested in the legal profession.

In Re: M an Advocate AIR 1957 SC 149

Background:

The case "In Re: M an Advocate" involves disciplinary proceedings against an advocate. The
Supreme Court of India was called upon to decide whether the conduct of the advocate in
question warranted disciplinary action under the Advocates Act, 1961.

Facts:

1. Allegation of Misconduct:
o The advocate in question was alleged to have engaged in professional
misconduct by his behavior both in and out of court.
o Specific incidents included disrespect towards the court and inappropriate
interactions with clients and colleagues.

2. Proceedings:
o The Bar Council initiated disciplinary proceedings based on these allegations.
o The matter was escalated to the Supreme Court for a final decision.

Issues:

1. What constitutes professional misconduct for an advocate?

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 2. Whether the actions of the advocate in question amounted to professional
misconduct?
3. Appropriate disciplinary action to be taken if found guilty of misconduct?

Arguments:

 For the Advocate:

o The advocate argued that his actions did not amount to professional
misconduct.
o It was contended that the allegations were exaggerated and not reflective of his
overall conduct.
o The advocate also claimed that any perceived disrespect was unintentional and
a result of misunderstanding.

 For the Bar Council:

o The Bar Council argued that the advocate’s behavior demonstrated a clear lack
of respect for the judicial system.
o They presented evidence of multiple instances where the advocate’s conduct
was unbecoming of a legal professional.
o The council asserted that such behavior undermines the dignity of the legal
profession and warrants strict action.

Judgment:

1. Professional Misconduct:
o The Supreme Court laid down what constitutes professional misconduct,
emphasizing the importance of maintaining the dignity of the profession.
o The Court highlighted that advocates are officers of the court and have a duty
to uphold the rule of law and respect the judicial process.

2. Findings:
o Upon examining the evidence, the Supreme Court found that the advocate's
conduct did amount to professional misconduct.
o The Court noted several instances where the advocate's behavior was
inappropriate and disrespectful towards the court and others.

3. Disciplinary Action:
o The Supreme Court considered various factors before deciding the disciplinary
action.
o The Court decided to impose a suspension on the advocate from practicing law
for a specified period.
o The judgment also included directions for the advocate to undergo corrective
measures to understand the importance of professional conduct and ethics.

Conclusion:

The case "In Re: M an Advocate" serves as a significant precedent in defining and addressing
professional misconduct within the legal profession in India. The judgment reinforces the
importance of ethical behavior and respect for the judiciary among legal practitioners. It

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underscores that advocates must conduct themselves with the highest standards of
professionalism to maintain public confidence in the legal system.

JOHN D'SOUZA Vs. EDWARD ANI (AIR 1994 SC 975)

FACTS OF THE CASE:

In this case, the respondent Edward Ani filed a complaint with the Karnataka State Bar
Council saying that the appellant, to whom his mother-in-will, law’s Mrs Mary Raymond,
had given safe custody, refused to return the will after receiving two letters requesting its
return.

Mary Raymond had been given safe custody and refused to return the will after receiving two
letters requesting its return. This case relates to professional misconduct. One M. R. N. E
Raymond was the client of the appellant and Mrs Mary Raymond was also the client.

Mrs Mary during her lifetime got her will drafted by the appellant and entrusted the same
after execution with the appellant in respect of which the appellant had given a receipt.

The executrix had appointed her husband N. E. Raymond as the executor. The son-in-law
claimed himself to be the legal representative of the estate of Mrs Mary. He said that while
the other lawyer requested the appellant to let him have the client’s will, the appellant denied
it. Thereafter Mrs Mary was obliged to make another will prepared by another.

The respondent lodged a complaint with the Karnataka state association against the appellant
under section 35 of the Advocates Act. The state var council rejected the complainant,
holding that no prima facie case was made against the appellant.

The said disciplinary committee suspended the operation of the said order for one month.
Thereafter the appellant filed an appeal in the supreme court and held him guilty of
professional misconduct.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Was the supreme court right in the decision?

ANALYSIS OF THE CASE:

The respondent filed a review petition holding that there existed a prima facie case of
misconduct against the appellant advocate. Thus, the disciplinary committee held him to be
guilty of professional misconduct.

JUDGEMENT OF THE CASE:

The Supreme Court determined that the advocate had violated his professional obligations
and had engaged in improper behaviour.
The supreme court held that in the case of the complainant against the advocate for
professional misconduct is on the complainant. In this case, he was able to prove that the
advocate committed a breach of his professional duty.

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In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra

FACTS
Contempt of Court proceedings initiated against Advocate Vinay Chandra Mishra. The
proceedings were initiated because of an altercation between him and Justice S.K Keshote of
the Allahabad High Court.
Background

 Advocate V.C Mishra appeared before Justice Keshote and Justice Anshuman Singh
(Senior) in the case of Bansal Forgings Limited v UP Financial Corporation.
 The case pertained to a default in payment of installment of a loan taken by the
appellant from the respondent.
 In the trial court, the plaintiff (appellant in High Court) had filed an application for
grant of temporary injunction restraining the respondent from seizure of its factory.
 The trial court had passed an order restraining the corporation from seizing the factory
but also directed the company to furnish security for the amount of the installment.
 On 9th March 1994, Advocate V.C Mishra appeared before Justice Keshote
questioning the decision of the trial court to demand security.

Justice Keshote's version

 Justice Keshote wrote to the acting Chief Justice of Allahbad High Court:

‘I put a question to Shri Misra under what provision this order has been passed. On putting of
this question he started to shout and said that no question could have been put to him. He will
get me transferred or see that impeachment motion is brought against me in Parliament. He
further said that he had turned out many judges. He created a good [sic] scene in court. He
asked me to follow the practice of this court. In sum and substance it is a matter where except
to abuse me of mother and sister he insulted me like anything.’
Advocate V.C Mishra's version

 When the matter was called on board, Justice Keshote took charge of the proceedings.
 The judge stated that he was going to set aside the entire order of the trial court,
including the order of temporary injunction which was passed in favor of the
appellant.
 Advocate VC Mishra politely brought to the judges notice that the applicant has
dominion over the case and that is not tarnished by coming to the High Court.
 The judge then lost his temper and repeated that he will get rid of trials courts order in
toto.
 VC Mishra got perturbed and told the judge that it is not the practice of the Allahabad
High Court to dismiss matters without hearing or portions of judgments which have
not been appealed against.

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Advocate VC Mishra's version

 During the heated exchange, the judge stated that he was from the bar and could take
to goondaism. He further stated that he never opted for Allahabad and had opted for
Gujarat and Himachal Pradesh. He did not no why Chief Justice of India disregarded
his opinions and transferred him to a place he did not like.
 Thereafter the Judge deferred the matter for the next day and wrote to the acting Chief
Justice for doing something about it.

 Advocate V.C Mishra rejected the judge's version in totality and denied that he made
any references to impeachment. He did accept that he had mentioned that 'a judge got
himself transferred earlier on account of his inability to command the goodwill of the
bar due to lack of mutual reverance'

How did it reach Supreme Court?

How is the Supreme Court adjudicating these proceedings?

 Following the events of 9th March 1994, Justice Keshote instead of initiating
contempt proceedings himself wrote a letter to the Acting Chief Justice of Allahbad
High Court and requested him to 'do something for restoration of dignity of Judiciary.'
 The Acting Chief Justice forwarded the said letter to Chief Justice of India by his
letter of 5th April 1994.
 The learned Chief Justice of India constituted this bench to hear the matter on 15th
April 1994.

ISSUE 1
Whether the Supreme Court can take cognizance of contempt of High Court?
Contention
Advocate V.C Mishra's contention

 Article 129 vests with Supreme Court the power to punish only for contempt of itself
and not that of the High Courts.
 The High Court is another court of record vested with identical and independent
power of punishing for contempt of itself (Article 215).

Article 129: The Supreme Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of
such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself
Article 215: Every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such
a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself
Court's Analysis
Court's response

 The contention ignores that the Supreme Court is not only the highest Court of record,
but under various provisions of the Constitution, is also charged with the duties and
responsibilities of correct lower courts and tribunals and of protecting them from
those whose misconduct tends to prevent due performance of their duties.

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  Article 129 uses the phrase 'Court of Record' and such Courts have an inherent power
of dealing with contempt of subordinate or inferior courts according to well
established Indian and English jurisprudence.
 Inherent powers of a superior Court of Record have remained unaffected even after
codification of Contempt Law.
 The expression used in Article 129 is not restrictive instead it is extensive in nature. If
the framers of the Constitution intended that the Supreme Court shall have the power
to only punish for its own contempt, there was no necessity of inserting the expression
"including the power to punish for contempt of itself.'
 In absence of any express provision in the Constitution the Apex Court being court of
record has jurisdiction in every matter and if there be any doubt, the Court has power
to determine its jurisdiction.

Article 129: The Supreme Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of
such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself.
Whether the learned judge could be summoned for examination to verify the
incident given by him as against the contemner?

 According to Advocate V.C Mishra, in view of conflicting versions of the incident

given by him and the learned judge, it was necessary for him to cross-examine the
learned judge.
 Note that the judge had chosen not to prosecute the advocate himself and had reported
to incident to Acting Chief Justice.

ISSUE 2
Court's Response

 Section 14 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 deals with the procedure when the act is
taken for the contempt of High Court. Sub Section 3 deals with a situation where
contempt is tried by a judge other than the judge or judges in whose presence or
hearing the offense is alleged to have been committed.
 The provision in specific terms and for 'obvious reasons', states that in such cases it
shall not be necessary for the the judge or judges in whose presence or hearing the
offense is alleged to have been committed, to appear as a witness and the statement
placed before the Chief Justice shall be treated as the evidence in the case.

 The statement of the learned judge had been furnished to the Chief Justice and to the
contemnor.

What is Contempt of Court?

ISSUE 3

 Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Court Act defines criminal content.

 Criminal contempt means publication whether by words, spoken or written or by
signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise if any matter or the doing of any
other act whatsoever which -
 scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any
court
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  prejudices, or interferes with, the due course of any judicial proceedings
 interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the
administration of justice in any other manner.
 From the facts, it is clear that if allegations against contemnor are true would amount
to criminal contempt as defined under Section 2(c) of the Act.

Whose version is correct?

Whose version of the incident is correct?

 The contemner and the judge had vastly different versions of what transpired in the
courtroom on the day of the incident. After examining the judge’s letter and the
affidavits filed by the contemner, the court concludes that there is sufficient reason to
believe that the contemner had tried to browbeat, threaten, insult and disrespect the
judge.
 This is evidenced from the fact that he has made attempts to justify his conducts in the
affidavits filed and his narrative of events begins from the point where he takes
objection to the judge (who was a junior judge) taking charge of the proceedings. The
court observes that even if there was a convention wherein the senior judge was
supposed to ask questions and take charge of the proceedings, no lawyer or third party
can have a say in the matter or refuse to answer questions put forward to him on that
ground.
 The contemner admitted to being “emotionally peturbed” and his “professional
institutional sensitivity” got wounded appears to favor the judge’s version of events
overall. His own admittance that he made mention of a judge who had himself
transferred due to his inability to command goodwill of the bar also lends support to
the judge’s narrative.
 They say that he has misunderstood his function as a lawyer representing the interests
of the client and as an officer of the court and has abused both. Given his seniority in
the legal profession and the multiple administrative posts held by him, it was
especially expected of him to uphold the confidence of people in the judiciary and not
do anything to contradict his obligations.

Why should individuals be held in contempt?

 The judiciary is not only meant to adjudicate disputes between parties but has an
additional duty to oversee that all individuals and institutions, including the executive
and legislature, act in accordance with the laws. Thus, the dignity and authority of the
courts must be protected at all costs.
 This is why courts are also entrusted with the power of punishing those who indulge
in acts, whether inside or outside the courts, which undermine their authority and
bring them in disrepute.
 In exercising this power, the court is not vindicating the dignity of the individual
judge, but is upholding the majesty of the law and the administration of justice. The
court identifies the foundation of the judiciary as being a function of the trust and
confidence placed in it by the people. Acts like the one in question create
dissatisfaction and disrespect for the authority of the court and erode the edifice of the
judicial system.

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ISSUE 4
Should Advocate V.C Mishra's apology be accepted?
The court observes that the apology tendered by him in problematic as it only states that the
situation is deeply regretted and that the incident should have never arisen in the first place.
Accepting the apology would be problematic for three reasons:

 Firstly, the apology was not a free and frank admission of guilt or misdemeanor but
was instead couched in sophisticated language to simply justify his conduct. He was
not trying to take any responsibility for his actions but was attempting to exonerate
himself by referring to the incident as “not ideal” and”avoidable”. This, in the court’s
opinion, was only to salvage his reputation and professional image and not genuine.
 Secondly, his attitude has been defiant and belligerent from the start of the
proceedings, including in his affidavits, where he has chosen to make counter-
allegations against the judge and asked for an inquiry into the judge’s conduct instead
of explaining his behavior or showing remorse.
 Thirdly, accepting the apology would be condoning his behavior and thus amount to a
failure of this court to uphold the majesty of the law and maintain people’s confidence
in the judiciary. Failure to punish the offender would be a failure to perform one of the
essential duties of this court entrusted upon it by the constitution.

What punishment should Advocate Vinay Chandra Mishra face?

 Once it was established that VC Mishra had committed contempt of the court, the
Supreme Court had to determine the punishment he would face.
 V.C Mishra made two submissions with respect to the nature of punishment, and the
court rejected both them.

ISSUE 5
First Submission

 The court cannot suspend the license while punishing the offender for contempt as
that is a power vested in the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council or the
Bar Council of India. Thus, the Advocates Act denudes the power of Supreme Court
to impose such punishment of suspension or removing the advocate from practice in
its exercise of power under Articles 129 and 142 of the Constitution.

Court held

 No prohibition or restriction in the ordinary laws limits the constitutional powers of

this court. They rely on the judgment of the constitutional bench in the Union Carbide
case where they had held the same. Assuming that the powers under Article 142 are
subject to express statutory prohibitions, it would imply that statutes can override a
constitutional provision which is incorrect.
 In this case the inherent powers could not be diluted for three reasons:
 The court will then be unable to even reprimand the advocate for his professional
misconduct since reprimand is also a punishment which the State Bar Councils and
the disciplinary committee are entitled to do.

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  It would also mean that they cannot take any action since the Advocates Act confers
that exclusive power on the councils only. This would be erroneous to assume. The
jurisdiction thus co-exists independently of each other and the action taken under one
does not bar an action under the other.
 The court is the final appellate authority under Section 38 of the Advocates Act and
thus can impose any of the punishments mentioned in Section 35(3) including that of
removal of the advocate from the Bar Council and suspending him. The punishment
then will be in conformity with the substantive provisions of the act and would not be
ultra vires.

Second submission
Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(2) and 19(1)(g) and 19(6) have to be read together and thus the
power to suspend member of the legal profession or remove him from the Bar Council is not
available to this court under Article 129.
Court held
The freedom of speech and expression and to carry on trade/business is subject to the law of
contempt and the right to continue to practice is also contingent upon the same. When
reasonable restrictions are mentioned in Article 19(6), they mean constitutional provisions as
well as regular laws. The power given to this court under Article 129 is a duty to protect all
the limbs of the administration of justice from those whose actions interfere with or obstruct
the course of justice. Failure to exercise this power appropriately is a failure of that
constitutional duty.
Punishment

 Simple imprisonment for a period of six weeks; which will remain suspended for a
period of four years and will be activated if he is convicted of any other offense of
contempt within the same period
 Suspension from practice as an advocate for a period of three years
 Vacating all posts/nominated offices held by him in his capacity as an advocate

Concluding Comments

 This verdict stunned the legal fraternity. It was not just a lawyer but the chairman of
the Bar Council of India who stood convicted and sentenced for contempt of court.
 Not surprisingly, the impact of this verdict led to strikes by lawyers. Lawyers in Delhi
marched to Rashtrapati Bhavan to protest. In Allahabad, the High Court Bar
Association gave a call for a strike.
 Significantly, there was no call for a strike by the Bar Council of India.
 As for V.C. Mishra, as a result of his reaction to the judgement, he earned himself
another notice for contempt of court from the Supreme Court, this time from the
bench comprising Chief Justice
 This notice came after a press conference where he described the earlier verdict as
‘motivated, mala fide and incompetent’. He next went on to demand a public apology
from the three judges who had convicted him and sought their impeachment.

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