The ombudsman system was introduced in the UK following the Crichel Down Affair and the Whyatt

Report, resulting in the Parliamentary Ombudsman (under the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967)
and Local Government Ombudsman (under the Local Government Act 1974). While courts and
ombudsmen address different types of justice, the ombudsman is often a more efficient mechanism for
resolving administrative complaints.

The scope of the ombudsman is fundamentally different from that of the courts. Ombudsmen investigate
maladministration, a concept that is broader and more flexible than illegality. It covers conduct that falls
short of good administrative practice, such as delay, rudeness, or giving wrong information, even if the
act is technically lawful. Maladministration is not about interpreting statutes or applying strict legal tests
but about whether the administrative body acted in a way that caused injustice through poor service or
unfair procedures. The Debt of Honour case, involving compensation for British internees of WWII,
illustrates this: the courts in ABCIFER found no breach of law, but the ombudsman found
maladministration due to the government's inconsistent and opaque eligibility criteria. Her findings were
not legally binding, yet they ultimately led to compensation following parliamentary pressure.

In contrast, the courts focus on legality. Judicial review assesses whether public authorities acted within
their legal powers (ultra vires), followed the required procedures, or violated rights. The threshold for
intervention is high. As in Congreve v Home Office, a decision may be unlawful due to bad faith or
improper purpose, but courts will not quash decisions simply because they are unfair or poorly
reasoned. The ombudsman, however, can investigate even lawful actions if they fall below expected
administrative standards.

There are areas where ombudsmen and courts overlap, such as procedural fairness, legitimate
expectations, and reasonableness. In R v LCA ex p Liverpool City Council, the Court of Appeal
acknowledged that ombudsmen could properly address complaints even where judicial review was
technically available. Yet ombudsmen also have unique powers: they can initiate inquiries without
adversarial proceedings, gather documents, and interview staff confidentially—advantages the courts do
not possess. Their inquisitorial method allows for broader systemic insight. This flexibility lets
ombudsmen explore administrative culture and practices rather than focus only on the legal outcome of
individual cases.

Standing is another area of divergence. Judicial review requires “sufficient interest” under s.31(3) of the
Senior Courts Act 1981. Though this is broadly interpreted post-Greenpeace, it still requires legal framing
and evidence of specific detriment. For the ombudsman, the standard is that the complainant has
suffered “injustice in consequence of maladministration.” The Local Government Ombudsman’s
threshold, especially, allows for complaints based on emotional distress or administrative inconvenience.
In Balchin (No 1), the court recognised outrage and loss of trust in public administration as legitimate
grounds for injustice, indicating that the ombudsman’s role is geared more toward informal redress than
strict legal adjudication.

Nonetheless, ombudsmen cannot hear all complaints. They are barred from considering matters already
resolved by the courts or involving claims by public bodies themselves (PCA 1967, s.6 and LGA 1974,
s.26(6)). In R (Elias) v Secretary of State for Defence, a claim of indirect discrimination was resolved only
through judicial interpretation of the Race Relations Act, something outside the ombudsman's
jurisdiction. These limitations affirm the courts' essential role in protecting statutory and human rights,
while the ombudsman focuses on administrative standards and accessibility.
A procedural barrier unique to the Parliamentary Ombudsman is the MP filter; complainants must route
their grievances through a Member of Parliament (PCA 1967, s.5(1)). This was initially meant to
safeguard parliamentary oversight, but it is widely criticised today. The 2013 Public Administration Select
Committee Report argued that the MP filter deters legitimate complaints, delays justice, and is no longer
appropriate in a modern administrative state. While it may encourage MPs to take constituent concerns
seriously, it creates a bottleneck and undermines the accessibility of the process.

The remedies offered by courts and ombudsmen differ not only in substance but also in enforceability.
Courts can issue binding orders: quashing a decision, mandating action, or declaring rights. These
remedies have the force of law and, if ignored, can result in contempt proceedings. In contrast,
ombudsmen make non-binding recommendations. However, compliance is remarkably high. Local
authorities rarely reject recommendations; in the ten years leading up to 2006, only 12 out of 1,500
cases saw rejections. In the Debt of Honour case, although initial resistance from the government
blocked compensation, the ombudsman’s special report to Parliament eventually led to a reversal of
policy.

Cecil Clothier, former Parliamentary Ombudsman, defended the non-binding nature of ombudsman
remedies, noting that legal enforcement would require an appeal structure and formal rules of evidence,
undermining the system’s speed and accessibility. He called moral authority, supported by publicity and
parliamentary accountability, “as good an enforcing power as any reasonable ombudsman could wish
for”. Endicott concurs, suggesting that the ombudsman’s legitimacy lies in persuasion, not coercion.

The procedural approach of ombudsmen also enhances their efficiency. Courts operate through an
adversarial model, where two parties present opposing arguments in a formal setting, requiring legal
representation and adherence to strict timelines. Judicial review is particularly constrained in terms of
evidence, remedies, and timing. Conversely, the ombudsman’s inquisitorial method allows for proactive
investigation. Under ss.7–9 of the PCA 1967, the ombudsman may examine documents, summon
witnesses, and conduct informal interviews. This makes the ombudsman system more suitable for
unravelling complex bureaucratic failures and systemic issues. While ombudsman investigations may take
several months, they are generally less expensive, more accessible, and more user-friendly than judicial
proceedings.

While courts remain indispensable for determining the legality of public action and protecting individual
rights through enforceable remedies, the ombudsman system offers a faster, more flexible, and often
more effective route to administrative justice. In many cases, especially those involving poor service or
procedural mishandling, the ombudsman is a more efficient and citizen-centred alternative.