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Article Title
The Geo-Political Implications of the US-China AI and Tech Rivalry
Abstract Global Social Sciences Review
The emerging US-China rivalry over Artificial
p-ISSN: 2520-0348 e-ISSN: 2616-793x
Intelligence (AI) and cutting-edge technologies has
become a fundamental aspect of contemporary global DOI(journal):10.31703/gssr
politics. This research explores how the mission for Volume: X (2025)
technological dominance between these two major DOI (volume):10.31703/gssr.2025(X)
powers is redesigning the geopolitical landscape, Issue: II Spring (June 2025)
transforming long-standing coalitions, and introducing
DOI(Issue):10.31703/gssr.2024(X-I)
new frontiers of competition such as innovation, data
manipulation, and semiconductor supply chains. The Home Page
research explores critical developments such as the rise www.gssrjournal.com
of strategic tech-driven coalitions like QUAD and Volume: IX (2024)
AUKUS in setting global narratives around AI https://www.gssrjournal.com/Current-issue
governance. This research applies the theoretical lens of
Issue: II-Spring (June-2025)
Defensive Realism, which argues that states act to
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preserve their security in an anarchic international
system by countering potential threats. This qualitative Scope
study examines how AI leadership and control over https://www.gssrjournal.com/about-us/scope
innovative technologies are becoming strategic Submission
instruments in the restructuring of geopolitical power https://humaglobe.com/index.php/gssr/submissions
dynamics.

Keywords: US-China, Artificial Intelligence, Tech

Rivalry, Geopolitical Implications

Authors:
Bushra Haider: M. Phil Graduate, Department of
International Relations, Fatima Jinnah Women
University, Rawalpindi, Punjab, Pakistan.
Sobia Hanif:(Corresponding Author)
Assistant Professor, Department of International
Relations, Fatima Jinnah Women University, Visit Us
Rawalpindi, Punjab, Pakistan.
(Email: sobiahanif@fjwu.edu.pk )
Zeeshan Fida: Lecturer, Department of International
Relations, Fatima Jinnah Women University,
Rawalpindi, Punjab, Pakistan.

Pages: 45-54
DOI:10.31703/gssr.2025(X-II).04
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Citing this Article

04 The Geo-Political Implications of the US-China AI and Tech Rivalry

DOI 10.31703/gssr.2025(X-II).04
Bushra Haider Pages 45-54
Authors Sobia Hanif Year 2025
Zeeshan Fida Volume X
Issue II

Referencing & Citing Styles

Haider, B., Hanif, S., & Fida, Z. (2025). The Geo-Political Implications of the US-China AI and
Tech Rivalry. Global Social Sciences Review, X(II), 45-54. https://doi.org/10.31703/gssr.2025(X-
APA
II).04

Haider, Bushra, Sobia Hanif, and Zeeshan Fida. 2025. "The Geo-Political Implications of the US-
China AI and Tech Rivalry." Global Social Sciences Review X (II):45-54. doi: 10.31703/gssr.2025(X-
CHICAGO
II).04.

HAIDER, B., HANIF, S. & FIDA, Z. 2025. The Geo-Political Implications of the US-China AI and
HARVARD Tech Rivalry. Global Social Sciences Review, X, 45-54.

Haider, Bushra, Sobia Hanif, and Zeeshan Fida. 2025. 'The Geo-Political Implications of the US-
MHRA China AI and Tech Rivalry', Global Social Sciences Review, X: 45-54.

Haider, Bushra, Sobia Hanif, and Zeeshan Fida. "The Geo-Political Implications of the Us-China
MLA Ai and Tech Rivalry." Global Social Sciences Review X.II (2025): 45-54. Print.

Haider, Bushra, Hanif, Sobia, and Fida, Zeeshan (2025), 'The Geo-Political Implications of the
OXFORD US-China AI and Tech Rivalry', Global Social Sciences Review, X (II), 45-54.

Haider, Bushra, Sobia Hanif, and Zeeshan Fida. "The Geo-Political Implications of the Us-China
Ai and Tech Rivalry." Global Social Sciences Review X, no. II (2025): 45-54.
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Pages: 45-54 URL: https://doi.org/10.31703/gssr.2025(X-II).04 Doi: 10.31703/gssr.2024(X-II).04

Title
The Geo-Political Implications of the US-China AI and Tech Rivalry
Authors: Abstract
Bushra Haider: M. Phil, Department of International The emerging US-China rivalry over Artificial Intelligence
Relations, Fatima Jinnah Women University, (AI) and cutting-edge technologies has become a
Rawalpindi, Punjab, Pakistan. fundamental aspect of contemporary global politics. This
Sobia Hanif:(Corresponding Author) research explores how the mission for technological
Assistant Professor, Department of International dominance between these two major powers is redesigning
Relations, Fatima Jinnah Women University, the geopolitical landscape, transforming long-standing
Rawalpindi, Punjab, Pakistan.
coalitions, and introducing new frontiers of competition
(Email: sobiahanif@fjwu.edu.pk )
Zeeshan Fida: Lecturer, Department of International such as innovation, data manipulation, and
Relations, Fatima Jinnah Women University, semiconductor supply chains. The research explores
Rawalpindi, Punjab, Pakistan. critical developments such as the rise of strategic tech-
driven coalitions like QUAD and AUKUS in setting global
Contents narratives around AI governance. This research applies
 Introduction
the theoretical lens of Defensive Realism, which argues
 Theoretical Framework that states act to preserve their security in an anarchic
 Research Methodology international system by countering potential threats. This
 Technology and AI Domination in the Tech Cold War qualitative study examines how AI leadership and control
 US Dominance in AI and Strategic Supply Chains over innovative technologies are becoming strategic
 US Strategic Concerns over China's Accelerating AI
Advancements
instruments in the restructuring of geopolitical power
 Quad and AUKUS Influence Emerging Technologies dynamics.
 Conclusion
 References

Keywords:
US-China, Artificial Intelligence, Tech Rivalry,
Geopolitical Implications

Introduction the incumbent world leader in cutting-edge AI

The ongoing competition between the United technology, views China's rapid AI developments as
States and China over technological dominance a strategic challenge to its state security, economic
illustrates a new geopolitical struggle, termed the interests, and liberal democratic values. On the
Tech Cold War. Unlike the ideological divide of the other hand, China perceives the US containment
20th century, this rivalry is driven by control over strategies, including export restrictions and
emerging technologies, crucial tech infrastructures, alliance-building in the Indo-Pacific region, as a
and innovation ecosystems that determine future barrier to its rise as a global technology
economic and military power. The United States, as superpower. This competition is based on AI

This work is licensed under the Attribution-Noncommercial- No Derivatives 4.0 International.

 Bushra Haider, Sobia Hanif, and Zeeshan Fida
development, dominance in semiconductor high- QUAD, AUKUS, and BRI highlight strategic
end chip production, regulation of global supply dynamics. The research also examines export
chains, and the capability to define international controls in China and compares the AI innovation
tech norms. This paper examines the research ecosystems of the US and China, focusing on
problem: How is the US-China AI rivalry, framed as public-private partnerships and state strategies.
a Tech Cold War, redesigning global power
dynamics, discussing the crucial role of Taiwan's Technology and AI Domination in the Tech
semiconductor industry (TMSC), altering Cold War
international alliances, and the impact of LLM In the 21st century, the contest for global
models like Chat GPT and DeepSeek? supremacy has transformed from nuclear weapons
to algorithms. The first Cold War, fundamentally
Theoretical Framework between the Soviet Union and the United States,
This research employs Defensive Realism as the was based on ideological differences between
theoretical framework to understand the US-China Capitalism and Communism (Powaski, 1997, p.11).
rivalry in AI and technology. Defensive Realism This led to an extended period of turbulence and
suggests that states primarily act to preserve their competition. However, the incumbent US-China
security and balance power in an anarchic competition, often called the "Tech Cold War," has
international system. Kenneth Waltz asserts that shifted into a tech-powered competition (Horowitz
anarchy compels states to fend for their own et al., 2022, p. 5). It’s not about traditional military
security in order to safeguard their survival. strength but about who has authority over cutting-
According to Defensive Realism, these actions are edge technology (Wu, 2020). Unlike the Cold War’s
driven by the need to secure their positions in the ideological warfare, this competition is based on
global order (Waltz, 1979). concrete supremacy in economic and military
In this context, both the US and China are capabilities (Takach, 2023, p. 39).
focusing on technological supremacy as a means of It demonstrates a transition in the global power
preserving their economic, military, and hierarchy where the technology ecosystem, rather
geopolitical interests in an increasingly competitive than political principles, determines power and
world. This framework highlights the rivalry as a dominance (Takach, 2023, p. 46). Both states
strategic competition where both powers seek to recognize the critical role of AI and other cutting-
mitigate vulnerabilities and ensure their survival by edge technologies in transforming global
controlling emerging technologies that define frameworks, ensuring national security, and
future global power dynamics. Additionally, efforts manipulating the international order of the 21st
to mobilize tech partnerships, control supply century (Brands, 2020). In this new competition,
chains and set global tech standards are reshaping China and the US have dedicated themselves
the global geopolitical landscape, reviving rivalries, entirely to a decisive, decade-long race to ensure
and fostering a new era of great power competition. competitive advantages in AI and other emerging
technologies like semiconductors and quantum
Research Methodology computing (Campbell & Sullivan, 2019). With
This study uses qualitative research to explore the Artificial Intelligence innovations, quantum
US-China AI rivalry and the impact of technological computing, and semiconductor advancements, this
dominance on geopolitics. The study involves a time has shaped an age of geopolitical influence
comprehensive analysis of publicly available (Lewis, 2022). The United States leads in the tech
materials including analysis of key documents, development race by utilizing its tech ecosystem,
government policies, think tank reports, working strategic collations like the Quad and AUKUS, and
papers, and investigative news articles. initiatives such as the CHIPS Act to enhance
Triangulation of these sources is carried out to semiconductor manufacturing and R&D (He, 2018).
understand the US and Chinese perspectives and Its influence in AI, quantum computing, and
strategies with respect to the use of AI and military technologies, integrated with strong
emerging technologies. Case studies on Taiwan's geopolitical dominance through framework
semiconductor industry and rising coalitions like developments and ensuring its edge because of its

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The Geo-Political Implications of the US-China AI and Tech Rivalry
influential alliances connections and joint strategic Russia, and others work on continuous, undetected
efforts leverages its lead in tech supremacy cyber infiltration. Unlike the Cold War's hyper-
competition (Allison et al., 2021). The rivalry logical deterrence model, artificial intelligence
extends across the quest for economic or military warfare functions in ambiguity, undermining
influence, elevating the role of strategic MAD's principles (Sparke, 1998). This fluctuation
partnerships, policy consolidation, and intensifies stress, pushing states to overstep limits
transnational cooperation to create centers for with increasing frequency. As AI-enabled systems
political influence (Hu, 2021). facilitate new "digital empires," the rising US-China
This competition has global prominence, competition for tech-driven influence determines
innovating trade linkages, partnerships, and the the realities of the Tech Cold War. The United
international technology ecosystem while pushing States, managing China’s strategic development, is
for the potential decoupling or splitting of global extensively engaged in sustaining its leading-edge
supply networks (Wang & Sun, 2021). States across technology through AI and quantum computing.
the globe are driven to align with either the US or As China upgrades its technological strengths, the
China, shaping emerging trends of alliance and US is taking a competitive approach by protecting
rivalry in international affairs (Kirton & Wang, its technology infrastructure expansion, securing
2023). East Asian states and entities, including intellectual property, and enhancing cooperation
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, are critical players with allies to counter China's dominance. With
in this new pattern of competition. They balance initiatives like the US National AI Strategy and
collaboration with the US while ensuring economic investments in cutting-edge technologies, the US
coordination with China (Shah, 2023). Their aims to assert influence in AI and cyber security
strategic significance as centers of innovation and (Lin & Meng, 2023). This rivalry is not just a mutual
manufacturing hotspots enhances their roles in this contestation; it extends globally, as both states race
race of technological dominance as they navigate to lead in domains that will shape the future of
the intricate requirements from both sides military power, economic preeminence, and
(Pekkanen, et al., 2007). As the global order geopolitical power (Govella, 2021). The rivalry
transforms, this race of technological dominance between the US and China is rethinking global
mirrors the strategic competitions of history but power dynamics, determining the framework of the
redesigns them through a lens of economic mutual Tech Cold War, where technology and AI are at the
dependency and leading-edge innovation (Kennedy core of the conflict (Ding & Dafoe, 2021).
& Lim, 2018). Advanced technological capabilities,
comprising everything from semiconductors to US Dominance in AI and Strategic Supply
military applications of AI, are now the foundation Chains
of twenty-first-century leadership dynamics, The United States excels in all primary AI domains
prompting dominant states to realign their policies through innovative research, high-capacity
and strategic initiatives to ensure a competitive technological production, a dynamic tech
edge in a fast-paced world (Liu & Liu, 2019). ecosystem, and strategic investments. This leads to
The Cold War between the US and the Soviet innovating AI systems and scaling up machine
Union detached them from direct military learning and deep learning models (Horowitz et al.,
engagements due to the doctrine of Mutually 2022). Companies like Open AI and Google AI have
Assured Destruction (MAD), whereas the rise of initiated leading-edge technologies, large language
artificial intelligence has intensified the models (GPT, BERT), and generative AI (Wamba et
uncertainties of confrontation in today's Tech Cold al., 2023). Domain-specific applications further
War (Takach, 2024). Unlike nuclear weapons, highlight US leadership. AI-integrated solutions are
artificial intelligence in military operations can transforming medical diagnostics with substantial
paralyze strategic infrastructure, sabotage research contributions from IBM Watson Health, Tempus,
facilities, rig elections, or smartphone infiltration and groundbreaking startups (Russo-Spena et al.,
without leaving compelling evidence of their origin 2019). In self-driving vehicles, companies like Tesla,
(Farrell & Newman, 2019). This invisibility Waymo, and Cruise are taking the lead in
complicates retaliation, as rivals like the US, China, integrating AI-powered navigation systems (Torres

Vol. X, No. II (Spring 2025) 47 | P a g e

 Bushra Haider, Sobia Hanif, and Zeeshan Fida
& George, 2023). Military and security applications dilemma, as Taiwan’s strategic advantage in global
rely on AI for unmanned aerial systems for defense, semiconductor production and distribution has
AI-driven maintenance prediction, and geospatial become a primary focus of US-China cold-war 2.0
analytics, anchored by defense industry companies dynamics (Lee & Johnson, 2011). The US has
and DARPA initiatives (Ding & Dafoe, 2021). activated efforts like the CHIPS and Science Act to
American companies like IBM, Google, and consolidate national production capacity and
Microsoft are also making breakthrough reduce reliance on foreign entities (Ernst, 2021).
innovations in quantum computing by leveraging American cloud giants such as AWS, Google Cloud,
AI in quantum systems to drive optimization and Microsoft Azure provide the technology
improvements, cryptographic code, and sustainable infrastructure for global AI-integrated applications.
material research issues (Ferràs-Hernández et al., While expanding US global economic influence,
2023). The influence of US-developed guidelines they also play a fundamental role in forming the
like TensorFlow by Google and PyTorch by Meta geostrategic competition with China over
stresses its dominance on global AI eco-system technology and AI-powered supply chain
growth, providing cutting-edge tools for optimization (Luitse, 2024). The United States
researchers and global app developers (Osborne et maintains global market dominance in AI
al., 2024). Advanced tech Companies like NVIDIA innovation, mainly powered by private-sector
fuel innovation in AI hardware with advanced-level investments, which influence the tech investment
GPUs and specific chips, facilitating broad-scale AI landscape. The US government plays a defining
model training and execution. Industry and role, extensively through military-related
educational leadership further cement US investment via agencies like DARPA, which grants
dominance, with tech startups like Google, billions annually to AI-driven projects targeted at
Microsoft, Amazon, and Meta investing national security, robotic warfare weapons, and
considerably in AI research and collaboration with digital infrastructure security (Sayler, 2020).
primary institutions like MIT, Stanford, and Additionally, university-industry research
Carnegie Mellon (Coutinet & Flacher, 2024). These initiatives enhance AI development, with top
institutions produce prime talent and leading-edge universities like MIT, Stanford, and Carnegie
research, driving current progress. State initiatives Mellon working together with tech industry
also play a primary role. Investing in AI research pioneers Google, Microsoft, and Amazon (Christie
through DARPA and NSF fuels innovation, while et al., 2021). These research collaborations ensure
the coordination between public and private that AI research breakthroughs are extensively
domains coordinates integration with national scientific and economically sustainable, expanding
concerns and government economic initiatives reinforcement of the US as a leading global hub for
(Daniels & Chang, 2021). The US forms cross-border AI innovation centers.
AI guidelines and regulations through its
leadership in organizations like the OECD US Strategic Concerns over China's
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Accelerating AI Advancements
Development) and its dominance in ethical AI The United States views the accelerated growth of
frameworks. By capitalizing on its tech-driven AI in China as a major obstacle to its tech-driven
influence, the US exports AI-based solutions across leadership and geostrategic dominance (Scobell,
regions, ensuring its geopolitical advantage and 2020). Chinese AI Company Deep Seek has recently
sustained governance in all sectors of AI (Perskaya emerged as an important player in the global AI
& Krasavina, 2019). contest. DeepSeek-R1, delivers performance
While the U.S. leads in chip design, it is comparable to leading models like Open AI’s GPT-
primarily reliant on Taiwan Semiconductor 4, despite being developed at a low cost—
Manufacturing Company (TSMC), 2020 for its approximately $6 million compared to GPT-4's
leading-edge chips. TSMC’s supply chain estimated $100 million advancement cost. This
production expertise customizes the manufacturing productivity is achieved using less advanced
of NVIDIA’s and AMD’s advanced processors hardware, mitigating risks US export controls on
(Jeong & Robertson, 2023). However, this advanced chips pose (Nature, 2025). Deep Seeks’
dependence also highlights a main geopolitical

48 | P a g e Global Social Sciences Review (GSSR)

The Geo-Political Implications of the US-China AI and Tech Rivalry
rise is a direct threat to US AI dominance because (Lundvall & Rikap, 2022). As China gradually turns
its open-source, cost-efficient models have into a leader in major technological industries, the
attracted global attention. Deep Seek highlights US fears its tech-based influence and national
China's capacity to innovate despite US chip security could be compromised (Yu, 2020).
restrictions. The US is answering with stricter tech
export controls, AI governance with allies, and Quad and AUKUS Influence Emerging
increased local investments to maintain its AI Technologies
dominance. However, DeepSeek’s success signals
The Indo-Pacific has emerged as the focal point of
China’s increasing AI resilience, escalating the US- geopolitics in the contemporary era. Mutual
China high-tech competition. The US government security agreements strengthening to counteract
has also highlighted issues over DeepSeek’s the Chinese ambition in this region and alliances
potential national security risks, including data like QUAD and AUKUS are profound examples of
privacy issues and the possibility of intellectual allied security efforts. Australia, the U.K., and the
property theft due to its open-source nature U.S.A. announced AUKUS in September 2021. The
(Computerworld, 2025). After the launch of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) between
DeepSeek, the shares of the US high-tech firm the United States, Australia, India, and Japan is
Nvidia dropped by 17%, decreasing the company's essential in charting new directions for next-
market value by approximately $600 billion.
generation technologies and AI (Saran, 2024). The
Similarly, Google's parent company Alphabet Quad is arranged strategically as an adjustment to
suffered a loss of $100 billion, while Microsoft faced China's tech-increasing dominance in the Indo-
a loss of $7 billion. Overall, the combined loss of Pacific region because of the promotion of
these three major companies has exceeded $1 democratic values and creating the future
trillion. Additionally, DeepSeek's success has led to landscape across AI and other innovative sectors
sharp declines in US tech stocks and impacted (Glaser, 2024). The Quad countries lead
global markets, reflecting the growing international AI research and beating the EU and
competitiveness of Chinese AI. These innovations ASEAN also producing over 650,000 papers
underscore the amplifying high-tech competition between 2010-2020. Each player of QUAD brings
between the US and China, as both nations vie for exclusive strengths (Center for Security and
AI supremacy (McCartney et al., 2025).
Emerging Technology, 2024). The US leads in
The US perceives China’s state-controlled natural language processing and machine
funding in AI, its extensive plans for autonomous learning, India leads in big data analytics and
monitoring systems, and AI-powered defense pattern detection, Japan leads in robotic technology
systems as an ongoing threat to its digital and and replicating systems, and Australia leads in
military interests (Layton, 2020). Moreover, computing and speech science foundations
unmanned aerial systems, data-driven predictions, (Fedasiuk et al., 2021). However, intra-quad AI
and tech competencies are substantial barriers to partnerships are minimal and produce only 4% of
US defense superiority (Grossman & Goldman, co-authored international AI research papers.
2024). China’s funding of AI-integrated military While the US has significant AI connections,
technologies, like robotic warfare technologies and partnerships between the Quad nations remain
combat intelligence processing, intensifies limited, restraining top productivity and optimal
concerns that Beijing could accomplish military performance of their collaborative power (Konaev
equality or beat the US in targeted zones (Bächle & & Dunham, 2020). China remains an important
Bareis, 2022). The growing potential of China’s AI- research partner of Quad countries as long as
powered reconnaissance system also alerts the US global political tensions persist and highlights the
to its possibilities to influence global AI standards, profundity of its international technological
particularly in autocratic regimes (Al-Hasnawi, alliance (Global Times, 2024). The US is the largest
2021). The US restrictions on Chinese high-tech foreign investor in AI companies of all Quad
companies, such as Huawei, and sanctions on members India, Japan, and Australia for driving
access to critical technologies like semiconductors, innovation, However, capital allocation is
are seen as an organized initiative to reduce the constrained in intra-Quad and with massive
speed of China’s technological developments

Vol. X, No. II (Spring 2025) 49 | P a g e

 Bushra Haider, Sobia Hanif, and Zeeshan Fida
Chinese funds posing a demanding scenario to the fingers at these collaborations for highlighting what
Quad’s tech autonomy (The Economic Times, it calls "Cold War mentality," (France 24, 2023).
2024). Economic dependencies on China curtail AUKUS and the Quad counteract these standpoints
progress to lower dependence on its technology. by boosting democratic values and commitment to
However, the Quad can strengthen its competitive a rules-driven international order to challenge the
edge as an international leader in innovation West's perceived China's autocratic state (Lowy
focused on long-term growth through strategic Institute, 2024). These partnerships' purpose is to
partnerships and ensuring that AI advances follow illustrate an alternative ideology to China's
democratic norms (Quad Investors Network, 2024). communism and territorial aggression and focus on
Comparably, AUKUS, a trilateral security the ideological divide in ongoing global politics by
partnership between Australia, the UK, and the US indicating values like advocacy of rights, digital
is a transformative progress in Indo-Pacific autonomy, and responsible and sustainable AI tech
geopolitics announced on 15 September 2021. It is development (Tellis, 2021). The rivalry’s impact on
committed to settling the balance of China's middle powers for collective security and power
strengthening leverage and coordinating efforts for dynamics is profound, which tackles the problem of
regional stability (Tahir, 2024). The collaboration stabilizing connections with both superpowers
mainly facilitates Australia in attaining nuclear- while upholding their autonomy. The US-China
driven submarines and extending strategic competition will mold the world economy and
coordination in emerging technologies such as military operational areas for years as AI advances
technological innovation capacity, AI, quantum- (Lee, 2018).
enabled computing, and marine defense
capabilities (Paul, 2023). The United Kingdom Conclusion
follows with its "Global Britain" vision by boosting The US-China AI competition is not just a
its defense positioning in the Indo-Pacific amidst technological rivalry but an international struggle
China’s military expansion (Cheng, 2022). The for power that will determine the course of global
AUKUS marks its largest defense commitment in power dynamics (Kong, 2016). Meanwhile, China is
the decade of advancement in enhancing its making steady progress in keeping pace with AI
defense capabilities for Australia (Cox et al., 2023). and semiconductor production and overcoming
AUKUS fosters innovations in AI, quantum considerable challenges in the face of US-imposed
computing, and digital infrastructure protection on restrictions. China's demonstrated ability to
the tech front. These investments strive to develop systems like Deep Seek is a huge setback
transform military alignments and gain a for the US. This active competition, driven by both
technological edge in defense to offset China’s nations' desire to maintain technological
advancements in these domains (Trabucco & Maas, supremacy, will keep the world on edge (George &
2023). China perceives AUKUS and the Quad as top George, 2023). This rivalry presents an opportunity
security threats to its strategic goals in the Indo- to switch between the two superpowers, creating
Pacific. US-led geopolitical alliances are structured new coalitions and enhancing coordination
to counter its growth and threat to its increasing between middle powers and developing states.
authority (Zarrar & Gichki, 2022). Beijing has While also coping with the uncertainties of this
implemented counter-strategies like empowering decisive geopolitical battle. The global landscape
its defense capabilities, extending its Belt and Road observes the development of the Tech Cold War; an
Initiative (BRI) to advance economic supremacy, extended period of competition as the US and
and enhancing collaborations with Russia (Bisley, China continue their geo-political rivalry that could
2024). It has intensified its technology contest by last decades and transform the landscape of
backing with considerable capital in AI, quantum international relations (Takach, 2024).
breakthroughs, and IT capabilities to ensure a
leading position (Sumadinata, 2022). China points

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The Geo-Political Implications of the US-China AI and Tech Rivalry
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