1985

No. 1: Art 13; Mitigating circumstances; minority

Minority is generally a privileged mitigating circumstance which entitles the minor
offender to a suspended sentence. It may however, under certain circumstances, be
considered as a mere ordinary circumstance in which case the offender may be
immediately sentenced and made to serve the penalty imposed upon him instead of
being placed under suspended sentence. Discuss.

Answer:

Minority as a privileged mitigating circumstance is considered in the imposition

of the penalty, (Art. 68, Revised Penal Code). However, the age of the minor at the time
of the commission of the crime may be considered in suspending the sentence upon
conviction. So under the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree 603, as
amended) a minor under 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense and at
the time of the trial, if found guilty after trial may apply for the suspension of the
sentence. The only instance where there is no suspension of the sentence in spite of
minority is that provided in Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code where the minor under
16 years old at the time of the commission of a light felony if found guilty, the sentence
is immediately imposed. But Article 80 has been expressly repealed by Presidential
Decree 1179 which took effect on August 15, 1977. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court
held in People vs, Sanchez (132 SCRA 103 1984) that there are only two instances where
there can be no suspended sentence, to wit:

1) if the offense committed by a minor is punishable by death or life imprisonment;

2) if the minor is 18 years and above at the time of the commission of the offense and at
the time of the trial.

No. 1: Art 80; Suspension of sentence; minors; PD603

Minority is generally a privileged mitigating circumstance which entitles the minor
offender to a suspended sentence. It may however, under certain circumstances, be
considered as a mere ordinary circumstance in which case the offender may be
immediately sentenced and made to serve the penalty imposed upon him instead of
being placed under suspended sentence. Discuss.

Answer:

Minority as a privileged mitigating circumstance is considered in the imposition

of the penalty, (Art. 68, Revised Penal Code). However, the age of the minor at the time
of the commission of the crime may be considered in suspending the sentence upon
conviction. So under the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree 603, as
amended) a minor under 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense and at
the time of the trial, if found guilty after trial may apply for the suspension of the
sentence. The only instance where there is no suspension of the sentence in spite of
minority is that provided in Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code where the minor under
16 years old at the time of the commission of a light felony if found guilty, the sentence
is immediately imposed. But Article 80 has been expressly repealed by Presidential
Decree 1179 which took effect on August 15, 1977. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court
held in People vs, Sanchez (132 SCRA 103 1984) that there are only two instances where
there can be no suspended sentence, to wit: 1) if the offense committed by a minor is
punishable by death or life imprisonment; 2) if the minor is 18 years and above at the time
of the commission of the offense and at the time of the trial.

No. 2: Art 148; Direct Assault; Art 25; Penalties; appreciation of

modifying circumstances
Arthur, a 17 year old student and aggrieved by the death of his only brother in a
previous rally at the hands of the police, fired at a motorcycle cop passing by their
place. He, however, missed his target and instead hit Jason, a passerby, who died
instantaneously.
(A) As an investigating fiscal, what charge or charges will you file against Arthur?
Reasons.
(B) Upon arraignment, Arthur pleaded guilty and invoked the additional mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. As a judge and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, what penalty will you impose upon Arthur? Discuss.
(C) May Arthur apply for and be entitled to probation under P.D. 968, as amended by
P.D. 1251 and Batas Pambansa 76?

Answer:

(A) If I were the investigating fiscal, I would file against Arthur an information for the
complex crime of Direct Assault with Homicide. The motorcycle cop is an agent
of a person in authority. Firing at the peace officer is attacking him, one of the
modes of committing Direct Assault. (Art. 148, Revised Penal Code). Since a third
person was hit instead, resulting in his instantaneous death, the single act of
shooting resulted in two grave felonies, to wit, direct assault and homicide, a
compound complex crime. (Art 48, Revised Penal Code).

(B) As a judge, I will first consider the imposable penalty under the Revised Penal
Code for the complex crime of Direct Assault with Homicide. The penalty is for
the more serious crime to be imposed in its maximum period, (Art 48, Revised
Penal Code).

The age of Arthur at the time of the commission of the crime, which is 17 years, is a
privileged mitigating circumstance. Under Art. 68, par. 2, Revised Penal Code,
the imposable penalty is to be lowered by one degree.

There being two mitigating circumstances which are voluntary plea of guilty and
voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty, being divisible,
is attain to be lowered by one degree. (Art. 64, par. 5, Revised Penal Code).

The imposable penalty, lowered by two degrees, will be the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence. The mini-mum will be one degree next lower than the maximum.
(Act. 4103 as amended, Indeterminate Sentence Law).

No. 3: Entrapment vs instigation

DD, a member of the National Bureau of Investigation, was approached by his
compadre, EE, regarding the latter's plan to hold-up a nearby bank. DD agreed to lend
his car as the get-away car; he also asked his driver, FF, to drive the car for EE. On the
day the crime was to take place, DD tipped off the local police. EE was arrested as he
pointed a gun at the bank teller demanding cash:
(A) Can EE raise the defense of instigation by DD? Discuss.
(B) Did DD incur any liability? Discuss.

Answer:

(A) EE cannot raise the defense of instigation by DD. Instigation takes place when a
peace officer in the performance of duties induces a person to commit a crime. The
reason why the crime is committed is because of the inducement. The facts of the
problem are clear that DD did not induce nor instigate EE to plan the hold up of
the bank. The plan was already conceived by EE when he approached DD. When
DD agreed to the plan by lending EE his car. as a get-away vehicle and his driver
to drive it for EE, he devised a way tofacilitate the apprehension of EE, as when
DD in fact tipped off the local police on the day the crime was to take place. This
is not a case when an innocent person is induced to commit a crime merely to
prosecute him. It is simply a trap to catch a criminal. (People v Valmores et al 122
SCRA 922 1983).

(B) DD is not criminally liable. His agreeing to the plan of EE to hold up the bank is
merely a way to trap or facilitate the arrest of EE. This is evident when DD tipped
off the police on the day when the crime is to be committed. DD acted in the
performance of his duties as an officer of the law to entrap EE.

No 4: Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; cruelty

A case of MURDER was filed against MN for killing XY, solely on the basis of a
finding that XY sustained more than 200 stab wounds, only three of which were fatal.
Discuss the propriety of the charge filed against MN.

Answer:

The charge for Murder against MN is not tenable. Any qualifying circumstance of
murder cannot be inferred but must be proved satisfactorily and conclusively as the act
itself. The fact that the victim sustained more than 200 stab wounds, of which only three
were fatal, does not indicate cruelty as a qualifying circumstance of murder. Cruelty
requires deliberate prolongation of suffering of the victim. The number of wounds in
itself does not show cruelty as it is essential to prove that the wounds were inflicted
unnecessarily while the victim was alive to prolong his physical suffering. In cruelty, the
wrong done in the commission of the crime is deliberately augmented by causing other
wrongs not necessary in the commission of the crime. Cruelty cannot be presumed
(People vs. Artienda 90 SCRA 944).

Scoffing or outraging at the corpse of the victim cannot also be invoked as the facts
do not show that wounds were inflicted when the victim was already dead or in what
part of the body were the wounds inflicted. Besides, being a qualifying circumstance, it
cannot also be presumed.

No. 5: Art 6; Stage of execution; desistance

Intending to kill his estranged wife Myrna, Anthony mixed poison in her coffee which
would have normally killed her. After drinking the coffee, Myrna felt nauseated and
vomited. Appalled by the suffering and helplessness of his wife, Anthony took pity
on her and gave her an antidote. Myrna recovered completely after ten(10)days.
Discuss with reasons the criminal liability, if any, of Anthony. May he invoke
desistance in his favor?

Answer:

Anthony will not be liable for frustrated parricide. Although the wife, Myrna,had
drank the poisoned coffee, and all the acts of execution to kill her were already
committed, she did not however die due to the antidote administered by Anthony. The
crime was therefore not produced due to the voluntary act of Anthony. In a frustrated
felony, the acts of execution have been performed which would produce the felony as a
consequence but nevertheless do not produce it by causes independent of the will of the
offender. So, if the perpetrator himself prevented the consummation of the crime, it is not
frustrated.

In that sense, when Anthony gave the antidote to his wife, when he saw her
suffering after drinking the poisoned coffee, such act may be considered desistance in
killing her, although as a rule, desistance refers to acts of execution. The facts of the
problem merely state that after the administration of the antidote, the wife recovered after
ten (10) days. It may be presumed that she was ill during that period. Since there is no
mention of medical attendance nor incapacity from work, the offense will be slight
physical injuries under Par. 2 of Art. 266 of the Revised Penal Code.

No. 6: Art 11; Mistake of fact

Pat. Josue, a member of the INP Western Police District, together with two (2) other
policemen, was chasing Katindig, a notorious police killer. Katindig entered a nearby
dimly lighted warehouse. Josue and his companions continued pursuing him. When
they reached the mezzanine, Josue saw a man crouching behind a pile of boxes,
holding what appeared to be a long rifle. When the man suddenly stood up and faced
Josue and his companions, Josue fired at the man hitting him fatally. It turned out,
however, that the deceased was the warehouseman who was holding a mere lead pipe.
Discuss Pat. Josue's criminal liability for the said killing stating your reasons.

Answer:

Patrolman Josue will not incur any criminal liability. He can invoked in his favor
mistake of facts due to good faith. Under the circumstances, Patrolman Josue shot the
victim in the honest belief that he was the notorious police-killer whom they were chasing
until he entered a dimly lighted warehouse. In the mezzanine of the warehouse,
Patrolman Josue saw a man crouching behind a pile of boxes holding what appeared to
be a long rifle. The patrolman fired at the man when he suddenly stood up and faced
him. He had no opportunity to verify first the identity of the victim before acting. He
acted, therefore, without criminal intent and had the facts turned out to be true, as
Patrolman Josue believed them to be, that is, that the victim was the notorious police-
killer, that act committed would be lawful.

No. 7: Art 25; Penalties; three-fold rule

Finding Carlos Torres guilty of ROBBERY as charged, Judge Cruz nevertheless
dismissed the case against him it appearing from the evidence that Carlos Torres had
already been previously convicted in fifteen (15) other criminal cases and sentenced to
a total penalty of 305 years,... his HONOR ruling that anyway the total penalty which
he may be compelled to serve cannot in any case exceed forty (40) years under the
"three-fold rule".
Comment on the legality of His HONOR'S aforesaid pronouncement.

Answer:

The dismissal of the robbery case by Judge Cruz is improper and irregular.
Dismissal is inconsistent with the finding of guilt of the accused. The duty of the Court is
to apply the law and to impose the penalty provided upon the accused found guilty of
the crime charged. The reason that the accused, Carlos Torres, had been previously
convicted in fifteen (15) other crimes and sentenced to a total penalty of three hundred
five (305) years and the total penalty that the accused may be compelled to serve cannot
exceed forty (40) years under the three-fold rule, does not find application in law. The
threefold rule applies to the service of the penalties and not in the imposition of the
penalties. (People vs Escares 102 Phil. 677).

No. 8: Art 350; Marriage contracted against the provisions of the

marriage law
While his marriage to Sylvia was subsisting, Rollie took Cynthia, who had been legally
separated from her husband, to Ramon Abad, who, in priestly attire and posing as Fr.
Chavez of the Aglipayan Church, solemnized their marriage. After the marriage, Rollie
took Cynthia to Baguio on a week-long honeymoon.
As a fiscal and based on the foregoing facts, what charge or charges will you file and
against whom? Discuss.

Answer:

As a fiscal, I will file a charge of Usurpation of Official Functions against Ramon

Abad. He merely posed as a priest of the Aglipayan Church and was not therefore
authorized to solemnize a marriage. Solemnization of a marriage is an official function.
(U.S. v. Hernandez, 29 Phil. 109).

Against Rollie, the charge will be a marriage contracted in contravention of law

which is penalized in Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code as an Illegal Marriage, It
cannot be bigamy as the marriage with Cynthia did not have all the essential requisites
of a valid marriage, (People v. Peralta CA-GR No. 13130- R, June 30, 1955).

No. 8: Art 177; Usurpation of Official Functions

While his marriage to Sylvia was subsisting, Rollie took Cynthia, who had been legally
separated from her husband, to Ramon Abad, who, in priestly attire and posing as Fr.
Chavez of the Aglipayan Church, solemnized their marriage. After the marriage, Rollie
took Cynthia to Baguio on a week-long honeymoon. As a fiscal and based on the
foregoing facts, what charge or charges will you file and against whom? Discuss.

Answer:
 As a fiscal, I will file a charge of Usurpation of Official Functions against Ramon
Abad. He merely posed as a priest of the Aglipayan Church and was not therefore
authorized to solemnize a marriage. Solemnization of a marriage is an official function.
(U.S. v. Hernandez, 29 Phil. 109).

Against Rollie, the charge will be a marriage contracted in contravention of law

which is penalized in Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code as an Illegal Marriage, It
cannot be bigamy as the marriage with Cynthia did not have all the essential requisites
of a valid marriage, (People v. Peralta CA-GR No. 13130- R, June 30, 1955).

No. 9: Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self- defense

Feeling homesick and terribly missing his wife after a long absence, Ronald, without
notice, came home from Saudi. Arriving at their residence, he immediately proceeded
to their bedroom where he saw his wife lying on their bed under a mosquito net locked
in embrace with his compadre Dante Ayala He immediately drew his gun but was
beaten to a draw by Dante whose bullet felled him.
Prosecuted for Homicide for killing Ronald, Dante set up self-defense but was
nevertheless convicted.
(A) Comment on the validity of Dante's conviction.
(B) In the above given case, supposing Ronald shot Dante and his (Ronald's) wife,
while Dante was on top of the latter, thus killing both of them, will you grant him the
benefit of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code? Explain.

Answer:

(A) The conviction of Dante was valid. He cannot claim self-defense as there was no
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. When Ronald drew his gun upon
surprising his wife locked in embrace with his compadre Dante.

(B) If Ronald shot Dante and his wife while Dante was on top of the latter, killing
both of them, Ronald can avail of the benefit of Article 247, Revised Penal Code).
The basic element of this article is that the unfaithful wife and her paramour were
surprised by the offended husband during the act of sexual intercourse or
immediately thereafter. To an ordinary, prudent person who surprised a man
lying on top of his wife in their marital bed such act in the mind of the husband
would mean nothing else but sexual intercourse.

No. 10: Art 251; Death in tumultuous affray

After engaging in a drinking spree at Celia's birthday party, a turbulent commotion
took place in Celia's premises involving no less than forty (40) guests during which
occasion Tito was killed by shots fired from a .45 cal. pistol. The fiscal filed a case of
"Death in TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY" against all the participants in the melee. Do you
agree? Reasons.

Answer:

The charge of "Death in Tumultuous Affray" against all the participants in the
melee is not proper. In a tumultuous affray the actual killer of the person killed is not
known. Then the one liable will be the person known to have inflicted serious physical
injuries upon the victim. If he is also not known, the one liable will be the person known
to have employed violence upon the victim. Death in a tumultuous affray under Article
261 of the Revised Penal Code applies if the killer of the person killed in the course of the
affray cannot be ascertained. (U.S. v. Tan- doc 40 Phil. 954).

No. 11: Art 267; Kidnapping/Serious illegal detention

Ernesto, a rejected suitor of Madonna, waited one evening for the latter to come out of
her school. Catching Madonna by surprise, Ernesto succeeded in forcing Madonna to
his car and thereafter drove off for his hometown in Calamba, Laguna. He kept
Madonna in his parents' house solely to convince her to accept his marriage proposal.
Frustrated after three (3) days, Ernesto succeeded, after kissing her, fondling her breast
and touching her private parts, in forcibly having carnal knowledge of Madonna once
every day for the next three (3) days. On the 7th day, Madonna was rescued by the
police authorities.
What crime or crimes did Ernesto commit? State your reasons.

Answer:

Ernesto committed serious illegal detention and three (3) rapes. As long as there is
restraint of liberty, Illegal Detention is committed. Since the offended party is a woman,
the crime is serious illegal detention. (Art. 267 Revised Penal Code). Madonna was
deprived of her liberty for six days although in the first three days Ernesto kept the
offended party in the house of his parents solely to convince her to accept his marriage
proposal. (People vs. Crisostomo et. al., 46 Phil. 775).

In the next three days, by forcing Madonna, Ernesto had sexual intercourse with
her once a day. Rape is not a continuous crime and so three rapes are committed. A
complex crime is not committed because the serious illegal detention is not a means
necessary to commit rape. Besides rape can be committed even without serious illegal
detention. (People vs. Beraal 131 SCRA 1984).

No. 12: Art 19; Anti-fencing law

While waiting for his car, AB was approached by CD, who offered him a new set of
auto mechanic tools coating P3,000.00 for only P500. AB paid CD P500 and thereafter
gave the brand new set of tools as a birthday gift to his godson, an auto mechanic. It
turned out later that CD is the object of a police manhunt upon complaint of his
employer for the theft of more than 100 sets of similar tools. Threatened with criminal
prosecution for violation of the Anti- Fencing Law, he consulted you as to his probable
criminal liability for the said transaction.
Put down in writing your advice and explanation on his query.

Answer:

Fencing is the act of any person, who with intent to gain for himself, or for another
shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of or shall buy and sell
or in any other manner deal in any article, item or object or anything of value, which he
knows or should be known to him to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft (P.D. No. 1612), Considering that CD was a total stranger to AB, that
the former was the one who approached the latter to sell auto mechanic tools costing
P3.000 for only P500, that CD was not in the business of selling auto mechanic tools nor
was he representing any store engaged in such business, AB should have been placed on
guard that the object purchased by him was the proceed of the crime of robbery or theft.
AB should be liable for fencing. I would advice him to show his good faith in purchasing
the auto mechanic tools— that he requested from CD, the seller, a receipt, with a warranty
to defend his ownership from a claim of any person whatsoever.

No. 13: RA 3019

Cris Vera, an influential member of the Sangguniang Panlunsod of Butuan City and a
well-known radio commentator of the said place, addressed a written communication
to Director Jose of Butuan City LTC, asking for the issuance of a "temporary permit"
for a special trip to Ozamis City of a TPU jeepney belonging to Vera's relative which
got involved in a vehicular collision with a private car in the latter's place. The purpose
of the said request is to make it appear that the trip although not within the authorized
route of the TPU jeepney's certificate of public convenience, was nevertheless
authorized so as to enable the owner to recover on the insurance policy.
Director Jose refused, fearful of the disastrous consequences. Thereafter, he was the
subject of unsavory comments and furious attack by Cris Vera in his program. Director
Jose then countered with a criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Graft Law with
the Tanodbayan against Cris Vera.
Will the complaint prosper? Discuss with reasons.

Answer:

The criminal complaint against Cris Vera for violation of the Anti-Graft Law which
was filed with the Tanodbayan will not prosper. The mere act of Cris Vera, an influential
member of the Sangguniang Panlunsod of Butuan City and a well-known radio
commentator of addressing a letter to Director Jose of Butuan City LTC, asking for the
issuance of a "temporary permit" for a special trip to Ozamis City of a TPU jeepney
belonging to Vera's relative which got involved in a vehicular collision with a private car,
is not "persuading, inducing or influencing" another public officer to perform an act in
violation of the rules and regulations of the office. (Sec. 3 (a) Act. 3019), Generally to
induce, persuade or influence is to give a price, reward or promise. It is essential that the
accused should have acted for a consideration, payment or enumeration (People vs,
Bornales 13 SCRA 972, 67 O.G. 8316). The fact that Director Jose was the subject of
unsavory comments and furious attacks by Cris Vera in his radio program after the denial
of the request, as its purpose was to enable the owner of the TPU to recover on the
insurance policy, do not also constitute ''persuading or influencing" as there is no mention
that the attacks were uttered due to the denial of such request for the issuance of the
"temporary permit".

No. 15: Art 315; Estafa; violation of PD115

Garcia, an importer, succeeded in convincing his bank to release his importation under
a trust receipt agreement he signed last January 15, 1985. Upon maturity of the trust
receipts on February 5, 1985, Garcia paid the bank in check which was however
dishonored.
Informed of the said dishonor, Garcia paid only 60% of the amount of his check and
refused to pay the balance despite demands.
(A) On the basis of the foregoing facts, what may Garcia be prosecuted for? Reasons.
(B) What is the effect of the 50% payment
made by Garcia on his criminal liability? Discuss.

Answer:

(A) Garcia should be prosecuted for the violation of the terms of a trust receipt which
is punished in P.D. No. 115 as estafa through misappropriation or conversion.
Under the trust receipt agreement, Garcia was under obligation upon, maturity
thereof to turn over to the bank the proceeds of the sale of the imported goods,
document or instrument or to return the said goods, documents or instrument if
not sold. Failure to comply with this obligation shall constitute estafa under Art.
315, Par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code. Since Garcia paid only 50% of the
amount, he will be liable for estafa regarding the balance of 50%.
(B) Partial payment does not extinguish criminal liability because a criminal offense
is committed. (Javier vs. People 40 O.G. 67).

No. 16: Art 349; Bigamy

While in the United States sometime in 1975, Armand married Amparo. Because of
violent repeated quarrels between them, Armand came back to Manila in 1979 and
being lonesome, married Corina that same year. Amparo died in 1979, Two years
thereafter, Armand got entangled with Delilah whom he married in Baguio in 1981.
(A) Can Corina prosecute Armand for bigamy?
(B) How about Delilah, can she likewise file a case of bigamy against Armand?

Answer:

(A) The facts of the problem do not indicate the specific date of the death of Amparo
in 1979 nor the marriage of Armand to Corina in 1979. If the marriage with Corina
was contracted before the death of Amparo, such marriage would be void for
being bigamous. Corina cannot prosecute Armand for bigamy because of his
marriage to Delilah in 1981, since the prior subsisting marriage was void. If the
marriage with Corina was entered into after the death of Amparo, such marriage
would be valid. Corina then can prosecute Armand for bigamy regarding his
marriage to Delilah in 1981 as it was contracted during the existence of a prior
valid marriage.

(B) Delilah cannot file a case of bigamy against Armand regarding his marriage with
her in 1981 if the prior marriage with Corina was contracted before the death of
Amparo as such marriage is void for being bigamous. If the marriage with Corina
was entered into after the death of Amparo, then such marriage will be valid.
Delilah then can prosecute Armand for bigamy in connection with his marriage
with her in 1981.

No. 17: Art 320; Arson & Murder

B set the house of A on fire by way of revenge against the latter. B did not know that
A was inside. A died because of the fire,
(A) What crime or crimes did B commit?
(B) Suppose B knew that A was inside, what crime or crimes did B commit?
 (C) Suppose before setting it on fire, B entered the house and killed A. Then B set
the house on fire to hide the body of A. What crime or crimes did B commit?
Explain your answers.

Answer:

(A) B will be liable for the special complex crime of arson with homicide as provided
in Presidential Decree No. 1613, because the death resulted from the arson. The
case of People v. Paterno (L-2665, March 6, 1960)—that the arson absorbed the
death, is no longer controlling.

(B) If B knew that A was in the house when it was set on fire, the crime will be murder.
The fire is the qualifying circumstance.

(C) If B killed A before the house was set on fire, two crimes are committed, murder
and arson. The arson was committed to conceal the crime of murder.

No. 18: Art 210; Bribery & Corruption of public official

While manning the traffic lights at the intersection of Espana and Washington Streets,
Patrolman Torres ordered BB to stop his taxi, threatened toarrest him and confiscate
his driver's license allegedly for speeding and reckless driving. Conversant with the
dirty ways of some traffic officers, BB pulled out his wallet, picked up his driver's
license with the hidden P20.00 bill inside the same and handed it to Patrolman Torres,
Thereafter, Patrolman Torres returned SB's license and allowed him to go.
What criminal prosecution may be filed against Pat, Torres and/or BB under the
circumstances? Discuss.

Answer:

Patrolman Torres should be charged with bribery and BB the driver for corruption
of a public officer, in the supposition that the driver was speeding and for reckless
driving. The money was given by the driver so as not to be arrested and for his driver's
license not to be confiscated. But if the driver was not speeding nor was there reckless
driving but the policeman threatened to arrest him and confiscate his driver's license, the
giving of the P20.00 bill would be due to the intimidation employed by the policeman. In
this case, the policeman will be liable for robbery thru intimidation. The driver will not
incur any criminal liability.

No. 19: Art 310; Qualified theft {Carnapping}

CB, a driver of RM, on the boundary system, ran away with the jeepney of the latter
and sold the same, pocketing the proceeds thereof to the prejudice of the aforesaid
owner.
What crime or crimes were committed by CB? Discuss.

Answer:

The driver will be liable for qualified theft. Under the boundary system, the driver
is an employee of the owner of the vehicle. He has only the physical possession of the
vehicle. By running away with the vehicle and selling the same and misappropriating the
proceeds thereof, qualified theft is committed.

No 20: Art 353; Libel

What is LIBEL and what pertinence has malice in law and malice in fact in incurring
criminal liability therefor? Discuss.

Answer:

Libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or a vice or defect, real or

imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or a juridical person or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.

Malice in law is presumed from every defamatory imputation. When the

imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need not prove malice. The law presumes that
the defamation is malicious. This is malice in law.

In a conditionally privileged communication, malice is not presumed. The

prosecution must prove malice in fact for the conviction of the accused of libel involving
qualifiedly privileged communication. This means that the accused was prompted by
personal ill-will or spite and not in response to the performance of a duty but merely to
injure the reputation of the person defamed. Malice in fact is inconsistent with good
motives and justifiable ends.

1984
No. 1: Art 16; Degree of participation
A kidnapped a boy and demanded a ransom of P100,000 from the boy's parents. In
time, the ransom was paid and the victim was released. When X (A's adopted sister)
learned that A was being hunted by the police for kidnapping, she took him into her
house and concealed him. A was thus able to elude the police.
Did X incur any criminal responsibility? Explain.

Answer:

A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma

X has no criminal liability. She is not a principal because she did not take part in
the commission of the act, or induce another to commit, or cooperated in the
commission of the offense by another act without which it will not have been
accomplished. (Art. 17, 12 RPC).

Neither is she an accomplice because she did not cooperate in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts (Art. 18). She is not also an accessory
because, although she harbored, or concealed or assisted in the escape of the
principal, the crime is not treason, parricide, murder or an attempt to take the life
 of the Chief Executive or the author thereof is known to be habitually guilty of
same other crime (Art, 19 (3): R.P.C.).

A. Comments and Suggested Answer

X did not incur any criminal liability. X learned that A was being hunted by the
police for kidnapping and so being an adopted sister, she took A in her house and
concealed him, thus enabling him to elude the police. X cannot be a principal nor
accomplice because her participation is subsequent to the commission of the crime. Being
a private person, she is also not an accessory, as the crime of kidnapping is not included
among the cases, where such private person harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of
the author of the crime who is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, attempt against the
life of the Chief Executive or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. (Art.
19, par. 3, Revised Penal Code)

No. 2: Art 12; Minority; effect on accused’s liabilities

In what specific ways does the Revised Penal Code exhibit due regard for the minority
of an accused;
(a) in the determination of is criminal liability
(b) in the determination of the degree of his
culpability
(c) in the imposition of penalties upon him

Answer:
A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma (a) Re: Criminal liability of a minor
Under Art. 12 of the RPC: A person under nine years of age is exempt from criminal
liability.

A person over nine years of age and under fifteen is also exempt from criminal
liability, except when he acts with discernment in which case he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Art. 80 of the RPC, which suspends the sentence of minor
delinquents. Under Art. 80 of RPC, whenever a minor under 16 years of age at the date
of the commission of the offense, a grave or less grave felony, is accused thereof, the court
after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, instead of pronouncing judgment
of conviction shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such minor to the
custody or care of a public or private benevolent or charitable institution, established
under the law for the care, correction or education of orphaned, homeless, defective and
delinquent children, or to the custody or care of any responsible person — until such
minor shall have reached his majority age or for such less period as the court may deem
proper.

However, under P.D. 1179, which amended P.D. 603 (The Child and Youth
Welfare Code), which in turn, under Articles 189 and 192, thereof {P.D.603), amended
Art. 80 of RFC, the suspension of sentence and commitment of youthful offenders covers
minors over nine years and under eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of
the offense who acts with discernment. If he acts without discernment, then he is exempt
from criminal liability.

B. Re: Degree of Culpability

Minority is treated as a mitigating circumstance under Art. 13 of the RPC, Under

said article, a minor is a person under 18 years of age, in which case he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with the provisions of Article 80 (as amended by P.D. 603, as
amended by P.D, 1179.)

But the rule is now settled that minority under 18 years is a privileged mitigating
circumstance under Art 68 of the RPC, which provides for the imposition of penalty one
or two degrees lower than that prescribed for the offense.

(e) Re: Imposition of Penalties on Minors — Article 68 of RPC provides:

When the offender is a minor under 18 years and his case is one coming under the
provisions of the Code (RPC), the following rules shall be observed:

1. Upon a person under 15 but over 9 years of age, who is not exempted from liability
by reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a
discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least
than that provided by law for the crime which he committed.
2. Upon a person over 15 and under 18 years of age, the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.
— The provisions of P.D. 603, as amended by P.D. 1179, on suspension
of penalties in the case of youthful offenders (under 18) are also applicable.

B. Comments and Suggested Answer

The specific ways provided by the Revised Penal Code regarding the minority of an
accused follow:

a) In the determination of his criminal liability

A minor 9 years of age and under at the time of the commission of the crime is exempt
from criminal liability, a minor over nine years and under fifteen years of age at the time
of the commission of the crime is also exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted
with discernment. (Art. 12, Rev. Penal Code as amended by Art. 189, P.D. 603 amended
by P.D. 1179)

No. 3: Entrapment vs instigation

From the viewpoint of the accused, is it essential to make a distinction between
instigation and entrapment? Explain its legal significance.

Answer:

A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma

Yes. In entrapment, ways and means are effected to trap the offender, while in
instigation, the instigator induces another to commit a crime; thus he himself becomes a
co- principal.
Entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the offender, while instigation
is.

B. Comments and Suggested Answer

From the viewpoint of the accused, it is essential to make a distinction between
instigation and entrapment. The reason it that instigation is exempting whereas
entrapment is not exempting nor mitigating. Instigation takes place when a peace officer
induces a person to commit a crime. Without the inducement, the crime would not be
committed. For reason of public policy, it is exempting; otherwise, the peace officer
would be a co- principal. The instigator must not be a private person. In the case of
entrapment, ways and means are devised by a peace officer to trap or capture a person
who has committed a crime. With or without the entrapment, the crime has been
committed already.

Hence, it is not a bar to the prosecution of the offender. (People vs. Valmores et al
L 58635, June 24, 1983 122 SCRA 922)

No. 4: Art 11; Justifying circumstances; defense of stranger

Despite denial of a rally permit from the City Mayor, a group of students from
different schools held a rally at Liwasang Bonifacio. At the rally site, they were met by
members of the WPD Dispersal Unit, armed with truncheons, water hose, etc.
When student A saw a policeman striking a fellow-student, B, with a truncheon, he hit
the forearm of the policeman with an empty bottle of Coke in order to prevent the
latter from further hurting B. At this point, other policemen came, subdued A and
arrested him.
For what crime or crimes, if any, under the Revised Penal Cede may A be charged? If
A is liable for any crime, what circumstances would mitigate or aggravate his liability
under the given facts? Explain

Answer:

(b) Furnished by Office of Justice Palma

None. When the policeman struck B with a truncheon, he goes beyond the limits
of his powers. Consequently, A who employed adequate means to prevent the policeman
from hurting B could not be held liable for assault or resistance nor for physical injuries
considering that he merely acted in defense of a stranger.

(c) Comments and Suggested Answer

A is not liable under the Revised Penal Code. He is entitled to defense of stranger, which
has the following-requisites:

1) unlawful aggression,
2) reasonable necessity to prevent or repel it,
3) the person defending is not induced by revenge, resentment of any evil motive. (Art.
11, par. 3, Rev. Penal Code People vs. Lara CA 43 O.G. 3152).

The policeman who hit the student B with a truncheon, while the students were at
the rally site, abused or exceeded his authority. In this case, the policeman would be an
unlawful aggressor. Aacted on impulse by striking the policeman on the forearm with an
empty coke bottle to prevent him from farther hurting B.

From the facts of the case B wasalready injured by the policeman when A hit him
and the means employed under the circumstances would be reasonable. A was, not
actuated by revenge, resentment or any evil motive.

Alternative Answer:

A can be held liable for simple resistance When the policeman hit B with a
truncheon the presumption is he acted in fulfillment of his duty as a peace officer to
maintain and preserve order in the rally site. However, the act of the policeman can be
considered sufficient provocation to A for him to bit the policeman on the arm with a
coke bottle to prevent him from further hurting B. A can invoke such mitigating
circumstance. The crime committed is not direct assault as a policeman is an agent of a
person in authority and the act of A under the facts cannot constitute manifest defiance
to the authority of the law. {U.S. vs. Tabiana, 37 Phil. 975) The aggravating circumstance
of disregard of the rank of the policeman is also present. (People vs. Regala, 113 SCRA
613 [1982] )

No. 5: Art 3; Motive vs intent

(b) Distinguish intent from motive.
(c) When does proof of motive become a crucial consideration in a criminal
prosecution?
(d) Whatcategoriesofcrimedonotrequire
criminal intent?

Answer:

(d) Furnished by Office of Justice Palma

(a) Motive is the reason which impels one to commit an act for a definite result; intent is
the purpose to use a particular means to effect such a result. Intent is an element of a
crime, whereas motive is not.
(b) It becomes a crucial consideration in criminal prosecution when there is doubt as to
whether or not the accused committed the crime.
(c) felonies committed by means of culpa. 2. offenses punishable as mala prohibita.
(e) Comments and Suggested Answer:

1. Motive is the reason which impels one to commit an act for a definite result while intent
is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such a result. Motive is not an element
of the crime while intent is an element of the crime committed by dolo.
2. Proof of motive is a crucial consideration in a criminal prosecution if there is doubt
whether the accused committed the crime or not or whether the evidence on the
commission of the crime is circumstantial or inconclusive, or the identity of the accused
is in question.
3. Criminal intent 'is not required in felonies committed by negligence or impudence and
in offenses which are mala prohibita.

No. 6: Art 112; Civil liability; effect of acquittal

Does acquittal in a criminal case carry with it exemption from civil liability? Explain.

Answer:

A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma

Except in those instances where the law provides for the prosecution of the criminal
action independently of the civil action, about the only known case where the accused
may be exempted from civil liability is the case of his acquittal from the criminal
responsibility and its judgment in court accordingly makes a pronouncement that the
basis for civil liability does not exist.
 B. Comments and Suggested Answer

Acquittal in a criminal case carries with its exemption from civil liability when there is a
declaration in A final judgment that the fact from which the civil action might arise does
not exist (Sec. 3 C Rule 111, Rules of Ct.) (Tan vs. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., et a1 91 Phil.
672) In the following cases, acquittal in the criminal action does not carry with it
exemption from civil liability:

1) When the acquittal is on the ground that the guilt of the accused has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt (Art 29, Civil Code);
2) When the acquittal is due to an exempting circumstance except accident and lawful or
insuperable cause (Art 12, Rev, Penal Code);
3) in cases of quasi-delict (Art 2177 Civil Code)
4) when the finding of the court in acquitting the accused is that there is only civil
responsibility and not criminal responsibility (De Guzman et al vs. Alva et al 51 O.G.
1311) 5) in case of independent civil action under articles 31, 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil
Code)

No. 7: Art 210; Bribery; immunity from liability of bribe-giver

Under what conditions is a bribe-giver immune from criminal prosecution? What is
the scope of his immunity?

Answer:

A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma

1. When the information refers to consummated offense of bribery
2. When the information and testimony of the giver are necessary for the conviction
of the accused public official.
3. When such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State.
4. When the informant has not yet been previously convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude.

The givers of bribes and their accomplices are exempt from prosecution or
punishment for the offense with reference to which their information and testimonies
were given.

B. Comments and Suggested Answer:

A bribe giver is immune from criminal prosecution if the following requisites are present:
1) the information must refer to consummated bribery;
2) the information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the accused public
officer;
3) such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State;
4) such information and testimony can be corroborated on material points; and
5) the informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude.

The informant or witness shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for the
offense to which the information or testimony where given and this immunity may be
enjoyed by such informant or witness notwithstanding that he offered the bribe to the
public official or is an accomplice for such bribe giving or even in cases where the
information and testimony are given against a person who is not a public officer but who
is a principal or accomplice or accessory in the commission of the bribery.

No. 8: Art 183; Perjury

A executed an affidavit in support of a criminal complaint for estafa he filed against
B. After an amicable settlement under which A was paid the swindled amount, he
made another affidavit wherein he detailed events totally inconsistent with the facts
narrated in the first affidavit.

Later, B filed a complaint for perjury against A with the Fiscal's Office and presented
in support thereof the two contradictory affidavits of A. No other evidence was
submitted.

If you were the investigating fiscal, how would you resolve the case? Why?

Answer:

A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma

The complaint should be dismissed. The respondent or accused cannot be convicted

of the crime of perjury solely on the basis of his contradictory sworn statements. It is
further necessary to prove which of the two statements is false by evidence other than the
contradictory statements.

C. Comments and Suggested Answer

If I were the fiscal, I would dismiss the complaint for perjury. There is no perjury
solely on the basis of two contradictory statement. There must be further evidence to
show which of the two sworn statements is false. (U.S. vs. Capistrano 40 Phil. 902).

No. 9: Art 315; Estafa through falsification of private document

Can the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of a private document be committed?
State your reasons.

Answer:

A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma.

There is no such crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, so it cannot be
committed under any circumstance.

The reason for this is that the falsification of a private document to be punishable
requires damage to a third person or intent to cause damage, consequently, where there
is conversion to his own use of the amount collected through the use of falsified
documents, the crime committed is that of falsification of private document with
prejudice to a third person and not estafa through falsification of private document.

B. Comments and Suggested Answer

 There is no complex crime of estafa thru falsification of a private document The
reason is the damage which is an element of estafa in the very same damage which is
caused by the falsification of a private document, as an element thereof. So, the
falsification of a private document cannot be a means to commit estafa as the immediate
effect of the falsification which is the damage, is the same as that of estafa. If a private
document is falsified to cause damage to the offended party the crime is falsification of a
private document. (People vs. Reyes 56 Phil. 286). If a private document is falsified to
conceal the misappropriation by the accused of the money belonging to the offended
party, the crime is estafa. (People vs. Co Beng CA 40 O.G. 1919).

No. 10: Art 315; Estafa; effect of novation

Does novation or compromise affect the criminal liability of a person accused of
estafa? Explain.

Answer:

D. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma

Novation or compromise does not affect criminal liability of the offender or accused.
So, partial payment or extension of time to pay the amount misappropriated or
acceptance of a promissory note for payment of the amount involved does not extinguish
criminal liability, because a criminal offense is committed against the people and the
offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes
for the commission of the offense.

But if the compromise is executed before a criminal action is instituted or where

the amount misappropriated was converted into a contract of loan and the accused was
made to acknowledge the debt, there is novation of contract so as to extinguish any
incipient criminal liability of the accused; but the novation must be expressed and must
refer only to the incipient criminal liability.
C. Comments and Suggested Answer

Novation or compromise does not affect the criminal liability of a person accused
of estafa if it occurs after the filing of the criminal action in court. So, partial payment or
extension of time to pay the amount misappropriated does not extinguish criminal
liability because a criminal offense is committed against the People and the offended
party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for the
commission of the offense. (People vs. Gervacio L 7705 Dec. 24, 1957).

But if the compromise is executed before a criminal action is instituted as where

the amount misappropriated was converted into a contract of loan and the accused was
made to acknowledge the debt, there is novation of contract so as to extinguish any
incipient criminal liability of the accused but the novation must be expressed and must
refer only to the incipient criminal liability. It prevents the rise of criminal liability as long
as it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal information (Guingona Jr. vs. City Fiscal et
al of Manila L-64750, Jan. 30, 1984,
127 SCRA 201).

No 11: Art 25; Probation Law

Under the probation law, the filing of an application for probation "shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to appeal."

Is this waiver mandatory or irrevocable? Explain.

Answer:

Furnished by Office of Justice Palma

Despite the provision in the Probation Law that the filling of an application for
probation "shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal", it has been held that such a
waiver is not irrevocable, hence an accused may withdraw his application for probation
and instead opt to pursue appeal from conviction. (Yusi v. Morales, 121 SCRA 853). For
the purposes of probation what the law gives more importance to is the offender, not the
crime (To v. Cruz Pano, 120 SCRA 8). In line with the public policy behind probation, the
right of appeal should not be irrevocably lost from the moment a convicted accused files
an application for probation. Appeal and probation spring from the same policy,
considering justice, humanity and compassion {Yusi v. Morales, Supra).

E. Comments and Suggested Answer

The waiver provided in the Probation Law is not irrevocable. The offender may
still withdraw his application for probation and file an appeal if the period to do so has
not yet prescribed. Probation Law is interpreted liberally in favor of the accused. It is not
served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of its provisions. Appeal and probation
spring from the same policy considerations of justice, humanity and compassion. If it
appears that the application for probation was improvidently filed by the offender who
was assisted by counsel de oficio and not by his counsel of record who was in a better
position to consider fully the strength of a possible appeal, being fully familiar with the
case, the waiver rule cannot be considered irrevocable. (Yusi et al vs. Judge Morales L-
61958, April 28, 1983, 121, SCRA 653).

No 12: Art 315; Estafa & BP22

A issued and delivered a check to his friend B. Both A and B knew that the check
was not funded. In payment of some goods, B indorsed the check to C, who
immediately deposited it with his bank. When presented for payment to the drawee
bank, the check was dishonored. Notices for dishonor were sent to A and B. One month
thereafter, C went to the City Fiscal's Office to file a criminal complaint.
Against whom should the complaint be filed and for what crime or crimes, if any?
Explain.

A. Furnished 6y Office of Justice Palma

A is liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Check Law, which
punishes the mere act of issuing a check not sufficiently funded. B is liable for estafa for
negotiating in bad faith the check to C that the same was not funded.

B. Comments and Suggested Answer

Under the Revised Penal Code, A, the drawer is not liable for estafa, as he delivered
the check to B, a friend, who knew that the check was not funded.
Deceit was not employed by A in the issuance of the check. B, however, who endorsed
the check as payee to C in payment of some goods, with knowledge that the check was
not funded, acted in bad faith or with deceit, and with intent to defraud C, the endorsee,
is liable for estafa. (People vs. Isleta et al 61 Phil. 332).
Under Batas No. 22, A is liable for the offense of issuing a check without sufficient funds.
The presumption is the check was issued for a consideration or for value and A made,
drew or issued said check knowing at the time of issue that he did not have sufficient
funds to pay the check in full when presented for payment B, the endorser, is not liable
under Batas 22 as he is not the maker, drawer or issuer of said bouncing check.

No. 13: Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; generic vs qualifying

From the standpoint of legal, effect and weight, how would you distinguish generic
aggravating from qualifying circumstances?

Answer:

F. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma

1. A generic aggravating circumstance can be offset by an ordinary mitigating
circumstance which is not so in qualifying circumstance.
2. A qualifying aggravating circumstance cannot be proved as such unless alleged in
the information whereas a generic aggravating circumstance may be proved even
though not alleged.
3. A generic aggravating circumstance increases the penalty to the maximum hut not
beyond that provided by law, whereas a qualifying aggravating circumstance
changes the nature and even the name of the offense to one more serious.

G. Comments and Suggested Answer

Generic aggravating and qualifying circumstances are distinguished as to legal effect and
weight, as follows:

1. A generic aggravating circumstance can be offset by an ordinary mitigating

circumstance which is not so in a qualifying circumstance.
2. A qualifying circumstance cannot be proved unless alleged in the information whereas
a generic aggravating circumstance may be proved even though not alleged.
3. A generic aggravating not offset has the effect of increasing the penalty to the
maximum but not beyond that provided by law. A qualifying circumstance changes not
only the nature but also the name of the crime and the offender becomes liable for the
new offense which is more serious in nature.

No. 14: Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; treachery

Aside from the procedural requirements, what are the other requisites for treachery to
be considered as a qualifying circumstance?

Answer:

A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma

1. By employment of means, method or manner of execution which would insure the

offenders safety front any defensive retaliatory act on the part of
the offended party.

2. By the fact that such means, method or

manner of execution was deliberately or consciously chosen.

Comments and Suggested Answer

The other requisites of treachery as a qualifying circumstance aside from the procedural
requirements are:
1. Employment of means, method or manner of execution which would insure the
offender's safety from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the offended
party, which means no opportunity is given to the latter to defend himself or
retaliate, and

2. Such means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously

chosen. (People vs, Barnayo, L-64164, June 22, 1934, 129 SCRA 725)

No. 14: Art 146; Illegal Assembly

At a meeting of about fifty (50) residents of Bo. Ta-talon, Quezon City, Juan, whose
son was shot by the marines, told the residents that it was hopeless to seek redress
from the authorities and that the only recourse was to topple it by force. Among those
in the meeting were four (4) Burly looking men in civilian clothes but with sidearms,
all of whom stayed up to the end of the meeting. They even participated therein by
edging and cheering Juan. Quezon City policemen arrived and they arrested Juan
together with Pedro and Jose who were with Juan on the platform. The four (4) armed
persons, however quietly disappeared when the policemen arrived.
1. As a prosecutor, what case will you file against Juan, Pedro and Jose? State your
reasons.
2. Would your answer be the same if the four (4) armed men turned out to be
intelligence operatives of the Philippine Constabulary ? Explain your answer.
Answer:

(A) As a prosecutor, I will file against Juan, Pedro and Jose, a charge of Illegal
Assembly under Art. 146 as amended by P.O. 1834. What Juan told the
residents during the meeting, that "it was hopeless to seek redress from the
authorities and that the only recourse was to topple it by force," is an act of
propaganda against the government in order to destabilize the government
or to undermine the authorities by eroding the faith and loyalty of the
people,

(B) The answer is still the same as when the four burly men participated in the
meeting by "edging and cheering" Juan while he was speaking, the crime
of Illegal Assembly was already being committed.

No. 15: Art 25; Probation Law

On a plea of guilty, X was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence and was
sentenced to a prison term. The judgment made no pronouncement regarding his civil
liability. X forthwith applied for probation.
The following day, the private prosecutor, who was not given the chance to present
evidence on X's civil liability, filed a motion to set the case for the reception of said
evidence. Although supported by the fiscal, the motion was denied by the judge on
the ground that it was filed out of time. According to the judge, "the prosecution
should have asked for leave to prove the civil liability of the defendant before
judgment was rendered, not thereafter, for a hearing for that purpose after judgment
would in effect nullify the order of suspension of the sentence and would defeat the
very purpose of the Probation Law."
Was the denial of the motion in accordance with law? Explain.

Answer:

No, The denial of the motion was not proper. In Bud-long vs. Apalisok (122 SCRA
935), it was held that probation affects only the criminal aspect of the case. The suspension
of the sentence imposed on the accused who is granted probation, has no bearing on his
civil liability.

The court must hear the civil aspect of the case where accused pleads guilty and
at the same time.

In the example given, the judgment was not final. Hence, the court should have
re-opened the case for reception of evidence in support of the civil aspect. It would be
contrary to the rule against multiplicity of suits should the private prosecutor be
compelled to institute a separate civil action for the recovery of the civil liability, either
on the concept principle of ex-delicto or ex-quasi-delicto, since the same acts may be both
considered as delict or quasi-delict giving rise to civil liability.

B. Comments and Suggested Answer

The denial of the motion was not in accordance with law. The granting of
probation affects only the criminal liability of the offender. This is shown by the statutory
definition of probation which is a disposition under which the defendant after convicton
and sentence is released subject to the conditions imposed by the court and to the
supervision of the probation officer. The "conviction and sentence" phrase shows that
probation affects only the criminal aspects of the case. The suspension of the sentence
imposed on the accused who is granted probation has no bearing on his civil liability.
There is no legal basis in the conclusion of the trial court that a hearing to prove the civil
liability of the accused would nullify the order of suspension of the sentence and would
defeat the very purpose of the Probation Law. The denial of the motion would violate the
right of the complainant to due process. The motion was filed on the day after the
judgment of conviction was rendered and hence before it became final. Besides the civil
liability of the accused is not part of the penalty for the crime committee. It is personal to
the offended party. (Burlong vs. Apalisok L-60151 June 24,1983, 122 SCRA 935).

No. 16: Art 353; Libel

A, the husband of B, informed & TV commentator, C, that his wife had complained
that their youngest child who was allegedly extremely ill and on the verge of death
was denied admission at the RX Hospital because B, his wife, could not put up the cash
deposit required by the hospital.
Without verifying said report, C, in his TV program, urged the closure by the
authorities of RX Hospital for denying medical assistance to a dying child simply
because the mother could not give a cash deposit. He added that the said hospital even
refused to accept a check.
It turned out however that the story was wrong. The sick child of A and B was never
in critical condition, and there was no check involved in the incident. Subsequently, C
was charged with libel. Decide the case with reasons.

Answer :

A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma

C, is liable for libel because the imputation tend to cause dishonor, discredit or
contempt on the hospital. It is not true that the conditions of the child was in a dying
condition at the time. There was no check offered by way of deposit so the statement of
C that the hospital refused to accept the check was false.
The fact that C did not even verify the report makes his liability clear.

B. Comments and Suggested Answer

C is liable for libel. The imputation is defamatory as it tended to cause dishonor,

discredit or contempt on the hospital. Malice in law, is therefore, presumed. It is not true
that the child was extremely ill and on the verge of death nor is it true that the hospital
refused to accept a check for the admission of the child. Without verifying the facts and
urging the closure of the hospital by the authorities for denying medical admission to a
dying child, the intent to cast aspersion and injury to reputation and standing of the
hospital becomes manifest as it was done with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not.

Alternative Answer:

C is not liable for libel. In the TV program of C, what he did was to convey to the
public what substantially was imparted to him by A that his wife told him that their child
was denied admission to the hospital because B the wife of A could not put up a cash
deposit. The facts of the problem do not show that such are false. And it cannot be
assumed that C was motivated by spite, ill will or evil design against the hospital when
he made the charge as the business of a hospital is coupled with public interest. As long
as there is probable belief in the truth of the matter charged and the charge is made in
good faith, the author cannot be liable for libel. (U.S. vs. Bustos et al 37 Phil. 737).

No. 17: RA 3019

A, a BIR examiner, was undertaking an examination of the tax liability of X under his
1983 income tax returns. When X learned that A's son who had just returned from the
United States was going to be married, he sent through A a no-frost refrigerator as his
wedding gift.
What crime or crimes, if any, did A and/or X commit? Explain.

Answer:

A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma

A and X are both guilty of violation of R.A. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practice Act) which provided among others:
"Sec. 3: Corrupt practice of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public office
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: "xxxxx
"(b) directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift present, share, percentage, or
benefit for himself or for any other party, wherein the public officer in his capacity has to
intervene under the law. "x x x -x x

"The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit referred to in
paragraphs (b) and (c) or offering or giving to the public officer the employment
mentioned in paragraph (d) of this section, shall together with the offending public
officer, be punished under Section nine (9) of this Act----"
"Section 2 (c) of said law also provides that:
"Receiving any gift" includes the act of accepting directly or indirectly a gift from a person
other than a member of the public officer's immediate family, in behalf of himself or any
member of his family or relative within the fourth civil degree, either by consanguinity
or affinity even on the occasion of a family celebration or national festivity like Christmas,
if the value of the gift is under the circumstances manifestly excessive."

B. Comments and Suggested Answer

A and X are both guilty under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. A, the BIR
examiner is liable for "receiving the no-frost refrigerator as & wedding gift for his son,
while he was undertaking an examination of the tax liability of X, the gift giver, under
his 1983 income tax return. The Anti-graft law punishes the public officer for directly or
indirectly receiving- a gift for himself or for any other party wherein the public officer in
his capacity has to intervene under the law. (Sec. 3 b Art. 3019). The person giving the gift
to the public officer is punished together with the public officer (Sec. 9 Art. 3019).
Receiving any gift under the Anti-Graft Law includes the act of accepting a gift directly
or indirectly from a person other than a member of the public officer's immediate family,
in behalf of himself or any member of his family x x even on the occasion of a family
celebration or national festivity like Christmas, if the value of the gift is under the
circumstances manifestly excessive. The no-frost refrigerator is certainly a very expensive
item and if A was not a BIR examiner undertaking the examination of the income tax
return of X at the time the wedding gift was given, certainly a gift that expensive would
not have been given.

No. 18: Art 349; Bigamy; Art 334; Concubinage

While his wife was still living, A married C, single, in Hongkong. After living there
for a couple of years, A and C returned to and settled in Manila.

(a) Can A be prosecuted for bigamy? Why? (b) In any event, can A be prosecuted for
any other crime? If so, what? How
about C? Explain.

Answer:

A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma

B. If A and C ceased to have any relation upon their return to the Philippines, they
are not criminally liable for bigamy, because the second marriage was celebrated
outside the country.

On the assumption that upon returning to Manila, A and C lived together as husband
and wife. A can be prosecuted for concubinage for cohabiting with a woman who is not
his wife. C can also be prosecuted for the same offense, if she knew that A is married.
B. Comments and Suggested Answer

A cannot be prosecuted for bigamy because bigamous marriage was celebrated in

Hongkong. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code do not have extra-territorial
application to the crime of bigamy. (Art, 2, Revised Penal Code).

(b) When A and C returned to and settled in Manila, it would mean that A cohabited with
C, that they lived together as husband and wife. A will be liable for concubinage. C will
be liable if he has already knowledge that A is married.

1983
No. 1: Art 315; Estafa; violation of PD 115
A imported lychees, covering its payment with a letter of credit he obtained from a
bank under a trust receipt arrangement. Upon arrival of the goods, he sold all of them
but did not turn over the proceeds to the bank, despite demands for him to do so. What
crime, if any, did A commits? Why?

Answer:

Estafa thru misappropriation. Presidential Decree No. 115 provides that the
misappropriation of the proceeds realized from the sale of goods released under a trust
receipt is estafa under par. L(b) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The reason is
that the bank who has advanced the payment of the imported lychees under a letter of
credit obtained by the importer continues to be vested with the ownership of the goods
until the proceeds of the sale have been turned over to the bank. (Samo vs. People L-
17603-04, May 31, 1962) Presidential Decree No. 115 provides further that the failure of
the importer to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods under a trust receipt
arrangement to the extent of the amount owning to the bank is estafa.

No. 2: Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self- defense; defense of

property

Considering that the Revised Penal Code provisions on justifying circumstances apply
to anyone "who acts in defense of his person or rights," can there be self-defense when
there is simply an aggression against one's property, not coupled with an attack against
his person? Explain.

Answer:

No. Self-defense will be incomplete. Under the Civil Code there is unlawful
aggression on the property rights of another. But to constitute self-defense of property
two other elements must be considered, namely, reasonable necessity of the means
employed to repel the aggression and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending his property. People v. Apolinar (38 O.G. 2079 ) held that there is no
self-defense of property if the attack on the property is not coupled with an attack on the
person of the owner or possessor of the property.
 If for example, the owner shot the aggressor altho his person was not attacked,
self-defense of property will not be present, altho there is unlawful aggression on his
property right, because the means adopted to repel the aggression is not reasonable.
(People vs. Navaez (1983) 121 SCRA 403)

No. 3: Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; recidivism vs habitual

delinquency

X already had three previous convictions by final judgment for theft when he was
found guilty of robbery with homicide. In the last case, the trial judge considered
against X both recidivism and habitual delinquency, X appealed, contending that
conviction for one crime cannot twice be considered against the accused, once for the
purpose of using it as basis for afinding of recidivism, and again, to establish habitual
delinquency. Resolve with reasons.

Answer:

The appeal is not meritorious. Recidivism and habitual delinquency have different legal
effects. In the conviction for robbery with homicide, recidivism is appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance because the previous convictions for theft are embraced in the
same title of the Code as robbery with homicide, which are crimes against property.
Habitual delinquency is also considered because of the three previous convictions by
final judgment for theft, for the imposition of the additional penalty.

No. 4: Art 19; Degree of participation; accessory

A proposed to B that they rob a certain store, to which B agreed. Later, however, B
undertook the robbery alone and made off with P2,000 cash. The following day, after
making some shallow explanation, B apologized to A and gave the latter P500, which
A somewhat grudgingly accepted.
What is A's liability, if any, and the legal basis thereof?

Answer:

A is liable as an accessory. Altho A proposed that robbery be committed in a

certain store, such proposal is not punished by law. So if B, to whom the proposal was
made committed the robbery alone, only he will be liable for the robbery. But since A
received from B P500 which he knew to be part of the amount of P2,000, which was
robbed, A is liable as an accessory because he profited from the proceeds of the
commission of the crime.

Alternative Answer:
A is liable for the offense of fencing. The reason is A with intent to gain for himself,
received, possessed and kept an article or object of value which he knew to have been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery. (Presidential Decree No. 1612) Money
is an article of value.
No. 5: Art 266-A; Rape; attempted
With lewd design, an illiterate newsboy forced a 16-year old girl to lie on the grass and
tried to make love to her, but no penetration was effected because of the valiant
resistance of the victim. What crime was committed? What mitigating circumstance, if
any, would you appreciate in favor of the offender? Explain.

Answer:

Attempted rape. When the newsboy forced the girl to lie on the grass and tried to
make love to her, his intention was to have sexual intercourse with her. But there was no
penetration because of the resistance of the girl. So all the acts of execution to produce the
crime of rape were not performed due to a cause other than the spontaneous desistance
of the offender.

There is no mitigating circumstance. Although the newsboy is illiterate, that in

itself is not mitigating. Lack of sufficient intelligence and knowledge of the full
significance of all acts constitute the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.
(People vs. Geronimo (1973) 55 SCRA 246) Besides, in crimes against chastity, like rape
lack of instruction or low degree of intelligence is not mitigating (People vs. Lopez
L14347, April 29, 1960)

No. 6: Art 293; Robbery with homicide vs homicide

Insulted by the manager of the bank where he was employed as security guard, A,
enraged, shot the former, who died on the spot. As A was about to leave the bank
premises, he noticed the vault open. He entered it, forced open a locked container and
got the jewelry therein.
If you were the fiscal, for what crime or crimes would you prosecute A? Explain.

Answer:

Homicide and Robbery. It is not robbery with homicide because the purpose of A,
the security guard, was not to commit robbery. It is not murder because the aggression
was preceded by the insult of the manager which enraged the offender. So the killing was
attended by passion which negates the presence of treachery. The taking of the jewelries
was an afterthought as the offender entered the vault only when he noticed it was open
when he was about to leave the bank premises. The jewelries were in a locked receptacle
which he forced open while inside the bank premises. This is robbery with force upon
things under Article 299, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

No. 7: Art 160; Quasi-recidivism

X, an unlettered prisoner serving sentence for homicide, killed a coprisoner with
evident premeditation, after which he voluntarily surrendered to the prison guard and
confessed his wrongdoing.
Upon arraignment, he pleaded guilty to the murder charge.
After a brief trial to ascertain beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused and the
presence or absence of modifying circumstances, the trial judge imposed the penalty
prescribed by law for murder in its maximum period [death], disregarding the
mitigating circumstances established by the defense.
(a) Did the judge act correctly? Why?
(b) If the murder was committed outside of prison before X began to serve his sentence
for homicide, would your answer be different? Reasons.

Answer:

a) The judge acted correctly. The reason is because X was a quasi-recidivist as he

killed his fellow prisoner while he was serving the sentence for homicide. (Art. 160
Rev. Penal Code) The penalty for the second crime is to be imposed in its
maximum period without regard to the attending mitigating and aggravating
circumstances. (People vs. Bautista (1978) of 2 O.G. 2117)

b) The same answer because there is quasi- recidivism since the offender who was
convicted by final judgment of homicide committed the second felony, which in
this case is murder, before beginning to serve the sentence for homicide. (Art. 160
Rev. Penal Code)

No. 8: Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; recidivism

Three persons — A, B and C — were found guilty of homicide. Each of them had been
previously convicted of an offense: A for robbery; B for estafa; and C for frustrated
murder.
In the homicide case, against whom may the aggravating circumstance of recidivism
be appreciated. Why?

Answer:

Only against C. The reason is homicide for which A, B and C were found guilty is
embraced in the same title of the Code as frustrated homicide, for which C had been
previously convicted. Recidivism is a personal cause which should affect only C to whom
it is attendant. (Art. 62, par. 3)

No. 9: Art 365; imprudence & negligence

A jeep recklessly driven by A went out of control and hit the wall of a house and a
bystander, wrecking the wall and injuring the person hit.
In two separate informations, the driver was charged with damage to property thru
reckless imprudence and slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence.
Was the charge proper? If you were the Fiscal, for what crimes would you prosecute
A? Explain.

Answer:

The charge is not proper. If I were the Fiscal I would prosecute A in a single
information for the crimes of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and
slight physical injuries. The essence of the quasi-offense of criminal negligence or
imprudence lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that if intentionally
done would be punishable as a felony. For the law punishes the negligent or imprudent
act and not the result thereof. In other words, negligence or imprudence is the crime itself.
So if two information are filed, one for damage to property thru reckless imprudence and
the other for slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence, and the offender is
acquitted or convicted of the crime of slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence,
such conviction or acquittal will constitute double jeopardy in the prosecution for
damage to property thru reckless imprudence as such refers to the same act of reckless
imprudence. (People vs. Buan (1968) 22 SCRA 1383 Buerano vs. Court of Appeals (1982)
115 SCRA 82)

Alternative Answer:
The charge is proper. A should be prosecuted for two information, one for damage
to property thru reckless imprudence and another for slight physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence. A single information cannot be filed because the slight physical
injuries had it been intentional would be a light felony. There is, therefore, no complex
crime. The reckless imprudence is not the crime itself but only a means or modality to
commit the crime. (People vs. Fallar 39 O.G. 1369; Lontoc, Jr. vs. Judge Gorgonio, L37396,
April 30, 1979)

No. 10: Art 29; Preventive imprisonment; Art 247; Death under
exceptional circumstances; destierro
Having caught A in flagrante delicto doing the sex act with his [B's] wife, B shot and
killed A while the latter was still in the compromising act. B was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua for murder after a protracted trial. It was only on appeal that he was given
the proper penalty of destierro under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
During the pendency of the case, the accused was under preventive detention which
lasted for about eight years.
(a) In serving his sentence, is B entitled to credit for his preventive imprisonment?
Explain.
(b) What is the philosophy of the legal provision imposing the penalty of destierro for
the above crime?

Answer:

a) A can be credited for his preventive imprisonment. Destierro as a penalty involves

also deprivation of liberty. (People vs.. Bastasa (1979) of 6 O.G. 6844)

b) The philosophy of the legal provision imposing the penalty of destierro is that it is
intended more for the protection of the offender rather than as a penalty (People
vs. Coricor 79 Phil. 672) which is to remove the offender from the vicinity and to
protect him from acts of retaliative or reprisal principally from the relatives of the
deceased spouse (People vs. Lauron CA 67 O.G. 7369)

No. 11: Art 25; Indeterminate Sentence Law

A convict serving sentence for robbery escaped from the penitentiary and killed a rival
gang member. Found guilty of homicide, he was given a straight prison term. He
moved for reconsideration, contending that not being a habitual delinquent, he was
entitled to an indeterminate sentence. Decide with reasons.

Answer:

The convict is not entitled to an indeterminate sentence because when he

committed the crime of homicide he escape from the penitentiary while serving the
sentence for robbery. Section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law enumerates the cases
in which the law cannot apply and one of those is if the offender escaped from
confinement or evaded his sentence.
No. 12: Art 49; error in personae
Julius planned to do away with Mario, a business rival. With a bolo in hand, Julius
waited in ambush at a dark alley where Mario used to pass every night on his way
home. When a figure came by, Julius struck him with the bolo again and again,
thinking that he , was Mario. It turned out that the victim was Julius' own father who
had the same general appearance as Mario.
What crime was committed? Citing applicable legal principles, for what crime should
Julius be punished? Why?

Answer:

The crime committed is parricide. The problem refers to mistake in identity

because the crime intended which is the killing of Mario, a business rival, is different
from the crime committed, which is the killing of the father of Julius, the offender. Under
Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender, however, will be punished for the
crime intended, which is murder, as the victim was ambushed at right and therefore
treachery attended the killing of the victim, the penalty of which is to be imposed in its
maximum period. The reason is the penalty for the crime committed which is parricide
prescribes a penalty higher than murder which the accused intended to commit.

No. 13: Art 39; Subsidiary imprisonment

Charged with estafa in September 1983, the accused was found guilty and sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
P3,000, aside from the indemnification of the victim, with subsidiary imprisonment
for both fine and indemnity in case of insolvency.
Was subsidiary imprisonment properly imposed? Explain.

Answer:

Subsidiary imprisonment was not properly imposed because the principal penalty
which is 4 years, 2 months 1 day of prision correcional as minimum to 8 years and 1 day
of prision mayor as maximum, is higher than prision correcional. (Art, 39, par. 3, Rev.
Penal Code) Besides, there is no subsidiary imprisonment for indemnity, as subsidiary
imprisonment is limited to non-payment of fine. (Art. 39 as amended by Act 5465)

No. 14: Art 210; Bribery & Corruption of public official; & RA
3019
A building contractor offered a bribe to an engineer employed in the Ministry of
public Works and Highways. The latter refused the offer, not because of moral
scruples but because he thought he was being entrapped.
1. (a) What crime or crimes, if any, under the Revised Penal Code were committed
and by whom? Give the basis of the liability or non-liability of both the
building contractor and the engineer.
 2. (b) Did either or both offerer and offeree commit any offense under the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act [Republic Act No. 3019}? Why?

Answer:

a) The building contractor is liable for attempted corruption of a public

officer because the bribe offered was not accepted by the engineer of the Ministry of
Public Works and Highways, who is a public officer. (Art. 212 Rev. Penal Code) The
engineer does not incur any criminal liability. The reason for the refusal is immaterial.

b) Neither the offeror and the offeree can be held liable for any offense under the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Act 3019), Sec. 4 (b) of the said law which punishes any
person who knowingly induces or causes any public officer to commit any of the offenses
defined in Section 3 of the law, will not apply. The problem does not specifically state
that the contractor induced on caused the engineer to commit any of the acts enumerated
in Section 3 of the law.

No. 15: Art 90; Prescription of crimes; when to file if last day falls
on a Sunday or holiday
When the last day of the prescriptive period for the filing of a criminal information
falls on a Sunday or any other holiday, may it be filed in court on the next working
day? Why?

Answer:

The information cannot be filed on the next working day following the last day of
the prescriptive period for the filing of a criminal information which falls on a Sunday or
on a holiday. Statutes of limitations in criminal cases are granted by the State as an
amnesty and are liberally construed in favor of the accused. The provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code or of the Rules of Court cannot apply as it will lengthen the period
of prescription of the crime. (Yapdiangco vs. Buencamino L28841, June 24, 1983)

No. 16: Art 315; Estafa & BP 22

A issued to B a P30,000 check in payment of the jewelry the former simultaneously
received from the latter. The check bounced. For what offense or offenses may A be
indicted? If accused for violation of two separate laws, could A be held liable under
both? Reasons.

Answer:

A can be indicted for estafa under Act 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Rep. Act 4885 and under Batas 22 for the offense of issuing a bouncing check.
Under the Revised Penal Code the bouncing check was issued in payment of the jewelry
received, which is, therefore a simultaneous obligation. Under Batas 22 the check is issued
for value. The accused can be held liable for both. Sections 5 of Batas 22 provides that
liability under the law is without prejudice to any liability under the Revised Penal Code.

There is no double jeopardy because the two offenses are not the same. In estafa,
damage is an element. The offense punished in Batas 22 does not require damage. Besides
Batas 22 as a special law punishes an offense which is Malum Prohibitum. Criminal intent
is not an element. In estafa, intent to defraud is an element.

No. 17: Art 25; Probation Law; effect of discharge

When a person convicted by final judgment is placed on probation and finally

discharged after the probation period, is he still required to satisfy his pecuniary
liabilities under the Revised Penal Code? Why?

Answer:

Under the Probation Law (Presidential Decree No. 968 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1257) if the person who is placed on probation is finally discharged, such will
operate to fully discharge the offender of his liability for the fine imposed. Under Art. 38
of the Revised Penal Code, fine is one of the pecuniary liabilities of the offender. The other
pecuniary liabilities which are reparation for damages caused and indemnification for
consequential damage. (Art 38, Supra) which constitute the civil liability of the offender,
are not extinguished because probation affects only the criminal aspect of the case. This
is clearly evident in the "conviction and sentence" clause of the definition of probation
under Presidential Decree No. 968. (Budlong vs. Judge Apalisok L60151, June 24, 1983)
(Note: The question should have referred to the civil liability of the offender as that seems
to be the intention of the examiner)

1982
No. 1: Art 2; General principles; territoriality; exceptions

Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code states that the provisions of the said Code shall be
applicable to crimes committed not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines, but also outside thereof, in the five (5) instances mentioned therein. What
are the underlying reasons behind, or rationale for, each of those five (5) instances?
Explain fully one by one.

Answer:

The five instances provided in Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code in which its
provisions are applicable outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and the
underlying reasons behind each of said instances are the following: \

1. When the offender should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship.
For this exception to apply, the Philippine ship or airship must be registered under
Philippine laws. As such it is considered an extension of Philippine territory.

2. When the offender should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency

note of the Philippines or obligations and securities issued by the government. The
reason is to protect Philippine Currency notes and obligations or
 securities issued by the government in order to preserve the financial credit and
stability of the government.

3. When the offender should be liable for acts committed with the introduction in the
Philippines of obligations and securities mentioned in paragraph 2. The reason is
to protect the economic interests of the Philippines as the introduction of such
forged or counterfeit obligations and securities into the country is as dangerous, if
not more, as the forging or counterfeiting of the same.

4. When the offender, while being a public officer or employee should commit an
offense in the exercise of his functions. The offense committed by the public officer
affects the integrity of the office and is against public administration of the
Philippines. The law should follow the public officer wherever he may be. If such
is not punished by the laws of the country where the public officer is at the time
of its commission, or is not triable by its courts, the absence of this exception would
not make the provisions of the Code applicable since the crime is committed
outside of Philippine territory.

5. When the offender should commit any of the crimes against the national security
and the law of nations. The reason is to safeguard the existence of the state.

No. 2: Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self- defense

"A", intending to kill "B", attacked the latter with a bolo. "In trying to defend himself
with a piece of wood by parrying the blows delivered by "A", "B" hit "C", an onlooker,
on the head, as a result of which "C" died. Is "B" liable for "C'"s death under the legal
provisions that "although the wrong done be different from that intended?" Explain
your answer.

Answer:

B is not liable for C's death because he acted in self-defense. The legal provision
that "although the wrong done be different from that intended" contemplates the
commission of a felony and the wrong done is the direct, natural and logical consequence
thereof even though not intended. Had B acted in incomplete self- defense, then this
provision would apply, because there is mistake in the blow or aberratio ictus. In the case
of self-defense, however, which is a justifying circumstance, the act committed is lawful,
hence B would not incur any criminal or civil liability.

No. 3: Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self- defense

"A" intending to kill "B", shot the latter with a gun at close range. Although hit but not
mortally wounded, "B" grappled with "A" for the possession of the gun until "B"
succeeded in wresting it from his adversary. Immediately thereafter, "B" fired the gun
at "A" whom he killed. Prosecuted for homicide, "B" interposed self-defense. The
prosecution however contended self-defense was untenable because "A" had already
been disarmed. Decide, explaining fully your decision.

Answer:

The contention of the prosecution that self- defense was untenable because A had
already been disarmed must be sustained. The reason is there is no more aggression to
be prevented or repelled. Upon almost identical facts, in the case of People vs. Dayag et
al, 98 SCRA 851 (1980) the Supreme Court held that as the victim was killed after the
accused had wrested the gun from the former, since there was no more aggression to stop
or repel as the victim was shot and killed when he was already unarmed and defenseless,
self-defense cannot be invoke.

No. 4: Art 353; Libel

"A" caused the publication in a newspaper of a news item wherein "A" stated that "B"
had cheated him in a business deal and that the public was being warned against
entering into any transaction with "B". The latter countered with a subsequent press
release in the same newspaper to the effect that "A"'s allegations were not true and that
"A" was a liar because it was "A" himself who cheated "B". The fiscal charged both "A"
and "B" in separate information for libel upon the complaint of "B" and the counter-
charge of "A". Decide with reasons.

Answer:

B's complaint should be sustained. His press release stating that the allegation of
A that B cheated him in a business deal is not true and that A was a liar as it was A who
cheated him altho defamatory is a fair and adequate answer to the libel uttered by A and
is necessarily related to the imputation made by A. B only made an explanation and in
doing so, uttered it in the same language that A did. This is self- defense in libel as the
utterance is not excessive but adequate to repel the sting of the aspersion cast upon him
by A. (People vs. Chua Hong, CA 61 O.G. 1932). On the other hand, A having initiated
the libelous publication against B cannot escape criminal responsibility. All the elements
of libel as to A are present, to wit:

1) Defamation
2) Malice
3) Publication
4) the person libeled is identifiable

No. 5: Art 16; Degree of participation; accessories who are exempt

"A" committed the crime of murder. His father, "B", the chief of police of "X" town,
who had knowledge of "A"'s commission of the crime, concealed his son to evade arrest
and prosecution. Is "B" guilty as accessory to the crime or murder? Is "B" guilty of some
other crime? If he is, what crime did he commit? If not, why not? Reasons.

Answer:

B is not guilty as an accessory to the crime of murder committed by his son whom
he concealed to evade arrest and prosecution. The reason is B is a relative of A and under
Art. 20 of the Revised Penal Code is exempt from criminal liability as an accessory except
if he profited or assisted the offender to profit from the effects of the commission of the
crime, B, however, should be guilty of prevaricacion or derelection of duty for having
failed maliciously to institute the prosecution for the punishment of A, his son, whom he
knew to have committed a crime as B is an officer of the law charged with the prosecution
of offenses.
No. 6: Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; treachery, nighttime,
superior strength and uninhabited place
"A", a suitor of girl "B", saw the latter at about midnight walking along a dark and
deserted alley near her house. "A" sneaked up to her, grabbed her breasts from behind,
kissed her, and at the same time raised her dress. At that moment, a noise was heard
frightening "A", who immediately ran away.
If you were the fiscal, for what crime would you prosecute "A"? Would you allege
treachery, nighttime, superior strength and uninhabited place as aggravating
circumstances? Reasons.

Answer:

The crime committed is acts of lasciviousness. Stealthily kissing, embracing and

fondling the breast of complainant and raising her dress constitute lewd or lascivious
acts. (People vs. Yabut, CA G.R, No. 2550-R Aug. 5, 1960). More so, as the acts were
committed at midnight and in a dark and this aggravating circumstance applies only to
crimes against persons. Acts of lasciviousness is a crime against chastity. Nighttime is not
present because the facts do not show that the accused took advantage of the darkness of
the night to facilitate the commission of the crime to insure immunity from capture.
Superior strength is not aggravating because mere physical superiority is not taking
advantage of superior strength. It is necessary to prove the relative strength of the parties
(People vs. Bustos, 51 Phil 385). Uninhabited place is also not present because the place
of the commission of the crime was near the house of the offended party and the fact that
A heard some noise which frightened him show that the place was not uninhabited.
Besides, the facts do not show that the place was purposely chosen for the easy and
uninterrupted accomplishment of the crime (People vs. Luneta et at., 45 O.G. 2832).

No. 7: Art 25; Penalties; appreciation of modifying circumstances

Homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. The accused, 17 years of age,
committed the crime of frustrated homicide while under the state of passion and
obfuscation and acting in immediate vindication of a grave offense committed by the
deceased against Ms wife. Accused thereafter surrendered voluntarily immediately
after the commission of the offense, and pleaded guilty at the trial. What is the proper
penalty to be imposed upon him? In your answer disregard the civil liability but
consider the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Explain fully the procedure adopted in the
computation of the penalty.

Answer:

The proper penalty to be imposed upon A is Arresto Mayor in its Minimum

period. Frustrated Homicide is punished by one degree next lower than Consummated
Homicide, Since the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal, one degree next lower
will be prision mayor, which is the penalty for Frustrated Homicide. The accused was 17
years old when he committed the crime. Such minority is a privileged mitigating
circumstance. Prision Mayor should be lowered by one degree under Art. 68 of the
Revised Penal Code which will be Prision Correctional. Voluntary Surrender and
Voluntary Plea of Guilty will reduce again the imposable penalty by one degree as there
was no aggravating circumstance present and the imposable penalty is divisible in nature
(Art. 64, par. 5 R.P.C.) So Prision Correctional will be lowered by one degree which is
Arresto Mayor. The maximum imprisonment in Arresto Mayor is six months. The
Indeterminate Sentence Law will not apply under Section 2 thereof because the term of
imprisonment in the penalty does not exceed one year. Since passion and obfuscation and
immediate vindication of a grave offense were also present whether based on the same
fact or on different facts Arresto Mayor is to be imposed in the minimum period as there
is no attending aggravating circumstance.

No. 8: Art 25; Penalties; concurrent service of sentence

What penalties, among those mentioned in the Revised Penal Code, may be served
concurrently and what penalties cannot be served concurrently? Explain.

Answer:

Penalties which may be served concurrently: Perpetual or Temporary absolute

disqualification or perpetual or temporary special disqualification, public censure or
suspension from public office. These penalties may be served with imprisonment.
Penalties which cannot be served concurrently; Imprisonment like Reclusion Temporal
and Prision Mayor which must be served successively, one after the other, in the order of
severity.

No 9: Art 266-A; Rape; marriage of accused with offended party

"A", "B" and "C", helping one another, raped a woman "X" three times, each of them
taking turns in having sexual intercourse with her. Accordingly, three rape cases were
filed against "A", "B" and "C": Case 1, wherein "A" had sexual intercourse with "X";
Case 2, wherein "B" had intercourse with "X"; Case 3, wherein "C" had intercourse with
"X". While the cases were pending trial, "A" married "X". What effect has this marriage
on the criminal liability of "A", "B" and "C" in each of the three cases? Explain.

Answer:

The marriage of A with X will extinguish his criminal liability in the rape
committed by A upon X. The criminal liability of B and C as co- principals in the rape
committed, by A upon X for having helped A in committing the crime is also
extinguished because under Article 344 R.P.C. such marriage will benefit also the co-
principals. The criminal liability of A in the rapes committed by B and C upon the
offended party is not extinguished because these rapes are separate and independent
from the rape committed by A. Art 266-A; Rape; necessity of medical examination.

No. 10: Art 333; Adultery

"H" and "W" were newly married. While "H" was away in a foreign land, "X" courted
"W", and they subsequently had successive sexual intercourse. Upon his return and
upon learning of the unfaithfulness of his wife, "H" filed an adultery case with the
fiscal against "W" and "X". The fiscal's investigation showed beyond doubt that all the
while "X" did not know that "W" was a married women.
Hence, the fiscal filed an adultery charge against "W" only. If you were the fiscal, how
would you justify your action? If you were the lawyer for "H", what arguments would
you advance so as to compel the fiscal to include "X" as co-accused? If you were the
judge, what would be your decision?
Answer:

If I were the Fiscal I would justify the filing of the adultery charge against W only
because from the investigation, X did not know that W was a married woman. Under the
law the man who has carnal knowledge of a married woman not knowing her to be
married is not liable for adultery. (Art. 333, R.P.C.) If I were the lawyer for H, I would
advance the argument that the supreme Court has already established the rule that the
jurisdiction of the court to hear and determine a charge of adultery depends upon the
filing of the complaint by the husband and the husband is expressly prohibited from
filing the complaint against one of the parties without including the other (U.S. vs.
Asuncion 21 Phil. 399). If I were the judge, my decision would foe to sustain the
contention of the lawyer for H because without including the paramour in the criminal
action the Court will not acquire the jurisdiction to hear and try the charge. As the
Supreme Court said, it is for the Court to determine the question of the guilt or innocence
of the paramour in the crime of adultery.

No. 11: Art 266-A; Rape; acknowledgement of offspring

"A", "B" and "C" took turns in raping a woman "X". If all of them were finally convicted,
would it be correct for the judge to order each of them
to acknowledge and support the offspring of "X"? Reason.

Answer:

It would not be correct for the judge to order each of the accused to acknowledge
the offspring of X because it is impossible to determine the paternity thereof. (People vs.
de Leon et al., L-2094, April 1950), It would be correct, however, for the court to order
each of them to support the offspring asanyone of them may be the father and that each
and everyone of them is directly responsible that an unwilling mother may give birth to
an undesired offspring as each and everyone of them contributed to and cooperated in
giving birth to the child. (People vs. Velo et aL, 80 Phil 438).

No. 12: Art 171; Falsification of private document

"A", son of "B", knowing that "X" owed "B" Pl,000.00 which had already matured, wrote
a collection letter to "X", falsifying "B'"s signature in the letter which "A" himself
delivered to "X" without "B" 's knowledge. "X" paid the amount to "A" and thereupon
appropriated the money for his personal use. Upon learning of the action of his son,
"B" filed a complaint against the former. If you were the fiscal, for what crime or crimes
would you prosecute "A"?

Answer:

If I were, the Fiscal I would prosecute A for the crime of falsification of private
document. Altho, the falsification was used as a means for A to misappropriate the
amount delivered to him by X, a complex crime of estafa thru falsification of a private
document is not committed because the element of damage in estafa is the same damage
which is an element of falsification of a private document. (People vs. Dizon, CA 48 O.G.
168). The crime is not estafa because without the falsification of the private document A
would not have committed the defraudation. There is no complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of a private document.
 In spite of the relationship there is criminal liability. Relationship is an absolutory
cause in the crimes of theft, estafa and malicious mischief only.

No. 13: Art 308; Theft

"A" broke open a window and, without entering the house, took a wooden chest lying
just underneath the window. He brought out the chest to the yard where he broke it
open and took away the contents thereof, all valued at P1,000.00. What crime did he
commit? Reason.

Answer:

The crime committed by A is theft. For robbery with force upon things to be
committed, the offender should have entered the house. The facts of the problem show
that A without entering the house took the wooden chest lying underneath the window
which he broke open. To constitute robbery the offender who brought outside the locked
receptacle must have entered it; otherwise, the crime committed is theft.

No. 14: Art 249; Homicide vs murder

"A" and "B" were both astride the same carabao, the latter being behind the former.
"X", intending to kill "A", aimed his gun at "A" and fired, inflicting a fatal wound on
the chest which produced "A'"s death. "X" shot "A" again, but this time the bullet hit
and passed through "A'"s left arm, causing less serious physical injuries, then lodged
itself in "B'"s heart, causing his death. What crime or crimes is "X" guilty of?

Answer:

X committed murder regarding the killing of A because he was shot deliberately

while astride with B on a carabao without giving him any chance to defend himself.
Treachery is therefore present. X committed homicide regarding the killing of B as the
second shot hit A who was already dead and the bullet lodged in B's heart. The intention
of X was to kill A and not B.

No. 15: Art 29; Destierro

May an accused person sentenced to destierro be credited with a portion of the time
during which he had undergone preventive imprisonment? If not, why not? If in the
affirmative, what portion of the time of preventive imprisonment should be credited
to him?

Answer:

An accused sentenced to destierro can be credited with a portion of his period of

preventive imprisonment in the service of the sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty
because destierro as a penalty involves also deprivation of liberty although partial.
(People vs. Bastasa et al, 88 SCRA 184).
No. 16: Art 246; Parricide
"A", a prominent and high official, had illicit relationship with "B", a girl very much
below his social standing. A child was born to them as a result thereof. "A" killed the
child, over three days old, so as to conceal his dishonor.

a) What crime did'"A" commit?

b) Does relationship in this case constitute a
privileged mitigating circumstance?
c) How would you answer the questions (a) and (b) if the child were less than three
days old?

Answer:

a) "A" committed parricide as this crime is committed even though the relationship of
the father "A" with the child, over three days old, is illegitimate.
b) The answer is no because relationship in parricide is inherent, aside from the fact that
it is not provided in the Code as a privileged mitigating circumstance?
c) If the child were less than three days old, the crime would be infanticide. Relationship
of "A" the illegitimate father, is not privileged mitigating. Art, 255, provides for such
privileged mitigating circumstance if the offender is the mother and the child was killed
to conceal her dishonor.

No. 17: Art 333; Adultery

"A", husband, and "B", wife, are legally married. So are "X", husband, and "Y", wife.
"A" and "Y" had sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances. "X" and "B"
likewise had sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances.
a) Who are guilty of adultery? And who among them may file the corresponding
complaint?
b) Who are guilty of concubinage and who among them may file the complaint?

Answer:

Y, the wife of X, will be guilty of adultery. A, with whom Y had sexual intercourse
will be guilty of adultery if A knew that Y was married. X, the husband of Y will file the
complaint being the offended party. B, the wife of A will be guilty of adultery. X with
whom B had sexual intercourse will be guilty if X knew that B was married. A the
husband of B will file the complaint being the offended party. Those liable in adultery are
the married woman and the man who has sexual intercourse with her knowing her to be
married.

A and Y will be liable of concubinage. B, the wife of A will file the complaint as
she is the offended party. X and B will be liable for concubinage. Y wife of X being the
offended party will file the complaint as she is the offended party. Those liable in
concubinage are the husband and the paramour.
No. 18: Art 249; Homicide; information for homicide but murder
is proven
"A" is prosecuted for homicide under proper information. At the time of the trial, it
was established that the crime was committed with treachery, premeditation, at
nighttime and with abuse of superior strength.
(a) If you were the judge, what crime should you convict “A” of? Why?

Answer:

(a) If I were the judge, I would convict A of homicide as that is the crime charged in the
information.

No. 19: Art 134; Rebellion; theory of absorption

Explain the theory of “absorption” in rebellion

Answer:

leading cases of People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 and People perpetrated in
furtherance of rebellion, a political offense, perpetrated in furtherance of rebellion, a
political offense, assumes the political complexion of rebellion of which it is merely
ingredient and consequently cannot be punished separately from rebellion, or complexed
with the same to justify the imposition of a graver penalty. In law such an offense is part
and parcel of the rebellion itself and cannot be considered as giving rise to separate crime.

However, this doctrine is modified now by Article 142-A, incorporated in the

Revised Penal Code by Presidential Decree No. 942, which provides that if by reason of
or on the occasion of a rebellion, an offense more serious than rebellion is committed, the
offender is to be punished for the more serious offense, and the penalty is to be imposed
in its maximum period. Murder is unquestionably more serious than rebellion as it is
punishable by death. So, if during a rebellion, murder is committed to further the ends of
rebellion, the murder cannot be absorbed in rebellion. The penalty for murder in this case
will be imposed in its maximum period as provided in Art. 142-A. (PD 942 was repealed
by EO 187)

1981
No. 1: Art 12; Exempting circumstances; accident
"A" and "B", both civilian guards, were seated inside the guardhouse. While "A" was
cleaning his service pistol, "B" snatched it. In the ensuing struggle for the possession
of the weapon. "A" succeeded in wresting it from the hand of "B". But then the pistol
exploded with the bullet hitting the breast of "C", another civilian guard, who died as
a consequence of the gunshot wound. Is "A " criminally liable for the death of "C''?
Why?

Answer:
 A is not criminally liable. Since his service pistol was snatched by B, in trying to
regain its possession, A was in the lawful exercise of a right. When A succeeded in
wresting the pistol from the hand of B and it exploded with the bullet hitting C, A cannot
incur any criminal liability as he was performing a lawful act. Even under the Civil Code,
he is justified to employ reasonable force to repel the unlawful deprivation of his
property, (Art. 429, Civil Code). Criminal intent is not present nor is there negligence
under the circumstances. The death of C was, therefore, accidental. (People vs. Bindoy 56
Phil. 15).

No. 2: Art 280; Trespass to dwelling

Patrolman "A" caught "B" one night in the act of removing the glass jalousies of the
window of the house of "C", which was closed. "B" had already detached three glass
blades. "A" arrested "B" and booked him for "Attempted Robbery." Do you agree? If
not, and if you were the investigating Fiscal, with what offense would you charge "B"?
Give your reasons for either answer.

Answer:

I do not agree with A who booked B for attempted robbery. If I were the Fiscal, I
would charge B for attempted trespass to dwelling. In an attempted felony, the offender
begins the commission of a felony by overt acts which must have a direct connection with
the felony. It is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution if carried to its
complete termination following its natural course without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the offender, will logically and necessarily
ripen to a concrete offense. The removal of the three glass blades of the jalousies have no
direct connection with the crime of robbery by force upon things. The purpose of
removing the glass blades to enter the house was still indeterminate. But certainly in
making the opening, the intention of the offender was to enter the house against the will
of the owner of the house. (People vs. Lamahang 61 Phil. 703). So, the crime for which B
should be charged, is attempted trespass to dwelling.

No. 3. Justifying circumstances; self-defense

"A" is the wife of "B", but she and "X", her former boyfriend, were having an illicit
relation. One afternoon, "B", unnoticed by "A", followed his wife to a motel and saw
her enter a room and close the door. After the lapse of some minutes, "B" managed to
get in and found "A" and "X" lying together in bed. With his knife, "B" lunged at "X "
but the latter parried the thrust and was able to wrest the weapon from "B" and stabbed
the latter to death. Prosecuted for Homicide, "X" invoked the justifying circumstance
of selfdefense in killing "B". Would you uphold the defense? Explain briefly.

Answer:

X cannot invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense. An essential requisite

of self-defense is unlawful aggression. The act of B in assaulting X when he found him
and A, B's wife, lying together in bed in a room of the motel is natural and lawful, as it
was made by B, the deceived and offended husband in order to defend his honor and
rights. X should have known that having illicit relations with A, a married woman, X
being her former boy friend, he was performing an unlawful and criminal act that would
expose him to the vengeance of the offended husband. The act of B in assaulting X under
the circumstances cannot constitute unlawful aggression (U.S. vs. Merced 39 Phil. 198).
Furthermore, in view of his illicit relations with A, B's wife, and the situation in which B
found them, lying together in bed, would constitute sufficient provocation to B for him
to attack X. The third requisite of self-defense which is lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself is, therefore, also absent.

No. 4 Art 16; Degree of participation; principal by inducement

In the course of an argument over a parcel of land, which each one claimed as his own,
"B" hit "A" on the face. A week later, "C", father of "A", and "B" were disputing the
ownership of the same property. Coming from behind, "A" clubbed "B" on the head
causing him to topple unconscious to the ground. Then "C" told "A": "that serves him
right." Postmortem examination disclosed that "B" died instantly from the blow he
received on the head, "A" and "C" were charged by the Prosecuting Fiscal for the death
of "B". Is "C" criminally liable as a principal by inducement for the death of "B"? Why?

Answer:

C is not a principal by inducement. The requisites of a principal by inducement

are: (1) that the inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the
commission of the crime and (2) that such inducement be the determining cause of the
said commission of the crime induced. (People vs. Omine Kiichi 61 Phil. 609; People vs.
de la Cruz, L-30912, April 30, 1980, 97 SCRA 385). The facts of the problem show that
when C told A after A clubbed B's head causing him to topple unconscious to the ground
that serves him right, A had already committed the crime of killing B. So, the utterances
of C cannot be the determining cause of the commission of the crime. Furthermore, A had
a reason of his own in committing the crime. (People vs Caimbre et al 110 Phil 370; People
vs. Castillo et al 17 SCRA 721). There was no inducement.

No. 5. Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; abuse of confidence

"H" and "W" are husband and wife living in an apartment within the University belt.
They took in "S", a male student- townmate, as a boarder. Before long, "W" and "S" fell
in love with each other until one day "H" caught them in bed. If you were the
Investigating Fiscal to whom "H" complained, what aggravating circumstance or
circumstances would you allege in your Information for Adultery against "W" and "S"?
Why?

Answer:

If I were the Fiscal, I would allege as an aggravating circumstance that the crime
was committed with abuse of confidence. Evidently, S was taken in as a boarder by the
spouses M and W because he was their townmate. Such engendered trust and confidence
in the relationship of the Spouses with S. By committing adultery with W, abuse of
confidence was availed of by S in the commission of the crime, since he took advantage
of the favorable position in which he was placed by the injured party as boarder in their
house. (U.S. vs. Barbicho 12 Phil. 616). Dwelling cannot be alleged as an aggravating
circumstance because the wife and the paramour were living in the same house where
they had a right to be. (U.S. vs. Distrito et al 23 Phil. 23).
No. 6 Art 13; Mitigating circumstances; applicability in special
laws
An accused was charged with Illegal Possession of a caliber .45 pistol. Upon
arraignment, he pleaded "guilty" to the charge and invoked his plea as a mitigating
circumstance. Can the court consider that plea as a mitigating circumstance in
imposing the proper penalty on him? Why?

Answer:

The plea of guilty cannot be considered a mitigating circumstance. Alleged

possession of a firearm is punished by a special law. The imposition of the penalty
provided in a special law rests upon the discretion of the court. Furthermore, the plea of
guilty as a mitigating circumstance under the Revised Penal Code, is appreciated only in
a divisible penalty. It cannot be applied to a penalty which is indeterminate, that is, not
divisible into periods of fixed duration, which is the penalty provided in special laws like
the law punishing illegal possession of firearms.

No. 9 Probation Law

Isidro, 21, was convicted of Consented Abduction and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of three (3) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correctional, as maximum. Isidro did
not appeal but he filed a petition for probation. The probation officer recommended
favorable action on the application stating that the accused did not intend to cause a
grave wrong and had the potential of a good probationer. The trial court denied
probation on the ground that it would be better for the accused to serve his sentence
so that he could reform himself and correct his selfish tendencies. Admittedly, Isidro
does not fall within any of the classes of disqualified offenders under the Probation
Law. Would you sustain the action of the trial Judge in a Certiorari case assailing it?
Reasons.

Answer:

I will not sustain the action of the trial judge. His denial of the application for
probation because it would be better for the accused to serve his sentence so that he could
reform himself and correct his selfish tendencies was arbitrary, capricious and whimsical.
He should have considered the recommendation of the Probation Officer which was
made after a post investigation of the offender in accordance with the Probation Law,
that the offender was entitled to probation because he had not intended to commit a grave
wrong when he committed the Page 120 of 374 crime of consented abduction and that he
had the potential of a good probationer. (Balleta Jr. vs. Judge Leviste, 92 SCRA 715 (1979)

No. 11. Art 319; Removal, sale or pledge of mortgaged property

"O" is the owner of a car. He mortgaged it to "B" under the Chattel Mortgage Law to
secure a loan of P2,000.00 that he had obtained from "B". The lawyer of "B" who had
prepared the document for him forgot to register it in the office of the Register of
Deeds. "O" sold the car to "C" as free from liens and encumbrances but failed to pay to
"B" the loan of P2,000.00 on its date of maturity. Prosecuted for violation of paragraph
two of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code (Removal, sale or pledge of mortgaged
property), is "O" criminally liable for this offense? Why?
Answer:

"O" cannot be criminally liable under Art. 319 of the Revised Penal Code, par. 2,
which provides: "Any mortgagor who shall sell or pledge personal property already
pledged or any part thereof under the terms of the Chattel Mortgage Law, without the
consent of the mortgagee written on the back of the mortgage and noted on the record
thereof in. the Office of the Register of Deeds of the Province where such property is
located." From this provision it is clear that the first mortgage must be recorded in the
Register of Deeds because the consent of the first mortgage must be written at the back
of the second mortgage and noted on the record thereof, (which refers to the first
mortgage) in the Register of Deeds. Selling the thing already mortgaged as free from liens
and encumbrances constitutes estafa. (People vs. Alvarez, 45 Phil. 472).

No. 12. Art 286; Grave coercion

The goats of "G" entered the garden of "H" and destroyed the vegetables growing
thereon. "H" caught the animals and tethered them near the hut. Soon Page 267 of 374
"G" arrived and told "H" to release the goats as they were his. "H" refused; telling "G"
to pay first for the value of "H's" damaged vegetables. With threats of bodily harm, "G"
compelled "H" to turn the goats loose. What crime was committed by "G", if any? Why?

Answer:

G committed grave coercion. Coercion is committed not only by violence but also
by intimidation, like threat of bodily harm which compelled H to turn the goats loose,
whether it was just or unjust. G had not acted under authority of law or exercise of a
lawful right since the goats of G destroyed the vegetables growing on the garden of H,
who refused to release the goats tethered near his hut until G pay first for the value of the
damaged vegetables. (U.S. vs. Mena 11 Phil. 543)

No. 13. Art 337; Qualified seduction

"A" is a girl of 17 years, single and a fourth year high school student whose teacher is
"B". Teaching in the same school is "C". One afternoon, after class, "A" and "C" had
sexual intercourse in the storeroom of the school. "A" became pregnant. Prosecuted for
qualified seduction. "C" interposed the following defenses: (1) "C" is not the teacher of
"A"; {2} "A" is not a virgin; and (3) the sexual relation was with the consent of "A". Are
the defenses of "C" meritorious? Reasons.

Answer:

The defenses of C are not meritorious, (a) Qualified seduction may be committed
as long as the accused is a teacher in the same school where the student is studying. This
is due to the abuse of confidence and the moral influence which the teacher exercises over
the victim as a member of the faculty [(Santos vs. People, 40 O.G, {Sup. 6). (b) Virginity is
not to be understood in the physical sense. It includes a girl of good reputation, (People
vs. Lanot, CA- G.R. #04557-CR, Jan. 18,1964), (c) Consent of the woman is not a defense
since it was accomplished by abuse of authority or confidence in view of the position of
"C" as a teacher.
No. 14. Art 349; Bigamy
"A" is a Bureau of Internal Revenue Agent assigned in San Fernando, Pampanga. On
January 5, 1955, he married "B" before the Municipal Judge of that town. On December
1, 1960, he was transferred to Cagayan de Oro City and left his wife with her parents
in San Fernando On October 5, 1965, he married "C" before a Minister of the Iglesia ni
Kristo in Cagayan de Oro City. "B" learned of the second marriage, so she filed a case
for Bigamy against "A". During the pendency of the case in the Court of First Instance,
"B" died. Convicted by the Court, "A" appealed and assigned two errors: (1) that the
Information against him is defective because it did not include "C" as a codefendant;
and (2) that the trial Court erred in convicting him after the death of "B", since at that
time there was no longer any impediment to his marriage to "C". Are the assigned
errors of "A" meritorious? Why?

Answer:

The assigned errors are not meritorious.

1) The information against "A" is not defective because it did not include "C" as co-
defendant. Bigamy is not similar to the crimes of adultery and concubinage,
wherein. Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code specifically requires that the accused,
if both are alive should be included in the information. In bigamy, which is a public
crime, both the first and second spouses may be offended parties depending on
the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused with' out being
aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the
previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the
information, which the facts of the problem, however, do not show (People vs.
Nepomuceno, Jr., 64 SCRA 418).

2) The trial court did not err in convicting the accused after the death of "B" during
the pendency of the case. When "A" married for the second time, his first marriage
with "B" was still subsisting and, hence, he committed already the crime of bigamy.
Such second marriage is not included in the exceptions provided in Article 83 of
the Civil Code. There is no law which provides for the extinction of bigamy after
the death of the first wife of the accused. (People vs. Reyes, CA 62 O.G. 1525).

No. 15. Art 223; Infidelity in custody of prisoners

"D", a detention prisoner for Homicide, escaped while working at the guest house of a
provincial governor, which at the time was being rented by the province. The detainee
worked at the guest house pursuant to a note of the Governor to the Assistant
Provincial Warden asking for five men to work in the guest house. The note did not
mention the names of the prisoners under surveillance, who picked the men to
compose the work party. Would you find the Governor and the Assistant Provincial
Warden guilty of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoners?

Answer:

The Provincial Governor and the Assistant Provincial Warden cannot be guilty of
Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoners. This crime is committed in two ways, to wit: (1) by
a public officer who shall consent to the escape of a prisoner in his custody or charge (Art.
223, Rev. Penal Code) and (2) by a public officer in whose custody on charge a prisoner
has escaped by reason of his negligence (Art. 224, Rev. Penal Code). Under the first mode,
connivance in the escape of the prisoner on the part of the public officer is an essential
condition in the commission of the crime of infidelity in the custody of the prisoner. No
connivance in the escape of the detention prisoner "D" from the custody of the Provincial
Guard charge with the duty of keeping prisoner under surveillance can be deduced from
the note of the Governor to the Assistant Provincial Warden asking for five men to work
in the guest house as the note does not mention the names of the prisoners to be brought
to the guest house. The provincial guard was the one who picked the men to compose
the work party. Nor is the crime committed under the second mode. Since negligence
resulting in evasion is definite laxity amount to deliberate won performance of duty. If
there is negligence committed, it must be that of the Provincial Guard who is the public
officer charged with the custody and guarding of the prisoner "D" (Alberto vs. Judge de
la Cruz, L-31939, June 30, 1980. 98 SCRA 406).

No. 16. Art 266; Physical injuries; inflicted by teacher on pupils

"T" is a public school teacher. One of her pupils, "B", tripped another classmate "C",
causing "C" to fall on the floor and suffer a contusion on the forehead. So, "T", with
her bamboo pointer, whipped "B" on the thigh, which produced a linear bruise. If you
were the Judge before whom a Slight Physical Injury case was filed against "T", how
would you decide the case? Select the correct answer from the following, and explain:
(1) I will acquit "T" because in school and during school activities, the teacher exercises
parental authority over her pupils.
(2) I will acquit "T" because she just tried to discipline "B" for his misconduct. It was
farthest from "T's" thought to commit any criminal offense. The means she actually
used to punish "B" was moderate and she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or
malevolent intent.
(3) I will convict "T" because the State should exercise utmost vigilance to assure that
teachers should refrain from inflicting corporal punishment.
(4) I will convict "T" because teachers in the exercise of their authority in loco parentis
cannot inflict any corporal punishment even though moderate.
(5) I will convict "T" because if no physical injuries resulted the act is still penalized
by the Revised Penal Code as ill- treatment.

Answer:

(1) I will acquit "T" because in school and during school activities, the teacher
exercises parental authority over her pupils. The teacher, under the Civil Code,
exercises substitute parental authority over the students. As such, the teacher can
discipline the pupil in the same manner that the parent does to the child.

(2) I will acquit "T" because she just tried to discipline "B" for his misconduct. It was
farthest from "T's" thought to commit any criminal offense. The means she actually
used to punish "B" was moderate and she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred and
malevolent intent. The whipping of the student for the act she had done in tripping
another classmate, who suffered contusion on her forehead because she fell on the
floor, was to discipline her. The teacher did not, therefor act, with criminal intent.
That nature of the injuries suffered by the student, linear bruises on the thigh,
show that the teacher merely intended to discipline her. She was not motivated by
illwill, hatred or malevolent intent.
No. 17. Art 19; Anti-fencing law
Without asking for any document of ownership, "A" bought from "B", a person who
claimed to be a "balik-bayan" from Saudi Arabia, a 1980 model National TV set for
P500.00. Two days later, a policeman visited "A" and informed him that the TV set he
had bought from "B", who already confessed to the robbery, was stolen from the house
of "C". Claiming that he bought the TV set in good faith, "A" refused to surrender it to
"C", So "A" was charged under the Anti-Fencing Act of 1979 (Presidential Decree No.
1612). Is "A" criminally liable under this Act? Why?

Answer:

"A" is criminally liable under the Anti-Fencing Act of 1979. Under this law, mere
possession of any goods, article, item, object or anything of value which has been the
object of robbery of theft shall be prime facie evidence of fencing. Fencing is committed
if a person who with intent to gain for himself or another shall buy, receive, possess, keep,
acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell or in any manner deal in any
article, item, object or anything of value, which he knows or should be known to him, to
have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. The law involves second hand
articles. A purchased the 1980 model National TV set as a second hand item. His failure
to ask any document of ownership and if "B" was indeed a "balikbayan" whether he
brought the TV set with him when he returned to the Philippines as evidenced by a carrier
manifest since the TV set certainly cannot be hand carried, and since the price was
considerably cheap, are circumstances which show that he should have known that the
TV set was a proceed of robbery or theft.